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olitical parties are shaped by the different divisions within society. Studies on the emergence of political parties generally take into account different variables such as socioeconomic divisions, religious and ethnic distinctions, urban and rural divisions, sentiments towards the current system of governance, foreign policy preferences, and whether economic policies are state-oriented or private entrepreneur-oriented. However, the shaping of politics over time, the presence of parties in the political arena, as well as their rise or fall in influence, are also explained through various other dynamics.

Although political tendencies in the world are categorized on the basis of two main labels, namely right and left, the breadth of the political spectrum cannot be explained solely on the basis of this distinction. The practice of political culture, the conjunctural positioning of election periods, and the constitutional and legal obligations of the political and electoral system often render a distinction solely based on a template of values ambiguous. In Turkey, despite the changes and transformations in politics and society, the main issues and axes that shape voter behavior still remain decisive.

For example, in the 2023 elections, as a manifestation of Turkish modernization, the idea of shaping society from the top down through elites influenced the political actors of the opposition bloc as they tried to bring together parties with different identities under the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), assuming that the electorate would accept their engineered political vision. Through the discourse of the “historical and intellectual background of the Table of Six,” the opposition bloc tried to idealize the combination of right-left, conservative nationalist and secular liberal as a search for a kind of social contract, through ideas that even the actors sitting at the table themselves were ambiguous about.

Some of those who expressed this view, which was put forward as a “Century of accumulation,” did not hold back from declaring that after the elections the last thing they would want in their political lives was to be a CHP candidate. They misconstrued the transformation in politics and society in Turkey and presented de-politicization as a political tactic. This interpretation of politics was a manifestation of a failure to analyze fully the dynamics of Turkish politics and the basic worldviews and perspectives of Turkish society.

Continuities and ruptures in political culture

The divide that has existed between society and elites since Ottoman modernization has been the dominant determinant of Turkish politics in the last century. This dividing line, which stands out in political and sociological analyses as the center-periphery divide, has formed the founding basis for political parties in Turkey and the way they relate to society.

Since the Tanzimat period, certain elitist interest groups led and articulated by the military and civilian bureaucracy, mainly the forces representing the center, have supported political parties hat represent the interests and worldview of the latter. Meanwhile the more traditional, conservative, and religious segments of society, representing the periphery, have mostly clustered around the parties that are the main carriers of right-wing politics within the periphery bloc. Periodically and conjecturally exceptions exist and there are partial crossovers between these two main blocs, but for the most part identities are the main determinant of the behavior of the majority of voter clusters. In other words, the weight and determinacy of right-wing politics in Turkey persists.

Since its foundation, the CHP has represented the central forces, while the Democrat Party and its successors have been the representatives of the periphery. In the entire history of the republic, these two main blocs have also determined the course of ruling-opposition relations. Although the manifestations of social transformation were clearly visible in the 2000s, the CHP failed to achieve a meaningful increase in voter support, let alone win elections. Unable to come to power through democratic means, elitist interest groups and the tutelary structures with which they are allied have historically relied on the fragmentation of political space and the weakness of political structures to reduce the determinism of right-wing politics.

Since the 1960s, intellectuals and the press have played a central role in the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics. Most political scientists agree that the fundamental problem of fragmentation and volatility in Turkish politics is the result of intervention through different means and methods in the political sphere.

Political parties in Turkey were established at the beginning of the last century. A multiparty system was first introduced during the Second Constitutional Monarchy (Ikinci Meşrutiyet). In the early Republican period, the opposition attempted to form political parties, but they were soon shut down, as for example in the case of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). In the single-party period, opposition parties were not permitted, and in 1936, the CHP, which was the only party, was integrated into the state.

Multiparty politics began in 1946, but democratic politics began on May 14, 1950 when the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. Since the DP’s first years in power, the state elites—civil and military bureaucracy, the majority of the educated class including the academia, and the economic class fed by the state—wanted democracy to be practiced in a restricted sphere and aspired to monopolize the normative sphere of politics.

By supporting military coups against civilian politics and demanding the permanence of the tutelage establishment, these groups created mechanisms of distrust towards political parties. They believed that only they, as opposed to democratically elected politicians and political parties, could determine the developments that would be in the long-term interests of society.

Thus, when political parties “went astray,” military coups could be “legitimized.” From this perspective, these self-interested tutelage groups supported the coups and coup attempts of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007, blaming the parties elected by popular vote. In order to justify their undemocratic behavior, they took refuge behind the argument that the “political parties had deviated from Atatürk’s principles.”

In order to construe a “flawed democracy,” the elite blamed the people who voted for political parties they did not approve of. When the parties they opposed were elected, they devalued the people’s preferences by saying “democracy is not just about the ballot box” and that the majority of voters belonged to the “ignorant masses.” The idea that the main characteristic of Turkish modernization was its top-down, coercive nature, that democracy could be dictated from above, and that the people should vote for the indicated parties was defended even by political scientists who described themselves as democrats.

Parties voted into power by the people were punished, periodically removed from power, and had their institutional structures banned from the political arena. Their replacements were asked to engage in politics in a limited and narrowly defined field and, if they came to power, to deal only with roads, sidewalks, bridges, and infrastructure services. Foreign policy, security, higher education, even education and youth policies were required to be framed and implemented by the presidential office under the control of tutelage and the civil and military bureaucracy under its command.

Since the transition to democracy and until the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, no party has been in power for a long period of time, with the exception of the DP’s 10-year uninterrupted government that ended with a coup d’état. In every election held from the late 1980s until 2002, a different party came out on top.

In Turkey, political parties have always lacked institutionalization and existed as leader-centered entities. The parties of leaders who could not manage political elite change and management well were constantly divided and lost ground. Again, as a result of the lack of institutionalization, external interventions in political parties’ elites often facilitated divisions. With the exception of the AK Party and the DP, none of the parties that were founded as offshoots of major parties have been able to become an alternative to power; these efforts have only contributed to the fragmentation of the political sphere, serving populism and the devaluation of politics.

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estern Europe is currently experiencing a wave of public desecrations of the Quran. In the Netherlands, the leader of PEGIDA tore pages from the Quran and trampled them. In Denmark and Sweden, activists have on several occasions burned copies of the Quran in front of buildings belonging to Islamic organizations.

What is striking is that the authorities in these countries have acted as mere bystanders, claiming that they are powerless to deal with such activities. They argue that the desecration of the Quran is a reprehensible act, but that it is legal and therefore cannot be stopped. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson recently said, “It can be legal and still be horrible.”

Many Muslims in the countries concerned and around the world are outraged by the authorities’ passive attitude and are calling on them to act. In July, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution, introduced by Pakistan and Palestine, condemning such desecration and calling on states to close the legal loopholes that prevent them from tackling it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been a vocal critic of the Swedish authorities’ refusal to stop such desecrations. This raises the stakes considerably, as Sweden’s accession to NATO has yet to be ratified by the Turkish parliament. President Erdoğan has indicated that this is unlikely to happen as long as copies of the Quran are being burned. Thus, the question of whether the Swedish authorities are right to claim that their hands are tied has become politically important.

Freedom of expression?

The Swedish authorities claim that rallies where the Quran is burned are protected by freedom of expression and therefore cannot be restricted, thus giving freedom of expression priority over other rights. However, Sweden is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not recognize such a hierarchy of rights. All rights in the convention are equal, and if they conflict, they must be weighed against each other. In the case of the desecration of the Quran, there is a conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its judgment in E.S. v. Austria, has shown how the right to freedom of expression must be balanced against the right of others to have their religious feelings protected. The case concerned an Austrian politician who had been fined for making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed. She claimed that the fine amounted to an unlawful interference with her freedom of expression.

The ECtHR disagreed: it recognized that religious groups must tolerate criticism by others of their religious beliefs. However, if that criticism incites hatred or religious intolerance, restrictions are justified. The applicant’s offensive attack on the Prophet Mohammed  went beyond the permissible limits of objective debate and her comments were likely to cause justified indignation among Muslims. The ECtHR reiterated that state parties have an obligation under the convention to maintain religious peace, i.e., the peaceful coexistence of religious and non-religious groups.

ECtHR key judgement

It is not clear what is stopping the Swedish authorities from applying E.S. v. Austria to the desecration of the Quran. The verdict is not obscure: the ECtHR has described it as a key judgment, meaning that it has strong precedential value, and although the ruling concerned Austria, it is expected to be followed by all state parties, including Sweden. The ECtHR is the final authority on the interpretation of the convention and state parties are expected to apply the principles arising from its judgments.

The convention has been incorporated into Swedish law by an Act of Parliament and the Swedish Constitution prohibits the adoption of laws that contravene the convention. Thus, even if there were a law allowing people to burn the Quran, such a law would be contrary to the convention, which would render it null and void. The authorities also cannot avoid banning the desecration of the Quran by claiming that they have no express legislative authority to do so; Swedish courts have consistently held that the convention can serve as a legal basis for action in the absence of enabling legislation.

The Swedish government has announced that it has introduced legislation to tighten border controls in order to prevent the entry of persons who might endanger Sweden’s security interests. Presumably this is intended to silence fervent critics of Sweden’s hands-off policy; however,  this is not how the ECtHR expects Sweden to maintain religious peace. The Swedish government has also indicated that it is considering changing the law to allow the police to prevent copies of the Quran from being burned in public. It need not look far: a simple application of E.S. v. Austria will suffice.

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urkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan expressed his jubilation as he declared the commencement of the “Century of Turkey” during his inauguration speech on April 4. Employing the metaphor of the “New Red Apple,” Erdoğan described the current era as one of conquest, proclaiming that the “doors of our country’s growth have been opened.”

With the centennial of the Turkish Republic approaching on October 29, 2023 the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) government has unveiled an ambitious vision for the nation’s future. Throughout his election campaign, the recently re-elected president emphasized his 2023 vision and showcased projects initiated in alignment with the “Century of Turkey” plan.

This comprehensive vision comprises 17 principles encompassing sustainability, science, technology, peace, stability, and power, constructing a future-oriented perspective that fosters proactive transformation both domestically and internationally. To gain a deeper understanding of this plan, let us explore the “Century of Turkey” through President Erdoğan’s statements.

The vision was initially presented by Erdoğan on October 28, 2022, during an address to a crowd in Ankara. In his speech, Erdoğan expressed the desire for a robust start to the new century of the Turkish Republic with the “Century of Turkey.” He stated, “At a time when the world is facing vital challenges, we want to make our country one of the 10 largest states globally in all fields of politics, economy, technology, military, and diplomacy.”

Economic revival takes precedence in the agenda

During his first cabinet meeting, President Erdoğan outlined three primary goals for the early stages of the “Century of Turkey”: reducing inflation to single digits, facilitating the voluntary and dignified return of refugees, and contributing to global peace through an enterprising and active foreign policy.

Addressing Turkey’s economic challenges emerges as Erdoğan’s top priority. To tackle the persistent high inflation rate, currently at 39.59%, he appointed former deputy prime minister Mehmet Şimsek as the minister of treasury and finance. Şimsek’s international stature reassures both domestic and global stakeholders.

The appointment of Hafize Gaye Erkan, who held prominent positions in the banking sector in the United States, as the head of the Central Bank of Turkey, has also garnered attention. After years of pursuing a low-interest rate policy, Erkan’s appointment signifies a move towards normalization in the eyes of the markets.

Emphasis on a stronger and stable Turkey

Underlining that the Republic has not been able to live in peace within itself for a significant part of its century-long history, President Erdoğan remarked, “The calculations of imperialists on our country have never been lacking. The pawns used in these dirty calculations have never been lacking either. It was the same yesterday and it is the same today. Instead of relying on the supremacy of the national will, our country has wasted golden years in the hands of governments that remained under the guidance of the forces of tutelage.”

Erdoğan stressed that Turkey has now become a stronger nation capable of withstanding threats from both domestic and foreign actors. He asserted, “They did everything to strip us of these lands. They tried to do so sometimes by coming here in person and sometimes by using their pawns. We, as the nation, liberated our homeland in the War of Independence and shouted once again to the whole world that we would never accept slavery. Lastly, they attempted to invade our homeland by making the traitors within attack us on the night of July 15. We stopped it, as well, in solidarity with our people.”

“Let us face east and west – but, most importantly, the truth.”

Another priority of the “Century of Turkey” vision marks a turning point in Turkish foreign policy: adopting a more proactive and multipolar perspective rooted in compassion. Erdoğan pledged to strengthen Turkey’s diplomatic hand around the world. He noted that “the international community will see a Turkey that takes more initiative in solving global crises, strives more for the establishment of peace and stability in its region, works harder for the development of the Turkish and Islamic world, and protects the oppressed and victims.” The “Century of Turkey” envisions a revolution that will bring democracy, development, peace, and welfare to every corner of the world. Hakan Fidan, who was the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) since 2010, was appointed as the new foreign minister.

Full-scale fight against terrorism

The scope of Turkey’s counterterrorism vision is expanded in the “Century of Turkey” plan. Erdoğan promised determination to eliminate terrorist elements saying that interlocutors would find a determined, braver, more compassionate, and more active Turkey that fights terrorist organizations inside and outside its borders more decisively. “They stalled us with terror for years. They wasted our resources and energy for years. They stole away our children’s future, the light in their eyes and the hope in their hearts. They worked to raise walls of blood and tears in the way of our people. They tried to undermine our eternal fraternity by setting Turks and Kurds against one another…” He went on to add, “The separatist terrorist organization is a dagger with which the imperialists stabbed our country in the back in order to spill our blood and weaken us.”

Transitioning from a coup d’état-drafted to a libertarian constitution

In his speech at the Presidential Inauguration Ceremony, President Erdoğan said, “We will strengthen our democracy with a libertarian, civilian, and inclusive constitution by getting rid of the current constitution, which is a product of a coup. We will continue to make our country grow through investment, employment, production, exports, and current account surplus. We are determined to put Gazi Mustafa Kemal’s principle of ‘Peace at Home, Peace in the World’ into practice in its true meaning.”

With the launch of the “Century of Turkey,” President Erdoğan aims to propel Turkey towards a transformative future, characterized by progress, development, and global engagement. The vision encompasses various aspects, including foreign policy, counterterrorism efforts, constitutional reforms, and economic improvements. As Turkey celebrates the 100th anniversary of its Republic, the “Century of Turkey” represents a significant milestone in the nation’s history, setting the stage for a new era of growth and influence.

With Turkey’s transition to a presidential system in April 2017, after a historic referendum that saw 51.4% of the votes cast in favor of the new system, political parties in Turkey immediately began to adapt to the new system. The presidential system, which requires candidates to win an absolute majority of first-round votes, forged pre-election alliances. It became clear to all opposition parties, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), that on their own they could not defeat Erdoğan or the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) under Erdoğan’s leadership.

The rapprochement between the AK Party and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) after the July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt merged into an alliance called the “People’s Alliance” for the June 2018 presidential elections. The People’s Alliance was also joined by the BBP (Great Unity Party). This was followed by the opposition’s first serious move to form an alliance: the CHP, the Iyi Party, the Felicity Party (SP), and the Democratic Party (DP) formed an alliance for parliamentary elections, but disagreed on supporting a common presidential candidate. The June 2018 presidential election was a disaster for the opposition with Erdoğan’s winning 52.59% of the vote in the first round.

Over the past few years, Turkey has experienced a major economic crisis and recently a devastating earthquake. This led many political analysts to surmise that Erdoğan’s long, invincible reign in Turkish politics may be coming to an end with the presidential elections of May 14. Nevertheless, the opposition had to take over the reins tight and embark on an impossible mission: to bring together Turkey’s liberal, democratic, right-wing, left-wing, Turkish nationalist, and Kurdish nationalist circles and societal segments. This ideologically incoherent, politically unstable, and sociologically irreconcilable alliance united for one purpose: to overthrow President Erdoğan.

The coalition formed by opposition to Erdoğan was named the “Nation Alliance” or the “Table of Six,” which included most of the political groups in the opposition except the HDP, which contested the May 14 general elections under the YSP (Green Left Party). The YSP, overwhelmingly dominated by Kurdish ethno-nationalists, including some far-left political groups, did not nominate a presidential candidate, which translated as open support for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The implicit inclusion of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatists in the coalition created an insurmountable ambiguity and a bizarre situation for the opposition. If there is one thing that Turkish society as a whole would not accept, it is an overt or covert coalition with the HDP, the political wing of the PKK terrorist organization, as Erdoğan’s discourse reveals on every occasion. Kılıçdaroğlu’s promises to release Selahattin Demirtaş, the currently imprisoned former co-chair of the HDP, to grant autonomy to the Kurdish-majority provinces, and his perpetual silence to the statements of the leading PKK figures supporting his candidacy were perceived by most of the Turkish people as an imminent threat to the unity of the state.

The rallies of the opposition in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey brought the tacit coalition to the surface. The CHP and YSP flags were waved together, and especially the victory signs by Selvi Kılıçdaroğlu, the wife of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and Dilek İmamoğlu, the wife of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, angered Turkish people who frowned on the now obvious enlargement of the alliance to include Kurdish nationalists in an already Kemalist, liberal, secular, conservative, and nationalist coalition.

This incoherence led a wider public to see the opposition as insincere, unreliable, and unsustainable, so they once again turned to Erdoğan because he symbolized stability and a kind of idealism for the nation despite the economic crisis. The result on May 14 was yet another electoral defeat for the opposition candidate —for the 11th time—with 44.88% of the vote, and another victory for Erdoğan with 49.52% of the vote.

President Erdoğan pioneering the national will, yet not necessarily adhering to a nationalist view, has managed to regain the confidence of the masses and is now very close to winning the runoff on May 28, 2023, on the eve of the symbolically important day of the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror. The irony is that a few days before the runoff, the opposition, as if lurching from one frustration to another, insists on the strategy that already cost them the election. Once again, they are attempting a “mission impossible.”

To win the votes of Sinan Oğan, a right-wing candidate who surprisingly won 5.17% of the vote, Kılıçdaroğlu’s newly formed campaign team clumsily and abruptly shifted the focus of the discourse to an anti-refugee and nationalist one. On May 24, after long negotiations, Kılıçdaroğlu was able to reach an agreement and secure the support of Ümit Özdağ, the far-right leader of the Victory Party, a staunch nationalist and the most vocal political figure promising the immediate deportation of millions of Syrian refugees. As well as injecting a nationalist discourse into Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign, Özdağ tacitly revealed on his Twitter account that in return for support he would be appointed interior minister if Kılıçdaroğlu won the runoff.

The agreement infuriated YSP voters, who took to social media to express their anger, while the YSP’s central board expressed its dismay over the terms of the agreement between Özdağ and Kılıçdaroğlu. However, despite the agreement, the YSP publicly stated that they would still support Kılıçdaroğlu since Erdoğan is their biggest enemy and called voters to vote for the Nation Alliance’s candidate. It is unknown how people in the eastern and southeastern provinces will respond to this call and whether they will be able to overcome their disapproval. Kılıçdaroğlu’s final political tango could cost him the large number of YSP votes from Turkey’s eastern and southeastern provinces, estimated at around 10% of the country’s total.

Endorsed by Sinan Oğan in his presidential candidacy on May 22, President Erdoğan can comfortably watch his rival’s final political maneuver from left to right. Obviously, this latest episode by Kılıçdaroğlu is also doomed to failure, as the opposition’s deadlocked and irreconcilable coalition has proved to be incredulous, untrustworthy, and incoherent in the eyes of the public.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is again on the horns of a dilemma: he wants to win the support of Turkish nationalists while retaining the support of Kurdish nationalists. The Nation Alliance’s far-fetched election campaign is most likely to fail, and this latest episode may be remembered as yet another political short-sightedness on the part of Turkey’s opposition parties.

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urkey held presidential and parliamentary elections on Sunday, May 14. The results show that while the Erdoğan-led People’s Alliance obtained a majority of seats in the parliament, the next president will be elected in a runoff on May 28 as President Erdoğan was 0.5% short of the 50% threshold. On the other hand, the opposition’s candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu got 44.9% of the votes followed by Sinan Oğan who surprisingly secured 5.2% of votes.

The elections in Turkey were given great importance not only by competing alliances and parties but also by the electorate, 89% of which voted. The majority of poll companies, most of which are pro-opposition, predicted that Kılıçdaroğlu would win in the first round – which did not happen, nor did he lead the elections.

There are many noteworthy aspects regarding the elections in Turkey. The most striking is certainly the disappointment of the Turkish opposition, which this time was confident about overthrowing Erdoğan and was shocked when all votes were counted. Kılıçdaroğlu had allied with five right-wing parties (Table for Six) plus the pro-PKK party HDP to win the elections. When the ratios of the opposition parties in the previous elections are added up, one could have expected a landslide victory for Kılıçdaroğlu. What is more, their cooperation in mayoral elections had worked well.

In addition, in order to ensure his victory, Kılıçdaroğlu even granted 37 of his party’s parliamentary seats to the small parties of the Table for Six who each get around 1% of votes if they run independently. While the smaller parties are the biggest winners in the Nation Alliance, handing over so many seats to parties with such small vote percentages will certainly be used against Kılıçdaroğlu by his party. The aim of allying with Erdoğan’s former aides was to weaken him, but ironically it looks like the alliance may actually cause Kılıçdaroğlu to lose his CHP chairmanship.

Moreover, unlike expectations, the de facto alliance with the HDP did not help Kılıçdaroğlu achieve victory. The CHP-led Nation Alliance must have thought if it can add the 10% of HDP votes to its own, it could easily win the elections. Kılıçdaroğlu and his companions gave many promises to the HDP such as releasing the party’s former leader Selahattin Demirtaş and discharging the trustees who had replaced HDP mayors.

The HDP was also confident that Kılıçdaroğlu would win: some went so far as  to mention freeing Afrin while others claimed they would release Abdullah Öcalan and other inmates. All these claims became viral on social media and, as expected, they caused a backlash. While Kılıçdaroğlu got almost all the votes of the HDP electorate, his concessions to the HDP, led Turkish nationalists to leave the alliance.

This is why the opposition alliance’s nationalist member, the Iyi Party, got only 9.75% of votes since nationalists slide to Sinan Oğan, who was another presidential candidate representing far-right groups. Oğan surprisingly got 5.2% of votes and suddenly became the pivot politician for the runoff.

Oğan has just declared that he will support Erdoğan in the runoff, further reducing Kılıçdaroğlu’s chance of being elected. It is clear that allying with Kurdish nationalists only provoked Turkish nationalists and boosted right-wing parties’ votes including the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), the nationalist party in the People’s Alliance.

As a result, not the Kurdish nationalism but the Turkish nationalism was (and will be) decisive for the election results. It is therefore clear that any party that allies itself with the HDP should not have high expectations at the polls due to the party’s strong ties with the PKK. The AK Party had also lost votes during the peace process that continued between 2013 and 2015.

Regarding the People’s Alliance, they will be represented by 323 members in the parliament, which means that they obtained the majority in the legislative body. The AK Party will be represented by fewer MPs as its votes shrunk to 35.5%, a 5% decrease from previous elections. On the other hand, the YRP (Yeniden Refah Partisi, New Welfare Party), headed by Fatih Erbakan, the son of former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, won five seats in the parliament.

Voters who left the AK Party voted for either the YRP or the MHP. Thus, in a sense, voters remained in the alliance. Thus, it emerges that while people’s loyalty to Erdoğan continues, this is not the case for the AK Party. Perhaps both Erdoğan and the AK Party should focus on why people differentiate between the leader and the party.

As for the runoff, both Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu will most probably keep their current voting rates as people have cast their vote consciously. Erdoğan will additionally get votes of Oğan’s supporters though not all of them. It is not clear whether Erdoğan promised anything to Oğan but logically siding with Erdoğan was the best choice for Oğan since the president needs only 0.5% to win.

Turkey will elect its new president on May 28 and the incumbent president Erdoğan is more likely to win since he is 4.5% ahead of his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. If no extraordinary developments take place, Erdoğan will start his last term on May 29. Meanwhile, it should be noted that he is 3% behind his vote ratio when compared with the previous election. That said, the result is still a success as he is close to a new victory. In addition, since the previous elections, Turkey has experienced two economic crises, a pandemic, and devastating earthquakes. Despite these man-made and natural disasters, Erdoğan will most likely lead his country for five more years.

In countries where democratic elections are held, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the only leader to be elected president by exceeding 50 percent in the first round in two elections (in 2014-2018) in his quarter-century political life. Despite the global COVID pandemic, a war next to its borders, an earthquake disaster devastating 11 provinces and affecting a region the size of the Netherlands, and an economic crisis, Erdoğan, this time, narrowly missed being elected in the first round, but finished the race ahead.

Despite the hateful articles and comments published under the headline “Dictator” in all Western media from the Old to the New Continent, Erdoğan finished the first round ahead. He managed this despite Joe Biden’s call as the Democratic Party presidential candidate in 2020 to cooperate with the Turkish opposition in order for Erdoğan to lose the 2023 elections; despite the U.S. actions towards this during Erdoğan’s presidency; and despite the joint EU-U.S. maneuvers to put Greece in opposition to Turkey.

Erdoğan has delivered more services in the last 21 years than the Turkish Kemalist establishment has on the previous 80 years: He democratized the military-civilian relationship in the country. Muslim conservatives have been liberated. He removed barriers to education and employment for headscarved women. There is now a Kurdish-language channel on state television. Kurdish became an elective subject in schools and Kurdish language chairs were opened at universities.

He opened Hagia Sophia for worship, changed the face of Turkey politically, militarily and economically, completely renewed transportation and health services from west to east, and took the country over several thresholds in the field of technology and space. The Erdoğan administration built the first domestic automobile, established the first nuclear power plant in the country, discovered natural gas and oil in the Black Sea region, and built the first UCAV (unmanned combat aerial vehicle) ship.

The reconnaissance and combat drones produced by Turkey “changed the world war strategy” according to Francis Fukuyama and transformed Turkey into a regional actor. Thanks to Erdoğan Turkey has risen to prominence with its humanitarian aid across Africa, and has become a military power in North Africa. Erdoğan played a key role in the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian occupation. In fact, for the first time in history, members of the Organization of Turkic States declared their support for a leader—Erdoğan—before the elections.

Erdoğan aptly mediated many crises in the Balkans, brought together two warring countries, Russia and Ukraine, and saved the world from a food catastrophe by opening a grain corridor through a grain deal, which has just been extended yet again. Only 67 days after the earthquake, he handed over the keys to 1,442 houses, 250 village houses, and 47 workplaces. He started the construction process of more than 105,000 houses affected by the earthquakes.

Undoubtedly, over the past 21 years, Erdoğan is far ahead in terms of performance compared to his European and U.S. counterparts. The Western press also acknowledges this, albeit in reverse. In the smear campaign against Erdoğan, he used to be compared to Iraq’s Saddam and now he is compared to Russia’s Putin! After the first round of the presidential elections, this too has changed: Newsweek, which had previously described Erdoğan and Putin as two dictators who admire each other, risked contradicting itself by stating, “Stop Calling Erdoğan a Dictator. Dictators Don’t Go to Runoffs”

But what is surprising is not Erdoğan’s victory, as the Western press or the opposition in Turkey claims. After all these years, it was still Erdoğan in fact that was defining the elections as the electorate was being asked to either side with him or against him. Kılıçdaroğlu even took his election slogan from Erdoğan’s nickname for him and gladly accepted it: “(Bay Kemal) Mr. Kemal”! What is, in fact, surprising is that, yes, Erdoğan finished 5% and nearly 2.5 million votes ahead of Kılıçdaroğlu, but that Kılıçdaroğlu could still collect 44.88% of the votes!

This is a significant success for Kılıçdaroğlu, even though he has the full support of the Western world and that he has gathered five, large and small, political parties of various ideological orientations ranging from secular nationalist to religious conservative, plus, the HDP, the political arm of the PKK. The astonishing part of this success does not stem from the fact that he is an Alevi or, as the Armenian intellectual Sevan Nişanyan put it, “probably the most incompetent, defeatist and unrepresentative person in the history of politics, who ran and lost 10 [now 11] elections.”

What is surprising is that he achieved this vote share as the CHP leader in Turkey. As a matter of fact, the CHP, whose presidential candidate was considered the election favorite, received 25.35% in the parliamentary election, 10 points behind the AK Party, which still received 35% of the votes after all these years.

In Turkey, May 14, the 2023 election day, was also the anniversary of the transition from a one-party to a multiparty political life and the victory of the Democratic Party (DP), on May 14, 1950. DP leader Adnan Menderes was declared a “dictator” by the CHP just a week after the elections, just like President Erdoğan. May 14, 1950 marked the end of one-party political life in Turkey—in other words, the end of the CHP rule. The CHP has never even once been in power on its own, and on May 14, 2023, it received 25% of the votes.

On May 14, 1950, right after the DP’s greatest electoral victory, the “young military officers” had already decided to overthrow Menderes. The CHP was not only the political mastermind of the process leading up to the May 27 coup d’état, but also organized the conditions for the coup and supported it. Immediately after May 14, 1950, a trivet was set up comprising a formula that matured over time: the country was to be ruled by a tutelage system established by the military, the judiciary, and the CHP. Prime Minister Menderes and three of his ministers were executed, and the country’s future was brought under full control with the 1961 constitution.

This situation was checked and adjusted by other military coups and constitutions when necessary. As the prime minister of the minority government formed in 1963, National Chief İsmet İnönü, CHP chairman, passed a law declaring the May 27 coup a national holiday called “Freedom and Constitution Day” (Hürriyet ve Anayasa Bayramı). Muslim conservatives, Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, people of all identities inherited from the Ottoman Empire were oppressed by this sovereignty for 80 years. This is the whole history.

Erdoğan, too, has had to grapple with this system from the moment he entered politics: he was banned from politics, imprisoned, his party was shut down, the party he founded was sued for closure, he was the target of military coups, and attempted military coups. Finally, in the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, there were direct attempts to eliminate him—not by execution this time like Menderes. The coup plotters tried to kill him in the hotel where he was staying and on a plane in the air. With the bitter memory of the May 27 coup and the hanging of Adnan Menderes in mind, thousands of people said “Never Again” and took to the streets, foiling the coup attempt.

As has been the case since May 14, 1950, CHP voters did not understand why their party finished the elections with 25% of the votes and why Kılıçdaroğlu, the presidential candidate, lagged behind Erdoğan. On his social media account, the left-oriented Turkish intellectual and mathematician Ali Nesin asked: “What must we have done to this people in 80 years that we can’t easily win in the first round despite 20 years of government wear and tear and economic crisis and an earthquake? Let those who have any sense think from this perspective!” As always, Nesin’s interlocutors do not seem to be willing to seek the answer to his question. Maybe they thought that with a few changes in Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric and tactics over the past few years, everything would be forgotten.

As happens every time, CHP voters, led by their politicians, created outrage on social media claiming that the elections were rigged. This despite a difference of over two million votes! Clearly numbers don’t matter to them: in 2018, the difference of votes between CHP’s Muharrem İnce and Erdoğan exceeded 10 million, yet the CHP and their advocate media for a week tried to set the agenda with the same allegations. Again, as has been the case after every election since 1950, those who partially believed in the election result were insulted on social media.

They accused Erdoğan’s 26.5 million voters of “ignorance, stupidity, idiocy, and idleness.” In response to President Erdoğan’s vote support in the earthquake-hit provinces exceeding 60%, angry pro-CHP voters tweeted, “We wish you had died, we wish our hands had been broken so we wouldn’t have helped you.” A CHP mayor even kicked earthquake victims out of the hotel where they were being offered temporary shelter.

O

n May 14, Turkey held one of its most critical elections in recent history. While on the one hand, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was confident enough to win the parliamentary elections and lead the presidential one in the first round, the Nation Alliance was committed to end the two-decade-rule of President Erdoğan. President Erdoğan is seen as the favorite in the runoff presidential elections to be held on May 28 with a scorecard that includes many positive developments from democratization to gains in foreign policy, and accelerated development projects to the increasing capabilities of the Turkish defense industry. On the other hand, the Turkish opposition had claimed that they were closer than ever to ending the 21-year rule of the AK Party and its leader.

In their election campaigns, the People’s Alliance highlighted national security concerns and the moves that paved the way for Turkey’s independence in domestic and foreign policy, and the Nation Alliance conducted a campaign that focused on economic challenges and delivering unconvincing messages to the youth and women. It was clear that the Nation Alliance’s absurd proposals such as reducing onion prices instead of producing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which have become one of the most critical instruments of Turkey’s national security and foreign policy, drew the reaction of voters.

The elections were held in a competitive, yet democratic environment. President Erdoğan won the presidential election with 49.5% of the votes, but as he did not receive the 50+1 votes required to become president, a runoff is required. The fact that the Nation Alliance received around 45% of the votes revealed that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the other members of the coalition did not have a successful election strategy nor could they accurately understand the voting behavior of the Turkish voters.

As both domestic and international observers are trying to make sense of the election results, it would be useful to make some related observations. First, the picture that emerged with the end of the May 14 elections is that Turkish voters prioritize national security issues and projects in areas that are seen as a matter of survival for Turkey rather than focusing on economic difficulties. At this point, the decisiveness of the AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the two prominent components of the People’s Alliance, in the fight against terrorism and their independent foreign policy are the two most important factors that pushed Turkish voters to vote for them.

Turkey, which has become a game-changer in conflict and crisis areas in its immediate geography thanks to its defense industry, is taking important steps both to protect regional interests and increase its international reputation as a broker in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. In addition to this, thanks to its strong UAV capacity and operational know-how, Turkey maintains its cross-border operations, and in this way, the durability and flexibility of the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey have almost ended. Although the defense industry projects introduced by the Turkish government were appreciated by almost every segment of Turkish society, the CHP developed a discursive opposition to these projects, causing them to lose votes in the May 14 elections.

In a recent interview, Ünal Çeviköz, one of the CHP’s most important names, harshly criticized Turkey’s Libya policy and asked, “What are we doing in Libya?” However, the “Blue Homeland” Doctrine, which was put forward by Turkey regarding the protection of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean, placed Libya at a critical point. By being involed in the crisis on behalf of the UN-recognized government, the balance of power in Libya has improved in favor of Turkey’s interests, and Turkey has pushed many regional and international actors into retreat.

Similarly, senior officials of the CHP started a disinformation campaign against the support given to the Azerbaijani army during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Çeviköz, CHP’s Chief Advisor for Foreign Relations at the time, claimed that Turkey had sent Syrian mercenaries to Karabakh, and later retracted his words. In the following days, the Azerbaijani army achieved a historic victory with the support of Turkey and an important territory was recaptured by Azerbaijan after signing a peace agreement with Armenia.

On the other hand, the CHP’s relationship with the Green Left Party (YSP), which is affiliated with the PKK, received a significant reaction from nationalist Turkish voters. Unlike the determination of the People’s Alliance in the fight against terrorism, the covert alliance of the CHP with the YSP caused Turkish voters to view the People’s Alliance as critical to the survival of Turkey. With the election of Kılıçdaroğlu as president, voters  feared that Turkey would weaken in its fight against terrorism. Additionally, the strategy followed by President Erdoğan in Syria stands out as the biggest obstacle to the PKK’s forward-looking territorial and independence demands.

Overall, the May 14 elections revealed a picture in which nationalist voters were influential and voters put national security issues at the forefront. Despite the elections being held in the shadow of economic difficulties and a destructive earthquake, the Turkish people made their choice in favor of the continuity of national policies and stability. Also, the results show that the Turkish people question the opposition in terms of their political cadres and potential national policies. In contrast, the People’s Alliance’s main election agenda of “nationhood” and “national security” resonated with and gave hope to voters.

T

urkey’s May 14 elections are a critical turn for the country which finds itself at a historic crossroads. This, in turn, has set the stage for a campaign period in which all candidates and parties are leaving no stone unturned. The quiet period of the campaign during the month of Ramadan, which witnessed the expansion of both alliances and the drafting of MP candidates, has now entered its hottest phase. Now the final 100-meter stretch of the nearly 2-year-long election marathon is taking place featuring the fierce competition between the People’s Alliance and the Table of Six (Nation Alliance).

There is no doubt that this election will be the hardest for undecided voters in Turkey’s recent history. This is because the polarization between the two main alliances is determined by the “President Erdoğan factor” rather than ideological distinctions such as right/left or conservative/secular. The Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP), the Future Party (GP), and the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), which are running on the CHP list, have many politicians who opposed the CHP mentality.

Despite Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric of making amends, the CHP has not yet finalized its new ideological formation. It is still unclear whether the Republican Party is now Kemalist, nationalist, or leftist. While Kılıçdaroğlu is pushing all the ideological buttons to win votes, the CHP media maintains its Kemalist and secularist character viewing the AK Party and the People’s Alliance as “misogynist and radical Islamist.” Today’s CHP does not represent a consistent identity, and even capitalizes on a politics of ambiguity.

Kılıçdaroğlu’s message to Muharrem İnce, reveals his ideological zealotry. According to journalist Fikret Bila, Kılıçdaroğlu told İnce, “Turkey is under occupation. The Republic is under threat. This election is of historic importance and requires a historic responsibility.” Like Kılıçdaroğlu, certain writers working in the CHP media companies are as ideologically radicalized as they were in the 2007 mass Republican and Kemalist rallies.

However, the conservative-religious segments of society have never viewed the Erdoğan’s government demands as misogynist and radical Islamist, including the headscarf. Resentful conservatives do not accuse the AK Party of radical Islamism and will not vote for the CHP just for the Felicity Party or Future Party to win a few parliamentary seats. There are other motives, but it remains to be seen whether they will trust Kılıçdaroğlu’s word when he keeps changing it; or whether Kurdish voters will vote for the CHP candidate instead of Erdoğan, who gave them their identity rights.

Turkish nationalist voters will also have a hard time making an ideological choice: on the one side, there is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and, on the other, the Iyi Party. Kılıçdaroğlu claims that he is the true nationalist despite the open support the Nation Alliance is receiving from the PKK. While the fight of the People’s Alliance against the PKK and FETO terrorism is established, the HDP line imposes its radical demands on the Nation Alliance. In fact, the argument that the “Republic is under threat” can more accurately be used by the People’s Alliance.

Leftist voters, both Turkish and Kurdish, overwhelmingly support the CHP and Kılıçdaroğlu. However, with the Democratic Left Party’s (DSP) decision to join the People’s Alliance, this has become somewhat ambiguous. Some may say that the DSP is not leftist, pointing to its nationalist reflexes. But the DSP was founded by the late Bülent Ecevit, former prime minister and famous leftist politician, and its political stance perplexes some voters who would otherwise vote for the CHP.

Muharrem İnce, who criticizes both the People’s Alliance and the Nation Alliance, attracts the attention of nationalist-secular voters. The situation is such that different Turkish parties can utilize the rhetoric of “Menderes, Özal, Ecevit, Türkeş, and Erbakan are turning in their graves” against each other. All these parameters indicate voters will have problems deciding how to cast their vote on May 14.

Alliance of Contradictions

Kılıçdaroğlu’s election campaign displays a low tempo in terms of polemics. I don’t know if this will change in the final stretch, but it is clear that Kılıçdaroğlu’s current low tempo is a campaign tactic. He may have preferred this approach following the suggestion of his campaign advisors that he follow a tactic similar to Ekrem İmamoğlu’s in the 2019 local elections. He may also have chosen to remit harsh accusations toward Iyi Party leader Meral Akşener and some CHP members. But Kılıçdaroğlu’s profile as a presidential candidate is quite different from that of İmamoğlu’s profile as mayor. This is because Kılıçdaroğlu is behind a lot of harsh rhetoric and broken promises that need to be forgotten.

His reading of FETO tapes out loud in Parliament; his denial of the July 15 coup attempt, and, what is more, deeming it as a “civil coup” plotted by the government itself; his opposition to the freedom of wearing a headscarf in the Constitutional Court; and his failed tenure as director-general of the Social Social Institution (SSK) experience during the coalition period are all in the public record. In other words, Kılıçdaroğlu is an old name with a lot of baggage and polishing his profile is not an easy job.

It remains to be seen to what extent softening his harsh rhetoric will give Kılıçdaroğlu a new “responsible statesman” profile. However, Kılıçdaroğlu’s tactic serves as a litmus test of the Nation Alliance as a disorganized and incoherent coalition in terms of ideology, identity, and policies. Despite all the documents produced by the Table of Six, the Nation Alliance has still not moved on from being simply reactionary. The opposition to President Erdoğan and the goal of transition to a “strengthened parliamentary system” are not enough for Kılıçdaroğlu to reach a coherent discourse.

The opposition parties’ stress on democracy does not provide a common vision for the Nation Alliance. Keeping some political and ideological issues vague may also be a campaign choice; however, the space left vacant by the Nation Alliance parties and their candidate is being filled by the Green Left Party (YSP-HDP’s backup party for the election), the TİP (extreme leftist Turkish Labor Party), and CHP-supporting media.

Classical CHP secularists, the HDP, and the TİP supporters are increasingly declaring the People’s Alliance and Erdoğan as “radical Islamist.” On the other hand, DEVA and the pro-GP media claim that the AK Party is harming religion. The liberal leftist names nominated by the YSP also play a role in casting doubts on the heroic popular defense of July 15 and creating an agenda for the “Kurdish question.”

They advocate the idea of starting a new Peace Process, if Kılıçdaroğlu wins, forgetting that the HDP and the PKK ended the previous Peace Processes and were responsible for the Kobani incidents and the trench clashes. The HDP has engaged in no self-criticism about its support of terrorism. In fact, its inclusion in the Nation Alliance rescued the HDP from being marginalized. Moreover, the HDP started formulating policies and discourse for the Alliance and its candidate Kılıçdaroğlu, which make his efforts to unify the disorganized opposition even more difficult. The harsh rhetoric of the Turkish and Kurdish left merges with the CHP secularism, leaving DEVA, the SP, and the GP rooting for Canan Kaftancıoğlu.

Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance

President Erdoğan, as the candidate of the People’s Alliance, stands out with his twenty years of experience and his effective role in international politics. Erdoğan aims to strengthen the “Axis of Turkey,” which he has already started to build with his approach that addresses security, defense, and foreign policy. Between 2016 and 2020, when necessary, Erdoğan risked rising tensions with the U.S., Russia, and certain regional powers. In the last two years, however, he consolidated Turkey’s gains with a policy of normalization. After the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, Turkey is now entering a new phase of normalization with Egypt.

After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it became a trend in the Middle East to diversify classical alliances and normalize problematic relations. The Gulf countries’ neutral position in the Russia-Ukraine War and China’s role in the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia point to new equations in the Middle East. Moreover, French President Macron’s quest for strategic autonomy for Europe and his efforts to stay out of the Taiwan crisis speak to the diverging interests of the great powers at the global level. One of the most active countries in this new global and regional era is Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership.

The May 14 elections mark a crossroads for Turkey’s role in the region and Turkish foreign policy. Either Turkey will maintain its strategic autonomy or it will return to its traditional foreign policy codes and abandon its current assertive foreign policy. The Turkish people will choose between these two options. There is a vision/declaration of Turkey as a regional leader and global actor, on the one hand, and the promise of retreating from the problem areas in the region with an inward-looking policy, on the other. Taking place on the centennial anniversary of the Republic, the May 14 elections are an important turning point for Turkey and its entire region.

B

oth in Turkey and in many capitals across the world, Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections to be held on May 14 are considered among the most important events of the year. Washington and most European capitals view the elections as an opportunity to end Erdoğan’s rule in Turkey, which they view unfavorably. In a speech during his presidential candidacy, U.S. president Joe Biden made it clear that he wanted to overthrow Erdoğan by supporting “those elements of the Turkish leadership that [he thought] still exist, and get more from them and embolden them to be able to take on and defeat Erdoğan.” Biden also alleged in the same speech that he wanted to overthrow Erdoğan “not by a coup, not by a coup, but by the electoral process.”

It is not possible to know exactly what the Biden administration has done to achieve this goal. What partnerships Biden has formed to date with—in his own words—”elements of the Turkish leadership” in order to overthrow Erdoğan, how much “yield” he has gotten from them so far, and how much this will affect the election results in Turkey are all unknown.

No doubt, Turkey’s presidential elections and foreign policy preferences are interconnected: the ruling AK Party’s foreign policy preferences affect the election process and its results, and, at the same time, the election results determine Turkey’s foreign policy direction.

How do the AK Party’s foreign policy preferences affect the elections?

President Erdoğan’s foreign policy trajectory is one of the main reasons behind the aforementioned U.S. stance on the upcoming Turkish elections. The way Turkish-American relations were built in the aftermath of World War II and the course of relations thereafter led Washington, which had supported Turkey in the face of threats emanating from Soviet Russia, to think that it could directly intervene in Turkey’s domestic and foreign policy in return for this support.

In line with this understanding, during the Cold War, the U.S. administration did not hesitate to intervene in Turkish politics when it deemed necessary, either with tanks on the streets or other methods. Turkey was not the only NATO member to be subjected to Washington’s direct or indirect interventions under Cold War conditions. However, during the AK Party era, Turkey’s pursuit of a more independent foreign policy, both through the self-confidence of its rapid increase in economic and military capacity and the leadership qualities of Tayyip Erdoğan, led to serious crises between Washington and Ankara.

The United States, uncomfortable with Ankara’s shift away from Washington’s line, especially in its Middle East policy, has intensified its pressure on Turkey, while Ankara, to balance these pressures, has turned to cooperation with countries such as Russia within the framework of its multidimensional foreign policy approach. This, in turn, has led to an increase in Washington’s pressure, creating a vicious circle in the relations between the two countries that is difficult to overcome.

The main reason for this development is the unwillingness of the United States to accept Turkey’s desire for a more balanced relationship between the two countries based on sovereign equality. The AK Party government’s foreign policy approach, which has been more independent and has prioritized Turkey’s interests, has not aimed to turn Ankara’s back on the West, but rather to enhance the security partnership with the U.S. within the NATO framework.

Turkey’s desire has simply been to contribute as an equal sovereign partner to the shaping of NATO and U.S. security policies in the Middle East, the Eastern Mediterranean, the Balkans, and the Caucasus. Ankara wanted and continues to want to end of policies formulated in Washington or other Western capitals on Turkey. The efforts of anti-Erdoğan and anti-AK Party circles in the U.S. security bureaucracy, politics, and media to force Turkey into the Western orbit instead of accepting its new identity have plunged relations between the two countries into one of the deepest crises in history.

At this point, we are faced with a United States that openly supports the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, which is the biggest security threat to Turkey, an America that pursues an anti-Turkey policy in the Eastern Mediterranean, and an American president who aims to overthrow President Erdoğan through elections.

Will the election results affect Turkish foreign policy

Tayyip Erdoğan is a politician determined to maintain the multidimensional foreign policy approach Turkey has practiced so far, while his opponent Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is expected to rebuild the old style of relations between Turkey and the West. In fact, while it is clear what the two major components of the People’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP, stand for in foreign policy, it is not clear how the two major components of the Nation Alliance, the CHP and Iyi Party, and the HDP, which has entered into a named electoral alliance with them, will compromise on foreign policy. The goal of overthrowing President Erdoğan seems to be the only common point that unites these two parties—in this respect, they share a similar goal to Biden.

But can we talk about a harmony between the components of the Nation Alliance on what Turkey’s policy towards the PKK/YPG should be? The HDP, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatist party, supports the PKK/YPG and, in line with the Biden administration, backs the YPG in Northern Syria and shares the goal of overthrowing Erdoğan. However, the nationalist Iyi Party has a different understanding on this issue for sure.

The CHP, on the other hand, seems to be a political party that includes people close to both sides of the PKK/YPG issue. If the Nation Alliance, which is united around the simple goal of toppling Erdoğan, wins the elections, Turkey is likely to face a major fight over its PKK/YPG policy. This is because the U.S. and the HDP are not expected to give up the “gains” the PKK/YPG has made thus far in Syria.

In short, if Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance win the elections, Turkey will maintain its multidimensional foreign policy approach based on national independence. If Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance win the elections, serious problems will inevitably arise between those who advocate that Turkey should pursue a foreign policy in line with the U.S. and those who argue that Turkey should stand against the U.S., especially on security issues harming Turkey’s interests.

In this case, it is likely that the Biden administration, which aspires to intervene in Turkey’s elections with the aim of ousting Erdoğan, will re-engage and try to design a government that will not pose a problem for U.S. interests by contacting those “elements of the Turkish leadership…, get[ting] more out of them, and embolden[ing] them.” This could take the form of removing some of the Nation Alliance’s current components and making the HDP a direct partner in the government.

The formation of such a government would mean that Turkey would abandon its multidimensional foreign policy and return to one that is U.S.-oriented. However, for this to happen, the Nation Alliance and the HDP would have to win both the presidential and parliamentary elections, and then the U.S.-aligned actors would have to maintain their majority in parliament. The results of the upcoming elections will reveal a lot about how the Turkish public evaluates politics and how these differences in foreign policy approaches are reflected in voter preferences.

The Washington Post grudgingly conceded the following fact in the title of an analysis by Bobby Ghosh: the world’s most important election in 2023 will be in Turkey. John Bolton’s recommendation to NATO in his January 16 essay for The Wall Street Journal and the oblique image gracing the cover of the special issue of The Economist on Turkey (Jan. 21-27) are also among the most striking manifestations of a partisan desire to meddle in Turkish elections spearheaded by the United States and the United Kingdom.

It goes without saying that the audience of the abovementioned publications is not limited to U.S. and Western decision-makers: the same content is being reproduced in Turkey with a nod of approval. The meaning of such messages, which hint at the Biden administration’s intent to meddle in Turkish elections (as signaled before Biden took office) and suggest that the psychological warfare which serves that purpose is about to escalate, can be analyzed within several frameworks.

Anti-Erdoğanism

Anti-Erdoğanism in the United States and other Western countries, together with the content that fuels that sentiment, is rooted in two historical phenomena that have been caricaturized to seamlessly resonate with the Western mind. The first (and more proximate) is dictatorship and, specifically, the various European dictatorships that emerged after World War I. The terms “dictator” and “dictatorship,” which originate in Latin, referred to a judge with extraordinary powers in the Roman Empire.

In the twentieth century, the terms came to refer to political systems where a single person or group exercise political power exclusively, and to their leaders. Carved into the crescent on the cover of The Economist, Erdoğan’s profile resembles the same magazine’s April 15-21, 2017 issue and Der Spiegel’s August 4, 2014 issue. Thus, The Economist reproduces the image of a dictator in the contemporary sense.

The second source of anti-Erdoğanism can be traced back to the black propaganda that targeted Sultan Abdulhamid II in the late nineteenth century. At the time and in later periods, Abdulhamid, among other things, was accused of being “despotic” and there was an attempt to portray his reign as an “age of tyranny.” As a side note, it is no coincidence that the Good Party’s chairwoman turned the idea into a campaign slogan at an impromptu gathering in Istanbul. Luckily, the message’s intended recipients could not sufficiently understand it and it was not repeated.

The comedian Sasha Baron Cohen’s The Dictator was presumably the first time the two concepts, “dictator” and “despotic sultan,” were married and presented to the greater public. The main character, who featured orientalist elements, rose to fame beyond the United States. Whereas the intended target of mockery was supposedly Muammar Gaddafi, the Libyan leader who was toppled in 2011, The Dictator helped caricaturize the leaders of other Muslim nations, against which the U.S. waged war in the name of “democracy.”

Erdoğan’s depiction on the cover of The Economist (June 8-14, 2013) and a cartoon, where the Turkish president is portrayed wearing a caftan and beheading Twitter with a sword, originally printed in the newspaper Sözcü to mock a 2014 ban on the social media platform and republished by Der Spiegel, were among the most striking examples of that tendency. Caricaturizing Erdoğan as a dictator or dictator-sultan serves two purposes: it feeds a distorted image of the Turkish president into Western minds, and persuades them to buy into the idea that the modern and secular republic, which emerged after the Ottoman Empire, is at risk, as suggested in the above articles.

Turkey’s Foreign Policy Moves

“Erdoğan’s neo-Ottomanist policies” represent one of the main points of reference in anti-Erdoğanist propaganda. The propagandist claim attempts to problematize Turkey’s presence in Libya and its safe zones in northern Syria, and has been reproduced domestically. Indeed, judging by public statements, it would appear that the Nation Alliance would quickly reverse Turkey’s foreign policy if it were to come to power. The term “neo-Ottoman,”which Bolton employs in conjuction with various trivial concepts, that blames the victim in order to whitewash the real perpetrators’ crimes.

Moreover, in his own way, Bolton provides additional support from the West to the opposition by calling on NATO to kick Turkey out in case of Erdoğan’s re-election. Likewise, Piotr Zalewski, The Economist’s Turkey correspondent, in the magazine’s special issue on Turkey, argues that the opposition must be supported. Apart from making baseless claims and offering odd analyses, Zalewski reduces Turkey’s Syria policy to fighting an imaginary group of people called “Kurdish insurgents.” As such, Zalewski attempts to answer the question that Reuters asked on January 18: “What’s at Stake in Turkey’s Upcoming Elections?”

The part of Zalewski’s article that relates to the world stresses that the main issue at stake is Turkey’s military operations in Syria and Iraq and its military support to Libya and Azerbaijan. Thus, it becomes clear that “what happens in Turkey doesn’t just stay in Turkey”–as acknowledged with reference to Ziya Meral in The Washington Post’s January 9 analysis. That is why the upcoming election’s significance and potential outcome relate to the desired reversal of Turkey’s foreign policy decisions and moves.

Indeed, the same piece builds on a quote by Selim Koru that the upcoming elections will determine whether Turkey’s immediate neighborhood will revert to a policy that complements U.S. and European influence or double down on a foreign policy that challenges and seeks to replace it. Furthermore, it seems that the local sources which contribute to the pieces that seek to remind everyone which way Turkish foreign policy is supposed to go, mistakenly assume that they make progress by running westward on an eastward-moving ship.

Election Security and Refugees

Two major similarities between the pieces which we have analyzed here are their references to election security and refugees. Bolton urges the West to take “bold action to help ensure his domestic opposition gets a fair shake in upcoming presidential elections.” What exactly does it mean that “opposition gets a fair shake”? Later in the piece, it becomes clear that it is about “free and fair” elections and the threat of being kicked out of NATO in their absence.

The Russia-Ukraine war has revealed the thin and fragile line between the West and Russia in the guise of a new geopolitical power struggle. During and after the Cold War, the two blocs have been waging a power struggle over different countries/regions instead of directly engaging in a hot war. Cuba, Vietnam, Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, and finally Syria have been theaters of this struggle.

The Ukraine crisis which emerged over the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and continued with the de facto situation in the Donbass region until last year, has now reached a new phase. There is a new geopolitical showdown between Russia and the U.S.-led Western bloc unfolding before our eyes. But this time, there are some differences from the Cold War era.

Although a common and harsh sanction policy against Russia has begun, one big question is whether the West, as a unified bloc, can walk the same political and strategic line as it did during the Cold War. Principally, there exists the energy issue for members of NATO that are in the European Union (especially Germany), worrying Europe due to lingering uncertainties. And there is not any serious sign that the U.S. has a concrete projection to convince its European allies to replace Russian gas at this point.

What is more, foresight of an intra-European leadership struggle that is likely to emerge between Germany and France in the near future, after Germany’s declaration that it would increase its military power with a large defense budget, suggests that it is possible to talk about multiple scenarios regarding the future architecture of the Transatlantic bloc.

Turkey and the War in Ukraine

Another important aspect of the Ukraine war is the exceptional position of Turkey, which has NATO’s second-largest military and whose role in regional issues significantly increased in recent years. President Erdoğan was able to strengthen both Turkey’s effectiveness and diplomatic power in many regional issues such as northern Syria, Libya, the Eastern Mediterranean, and the Southern Caucasus.

What does President Erdoğan calculate to gain from the diplomatic efforts in the Russia-Ukraine war?

Turkey’s ability both to follow independent policies that occasionally conflicted with Russia and to develop joint initiatives with it explains Turkey’s adaptation to the multipolar world order. Now, there is the Ukraine crisis.

So, what does President Erdoğan calculate to gain from the diplomatic efforts in the Russia-Ukraine war? As a political leader who seems to be one of the few leaders of a NATO country with relatively good access to Putin, what could be the advantages and drawbacks of his leadership in diplomacy means?

But in spite of all of this, we see that the two countries stayed away from any serious conflict. For example, while Turkey did not recognize Russia’s annexation of Crimea and now the invasion of Ukraine, and has clearly stated its own position in support of Ukraine’s territorial integrity and the right of sovereignty on the basis of international law and legitimacy, it has also declared since 2014 that it would not be a part of any sanction against Russia.

Turkey also avoids a confrontation with Russia along with the Western bloc and adopts a strategy of not taking a categorical position, i.e., not joining the sanctions campaign.

Turkey wants to minimize tension that may arise from conflicting interests through immediate and timely intervention and reaching a middle ground with mutual trade-offs when necessary.

Turkey approaches Russia differently than all the other members of the Western bloc, while also insisting on its principal position, i.e., the objection to the annexation of Crimea and to the invasion of Ukraine. Turkey also avoids a confrontation with Russia along with the Western bloc and adopts a strategy of not taking a categorical position, i.e., not joining the sanctions campaign.

Fruits for Turkey

This has recently served to open up a diplomatic space for Turkey as we have seen in Syria. Again, despite various conflicts like those in Libya and in the Mediterranean, Turkey and Russia could take a joint initiative in the process leading up to the Berlin Conference. So, can Erdoğan and Putin find a similar path in Ukraine?

It is primarily important to look at the approaches of the two leaders in times of crisis.

There are two basic elements present in Erdoğan and Putin’s relationship that most leaders do not have in their bilateral relations: timely intervention and playing their cards face up. The main point here is that the two leaders intervene immediately, especially in times of heated tension in the relationship, and open the option of negotiations transparently.

These two aspects helped to ease and settle serious crises in bilateral relations and regional conflicts in the last six years, and helped to find a solution without facing greater catastrophes.

This is, of course, not an alliance relationship. Both leaders could sustain their relationship through dialogue and a search for common ground as they approach each other with politically realistic, flexible, and viable options. Pragmatism lies at the heart of this flexible cooperation, which is more beneficial than conflict for both sides.

Russia is well aware of the costs of a global economic, financial, technological, and social isolation, and the mid- and long-term risks to itself of the prolongation of the war. It is quite possible at this point that Russia has an exit strategy that it plans to use in the process of dialogue with regional or global actors towards the peace negotiations.

Russia and Ukraine Understand Turkey’s Role

Ukrainian President Zelenskiy describes his relationship with Erdoğan with the words of trust. Turkey’s clear emphasis on Ukraine’s territorial integrity and its right of sovereignty for years, its fair approach to Ukraine in the international diplomacy arena, and the bilateral trade and military relations developed recently are the main reasons behind Zelensky’s positive assessment of Turkey.

Zelensky, just like Putin, approaches the issue from a realpolitik and pragmatic point of view. He is well aware that from the first moment the crisis escalated, no leader of any NATO country has had any engagement with Putin that had any potential of concrete and realistic results. As a matter of fact, for Zelensky, the Russian government’s official approval of a list of countries that commit “unfriendly actions” against it confirms the importance of Turkey’s presence at the diplomacy table as the only NATO member that is not on this “unfriendly countries” list and which still has not broken relations with Russia.