Rising tensions between Iran and Israel, culminating in retaliatory warfare since the 7th of October, have plunged Saudi Arabia into a state of uncertainty. Despite Riyadh’s long-standing rivalry with Tehran, the recent truce with Iran, escalating regional tensions and Saudi Arabia’s own domestic interests have led its leaders to adopt a more cautious and pacifist tone.

This time, Saudi Arabia has framed its response to Israel’s actions against Iran in legal rather than political terms. Riyadh condemned the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran as a “blatant violation” of Iran’s sovereignty. Earlier, Israel’s attack on the Iranian consulate in Damascus on 1 April, followed by Iran’s retaliatory missile and drone barrage two weeks later, prompted Saudi Arabia, along with other Gulf states, to swiftly condemn the Israeli attack and warn of “the dangers of war and its dire consequences”.

Despite historic tensions with Iran, Saudi Arabia has been actively involved in diplomatic efforts to prevent a catastrophic escalation. Prince Faisal bin Farhan, the Saudi foreign minister, has been at the forefront of communication with all parties involved, advocating “double restraint” and stressing that “we do not need more conflict in our region”.

For the Saudis, a war with Iran – whether started by Israel or anyone else – is a no-win scenario. It will be fought in their backyard and the Arabs will bear the brunt of the devastation. Arab soil will be the battleground because Israel and Iran have no common borders. Such a war would shatter Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) vision of a prosperous and unified Middle East, a dream he once likened to a ‘new Europe’. Instead, the region could tragically morph into a post-World War II Europe, divided and set back for decades.

As a key player in the global oil market, Saudi Arabia is acutely aware of the economic consequences of any disruption to oil supplies in the event of a regional war. The recent example of the Houthis, a relatively small group, posing a critical threat to international shipping routes in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden during the Gaza conflict, albeit with subtle efforts at prevention by the ad hoc US-UK-led naval coalition. In addition, the kingdom’s proximity to conflict zones and the presence of Iranian-backed militias in neighboring Iraq and Yemen on Iran’s axis of resistance pose significant security threats.

Before even considering such a fight, the Saudis need ironclad security guarantees from their Western allies, the same kind that Israel enjoys to ensure deterrence. Frankly, that’s a tall order, at least for now. While their offensive capabilities exceed those of Iran, the Saudis recognize the need for robust air defences to counter Iran’s extensive arsenal of missiles and drones. This concern underscores the importance of President Donald Trump’s 2020 proposal for a Middle East NATO against Iran, particularly one that unites Saudi Arabia, Israel and other Arab states.

Building on the momentum of the Abraham Accords, which normalized relations between Israel and several Arab states, the US envisioned a regional defence cooperation framework. This included transferring Israel’s operational area of responsibility from the US European Command (EUCOM) to the US Central Command (CENTCOM) and proposing integrated air and missile defence (IAMD). This vision seems to be bearing fruit, albeit in a fragile and secretive way.

Although acknowledged by Israel and denied by Arab governments, including Riyadh, reports from outlets such as the Wall Street Journal suggest that Saudi Arabia has played a role in intercepting Iranian missiles and drones. Of course, this was a sign of cooperation, not an intention to engage in a full-scale war between the two. Unlike Arab officials, Israeli Defence Minister Yoav Gallant openly saw it as “an opportunity to build a strategic alliance against this serious threat from Iran, which threatens to put nuclear explosives on the heads of these missiles”.

Iran’s attack on Israel served two purposes. First, it exposed Israel’s formidable air defenses and unwavering Western support, which boasts an impressive, reported 99% intercepting success rate. Second, this narrative would undoubtedly spark a parallel drive for advanced defence capabilities in Saudi Arabia, while raising concerns about unequal treatment of allies in the face of the Iranian threat. It reminds us of how the Saudis have endured a serious threat from Iranian-backed Houthi rebels since 2015 (over 430 ballistic missiles and 851 armed drones).

President Biden’s complex relationship with Saudi Arabia’s MbS has further complicated the situation, shaking security assurances. Attacks by Iranian-supplied Houthi missiles and drones on key Saudi energy facilities in 2019 and 2021 marked a turning point. The subsequent US withdrawal of Patriot missile batteries in 2021 exacerbated feelings of abandonment and a lack of US commitment, as expressed by Prince Turki Al-Faisal to CNBC, ‘not indicative of America’s stated intention to help Saudi Arabia defend itself against external enemies’.

Recently, Saudi Arabia took a step back from discord with Iran, a step towards normalization with Israel, and another towards a security pact with the US before the presidential elections in November. But the outbreak of the Hamas-Israel war has halted progress on these fronts. One reason is Saudi Arabia’s balancing of moral imperatives with strategic considerations.

Traditionally a champion of the Palestinian cause, Saudi Arabia finds it morally and popularly unacceptable to ally itself with the Jewish state (Israel) occupying Palestinian territory and recently killing 33,000 in Gaza against the Shiite Muslim state (Iran), especially at a time of war. But despite discreet cooperation with Israel, Saudi Arabia is officially stuck in a ‘chicken or the egg’ conundrum. Should a solution to the Palestinian problem come before normalizing relations with Israel, or vice versa?

Precarious neutrality reigns

In a multipolar regional landscape where Iran and Israel, both adversaries of the Arabs, are engaged in a protracted conflict, Saudi Arabia will arguably gain a strategic advantage in the regional balance of power. It is worth noting that the Arab Israeli enmity predates that of Iran and has been unresolved since 1948.

The Saudis may consider themselves fortunate to have cautiously forged a truce with Iran and avoided formal normalization with Israel, which would provide a strategic buffer in the event of war. This stance may allow them to maintain neutrality, be ready to mediate, or at least send an appeasing message to Iran if necessary.

In Saudi Arabia’s quest for foreign policy autonomy, neutrality has become one of its strategic tools. It allows Riyadh to avoid entanglement in US rivalries, as seen in conflicts such as the Russian-Ukrainian war and the brewing Israeli Iranian escalation. Such detachment is in line with Saudi political and economic interests.

Indeed, any attempt by Saudi Arabia to remain neutral in a looming war between Israel and Iran is a precarious balancing act. The kingdom hosts some American business and defence assets on its soil, including Patriot batteries, which necessitates routine cooperation with the US, especially in contingencies such as an Israeli Iranian war.

T

he Islamic Republic of Iran and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have decided to resume their diplomatic relations after a seven-year hiatus. The negotiations were initiated by Chinese President Xi Jinping and took place in Beijing on March 6-10, with State Minister Musaid bin Mohammed al-Aiban and Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council Ali Shamkhani representing Saudi Arabia and Iran, respectively.

As a result of the talks, both nations have agreed to reopen their embassies within two months and revive their Security Cooperation Agreement (2001) and the Comprehensive Cooperation Agreement (1998). These agreements were originally signed with Saudi Arabia during Mohammad Khatami’s reformist presidency in Iran.

The diplomatic rupture between the two nations stemmed from Saudi Arabia’s execution of Shiite religious leader Ayatollah Sheikh Nimr Baqir al-Nimr in early 2016, which provoked a mixed reaction on the streets of Iran and led to the arson of the Saudi Embassy in Tehran.

Consequently, diplomatic relations between the two countries were severed, and their strained relations were further aggravated by proxy wars in the region for five years. However, negotiations between the two have been underway for the past two years with Iraq and Oman as intermediary countries – the role of which was acknowledged by both Iran and Saudi Arabia, which thanked them in the agreement text.

Reasons behind normalization

The agreement signed on March 10 has distinct motivations for all three parties involved. Iran’s objective is to expand its network of partners in response to the international isolation caused by the U.S. sanctions. Since assuming office, President Ebrahim Raisi has emphasized his country’s commitment to cultivating positive relationships with neighboring countries and looking towards the East rather than the West. Therefore, the decision to reestablish diplomatic ties with Saudi Arabia is significant in mitigating Iran’s losses resulting from sanctions and diplomatic isolation.

Saudi Arabia opted for normalization as a means of avoiding potential risks such as the loss of U.S. support and pressure from Iran, particularly after the election of President Joe Biden. This agreement also carries significant implications for Saudi Arabia. The government in Riyadh, which has frequently operated under the security umbrella of the United States, is signaling to the Biden administration that it has other options. This message could also be interpreted by the U.S. as a warning that it risks losing its partners in the region to Iran and China if it fails to provide adequate support.

China’s global vision prioritizes the stability of the Middle East due to the region’s abundant oil and natural gas resources and investment potential. The presence of conflicts and instability in the Middle East poses a significant obstacle to China’s economic opening policy. Therefore, it seeks to establish favorable relations with both Tehran and Riyadh, recognizing that the tension between the two countries indirectly affects it. The recent visit by Xi Jinping to Saudi Arabia highlighted the challenges China faces in this regard. The bilateral talks between Beijing and Riyadh, and the statements following the China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, had an adverse impact on China’s relations with Iran.

Despite diplomatic efforts and Iranian President Raisi’s visit to Beijing, had the situation at the time persisted without any substantial improvement in Tehran-Riyadh relations it would have posed challenges for China. What is more, the ongoing tension restricted China’s opportunities for cooperation with both countries.

The decision by Iran and Saudi Arabia to hold negotiations in China was a significant political message aimed at the United States. Iran has long opposed the U.S. and has urged other countries to create an alternative system to the one in which the U.S. is the dominant power. Saudi Arabia, a long-time ally of the U.S. that has relied on its security protection, has partially heeded Iran’s call. Although it may not be seeking to build an anti-U.S. system, Saudi Arabia’s decision to negotiate with Iran in China sends a clear message to the U.S. that it cannot take its alliances for granted.

Consequences for regional and global politics

The agreement reached between Saudi Arabia and Iran is likely to have a positive impact on the region’s conflicts and instability. The revival of the security agreement of 2001 is particularly significant, as it signals a commitment by both parties to avoid interventions that could undermine each other’s security. This, in turn, suggests that the era of “proxy wars” between Saudi Arabia and Iran, particularly in competitive regions, such as Yemen, may be coming to a close.

The strained relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia had contributed to Iran’s diplomatic isolation, as Saudi Arabia had been actively funding influential media outlets, such as the Washington, D.C.-based news television channel “Iran International” to portray Iran negatively to the international community. Thus, the recent détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is expected to alleviate some of the international pressure on Iran. This development is particularly significant for the country given the challenges it has been facing due to the recent internal protests and subsequent crackdowns.

China’s mediation in the Iran-Saudi Arabia agreement is a significant source of diplomatic success and prestige for the country. It indicates that China’s desire to fill the gap left by the U.S. in the region is becoming more concrete. The agreement is a manifestation of China’s aspiration to exert influence not only in the economic sphere but in the realm of politics and diplomacy. Undoubtedly, the successful diplomatic efforts of both Muslim countries will have a practical impact on reducing the pressure felt by China regarding the Uyghur issue, thereby serving as another advantage for China in this process.

It is expected that the Washington administration will react to this process soon, as despite the U.S. initial positive diplomatic and discursive stance, the recent development has produced three distinct undesirable outcomes for it.

First, its claim to be the global hegemon and its political authority has been seriously undermined in the Middle East. Second, China, its biggest rival, is expanding its influence in the Middle East as an economic power, and now as a political and diplomatic one as well. Finally, there is a high likelihood that Israel will be adversely affected by this process. It is known that Israel, which is the most important partner of the U.S. in the Middle East, has benefited for years from the opportunities created by the internal conflicts and weaknesses in the region.

Although the process is fragile and prone to disintegration, China has declared its aspiration to become the hegemon in the Middle East, a title the U.S. has long claimed for itself. We will see how the U.S. will respond to this challenge in the coming days. No doubt, this answer will serve as an effective dynamic in the global superpower struggle.

In a televised interview on the Iranian Al-Alam news channel on February 8, secretary general of the Lebanese militant group Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, revealed that they wished the ex-Lebanese prime minister, Saad Hariri, reconsider his bombshell decision of “suspending” his political career, announced on January 24.

Nasrallah called the decision “unfortunate,” given that Hariri was their “candidate for the premiership,” highlighting that the political landscape remains extremely opaque in a post-Hariri era and that channels of cooperation and communication with the Future Movement, Hariri’s political party, shall remain open.

Ironically, Hezbollah never named Hariri for the premiership in the custom parliamentary consultations often held by the president of the republic before a PM is designated based on a majority of votes. However, Hezbollah’s position on Hariri’s departure says a lot about the role Hariri played to the militant group’s advantage especially since 2016, despite Hezbollah basking in unrivalled power during that period.

Hariri’s exit does not necessarily imply that observers, politicians, and researchers have written him off completely; however, his decision should not be taken lightly either, in terms of the seismic shift the country is undergoing by moving completely into the “Iranian influence archipelago.”

In late January, Saad Hariri arrived in Beirut following months of speculation in the wake of yet another solitary retreat – this time in the Emirati capital, Abu Dhabi – that came into effect mid-July last year. Hariri, a PM-designate at the time, stepped down after failing to form a government for over eight months. In Beirut, Hariri met with his aides, party members, MPs from his bloc, and other sectarian leaders or figures, and proceeded to announce the unthinkable: suspending his involvement in political activities and not running in the upcoming parliamentary elections.

In third-world countries (although I have reservations regarding the term), politicians and leaders do not simply step down: they either abdicate to their heirs or die while still in office. If they ever step down, it is often a form of a relegitimization process following serious blunders. Exhibit A is Egypt’s leader Gamal Abdel Nasser’s shenanigan in 1967 following his country’s catastrophic defeat by Israel in the Six-Day War of 1967.

Hariri is no Nasser

But Hariri is no Nasser and he might not even aspire to be one, and, Hariri was not met with waves of people flocking the streets asking him to rescind his decision as Nasser experienced back then. Hariri enjoyed a few flagship “selfies” with a handful of supporters near his Beiruti mansion and a couple of hours of chants in his name. The feeble reaction from Saad’s supporters, the ones he represents, is symptomatic of current times in Lebanon where sectarian leaders, previously holding gods-like statuses, are dealt major blows to their popularity, to a varying extent.

The Sunni community today stands at a three-way crossroad with different options to mitigate the current situation. As Saad fades into the horizon, until further notice, Sunnis can either succumb to further marginalization and disenfranchisement without devising a plan to attempt to fill Hariri’s shoes, or the main Sunni figures in the country can move towards creating a consortium that manages the transition into a post-Hariri era through cooperation, or lastly, compete amongst each other over the leadership of the sect causing further communal depression and the complete erosion of the sect’s leverage within the country’s power-sharing arrangement.

Unfortunately, Lebanon isn’t shifting into a secular state any time soon, nor will its sectarian system be altered at the moment, despite the hopeful dreams of the Lebanese youth that took to the streets during the October 2019 uprising.

It appears that the Lebanese Sunni leaders understand that now is not the time for petty politics amongst them, especially during an extremely sensitive phase where Iran sits and negotiates with the United States in Vienna not only regarding its nuclear program but also its influence in the region, and while the world is starting to show signs of reconsideration of policies towards the Syrian regime, despite its track record of war crimes and crimes against humanity.

As such, a common understanding seems to be brewing for the option of a concerted effort to rally the community and block the way in face of lackluster disbursement of Sunni votes. The cornerstone of such an effort will be the mufti who already adopted a proactive approach to the situation, in addition to the club of ex-prime ministers who, alongside Mikati, can throw their weight around.

However, this does not ensure that Hariri’s shoes will be filled. After all, and despite his blunders, he remains the Sunni community’s most popular leader and no other figure enjoys the potential Saad once represented – not even the sitting billionaire PM, Najib Mikati, who has yet to come out of his localized constituency in northern Lebanon towards the country as a whole.

With the Sunni community divided, Hezbollah can now rule much easier

The recent dynamics will pave the way towards a schism between the Sunni figures of the cities and those of the peripheries, who are not aligned in politics and allegiances. In fact, peripheral figures have a bigger chance for representation today, especially since they’ve maintained good relations with the Syrian regime in Damascus and with the tides shifting in their favor.

This schism will serve as a conduit for both Hezbollah and Bashar al-Assad to exercise influence over the Sunni role within the power-sharing arrangement, allowing them to break any form of unity sect leaders might work to establish. It’ll be easier for Hezbollah to rule in the wake of a divided Sunni community.

Hezbollah has lost an ally in Saad Hariri, a pro-Western PM with access to all capitals of the world who acted as a buffer between the international community and the Iran-aligned militant group and also as a whipping boy for most of the shortcomings under the pretext that “Hezbollah doesn’t rule.” Now, the group is gearing for a wider share of the pie in Lebanon as the reconfiguration of spheres of influence is underway in the region.

Hariri is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in.

Hariri’s decision stacks up against a series of mistakes he has committed over a 17-year period, yet the decision might eventually pay off during these trying times – as in now. Saad is obviously jumping ship, a sinking one with more holes than the current 6.5 million population can fill even if they all chipped in. The economy is in shatters, the country’s relations with the outside world are collapsing, and the predominant Hezbollah-Free Patriotic Movement alliance has no competency or potential to lead the country out of the abyss.

More so, in order to secure a deal with the International Monetary Fund and other global donors, the time will come where even more difficult austerity measures will be required with harsh reforms that often come at a popularity expense. Hariri being out of the picture means he won’t be associated with those measures and will spare himself further decline in popularity.

For decades, the geopolitical and geo-sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out across the Middle East in various destabilizing ways. Since the Houthi rebels usurped control of Sana‘a in 2014, Yemen has been an important flashpoint in this competition for regional influence with Riyadh and Yemeni forces loyal to the UN-recognized Yemeni government waging war against the Iranian-backed insurgents for nearly seven years. The conflict(s) in Yemen still rages on. In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib. Meanwhile, Houthi missiles attacks keep on targeting their enemies, most recently including the UAE, at least according to the rebel group’s claims.

A major question that analysts have been asking since Saudi-Iranian talks began in Baghdad in April 2021 is, what could such dialogue mean for Yemen? It seems safe to conclude that although these talks have not led to major strategic or necessarily tangible changes in Yemen, there have been some tactical changes that could be grounds for some cautious optimism.

An important development in late 2021 was the death of Hassan Erlou who served as Iran’s ambassador to the Houthis. His passing called into question the relationship between the Houthis and their backers in Tehran, and how that could change the face of the war in Yemen. Erlou, who was smuggled into Yemen in 2020, was likely evacuated on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Iraq, before flying home to Iran where he died from COVID19 on December 18, 2021.

“Erlou was obviously, from the evidence that we have, someone who was quite closely tied into the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)] and the Quds force,” explained Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, in an interview with Politics Today. “He was on the U.S. Treasury watch list. Having someone like him leaving [Yemen] without being actually arrested and then flying over Saudi territory was quite a concession from the side of the Saudis. This was only possible because of Iraqi mediation.”

Yet there were many conflicting reports about Erlou and his situation in Yemen just before leaving the country. The Saudis and Iranians told different stories about what had happened as well as the significance of and reasons for his exit from Yemen. “According to the Saudis, Erlou’s return to Tehran reflected tensions between the Houthis and Iran, but there has been little evidence of a breach in the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran,” according to Dr. Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Some reports even claimed that the Houthis were pushing for Erlou’s exit due to rising domestic pressure to distance themselves from Tehran.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Krieg explained, beyond all the facades and information warfare, there is a renewed willingness to talk between Riyadh and Tehran. In fact, last month when the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Pakistan to address the situation in post-U.S, Afghanistan, diplomats from the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic met.

This meeting between Saudi and Iranian officials in Islamabad “suggests that there is a willingness and also permission from the superiors to actually have these talks continue and that’s the most important thing,” according to Dr. Krieg. Additionally, in late 2021 the Saudi government granted Iranian diplomats visas at the OIC—a development suggesting that Riyadh and Tehran could possibly restore diplomatic relations this year.

Last month, the Saudi-led coalition released video footage and photographs that purportedly confirmed that the Houthis are receiving support from Hezbollah and the IRGC. The videos purportedly show a Hezbollah leader giving Houthi leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim instructions, Hezbollah trainers teaching Houthis to operate drones, boxes of drone parts with the Hezbollah logo, and satellite footage showing how the IRGC has assisted the Houthis in transforming the Sanaa International Airport into a drone and missile launching pad.

“The Saudis want the Iranians to stop their surrogate operations across the region, whether it may be in Yemen or Iraq,” argued Dr. Krieg. “The problem with that is that the Iranians are saying there are no surrogate operations, and that these are local operations which we have no control over, which is obviously a lie. But it’s obviously this kind of surrogate game is one that’s based on dissociation and plausible deniability. Hence, why it’s very difficult to come to any conclusion because the Iranians will say in the first place ‘we have no forces on the ground, so we have no control over what’s going on’. It’s true to an extent. The control that the Iranians have over surrogate operations is limited. That’s something that the Saudis understand, and it always provides the Iranians with a degree of plausible deniability and disassociation to tell others that they’re actually not involved. That makes it difficult to come up with a solution that is sustainable.”

These recent developments leave us questioning how Erlou’s replacement will affect the situation in Yemen. Earlier this month, Iranian officials appointed Abdul Reza Shahlai as Erlou’s replacement without giving him an official diplomatic title, which some believe may be a sign of positive relations between Tehran and Riyadh. According to Gregory Johnsen, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: “If the narrative of a split between the Houthis and Iran is true, then it is notable that Shahlai will not be given a diplomatic title, and by selecting an official already in Yemen, Iran honored the Houthi commitment to Saudi Arabia not to bring in a ‘new diplomat’.” However, his appointment could also simply be a means of convenience. Shahlai has been in Yemen for several years, meaning that they would not have to go through the effort to smuggle a new diplomat into the country and he is already a seasoned military commander with experience in Yemen.

In the final analysis, Saudi Arabia will continue to see Iran as a threat in the long term, no matter the direction that dialogue between the two countries takes in 2022. Iranian influence in Yemen will continue terrifying the Saudis. Nonetheless, one can assume that thanks to Iraqi mediation the likelihood of a repeat of the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019 has decreased.

Within the context of the Iranians wanting to improve their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to create a new architecture in the sub-region, we might see Tehran begin to show more sensitivity toward Saudi security as it directly pertains to the Gulf. But beyond the Gulf, it is tough to imagine talks in Iraq between Riyadh and Tehran leading to the Islamic Republic winding down its surrogate or “proxy” operations throughout the greater Middle East.

In March 2010, at the last Arab summit held in Libya, then secretary-general of the Arab League Amr Moussa proposed to expand the Arab League to include Turkey. Moussa called on Turkey to be part of the Arab regional system in a strategic dialogue as a friendly neighboring major power with strong historical, cultural, and economic ties to the region. However, Moussa’s “Arab neighboring policy” was postponed to the next summit and was never realized after the region was shocked by the wave of Arab uprisings that started a few months later.

In the pre-Arab uprisings era, Turkey was enjoying the golden days in its relations with regional countries, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On the Turkish side, economic considerations and the enhancement of its position in the Middle East were the driving force, while on the GCC states, the adverse impact of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which strengthened the Shiite position in the country, and the rising Iranian influence in the region had an important impact on their consideration of Turkey as a potential partner.

Despite their domestic differences, Turkey and the GCC states agreed on the fact that without mutual cooperation, it would be quite difficult for the two sides to maintain the balance of power in the region in such a way as to favor their own interests. Thus, domestic factors did not play a large role in shaping the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and the GCC states when the nature of the regional developments, such as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, were more related to the balance of power in the Middle East. For the sake of their regional interests, Turkey and the GCC states did not allow their domestic differences to come to the surface and adversely affect their cooperation.

However, the harmony that Turkey and the GCC enjoyed ended fairly soon with the Arab uprisings, especially after Egypt’s military takeover in 2013. The regional security perceptions of two opposing alliances – one that supported the popular movements, spearheaded by Turkey and Qatar, and another that opposed them championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – diverged significantly over regional crises, creating an “ideological proxy war” which preponderated over their mutual concerns.

In recent months, this picture has begun to change as several signs of a rapprochement between these actors have emerged. The era of military-based hard power politics that had led to subsequent crises between these actors seems to have closed and a fresh start is on the horizon.

Breaking the ice, but gradually

Following the recent visit of UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nayhan to Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a rare phone call with UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). That was followed by a call between their foreign ministers. It was reported that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, a good friend of both Erdoğan and MBZ, helped facilitate the rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE – two countries that confronted on almost all regional issues concerning Libya, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the past decade.

Triggering factors for rapprochement 

Due to external factors, both international and regional, and domestic factors related to economy and security, countries within these opposing blocs have equally started to recalibrate their positions and reset their relations, which had previously been predicated on confrontation. The main theme of this new era is realpolitik as actors seem determined to put ideology aside and focus on the economy for solid gains to end a period of intense regional rivalry.

International: The new U.S. administration under Joe Biden is determined to prioritize Asia, to deal with its own domestic issues, and to push for diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the preceding Trump administration. This change in the global context came at a time when the U.S. is re-evaluating its military footprint in the region, which has been a triggering factor in pushing Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia towards a de-escalation era.

Biden’s tenure not only led these countries to question the U.S. security commitment but also raised the importance of relying on regional cooperation just like in the pre-2011 era. Ultimately, the recent reconciliation climate aligns with the Biden administration’s policies in the region.

Regional: The signing of the Al-Ula declaration that officially ended the Gulf dispute created further incentives for Ankara to break the ice with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. As such, Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with Egypt paved the way to the rapprochement with the other Gulf countries as well. Turkey and Qatar started a dialogue with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while in order not to remain on the sidelines of this regional era of rapprochement the UAE also rolled up its sleeves.

Another regional factor that triggered these developments was the growing relations between Egypt, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot administrations in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Turkish interests. For Turkey, cooperation with Egypt on the issues related to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean is vital, while the same applies to Cairo as well.

Domestic: Domestic considerations play a significant role in shaping a country’s foreign policy. In the domestic context, Turkey’s precarious economic situation and the UAE’s need to make investments in accordance with its “Vision 2030” have been a driving force in the Turkey-UAE rapprochement. Erdoğan underlined that trade was the main focus of talks with Tahnoun, saying that “serious Emirati investments” lay on the horizon. Cultivating economic ties not only benefits the two sides, but could also prove beneficial to both countries’ political and security interests.

To conclude, the Middle East has proven this several times: yesterday’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally. Changing geopolitics and realities in the region have pushed countries to put aside ideological differences for the sake of national interests and stability in the region.

Now that the Turkey-Qatar and the UAE-Egypt-Saudi Arabia blocs seem to perceive this rapprochement as an opportunity to maintain their regional influence, it is unlikely that they will allow minor internal political calculations to hamper this rapprochement process.

Time will show whether regional countries will be able to build confidence similar to the pre-2011 era, when interest-driven pragmatism outweighed ideologically-driven foreign policy.

On April 18, news of Iran-Saudi Arabia talks to re-establish relations was reported in the media. Aside from the veracity of the news, recently there have been bilateral signs of softening. Both countries have their reasons that drive them to the negotiation table.

The Saudi-Iranian relations, although improved for a short period in the 1990s, cooled off with the geopolitical shift in the Middle East following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The rise of pro-Iranian politicians in “new” Iraq increased Iran’s role in the country’s turbulent politics, an influence that gradually expanded with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

However, the Arab Spring has put Iran and Saudi Arabia in a paradoxical situation. While considering the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya as a phenomenon inspired by its Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran regarded the mass protests in Syria and Iraq as a conspiracy initiated by its enemies: the Zionists, the West, and their regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia tried to seize the opportunity and, in an obvious contradiction, perceived the Syrian revolution as the people’s democratic right while considered the protests and events in Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon a result of Iranian intervention. Thus, the fierce proxy war between the two sides became inevitable.

It is clear that the hostile policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia are due to their pragmatic thinking. The two countries have always tried to prevent each other from acquiring more power by giving money and weapons to their governmental and non-governmental allies. The war in Syria caused the two to enter into a fierce proxy war; however, as the war entered an erosive stage, military spending on both sides increased sharply.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen. There were even large-scale demonstrations and clashes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which Saudi officials perceived as a result of foreign intervention, implicitly accusing Iran. Eventually, the Saudi influence in the Syrian war gradually declined after 2015 as they became heavily involved in the war in Yemen against the Houthi group, which maintains close ties with Iran.

The continuation of hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia has led to unpleasant results. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has tarnished Saudi Arabia’s prestige. After six years of intense conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has faced severe international pressure in addition to not being able to achieve its desired results.

The heavy cost of the war in Yemen and the increase in military spending, along with falling oil prices and the COVID19 pandemic, have led to a downturn in the Saudi economy and a budget deficit. Additionally, the competition with Iran has caused the latter to make its influence in the Middle East persistent by forming proxy groups, while the main goal of Saudi Arabia was to eliminate Iran’s influence.

Although Iranians have gained a lot of experience in fighting regional rivals, the overall consequences haven’t been favorable for the country. Iran sees the wars in the region as a conspiracy to curb its influence in the Middle East, and as a result, believes that groups such as Daesh (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra were formed by Saudi Arabia and its regional and international allies. Therefore, Iran has to defeat its enemies in erosive battles outside its borders.

However, the outcome of the bloody wars has shown that this policy isn’t sustainable for either country. Increasing Iranian influence has led neighboring Arab countries to seek refuge in Iran’s number one enemy, Israel. In addition, Saudi Arabia, due to its influence in the Arab world, has been able to seriously disrupt Iran’s relations with other Arab countries.

For example, after the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, Saudi Arabia encouraged Arab countries to close down their embassies in Tehran. Coinciding with the former U.S. President Donald Trump taking office in the United States, international pressure and sanctions on Iran increased to a high level and Saudi Arabia encouraged the United States and other Western countries to intensify pressure on the country.

The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran.

Nevertheless, an even worse scenario materialized when Saudi Arabia’s close allies normalized their relations with Israel in 2020. The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran. Since the UAE and Bahrain have already normalized their relations with Israel, it is possible that Israel will enter the region’s security mechanisms as a protector of these states.

Further efforts were made to re-establish relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia following an attack on a Saudi Aramco facility in September 2019. Even before this attack, the Iranian foreign minister had signaled that a “non-aggression pact” with Saudi Arabia and its allies was offered. The attack on Aramco showed the ability of Iran’s allies to reach the depths of Saudi territories.

However, after the attack, which put the two countries at risk of direct confrontation, Iran softened its approach towards Saudi Arabia. It is even said that General Soleimani, who was assassinated in Baghdad by the U.S. military, was carrying a message to Saudi officials during his visit to Iraq.

Saudi Arabia seems to have softened its stance as a result of the Houthis in Yemen targeting of its infrastructures almost daily. The purpose of these tactical attacks, which seem to have been somewhat successful, is to force Saudi Arabia to stop attacks on Yemen and to negotiate with Iran. Along with this, the pressure by the Biden administration on Saudi Arabia has made Saudi officials more flexible with Iran.

Today, with the resumption of Iran’s talks with the P5+1 group, there is a possibility that with the return of Iran and the U.S. to the nuclear deal, Iran will offer more support to the Houthis, who have been in control of Yemen’s northern governorates since 2014. Accordingly, the Houthis, in practice, have become an effective force vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and Iran can use them to pressure the Saudis.

Houthi missile and drone attacks have repeatedly closed Saudi Arabia’s airports, terminals, and other vital infrastructure. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that Yemen’s Houthis have become the second most powerful quasi-governmental force in the region after Lebanon’s Hezbollah, both of which are close to Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia does not have such a leverage.

The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 when the Houthi rebels commenced their gradual, but violent takeover of the capital city Sana’a. This led to a coup that forced President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi out to his home town and temporary capital city, Aden in February 2015.

By March, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, to oust the rebels, restore the government and to bring stability to the region. The coalition became notorious for violating human rights, bombing civilians and destroying vital Yemeni infrastructure.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree that the Houthis are the main threat to regional security. Despite the rebels’ military capabilities have never been enough to change the balance of power in the region, their strong links to the Iranian regime turns the Houthis into a threat by proxy.

The group, which is based in the northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia, has the capability to attack major Saudi cities, including Jeddah. Rockets fired from Yemeni territory are regularly intercepted, however in situations where they aren’t, the Houthis are able to inflict damage.

On November 23, 2020, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking an Aramco oil company distribution station in the city of Jeddah. Houthi spokesman, Yahya Sarea, warned foreign companies and residents in the neighbouring kingdom, saying they should exercise caution as “operations will continue.”

“The strike was very accurate, and ambulances and fire engines rushed to the target,” Sarea said, explaining that the Houthis used an Iranian-made Quds-2 type winged missile to carry out the attack.

Such attacks not only harm Saudi Arabia, but demoralize the rest of the Gulf Arab countries as weaknesses in their military powerhouse begin to show. Therefore, restoring relative stability and disarming the Houthis in Yemen is paramount to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Where differences begin

Whilst Riyadh and Abu Dhabi agree that a stable Yemen is important to regional security, a problem therein lies in what a stable Yemen looks like and where they are able to secure their separate political and economic interests.

The UAE entered the coalition understanding the way in which Aden is significant to Abu Dhabi’s economic and strategic standing in the region. Having a strong presence in Aden means the UAE would have the luxury of the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with easier access to the Indian Ocean and more control over the Red Sea.

Spreading its sphere of influence to the Socotra Island means the UAE would be able to strengthen its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, as it has shown interest through quietly pumping investment into the island and arming secessionists.

The southern separatists seek renewed independence for southern Yemen, which was ruled as a separate state until 1990.

The UAE also heavily backed local resistance forces in Aden and other parts of the southern regions to liberate them from the Houthis. However, areas from the northern areas such as Taiz, which has a reputation for being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, did not receive as much help from the UAE, despite it being besieged by the Houthi rebels.

On August 6, 2019, two fighters from the UAE-backed Southern Security Belt were killed during clashes with pro-Hadi government forces. A day later, the STC deputy leader, Hani bin Breik, marched on the Maasheeq Palace in Aden and called on secessionists to overthrow Hadi’s government in the coastal city.

It became clearer than ever that the UAE is fuelling a “war within a war” inside Yemen; not only distracting from the original aim of ousting the Houthis, but putting its interests in Yemen before achieving the aim of the Saudi-led coalition.

From the outside looking in, the coalition was divided which was creating yet more bloodshed in Yemen in addition to the casualties the indiscriminate coalition airstrikes have caused.

Reconciliation and hope for the future

In a bid to restore relative stability, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement in Riyadh on November 5, 2019. The ambitious Riyadh Agreement aimed to create a 50-50 cabinet and to work together to restore the Hadi government back to Sana’a.

The unity government was initially supposed to be formed in 30 days, but it took more than a year. By December 19, 2020, the government was formed.

The unity government can be as successful as long as the reasons behind its formation remain stronger than the divisions that continue to haunt northern and southern Yemen. It’s impossible to say that the newly formed government will solve a problem that created wars between the two populations and caused southern separatists to believe that northern Yemen was occupying the south.

In order to nurture a strong unity government that goes beyond temporarily sustaining peace, grievances of both populations need to be heard and longer-term solutions must be brought to the table by creating a democratic space and ample conflict resolution. The unity government must be seen as a stepping stone to lasting stability, not an ultimate achievement.

Women, local leaders and religious and tribal figures need to be included and sustainable vision for a well-represented and localised Yemeni government must be on the table for a fruitful post-war vision. As it stands, the unity government is all-male, creating a cabinet that excludes women for the first time in 20 years.

Can the explosion create more divisions?

On December 30, 2020, an aircraft carrying members of the recently formed unity government landed at Aden International Airport, only for the passengers to be met with explosion and gunfire as they disembarked.

The attack left 25 people dead and 110 others injured, but none of the passengers were hurt. At the wake of the attack, there were concerns how such an assault could affect the unity government.

Both the Hadi government and the STC blamed the Houthi rebels of the attack. Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik sustained accusation that the Houthis were behind the explosions.

“Preliminary investigations indicate that Houthi militias stand behind this crime,” Saeed said as the newly reshuffled Cabinet met for the first time in Aden on December 31, 2020, adding that “intelligence also indicates that some Iranian experts were prepping for such an operation over the last few months.”