Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) visit to Turkey on June 22, 2022, consolidated a new paradigm in the Gulf. This comes along with a shift from a militarized and securitized rhetoric to a diplomatic reconstruction process based on economy-oriented policies. In the joint statement, Saudi and Turkish officials underlined their determination to political, economic, military, energy, technology, and security cooperation based on “historical brotherhood” to consolidate regional peace. Hence, the reciprocal visit has apparently ended the break in Saudi-Turkish dialogue upon the mutual needs of both sides to reconcile by negotiating the possibility of damaged bilateral relations.

Saudi decision-makers and media portrayed the crown prince’s visit as the last leg of his regional tour to Egypt and Jordan, and, thus, not a special visit to Turkey per se. Like Egypt and Jordan, MBS’s visit is significant for the Turkish economy, struggling since late 2021 with currency devaluation against the U.S. dollar. One expectation from the visit was to bolster investment, especially in the defense sector, which might also be reinforced by tightening social and cultural ties.

Since the beginning of this year, Saudi Arabia and Turkey have been trying to manage a diplomatic meeting at the highest level. Although Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan had announced a potential appointment with King Salman bin Abdulaziz in February 2022, the meeting was canceled. Later, in May 2022, Erdoğan visited the kingdom. During that time, Erdoğan mentioned King Salman’s “promise” to visit; according to some, thus drawing attention  to the Saudis’ hesitancy in terms of timing and content to pay a diplomatic visit to Turkey. Despite the mutually positive atmosphere, until MBS visited Turkey on June 22, Saudis preferred to carry on with talks behind the scenes and extend the negotiation process for normalization.

On his visit to the Saudi Kingdom, President Erdoğan had emphasized the opening of a “new era” in bilateral relations and strengthening ties in several fields. However, Saudi newspapers preferred to ignore Erdoğan’s earlier visit to Saudi Arabia, highlighting MBS’s visit to Turkey as the mark of the beginning of this “new era” of cooperation. Likewise, following Erdoğan’s visit to the Saudi Kingdom, officials of both sides made no joint statement. Despite the absence of the latter, the closure of the Muslim Brotherhood’s Mekameleen TV station in Turkey signaled, at least, one of the priorities set by the Saudis.

As the issue of the Muslim Brotherhood is removed from the table, so the concerns of Saudi decision-makers are eased, and diplomatic channels can be reopened. In fact, Turkish foreign policy-makers have always tended to avoid irreparably jeopardizing bilateral relations and have always adopted a respectful rhetoric for the rulers of Saudi Arabia. Not long after MBS’s visit, Erdoğan announced the Saudi intention to buy battle-proven Bayraktar drones, involved in successful combat in Libya, Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Ukraine, from Turkey. Behind the Saudis’ colder attitude regarding making a joint statement with Turkey was an effort to play hardball and embolden their position in the normalization process.

The post-al-Ula regional security narratives of the Saudis have revolved around adjusting the shortcomings of personalized politics and in repairing Saudi Arabia’s bilateral relations. The Saudi assertive rhetoric against Turkey was mainly the consequence of the Khashoggi affair in 2018 and the following campaign targeting MBS’s persona both in Turkey and on the international stage. The transfer of the Khashoggi trial to the Saudi authorities in April 2022 calmed the tension, alleviating the damage. It became clear that Turkish decision-makers were more willing to accelerate the rapprochement with the Kingdom.

Leaving a military- and security-based foreign policy and adopting active diplomacy is likely to help Saudi Arabia balance its security reliance on the United States as an external guarantor and hail the Kingdom as a initiator of a new security architecture. Saudi decision-makers understood that normalizing relations with Turkey and Israel is vital for Saudi foreign policy.

Turkey’s isolation, on the other hand, in the energy rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean through Saudi Arabia’s siding with Egypt, Greece, Cyprus, and Israel attested to Turkey’s need to deal with Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia all at the same time. Having the Saudis near, taking some normalization steps with Egypt, and establishing dialogue with Israel would likely help Turkey reach an accommodating status quo for its regional security needs, particularly in the Eastern Mediterranean.

While Turkey and Israel moved to restore ties at a high level after 15 years with Israeli President Isaac Herzog visit to Turkey in March 2022, the coming days are likely to bring the initiation of an official dialogue between Saudi Arabia and Israel, which in turn will likely have favorable implications for Turkish foreign policy.

Efforts towards normalization in bilateral ties between Turkey and Israel have been underway for some time. The process of normalization is expected to bear fruit with Israeli President Isaac Herzog’s planned visit to Turkey on March 9-10. The Israeli president’s acceptance of the invitation by the Turkish leadership to visit the country after more than a decade of frosty relations merits attention and deliberation.

The normalization of Turkish-Israeli relations is dictated by regional and global pressures as well as driven by mutually expected opportunities both at regional and global levels.

The Middle East as we know it? No more

Turkish-Israeli normalization is taking place within the context of a structural change in the regional environment of the Middle East. All prominent players in the Middle East such as Turkey, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel as well as the UAE and Qatar–who happen to be also traditional U.S. allies–are going through a period of reckoning and due adjustment for more strategic autonomy, which is not a result of their own choice. Now, all regional players feel the urgency of safeguarding their interests with limited expectations from Washington.

The abrupt withdrawal of the U.S. from Afghanistan was a wake-up call for all traditional American allies in the region: the U.S. is not omnipresent there anymore to provide unwavering security in the Middle East, and since Obama’s “Asia Pivot” its focus is rather on the Asia-Pacific. The corollary is that regional actors must act together and take care of their own security and survival.

Thus, regional actors in the Middle East cannot afford to be involved in an unending geopolitical struggle with each other, especially when the Iranian threat is looming. Iran is becoming a commonly perceived threat among the traditional U.S. allies both with its potential for regional expansion in light of the renewed nuclear talks with the U.S. and with the actual attacks by Iranian proxies, showcased by Houthi attacks against the UAE, the tanker attacks in the Gulf in the past, and the ongoing missile attacks on Saudi oil facilities.

Opportunities, like systemic pressures, are driving the wave of normalization, too. The diversification in the interests and priorities of certain regional powers–Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE especially on specific cases such as Yemen, the OPEC, the Ethiopia-Renaissance Dam, etc.–that since 2013 used to move in concert with one each other and Israel on almost all issues, opened up a lot more options for all: no actor is hostage to any specific camp, coalition, or alliance anymore. “Out of the box” options such as aligning with Turkey became viable for all actors.

With the thaw in relations between Qatar and the rest of the Gulf and Egypt as well as Turkey’s active signaling of its interest in normalization with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and the UAE, the regional environment became much favorable to cooperation rather than conflict.

The Biden administration’s withdrawal of support from the EastMed project has been a watershed moment for the normalization of relations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Israel and Egypt, on the other. The project functioned as a divisive force between Turkey, Israel, and Egypt due to the Greek and Greek Cypriot input. The realization of EastMed’s unfeasible nature paved the way for other feasible alternatives such as the pipeline project between Turkey, Israel, and Egypt.

Changes in international politics

The COVID19 pandemic and its impact on the global economy has taken a toll on each and every national economy. The world is yet to recover from the disruption in supply chains and food security became extremely important as many regions are experiencing partial food crises. This makes geopolitical struggles a luxury, especially in certain regions. Connectivity became much more important, and concerns for the Chinese domination of the world’s supply chains require the creation of alternatives.

The Turkish-Emirati normalization, for example, has a distinct aspect of ameliorating the problems created by the pandemic. With envisaging investments in logistics, agriculture, health, and manufacturing, Turkey and the UAE are poised to ride this wave efficiently. Likewise, Turkish-Israeli normalization is also well suited for cooperation especially in agriculture and energy among other areas.

There is growing tension and confrontation between the Western alliance and Russia over Ukraine, which will have an inevitable impact on the energy security of Europe as the Nord Stream 2 project has already been suspended. Along with LNG supplies from the U.S., Qatar, Canada, Algeria, and the pipeline gas from Azerbaijan, the transfer of Israeli gas to Europe via Turkey will be extremely valuable. This would also cement a stable and long-term Turkish-Israeli cooperation.

Iran, the common denominator?

Alliances are formed against a specific threat. Although it is too early to talk about an “alliance formation” between Turkey and Israel, Iranian expansion across the Middle East and its capacity to inflict damage on other regional actors from the Persian Gulf to Israel and from Yemen to Syria makes it a common source of concern for both Turkey and Israel. Israel already has a routine of targeting Iranian assets in Syria via airstrikes and Turkey’s performance against Iran-backed militias in Syria over a decade is beyond question.

Turkey is the greatest bulwark against Iranian expansion and aggression in northern Iraq and northern Syria. The common interest in curbing Iranian expansion could motivate Turkey and Israel towards rapid and greater cooperation. Israel cannot counter Iran solely by allying with the UAE or even Saudi Arabia–Turkey’s support is crucial.

Risks and prospects

It wouldn’t be wrong to argue that both Ankara and Tel Aviv bided their time to mend ties in the past. While Erdoğan and Netanyahu were at the steering wheel of their respective countries, it was extremely difficult to normalize ties. Netanyahu’s provocative and aggressive policies would dynamite any effort towards rapprochement anyway. Therefore, change in the Israeli government was an opportunity, very well seized by Ankara, to kick off the process, which helped both sides break the undesired deadlock.

Normalization is not a road without bumps. The Israeli government’s precarious coalition creates doubts regarding its longevity in power, which makes the Israeli presidency a much more reliable interlocutor for long-term planning in bilateral relations. Plus, the right-wing components of the Israeli government, and the aggressive and provocative policies towards Al-Aqsa Mosque, East Jerusalem, and Gaza might put the Turkey-Israel normalization in jeopardy in the future.

Notwithstanding the risks, the Turkey-Israel normalization could prioritize focusing on issues and areas of great potential rather than on disagreement points. Disagreements are already dwarfed by the greater potential of cooperation in many areas, so compartmentalization is easy.

The transfer of Israeli natural gas to Europe via Turkey could be the backbone of a solid partnership. In the best-case scenario, normalization in Turkish-Israeli relations might even relieve Turkey from the bipartisan anti-Turkish lobby in the U.S. Congress, which has been a disruptive force in Turkish-American relations for the past decade.

In March 2010, at the last Arab summit held in Libya, then secretary-general of the Arab League Amr Moussa proposed to expand the Arab League to include Turkey. Moussa called on Turkey to be part of the Arab regional system in a strategic dialogue as a friendly neighboring major power with strong historical, cultural, and economic ties to the region. However, Moussa’s “Arab neighboring policy” was postponed to the next summit and was never realized after the region was shocked by the wave of Arab uprisings that started a few months later.

In the pre-Arab uprisings era, Turkey was enjoying the golden days in its relations with regional countries, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On the Turkish side, economic considerations and the enhancement of its position in the Middle East were the driving force, while on the GCC states, the adverse impact of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which strengthened the Shiite position in the country, and the rising Iranian influence in the region had an important impact on their consideration of Turkey as a potential partner.

Despite their domestic differences, Turkey and the GCC states agreed on the fact that without mutual cooperation, it would be quite difficult for the two sides to maintain the balance of power in the region in such a way as to favor their own interests. Thus, domestic factors did not play a large role in shaping the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and the GCC states when the nature of the regional developments, such as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, were more related to the balance of power in the Middle East. For the sake of their regional interests, Turkey and the GCC states did not allow their domestic differences to come to the surface and adversely affect their cooperation.

However, the harmony that Turkey and the GCC enjoyed ended fairly soon with the Arab uprisings, especially after Egypt’s military takeover in 2013. The regional security perceptions of two opposing alliances – one that supported the popular movements, spearheaded by Turkey and Qatar, and another that opposed them championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – diverged significantly over regional crises, creating an “ideological proxy war” which preponderated over their mutual concerns.

In recent months, this picture has begun to change as several signs of a rapprochement between these actors have emerged. The era of military-based hard power politics that had led to subsequent crises between these actors seems to have closed and a fresh start is on the horizon.

Breaking the ice, but gradually

Following the recent visit of UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nayhan to Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a rare phone call with UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). That was followed by a call between their foreign ministers. It was reported that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, a good friend of both Erdoğan and MBZ, helped facilitate the rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE – two countries that confronted on almost all regional issues concerning Libya, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the past decade.

Triggering factors for rapprochement 

Due to external factors, both international and regional, and domestic factors related to economy and security, countries within these opposing blocs have equally started to recalibrate their positions and reset their relations, which had previously been predicated on confrontation. The main theme of this new era is realpolitik as actors seem determined to put ideology aside and focus on the economy for solid gains to end a period of intense regional rivalry.

International: The new U.S. administration under Joe Biden is determined to prioritize Asia, to deal with its own domestic issues, and to push for diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the preceding Trump administration. This change in the global context came at a time when the U.S. is re-evaluating its military footprint in the region, which has been a triggering factor in pushing Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia towards a de-escalation era.

Biden’s tenure not only led these countries to question the U.S. security commitment but also raised the importance of relying on regional cooperation just like in the pre-2011 era. Ultimately, the recent reconciliation climate aligns with the Biden administration’s policies in the region.

Regional: The signing of the Al-Ula declaration that officially ended the Gulf dispute created further incentives for Ankara to break the ice with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. As such, Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with Egypt paved the way to the rapprochement with the other Gulf countries as well. Turkey and Qatar started a dialogue with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while in order not to remain on the sidelines of this regional era of rapprochement the UAE also rolled up its sleeves.

Another regional factor that triggered these developments was the growing relations between Egypt, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot administrations in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Turkish interests. For Turkey, cooperation with Egypt on the issues related to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean is vital, while the same applies to Cairo as well.

Domestic: Domestic considerations play a significant role in shaping a country’s foreign policy. In the domestic context, Turkey’s precarious economic situation and the UAE’s need to make investments in accordance with its “Vision 2030” have been a driving force in the Turkey-UAE rapprochement. Erdoğan underlined that trade was the main focus of talks with Tahnoun, saying that “serious Emirati investments” lay on the horizon. Cultivating economic ties not only benefits the two sides, but could also prove beneficial to both countries’ political and security interests.

To conclude, the Middle East has proven this several times: yesterday’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally. Changing geopolitics and realities in the region have pushed countries to put aside ideological differences for the sake of national interests and stability in the region.

Now that the Turkey-Qatar and the UAE-Egypt-Saudi Arabia blocs seem to perceive this rapprochement as an opportunity to maintain their regional influence, it is unlikely that they will allow minor internal political calculations to hamper this rapprochement process.

Time will show whether regional countries will be able to build confidence similar to the pre-2011 era, when interest-driven pragmatism outweighed ideologically-driven foreign policy.

Middle Eastern politics experienced the peak of Turkish-Saudi partnership during the 2015-2016 period as ASELSAN, one of the top Turkish defense companies, signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding (MoU) with promising Saudi defense companies TAQNIA and KACST.

TAQNIA also established a joint venture with ASELSAN in 2016 with the potential of initiating similar trends amongst Saudi Arabia’s strategic partners in the Middle East. These agreements were the outcome of former initiatives started in 2013 by Saudi Arabia to reduce the national manufacturing skills gap in the defense sector.

Saudi Arabia, then, turned to Turkey seeking military cooperation both in technology and training as its Western partners designated the country as a client of weapon systems and excluded it from all knowledge transfer programs. However, the Saudi struggle with the 2nd Obama administration regarding weapon sale deals worth over US$80 billion ignited an internal reaction against Western dependency in defense provision.

The Turkish-Pakistani defense cooperation was a clear example for the Saudis of Turkey’s eagerness to share know-how with a regulated sense of regional cooperation.

However, this process came to a halt when the potential regional independence succumbed to regional and political rivalry. The Saudi and Emirati position towards Turkey after the July 15th coup attempt in 2016 caused a root-to-branch transformation in the Turkish attitude towards these two countries.

The Gulf Crisis in 2017 forced Turkey and Qatar, strategic partners with function ties, to be in the opposite camp of the Arab states that gathered under Saudi leadership. The assassination of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials in Turkey in 2018 caused a trauma in the bilateral relations with a resulting stiff political rivalry and a reciprocal antagonistic discourse.

Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States strengthened the aggressive political discourse by the Saudi leadership against Turkey. Moreover, Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan, and Morocco normalized their relations with Israel forcing Turkey to rehabilitate its bilateral affairs with the latter to avoid stigmatization as a “troublemaker.”

However, the Saudi stance toward the two-state solution may facilitate a common bilateral foreign policy with Turkey towards the Palestinian issue in the long run. This aside, the normalization with Israel and the Turkish-supported GNA victory in Western Libya, the Saudi-UAE de jure rule in Yemen, and the Turkish-Russian de facto rule in Syria stabilized regional affairs and put volatile stalemates on hold.

Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia and Qatar agreed to cease the ill-functioning Qatari blockade with a potential of swift recovery for a region struggling with pressing economic conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. One fundamental reason behind the Saudi retreat is the prospect of the four-year Democratic leadership in the U.S., which is going to corner Saudi Arabia in the region in several aspects.

The peak of the Turkish-Saudi bilateral affairs coincided with the second-term of Barack Obama’s Democratic administration – a fact that is no coincidence. The Biden administration will not endorse the Turkish and Saudi bargains in the region which, in turn, forces these two influential actors to build a single-issue alliance until the tide goes out.

However, the heightened hopes on both sides resulting from positive signals did not last long and the process seems to be currently on hold. The Saudi-Greek military drills in March 2021 escalated tensions and hindered a chance of reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Defense Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey

However, there are potential areas for collaboration between Turkey and Saudi Arabia that would be reciprocally lucrative. The history of defense collaborations between the two countries indicates that there was a high Saudi demand for cooperation with Turkish defense experts on how to build a comprehensive road map for the country.

Turkey can collaborate with Saudi Arabia in the defense sector as Turkey is looking for alternative export destinations and investment flow.

The first area of collaboration between the two countries might be expertise and sectoral knowledge transfer to the Saudi side and its satellites in the region. A fundamental, intangible asset that the Turkish defense industry can offer the Saudi leadership comes in the form of defense industry capacity capacity development and maintenance.

In fact, extensive regulations and invisible barriers usually force industries in their infancy to seek to export. When it comes to collaborating with Saudi Arabia in the defense sector, another benefit for the Turkish side is that it is looking for alternative export destinations and internal investment flow that would regenerate the economic shortages in the defense industry.

Matching the security needs and demands of Middle Eastern states with the Turkish defense industry’s production is not only essential for Turkish exports but also for a recovery process. However, the history of Turkish defense exports to the Middle East bears clues to the sectoral demands through which potential collaboration and cooperation areas crystallize.

Before the diplomatic and political crises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the arms exports and collaboration projects for armored vehicle systems were accelerating at a significant level. For instance, Turkey was modernizing the Saudi M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) (over 1,200 in total during 2008-13) with an assembly line established in the receiving country while Turkish armored vehicles company Otokar and Emirati company Al-Jasur initialized the production of 400 Rabdan 8×8 APCs (2017) in the United Arab Emirates.

These two procurement and modernization processes alone were worth more than US$3.5 billion which is a considerable amount for APC exports. These exports also facilitated the Turkish exports to Egypt (BMC-Ejder), Kuwait (Ejder), Oman (FNSS-Pars), Qatar (BMC-Ejder Yalçın, Amazon, KIRPI II), and Tunisia (BMC-Ejder Yalçın, Vuran) with procurement deals worth more than US$2 billion.

The Land Defense Systems promises future export areas with Altay tank on the production line despite the power pack shortage, battle-proven FIRTINA self-propelled MRLs (multiple rocket launchers), and battle-tested HISAR-A/O (Short and Middle Range AD) systems being delivered in 2021.

Turkish defense collaborations and exports do not remain restricted to the land defense systems as Pakistan, Egypt, and Qatar have utilized Turkey’s naval system with several procurement deals including MILGEM corvettes, MRTP-20 Improved Fast Intervention Crafts, and MRTP-33 Fast Patrol/Attack Crafts. As the turmoil in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden disturbed international maritime trade, Middle East destinations such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait sought more expensive European and U.S. alternatives; for some states, the reason was the impasse with Turkey, and for others, the increasing one-way dependency.

Turkey expresses eagerness in collaborating with countries that have the required capital and workforce. With the several procurement and collaboration prospects at hand, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) might be able to establish a know-how transfer platform.

In the wake of the Arab Awakening in 2011, ties between Turkey and the Gulf duo, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), began to deteriorate. This is particularly true after the counterrevolution led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Egypt where they bankrolled the bloody coup against the democratically elected government of the late president Mohamed Morsi and installed their henchman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

The failed coup in Turkey in 2016, the unjust blockade of Qatar in 2017, the Arab duo’s constant support of counterrevolutionary forces in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, and their anti-Turkey stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, have vitiated any chance to recuperate the fraught ties between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The rise of Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and his alliance with UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed made a deadly anti-revolutionary combination in the Middle East. This convergence of counterrevolutionary states ultimately resulted in putting Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the opposite sides of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.

Turkish-Saudi rapprochement is more likely

In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is a “real” country with a huge land mass, significant native population, natural resources and, of course, the custodian of Mecca and Medina. All these aspects make Saudi Arabia an important player in the region and beyond.

Therefore, in the long run, Turkey would naturally want to avoid a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, there is no such direct competition between Turkey and the UAE. In fact, the UAE is the pawn of major powers that are opposed to Turkey’s growing profile in many important regions of the world.

There is no match between the national power of Turkey and that of the UAE. That’s perhaps one of the reasons why we see direct criticism of the UAE by Turkish authorities.

Conversely, one could argue with great confidence that Saudi Arabia’s capacity to withstand Mohamed bin Salman’s perturbations and the kingdom’s chances to remain a major regional player are high, unlike the Emirati “sand castle” that is open to vulnerabilities of all sorts and is even open to collapse as a result of Mohammed bin Zayed’s erratic foreign policy decisions.

In the last few years, due to its reckless foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has squandered a lot of good will and this seems to have been realized in Riyadh, which used to be a considerable soft power and, for good reason, held the status of an arbiter among its fellow Muslim countries.

The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

Turkey does not pose any kind of threat to Saudi Arabia and its internal political consensus. What Turkey expects from Saudis, though, is to disassociate itself from UAE policies in the region, which Turkey feels are designed in Western capitals for the purpose of destabilizing the region.

Turkey has made sure to avoid direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, while the Saudis are cognizant of the fact that they stand to lose a lot in any direct conflict with Turkey. All these factors make the rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia more likely. The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

The demands included closing Al-Jazeera TV, shutting the Turkish military base, and downgrading ties with Iran. Qatar rejected all demands. Besides Qatar, two other GCC member countries, Kuwait and Oman, have long been developing their ties with Turkey. In this regard, Turkey’s increased profile in the GCC and in the Middle East may prompt Saudis toward a reconciliation.

A substantial number of Saudi Arabia’s power brokers have always viewed the embargo on Qatar as a bad policy and have known that a direct confrontation with Ankara would be harmful for Riyadh. Saudis also know that the ghost of journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul will not disappear easily.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan.

Though there have always been uncertainties in Saudi policies and abrupt changes can be expected, Saudis usually do not go beyond a certain point when it comes to confronting or criticizing the major Muslim countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and Egypt.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan. Since Pakistan signed the bilateral security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1982, it has been assisting the Saudis in areas like military training and defense production.

It is extraordinary that the Pakistan government allowed General Raheel Sharif, who retired as army chief in November 2016, to move to Saudi Arabia as a top military advisor. It’s not talked about in a pretentious way, but there is a Pakistani commitment to intervene in a decisive manner if Islam’s holiest cities come under threat and Saudi Arabia seeks help.

T

he first priority of Saudi Arabia and the UAE has always been the preservation of their regimes. They are now anxious as their chief security guarantor, the United States, is going through a tumultuous period in its domestic politics. The Biden administration appointees are not giving clear indications as to what sort of foreign policy goals they will pursue in the Middle East.

The multibillion-dollar investment in Egypt is also not sustainable since el-Sisi himself is engulfed in many crises and won’t be able to rescue the Saudis and Emiratis even if he wants to do so. On the other hand, Pakistan, which has long played a role in guaranteeing Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and the regime’s security, holds significance for Saudi Arabia beyond a desire to cultivate religious ties and assert its soft power.

As the world’s fifth most-populous country and a nuclear power, Pakistan’s market and security dimensions have been attractive to the Saudis. However, Pakistan is wary of joining Saudi regional power games and its feckless rivalries with other countries in the region as was evident in its unwillingness to support the kingdom in the imprudent Yemen war. Therefore, the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain feel very anxious in the fast-changing regional and global scenarios.

A Beleaguered UAE?

Saudis in particular would not want to annoy Turkey. Even after putting maximum pressure, the Saudis and Emiratis could not discourage their close ally Pakistan from deepening political and military ties with Turkey. It seems that Saudi Arabia has now realized that it can’t do much to stop the new realignments in its neighborhood, and any new realignment -with or without Iran- in the region will definitely not toe the line of abrasive Saudi policies.

Ethno-religious diversity and the strategic location of the Balkans have always attracted global and regional actors. It is a geography where the interests of many neighboring and non-neighboring countries such as the EU countries, Russia, the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf countries, intersect.

Although the Balkans are often associated with ethnic conflict, poverty, and corruption, the natural diversity, fertile lands, tourism opportunities and the peninsula’s location on the world’s major energy routes have mounted the interests of foreign actors in the region.

For Saudi Arabia, food security is a serious problem and, therefore, this is one of the most important reasons to maintain good relations with the Balkans. Turkey, on the other hand, uses its historical and cultural ties in order to exercise influence over various communities in the Balkans which for centuries were part of the Ottoman Empire, the ancestor of the modern-day Republic of Turkey.

To understand better the reasons behind the Turkish-Saudi competition in the Balkans, a brief history of the Saudi-Turkish ties is necessary.

Saudi Arabia-Turkey Relations

The relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia are complicated. Although up to the 2010s, the two countries maintained good ties, after the Arab Spring, bilateral relations have deteriorated.

The Arab Spring is not the only reason behind this dramatic turn. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War were important events for the Saudi-Turkish relations, and following these two events, the Balkans started to occupy a place in the foreign policy agendas of Ankara and Riyadh.

However, the involvement of Saudi Arabia with its Salafi version of Islam in the Balkans has endangered the influence of Turkey on the region’s Muslim communities. The rising economic and political influence of Riyadh in the Balkans later deepened the geopolitical and ideological competition between Ankara and Riyadh.

Following Turkey’s support for Qatar during the Gulf-Qatar crisis in 2017, which was only recently settled, the ties between Ankara and Riyadh became further strained. However, the real blow to the bilateral relations came after the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

Turkey’s disclosure of the Saudi government’s role in the Khashoggi murder and the elevation of the issue to an international level was followed by Saudi Arabia’s semi-official embargo on Turkish products. In addition to the above, the two countries support opposing sides in the Libyan civil war.

Riyadh’s intentions for cultural, economic, and political influence in the Balkans are reciprocated by Ankara, which triggered a competition between the two.

Especially after the instability resulting from the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia realized the need for new allies.

The Balkans, which needed foreign investments and which are well-known for their agricultural produce and arms industry, were considered a perfect choice. However, Riyadh’s intentions for cultural, economic, and political influence in the Balkans are reciprocated by Ankara, which triggered a competition between the two.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, provides solid assistance to the Muslim communities and religious authorities in Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Albania through its official advisers. For instance, some Bulgarian Muslim leaders receive financial support annually from the Diyanet, in addition to books on religion and the training of imams.

Mosques are the major spaces of competition between Saudi Wahhabism and Turkey’s moderate Sunni Islam. Both countries find opportunities in mosques to spread their language and culture. Mosques financed by Turkey provide free Turkish language courses, while mosques financed by Saudi Arabia provide free Arabic language courses.

However, Turkey is one step ahead of Saudi Arabia in the Balkans, because Ankara promotes a version of Islam closer to Balkan Muslims, thanks to their common historical and religious heritage. Another advantage for Turkey is the Turkish communities living in the Balkans and the Balkan communities living in Turkey.

Turkey focuses its efforts on the promotion of the Turkish language and culture, and on preserving the historical monuments in the Balkans dating back to the Ottoman period through various programs and scholarships provided by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Türkiye Scholarships (Türkiye Bursları), and the Yunus Emre Institute.

Ankara has also become a significant player in the region’s economy and infrastructure by building local schools and other public facilities. In addition, TİKA, which is engaged in the restoration of Ottoman historical structures, renovates schools, hospitals, and other facilities in Kosovo, North Macedonia, and other Balkan countries.

Turkish and Saudi Economic Influence in the Balkans

Economy is the easiest way to gain influence in the Balkans, where the investment percentages are low and the unemployment rates are high. These two reasons in particular push Balkan countries to re-establish their relations with Saudi Arabia and to strengthen ties with Turkey.

In the 2000s, Saudi Arabia provided various forms of aid to Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus came to prominence in the Balkans not by using religion, but by the investments made by subsidiaries of Arab companies like the Al-Shiddi Group.

After the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia realized the importance of new allies outside the Middle East, allies which can also function as reliable providers of agricultural products.

Riyadh’s purchasing of weapons from Balkan countries increases its economic influence, and, in turn, this increases the dependence of Balkan countries on Saudi Arabia.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia use economic tools such as direct and indirect investments in the banking, tourism, hotel management, real estate, and agriculture sectors. Although Turkey has strong trade ties with the Balkan countries, nowadays Saudi Arabia is becoming a serious rival to Turkey.

Saudi Arabia-based companies have been buying up land in Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The Al-Shiddi Group is building hotels, has undertaken an entire residential area project in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, acquired Serbia’s largest airline carrier, and has invested in FlyBosnia.