After Turkey and the Syrian opposition launched Operation Peace Spring against the PKK/YPG terror group to preserve Syria’s territorial integrity and address Turkey’s national security concerns, many states have taken steps against Turkey. The main tool used was sanctions against the Turkish government. At the time of writing, Czechia, Finland, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Norway have imposed arms embargoes on Turkey. Additionally, the Trump administration announced a set of sanctions against Turkey including new tariffs and the targeting of Turkish officials, with possible sanctions from the US Congress as well. The absurdity of all of these sanctions is that Turkey is ready to accept any kind of sanction as the cost of inaction would be of much higher. The sanctions only weaken NATO and pushes Turkey away from the western alliance.

Turkey did not start this operation hoping that the Trump administration would greenlight it. This operation was inevitable. Northeast Syria was heading towards becoming a PKK statelet and a long-term threat to Turkey’s national security and territorial integrity. Diplomatic attempts by Ankara to find a joint solution with Washington failed as the American side have not acknowledged the most important concerns of Turkey and CENTCOM torpedoed any agreements from happening.

For Turkey, the YPG presence in northeast Syria poses a threat to Turkey through their possible cross-border attacks. In this manner, the security mechanism as the US side called it could address these concerns but actually this was the less important concern of Turkey. The oft repeated sentence that the US side “understands Turkey’s legitimate security concerns” was just not true. The US has not understood its longtime ally at all. Turkey wants to prevent the establishment of a PKK communist state along its southern borders at all costs. Turkey looks to the situation in Syria from a geopolitical standpoint of view and knows that the situation in Syria would harm Syria’s territorial integrity and pose a serious threat to Turkey’s territorial integrity in the long run, opening the gates for endless wars and chaos in the already chaotic Middle East.

A second concern of Turkey is related to the situation of the Syrian refugees, which is heavily underestimated by the west. The rise in hate speech, social tensions, economic costs and the political environment in Turkey has meant that Turkey can no longer carry this burden anymore, but Turkey has found itself in a deadlock. Syrian refugees will not return to areas held by the regime or the YPG, the EU will not allow refugees to cross into Europe, and the international community is not providing enough support to Turkey for hosting such a large refugee population. Lastly, the situation in Idlib could generate a further two million more refugees. A new inflow of refugees into Turkey would destabilize one of the last islands of stability in the Middle East. Turkey had no other choice but to establish a safe-zone in Syria.

Many other costs could have emerged if Turkey would not have intervened. In order not to surpass the limits of this article, I will finish with a last danger. The PKK/YPG is  indoctrinating a new generation in northeast Syria with hatred against Turkey, and like Daesh (ISIS) indoctrination in the region, would create a long term security threat for Turkey as well. Seeing the costs that Turkey could face by not intervening in Syria, attempts by other states to impose sanctions against Turkey are useless and won’t change Turkish opinion at all. These same governments who have not imposed any sanctions against Saudi Arabia over Yemen are only satisfying themselves by doing so.

Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said earlier in September that he would discuss the problems between Turkey and the United States when he met with the U.S. President Donald Trump on September 25, as part of his trip to New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. But neither side has revealed what was discussed and if anything was resolved.

There was no shortage of issues for the two leaders to talk about. There are still Americans imprisoned in Turkey. The U.S. refuses to deport Fetullah Gülen, whom Ankara holds responsible for the 2016 coup attempt. There is an ongoing dispute over the enforcement of sanctions on Iran. Perhaps most immediately and gravely, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft system from Russia will, by the letter of American law, incur sanctions that could do serious harm to the Turkish economy.

Still, there are creative ways around most of these issues. For example, the U.A.E. has strong economic ties with Iran, and the U.S. abides it. Proposals have already been put forth to finesse the S-400 issue, and so on. The crux of the U.S.-Turkey dispute, and the one where interests are radically incompatible, is Syria.

In the summer of 2011, after months of trying to find a peaceful resolution between Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and protesters failed because of the regime’s  continuing murder of civilians, the Turkish government, which already provided a safe haven for refugees fleeing the carnage, began supporting the nascent armed rebellion. The U.S. ostensibly supported the revolutionary movement, though never seriously tried to tip the balance in its favor and over time shifted its policy ever-more-firmly in Assad’s favour for reasons related to Iran policy.

When the U.S. was eventually forced to intervene in Syria in late 2014 by the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS / Daesh), the U.S. tried to engage in counter-terrorism alone. The U.S. wanted to avoid entanglement in the underlying Syrian war, particularly any anti-Assad activity, because the Iranians had made it clear that they would walk away from nuclear negotiations if their proxy regime in Syria was threatened. The attempt by the U.S. to run a narrow counter-terrorism war in Syria was inherently flawed on its own terms, since Assad was the incubator of ISIS and counter-terrorism cannot be separated from the political context. But in the choice of partner for this mission, the U.S. created a whole new crisis.

The U.S. chose to work with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), to defeat ISIS. The PYD/YPG has had close relations with the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran for decades, and retained cordial relations with the pro-Assad coalition after the war began. The PYD/YPG thus could be trusted not to draw the U.S. into a confrontation with the regime. As a side-effect of the anti-ISIS war, the PYD/YPG was left in control of nearly one-third of Syria that ISIS had taken away from the rebels—a radical redrawing of the political map in Syria that the U.S. was publicly opposed to meddling in. And this created problems that were not limited to Syria.

The PYD/YPG that the U.S. has so vastly empowered is a department of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist group that has waged war on Turkey since the mid-1980s. The attempt to rebrand this force as the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) by attaching a few dependent Arab groups might suffice to convince the Western media that “Rojava” is a multi-ethnic democracy, but it is hardly convincing to the people who live under its authoritarian rule.

Whatever the ethnic composition of the SDF and its civilian affiliates, the PKK retains sole military-political control. Within Syria, this has created an explosive situation where a demographically and politically alien party is ruling over resistant Arab populations, and for Turkey a PKK state on its borders is seen, not unreasonably, as a dire security threat. That the U.S. is underwriting this project has created a rift in NATO that Russia has been quick to exploit.

Turkey has twice intervened in Syria, in 2016 and 2018, to push the PKK away from areas of its border in the west and continues to hold these zones through Syrian Arab proxies. These operations left the PKK holding territory mostly to the east of the Euphrates, and Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to initiate a third operation against this zone.

The U.S.’s response to this has been to try to avert a Turkish incursion in eastern Syria where its own forces are based. To do this, the U.S. proposed the “Manbij roadmap”, a model that would, in theory, assuage Ankara’s concerns by removing YPG/PKK control of various urban centres and setting up joint U.S.-Turkish patrols. This has since morphed into a proposal for a “safe zone” that would buffer between Turkey’s border and the PKK-held areas. Given the failure of this concept in Manbij, where the PKK simply reflagged its cadres, Ankara was understandably sceptical to begin with and negotiations have duly stalled. While there has been misdirection on all sides, and proposals for the U.S. to arm-and-equip a 100,000-man PKK force in Syria indefinitely do little to improve the atmosphere, the fundamental problem is less bad faith than diametrically opposed priorities.

Turkey sees the PKK as the primary issue and wants a twenty-mile (30 km) zone under its control inside Syria to deal with this. The U.S., focused monomaniacally on ISIS, wishes to preserve “stability”, however short-termist the definition, and is therefore prepared to grant a much more limited Turkish presence in an area it intends to continue to control, but which is supposedly clear of PKK forces. Displeased with the process, the Turkish government has attempted to gain leverage by signaling a willingness to act unilaterally.

In early August, Erdogan said that Turkey could “only be patient for so long”. At the end of that month, the Turkish president said, “If our soldiers do not control the region [east of the Euphrates] within a few weeks, we will put our own operation plan into effect”. On 18 September, Erdogan said the U.S. has two weeks (to 2 October) to deliver “results”, or else Turkey would go it alone. Most recently, in his U.N. speech, just hours before he met Trump, Erdogan spoke of establishing a 30-km “peace corridor” along a 480-km stretch of the Syria-Turkey border into which two million Syrian refugees in Turkey could be resettled. To underline his point, Erdogan brought along a map.

So, what happens now?

It is extremely unlikely that Turkey will intervene east of the Euphrates by the early October deadline, and highly unlikely that Ankara will risk clashing with U.S. forces at any other time. As such, some version of the status quo—with the U.S. buying time and Turkey preparing to intervene but never quite getting there—could perpetuate for quite some time. That said, low probability, high impact events are not unknown in the Middle East, and this is a situation that has two major wildcards, Erdogan and Trump, plus a trendline that from several angles favours one particular outcome.

From the Trump side, he wants to leave Syria—he has tried twice and been restrained by his officials—and it is possible that he might finally get his way, especially with people like National Security Adviser John Bolton now out of the administration. Trump’s “maximum pressure” rhetoric is a thin veneer for his desire for a deal with Iran, and he might well follow Obama in trading Syria away to get Tehran’s signature.

If the U.S. withdraws under a deal to let the Turks in, it could significantly mend U.S.-Turkey relations; without a deal, Erdogan could still get what he wants but there would be much less political windfall to the alliance. It is also possible, however, that the U.S. would withdraw after organizing with Russia to reconcile the PKK and the Assad/Iran system. Even if Turkey got a narrow buffer zone under this latter arrangement, it would fully restore to Damascus the PKK weapon it used for decades against Turkey.

On the other side, because it is so clear Trump wants out—the number of U.S. troops has been halved to 1,000 this year—Erdogan might calculate that an incursion would not result in triggering the U.S. tripwire, but in Trump deciding to wash his hands of the Syria dilemma altogether. He might even be correct, though it would be a reckless gambit with profound political costs to a relationship with America that is, after all, and despite the current President’s view, about more than just Trump.

Turkey’s purchase of Russian S-400 missile system continues to prompt debate in Ankara and Washington. The United States maintains that Turkey’s use of the Russian system will subject American F-35 fighter jets to potential exploitation by competitors. At the same time, Turkey has stressed that the missile defense system is key to preserving its sovereignty and security. In the past few weeks, tension over the purchase has reached new heights. As the first delivery of the the Russian system arrived in Turkey, many in Washington were eager to respond. In a statement released by the White House, the Trump administration announced Turkey’s removal from the U.S. F-35 program. Several U.S. government officials have argued that Turkey should also face sanctions. However, in contrast to Congress and many of his own appointed officials, President Trump has refrained from offering condemnations. His comments on the S-400 dispute have led many to consider the President as a wild card, who may choose to protect Turkey from a harsh domestic backlash.

Over the past month, President Trump has demonstrated a clear reluctance to draw lines in the sand over the S-400 issue. After meeting with President Erdogan in Osaka, the President differed from his Turkish counterpart in how he recounted their bilateral meeting. President Erdogan’s post-meeting comments suggested that a resolution had been reached on this critical point of tension. He called Turkey’s S-400 purchase “a done deal” and stated that he received personal assurance from President Trump that the United States will not impose sanctions on Turkey. On the same day, President Trump painted a much less detailed picture. When asked if the United States will impose sanctions, the President failed to directly respond. In his response, he commented on the Kurdish issue in Syria, the release of American Pastor, Andrew Brunson, from Turkish detention, and on his personal rapport with President Erdogan—and yet he failed to provide any clarification on the U.S. sanction threat.

The one main point of presidential agreement President Trump did elaborate on centered on shared criticism of the Obama administration. Under President Obama, Turkey had first attempted to purchase the U.S. Patriot missile system, but several attempts at negotiations stalled and a deal was never struck. President Trump explained, “But, honestly, I’m all for our country, but [President Erdogan] got treated very unfairly. He was told you can’t buy it, you can’t buy it.” While calling the situation a “problem” and “a mess”, he concluded that both leaders would continue to work on the issue. Overall, the President provided little insight into any concrete developments that may have been achieved in Osaka. Instead of listing U.S. expectations for the future, his comments focused on how Turkey’s Russian purchase could have been avoided in the first place.

With Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program affirmed and talk of sanctions buzzing in Washington, all attention has turned to President Trump.

In direct contrast, members of Congress and the national security apparatus have been eager to criticize Turkey and many have clearly advocated for a hardline response. As recently as this past week, congressional action has targeted Turkey: Republican Senators Rick Scott and Todd Young proposed a resolution that condemns Turkey’s S-400 purchase and calls on the President to issue retaliatory sanctions. Additionally, before the system’s delivery, five other major pieces of legislation circulated in Congress with the objective to exclude Turkey from the F-35 program. Moreover, over the past month, comments made by officials from both the State Department and the Department of Defense have sought to push the administration towards the sanctions option. In a letter to Turkey’s defense minister, the former U.S. Acting Secretary of Defense proposed that Turkey would face both sanctions and disassociation from the F-35 program if the country activated its purchased missile systems. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo commented, “The law requires that there be sanctions and I’m confident that we will comply with the law and President Trump will comply with the law.” Particularly in this presidency, rarely have issues brought together both sides of the aisle and members of the administration. However, instead of supporting recommendations that might satisfy his appointed officials and win him political points in Congress, the President has not embraced calls for severe reprisal.

In fact, President Trump has continued to utilize talking points similar to those he employed in Osaka. In a cabinet meeting, when speaking in reference to Turkey’s removal from the F-35 program, he stated, “It’s a very tough situation that they’re in, and it’s a very tough situation that we’ve been placed in the United States … we’ll see what happens. But it’s not really fair.” Though he denied he was “sticking up” for Turkey, the President once again highlighted his good relationship with President Erdogan. Last week, in a response to a question inquiring about sanctions, he told reporters that the administration was not currently looking at the sanctions option. When the President met with a group of Republican Senators to discuss the topic further, it was reported that he advocated for negotiations with President Erdogan. His reportedly pointed discussion with Senator James Risch on the matter suggests the President’s intent to make headway in the closed-door meeting, but it remains unknown if Senators have altered their positions. Considering the extent of congressional criticism over the past two years, it may take President Trump more than one meeting to inspire a change of mind.

While President Erdogan and President Trump agreed in Osaka on the importance of the U.S.-Turkey alliance, the arrival of the missile system in Turkey foreshadows difficult times ahead for the strategic partnership. With Turkey’s expulsion from the F-35 program affirmed and talk of sanctions buzzing in Washington, all attention has turned to President Trump. Will he convince Congress to change course? Or, if unsuccessful, will he utilize his power as president to delay or waive sanctions? If the President chooses to risk political controversy on Turkey’s behalf, a greater question remains: how will U.S.-Turkey relations fair as a result?

Late last month, the U.S. Senate voted to lift a 32-year arms embargo against the Greek Cypriot administration after months of campaigning spearheaded by Senators Marco Rubio, a Republican, and Bob Menendez, a Democrat. The bill, dubbed the “Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act,” aims to deepen U.S. security ties with the internationally-recognized “Republic of Cyprus,” and, in the words of Sen. Menendez, “usher a new era for an eastern Mediterranean architecture rooted in shared security and prosperity.”

Calls to lift the embargo were first brought up in December 2018 in a letter sent to the State Department penned by Republican Congressman and co-chair of the Congressional Caucus on Hellenic Issues, Gus Bilirakis. He was supported by fellow members of congress, including Democratic representatives Ted Deutch, who serves as the co-chair of the Congressional Hellenic-Israel Alliance and chairman of the U.S. House Middle East and North Africa Subcommittee. In addition to the lifting of the Cyprus arms embargo, the bill also envisions greater energy cooperation in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece, Israel and the Greek Cypriot administration through the establishment of a United States-Eastern Mediterranean Energy Center, and the authorization of millions of dollars of financial and logistical assistance to the Greek and Greek Cypriot militaries. Most significantly, however, the bill further aims to halt the delivery of American F-35 fighter jets to Turkey in a bid to dissuade Ankara from going ahead with the purchase of the Russian-made S-400 missile defense system.

Turkey struck the deal with Russia to purchase the S-400s in July 2017 after Washington refused to share technology from its Patriot system with Ankara.

Turkey struck the deal with Russia to purchase the S-400s in July 2017 after Washington refused to share technology from its Patriot system with Ankara. Some critics in the U.S., such as Representative Eliot Engel, have argued the Russian system is not compatible with NATO systems. But the dispute between Turkey and the U.S. over the Russian missiles is just one of a number of ongoing issues that continue to plague relations between Ankara and Washington. The two NATO allies have had a number of differences in recent years, particularly over the U.S.-led alliance’s arming of PKK-linked militants in Syria, as well as Washington’s failure to extradite Fetullah Gulen, a Pennsylvania-based criminal cult leader accused of orchestrating a coup attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Last year, U.S. President Donald Trump declared sanctions against two ministers in the Turkish cabinet over the jailing of an American pastor in Turkey who expressed support for the PKK. The sanctions caused the U.S. dollar to spike to record highs against the Turkish lira. Even though Turkey later released the pastor, Trump’s words opened the door wide for further anti-Turkish sentiment in the U.S., with some critics even calling for Turkey to be expelled from NATO. At the same time, amid talk of distancing Turkey from the military bloc, conversations about opening the doors of NATO membership to the “Republic of Cyprus” were sparked.

The lifting of the arms embargo could be seen as the start of a process designed to gradually integrate the Greek Cypriots into a greater alliance with the West. It is therefore no surprise that the bill passed by the U.S. Senate also comes with some anti-Russian strings attached. Two last-minute amendments to the bill requires the U.S. administration to submit reports to Congress at least once a year to certify that the Greek Cypriot administration “has made and is continuing to take the steps necessary to deny Russian military vessels access to ports for refuelling and servicing” and is “continuing to cooperate with the United States government in efforts to implement reforms on anti-money laundering regulations and financial regulatory oversight.”

The Russian foreign ministry warned the U.S. against “anti-Russian plans” in Cyprus.

Back in December, the Russian foreign ministry warned the U.S. against “anti-Russian plans” in Cyprus. Greek Cypriot Foreign Minister Nikos Christodoulides reassured the Russians that closer Greek Cypriot-American ties were not “prejudicial” to Nicosia’s other diplomatic relations with Moscow and that its foreign policy doesn’t engage in a “zero-sum game.” In early June, before the bill was passed, Stefanos Stefanou, spokesman of the Greek Cypriot opposition left-wing party AKEL, argued the lifting of the arms embargo served as “part of the promotion of US foreign policy in the region … to prevail in a competition with other countries like Russia, China and Iran in the wider region”. Stefanou said this strategy would prove dangerous to Cyprus and put at risk Nicosia’s diplomatic relations with other countries “which Cyprus needs at least as much as the US”. Even Greek Cypriot leader Nicos Anastasiades described the amendments as “unfortunate” and an attempt to interfere with his country’s sovereignty. Indeed, Greek Cypriot compliance with the amendments would undermine a 2015 agreement between Anastasiades and his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin to allow Russian military ships access to the island’s ports. Nonetheless, Greek Cypriot Defense Minister Savvas Angelides brushed off the amendments after the bill passed, telling state radio: “No country can impose on Cyprus an obligation to stop providing facilities to Russian or other ships”.

It could be argued that Greek Cypriot closeness to Russia during the Cold War was the reason why the U.S. arms embargo was implemented in the first place, although in more diplomatic terms it was just seen as a measure to prevent an escalation of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. Only four years prior to the ban, Turkish Cypriots in the north of the island had declared the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, recognized only by Turkey. That was following nine years of failed peace negotiations between the island’s two largest communities after a Turkish military intervention in response to a Greek-inspired coup in 1974 saw Cyprus split in two.

Although the “Republic of Cyprus” has long been an ally of the West, going on to gain EU membership in 2004, as a non-NATO state it has also been seen as susceptible to falling into Russia’s sphere of influence. Turkey, on the other hand, boasts of having the second largest army in NATO and is a committed Western ally with a proven track-record of loyalty. That being said, the international community considers Turkey’s continued presence in northern Cyprus to be an “occupation,” rejecting Turkey’s legal argument for the intervention.

And while Turkey was also on the receiving end of a U.S. arms embargo following its 1974 intervention, the arms trade between Washington and Ankara returned to normal just four years later when the embargo was lifted. Today, despite their differences, Turkey and the U.S. continue to cooperate in the field of security. Even President Trump at the G20 summit in Japan in late June showed understanding towards Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, saying that Turkey was treated unfairly by the previous Obama administration when Ankara sought to acquire the American-made Patriots.

When it comes to the “Republic of Cyprus,” however, Washington still approaches the Greek Cypriot administration with a degree of mistrust due to Nicosia’s ongoing warm ties with Moscow. Despite a gradual decline since 2012, Russian investments still account for a huge proportion of economic activity in Cyprus. Furthermore, the EU has expressed concern over the Greek Cypriot administration abusing its EU membership by allowing Russian oligarchs with strong ties to the Kremlin a backdoor entrance to the bloc and its market through passport sales, as well as the corruption and money laundering.

The Greek Cypriot administration has also notoriously defied EU sanctions by allowing Russian ships destined for Syria to dock at its harbors, and has additionally granted Russian navy vessels in the region access to the port in Limassol. It is precisely this behavior that the US seeks to curb with the amendments of the aforementioned bill. Yet despite receiving no firm guarantees from the Greek Cypriot administration that it will fulfil its part of the deal to lift the arms embargo, the U.S. continues to support the Greek Cypriots in its moves against Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests in the region.

Despite receiving no firm guarantees from the Greek Cypriot administration, the U.S. continues to support the Greek Cypriots in its moves against Turkish and Turkish Cypriot interests.

Notably, the international community continues to ignore the repeated cries of Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots over unilateral Greek Cypriot efforts to exploit hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey and the TRNC have both insisted that attempts to exploit the reserves before a peace deal between Turkish and Greek Cypriots is agreed is a violation of Turkish Cypriot rights to those reserves. To add, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots have also warned that Greek Cypriot unilateralism on this issue threatens peace and stability in Cyprus. Nonetheless, the Greek Cypriot administration has started offering licenses to investors, including firms from the U.S., France and Italy. This has already led to a few incidents involving Turkish vessels that have been deployed block developments surrounding the hydrocarbons off the Cypriot coast.

Turkey has also recently started taking unilateral steps of its own to search for hydrocarbons around Cyprus in response, irking condemnations from the West. And instead of working to de-escalate tensions, bills like the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act have been seen as an endorsement of Greek Cypriot provocations. Kudret Ozersay, the foreign minister of the TRNC, argued the bill would prove to be counter-productive to U.S. interests, saying: “A peaceful and prosperous Cyprus, with both sides working together in good faith to resolve their problems, would be a good model in a region where peace is hard to preserve. Promoting dialogue is in the interest of the United States. The Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act is not.”

But in early July, Rep. Bilirakis, who initiated the process of lifting the embargo, in an article he wrote with the President of the American Hellenic Institute, Nick Larigakis, insists that the 1987 embargo on Cyprus “appears to have been imposed in the erroneous belief that it would somehow encourage Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots to resolve the nearly 45-year division of the territory,” and is “as anachronistic as Turkey’s perspective on the Cyprus issue,” while claiming Turkey’s “occupation” of the island’s north was the main obstacle to peace. “It is in the best interests of the United States for Cyprus to look to the United States, and not any other nation, to procure its defense articles,” the article said.

The main objective behind the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act is to sideline Turkey in the region and to oust all rivals to US foreign policy from Cyprus.

In May, Bilirakis also said the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Energy Partnership Act will enable the U.S. to support the trilateral relationship between Greece, Cyprus and Israel, which he hailed as a “new example of cooperation in an increasingly turbulent Eastern Mediterranean region.” Based on the congressman’s words, it is clear that the main objective behind the bill is to sideline Turkey in the region and to oust all rivals to US foreign policy from Cyprus. The bill is designed to assert U.S. control over the developing partnership between Athens, Nicosia and Tel Aviv to stop the emerging alliance falling prey to Russian agendas. However, Russia, which in recent years has been expanding its presence in the Eastern Mediterranean through its bases in Syria, is not taking such plans lightly. A statement released by the Russian foreign ministry said the bill “contains the provisions which are directly aimed at undermining Russian-Cypriot cooperation” and, in the event of the bill being adopted, would “seriously take into account its consequences” on Moscow’s foreign policy. “We consider any attempts to set an independent and sovereign country before an artificial choice with whom to cooperate, with Russia or Washington, as the most blatant violation of any possible rules and norms,” the statement added.

The probability is, however, that Russia would not have to take any real action to secure its interests in Cyprus, as the Greek Cypriot administration is not likely to shut the door on Moscow any time soon, especially as Nicosia is still heavily reliant on Russian money. Russian sympathies also run deep within Greek Cypriot society, with allied proxies ever-ready to stand their ground against further Western integration. Even the incentive of an end to the U.S. arms embargo is unlikely to persuade the Greek Cypriots to disown Russia, as Nicosia has never had a problem securing arms from other countries in the past, including an order of Russian-made S-300 missiles in 1997. And while the head of the governing Greek Cypriot center-right party DISY, Averof Neophytou, exclaimed “we will go tomorrow (to Washington) to order weapons” in a retort against AKEL’s scepticism toward the U.S. bill, the actual demand in Cyprus for U.S.-produced weapons is negligible.

Sanctions would only push Turkey further into Russia’s arms. Until then, Turkey is likely to stockpile American-made weapons to avoid the problems it faced during the last embargo in 1974.

As a small island-state surrounded by powerful nations, the “Republic of Cyprus” cannot rely on fire-power alone to ward off military threats. Frankly put, the Greek Cypriot army does not have the capacity to take on the responsibility that comes with owning a large amount of heavy weapons. Even with such weapons, the Greek Cypriots would still stand little to no chance against countries that have more enlisted soldiers than the entire population of Cyprus. Of course, the U.S. would be foolish to sell heavy weapons to an ally that may not be able to prevent them falling into the hands of elements hostile to U.S. interests. Therefore, the Greek Cypriot administration is unlikely to swerve from its current strategy of lobbying to politically isolate its enemies by forming alliances with neighboring countries – namely Egypt, Israel and Greece – who if need be would do the fighting for them.

If anything, the lifting of the arms embargo is no more than a symbolic gesture of solidarity to the Greek Cypriots, as well as a test of their loyalty to U.S. foreign policy. More importantly, however, the bill serves as a message to Turkey, which faces being expelled from participation in the F-35 program by July 31, as well as other sanctions due to the S-400s deal. A separate resolution submitted to the House of Representatives on June 10 proposed sanctions that could hamper Turkish bids to acquire CH-47F Chinook heavy lift helicopters, UH-60 Black Hawk utility helicopters, F-16 Fighting Falcon aircraft, and funnily enough, the Patriot missile defense system. Naturally, such sanctions would only push Turkey further into Russia’s arms. Until then, Turkey is likely to stockpile American-made weapons to avoid the problems it faced during the last embargo in 1974. In the meantime, the U.S. needs to consider whether the Eastern Mediterranean Security and Partnership Act will actually work for its interests in the region, or strengthen its rivals even more.

In response to Turkey’s assembling of troops along the Syria-Tukey border to areas held by the YPG terror group, the U.S. warned Turkey against launching any cross-border military operation in Syria. As I wrote, U.S. sanctions over the purchase of the Russian S-400 systems by Turkey might trigger a Turkish military operation in northeast Syria, but it will remain the duty of the U.S. to resolve the situation and avoid a confrontation with Turkey in Syria.

As negotiations over the safe-zone have stalled and a Turkish military operation seems imminent, the U.S. has to accept Turkey establishing a safe-zone by military means and has to withdraw south from the area and left the YPG face the same fate they did in Afrin. The defeat of the YPG by Turkey would allow the U.S. to form a new Syrian Democratic Forces with only non-YPG elements and join forces with Turkey.

As negotiations over the safe-zone have stalled and a Turkish military operation seems imminent, the U.S. has to accept Turkey establishing a safe-zone by military means.

Firstly, the U.S. expressed its concerns that U.S. troops deployed in Syria might be caught up in a potential cross-border Turkish military operation. In reality, Turkey does not need to care about U.S. concerns, as the U.S. has repeatedly ignored Turkey’s national security concerns by supplying the Syrian branch of the PKK. When the U.S., as a NATO partner, ignored an essential threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey and supplied terrorists, then why should Turkey stop itself from pursuing its national interest due to U.S. concerns over the situation of around 2,600 U.S. troops in Syria?

Secondly, the U.S. suggested that dialogue is the only way to secure the Turkey-Syria border in a sustainable manner. If so, why hasn’t the Manbij roadmap been implemented? Or, why have negotiations over a potential safe-zone stalled? While Turkey maintains dialogue, the U.S. and YPG are creating facts on the ground, such as the formation of 15 different military councils.

If the U.S. would have applied the withdrawal decision by Trump instead of annulling it, Turkey and the U.S. would have built a strong partnership in Syria. However, in case of a Turkish unilateral military operation, both sides can avoid confrontation. Turkey and the U.S. can agree to form the safe-zone by military means. Judging on the events of the past, neither the American administration nor its special envoy James Jeffrey are capable of enforcing its vision on CENTCOM officials operating in Syria, nor is the YPG willing to withdraw and allow a safe-zone torpedoing the long-term vision of the PKK.

If the U.S. would have applied the withdrawal decision by Trump instead of annulling it, Turkey and the U.S. would have built a strong partnership in Syria.

A common understanding between Turkey and the U.S. is the establishment of a safe-zone in northeast Syria. However, both sides cannot agree on the depth and the forces controlling the region. Turkey wants full depth and full control, the U.S. wants limited depth and no Turkish control. Even if both sides would have agreed on anything, the question of how the U.S. would enforce the agreement terms on the YPG still remains unanswered.

If the U.S. is as much concerned as they claim about the situation of U.S. troops in Syria, then the U.S. should make sure that its soldiers will withdraw south before the start of a potential Turkish military operation in Syria. The U.S. should let Turkey, the Syrian opposition and the YPG fight it out, and concentrate on the non-YPG elements of the SDF, focusing on reconstruction and governance. When the fighting in the north is over, the U.S. can engage with the new realities on the ground and work with Turkey.

Since Trump’s decision to withdraw troops from Syria immediately, Turkish and American delegates discussed this topic very intensively. However, the U.S. soon changed its mind from a full imminent withdrawal to a slow troop reduction. Turkey and the U.S. focused on the establishment of a safe-zone along the Turkish-Syrian border. Without going into other details like depth and territorial control, the Special Representative for Syria Engagement and the Special Envoy for the International Coalition, James Jeffrey, made it clear that the YPG will have to withdraw from the zone leaving the areas to other forces, which have not yet been decided. While negotiations continue, the U.S. has already started constructing facts. The YPG-dominated Syrian Democratic Forces began to change its name, again.

On June 14, the Syrian Democratic Forces announced the formation of the ‘Tal Abyad Military Council’ in the border town of Tal Abyad. The conference was organized in a hall attended by the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG and the women wing of the YPG. Two days later, the SDF held a ceremony on open terrain, announcing the formation of the ‘Kobane Military Council,’ again attended by representatives from the Syrian Democratic Forces, the YPG and the YPJ.

The Syrian Democratic Forces officially argued that, “The main goal of establishing these councils is to unify the military and security forces in the region, to involve local leaders in decision-making and to consolidate and institutionalize the institutional work within Syrian democratic forces by empowering and activating the military institutions within it,” proving the Turkish argument that locals are excluded from the decision-making process in YPG-held areas.

This move by the U.S. and the Syrian Democratic Forces is not new. After the PKK changed its name in Syria to the YPG, they re-branded themselves as the Syrian Democratic Forces. In Manbij, where Turkey and the U.S. had an agreement that the YPG will withdraw, the SDF formed the Manbij Military Council. The SDF also formed the Deir Ezzor Military Council, the Al-Bab Military Council and the Jarablus Military Council showing the aim of the YPG-dominated SDF to attack Turkey-secured areas in northern Aleppo.

This new attempt to re-name the YPG once again is a desperate act as proven by the experience of the Manbij Military Council, which is involved in clashes with the Turkey-trained National Army and as shown by the Turkish insistence that the YPG has to withdraw from Manbij. Similarly, current attempts by the U.S. and the Syrian Democratic Forces to form alleged local councils in border towns to Turkey will neither ease Turkey’s concerns, nor have any meaningful change for Turkey-U.S. negotiations, except for useless debate, the U.S. winning some time and sabotaging negotiations.

Some experts in Washington, such as Nicholas A. Heras, labeled the formation of military councils as, “a milestone along the road toward achieving the US (not Turkish) vision for the so-called Safe Zone,” but even for the U.S. vision, this move is meaningless. What is currently being done is only the formation of an YPG-front group upon the YPG model – a make up with no real life implications apart from the production of new flags and banners. The alienation of the local people will just continue after this.

If the U.S. wants to have any real change on the ground in order to step forward for the discussed safe zone, the U.S. should first start by forbidding the entry of the YPG into Tal Abyad. If the U.S. fails to do this, it’s useless to talk about any safe zone.

Two parties are simply arm-wrestling to prove their points in a historical evaluation process of their alliance in the rapidly changing age of the new international system.

Since the July 15, 2016, failed coup attempt in Turkey, bilateral relations between Turkey and the U.S. have been deteriorating. The recent S-400 conflict may lead to a new phase of relations between the two NATO allies. The cause of this conflict is Ankara’s determined stance in buying S-400 air defense missiles from Russia. In return, the U.S. has threatened to apply CAATSA sanctions on Turkey and remove the country from the ongoing F-35 project, which involves 8 countries in total.

How did this happen in the first place? Merve Seren – Associate Professor at Yildirim Beyazit University, Ankara, argues that Turkey has been using Nike Hercules and I-HAWKS defense missiles, dating back to the 60s technology, with an updated version of i-hawks (improved hawks). However, Ankara’s neighbors have all been updating their defense systems and this has proved as a serious threat to Turkey’s national security.

Ankara’s neighbors have all updated their defense systems and this has proved as a serious threat to Turkey’s national security.

Merve Seren highlighted how Turkey declared the need of a new defense system to its NATO allies back in 2006, before the Syrian Civil War kicked off, but that no serious development took place. After the break out of the crisis in Syria, Turkey’s need of an updated defense system became vital and therefore Ankara asked for offers from producing countries. Based on price, delivery time, co-production and various other criteria, China initially won the bid. However, the contract was cancelled due to pressure coming from the U.S. administration at the time.

Merve Seren also notes that in 2015, Turkey requested missiles from NATO. Batteries arrived, but Seren adds that due to differences among Turkey and other NATO allies in their policies towards the ongoing Syrian crisis (e.g. buffer zone, YPG/PKK), batteries were removed from Turkey in 2016. According to Seren, these developments isolated Turkey among its NATO allies, which is why the country had to seek to purchase an alternative system.

The alternative came from Russia. After the Russian plane crash incident, Russia and Turkey declared a strategic alliance to find solutions to the Syrian crisis. The Turkish government signed a deal with Russia and purchased S-400 missiles to be delivered in July 2019. Meanwhile, Turkey conducted two successful military operations in Syria with the support of Russia.

The issue is not about F-35s or S-400s; the real issue is the balance of power in the region.

According to TRT Middle East producer Muhammad Valid, the issue is not about F-35s or S-400s; the real issue is the balance of power in the region. Turkey and Israel are the two most important military powers balancing each other in the region, together with other regional actors. Since the Obama administration, the U.S. has wanted to keep Turkey weak and fragile, as opposed to increasing support for Israel. Valid adds that “Keeping Turkey weak would prevent President Erdogan from criticizing Netanyahu and Sisi – two close allies of the U.S.”

Similar to Merve Seren, political analyst at TRT World, Yusuf Erim, argues that Turkey has been left alone by the U.S. administration during the process. He gives the example of cancelled Sig Sauer hand-guns to Turkish President Erdogan’s security guards. Erim argues that the U.S. strategy to keep Turkey fragile forced the latter for an alternative, and when Turkey did try alternative defense systems, the U.S. applied political pressure. This is why the HQ-9 contract with China was cancelled. However, Erim notes that this time round Turkey did not only engage with Russia to purchase S-400s, but is in a strategic cooperation, which is why Ankara did not cancel the contract on this occasion.

The experts we have contacted confirm that the S-400 row between the U.S. and Turkey can be solved technically by a joint group from both sides.

At the moment the U.S. administration is forcing Turkey to cancel the contract, claiming that the placement of S-400s in Turkey and F-35s flying over them is “incompatible.” The experts we have contacted so far including Merve Seren, Muhammad Valid and Yusuf Erim, confirm the possibility to some degree with some objections, but they all seem to think that the issue of security can be solved technically by a joint group from both sides.  

According to records, President Erdogan and Donald Trump had a phone call and discussed the joint group option regarding the procurement of the S-400 defense system at the end of April. During a meeting held on May 1 in Ankara, Turkish Defense Minister Huluski Akar emphasized this point to U.S. Special Envoy for Syria, James Jeffrey. During an interview, Akar stated that the cancellation of Turkey’s order of F-35s (100 planes) or removal of Turkey from the F-35 project are both against international law and would damage both the project’s future as well as the companies and countries involved.

Yusuf Erim and Muhammad Valid confirm that the removal of Turkey from the F-35 project will affect the future of the project in a negative way. In the first place, Erim argues that the project has already been delayed enough, and that the removal of Turkey from the project will further delay the process for at least two years. This would have a negative impact on the confidence of the companies and countries involved. Secondly, while there are some technological problems in the project, it is not easy to remove Turkish companies from the project as these companies are producing critical parts that require years of know-how knowledge and experience. Finally, Turkey has the advantage of using F-35s in real conflicts toward the threats from the south, test the product, record valuable information about the product and its combat capabilities. According to Erim, this point is quite important for the market confidence in F-35s. Therefore, he argues that the U.S. will keep Turkey inside the project and deliver the F-35s.

Buying F-35 does not mean Turkey can use the planes wherever-whenever. The joint system of F-35s does not allow you to act independently but only together with the U.S.

Merve Seren adds that buying F-35 does not mean Turkey can use the planes wherever-whenever. The joint system of F-35s does not allow you to act independently but only together with the U.S. In other words, buying F-35s does not give property rights to Turkey – there are only 4 countries that have this right: Israel, South Korea, Japan, and Singapore. Seren specifically highlights that purchasing S-400s would not cause Turkey to leave NATO, but rather that both NATO and Turkey will benefit from this purchase. She also adds that the locations of deployment of S-400s is quite crucial in this process. Seren argues that it is important to highlight the fact that Turkey is not a threat to NATO or the West. In fact, Turkey is protecting NATO’s western borders in the hardest line of alliance and without Turkey’s strong stand, Europe would face greater threats.

Muhammad valid argues that the U.S. administration will sell F-35s to Turkey, but that if F-35s do not arrive to Turkey, then the latter could purchase SU-35 from Russia, which are more practical, cheap and one of the best air superiority planes in the market. In fact, he adds that F-35 is not an air superiority plane (like SU-35), but a multi-function plane.

If F-35s do not arrive to Turkey, then Turkey could purchase SU-35 from Russia, which are more practical, cheap and one of the best air superiority planes in the market.

Yusuf Erim argues that the U.S. sees the situation as damage to its reputation and does not want this product to be sold to Turkey. Erim states that according to Americans, the issue has become one of precedent, which allows for Russia to emerge as a competitor in the military industrial market. Therefore, they are forcing Turkey to cancel the deal. Erim argues that the U.S. administration describes the situation as Russia selling a ‘big ticket item’ to an important NATO ally for the first time in history.

The S-400 crisis is just one of the many differences of opinion between Turkey and the U.S. Other areas of differences include the YPG/PKK existence in northern Syria, excessive U.S. support for Israel, and U.S. sanctions on Iran. Both sides are changing their policies according to their new position in the rapidly changing developments both in the region and the world. However, Turkey, which declares a strong defense system is vital for its national security – based on the developments in the region – seems to have the upper-hand in the wrestle, as opposed to the U.S., which is basically trying to keep an ally under control. The relationship between President Erdogan and Donald Trump may help find a solution to S-400 row. However, many uncertainties in the region may lead to new other crises between the two.

The U.S.-Turkey relationship is up for renewed tensions in the coming months as a result of the pending S-400 air defense system purchase from Russia. The U.S. Congress has introduced several legislative measures, clearly designed to send Turkey a message about the potential transfer of these systems to Turkish soil. Congress had already asked Pentagon to produce a report about the state of relations with Turkey and blocked the potential transfer of F-35s to Turkey unless the S-400 transaction was canceled. Given the increasing role of Congress in especially Russia-related foreign policy matters as a result of the showdown with President Trump due to the Mueller investigation, Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia is destined to become a part of this domestic political struggle.  

At the technical level, various news reports indicate that U.S. military leaders think the security of F-35s would be compromised if they are operated alongside S-400s. Turkey has recommended to create a technical group to address these concerns but the U.S. is considering this as a tacit acknowledgement that purchasing Russian military systems might seem acceptable. Turkey has also made it clear that the decision to purchase S-400s was made after years of an air defense system that met Turkish requirements on price, tech transfer, and delivery schedules. After years of negotiations with the U.S., Europe, and China, Russia took the opportunity to provide Turkey with a deal that met all the Turkish conditions, adding favorable financing terms that were meant to sweeten the deal. However, the evolution of the Turkish position and how we got here seem to have little impact on the U.S. military leaders who find it unimaginable to allow a Russian system being operated alongside F-35s.

Given the increasing role of Congress in especially Russia-related foreign policy matters as a result of the showdown with President Trump due to the Mueller investigation, Turkey’s S-400 purchase from Russia is destined to become a part of this domestic political struggle.  

There is surely an economic aspect of this issue as well. The U.S. is not particularly thrilled about the Russian S-400 System’s encroachment into the international arms market, especially on the soil of a NATO country. For Turkey, however, various NATO members’ and the Obama administration’s decisions to pull the Patriots from the Turkish border with Syria without consultations with Turkey is a sore point. Turkey was exposed to missile threats from within Syria, where the civil war was raging and the absence of Turkey’s own air defense capabilities was laid bare in the face of a relatively sophisticated air defense system enjoyed by the Syrian regime at the time. Ever since, Turkey felt a diminished sense of solidarity in protecting Turkish security by its NATO allies. The Syrian conflict’s various threats pushed Turkey to urgently find solutions to its security capability gaps.

Turkey has traditionally been a strong customer of the U.S. defense industry. However, in recent years, the negative environment in U.S. Congress has prevented Turkey from enjoying a strong defense partnership with the U.S.

Turkey has traditionally been a strong customer of the U.S. defense industry. However, in recent years, the negative environment in U.S. Congress has prevented Turkey from enjoying a strong defense partnership with the U.S. The U.S. support for the YPG in northern Syria has soured bilateral ties as well. The current standoff about the S-400s threatens the decades-long strong defense relationship between the two NATO allies. There is no question that it would simply benefit Russia to give Turkey ultimatums rather than work with the Turkish leadership to resolve the issue. The U.S. needs to reassure Turkey about its security needs and repair the damage done by the U.S. support for the YPG. The two NATO allies have cooperated on creating a safe zone plan in recent months, thanks in large part to the U.S. team on Syria that is much more willing to take Turkish concerns seriously and address them properly on the ground. A similar cooperative attitude rather than a confrontational one needs to occur with the S-400 issue. Neither the U.S. nor Turkey would benefit from a strategic drift from one another.     

Minister of Justice, Abdulhamit Gül announced on Friday that Turkey had requested the extradition of 419 FETO (Fetullah Terrorist Organization) affiliated fugitives, members of the pseudo-religious cult which plotted the coup attempt of July 15, from various countries.

In an interview with Anadolu Agency, the minister noted that: “The extradition of 419 FETO leaders and members have been requested from foreign countries to date”. Adding that “red notice requests” had been issued for affiliates of the group who couldn’t be tracked down, Gul noted that there were FETO affiliates whose whereabouts were still unclear. Underscoring that the requests for extradition were issued after thorough investigation into the terroristic cult by the Turkish courts, Gul noted that these requests were conveyed via the Ministry of Justice to the respective countries that the fugitives escaped to or sought political protection in.

The threat that FETO poses is still underestimated by many countries. With a global network operating in over 160 countries, a net worth of 50 billion USD as of 2008, selflessly obedient followers who can give up anything and commit the most horrendous crimes on the command of their leader Fetullah Gulen, and a gruesome track record of devising a deadly coup across Turkey, martyring over 250 civilians and injuring over 2200 individuals in July 15, 2016. Turkey charges the organization with plotting to overthrow the state through an insidious decades-long infiltration into many state apparatuses spanning the military, judiciary as well as many strategic governmental organizations.

Minister Gul underlined that Turkey had reiterated its request for the extradition of the head of the cult, Fetullah Gulen, 7 times to the United States. Highlighting that the extradition requests were in line with the law of extradition and ample evidence and relevant documentation was submitted to the authorities, the Minister added that fresh evidence was shared with renewed requests.

The discrepancy between the judicial systems of the two countries is called to question as Turkey recently released Pastor Brunson after he went through a fair trial, whereas a leader that asks its followers to execute civilians -let alone being put to trial- is living merrily under state protection of the United States. Hopeful of the availing of justice, Justice Minister Abdulhamit concluded: “Our extradition requests are still held in the U.S. Department of Justice. At this point, our expectation is the initiation of a judicial process for extradition as soon as possible”

The U.S.-Turkey relationship has always been subject to ups and downs, including the Cold War years. This was one of the themes covered in a conference on the legacy of the July 15 coup attempt organized by SETA DC. The current state of U.S.-Turkey relations is certainly less than ideal, to say the least, but the good news is that both sides are talking to each other. The laundry list of disagreements includes their diverging views on the PYD and FETO, which continue to derail the relationship. After the U.S. withdrawal from the Iran nuclear deal and the Trump administration’s decision to impose sanctions on Iran with a November deadline, we can now add Iran to the list.

On the upside, the most recent Manbij agreement could help bridge the gap between the two sides on the PYD issue. The news of investigations launched against FETO may calm, albeit to a limited extent, the Turkish concerns that Gulenists continue to operate freely in the U.S. against Turkey. On Iran, the most recent U.S. officials’ visit to Turkey might help avoid yet another confrontation between the U.S. and Turkey, similar to the one back in 2010 when Turkey voted against imposing sanctions on Iran as one of the non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council. However, the most recent Congressional proposal that threatens Turkey’s access to some global financial institutions has put extra strains on the relationship.

In the above-mentioned conference, one overarching approach was that the U.S. and Turkey will be able to work through their disagreements as they have in the past. I subscribed to this idea as well but it does not mean that it will be easy. Turkey, as many other countries, has always found it easier to deal with the Executive branch rather than Congress since certain anti-Turkey lobbying groups have a strong influence on the Hill. The absence of a sufficiently large politically active pro-Turkey Turkish constituency in the U.S. has often been a disadvantage for Turkey’s views to be heard on the Hill. In the current situation, Congressional action driven particularly by the Brunson case is creating risks for the health of the ongoing U.S.-Turkey conversations over a variety of problem areas.

President Erdogan and President Trump seem to get along well and that could be a plus for the relationship. However, we cannot overlook the longstanding disputes coupled with a continuing strategic divergence over the PYD issue, which Turkey considers a national security threat. The Manbij agreement certainly helped to come to a common understanding on the northern Syrian city but it remains uncertain if it can be extended to the areas east of the Euphrates. Furthermore, it is a concern for Turkey that the PYD is seeking to cut a deal with the Assad regime to hedge its bets if the U.S. pulls out eventually. The U.S. has not articulated a clear policy on the PYD or about what it seeks to accomplish in northern Syria in the post-Daesh period.

The Trump administration continues to deal with domestic political problems ahead of the November elections. Much of the administration’s foreign policy approach has been about disruption and policy reversals rather than comprehensive strategies. The most consequential policy change for Turkey’s regional strategy might be the Trump administration’s policy reversal toward Iran, which is currently focused on imposing sanctions and isolating the country.

The U.S.’ relationship with Turkey continues to lack a solid policy framework although it benefits from established institutional ties and more robust engagement recently. The new Iran strategy may spell trouble for the relationship if the U.S. ignores Turkey’s concerns. In the absence of a broad framework for the bilateral relationship, we may end up experiencing a rehash of the 2010 disagreement over Iran, which may undermine limited progress in other areas.

The U.S. and Turkey can and most likely will work through specific policy issues but the current uncertainties can certainly destabilize the relationship once again. Both sides have a strong interest in avoiding such a scenario and deepening the strategic conversation will be ever more important to overcome potential spoilers.

The U.S. and Turkey have been pursuing conflicting strategies in northern Syria for a while now. Turkey adamantly pursued to end the U.S. support for the YPG while the Trump administration has seen the group as its “local partner” in the coalition’s anti-Daesh efforts. Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch has recently ended the YPG’s control over Afrin, a city in which the U.S. has declared no interest but expressed “concern” about the Turkish operation. While Turkey is focused on clearing its borders from the YPG and Daesh, the U.S. is insisting that Turkish military operations distract from the fight against Daesh.

The strategies of the two countries diverge from one another so much that they carry the potential to come head to head in Manbij. However, negotiations in bilateral strategy talks, a mechanism established following the former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster and Secretary of State Tillerson’s visits to Turkey, could yield a cooperation deal in Manbij, which could potentially be broadened. In such an optimistic scenario, the anti-Daesh fight would actually be strengthened while Turkey’s security concerns vis-à-vis the YPG could be met. A deal that pushes the YPG back east across the Euphrates and establishes a U.S.-Turkey coordinated patrol of Manbij can be the basis of broadened cooperation in northern Syria.

Today, Turkey is pushing the U.S. to end the YPG control in Manbij, a promise made by Vice President Joe Biden under the Obama administration. The capture of the town was so alarming that Turkey launched Operation Euphrates Shield in August 2016, only a month after the failed coup attempt of July 2016, in order to prevent further spread of the YPG control in the area. For Turkey, the PKK was trying to accomplish what it could not inside Turkey by creating an autonomous zone in northern Syria through the YPG. By intervening for the first time militarily in Syria, Turkey took the matter into its own hands as multiple U.S. reassurances about the short-term and tactical nature of its support for the YPG did not materialize.

Turkey has been able to change the strategic environment on the ground through its military operations at the expense of both the YPG and Daesh. Clearing its border from both terrorist organizations seems to be its current strategy. The U.S. strategy only partially overlaps with the Turkish strategy but that could be considered as a glass half full. Through an arrangement as described above, diversification of the governing structure of Manbij more representative of the ethnic makeup of the area could be accomplished. U.S.-Turkey military cooperation in patrolling the city can be a trust building measure. Such success in Manbij would not erase the overall strategic differences between the two allies but it would pave way for a broader and meaningful strategic conversation.

The U.S.-Turkey strategic realignment will be very difficult to achieve as the U.S. keeps its exclusive focus on Daesh while ignoring Turkey’s legitimate security concerns regarding the YPG. However, if Manbij can serve as a success story of military and political cooperation on the ground, both Ankara and Washington can build upon it. Regular strategic conversations to coordinate policy are a must between the American and Turkish governments and it can start with Manbij. This is true not only for their Syria policies but other regional issues as well.

As the Trump administration is gearing up to pull the U.S. out of the Iran nuclear deal, a new era of uncertainty and tensions will likely emerge. President Trump has championed “America first,” a slogan that at times manifested itself as unilateralism in foreign policy. The recent addition of the Pompeo-Bolton duo to the administration promises more unilateralism than multilateralism. The administration will likely find an unwilling Europe to corner Iran, and Turkey is not likely to take a confrontational stand against Iran. Yet, if the U.S. and Turkey can work together in northern Syria, they could broaden their regional strategic conversation that might also include Iran in the near future. A cooperation in Syria between two NATO allies is not a wishful thinking; it is a matter of whether they will.

On March 13, 2018, Rex Tillerson was fired from his post as Secretary of State. There is a rumor that Tillerson also found out from President Trump’s tweet. Mike Pompeo, who has been the Director of the CIA since February 9, 2017, will become the new Secretary of State and the current deputy director of the CIA will take over his job.

Who is Mike Pompeo?

In 1986, Mike Pompeo graduated top of his class at the U.S. Military Academy at the West Point. Following his graduation, he served as a cavalry officer patrolling the Iron Curtain in the U.S. army until 1991.

In 1991, Pompeo concluded his career in the military and enrolled into Harvard Law School, which he completed in 1994. After his graduation, he started his career in business.

Before Pompeo began to serve as Director of the CIA, he was serving his fourth term in the House of Representatives, as a Republican, Tea Party representative. He was first elected in 2010. He was a member of the House Intelligence Committee and Energy and Commerce panel.

Pompeo was also appointed to the House Select Benghazi Committee to investigate the tragic events in Benghazi, Libya.

Speaking about why he ran for government, Pompeo told the Washington Post, “I have run two small businesses in Kansas, and I have seen how government can crush entrepreneurism. That’s why I ran for Congress.”

After Trump was elected as president on November 8, 2016, he nominated Pompeo as director of the CIA on November 18. The Senate confirmed this nomination on January 23 and Pompeo was sworn in as the director of the CIA on that night.

Pompeo is well known for his royalty to President Trump, as he opposed the nuclear talks with Iran and was also against shutting down Guantanamo Bay. As a Tea Party politician, Pompeo portrays a conservative character who opposes high taxation.

Pompeo and Turkey

Pompeo’s name was first heard within the Turkish media and public when he tweeted about the country – a tweet that was later deleted. In this tweet, Pompeo likens Turkey to Iran.

After becoming the director of the CIA, Pompeo paid his first visit to Turkey on February 9, 2017. He met with Hakan Fidan, head of Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization and then attended a meeting with President Erdogan. On February 10, Pompeo met with Prime Minister Binali Yildirim at Cankaya. The main topics of the meetings were on Syria, the struggle against Daesh and FETO.

Pompeo’s Islamophobic discourse is not unknown to the world. In a speech when he made while being a member of congress, Pompeo stated, “threat to America is from people who deeply believe that Islam is the way and light and the only answer.”

Pompeo is known for having an evangelical Christian character, which can also be linked to a factor contributing to his loyalty to President Trump.

Knowing that Trump has conservative and evangelical politicians who are in important positions in terms of foreign policy, a question comes to mind. Will there be a reset in relations between Turkey and the U.S., which was worrying in the last years of the Obama administration, or will the Turkish government face more of a “Hawk Politics” instead of a compromising U.S.? Time will show.

According to information gathered by a source from Syria’s Haseke province, close to the Anadolu Agency, the US army has apparently delivered combat and mine resistant vehicles via the Semalka border crossing at the Iraq-Syria border.

It is reported that the source added that the terrorist organization plans to dispatch the vehicles and hundreds of militants to the Afrin district in Aleppo province, near the Turkish border.

The PKK/PYD needs to use the Aleppo corridor controlled by the Bashar al-Assad regime and Iran-backed groups for delivering the vehicles.

The PYD and its military wing YPG, are Syrian branches of the PKK, which has waged a war against Turkey for more than 30 years.

Since the PKK launched its terror campaign in Turkey in 1984, tens of thousands of people – including security personnel, women and children – have been killed, including more than 1,200 since July 2015 alone.

The US and the coalition has since ignored the link between the PYD and PKK – which the US, EU and Turkey list as a terrorist group.

Turkey cites the PYD’s deep ties with the PKK in opposing the US cooperation with the PKK/PYD.

While the US accepts the PKK as a terrorist organization, it claims that the PKK’s Syrian offshoot, the PYD, us a “reliable partner” against Daesh.