The US compartmentalizing the Syria crisis by focusing solely on fighting DAESH and leaving that up to the PYD-YPG might mean that it will be left out of the aforementioned solution process.
Especially after Western reactions to the coup attempt on 15 July, 2016 and the American military support for the PKK’s partner organization PYD in Syria, on top of the never-ending accession process with the EU, both the EU and the United States lost their leverage on Turkey.
In return, Turkey had expected the US firstly to accept Ankara’s offer of creating a safe zone in the northern part of Syria, and secondly that it would stop its given and continuing support to the PYD, an offshoot of the PKK in Syria.
Also, the inconsistent policies of allied countries for the refugees during the refugee crisis, along with the existence of ethnic and religious terrorist groups such as the PYD/YPG and DAESH, constitute the external factors that encourage Turkey to be more determined to implement effective education policies.
Euphrates Shield is a dual-edged strategy; first, the intention is to fight against Daesh, to ensure it is unable to penetrate Turkish borders again to carry out further terror attacks against citizens; second, the operation aims to prevent the expansion of PYD control (the Syrian affiliates of the PKK terror organization) along the Turkish borders.
The Euphrates Shield is intended to create a terror-free zone cleared of Daesh and PYD/PKK terrorists by the setting of a security zone between Jarabulus and Azaz within 40 kilometers of northern Syria.
Although US president Barack Obama identified Turkey-US relations in 2008 as representative of a “model partnership”, the tension between the two countries is significant, at present, mostly due to the Syrian crises but particularly because of the US discourse on and policies towards the PYD, the PKK’s Syria branch.
Even if this policy conflicts with the interests of the USA, methodologically, the armed elements in Syria could be treated in the same way that the United States treats the PYD/PKK elements.
This was partly related to the developments taking place in northern Syria, namely, the increasing power and international legitimacy of the PYD, the PKK’s Syria branch.
The political rivalry in Turkey has been joined by the regional conflict between DAESH and the PKK, including its splinters such as PYD and YPG, taking it to a military dimension that has facilitated the PKK to carry armed ethnic extremism into Turkey.
Furthermore, Washington’s current preferred alliance with the Democratic Union Party (PYD), which is closely cooperating with the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH remains another serious point of friction between the two sides where Ankara rightfully rejects all kinds of terrorism and naturally expects its NATO ally to show respect and understanding in this regard.
PKK leadership has two new block-partners in this new war: on the one hand, the Russians, the Iranians and the Assad regime through the PKK’s Syrian branch, the PYD, and, on the other, the military support of the US who saw the PYD as a substitute power for its own soldiers in the field war against IS.