To what extent is the Turkish army able to cope with its task of changing the balance of forces in Libya in favor of the Government of National Accord led by Fayez Sarraj, when taking into account the current situation, remoteness of the Libyan theater of operations and the potential of the warring party? How will Turkey’s support of the Government of National Accord of Fayez Sarraj, and Russia’s, albeit less openly and unambiguously, preference for the Libyan National Army and Khalifa Haftar, affect Russian-Turkish relations? And finally, bearing in mind the strategic nature of modern Russian-Turkish relations, how can Libya be prevented from becoming a new Syria in their relationship, moreover, not as in 2019, but as in 2015? As we remember because of Turkey and Russia’s different positions on Syria, in 2015 there was a grave crisis, which was later overcome with great difficulty and which still, sometimes, unpleasantly echoes in Russian-Turkish relations.
Because of the lack of enough natural resources, the Omani regime has tried to increase the welfare level of the country by using the existing reserves as effectively as possible, and allocating returns towards economic development and infrastructure.
The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), institutionalized in 1981 at the height of the Iraq-Iran war, was created to provide a unified security umbrella to the bloc’s micro-states who find themselves unable to face powerful political and economic challenges.
Understanding that diplomatic efforts with regional and international actors could not prevent the establishment of a planned corridor by the YPG terror group in northern Syria, Ankara decided to take a unilateral step towards eliminating the threats against its territorial integrity and national interests.
Northeast Syria was heading towards becoming a PKK statelet and a long-term threat to Turkey’s national security and territorial integrity.
He was, therefore, well-aware that “dragging” Iran to the negotiation table under the terms laid down by his administration was an impossibility at least in the short-run.
The King, “the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” and his troublesome son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) are accused of being involved in many international criminal activities, including the civil war in Yemen and the Khashoggi murder.
Shortly afterwards, U.
It can be said that with its actions, the council is pushing the country towards further instability and chaos.
Following the foundation of Israel, the Saudi administration adopted negative policies towards Israel, defined the country as the enemy in its backyard and made ARAMCO authorities promise that they would not sell oil to Israel.
Recent developments in the Persian Gulf, Israel’s aggressive policies towards Palestine and continuing confrontation between Iran and the United States have created a new environment where the possibility of a region-wide conflict is more obvious than ever.
-Israel-UAE axis, Turkey and some other global actors have sided with the Presidential Council of Libya and the Government of National Accord by staying true to the Libyan Political Agreement (LPA) and the Rome Conference against the attack of warlord Khalifa Haftar on Tripoli.
The article suggests that the reason for this support to Islamophobic groups in the West is simply to fight dissent at home and abroad towards their regimes, which are labelled as Islamist.