On the lush hills of the Myanmar-China border stands an autonomous self-governing polity in Myanmar, the Wa State. It is de facto independent from the rest of the country and has its own political system, administrative divisions and army. Stalemate delves into the captivating history and contemporary political landscape of the United Wa State Army (UWSA), an insurgent force with 20,000-30,000 active forces that stands as Asia’s most formidable.

This narrative of ethnographic exploration paints a vivid picture of an upland community, often brushed aside as mere rebels or linked to drug trade, yet proficiently upholding a unique autonomy that navigates between two dominant states. Rather than sidestepping the neighboring states, the Wa polity actively engages with them, a dynamic that unfolds against the backdrop of sovereignty and statehood struggles.

Through the lens of Andrew Ong’s meticulous analysis, in Stalemate: Autonomy and Insurgency on the China-Myanmar Border readers are led through the political culture entrenched within Wa elites and the general populace, the complex web of UWSA’s international connections, and the intricate capital flows in conjunction with China, illuminating the orchestration behind Wa autonomy. Geopolitical strategy and involvement in the shadow economy is what breathes life into the concept of Wa autonomy. In fact, the book adeptly navigates through the multifaceted borderland geopolitics and the nuances of the shadow economy, highlighting how the United Wa State Army carefully treads this intricate path.

Blending anthropological insights with his personal encounters as a World Food Programme employee in Wa State, Ong delivers a contemplative on-the-ground portrayal of political dynamics in Wa. His objectives, intertwined and interwoven, unfold in three tiers. Primarily, he endeavors to enable readers to perceive the world through the eyes of Wa State’s inhabitants, gaining their perspective. Subsequently, he aims to foster comprehension of the disparities between Wa governance principles and international norms. Lastly, he prompts a reconsideration of conventional interpretations of disorder and stability.

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ine Arab countries have entered the club of the top 40 weapons-buying countries in the world, according to a recent report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). At the same time, between 2018 and 2022, arms imports by European countries increased by 47% compared to 2013-17 while imported arms decreased by 40% in Africa, 21% in the Americas, 7.5% in Asia and Oceania, and 8.8% in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the global powers’ share in arms exports has varied, with the U.S. share increasing from 33% between 2013-2017 to 40% from 2018-2022, while Russia’s share fell from 22% to 16% in the same years. China’s share of global arms exports amounted to 5.2%, Germany’s share stands at 4.2%,  Italy’s at 3.8%, and Israel’s at 2.3% between 2018-2022.

For the first time, two Arab countries, namely Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have joined the list of top 25 arms exporters globally.

Algeria’s global share of arms imports has declined from 4.1% in 2013-2017 to 1.8% in 2018-2022, moving the country from 12^th position to 18^th in arms-importing countries globally. Algeria remains the top country in Africa importing arms.

Morocco’s arms sales have declined from 1.1% in 2013-2017 to 0.8% in 2018-2022 globally. Morocco currently ranks 29^th among arms-exporting countries—a decline from the 21^st position it held.

The GCC takes the lead

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) occupied the first ranking in arms imports, with 180 war jets ordered by the Gulf monarchies out of 260 exported to the Middle East. Notably, arms exports to the Arab Maghreb have declined while exports to Egypt, which has 4.2% of the global share of arms imports, remained the same.

In 2018-2022, Saudi Arabia came after India in global arms imports, with a total percentage of 9.6% following India’s 11%.

Saudi Arabia’s arms imports declined slightly from 10% of global arms purchases in 2013 to of 8.7% in 2017.

Qatar moved from the position of the world’s 17^th arms importer in 2013-2017, to third in the world in 2018-2022, with an increase of 311%.

The United States was the main contributor to exporting arms to Qatar with 42%, followed by France with 29%, and Italy with 14%.

Egypt and the UAE

The economic crisis in Egypt did not affect the share of its arms imports. Although Egypt receives approximately $1.3 billion annually in U.S. military aid, the United States is not among the top three arms suppliers to Cairo.

Instead, Russia topped this list with circa 34%, followed by Italy and France with 19% each.

On the other hand, the UAE arms imports have declined moving the country from fifth place in the world (2013-2017) to 11^th (2018-2022).

It is likely that the decline in the country’s arms imports is related to the country’s shift towards manufacturing its own weapons, and even exporting them, thus joining the club of top 25 arms exporters.

The UAE ranked 18th in the world in arms exports, accounting for 0.4% of the world’s total arms exports.

Between 2018 and 2022, the UAE exported 28% of Egypt’s arms imports, 27% of Jordan’s, and 15% of Algeria’s.

The United States was the main supplier of arms to the UAE, with about 66%, followed by Turkey (7.4%).

Russia ranked third with 5.4%, although the UAE army is known for its reliance on Western weapons.

The war in Ukraine and East Asian arms exports

Ukraine has become the third-largest recipient of global arms in 2022, accounting for 2% of global arms purchases between 2018 and 2022.

Between the years 2013 and 2017 and the years 2018 and 2022, arms imports by East Asian states increased by 21%. The SIPRI report concluded that “[a]rms imports by China rose by 4.1 per cent, with most coming from Russia. However, the biggest increases in East Asia were by U.S. allies South Korea (+61%) and Japan (+171%).” The report went on to state, “Australia, the largest arms importer in Oceania, increased its imports by 23 per cent.”

The list of major arms importers did not include Arab countries such as Oman, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, Mauritania, and Lebanon.

The Beirut clashes on Thursday, October 14, 2021, signaled a new chapter in the Beirut blast probe.

Protests to remove Beirut blast investigation judge Tarek Bitar, who is leading the investigation on the Beirut blast that killed more than 200 people on August 4, 2020, escalated in an urban guerrilla skirmish, leaving seven people dead and more than 30 wounded.

This time, tensions over the Beirut blast probe have reached a new level, and there are fears of violent escalations.

On October 14, Muslim Shiite parties, Hezbollah and Amal, organized a protest in front of Beirut’s Justice Palace to ask for the suspension of Bitar.

Meanwhile, chaos and confusion erupted in the Tayouneh area and the Ain al-Remmaneh suburb, in the southern suburb of the capital Beirut.

Tayouneh area is not new to sectarian clashes. It was a former 1975-90 civil war front line between Shia and Christian areas. Furthermore, the Ain al-Remmaneh suburb has been the theater of several clashes since the economic crisis started in 2019.

It is still unclear how the skirmish started, but unidentified snipers likely began firing at the protesters. Bursts of gunfire and explosions could be heard from the nearby Justice Palace, scattering the angry demonstrators. Black-clad protestors suddenly moved toward the Tayouneh area, where the Amal-Hezbollah armed groups were involved in gunfire clashes. The exchanges of fire involved snipers, guns, rifles, and rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs).

While Hezbollah and Amal accused the Christian right-wing party Lebanese Forces (LF) of being behind the sniper attack, the LF denied any involvement and condemned the violence. Its leader, Samir Geagea, also blamed the Hezbollah incitement against judge Bitar.

Chaos and confusion ruled the Beirut clashes. I witnessed Amal-Hezbollah demonstrators move from Beirut’s Justice Palace and reach the Tayouneh area, near the urban park Horsh Beirut.

Lebanese Army soldiers were deployed in the surrounding area to stop demonstrators and contain the violence. Military vehicles blocked the road and joined the epicentre of the clashes, where the shootings were ongoing.

Demonstrators approached soldiers asking them to let them pass. Meanwhile, hooded armed men, most likely Hezbollah-Amal demonstrators, appeared on the road and started to shoot in the air near the Lebanese Army, which took no action.

I also witnessed a crowd surround and attack an unidentified vehicle, and heard several other shots. It was not clear what happened as crowds obstructed the view of the vehicle. I didn’t see any wounded persons during these chaotic events. Gunfire exchanges and explosions could be heard in the immediate proximity of army deployment.

The Lebanese Red Cross reported seven dead and more than 30 wounded. Civil Defence volunteers and army soldiers evacuated people trapped in the crossfire.

The Beirut clashes have caused panic and fear among Lebanese. Gunfire and explosions echoed, the wailing sirens of ambulances and evacuations revived memories of the 1975-1990 civil war.

Four bullets fell near a private French school in Furn El Chebbak neighborhood, causing panic among children, as reported by media and confirmed by several pictures published online.

Not all of the casualties were participants in the protests. Among the seven dead, a woman was shot in the head by a stray bullet in her house, and a delivery worker on duty was shot in the crossfire.

Following the Beirut clashes, the Presidency of Lebanon declared a day of mourning. Banks, schools, and public offices were closed. The Lebanese Army increased its deployment near the area of the clashes.

The Lebanese Army arrested nine people following the violence, according to a press statement. Currently, it is also probing a soldier suspected of firing towards protesters during clashes.

The burden of pressure over the Beirut clashes unexpectedly brought the Beirut Port Explosion Victims Association’s spokesperson Ibrahim Hoteit to call for the removal of Bitar. In a video circulating last Friday, he accused the judge of politicization and the U.S. of involvement in the investigation.

The politicization of the probe has polarized public opinion and exacerbated the public debate. Whoever supports Bitar’s efforts for accountability and justice over the disastrous explosion now has to face those who want his suspension from the investigation.

Furthermore, the Beirut blast probe has led to sectarian clashes, which brought the investigation to a level of tension never touched before.

For the first time since the probe started, Hezbollah and Amal have mobilized armed militias and supporters to spark fear and pressure political institutions into removing Bitar.

It is unclear if the LF has been actively involved in the clashes, but the LF-Hezbollah’s rivalry seems to have poured into the Beirut blast investigation.

The violence that erupted at a boundary between Christian and Shiite neighborhoods added new concerns over the stability of the country. Amid such sectarian drift, the Lebanese people find themselves gripped between fear and the threat of further escalations amid an unprecedented economic crisis that is eroding the country’s social fabric.

Sources reported that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was badly wounded in gunfire in Kabul over a disagreement among the Taliban leaders on how to resolve the Panjshir situation and government structure. The Taliban later denied that Baradar was wounded. Nevertheless, a source asserted that the Deputy Afghan PM Mullah Baradar is upset with the current face of the Taliban government.

The Taliban formed the government and appointed ministers after 20 years of fighting the U.S. and the Afghan government. Last month, the Taliban swiftly reached the capital and took over 33 of the 34 provinces in the country without major impediment. However, despite a massive aerial and ground encroachment on Panjshir, the resistance against the Taliban is still alive.

The Taliban are going through a transition from guerilla fighting to governance, bringing order to a multiethnic nation, and adjusting within the contemporary world. War and governance are two distinct issues. Now that the Taliban must govern, they face numerous challenges.

Governance: No single institution is functional

The Taliban had vowed that the group would form an inclusive government where all political parties, ethnicities, and classes see themselves in the government. Nevertheless, last week, they announced their first cabinet where only their leaders and commanders are appointed. The announcement faced massive criticism since it did not include a single woman or any Hazara ethnics, whereas Afghanistan is home to millions of Hazaras.

The appointed ministers lack governmental experience, and no minister has a PhD, master’s, or undergraduate degree, while all the cabinet members, including its chief minister, are religious scholars. In addition, many of the skillful, well-educated, and experienced Afghans have already left Afghanistan and those who remain are striving to get out.

Human rights and the Taliban

The Taliban’s fastidious form of Islam has been met with deep concerns by human rights organizations and movements across the globe. In a democratic and liberal society, the Taliban apply an interpretation of Sharia law where music is banned, and women’s rights to education and work are limited or completely halted. This decision has brought the group face-to-face with criticism by the international community.

For the past 20 years, women enjoyed access to education and work – rights that they are now denied to them by the Taliban. Concurrently, Afghans have been posting on social media videos of Taliban flogging women on the streets and searching houses for affiliates of the previous government.

Such actions have led to women’s demonstrations in Kabul and a massive protest in Kandahar against the Taliban. The social media campaigns and attacks on them have discomforted the Taliban to the extent that the group couldn’t fully comprehend and mark its victory. Afghans and their sympathizers across the globe have been actively engaged in publicizing the Taliban’s actions. Relying on social media, the global media formulate news and update policy-makers across the world about the Taliban. The Taliban are monitored by ordinary Afghans’ cell phones, who record their moves and in one click inform the entire world.

The Taliban and the economy

The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that Afghanistan faces a dramatic humanitarian crisis. The warning comes after international aid to Afghanistan has dried up, businesses are closed, investments have fled, unemployment has reached an all-time high, and poverty is rife. The protracted conflict and drought have exacerbated the humanitarian catastrophe. The UN reports that in 2021 alone, over half a million people have been internally displaced in Afghanistan.

The Taliban now manage revenue sources such as customs; however, in the absence of trades, investments, and businesses, the customs do not generate enough revenue. In fact, they do not even cover the daily expenses of the Taliban’s sustenance and fuel expenses. The Taliban also do not have access to the $9.5 billion in assets belonging to Afghanistan’s central bank, which have been frozen by the United States. The country’s economic situation and the humanitarian catastrophe are causing genuine hardship to the Taliban.

Security challenges: National Resistance Front and ISIS-K  

In Afghanistan, Taliban fighters were not the only security threat to the country. Among others, the fighters of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) have conducted numerous attacks and have fought hard against the Taliban. After the fall of Kabul, ISIS-K published a commentary where the group accused the Taliban of betraying Jihadists with the peace agreement with the U.S., and the group vowed to continue fighting the Taliban. Since the Taliban took over the capital, ISIS-K has carried out deadly attacks.

Among others, the fighters of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) have conducted numerous attacks and have fought hard against the Taliban.

Last month, ISIS-K fired rockets in Kabul followed by a statement which read, “By the grace of God Almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate targeted Kabul International Airport with six Katyusha rockets.” In another incident, the group carried out twin suicide attacks against a crowd outside of the Kabul airport killing 85 people, including 13 Americans. It is estimated that the group has 4,000 to 5,000 fighters in Afghanistan. In an interview with CNN, Abdul Munir, a commander of the so-called Islamic State stated that he leads 600 fighters, including Indians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians. He added, “When the foreigners and the people of the world leave Afghanistan, we can resume our operations.”

Apart from the so-called Islamic State, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) is another headache for the Taliban. Even though the Taliban fighters have seized the center of Panjshir, the NRF fights from the mountains of Panjshir. The majority of the commanders of the Northern Alliance (officially the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), including Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum, Atta Mohammad Noor, and Hazara leaders have fought heavily against the Taliban.

Ismail Khan, another prominent commander in the  Panjshir resistance, asserted that the Taliban’s rule will not last and that Panjshir resistance is expanding. These commanders have opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan. Should they begin a resistance, they would put the Taliban’s government in hardship.

International isolation and the Taliban

The previous Afghan government was recognized worldwide; however, despite the Taliban having appointed their cabinet and chief minister, no country is amenable to recognizing their government – even the countries that have supported them in fighting the U.S. Despite Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, the country has not recognized their government. Iran and Russia, once amicable to the Taliban, now move in a different direction. Tehran slammed attacks on Panjshir Valley and urged the Taliban to honor commitments. It also slammed Pakistan’s aerial attacks on Panjshir and said it will probe into the attacks.

On the other side, Moscow has sent its military to Tajikistan to block potential threats from Afghanistan. The Taliban also face international isolation. The European Union had already threatened the Taliban with isolation if they seize power. In addition, Germany’s foreign minister stated, “A transitional government that does not include other groups is not the signal for more international cooperation and stability in the country.”

The E.U.’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said in a statement that the Taliban would face international isolation. NATO, the UN, and Britain warned that the Taliban will be isolated should they continue to take power by force, and that the international community will not recognize the group. Importantly, the president of the United Nations Security Council for September warned that the Taliban must sever ties with all international terrorist organizations or continue to face sanctions and isolation.

Should the Taliban not dramatically change their ideas and actions, the group might face extinction as it cannot govern a complicated country in a complicated region. To govern, the Taliban need legitimacy from the people, international recognition, and monetary resources. Meanwhile, they halted political dialogue and encroached on the National Resistance Front in Panjshir. Yet, a good lesson to be learned in Afghanistan today is that when the Taliban were toppled in 2001, they soon resurfaced in Bahramcha in the Helmand Province.

Should the Taliban not genuinely engage with the world and Afghan parties on the issues of concern, there are risks of facing international sanctions and of the emergence of national confrontations.

There are many reasons why nations go to war and even more why they go to civil war. The history of Lebanon in this respect is full of examples why this small Mediterranean nation is always perceived as vulnerable to civil strife.

Lebanon’s current economic and political collapse has unfortunately been a long time coming, as its archaic and medieval political system has struggled for decades to keep itself afloat. Corruption mixed with Iran’s Lebanon proxy Hezbollah have gradually detached Lebanon from the financial safety net which the Gulf Arab states and the international community has always provided.

While many have blamed the failure of the Lebanese political system and the tendency to go to war on sectarianism and international intervention, the crux of the problem lies in Lebanon’s 18 religious sects who have failed to recognize that updating the power-sharing formula, as they did in 1989 with the Taif Agreement, is insufficient if this change is not reflected in the constitution in a manner that provides stability and ultimately paves the way for a sustainable and functional state.

As it seems, there are many indicators which lead one to assume that civil war is at the gates. But, in reality, Lebanon’s current predicament requires more than a civil war to be resolved as many of the elements needed for civil war are non-existent – if not to say meager, at least in the foreseeable future.

As it stands, the only heavily armed and militarized faction in Lebanon is Hezbollah whose involvement and fighting experience in Iran’s regional expansionist project makes it lethal if civil war were to break out in Lebanon. While the rest of Lebanon’s sects and political parties maintain their own version of Praetorian Guards, some of whom were part of the Lebanese Civil War (1975-1990), their small weapons and limited training does not qualify them to a face-off with Hezbollah.

Perhaps more importantly and for the time being, the regional and international appetite for strife is non-existent. The regional tensions between the Arab Gulf states and Iran have shifted the former’s attention to protecting their home front, especially in Yemen and Iraq, two areas which Iran and its proxies have infiltrated and used as bases to attack foreign and Arab interests.

In practical terms, recent events which transpired on the ground confirmed that civil war in Lebanon is a zero-sum game as the sectarian composition and division brought about by the 15 years of civil war has virtually created homogenous sectarian units and thus any military action on behalf of Hezbollah at the moment will not yield any clear-cut military victory. Instead, it will further flame sectarian tensions.

Recently, Hezbollah faced off with the Arab (Sunni) tribes of Khalde, south of the capital Beirut, and the Druze inhabitants of the village of Shwaya in the area adjacent to the Lebanese-Palestinian borders, which showed the limits of Hezbollah’s Iranian weapons at least internally.

In Khalde, Hezbollah could not react to the Arab tribes avenging the death of one of their own at the hands of a Hezbollah member just like in Shwaya, where the Druze intercepted a Hezbollah rocket launcher as they refused to turn their homes into potential targets for Israeli retaliation.

Be that as it may, the abovementioned factors, or lack thereof, do not really dismiss the chances of violence breaking out in Lebanon. Any sort of civil strife, though, will not remotely resemble the 15 years of civil war the Lebanese experienced or were told about by their family. The violence which will break out will be guided by fear of famine and the collapse of social order brought about by the total erosion of the Lebanese state.

If the Lebanese do not realize that this illusion of a system they live under needs to change, sooner rather than later, they will be faced with a mutated beast of violence, a beast which their sectarian safety net will not be able to contain, nor external intervention of any kind will be able to suppress.

The specter of civil war(s) is always looming over Lebanon, but, this time around, the international community and the many regional factions are not interested or willing to invest time and money in a country which has proved to be a bigger burden than ever. As Lebanon stands, it is merely an inconvenience and no longer a model of coexistence or diversity as some claim.

The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 when the Houthi rebels commenced their gradual, but violent takeover of the capital city Sana’a. This led to a coup that forced President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi out to his home town and temporary capital city, Aden in February 2015.

By March, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, to oust the rebels, restore the government and to bring stability to the region. The coalition became notorious for violating human rights, bombing civilians and destroying vital Yemeni infrastructure.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree that the Houthis are the main threat to regional security. Despite the rebels’ military capabilities have never been enough to change the balance of power in the region, their strong links to the Iranian regime turns the Houthis into a threat by proxy.

The group, which is based in the northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia, has the capability to attack major Saudi cities, including Jeddah. Rockets fired from Yemeni territory are regularly intercepted, however in situations where they aren’t, the Houthis are able to inflict damage.

On November 23, 2020, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking an Aramco oil company distribution station in the city of Jeddah. Houthi spokesman, Yahya Sarea, warned foreign companies and residents in the neighbouring kingdom, saying they should exercise caution as “operations will continue.”

“The strike was very accurate, and ambulances and fire engines rushed to the target,” Sarea said, explaining that the Houthis used an Iranian-made Quds-2 type winged missile to carry out the attack.

Such attacks not only harm Saudi Arabia, but demoralize the rest of the Gulf Arab countries as weaknesses in their military powerhouse begin to show. Therefore, restoring relative stability and disarming the Houthis in Yemen is paramount to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Where differences begin

Whilst Riyadh and Abu Dhabi agree that a stable Yemen is important to regional security, a problem therein lies in what a stable Yemen looks like and where they are able to secure their separate political and economic interests.

The UAE entered the coalition understanding the way in which Aden is significant to Abu Dhabi’s economic and strategic standing in the region. Having a strong presence in Aden means the UAE would have the luxury of the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with easier access to the Indian Ocean and more control over the Red Sea.

Spreading its sphere of influence to the Socotra Island means the UAE would be able to strengthen its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, as it has shown interest through quietly pumping investment into the island and arming secessionists.

The southern separatists seek renewed independence for southern Yemen, which was ruled as a separate state until 1990.

The UAE also heavily backed local resistance forces in Aden and other parts of the southern regions to liberate them from the Houthis. However, areas from the northern areas such as Taiz, which has a reputation for being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, did not receive as much help from the UAE, despite it being besieged by the Houthi rebels.

On August 6, 2019, two fighters from the UAE-backed Southern Security Belt were killed during clashes with pro-Hadi government forces. A day later, the STC deputy leader, Hani bin Breik, marched on the Maasheeq Palace in Aden and called on secessionists to overthrow Hadi’s government in the coastal city.

It became clearer than ever that the UAE is fuelling a “war within a war” inside Yemen; not only distracting from the original aim of ousting the Houthis, but putting its interests in Yemen before achieving the aim of the Saudi-led coalition.

From the outside looking in, the coalition was divided which was creating yet more bloodshed in Yemen in addition to the casualties the indiscriminate coalition airstrikes have caused.

Reconciliation and hope for the future

In a bid to restore relative stability, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement in Riyadh on November 5, 2019. The ambitious Riyadh Agreement aimed to create a 50-50 cabinet and to work together to restore the Hadi government back to Sana’a.

The unity government was initially supposed to be formed in 30 days, but it took more than a year. By December 19, 2020, the government was formed.

The unity government can be as successful as long as the reasons behind its formation remain stronger than the divisions that continue to haunt northern and southern Yemen. It’s impossible to say that the newly formed government will solve a problem that created wars between the two populations and caused southern separatists to believe that northern Yemen was occupying the south.

In order to nurture a strong unity government that goes beyond temporarily sustaining peace, grievances of both populations need to be heard and longer-term solutions must be brought to the table by creating a democratic space and ample conflict resolution. The unity government must be seen as a stepping stone to lasting stability, not an ultimate achievement.

Women, local leaders and religious and tribal figures need to be included and sustainable vision for a well-represented and localised Yemeni government must be on the table for a fruitful post-war vision. As it stands, the unity government is all-male, creating a cabinet that excludes women for the first time in 20 years.

Can the explosion create more divisions?

On December 30, 2020, an aircraft carrying members of the recently formed unity government landed at Aden International Airport, only for the passengers to be met with explosion and gunfire as they disembarked.

The attack left 25 people dead and 110 others injured, but none of the passengers were hurt. At the wake of the attack, there were concerns how such an assault could affect the unity government.

Both the Hadi government and the STC blamed the Houthi rebels of the attack. Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik sustained accusation that the Houthis were behind the explosions.

“Preliminary investigations indicate that Houthi militias stand behind this crime,” Saeed said as the newly reshuffled Cabinet met for the first time in Aden on December 31, 2020, adding that “intelligence also indicates that some Iranian experts were prepping for such an operation over the last few months.”

On October 23, a ceasefire was signed following the successful campaign by Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to roll back General Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli with Turkish military help. All units are supposed to return to their camps and all foreign forces [including training crews] to leave within three months.

Registration was to begin immediately with a view to integration or demobilization. Land and air crossings are supposed to be opened and media escalation and hate speech to halt. A joint security room will form a monitoring force. The 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC) will develop a mechanism with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to monitor the implementation.

Signs of hope in Libya

Some real progress has been made. Despite an attack by Haftar forces on Ubari November 28, the ceasefire has generally held and exchanges of detainees have continued. Flights between Benghazi, Tripoli, Sebha, Ghat and Ubari have resumed. Oil production, almost stopped after Haftar closed most sites in January, is now back to pre-blockade levels of 1.2 million barrels per day.

While the 5+5 JMC continues to meet, political and economic negotiations are also happening. On December 7, the Central Bank of Libya held its first unified board meeting since 2014 to discuss exchange rates. UNSMIL has facilitated virtual and in-person sessions of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum [LPDF] on reforming the executive authority. Defying pro-Haftar Speaker Aguila Saleh, 127 out of 200 members of the House of Representatives met in Ghadames and agreed to choose a new speaker at their next session scheduled for December 21.

Saleh held a rival “official” session in Benghazi but less than 20 members showed up. His removal would be a blow to Haftar and his foreign backers: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. Saleh has been the effective civilian face of the eastern government despite Haftar’s attempted dismissal of all civilian authorities on April 27.

All of this is largely positive. So, has the civil war come to an end? Though we hope progress will continue, we are only at the beginning of the beginning. Recent history shows how difficult the road ahead will be.

Elections in Libya can be a step forward

According to the LPDF plan, presidential and parliamentary elections should be held December 24, 2021. This would be an important step, if they take place and are reasonably free and fair. However, as we saw before, elections are not a panacea. The results must be broadly accepted. Then comes the infinitely harder and more important challenges of making laws and governing. Between now and then other major obstacles remain.

The two sides have not begun to withdraw their combatants. Addressing the LPDF on December 2, UNSMIL acting chief Stephanie Williams noted that 20,000 foreign forces still on Libyan soil besides continued hate speech and human rights abuses.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills.

Haftar began his April 2019 offensive just days before a UN supported peace conference was to start, so the GNA is unlikely to want to give up its protector. Turkey has already indicated its forces will stay as long as the internationally recognized government wants them to.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills. One option would be a reasonably robust international peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and help separate the parties.

In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Qaddafi left hollowed-out security institutions. Most of the officers were colonels and most of the enlisted personnel were sergeant majors – generally near retirement age. Authorities constantly squabbled among themselves. In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. The old guard and the revolutionaries did not trust each other much. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Inevitably, many became used to their entitlements and reluctant to reform. While able to come together to combat existential threats like the so-called “Islamic State” [IS or Daesh] or Haftar’s advance on Tripoli, they tend to fight amongst themselves and against the Government when not under imminent danger.

There needs to be a comprehensive plan, accepted by most, if not all, with effective coordination. Transitional mechanisms will be needed for the different formations to come under an overarching structure with a generous, unified benefits structure for pay and retirement to avoid jealousy. This is essentially what South Africa did at the end of Apartheid.

Though that country still has issues, it has avoided falling back into civil war. A professional training mission should support this transition, focusing not just on basic training but also on effective democratic governance of the security sector. Ideally, this would be an international mission with a NATO backbone since it has the infrastructure. If it is composed of only a few countries, Libyans may not trust it. Fortunately, there are some plans created in 2012-2013 that lay out a vision of what Libyan security forces could look like, so the work does not need to start from scratch.

New player or new attitude in Libya?

A major factor will be the incoming American administration. Under President Obama, the U.S. did not get engaged much until IS arrived. President Trump was even more nonchalant, particularly given his indulgence to Middle Eastern autocracies, until Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries started showing up.

President-elect Biden has declared that he will be less permissive. A recent report by the Defense Department’s Inspector General invoking UAE funding of these fighters is a factor in bipartisan Congressional opposition to arms sales to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As they fight back with their impressive public relations arsenals, we will have to wait a few more months to see whether real change will come.

Disclaimer: The opinions above are those of Mr. Reid alone and do not purport to represent the United Nations.