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t was 1997, and the first elections that Imran Khan’s Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (Movement for Justice, PTI) had contested. The party’s candidate secured about 19 votes from the polling station in an area of a small town in Punjab, Sadiqabad. That was an apt reflection of his position in national politics as well, where his PTI couldn’t secure a single seat. His detractors were proven right: the delusions of grandeur that followed the cricket World Cup of 1992, where Khan had led his team, had got the best of him. He was shrugged off as being irrelevant by Benazir Bhutto’s Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and Nawaz Sharif’s Pakistan Muslim League (PMLN), the two major parties at the time.

In the 2000s, during General Musharraf’s military rule, Khan remained in opposition, albeit with only one seat that he was able to win in the 2002 elections. The PTI boycotted the following elections, held in 2008, alleging the system was rigged in favor of the corrupt.

But Khan’s party began to gather steam in the years preceding the 2013 elections and surprisingly came forth as the second-biggest party by popular vote in the 2013 elections, securing 35 seats in the lower house of parliament, the National Assembly. With just one seat in the 2002 and zero seats in the 2008 elections, this rise to 35 seats was phenomenal.

Then came the elections of 2018, in which the PTI secured 149 seats, leaving the PMLN trailing behind at 82. But the party was still short of the coveted number of 172 needed to form a government. It was left with no option but to invite smaller parties to a coalition to be led by the PTI. In any case, Imran Khan—long played down for his poor political acumen and irrelevance in national politics—had finally risen to become the prime minister of Pakistan within about two decades of entering politics.

Pakistan under Khan

Imran Khan had won elections on the promise of a “Naya Pakistan” (New Pakistan), an Islamic welfare state. He refashioned and expanded the existing Benazir Income Support Programme into the state-of-the-art Ehsaas cash transfers program for the poor, opened soup kitchens and shelters for the poor, and introduced fully state-sponsored health insurance in two provinces that were governed by the PTI, making treatment at government and many private hospitals free for over two-thirds of the population of the world’s fifth most populous country.

This was in addition to the other measures taken to give voice to the common person, such as the Citizen’s Portal, where any citizen could lodge a complaint online for any issues they faced in public services, and various other digitization initiatives for smooth provision of public services and reduction in red tape.

Even with COVID19 wreaking havoc across the world, Khan’s government performed decently in containing the pandemic and its economic fallout. Pakistan did not suffer the catastrophic mortality rates that both its neighboring countries—Iran and India—did, nor did it see a similar dip in its GDP. Moreover, the expansion of the social safety nets helped cushion the poor to muddle through the crisis.

Still, it was not all sunshine and roses. The government’s economic management left much to be desired. The IMF program kept getting interrupted—and prolonged—because of slippages in meeting targets, and policy inconsistency and uncertainty remained a problem throughout Khan’s time in office. Meanwhile in Khan’s almost four years in office, inflation was roughly double what it had been in the preceding four years.

Khan, the establishment, and a new-found camaraderie

Khan was quite popular when he assumed the premiership. However, he owed at least a share of that popularity to the tacit support of the powerful Pakistani military establishment. In fact, Khan’s rivals accused the momentous rally he held on October 30, 2011, which set up the tone for the PTI’s successful 2013 election campaign that saw its rise to second-largest party by popular vote, as having been sponsored by the military establishment.

Later, in 2018, when the PTI was short of the magic number of 172 seats to form a government, it was the establishment-leaning parties, such as the Pakistan Muslim League (PMLQ), the Balochistan Awami Party (BAP), and the Muttahida Qaumi Movement – Pakistan (MQM), which joined the PTI-led coalition, enabling Khan to become premier. But even before that, in the run-up to the 2018 elections, many candidates had warmed up to the PTI primarily because it was seen as the King’s (establishment) party.

Khan provided a fresh alternative to the establishment. He was clean, driven, and was ready to work under its auspices. General Bajwa, the military chief at the time, developed a good understanding with Khan and helped habilitate his government in both the domestic and international contexts. This helped the PTI-led coalition, as Khan’s party was mostly made of new politicians and was seen as inexperienced. In no time, Khan developed a warm relationship with the Arab Gulf states too—especially, Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MBS).

Countries like Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar had the international clout needed to bolster Pakistan’s position internationally, which helped break the ice with the U.S. Trump-led administration. At the same time, the influence of these regional heavyweights, which historically were practically lenders-of-the-last-resort to Pakistan, significantly eased things for Khan domestically as well.

The disillusionment

Yet, for someone like Khan, known for being headstrong throughout his life, working under the establishment’s influence was not an option. As the honeymoon period of his government neared its end, he started asserting his will. Khan wanted full control of his government, a relentless crackdown on corruption, and autonomy in devising foreign policy—as the PTI’s manifesto had promised.

Being the gung-ho type that he is, Khan was looking to make waves with radical changes in all spheres. General Bajwa, being relatively temperate, preferred stability and a continuation of the status quo, of which he was himself a part. For him, Khan was somewhat of a loose cannon.

Clearly, Khan was not cut out for the tightrope he was having to tread, and eventually, things fell apart.

Khan’s fall

As Khan diverged from Pakistan’s long-standing positions on various facets of foreign policy, his problems grew beyond Pakistan’s borders to ruffle feathers globally. His warming up to Turkey and Malaysia, and the idea of a new Islamic bloc besides the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC) was not received well in Saudi Arabia; his flat rejection of the recognition of Israel irked the regional powers which had already yielded to its growing influence.

Khan’s tilt towards Russia and China, and the denial of air bases to the United States, which was looking to maintain a presence in the region after the withdrawal from Afghanistan, angered the Biden administration. His strong exception to the letter by European countries’ ambassadors insisting on condemning the Russian onslaught on Ukraine irritated Europe. The U.S. was not ready to hear an “Absolutely no” to a question about bases, and European countries were not ready for rhetoric of the sort “Are we your slaves?”

How far-fetched is it to believe that global powers – with purpose, capacity, and reach, embark on regime change? In fact, it is not just probable, but likely. From Mossadegh in Iran, Rousseff in Brazil, Gaddafi in Libya, or several U.S. orchestrated regime change operations in Latin America, this is nothing out of the ordinary. It is a reality hiding in plain sight, openly attributed to the concept of American exceptionalism.

Therefore, outright dismissiveness of this possibility in Pakistan – with the illegal, unconstitutional removal of former Prime Minister Imran Khan, is not just disconcerting, but contrived. Loud, boisterous proclamations condemning the accusation of regime change seem so phony – especially coming from scholars of political science.

“I’m haunted every day…by the lies I told,” writes American author John Perkins in his New York Times best-seller Confessions of an Economic Hitman. “I’m haunted by the payoffs to the leaders of poor countries, the blackmail, and the threats that if they resisted, if they refused to accept loans that would enslave their countries in debt, the CIA’s jackals would overthrow or assassinate them.”

In compelling detail, Perkins describes the ways by which U.S. hegemony privileges an elite minority in countries of the Global South to convince them to mortgage their country’s wealth and policymaking. Whether it is by highly paid professionals that encourage the target country to accept loans in order for “corporatocracy” to flourish, or by local ‘kept rajas,’ who manipulate local policymaking in service of their foreign masters.

The consequences are simple: forfeiture of sovereignty. For those who resist, a well-orchestrated plan erupts to engineer regime change – through character assassination, bribery, parliamentary manipulation or, if necessary, murder.

Today, Perkin’s powerful, ominous words are hauntingly familiar as Pakistan – a nuclear nation of 220 million people, has been thrown into political disarray. Why? A vote of no confidence, allegedly orchestrated by the U.S., has removed the fiery, incorruptible Imran Khan. All this due to alleged U.S. unhappiness with Pakistan’s independent foreign policy, refusal to condemn Russia, allow drone strikes in Afghanistan, and an ‘iron-clad’ brotherhood with China.

As is customary according to diplomatic protocol, Pakistan officially lodged a strong protest and summoned the U.S. diplomat in Islamabad to condemn the meddling. If this is not an unequivocal instance of foreign interference in Pakistan’s internal politics, then what is?

Secondly, Khan’s government persuasively argues that it’s not just the evidentiary nature of the letter, but the context from which it emerges. The opposition focus, and the Supreme Court judgement, both remarkably avoid any mention of foreign interference, horse-trading, politicians on bail for corruption – even murder. Nor do they honestly acknowledge the National Security Committee, who agreed that there was a blatant interference.

What about the clandestine Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) dissident meetings with foreign diplomats? How about the recorded conversations with former National Security Advisor Moeed Yusuf with his American counterpart and instances of the clear hostile messages made to Pakistan’s outgoing Ambassador Asad Majid? All this has a direct bearing on the validity of vote of no confidence and Supreme Court decision.

After all, Khan’s government claims it has hard evidence of the horse-trading and bribery. If true, this is further evidence of an affront to the constitution and in clear violation of the rule of law. Is it not gross negligence, perhaps even treasonous, that neither the Supreme Court nor the opposition acknowledge this?

Third, in an unprecedented outpouring of grief, anger and determination, massive protests are occurring all over Pakistan. What is so inspiring is that these huge crowds were spontaneous. Millions of people across the country, in every major city, exploded in support of Imran Khan.

The powerful voices of hundreds of thousands of people were reverberating in the air with chants of ‘God is the Greatest.’ The chant means ‘there is nothing worthy of worship other than God’ and ‘the people will not accept an imported government’ – in clear reference to the new government being thrust on the people by foreign powers. Even Khan’s twitter account broke all records with over 160,000 people tuning in at the same time. It was nothing short of a spectacle.

This eruption of overwhelming popular mobilization screams to the world ‘we are not your slaves.’ It poses a direct, immediate threat to the teetering political order. And, this anger is not just directed at the opposition, but all those who facilitated this subjugation. Imagine the absurdity of asking someone to stand idly by as laws meant to protect society are being trampled by a privileged few. How could the judiciary allow murderers, traitors and convicted criminals abuse Pakistan’s parliamentary democratic structures in this way?

The Supreme Court’s bias is rightly being called out and their protestations seem so hollow and hypocritical. After all, the former head of Pakistan’s opposition, and newly minted Prime Minister, is himself on bail for corruption cases. It’s a strange, dystopic reality that has emerged.

Today, the overwhelming majority of Pakistan inwardly feel shame due the bizarre developments over the past few days. It’s not just that Imran Khan was removed from political office, but those who replaced him are the unethical, corrupt elite who do not represent the people. The new government is dominated by all those on corruption charges. In fact, 24 out of the 34 newly selected/imported cabinet are out on bail for various criminal offenses.

This is a horrible joke on the dignity of a nation. What makes this worse is that this imported government contains people who have previously viciously attacked state institutions, including the prestige of the army. As a result, demoralization, resentment, and anger is commonplace, which is feeding revolutionary fervor. This is a dangerous time for the people of Pakistan, and the powers that be must recognize this situation for what it is, and demand elections.

As Russian President Vladimir Putin has launched a “special military operation” against Ukraine, many countries and regional organizations reacted with condemnation, criticism, and sanctions while some others declared their support for Russia. For many countries in Asia and Africa, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a tightrope walk. Taking a neutral stance is regarded as an expression of support for Russia, and many leaders are concerned about the long-term consequences of publicly criticizing the Russians.

India and the Invasion of Ukraine

India maintains close ties with Russia and the United States. New Delhi has traditionally refrained from criticizing Russian aggression, including the Russo-Georgian war in 2008 and the annexation of Crimea in 2014.

Despite being a key player in the U.S.-led Quad in Asia, India has maintained a unique and privileged strategic relationship with Russia. In recent years, India has diversified its defense procurement, and much of the recently procured high-end defense equipment in the Indian inventory is of Western origin, particularly American and French; however, Russia still remains India’s largest arms supplier and a critical strategic ally.

Between 2016 and 2020, Russia supplied more than half of India’s arms imports. Close relationships with Moscow not only provided top-of-the-line military equipment, but also the much-desired strategic autonomy to India.

At a time when New Delhi has invested a lot of political capital in strengthening its ties with Washington, it is not easy for India to strike a delicate balance between its relationships with the United States, Europe, and Russia.

Between 2016 and 2020, Russia supplied more than half of India’s arms imports.

India’s archrival, Pakistan, which has had strained relations with Russia in the past, is now trying to improve its bilateral relations. Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan met with President Putin in Moscow as the Russian military forces were invading Ukraine. Khan’s visit to Moscow happened at the cost of Pakistan’s straining relations with the United States.

The timing of Khan’s visit may give the impression that Pakistan indirectly supported Putin’s decree on breakaway regions in eastern Ukraine, as well as the invasion, which began just hours after Khan arrived in Moscow. Pakistani officials have insisted that Khan’s visit to Moscow had nothing to do with the ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine. The visit was planned much earlier, and Khan and Putin stated that they discussed bilateral and South Asian issues during their meeting on Thursday.

The challenge for Pakistan will be to strengthen ties with Russia without alienating Western trade partners.

At a time when the world has become increasingly divided between the Western and China-Russia camps, it has become ever more difficult for India and Pakistan, South Asia’s rivals, to remain neutral.

The challenge for Pakistan will be to strengthen ties with Russia without alienating Western trade partners, all while balancing a growing defense relationship with Ukraine. Islamabad’s balancing act is simpler than that of New Delhi: its relationship with the U.S. is strained, and it has long sought to use its alliance with China to collaborate more closely with Russia, particularly in Afghanistan and Central Asia.

However, given its commercial ties with Europe and desire to play a larger role on the global stage, Islamabad must be cautious not to get too close to Moscow.

Although Pakistani authorities maintain that they want good relations with both China and the United States, and it was difficult to cancel or postpone the visit at the last minute, many Pakistanis believe Imran Khan could have rescheduled his trip.

Israel showed a calculated response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine.

At a time when neutrality and silence are seen as support for Russian aggression in Ukraine, Chinese influence and fear of irritating Russians forced Pakistani officials to go ahead with Khan’s trip to Moscow.

Israel and Ukraine

Israel, which has maintained excellent relations with Russia, demonstrated a calculated response to the Russian aggression in Ukraine, prompting significant criticism in the West. Israel is attempting to strike a balanced tone, doing the bare minimum to meet the bar set by the U.S. while avoiding crossing the red line drawn by Russia.

On February 22, Israel issued an insipid announcement supporting Ukraine’s “territorial integrity” without mentioning Russia. An irritated Russian ambassador to the UN responded by stating that his country opposes Israel’s occupation of the Golan Heights. This reference to Israel’s takeover of the Golan Heights from Syria 55 years ago signaled to Israeli officials that the time had come to get off the fence.

It will be difficult for astute Israelis to fool Putin. Israel expected to take an ambiguous stand, as it did following the 2014 Russian invasion of the Crimean Peninsula. Then, Israel simply abstained from the UN vote, citing a fictitious general strike in their foreign ministry as justification.

Because of its massive military presence on the Syrian side of the occupied Golan Heights border fence, Russia has become Israel’s “northern neighbor.” Russia also enjoys a huge influence on Israel’s archenemy, Iran, and Israel very well knows the repercussions of annoying Russia.

Just two years after the December 1971 war between Pakistan and India, on May 18, 1974, India detonated a nuclear device, confirming it possessed the A-bomb.

Pakistan had already lost a significant part of its land in that war. East Pakistan, which had already been undergoing a civil war, had emerged as the independent state of Bangladesh with help from India. With the war lost, and the country now divided, the timing of the Indian nuclear test could not have been worse.

Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto was under intense pressure to counter what was perceived as a threat to the very sovereignty of Pakistan. Just a few years back, in 1965, in an interview, Bhutto had said that if India built a nuclear bomb, “we will eat grass, even go hungry, but we will get one of our own.”

Sensing what was being cooked next door, he had already directed work on Pakistan’s nuclear program to be initiated and research had already begun in 1972. But it was progressing very slowly, and the prime minister’s restlessness was growing with each passing day. Now, India’s test had come to confirm his worst fears.

Like serendipity, a letter from a hardly known young scientist working in Amsterdam, Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, arrived, in which he offered his services to provide guidance for Pakistan’s nuclear program – Mossad officials would later regret having failed to assassinate him in time.

Dr. Khan, was immediately invited for a meeting by PM Bhutto. Upon his arrival in December 1974, he was surprised to learn that Pakistan’s nuclear program had already set about. What he did not like, however, was that the scientists were relying on the plutonium route. He sharply criticized this approach and explained the viability of the uranium enrichment route to Bhutto. Upon Bhutto’s request, he spelled out the action plan for highly enriched uranium to the scientists of the Pakistan Atomic Energy Commission (PAEC).

One year after the first meeting, when Khan came to his home country for his annual vacation, and happened to visit the site, he was dismayed with the pace of progress. The scientists already working in the PAEC were no lightweights and perhaps had little reason to be receptive towards the views of someone they saw – more or less – as a holidaymaker, coming from Amsterdam for vacation and telling them what to do. The distance bomb-learning program was not working.

But Khan’s frustration over the inefficiency of the program resulted in a reaction he did not expect: Bhutto invited Khan to leave his job, settle in Pakistan, and lead the program. Khan, who was well settled in his new home abroad, which he liked very much, and who also had a wife from the Netherlands, initially expressed hesitance.

Khan had studied metallurgy in Germany, materials engineering in the Netherlands, and obtained a doctorate from the Catholic University of Louvain, Belgium. Just after his doctorate, he had joined the company Verenigde Machinefabrieken Stork-Werkspoor (VMF) in the Netherlands, which had a big portfolio of heavy machinery, including nuclear plants-related equipment.

Khan got posted by VMF as a consultant at Urenco, a uranium enrichment company, which used to provide enriched uranium to power plants in Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the United States. According to Khan, the company was facing problems with designing gas centrifuges, and being an expert in materials, he was one of the engineers posted to this top secret facility.

Thus, Khan brought with him his experience and expertise in designing gas centrifuge technologies for uranium enrichment, which represented perhaps the most critical part in developing weapons-grade nuclear technology. He started working at a rapid pace to build the facility, and to develop and acquire materials and technologies, as fast as possible, without being detected.

Khan was a scientist, a metallurgist, and a nuclear-program architect, but at the same time, he was at the center of a secret network, having to strike deals to procure whatever was required from wherever at minimum cost and in the shortest time. Sometimes, this might have meant defense cooperation with other countries. In any case, the work progressed swiftly, and by the 1980s, Pakistan had achieved the capability for nuclear explosion.

Interestingly, the PAEC and the KRL, both complemented each other, but in many ways emerged as competitors too. Both claimed to have reached the potential to make a bomb in the 1980s using their own routes.

When India mobilized its forces in 1987 and started some of the biggest war exercises since WWII, Pakistani General Zia-ul-Haq landed in India to “watch a test match.” At the airport, he briefly met Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and warned him with a chilling equanimity, “Mr Rajiv, you want to attack Pakistan, do it. But keep in mind that this world will forget Hulagu Khan and Genghis Khan and will remember only Zia-ul-Haq and Rajiv Gandhi, because this will not be a conventional war but a nuclear war…”

With that threat, the war was averted. And Israel’s plans to strike KRL plants with India’s help, had fallen flat too.

The nuclear tests and Khan’s legacy

It was not until 1998 that Pakistan came to the fore with the bomb. When India performed its tests on May 11 and 13, 1998, Pakistan decided to go ahead with its own merely 17 days later. Pakistan conducted its nuclear explosions in an unpopulated, granite mountain range in Balochistan Province, under the name “Chaghi-I” on May 28, 1998 and “Chaghi-II” on May 30, 1998.

Before this, some had doubted Pakistan’s nuclear capability altogether. But the speed of Pakistani reaction came as a surprise even to those who believed it was in possession of an atomic bomb. Independent sources, based on seismic activity, confirmed that Pakistan had indeed conducted nuclear tests.

Today, the country is estimated to have a stockpile of nearly 165 nuclear warheads compared to India’s 156. Moreover, the KRL, in competition with the PAEC, operates a booming missiles program, in addition to other defense equipment.

Meanwhile, Khan became the target of Western media and governments quite early. In 1983, he was sentenced in absentia for trying to steal enrichment secrets from the Netherlands. He denied the charges, citing that the information he used to build the centrifuges was available in various sources which did not need any classified access. His conviction was overturned in 1986.

In 2004, Khan was accused of smuggling nuclear secrets and operating a nuclear black market. Pakistan, which is not a signatory to the Treaty of the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), and hence not bound by its terms, assured the international community of cooperation to avoid a backlash and possible sanctions.

To the nation’s surprise, the country’s hero appeared on national television and expressed regret over his actions, extending an unconditional apology. He confessed to having supplied gas centrifuge components to Iran, Libya, and North Korea. Immediately, he was put under house arrest to prevent further proliferation.

His house arrest ended in 2009, when a court found the house arrest orders to be illegal; however, his freedom to move remained severely restricted and he was kept under watch until his death on October 10, 2021, a few weeks after he had recovered from COVID19.

For much of the past seven years, the international community has stood on the sidelines as a passive onlooker as Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi, and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) he leads, ratches up telegraphed efforts to eradicate and annihilate the country’s 200 million Muslims.

The United Nations, Western democracies and even the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) each turned a blind eye and deaf ear to a speech given by then BJP president and current Home Affairs Minister Amit Shah in 2019, whereby he vowed to “remove every single infiltrator from the country, except Buddhists, Hindus and Sikhs.”

When the Indian government suddenly stripped Kashmir of its semi-autonomous status by undemocratically revoking Articles 370 and 35A of the Constitution on August 5, 2019, with the unmistakable intent of changing the disputed territory’s Muslim majority demography, it barely caused a ripple outside of Pakistan.

Equally ignored are the country’s year-on-year upward spike in anti-Muslim hate crimes, efforts to strip Muslims of their civil and democratic rights, including the Citizenship Amendment Act, National Register of Citizens, and so-called anti-Love Jihad laws, and nationwide calls for genocide among members of India’s ruling party or its closely held allies.

But when video emerged of a Hindu photographer jumping up and down triumphantly on a lifeless Muslim man, who had been shot and killed seconds earlier by a throng of police officers during an eviction drive in Assam’s Darrang district on September 25, the international community suddenly sprang to attention.

This was the moment the international community witnessed the Indian government cross the proverbial Rubicon River, a point of no turning back from what appears to be an irreversible slide towards genocide. The world now had footage to match a warning made two years ago by Dr. Gregory Stanton, founder of Genocide Watch, when he said, “Preparation for a genocide is definitely underway in India.”

Oman’s Grand Mufti Sheikh Ahmed Al Khalili, who’s widely regarded as one of the most influential clerics in the Middle East, put out a statement accusing the Indian government of “blatant aggression” against Muslims,” and called on Muslim counties to stand united against it.

Dr. Abdulaziz Othman Altwaijiri, former director of Islamic Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (IESCO), accused India’s “Hindu government” of persecuting Muslims “within the framework of a systematic policy and in light of international silence and Islamic inaction.”

There does, however, appear to be a global awakening towards the persecution of Indian Muslims, with the hashtags “India Kills Muslims,” “Indian Muslims Under Attack” and “Boycott Indian Products” trending on social media in Arab and Asian countries, alike.

Whether this evolves into something akin to the Boycott, Divestment and Sanction (BDS) movement against Israel remains to be seen, but what’s clear for now the Modi government’s actions and rhetoric, particularly as they apply to Muslims, is under a level of global scrutiny like never before.

When he became the first Indian prime minister to not be received at the porch of the White House by either the U.S. President or First Lady, which was widely interpreted a diplomatic rebuttal of his government’s human rights violations in Assam and Kashmir, a cold chill could be felt throughout the Indian parliament.

This chill made ever frostier by the recent hosting of the first ever major online conference on Hindutva in the United States, which saw faculty members and students from more than 53 universities, including Harvard and Stanford, come together with the objective of “Dismantling Global Hindutva.”

With growing international pressure and condemnation, along with a continued worsening of the economy, with unemployment and poverty levels rising to their highest levels in more than a decade, Modi needs something, anything that simultaneously throws the global community off his back and keeps Hindu voters polarized against Muslims.

This diversion came tragically, but politically opportunistically for the Modi government when members of a hitherto unknown militant group – the Resistant Front – were alleged to have assassinated two school teachers and a businessman in Indian occupied Kashmir on October 7.

A statement issued by the group said the targets were killed because they were “non-local Hindutva agents” and “government informers.” Indian security forces claim, without evidence, the militant group works under the orders of a “handler in Pakistan,” providing the pretext for a military crackdown in the disputed territory, which has already resulted in the arrests of more than 700 Kashmiri Muslims accused of being “terrorist sympathizers.”

The leaders of Pakistan’s main opposition parties gathered and formed the Pakistan Democratic Movement (PDM) in September 2020, accusing Pakistan’s Prime Minister Imran Khan of having a strong connection with the country’s military.

According to the opposition, democracy is under a serious threat if the current government proceeds in its cooperation with the army. Nationwide protests erupted across Pakistan with supporters of the two main opposition parties, Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) and Pakistan People’s Party (PPP), protesting against the military establishment’s involvement in politics.

The two main opposition parties have claimed that the country’s army brought Imran Khan into power. On September 16, 2020, a bill was introduced by Khan’s government which punishes anyone who intentionally defames or ridicules Pakistan’s army. The main purpose of the bill is to prevent “hate speech” against the armed forces. According to the opposition, however, this shows how the military establishment in Pakistan is strengthening its grip on power.

The Pakistani opposition had formerly claimed that an excessive number of troops was deployed inside the polling stations during the general elections of 2018. They claimed this showed the army’s powerful support for Imran Khan and that, therefore, the election was rigged.

Imran Khan’s party, Pakistan Movement of Justice (PTI), denied these claims by arguing that the presence of the army was to maintain law and order, and to ensure the transparency of the elections. The military presence, they argued, was only for the peaceful transition of power as general elections in Pakistan never go smoothly, opposition parties always claim that the elections are rigged, the elections are followed by protests, etc.

Military men rising in Pakistan’s bureaucracy

The number of governmental and private institutions run by persons who have a military background has been increasing since Khan was sworn into office. For example, retired Lt. Gen. Asim Saleem Bajwa was appointed by Khan as the chairman of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) authority and Pakistan’s ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Bilal Akbar, is a former three-star general. However, the latter was a reciprocal step as the Saudi ambassador to Pakistan, Nawaf bin Said Al-Malki, is also a former navy officer.

According to the opposition in Pakistan, foreign actors sometimes approach the army directly whenever they are on an official visit and this gesture runs against democracy.

According to the opposition in Pakistan, foreign actors sometimes approach the army directly whenever they are on an official visit and this gesture runs against democracy. However, PTI officials reject these claims by saying that although undoubtedly Pakistan’s army is an integral part of the Pakistani government, it’s an autonomous institution. They claim that the Khan administration has the same sort of relations with the armed forces as with other state institutions.

Pakistan is surrounded by its adversaries, and in particular India, so security is an inevitable part of Pakistan’s foreign policy. Speaking to Al Jazeera, Fawad Chaudhry, Pakistan’s federal minister of science and technology, said, “As far as Pakistan’s border security and territorial integrity are concerned, army and politicians should be on a mutual platform against India’s intentions to create chaos in Pakistan by sabotaging the CPEC project as well as supporting the BLA [Balochistan Liberation Army]. Army officials are strategically experienced and and disciplined in making decisions under alarming situations – there is no harm if the government moves forward with harmony with the military.”

Only 11 years after its independence, in 1958, Pakistan saw its very first military coup.

Pakistan has a decades-long history of army interference in civilian governments. Only 11 years after its independence, in 1958, Pakistan saw its very first military coup. Following this, there were two more coups, in 1977 and 1999. On other occasions, the Pakistani military explicitly ceased the government or enforced martial law.

Although Pakistan was established as a democratic country, in the 73 years since Pakistan emerged on the world map, almost half of this time has been under the rule of military administrations. Undoubtedly, the army has played an effective role in the political history of Pakistan.

Along with the failed coup attempts, the Pakistani army dissolved assemblies and removed civilian leaders from office several times. What is more, whenever martial law was announced in Pakistan, the military always stayed in power for a long period as compared to the democratically elected governments.

Despite long years of military rule, the Pakistani public has embraced army rule more enthusiastically than civilian governments. People love the army-run governments because according to them, Pakistan has developed more under martial law. Nonetheless, army rule is not acceptable for a democratic country as it increases the possibility of a dictatorship or totalitarianism.

Pakistani citizens love the military but there seems to be a wrong correlation between loving the country’s army and supporting a military administration in a democratic country. It is true that Pakistan has experienced economic growth under military governments, and this has helped create a positive image and legitimacy in the eyes of the public. For example, economic growth has always been higher under military rule as opposed to civilian rule.

Yet, certain military reigns overwhelmingly blackened the country’s image such as the results of the military operation carried out in 2004 under General Musharaf. Thereafter Pakistan started facing terrorism threats by Taliban attacks. During that time, the West started labelling Pakistan as a safe haven for terrorism.

Relations between India and Pakistan are strained even at the best of times. But in recent years, since Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party took power, the two countries have been constantly feuding on many fronts. Modi seems intent not only in stirring tension over India occupied Kashmir- a cause célèbre of his popular far-right base largely made up of Hindutva ideologues- but also in applying pressure on his rival within multinational forums in the one area where Islamabad suffers a serious weakness: containing non-state armed actors.

Pakistan’s problem with groups designated as terrorists is no secret. Having been the base for military operations that saw the Soviet Union defeated in Afghanistan in 1989 and, over a decade later in clashes with the West, during the US invasion of the Islamic Republic, which at the time was under Taliban rule, Pakistan has found it challenging, to say the least, in dealing with non-state armed groups and tribes that moved freely through its porous border.

Predictably India has exploited what is a major weak spot for Pakistan by lobbying to place its neighbor on the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) blacklist. The intergovernmental organization founded in 1989 on the initiative of the G7, plays a central role in global efforts in combatting terrorist financing. The Paris based organization has set global standards to combat terrorist financing. It also monitors a countries ability to prevent, detect, investigate and prosecute the financing of terrorism.

Once subjected to the FATF’s monitoring regime, a country can expect to face a tough time clearing its name. Since 2001 FATF has maintained a “Black-list,” containing the names of countries that the intragovernmental organization considers non-cooperative in the global effort to combat money laundering and the financing of terrorism.

While being grey-listed is not as harsh as being blacklisted, countries placed on the list may still face economic sanctions from institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and experience adverse effects on trade.

Only North Korea and Iran are in the current blacklist. It also keeps a “Grey-list.” These are countries that are at a higher risk of money laundering and terrorism financing but have formally committed to working with the FATF to develop action plans for what it calls anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT).

Both are living document, issued and updated periodically in official FATF reports. Blacklisted countries are highly likely to be subjected to economic sanctions, placed under prohibitive measures by FATF member states as well as international organizations. While being grey-listed is not as harsh as being blacklisted, countries placed on the list may still face economic sanctions from institutions like the IMF and the World Bank and experience adverse effects on trade.

Pakistan has been on the FATF grey-list since June 2018. It was put on notice to be blacklisted by October 2019 if the country failed to curb money laundering and terror financing. A 27 point action plan was also issued, demanding Islamabad to deliver successfully for it to avoid further punitive monitoring and for it to be granted unfettered access to the global financial networks.

Ever since, Prime Minister Imran Khan has been in a race against time to avoid Pakistan’s inclusion in the FATF black-list. Seeking to wriggle out of the grey list, last year the country’s federal government imposed financial sanctions on 88 banned terror groups and their leaders, including the alleged mastermind of the 2008 Mumbai attack.

Khan has expressed deep unease over the potential consequences of Pakistan’s failure to deliver on the 27 point action-plan as much as he has been worried over opposition parties politicizing the issue. “Going on the blacklist would mean sanctions, our economy crashing; we were hoping opposition would jointly pass legislation for FATF because it’s for Pakistan, not [our] personal interest” Pakistan is reported saying following a round of voting on new domestic legislation designed to address the 27 point action-plan.

India accelerated its lobbying against Pakistan during the four-day virtual meeting of the FATF two months ago.

Measures adopted by Khan’s government has eased some of the pressure. In October last year, FATF said that Pakistan had successfully complied with 21 out of 27 points of the action plan but nonetheless it decided to keep the country on its grey list until February 2021. This was a decisive moment when things were expected to come to a head. India accelerated its lobbying against Pakistan during the four-day virtual meeting of the FATF two months ago.

“It’s not that Pakistan is not trying hard to get out of the grey list, but the lobbying against the country by India is very strong,” a Pakistani representative in the FATF was reported saying to Anadolu Agency. The official also pointed to a vast network of hundreds of “fake media” outlets serving “Indian interests”. The official cited a Brussels-based watchdog, EU DisinfoLab, which uncovered a network of 265 coordinated fake local media outlets in 65 countries “serving Indian interests” and “undermining Pakistan”, as well as multiple dubious think-tanks and NGOs.

India’s lobbying campaign also joined forces with the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA) in what seemed to have been an attempt to inflate the terror menace emanating from Pakistan. The group alleged that Pakistan recruited terrorists to aid Azerbaijan and its ally Turkey in last year’s conflict with Armenia over the Nagorno-Karabakh enclave. Pakistan has denied such claims.

Details of the alliance uncovered by Foreign Lobby exposed the way in which ANCA was seeking to get support from the 4 million-strong Indian diaspora in its new campaign calling on the administration of U.S. President Joe Biden to sanction Pakistan as a terrorist financing state.

These efforts however have not produced the desired outcome India perhaps had hoped for, partly it is said due to the fact that since Islamabad’s inclusion in the grey-list three years ago, Pakistan has been assisted by Turkey, China, and Malaysia. Though it’s not clear if the three countries helped their ally in this case, Pakistan avoided sliding into the blacklist in February. FATF determined that Islamabad should remain on its grey-list, with the country’s status set to be reviewed at an extraordinary plenary session in June 2021.

At a press conference following the four-day virtual plenary meeting, FATF President Dr Marcus Pleyer said that Pakistan had made “significant progress” even though there remained some “serious deficiencies” in mechanisms to plug terrorism financing. Pakistan had fulfilled 24 out of the 27 actions points while the 3 remaining areas, said Pleyer “need to be fully addressed.” The FATF president noted that Pakistan was working towards its commitment made at a high level to implement the illicit financing watchdog’s recommendations, saying “that is not the time to put a country on the blacklist”.