Rather than a “New Cold War,” we are now witnessing the culmination of an economic war with Russia, where the financial, energy, and capital markets are the battlegrounds. In his timely book, Economic War: Ukraine and the Global Conflict between Russia and the West, political risk analyst and consultant Maximilian Hess takes the reader through the period in which the seeds of economic warfare are sprouting into full bloom: from the initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014 to Russia’s full-scale invasion in 2022 and beyond.  

The book skillfully delves into various economic fronts around the world, demonstrating the weaponization of economic tools such as pipelines, mining, credit, and cryptocurrencies. Each chapter unfolds like a chess game between Russia and the West, allowing the reader to map the moves of the contestants both chronologically and regionally, including Russia’s response to Western sanctions and what is at stake for each party.

There were a number of disputes in the early and mid-2000s between Russia and Ukraine over gas supplies and the terms thereof that led Russia to cut off deliveries and precipitated gas supply crunches in the wider European market. What I think people forget is that Nordstream 2 and Nordstream 1 were never intended to increase the total amount of Russian gas that could be pumped to Central Europe.

Instead, they were designed to ensure that Russia didn’t have to do it through Eastern Europe, in particular through Ukraine, so that Russia could then increase the leverage of its gas policy over Ukraine. We should have understood this risk at the time of Nordstream 2, because it was essentially designed to give Russia the same kind of leverage over other Eastern European states that it had gained over Ukraine.

Q. Why do you think Putin choose to invade Ukraine specifically in February 2022?

I think he thought it was an important time economically, when the West was weak and divided. He hoped that the sanctions response and the economic response would be less intense than it might have been at another time. Thinking in terms of change in 2020 and 2021, the end of the Trump administration and then the Biden administration that follows made it clear that there would be a concerted sanctions strategy.

He hoped that European unity would be weak and insufficient to resist him. Inflationary pressures from COVID-19 had already increased, and Russia had already begun to cut off its gas supplies to Europe. At the same time, he was preparing his troops to invade Ukraine and saw it as a moment when the West would be relatively weak economically and relatively vulnerable. Therefore, less likely to act against him and less likely to act in support of Ukraine. Which, of course, turned out to be a very big strategic miscalculation on his part.

Q. Has Russia’s strategy of crippling Europe with gas cuts failed?

Largely, I think it has failed. Not because of any failure within the strategy itself but because of collaborative actions on the part of the West. Intelligence was shared by the United States, by officials who had spoken on the record and had reached the assessment that there was a small chance that Russia wouldn’t invade Ukraine in October 2021, simply the brutal nature of Russia’s onslaught in February, and the fact that the Europeans saw an army of the largest form that had taken this action in Europe since World War II, made it clear to many European leaders that they had no other choice.

Putin was preparing, and did prepare, for a scenario in which Europe was fully on board with the sanctions regime through Russia’s fortress balance sheet strategy, the Kremlin’s process of building up large reserves of ‘hard currencies’ and gold. But now that the initial pain of that gas strategy is being felt, and inflation has been at such high levels for a year and a half. There are obviously still many politicians, particularly in Europe, such as former French President Nicolas Sarkozy, who are calling for a softer approach to Russia on these issues. That’s why Putin’s strategy is not one that is over; by threatening more economic pain, he can also undermine support for Ukraine in the long term. Global gas markets are much more fragile, and we could still see a new spike in gas prices this winter as a result of the Kremlin’s actions.

Q. Did Putin pull out of the Black Sea grain deal in an attempt to revive the inflation weapon?

I believe very strongly that this is what he is trying to do. It also gives him the tool of offering grain to African countries to gain more support there. I think we should be prepared for more actions by the Kremlin to deliberately try to stir up inflationary pressures, possibly trying to find a way to drive up prices, as well. The Kremlin really has only one major option, which is to threaten an export embargo and actually take action to make it look credible. That option is difficult because Russia’s budget is now so skewed toward the military.

L

ove him or loathe him, there’s no denying that Donald Trump brought a whole new level of spectacle to the world of international relations through his unique approach. In the age of social media, Trump wielded his Twitter account like a magician’s wand, conjuring up tweets that sent shockwaves through the global stage. From the moment he stepped into the political arena, he turned traditional diplomacy on its head, replacing dignified speeches with 280-character proclamations.

It was a rollercoaster ride of mixed messaging, unexpected U-turns, and moments that left even the most seasoned diplomats scratching their heads. One moment he’d be locking horns with world leaders, engaging in diplomatic smackdowns with the best of them. The next, he’d be cozying up to erstwhile adversaries like long-lost buddies.

In his book, Donald Trump’s Digital Diplomacy and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East, Ahmed Y. Zohny skillfully delves into the intricate relationship between history, political science, and the digital age. With a meticulous blend of content analysis and critical discourse analysis, Zohny examines the profound implications of Trump’s statements and tweets, that explain the often puzzling nature of his foreign policy decisions. At the same time, Zohny’s analysis unveils the intricacies of this unique form of diplomacy, shedding light on its influence on global politics.

While the American public remained primarily engrossed in the domestic implications of Trump’s presidency, people around the world were deeply curious about how his foreign policy choices would reshape the geopolitical landscape. What emerged from Zohny’s research was a deeper understanding of Trump’s communication style, marked by mixed messaging and impulsive decision-making.

One of the most significant areas of focus in the book is the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran Accord. Zohny compellingly argues that this decision not only guaranteed the collapse of the agreement but also added to the volatility in the already turbulent Middle East. Through detailed analysis, he highlights how this move significantly impacted regional dynamics and strained diplomatic relations.

Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

T

he Taiwan Strait has emerged as a geopolitical hotspot, garnering significant attention due to the escalating tensions between the United States and China. This narrow body of water, separating the island of Taiwan from mainland China, has become a focal point of power struggles and competing interests in the Asia-Pacific region.

China’s rise as a global power, both economically and militarily, has fueled concerns over its pursuit of reunification with Taiwan, which currently enjoys de facto independence from China. President Xi Jinping has made reunification a cornerstone of his administration, employing a combination of diplomatic pressure, military posturing, and economic incentives to isolate Taiwan diplomatically and erode its international standing. China’s military modernization, including the development of advanced weaponry and naval capabilities, has increased its capacity to forcefully assert its territorial claims. Meanwhile, the U.S. engages with Taiwan in a way China views as provocative. Should we be concerned?

In War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, Scott L. Kastner delves into the increasingly tense relationship between China and Taiwan. As fears of a potential military conflict loom large, Kastner offers readers a comprehensive and nuanced analysis of the factors that could lead to hostilities while emphasizing that the situation should not be exaggerated. This book not only sheds new light on the prospects for cross-strait military conflict but also explores the pathways that could either lead to or help prevent such a crisis.

Kastner begins by examining the complex implications of deepening economic integration between China and Taiwan. While economic ties have historically been seen as a stabilizing force, the author delves into the potential risks that arise as a result of this interdependence. He further explores the shifting balance of military power in the region, considering the implications of China’s military modernization efforts and the potential impact on Taiwan’s defense capabilities. These dynamics, coupled with uncertainty surrounding the future of U.S. commitment to Taiwan’s security, contribute to the complex landscape of the Taiwan Strait. A crucial question Kastner considers in his book is whether the United States would come to Taiwan’s defense.

The author also highlights the significance of domestic political changes in both China and Taiwan. By analyzing the internal dynamics within these two entities, Kastner provides readers with a deeper understanding of how domestic factors can shape cross-strait relations and potentially impact the likelihood of military conflict. Kastner delves into an in-depth examination of the intricately intertwined economies of Taiwan and China, as well as their historical background and the significance of freedom in the Taiwanese context.

While the risks of conflict are indeed real, Kastner’s analysis offers a more tempered perspective, emphasizing that war in the Taiwan Strait is far from inevitable. He argues that there are multiple distinct pathways that could lead to hostilities, and the mechanisms that may mitigate one type of conflict might not necessarily be applicable to others. However, the book underlines the presence of powerful mitigating factors, combined with plausible steps to reduce the likelihood of military conflict, providing a glimmer of hope for avoiding a catastrophic outcome.

Combining international relations theory with meticulous empirical analysis of regional trends, Kastner presents readers with valuable insights into the potential occurrence of war in the Taiwan Strait and, more importantly, how such a conflict can be averted. The book equips policymakers, scholars, and interested readers with the knowledge necessary to navigate this complex geopolitical landscape.

War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait is a timely work that provides a comprehensive examination of the risks and possibilities surrounding military conflict in the region. Kastner’s expertise and meticulous research contribute to a vital perspective that not only deepens our understanding of the Taiwan Strait issue but also provides valuable insights into maintaining peace and stability in the region.

Scott L. Kastner, War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait (Columbia University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780231198653, 272 pages

Written by Dilara Özer

T

here come times throughout history where military innovations or shifts in the character of warfare take great revolutionary leaps, allowing those able to reap their benefits first to position themselves at a substantive competitive advantage. Militaries that identify and exploit these periods of disruptive changes make major shifts in the balance of power, security, and prosperity for their nations. Those who fail to do so, or fail to adapt to change, risk exposing their country to danger. What will the next big thing in warfare be? And how can militaries successfully adapt to meet the challenge? The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers provides an authoritative take and the necessary foundation for healthy speculation.

Military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. discusses military revolutions—or shifts in the character of warfare—and specifically the most recent precision warfare revolution which is currently reaching its maturity.

According to Krepinevich, an even newer revolution is emerging. This is fueled by the advances of commercial and military-driven technology, such as AI 3D manufacturing, synthetic biology and quantum computing, and directed energy and hypersonic weapons, and is accelerated by the competition between the U.S., Russia, and China.

The precision warfare revolution was introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War. It gave the U.S. a monopoly over this form of warfare for several decades, but now other powers such as China have these capabilities.

In this era of increased competition amongst great powers, The Origins of Victory, first gives a preliminary assessment of the disruptive changes occurring in general war to identify the existing characteristics of the precision warfare regime, and goes on to offer speculation of the overlapping successor revolution.

Second, The Origins of Victory examines the crucial factor of how military organizations have successfully anticipated and exploited disruptive changes in warfare faster than their rivals.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I, Krepinevich considers the characteristics of the emerging competitive environment through trends over the years and identifies the ones that may show yield in the future. He discusses the maturing precision warfare and the overlapping new revolution, as well as their implication for deterrence.

The world is in an era of permanent low-level conflict. Traditional conflict has largely left its place to grey-zone warfare and hybrid war. States have always used unconventional and non-military ways to acquire leverage or attain victory; however, the increasingly complex and interconnected current nature of the world has made interdependence the battleground.

From sanctions to competing for and buying influence abroad, warfare has taken a more subtle, sly, undeclared, unending, and, most importantly, unrestricted, form. Nowadays, this has blurred the line between war and peace.

While traditional war is very expensive, unpopular, and often too difficult to manage, this new way of war is groundbreaking and does not shy away from any tool available. War is all around us, in everyday life, culture, economics, law, and information. Even something as innocuous as cute cat pictures online can become a ploy.

Mark Galeotti takes us through the weaponization of everything, from disinformation, cyberattacks, and espionage to subversion and crime, in order to understand the changing landscape of war and what it might bring.

Gone are the days of “stable” warfare! The subtle components of martial and everyday civilian life are blending, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. However, this development does not need to be a solely negative one. As Galeotti points out, conflict is democratized, meaning the people are not just bystanders and can take positive action to avoid zero-sum situations. The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War equips the reader with ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

When everything is weaponizable, why would the distinction hold any meaning? Where do we begin to look? How can civilians be mindful of this development? Many of the weapons used are often abstract but their effects are very much tangible and jolting. As it turns out, some things are more weaponizable than others.

Luckily, The Weaponisation of Everything lays bare how this warfare takes form all around the world with examples and a future trajectory. While this form of conflict may be vague and confusing, Galeotti makes the topic apprehensible for all readers.

Even though technology advances in leaps and problems seem to be constantly evolving, Galeotti’s approach invites the reader not only to face the emerging reality, but also to learn to adapt to the new permanent, bloodless war. The Weaponisation of Everything, first released in February 15, 2022, is now available in paperback as of February 14, 2023.

Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN 9780300253443, 256 Pages

C

lassical realism has been a long-standing theory in explaining international relations, and Jonathan Kirschner reminds us why. Although it has been overshadowed by newer schools of thought such as structuralism, classical realism offers great insight into contemporary issues in the international politics arena.

Have contemporary realists lost their way? With renewed emphasis on the crucial roles played by uncertainty, contingency, and contestation, An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics shows how classical realism better explains the formative events of the past and vital issues of today while assessing the fundamental flaws of classical realism’s would-be successors, namely structural realism and hyper-rationalism. It seeks to reclaim classical realism and deem it, once again, a worthwhile theory. The book, however, does not engage in paradigm wars and does not stray away from the realist tradition.

An Unwritten Future lays out realism’s core principles and discusses the contributions of the perspective’s key thinkers, including Thucydides, Hans Morgenthau, and Raymond Aron, among others. On brand with classical realism where “doubt is not an afterthought,” Kirschner also addresses realism’s limits and shortcomings.

In turn, Kirschner explores contemporary issues, including the ascent of great power challengers, the political implications of globalization, and the diffusion of power in modern world politics—such as the implications of China’s rise, future global order, and the shifts of balance of power and nature of conflict. He also does not neglect to provide a guide to a classical realist political economy highlighting the overlooked but impactful factor of social economy.

Kirshner debunks the notion that classical realism is unscientific and supports the idea that it is better to be vaguely right than exactly wrong. He highlights classical realism’s emphasis on attending to both power and purpose where history, uncertainty, and contingency play a large role. Classical realism, therefore, offers practical utility in an increasingly unpredictable world. Kirshner applies classical realism to the case of the British appeasement of the Nazis and the U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War to demonstrate theory in practice. The book also contains a discussion dedicated to explaining the inner workings of classical realism for its persistent skeptics.

Providing a refreshing reminder of the richness of classical realism, this reexamination of the realist tradition is a must-read for students, analysts, and academics interested in international relations theory. Furthermore, An Unwritten Future is rich within its scope, delving into theory, economy, history, and contemporary topics, and provides a little something for everybody.

Jonathan Kirschner, An Unwritten Future: Realism and Uncertainty in World Politics (Princeton University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780691166773, 336 pages

Robert H. Latiff’s Future Peace, a sequel to Future War, specifically brings to attention a subtle, yet potentially destructive effect of technologies such as autonomous systems, advanced weapons, and AI: the provocation to violence. Against the backdrop of the brewing power rivalry between the U.S. and its adversaries, technology aggregates tension and catalyzes violence.

Future Peace touches upon the ethical, security-related, behavioral, and technical aspects of technology and warfare. It consists of four chapters: “A Giant Armed Nervous System” (referring to the military), “Urge to Violence,” “Stumbling into War,” and “Avoiding War.”

Latiff’s book comes as a warning to practice caution when adopting new weapons technology, and aids in understanding human and technical behaviors to attenuate its harms and decrease the chances of war. Not only does technology make war easier and speedier, hence enabling the rush to war, but hinders human reasoning. Such technical changes make the process of sound judgement difficult; for example, thinking and acting in a diplomatic manner. Furthermore, these changes enhance the potential for human error to get out of hand.

Latiff argues that it is vitally important to avoid entering conflict in the first place. He highlights the importance of the cooperative efforts of many segments of society, from the public and technologists to militarists and decision-makers. He implies that it is criminal negligence to leave everything to automation processes or politicians. Therefore, Future Peace also lays out long to short term recommendations to maintain peace and reverse the rush to war.

A

utonomous features are not a matter of the future; they have been used in warfare for years. However, it is quite evident that with the advancement of technology and the weaponization of artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems are swiftly adapting and becoming accepted.

As these changes emerge, the question that is often raised by international organizations such as the UN, which set the norms of conduct in an effort to control and regulate the use of autonomous weapons, is “How will human beings maintain control of the use of autonomous weapons?” In their study, Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss flip the script to reveal another perspective of this dynamic.

Bode and Huelss aim to explain how testing, developing, and using weapons systems with autonomous features shapes ethical and legal norms, and how standards manifest and change in practice. The authors also examine the consequences of autonomous weapons for international relations.

Bode and Huelss acknowledge the fear and risks that these developments bring but adopt the approach that autonomous weapon systems may push people away from taking immediate decisions on the use of force as norms adapt to the appropriate use of force.

In short, Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms analyses the normative repercussions of weaponizing artificial intelligence by examining them not as tools used by the military but as shaping forces. Chapters include “Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Relations,” “New Technologies of Warfare: Emergence and Regulation,” “International Law, Norms, and Order,” “Norms in International Relations,” and “How Autonomous Weapons Systems Make Norms,” and contain assisting tables and figures.

As the trend and debate of autonomizing weapons systems continues, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Norms equips the reader with an understanding of the relation of human-machine interaction and the process of integrating new technologies into war.

I

n War Virtually, Roberto J. González takes the reader behind the scenes to expose how scientists, programmers, and engineers developed technologies that automate war, predict conflict, and regulate human thought and behavior. Does this sound utopian? Not so when you factor in the persistent drive to arm for virtual warfare. In this quest, data comes a valuable commodity.

González evaluates autonomous weapons, robotic systems, predictive modeling software, advanced surveillance programs, and psyops techniques. He examines the foundation of the latest version of warfare in order to explain how it has taken its current form through contemporary military operations and their high-tech and cultural underpinnings.

However, War Virtually transcends the design, innovative, and transformative aspects of technology and warfare, and touches upon human engineering. González reveals the relations between U.S. intelligence agencies and Big Tech, and its implications. It is no secret that algorithms construct behavioral models for anticipating or even predicting human behavior, and, therefore, all of us risk having our digital lives become part of the military-industrial economy.

Adopting a critical approach, González examines how the U.S. military is weaponizing technology and data for new kinds of warfare, and questions the notion that technological advancements will lead to more efficient and less destructive warfare. In fact, he implies that such an aspiration comes at a great cost, and argues that in this world, there is little room for hubris.

War Virtually covers a large array of topics including automated battlefield robotics, social scientists’ involvement in experimental defense research, the blurred line between political consulting and propaganda in the internet era, and the military’s use of big data to craft new counterinsurgency methods based on predicting conflict.

I

n Proto-Algorithmic War, Stefka Hristova offers a unique perspective on the Iraq War and the history of algorithmic and digital logic that came to be a crucial element of today’s warfare. She examines the military policy of the United States going into the Iraq War: the U.S. approached the war with the logic of digital and emerging algorithmic technology alongside the preceding numerical logics of the British Mandate in Iraq. In a sense, the Iraq War became an experiment in the early stages of development and utilization of such technology in warfare, and moreover war culture.

Hristova provides a case study of a comparative historical framework reaching back to the quantification techniques harnessed during the era of Mandatory Iraq (1918-1932) and analyzes the parallels and diversions between the numerical logics in both cases.

The author further evaluates the logic that moved beyond the British mandate for Iraq and reduced culture, society, and the physical body and environment into visual data-driven, sterilized, reproducible warfare, highlighting that it lacked cultural and historical context. Indeed, the actual experience of the Iraq War resulted in massive-scale death and destruction.

Proto-Algorithmic War offers an insight into the digitization and automation of war. Hristova aptly scrutinizes the ways in which the Iraq War attempted and often failed to see and incorporate population and territory as digital and further proto-algorithmic entities.

B

en Buchanan and Andrew Imbrie use fire as an analogy to showcase how AI has a dual nature: destructive and constructive. Just like our distant ancestors learning to operate their newly discovered, full of potential tool, our responsibility is to understand and use AI potential wisely. With AI revolutionizing the world, democracies have a responsibility to harness that power constructively and come out on top. Transformation is on its way—can humanity use AI to light the way? Or will the fire burn wildly and ignite a new type of war?

In The New Fire, Buchanan and Imbrie help us understand AI better by breaking it down into its “sparks,” which are data, algorithms, and computing power. They further explain the tangible and potentially destructive consequences of these sparks such as disinformation campaigns, new hacking tools, and military weapons.

On a larger scale, The New Fire shows the urgency of democracies to adapt to the powerful tool that is AI, as autocrats may use it for domestic centralized control and asymmetric advantages in combat. In that sense, they argue that harnessing the power of AI is crucial for holding democracy in balance in the world. The New Fire also acknowledges that democracies have a harder time adapting to the age of AI given ethical and civil concerns, but that new ways could be forged based on the advantages of democracy.

Drawing on examples from geopolitical competition and its analysis, Buchanan and Imbrie show how AI can work for democracy while respecting civil rights. In the age of AI, this crucial topic may determine the choice of course between war and peace.

Written by Dilara Özer

Despite its limited capacity, Greece assumes itself to be a major playmaker in regional politics, and thus follows an aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey. It’s worth asking why Greece pursues this strategy and what it hopes to achieve.

Neorealism, also known as structural realism in International Relations, offers a simple answer to this question: “Greece is trying to balance Turkey.” Drawing on Kenneth Waltz, the pioneer of the Neorealist School, states try to balance other states, which they lag behind, or try to limit others’ ability to some extent by resorting to internal balancing and/or external balancing mechanisms.

Internal balancing is the first and most common method of a balancing strategy. This happens as states strengthen their material capacity and power, and when they try to survive by their own means in the anarchic world system. If this is not enough, they resort to external balancing either to defend themselves or to minimize the threats they face. This generally occurs when states look to form alliances with stronger states. In this regard, Greece applies both internal and external balancing methods in order to counterbalance Turkey.

Initiatives for internal balancing

Following the Kardak (Imia) crisis with Turkey in 1996, Greece launched an armament program as part of an internal balancing against Turkey and came a long way towards this purpose. However, it temporarily paused the program due to the 2008 economic crisis and its effects.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations.

Thanks to the relative economic recovery in recent years and due to the current high tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece resumed its armament program. In order to counterbalance Turkey, it launched a new armament and military modernization program. The Athens administration increased its armament expenditures fivefold in 2021 compared to 2020, and launched a 10-year armament program worth 10 billion euros.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations. For example, Greece ordered a total of 18 fighter jets from France last year, with a cost of 2.3 billion euros. In 2021, it signed a contract to buy three frigates from France. Again in the same year, it purchased four warships worth $6.9 billion and signed an agreement with the U.S. for the modernization of its existing frigates worth $2.5 billion. These examples indicate that since Greece is incapable of modernizing its army by using its own sources, it needs outside support to activate its internal balancing elements.

Aside from the French and American military support, Greece uses its EU membership as a political and economic leverage against Turkey with the unconditional support of the GCA as its main ally in the region. So much so that Greece, acting together with the GCA, imposed sanctions on Turkey for its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean by using the EU’s legislative bodies, the European Parliament and the European Council. However, Turkey has not compromised its stance at the table and on the ground, and has insisted on protecting its rights in the region.

Can Greek counterbalance against Turkey work?

The question now is whether Greece will succeed in counterbalancing Turkey. In terms of internal balancing, Greece has almost no chance. There are two reasons for this. The first is related to Turkey’s current capacity which is incomparably greater than Greece’s. So much so that according to the rounded Armed Forces data, Greece, with a population of 11 million, has 100,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $5 billion. Turkey, with a population of 85 million, has 350,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $20 billion.

Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries.

All of Greece’s land and air forces lag behind Turkey’s. For instance, in terms of ground power Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries. Likewise, although Greece is rapidly modernizing its air power, it cannot compete with Turkey in this field either. In terms of the most important elements of air power, Greece has 600 aircraft, 200 multirole aircraft, and 270 helicopters whereas Turkey has 1,500 aircraft, 250 multirole aircraft, and 650 helicopters.

Moreover, while Greece does not have any armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in its inventory, Turkey has 170 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UCAVs, and almost all of them are produced domestically. These UAVs and UCAVs are Turkey’s strong trump card: they are battle-proven and have proven to be game changers in conflict zones such as Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Libya. As for naval power, Turkey and Greece have more or less similar numbers of warships, frigates, and submarines. Overall, it is not possible for Greece to compete with Turkey in terms of total military power – at least not on its own.

Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

The second pillar of Greece’s balancing strategy against Turkey is a relatively more functional deterring capacity. Undoubtedly Athens enjoys a high-level military cooperation with the U.S. and also benefits from the advantage of EU membership vis-à-vis Turkey, which is an EU candidate country. However, both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

It should never be forgotten that relations between states are interest-oriented and may change according to new conjunctures. Although Athens seems to have “secured” the support of the U.S. and France, nobody can know how long this alliance will last. In fact, the “AUKUS incident” experienced by France recently stands out as an example of how states can act against their allies when their interests are in question. Accordingly, Turkey’s determined stance to protect its rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean can foil Athens’s attempts to counterbalance Turkey politically, militarily, and economically.

To summarize, the Greek aggressive foreign policy to counterbalance Turkey pushes the Athens administration toward an extensive armament project and the modernization of its army. Greece has strengthened its cooperation with the U.S. and France and secured the political and economic backing of the European Union.

However, given the fact that the Turkish army is getting stronger every year by relying on its own domestic and national capacity, and given that Athens’s cooperation with France and the U.S. is susceptible to change in the long run, Greece may face disappointment in the future. Greek initiatives carry the risks of creating further tension and serious consequences if the country opts to lead Turkey toward security dilemmas instead of looking for ways to cooperate and establish permanent peace.

The issue of vaccine diplomacy is increasingly impacting pandemic-driven foreign policy decision-making. Evidence suggests that medically advanced high- and upper-income countries – those that developed their own vaccines against COVID19 – exhibit different foreign policy behaviors and crisis management techniques in terms of global vaccine distribution and international cooperation. The situation is becoming even more complex considering the fact that there are not only states that act as primary and unitary actors, but also non-state actors (e.g., vaccine producers) that influence international relations.

There are a few selected examples that show the different foreign policy behaviors of state and non-state actors regarding vaccine diplomacy. The U.S., for instance, pursues rather multilateral mechanisms for vaccine administering, largely financially supporting the World Health Organization’s (WHO) COVAX initiative to provide vaccines to the poor and underdeveloped countries.

However, the U.S. is reluctant to direct commitments for vaccine distribution before the inoculation of American citizens is completed. Russia, on the other hand, mostly focuses on bilateral negotiations and agreements. Through the Russian Direct Investment Fund (RDIF), the country manages global manufacturing, promoting, and distributing its Sputnik V vaccine worldwide. To date, more than sixty countries have approved Sputnik V and the number is gradually increasing.

The U.K.-Sweden company that developed the Oxford-AstraZeneca vaccine is currently experiencing delivery delays over which the European Commission has launched legal actions given that the vaccine is in high demand in the EU. Despite such actions, the company reaffirmed its commitments to COVAX. Finally, Johnson & Johnson’s single-shot vaccine producer signed an advance purchase agreement with the African Union’s 55 member states but also committed to a not-for-profit basis vaccine distribution through the COVAX facility although no earlier than 2022.

In all cases, policy-making has already moved to crisis management aiming to achieve health security, but also to produce results on a profit basis that are equally acceptable to both national audiences and the international community.

Both, state and non-state actors pursue their own goals when it comes to the way they act on the international stage, while balancing between promoting national interests, making international commitments, and seeking commercial advancement.

In all cases, policy-making has already moved to crisis management aiming to achieve health security, but also to produce results on a profit basis that are equally acceptable to both national audiences and the international community. The hypothesis here is that vaccine diplomacy lies in the space of the rational choice approach which is a method for assessing a nation state’s individual, goal-oriented foreign policy decision making and behavior.

In this regard, vaccine diplomacy appears to be an effective practice that puts together various international actors, collective entities, and issues that they all address within the space of a rationalist approach. The rational choice approach model includes: (1) strategic communication and strategic interaction; (2) negotiation and bargaining; and (3) international treaties and agreements that lead to international commitments. Taken together, these elements compose and define vaccine diplomacy, making it an essential mechanism of international cooperation.

During a pandemic, crisis-driven vaccine diplomacy can become the core element of international relations and international cooperation. Here is why. The ideational and material accounts of international cooperation are influenced and orchestrated by leading and medically advanced countries.

Foreign policy behaviors among and between actors and the issues they address promptly leads to complex interdependence, making international cooperation the only option at a time punctuated by the crisis. It’s foreseeable that communication, negotiation, and bargaining lead the way to increasing the number of international treaties and commitments.

The role of communication and strategic interaction in promoting international cooperation is critical. On the one hand, there is bilateral interstate communication which is often less transparent but presumably more effective considering the small number of parties involved in the diplomatic negotiation. On the other hand, there are large international organizations that are the agents of international cooperation.

International organizations are more observable and transparent. They also secure the membership and conditional participation of less developed countries in the communication process. Either way, bilateral or multilateral communication facilitates cooperation among states in which rational approaches prevail. This might explain the impressive number of Russia’s bilateral agreements in vaccine distribution, and the multilateral COVAX initiative. Either way what promotes global health, puts the global health security forward.

Negotiations and bargaining are the elements of statecraft and statesmanship that help pursue interests and propose solutions. From the rationalist approach perspective, it could be that negotiating sides don’t delve into ideological or political differences as these might put constraints on the negotiation outcome. . Even countries or groups distinct from one another are motivated to work together. Such countries or groups desire solutions and attempt to find the potential to compromise using bargaining strategies and scenarios to identify mutual benefits and maximize their international advantage rather than seeking absolute gains within the win-lose paradigm.

From a practical perspective, when countries or companies produce more treaties and agreements on the distribution of vaccines, this signifies that the effort to combat the pandemic on a global scale is underway. Thus, vaccine diplomacy negotiations and bargaining, emerging from strategic communication and strategic interaction, appear to be the tools of rational choice in the context of complex interdependence at the levels of bilateral and multilateral relations.