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n a significant move, far-right Dutch politician Geert Wilders, the leader of the Party for Freedom (PVV), announced on January 8, 2024, that he is withdrawing a controversial 2018 proposal that called for the ban on mosques and the Quran. This decision, seen as a crucial concession to potential coalition partners, comes just a day before the resumption of talks to form the next government following the November 2023 elections.

Wilders’ withdrawal of the legislation is considered a key step in gaining the trust and support of three mainstream parties that he aims to include in a coalition government alongside the PVV. One of the party leaders, Pieter Omtzigt of the New Social Contract, had raised concerns about the compatibility of some of Wilders’ policies with the Dutch Constitution, which upholds liberties, including freedom of religion.

The proposed legislation, dating back to 2018, was part of a series of laws presented by Wilders that aimed to restrict what he labeled as “Islamic expressions.” The bill characterized Islam as a “violent, totalitarian ideology” and called for the prohibition of mosques, the Quran, Islamic schools, as well as the wearing of burqas and niqabs. The decision to withdraw this legislation indicates a potential softening of the PVV’s strident anti-Islam stance.

Wilders’ more moderate position

During a parliamentary debate last year, following the PVV’s success in winning 37 seats in the 150-seat lower house of the Dutch parliament in the November 2023 general election, Wilders hinted at a more moderate position regarding his party’s anti-Islam policies. This move is seen as an effort to align the PVV’s proposals with the Dutch Constitution, addressing concerns raised by potential coalition partners.

In response to the withdrawal of the legislation, Wilders stated during the parliamentary debate, “Sometimes I will have to withdraw proposals, and I will do that. I will show the Netherlands, the legislature, Mr. Omtzigt’s party — anybody who wants to hear it — that we will adapt our rules to the constitution and bring our proposals in line with it.”

Wilders is scheduled to resume coalition talks on January 9, 2024, with Pieter Omtzigt and the leaders of two other parties: the center-right People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy led by outgoing Prime Minister Mark Rutte and the Farmer Citizen Movement led by Caroline van der Plas.

Laws lack majority vote

Wilders presented the three laws to the parliament in 2017, 2018, and 2019; however, they failed to secure a majority in the lower house.

Regarding the suggested ban on Islamic expressions, the Council of State, an independent legislative watchdog, recommended Wilders discard the proposal. In a 2019 advisory statement, the council stated, “The Advisory Division urges the initiators to reject the bill as it is inconsistent with the fundamental principles of the democratic constitutional state, principles that the initiators aim to safeguard.”

The withdrawal of the controversial legislation marks a significant development in Dutch politics, showcasing a potential shift in the PVV’s approach and creating room for broader cooperation within the political landscape.

Source: The Associated Press

Lately, a self-righteous trend of asking Palestinian speakers and guests ‘Do you condemn Hamas?’, in light of the organization’s Operation Al-Aqsa Storm on October 7, is sweeping across Western media outlets. While Palestinians have differing opinions about Hamas, the question hits a nerve even with those who do not support the organization. Ideally, it should be needless to say that this question is both insensitive, and comes off as ill-willed.

To Palestinians, who have been traumatized by the dynamics of the Israeli occupation and apartheid, years of collective punishment, and prolonged silence from the international community, it is difficult to provide an answer to a trap question asked by a press that looks for a cue to demonize Palestinians and justify their deaths and suffering by pointing to the actions of Hamas.

So, what is Hamas? Is Hamas a terrorist organization or a liberation organization? Officially, Hamas, or the Islamic Resistance Movement, is a Palestinian political and military organization that has played an increasingly pivotal role in the contentious dynamics of the Palestinian-Israeli issue. Understanding the fuss about Hamas requires delving into its origins, ideology, tactics, rise to power in Gaza, and the broader context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Founded in 1987 during the First Intifada, Hamas has evolved into a multifaceted entity. While it holds governance over a population exceeding two million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip, Hamas is most widely known for its armed opposition against Israel.

Hamas is recognized as a terrorist organization by numerous countries, some classifying the whole entity, while others just the military faction as such. It has fired rockets and mortars into Israel since the group took over the Gaza Strip in the mid-2000s in claims of resistance against Israeli occupation.

The most striking assault in terms of strategy and scale is the recent Operation Al-Aqsa Storm, which was launched as a reaction by the organization against the increasing harassments on the Al-Aqsa Mosque, the intensifying systematic nature of the occupation, and the trend of normalization between the countries of the region with Israel, according to experts.

A majority of the literature focusing on Hamas is through a simplistic western lens. This month’s bundle attempts to provide books that reflect mixed views about the organization, covering both journalistic and scholarly perspectives. Here’s what to read to gain a deeper and nuanced understanding of Hamas’s place in one of the most enduring crises of our time.

Where to begin? In an updated and fully revised edition of Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide, professor of Middle Eastern Studies, Northwestern University in Qatar Khaled Hroub provides an easily approachable introduction to Hamas in a straightforward Q&A format. This book takes readers through Hamas’s history, core beliefs, and its political agenda, offering valuable insights that are often missing from conventional news reports.

Hroub meticulously covers major events that have shaped Hamas’s trajectory, such as the crucial January 2006 elections, the evolving relationship with Fatah, and the 2008 Israeli Gaza offensive. Furthermore, the book delves into the intricacies of Hamas’s ideology by closely examining its charter, socio-economic strategies, and stance on Israel. Hroub goes beyond mere facts and figures and explains the underlying reasons for Hamas’s popularity, shedding light on the nuanced aspects of this influential organization.

Khaled Hroub, Hamas: A Beginner’s Guide (Pluto Press, 2010) ISBN: 9780745329727, 224 pages

Hamas Contained provides a thought-provoking perspective on an organization that has long been a subject of controversy and oversimplification. Author Tareq Baconi challenges the prevailing narrative that has demonized Hamas in both media and policy debates. Rather than resorting to simplistic accusations, he offers an in-depth exploration of this controversial organization. Baconi’s work, based on interviews with Hamas leaders and internal publications sheds light on the organization’s evolution over three decades.

He argues that Hamas cannot be neatly classified as either a democratic political party or a terrorist group. Instead, that it emerges as a complex liberation organization deeply rooted in the Palestinian nationalist cause. This perspective calls for a more comprehensive understanding of Hamas and its role in the Palestinian struggle.

Baconi traces Hamas’s transformation from a fringe military resistance group to a political entity attempting to govern. He emphasizes the need to challenge the conventional understanding of Hamas, highlighting how the group’s ideology, at times, poses a threat to the broader Palestinian cause and to its own legitimacy.

Crucially, the book scrutinizes Hamas’s reliance on armed struggle as a means of achieving liberation. It argues that this strategy has faltered in the face of a relentless occupation designed to fragment the Palestinian population.

Under Israel’s strategy of managing the conflict rather than resolving it, Hamas’s demand for Palestinian sovereignty becomes effectively neutralized, especially in the confines of Gaza. This stalemate perpetuates a cycle of brutality, allowing for the collective punishment of millions of Palestinian civilians. The book raises important questions about the impact of ideology, governance, and armed resistance on the quest for Palestinian self-determination.

Tareq Baconi, Hamas Contained: The Rise and Pacification of Palestinian Resistance (Stanford University Press, 2018) ISBN: 9781503632622, 368 pages

In The Foreign Policy of Hamas, Leila Seurat conducts a comprehensive analysis of Hamas’s international relations based on extensive fieldwork and interviews with Hamas officials across different locations, and insights from video conferences involving West Bank, Gaza, and Diaspora Palestinians.

Despite international boycotts following its 2006 electoral victory, Hamas has emerged as a significant global player. The book explores how Hamas strategically uses Palestinian internal issues to gain international legitimacy and competes with political rivals on the Palestinian stage through its interactions with non-Palestinian actors.

Seurat’s work reveals the strong link between Hamas’s foreign and internal policies, both driven by the quest for global recognition. The book dissects Hamas’s political strategies in dealing with Israel and other nations. It covers pivotal moments, such as the Trump administration’s ‘deal of the century,’ Israel’s Jordan Valley annexation plan, the impact of the UAE-Israel normalization accords and the COVID-19 pandemic.

Leila Seurat, The Foreign Policy of Hamas: Ideology, Decision Making and Political Supremacy (I.B. Tauris, 2022) ISBN: 9781838607449, 312 pages

Paola Caridi, an Italian journalist and historian, provides a compelling account of the rise of Hamas in her book Hamas: From Resistance to Government. When the organization scored a victory on the 2006 elections, it sent shockwaves through the Western world. Caridi delves into the critical questions that arose at the time: How did a majority of Palestinians come to support an organization often labeled as extremist, and how would Hamas’s newfound political power impact the broader Israel/Palestine conflict?

Caridi offers an understanding of the complex sentiments among Palestinians who rallied behind a government that endorsed armed resistance. Through on-the-ground research and interviews with Gaza residents and Hamas leaders, the book traces the history of Gaza from its golden age as a bustling port city to the formal emergence and gradual militarization of Hamas. The book strikingly includes a chapter on Operation Cast Lead, startling revelations from WikiLeaks, and the Cairo Revolution.

Paola Caridi, Hamas: From Resistance to Government (Seven Stories Press, 2012) ISBN-10 1609803825, 416 pages

Hamas: A History from Within delves into the multifaceted goals of Hamas, both in the short term and long term. In the immediate sense, Hamas aims to expel Israeli forces from the West Bank and Gaza, employing a combination of tactics that include attacks on Israeli military personnel, settlers in the Occupied Territories, and, more controversially, targeting civilians. Simultaneously, it nurtures the long-term ambition of establishing an Islamic state encompassing historic Palestine.

Hamas gained power and influence, particularly as Israel systematically dismantled the power structure of the secular Palestinian Authority led by Yasser Arafat. As a grassroots organization, Hamas has garnered significant respect among Palestinians due to its perceived lack of corruption.

Tamimi also delves into Hamas’s relations with Jordan, documenting Hamas’s constrained relationship with the Jordanian government. He traces the origins of Hamas within the Muslim Brotherhood, shedding light on the influence of its exiled leadership located in Syria and other regions. It also clarifies the internal structure and political objectives that guide the organization.

The book divides the organization into two main sections, with one responsible for establishing crucial institutions like schools, hospitals, and religious centers, while the other oversees military operations and acts of terrorism through its covert armed wing, the Izzedine al-Qassam Brigades.

Azzam Tamimi, Hamas: A History from Within (Olive Branch Press, 2007) ISBN-10 1566566894, 372 pages

Hamas comes as a paradoxical organization, recognized as a terrorist organization employing terror tactics all the while securing democratic mandate to govern Gaza. It promotes the concept of an Islamic state while conducting its own internal democratic elections with the organization’s leadership largely composed of secular professionals. Moreover, Hamas vocally calls for the destruction of Israel, yet it has reluctantly committed to honoring previous peace agreements.

Jeroen Gunning’s insightful analysis in Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence reveals that many of these apparent contradictions arise from Hamas’s ideology, its local support base, and the unique political landscape of Israel/Palestine.

Drawing on interviews with members of Hamas and its critics, as well as a decade of close observation of the organization, Gunning provides an exploration of Hamas’s dual commitment to ‘God’ and ‘the people.’ This book offers an examination of what Hamas’s political practices reveal about its stance on democracy, religion, and violence.

Additionally, Hamas in Politics delves into Hamas’s internal organization; the methods by which its leaders are selected, and the decision-making processes within the group. Through this comprehensive examination, Gunning sheds light on the complex blend of ideology and realpolitik that characterizes Hamas’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Jeroen Gunning, Hamas in Politics: Democracy, Religion, Violence (Hurst Publishers, 2010) ISBN 9781849040297, 312 pages

Although not necessarily about Hamas, Loren D. Lybarger’s Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories is a refreshing break from the two-dimensional thinking about Palestinian politics.

Lybarger’s provides a deeply insightful exploration of how dynamics between the Islamist movement and secular-nationalist factions within Palestinian society dynamics have transformed the identities of ordinary Palestinians. Identity, Religion, and Palestine takes the reader through the turbulent landscape of Palestinian life, starting with the first Palestinian uprising, or intifada, of the late 1980s, through the subsequent Oslo Peace Process, its disappointments, and the resurgence of violence during the second intifada in 2000.

Lybarger rejects of simplistic dichotomies that often plague discussions of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. He doesn’t force Palestinians into the oversimplified categories of pragmatists willing to accept territorial compromise and extremists advocating for armed struggle.

Instead, he takes the approach of listening to Palestinians themselves and, in doing so, uncovers layers of internal conflicts and divided loyalties that exist among individuals. Lybarger’s nuanced analysis humanizes the Palestinian experience, emphasizing the diverse array of opinions and aspirations that shape the identity and trajectory of the Palestinian people.

Lybarger’s research highlights a notable transformation in the core beliefs and group loyalties at both the individual and collective levels. It underscores how the convergence of identity and allegiance, coupled with the reshaping of convictions in the years following the intifada, has paved the way for an increased occurrence of shifts in factional memberships and loyalties. This model offers valuable insights into the dynamics that drive these changes and provides a deeper understanding of their causes.

(Originally published in 2007)

Loren D. Lybarger, Identity and Religion in Palestine: The Struggle between Islamism and Secularism in the Occupied Territories (Princeton University Press, 2012) ISBN: 9780691155425, 295 pages

The defeat of the Justice and Development Party (PJD) in the most recent general elections in Morocco is a blow for conciliatory Islamism (vis-à-vis the monarchy) and a resounding victory for the Royal Palace. How did the PJD fall from 125 MPs in the House of Representatives, the lower house of parliament, to only 13 MPs, making it the eighth political party in the country? In fact, there is no mystery and one can easily explain this debacle.

The PJD’s critics – and there are many in Morocco – argue that the defeat of the Islamists is the natural consequence of a punishment vote. “During the ten years that they governed Morocco, the Islamists have not been up to the task,” is often heard on Moroccan streets.

This is both true and false. It is true that the PJD lost the elections because it failed miserably on many fronts, primarily the economic and social ones. The party could not improve Moroccans’ economic conditions, could not reduce the huge social disparities, and could not fight against the endemic corruption. It’s claimed that the PJD has not tried to balance power with the Royal Palace by demanding, as the 2011 constitution allows, a real separation of powers.

At the same time, this is not true insofar as the PJD had no control over the government’s strategic decisions. It was certainly at the head of a theoretical majority in the parliament, but the government’s decisions were imposed on it. The parties, which were literally “stuck” to the PJD, came from different backgrounds and did not necessarily share its values and conservative views.

Should we therefore pity the PJD or label it a victim of the system? No. The PJD has voluntarily allowed itself to be drawn into a posture of total submission to the Royal Palace, serving primarily the interests of the monarchy instead of those of the people who voted for it.

Since 2011, when PJD Secretary General Abdelilah Benkirane was appointed head of government, and after his replacement by Saad Dine El Otmani in 2017, the PJD, which won all elections in this period except the latest one, has accepted all the royal cabinet’s diktats.

Apart from the post of head of government, the PJD has let the important ministries, without which nothing can be done in Morocco, slip away and has fallen back on secondary ministerial departments. When PJD officials were appointed, for a time, to head some of these important ministries, such as the Ministries of Justice and Foreign Affairs, the Royal Palace placed its men in key positions in order to chaperone the Islamists and to control them.

To this, we must add that the JDP has accepted to take responsibility for all the unpopular measures of the last ten years, knowing that, at the very least, they hurt the feelings of a large part of its electorate, and, at worst, they directly affected their lives.

In all fairness, the PJD is not the only one responsible for its downfall. Other factors also contributed to it. The involvement of the Moroccan state is one of them. For several years, the continuous disclosure of sexual scandals affecting important members of the party by press close to the “deep state” – some real and others invented – contributed to tarnishing the PJD’s reputation.

To this, we must add the direct interventionism of the Minister of the Interior Abdelouafi Laftit in the political life of the country with the aim of putting a spoke in the Islamists’ wheel. For example, it was Laftit, a man of the Royal Palace, who imposed a new electoral law in 2019 that was unfavorable to the PJD. This law brings about a new distribution of seats in the House of Representatives calculated on the basis of the number of registered voters and not of voters. And the funny thing is that this reform was imposed by the Ministry of the Interior on a government led by the main victim of this law: the PJD.

The money that flowed during the elections also contributed to the weakening of the PJD.

The other major factor that contributed to weakening the PJD is the money that flowed during the elections – a fact that was denounced by the Moroccan branch of the NGO Transparency International. Transparency International did not name the beneficiary of this venal strategy, but the Authenticity and Modernity Party (PAM), which came second with 87 MPs, specifically accused the National Rally of Independents (RNI) which won 102 seats of corruption.

To sum up, the latest general elections in Morocco, and especially the legislative elections, meant a terrible setback for the PJD and a victory, as a consequence of a long-standing strategy, for the Royal Palace. Not only is the PJD out, but a friend of King Mohammed VI, the billionaire and president of the RNI Aziz Akhannouch has been entrusted with forming the new government.

With a close friend of the sovereign at the head of the government in Morocco, a balkanized parliament, and a reduced and fragmented Islamist opposition, the legislature promises to be quiet and without upheaval – with a downside, however. Since 2011, the PJD has complacently played the role of the villain, the punching bag that is supposed to take the blows instead of the Royal Palace, in order to preserve the image of the monarchy.

The fall of the PJD in Morocco and the appointment of a man from the Royal Palace, who is said to be a newcomer even though he has been heading the Ministry of Agriculture since 2007, changes the situation. Akhannouch and the RNI are creatures of the real Moroccan power. If the new head of government succeeds in his bid to modernize Morocco and reduce social inequalities, it will be to the benefit of the Royal Palace. If he fails, it is the king who will be primarily responsible.

When the news circulated that Morocco’s leading political group, the Development and Justice Party (PJD), has been trounced in the latest elections, held in September, official media mouthpieces in Egypt celebrated the news as if the PJD’s defeat was, in itself, a blow to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. Regionally, political commentators who dedicated much of their time to discredit various Islamic political parties – often on behalf of one Arab government or another – found in the news another supposed proof that political Islam is a failure in both theory and practice.

“Regionally, the news of the (PJD) failure was greeted with jubilation,” Magdi Abdelhadi wrote on the BBC English website. “Commentators regarded the fall of PJD as the final nail in the coffin of political Islam,” he added.

Missing from such sweeping declarations is that those who greeted the defeat of the PJD with ‘jubilation’ are mostly the very crowd that dismissed political Islam even during its unprecedented surge following the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011; and the same intellectual mercenaries who unashamedly continue to sing the praises of such dictators as General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and the various Arab monarchs in the Gulf.

The PJD was not only defeated but almost completely demolished as a result of the vote, saving only 12 seats from the 125 seats it had obtained after the 2016 elections. The reasons behind such failure, however, are being misconstrued by various entities, governments and individuals with the aim of settling old scores and tarnishing political rivals. The ultimate objective here is to cement the status quo where the fate of Arab nations remains in the grip of brutal, corrupt and self-aggrandizing rulers, with no tolerance for genuine political plurality and democracy.

Those who insist on viewing Arab and Middle Eastern politics through generalized, academic notions have also found in the outcome of the Moroccan elections a perfect opportunity to delve further into sweeping statements. These knee-jerk, cliched reactions were boosted by the ongoing political crisis in Tunisia, the main victim of which, aside from Tunisian democracy, is the Ennahda Islamic party.

Democracy Crisis in Tunisia

On July 25, Tunisian President Kais Saied began a series of measures that effectively dismantled the country’s entire democratic infrastructure, while concentrating all powers into his hands.

Taking advantage of the poor performances and endemic dysfunction of the country’s major political parties, including Ennahda, as well as the festering economic crisis and the growing dissatisfaction among ordinary Tunisians, Saied justified his actions as a way “to save the state and society.”

Deterministic vs Dynamic Politics 

When the Arab Spring first began, starting in Tunisia in early 2011, it seemed that the fall of dictators and the rise of democracy was inevitable; also certain seemed the rise of Islamic parties, which has, indeed, registered substantial victories in various democratic elections throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – which was founded by the country’s Muslim Brotherhood Movement – won 37 percent of the votes in the parliamentary election in 2011; Morocco’s PJD secured over 25 percent of available seats in the parliament, while Ennahda obtained 89 of 217 seats.

Then, it was common to discuss Islamic parties as if they are all branches of the same ideological – in fact, in the view of some – even political movement. ‘Political Islam’ became synonymous with the ‘Arab Spring’. Some saw this as an opportunity for ‘moderate’ Muslims – marginalized, exiled and often tortured and killed – to finally claim what is rightfully theirs; others, namely Israeli and right-wing western intellectuals and politicians, decried what they saw as an ‘Islamic Winter’, claiming that democracy and Islam would espouse an even greater anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment.

Often missing from most of these discussions is the national context, under which all Arab politics, whether Islamic-leaning or otherwise, operate. In Morocco, for example, King Mohammed VI played his own political game to ensure the survival of the monarchy in the age of democratization. He quickly drew the Islamists nearer to him, offered a veneer of democracy, while practically holding on to all aspects of power.

Though it will take time to reach a conclusive analysis, it is possible that the PJD’s downfall was a result of its willingness to compromise on its declared principles in exchange for a very limited share of power. Indeed, at times, it seemed as if the Islamic party, elected to steer the country away from the rule of a single individual, was serving the role of the King’s official political party. This was manifested in the PJD’s acceptance and eventual endorsement of Morocco’s normalization of ties with the State of Israel in December 2020.

The Islamists’ recent defeat in Morocco, however, must not be viewed as a crisis in political Islam, for the latter is a theoretical concept that is in constant flux and is open to various, often radically opposing interpretations by different scholars and under different historical contexts.

While the PJD, for example, signed off to the King’s normalization with Israel, Ennahda vehemently rejected it. Indeed, each Islamic party seems to behave according to different sets of priorities that are unique to that party, to its socio-economic setting, political objective and, ultimately, to its own unique interests.

Eighteen years after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iraqi Shiites are divided on the relationship between political power, ethnicity, and religious legitimation. However, one thing that is clear is that the greater majority of high-ranking Shiite religious scholars in Iraq support democracy. Peyman Eshaghi of Politics Today interviewed Dr. Ali Taher Elmemmud, associate professor of sociology at the University of Baghdad, on his book titled The Embers of Governance: Iraqi Shiites and Nation-State Building Challenges in the Post-2003 Era, Beirut, Darelrafidayn, 2017 [in Arabic].

Q. What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book? What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book?

This book was my doctoral dissertation. It took two years to write, and a passionate defense that lasted six and a half hours was held for it. This was because it was the only dissertation defended in the Faculty of Humanities and the Department of Sociology of Baghdad University on Shiism and state-building in Iraq. After that, of course, it took a year to turn the dissertation into a book.

Of course, I removed some theoretical aspects from the book, and it became more suitable for non-academic readers and researchers. To write the dissertation, I conducted field research for more than a year. I succeeded in conducting interviews with twenty notable personalities. It was very challenging to meet Iraqi high-ranking Shiite clerics, known as “Sources of Emulation,” and top political figures due to Iraq’s situation and the sensitivities surrounding the issue. Among them are Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani, Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim, Muhammad Is’haq al-Fayadh, and Bashir Al-Najafi.

Talking to intellectuals was much easier, but as I said, interviewing leading religious figures in Iraq was more difficult. For example, I spent six months trying to interview a Shiite high-ranking religious scholar known as “Marja” (literally Source of Emulation) in Najaf.

Q. How did you conduct research for this book?

While examining the state-building by Shiites in Iraq after 2003, I tried to study the fundamental theories of state-nation building. But I soon realized that many of the approaches cited about Iraq do not reflect the realities of the country. Perhaps this is because most of the researchers who have worked in this field have been non-Iraqis or have not done fieldwork. It must be borne in mind that Iraq is a country with an ancient history and deep-rooted culture. Therefore, it is challenging to bring together all the affairs of Iraq and understand the country in terms of the relationship that the government has had with its people.

For example, Francis Fukuyama has written about state-building in Iraq, and British author Liora Lukitz has written another book on state-building in Iraq. In this book, Lukitz applies Anthony Smith’s theory of national identity to the case of Iraq. However, when we scrutinize the issue, we find that neither of the two writers has been able to consider and understand Iraq’s realities. These two “Western ways” of thinking could not comprehend the local complexities.

Since 2003, Iraqi Shiite Islamists have ruled with the same secular tools and way of thinking. Thus, it must be said that this is a new phenomenon in the course of Shiite political thought. In practice, no Shiite Islamist has tried to pass Islamic law in parliament since 2003. Personal status laws were never transformed into the “Islamic” ones. The budget law, one of the clauses of which imposes a tax on alcoholic beverages, which practically guarantees their free sale in Iraq, has never been criticized by a parliament whose majority is Shiite Islamists. They never tried to establish an Islamic institution called the government. Such things show that their Islamism enjoys a civil approach.

Although this approach is not Islamist in the conventional sense, it is not necessarily secular in the anti-religious sense. Instead, it respects religion without allowing religion to rule directly. Iraqi Shiite Islamists are in favor of a civil society, and Islamism for these Islamists is a belief in Islam and a personal commitment to it. In other words, Islamism is defined by performing a series of private acts of worship, observing sincerity and trustworthiness, and the like. Islamists have no purpose other than themselves and individual issues, and do not intend to lead society towards Islam.

Most of the Iraqi Shiites are following Ayatollah Sistani. However, they are not the only ones. Some Shiites are also openly secular in three types: first, liberal seculars represented by people like Ahmad Chalabi, who passed away a few years ago. Second, the national seculars who are represented in the political arena by politicians such as Ayad Allawi. The third group is the Communist seculars, represented by the Iraqi Communist Party.

Islamist Shiites are also made up of several groups. Most of them follow Ayatollah Sistani. The second group, which is smaller than the first group, is Muqtada al-Sadr. Religiously, they were following Sayyid Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, who was assassinated by state forces in 1999, and now they follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Muqtada is a nationalist figure who has never called for the formation of an Islamic-Shiite state since 2003. He has promoted religious, denominational, and cultural pluralism in Iraq, especially in recent years.

The third group of Shiite Islamists is loyal to the theory of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). They follow Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, who resides outside Iraq in the Iranian capital of Tehran. These people are mainly affiliated with Iraqi militia groups. They have never dared to say that they want an Islamic or Shiite state since the fall of Saddam, but their approach is vividly focused on the Shiite identity and creating a Shiite ummah. In their view, the Shiite ummah ranges from the Hazaras of Afghanistan to Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to them, the leadership of this Shiite nation will be in Tehran.

The last group of Iraqi Shiites is supporters of Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. They are much fewer in number than others. They are more focused on ritual issues, and they do not have a specific political program.

According to Bayat, Islamic political movements experience certain phases. The first phase is the experimentation, in which the movement gains power. Then, they face the paradoxes of being in power in addition to failure to realize their promises. In the end, the appeal, energy, symbols, and sources of legitimacy of political Islamism evaporate.

Bayat believes that this procedure does not lead to an anti-Islamic approach. However, the supporters of political Islamism tend to resecularize it which negatively affects their political career and their ability to hold on to power and remain as the winner their political career and simultaneously give up their religious ends and ambitions.

In recent years, scholars have tried to apply the post-Islamism theory to different cases, specifically the contexts where political Islam has been active in the past decades. Yadullah Shahibzadeh is among those who have followed political Islam in Iran. In his book Islamism and Post-Islamism in Iran: An Intellectual History, he explains the crisis of political leadership in post-1979 revolution Iran.

By detecting “Islamist totalism” in Iranian politics, he follows the career of Islamists in power. He discusses the challenges they faced with democracy, and the challenges with Islamist and non-Islamist reformists in their effort to guarantee democracy in Iran. Shedding light on Iranian political and intellectual history after the 1979 revolution, Shahibzadeh focuses on Iranian Muslim intellectuals and their understanding of politics and democracy in reference to their religious background and religiosity.

He argues that by providing a large amount of epistemological, ethical, and political insights to society, Iranian Muslim intellectuals have contributed to the transformation of Iranian Islamism into post-Islamism. Therefore, the past, solid Islamic ideology in terms of its avid eagerness to preserve political power and dominance has been enormously weakened and delegitimized.

Although the discussions on post-Islamism were more concerned with Iran, Egypt, and Turkey, after the downfall of the Baathist regime, Iraq also entered the current scholarship on post-Islamism. In Patriotic Ayatollahs: Nationalism in Post-Saddam Iraq, Caroleen Sayej has followed the attitudes of Islamist parties and activists in post-2003 Iraq and has provided a deep analysis of senior Iraqi clerics in the Iraqi political sphere.

Sayej focuses on Shiite clerics’ pronouncements and fatwas on political issues, and narrates their ideas and ideals on contested issues such as democracy. In Patriotic Ayatollahs, she narrates the most important Shiite religious scholars and their followers’ positions. For her, they have selected a progressive and secular approach in post-2003 Iraq. The case becomes more critical as most Shiite politicians and political leaders lived in Iran for years and were influenced by the theory of the “Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist” which is currently prevalent in Iran.

In other words, the Iranian experience has pushed the Iraqi Shiite religious scholars toward a post-Islamist inclination in Iraqi politics. Sayej’s main contributions to the issues of post-Islamism in this work are, first, her reference to the role of high-ranking religious leaders in insisting on the necessity of democracy and its legitimacy over any Islamic theocracy; and second, the vital role that nationalism plays in the political thinking and behavior of an Arab Muslim nation in the Middle East amidst sectarian temptations and tendencies.

In other words, the importance of Sayej’s work lies in the fact that she illustrates a path in which a transnational Shiite movement has been replaced by a local endeavor to guarantee a democratic system and to reinterpret Islamism in a way that deals with personal and communal piety and not with structural-political issues.

Are Knudsen and Basem Ezbidi have edited several articles and published them in a volume called Popular Protest in the New Middle East: Islamism and Post-Islamist Politics. The editors have considered a group of political uprisings in different parts of the Middle East, known generally as the “Arab Spring,” whose immediate outcome was overthrowing decades-long political regimes and substituting them with unstable states.

More than any other place, in post-Mubarak Egypt and post-Ben Ali Tunisia, Islamist political movements have gained power: the Freedom and Justice Party and the Ennahda Movement, respectively. In addition to a foreword by Asef Bayat, the authors have provided insightful analyses of Islamist and post-Islamist trends in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, and Turkey.

Popular Protest in the New Middle East deliberately moves away from the generalizations and abstractions of post-Islamism attributed to the Muslim world as a whole. The book, an essential read for all those interested in the subject, has applied the concept of post-Islamism and its related notions to different cases in Middle Eastern countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries and dealt with the concept in relation to Muslim political activists’ experiences in the past decades in their countries.

Last but not least in this grouping is a selection of articles edited by Mohammed Abu Rumman and published under the title Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? It discusses the main problems of post-Islamism as a term and concept. To put it concisely, the authors believe that although post-Islamism is controversial, they have decided to use it “in the absence of a more fitting label.”

Drawing on the experience of the Arab Revolutions, the authors ascertain that the revolutionaries failed to achieve certain of the classical goals of political Islam such as the Islamic state due to ideological delusions and sociological realities. The authors refer to the transformations of Islamists’ experiences in countries such as Iran, Iraq, Indonesia, and Jordan, and try to read the changes in different countries of the Middle East.

Published in 2018 and appearing later than the other works on post-Islamism, Post-Islamism: A New Phase or Ideological Delusions? draws on a range of theories and past discussions of the term. In each article, authors have used, challenged, and developed the theory of post-Islamism, based on its rich literature, and have contributed to this discussion by direct reference to different Muslim countries.

In Egypt and most of the Arab world, the holy month of Ramadan is TV series’ prime season. This year, during Ramadan, Islamist movements and terrorism were among TV series’ main themes; however, this topic has already been a focus point in films and on TV since the 1990s.

Many works such as Al-Irhabi (The Terrorist), Toyour Elzalam (The Birds of Darkness), or El-Nagoon Min el-Nar (Survivors of Hell) addressed the subject of Islamist movements and terrorism. Interest in the subject continued for the film and drama industry in the following years through works such as “Dam El-Ghazal” (The Blood of the Deer, 2005), The Yacoubian Building (2006), and El-Gamaah (2010).

Egyptian filmmakers tend to refer to Islamist groups and terrorism synonymously. This association continued in various TV dramas in 2021 such as “The Choice 2: Men of the Shadow”, “Cairo: Kabul”, and “Counterattack.”

The discursive association of Islamism with terrorism is based on three main typologies of Islamic groups in the Egyptian film industry. The first is Islamist groups or movements which aim to establish an Islamic political, economic, and social order, and to reorient the state accordingly. The second is non-political, traditional Islamic groups, which involve many subgroups such as Sufis, or local mosque communities that are mostly nonpolitical, with less public influence, and that are limited to local communal activities. The last type is the group of scholars (ulama) who are dominantly associated with Al-Azhar.

The Audience

In Egypt, the film and drama industry associates terrorism with Islamists by capitalizing on the armed practices of some of these groups. Among these are the armed activities in Egypt of groups such as al-Jama’a al-Islamiyya between the 1970s and 1990s, and the more recent operations of Daesh (ISIS) and Al-Qaeda. The industry has also capitalized on the political turbulence during and following the ruling period of the Muslim Brotherhood between 2012 and 2013. Political instabilities created an atmosphere in which negative representations of such groups were widely accepted by society.

What makes the story more interesting is that the traditional Islamic groups and the ulama were used in the derogatory portrayals of the Islamist groups. In these dramas, both the traditional Islamic groups and the ulama criticize and demonize Islamist groups, while also serving as a reference for how true and pious Muslims and Muslim congregations should be. The latter are represented as peaceful, practicing, ethical, and polite Muslims.

Most importantly, unlike the “rebellious” Islamists, they comply with the political authority (waliyy’al-amr) as a religious requirement. Thus, they tacitly criticize the Islamists by representing them as people that are misinterpreting Islam – the correct interpretation of Islam appears in the actions of the traditional groups.

In the case of the ulama, only the members who back the state and criticize the political activities of the Islamists are represented, such as the scholar Ali Gomaa. However, this time, their criticism is direct. In the movies, as in reality, the ulama condemn the activities of Islamists, regarding them un-Islamic. This has happened even when movies depict real-life cases for which there is no solid evidence of Islamist involvement.

The shows oversimplify and naively portray the reality through stereotypes that eventually produce a form of self-orientalist discourse. Using similar stereotypes and clichés, Egyptians, as non-Westerners, view their fellow citizens who have a different political affiliation – in this case, Islamists – as old-fashioned orientalists.

A brief analysis of the self-orientalist representations of these TV dramas shows that there are generally three characters representing three factions in Islamist groups: the leader, his disciples, and the newcomer.

Sheikh – The Leader: This character is usually a man over 50, with a long, white beard who speaks Classical Arabic (Fusha). He wears a traditional Arab dress (thawb) and is very invested in women as he has more than one wife and keeps changing them. He recites hadiths and passages of the Qur’an frequently in his casual discourse, but often misinterprets the meaning to fit his agenda. He manipulates the public, especially the youth. Meanwhile, he is aware of his distortion of religion, yet, he is only concerned about his personal interests.

The Disciples: These characters are the direct assistants of the leader. They are usually a younger version of the latter in terms of physical appearance, dress, and speech. However, they are divided into two categories: those, like the leader, who are aware of the distortion and manipulation they cause but who benefit from it, and those who are deceived by the leader and think that they are truly serving the religion and applying “Jihad.”

The Newcomer: This is the main character, who is generally a young man suffering from poor socioeconomic conditions. He finds his way to salvation in religion by joining a religious group, which offers him the prospect of escaping his miserable conditions; however, he falls victim to manipulation by the leader of the group and his disciples.

The group is depicted as a violent, terrorist organization, which proclaims anybody who refuses its objectives or disagrees with its statements as an infidel. The group is generally depicted as resorting to violence with shootings and bombings that take innocent lives.

Such characters and religious groups have been portrayed in a similar fashion in various Western TV shows, especially ones produced in the United States such as “24”, “Sleeper Cell”, and “The West Wing.” Such shows have used similar representations of “terrorist” organizations and their members. Evelyn Alsultany, an expert on the history of the representations of Arabs and Muslims in the U.S. media, calls these Western depictions the “terrorist stereotype.”

In her analysis of U.S. shows, Alsultany points out that they use certain strategies in an attempt to give the impression that the Muslim or Arab characters in the shows are complex, but in truth, they are simplified and stereotypically linked to terrorism. One of these strategies is “inserting patriotic Arab or Muslim Americans.” This strategy entails a “positive” patriotic Muslim character who knows the religion well and fights “bad” terrorist Muslim characters who are abusing Islam.

A similar method is followed in many Egyptian TV series, which take terrorism as their theme. The most recent examples are “The Choice 2: Men of the Shadow”, “Cairo: Kabul”, and “Counterattack,” aired during Ramadan this year. These TV shows all include religiously well informed officers, agents, and even a whole police unit, as in the case of “The Choice.” These practicing Muslim state officials fight the terrorist Islamist groups which, once again, misuse religion to deceive youth and attain their goals.

Many scholars and pundits of the MENA region are wondering why the Islamists did not take over during the massive protests known as the “Arab Spring.” This question is relevant to the extent that political Islam for many decades has been a popular movement that has threatened regimes marked by a deficit of legitimacy.

To address this issue, we need to bear in mind that the ideological references of Islamism pertain to a sort of utopia which prevented the movement from being politically efficient. Many Islamists became aware of this ideological handicap, seeking another path in order to play a role in the state institutions.

What is Islamism?

Islamism can be defined as a resistance to the inescapable secularization, or at least, an attempt to bargain the place of religion in the public sphere. Facing the social and cultural transformations of past colonization and current globalization, religious consciousness is worried about the future of Islam.

Hence the demand for the implementation of Islamic law, sharia. But this demand is not limited to the judiciary; it encompasses a worldview that dictates how the state and society should be.

In this regard, Islamism is a utopia expressing the desire for a perfect society and a fair state. The utopia is about building a social world where selfishness does not exist. For instance, in the Islamist literature of the 1980s in Algeria, including the weekly publication Al Munqid, the issue of underdevelopment was explained by mismanagement and bad economic policy.

The idea is that despite the fact that God created enough wealth, poverty is widespread and it is the result of the rulers’ corruption and selfishness. To reach this utopian goal, the state needs to be run by righteous people who fear God and who are not prone to corruption. Islamists are in search of the ideal government and the ideal leaders in a society marked by fairness.

The excessive violence in Egypt and Algeria led to a split of the movement: a mainstream approach to take over the state peacefully through the electoral process, and a minority trend supporting Al-Qaida and Daesh. It is worth noting that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt accepted to create a party (Justice and Liberty Party), meaning that by implication they saw themselves as a political party among others, while in the past they claimed to be the party of all the Egyptians.

Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

By foregoing violence to take over the state and by accepting other parties as legitimate competitors, Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Islamists took part in elections, and in some countries, they won. They won in Tunisia in 2011, and in Egypt and Morocco in 2012 following the nationwide protests.

The internet factor

The internet factor, as a societal phenomenon, reduced the influence of the Islamist discourse among young people. Multiple debates in many virtual forums gave the opportunity to oppose the Islamist views on society, women, culture, etc. There was a sort of deconsecration of the Islamist discourse with the idea that the verses of the Koran could have many different interpretations. This deconsecration was made possible by the free speech that was encouraged by anonymity on social media.

Some young people went as far as to claim to be atheists, and others questioned Muslim theology. At the university, professors and students engaged in debates questioning the religious authority of thinkers such as Al Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah.

There is a climate never seen before where people are demanding a reform of the theology inherited from the past. Students have started to read Mohamed Shahrour, Mohamed Taha, Mohammed Arkoun, among others.

Undermined by its ideological and political contradictions, Islamism failed to emerge as the dominant force to take over the state following the Arab Spring. The Islamists do not see themselves any more as the party of the nation; they have accepted to be one party among others.

In Tunisia, they backed down on issues of women and freedom of consciousness. In Morocco, they aligned with the king who kept the army and the foreign affairs under his control, despite having gained more seats in the National Assembly than any other party.

In Egypt and Algeria, certain Islamists are seeking the blessing of the military to take part in the state institutions. In Iraq, Sunni Islamism has been weakened by the excesses of violence perpetrated by Daesh. It leaves a space to Shiite groups to be more active, whether they align themselves with Tehran or not.