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n recent years, Türkiye’s presence in Somalia has deepened significantly. Whilst energy and space initiatives feature prominently, the foundation of this process lies in security, infrastructure and institutional capacity-building. In particular, the multi-layered cooperation model established after 2011 has laid the groundwork for the steps being taken in the energy sector today.

Türkiye’s commencement of oil exploration activities in Somalia may, at first glance, appear to be a purely technical energy initiative. However, this development is part of a much broader strategic framework. The operations currently being carried out by the deep-sea drilling vessel Çağrı Bey off the coast of Somalia are situated at the intersection of security, the economy, state capacity and geopolitical competition. Therefore, assessing the matter solely under the heading of energy exploration amounts to failing to grasp the bigger picture.

The strategic significance of Çağrı Bey

When evaluated within this broader framework, Türkiye’s oil exploration activities in Somalia represent a new phase. The work to be carried out by the domestically built and operated drilling vessel Çağrı Bey in the Curad-1 field goes far beyond a mere technical operation. The drilling, capable of reaching a depth of approximately 7,500 metres, is a process requiring advanced technology and high engineering capacity. Expected to last 288 days, this activity is considered a long-term strategic investment.

One of the most significant aspects of this initiative is the development of Somalia’s capacity to discover and manage its own resources. The potential discovery of an energy reserve could be a turning point for the Somali economy. This would not only mean an increase in revenue but also the strengthening of the state’s financial capacity and the acceleration of development processes.

From Türkiye’s perspective, this step represents the extension of its energy supply security strategy to an overseas dimension. Expanding into new fields in line with Türkiye’s objective of reducing its dependence on energy imports will contribute to it assuming a more active role in the global energy equation. Türkiye’s commencement of oil exploration in Somalia is not merely a one-dimensional energy investment. This development constitutes a multi-layered strategic move where security, economy, sovereignty and geopolitics are intertwined. The steps being taken in Somalia today will not only yield short-term results but will also shape the country’s economic and political transformation in the long term. Similarly, from Türkiye’s perspective, this process is a significant indicator of its transformation from a country that consumes energy to an active player in the energy sector.

If this process is successfully concluded, Somalia will cease to be a country associated with crises and will emerge as a new ‘safe haven’ and economic actor at both regional and global levels. Türkiye, as one of the key partners in this transformation, has the potential to further strengthen its strategic position in Africa.

From security to the economy: How did the groundwork come about?

For many years, the most fundamental issue in Somalia has been security. The weakness of state capacity and the influence of terrorist organisations have severely limited the development of economic activity. Türkiye’s approach in this regard has evolved from humanitarian aid to development assistance, and subsequently continued with military training tailored to local needs. However, this approach has not been limited to a purely military perspective but has aimed to build a more comprehensive security architecture.

At the current stage, Türkiye’s contributions are playing a decisive role in enhancing Somalia’s counter-terrorism capabilities. Reconnaissance and surveillance support provided by unmanned aerial vehicles, the operational contribution of air assets, and military training programmes have shifted the balance on the ground in favour of the Somali state. This has had both a military and a psychological impact. The narrowing of terrorist organisations’ operational space and the reduction in their attack capacity have contributed to the re-establishment of state authority.

The relative improvement in security has also paved the way for economic activities and investment. The rapid urbanization observed in Mogadishu in recent years, along with increased construction activities and private sector investment, are concrete indicators of this transformation. The active role of Turkish companies in infrastructure and superstructure projects serves as a significant lever in the revitalisation of the Somali economy.

One of Somalia’s greatest untapped potentials lies in its marine resources, which have remained underutilised for many years. From a blue economy perspective, fisheries, maritime transport and energy resources present critical opportunities for Somalia. Within the framework of the partnerships developed with Türkiye, fishing activities to be carried out in Somali territorial waters represent a significant step towards harnessing this potential. This process will not only generate economic revenue but will also strengthen Somalia’s control over its maritime zones.

In parallel, the process of building up Somalia’s naval forces is also noteworthy. These efforts, carried out with Türkiye’s support, are of critical importance in combating piracy and ensuring maritime security. Maritime security, whilst a military matter, is also decisive for the sustainability of trade and economic activities.

Furthermore, the operation of port and airport facilities in Somalia by Turkish companies constitutes a significant aspect of Türkiye’s economic presence in the country. However, as the Somali economy grows, the existing infrastructure is beginning to prove inadequate. This situation brings new port and airport projects to the fore. Another notable development, in terms of accelerating trade and reducing costs, is the increasing use of the Somali flag on commercial vessels. This step has the potential to significantly shorten trade transit times. This will not only accelerate Somalia’s integration into global trade networks but also enhance its competitive strength.

Geopolitical dimension: A new balance in a critical geography

Somalia’s geopolitical position makes these developments all the more significant. The Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea route constitute one of the most critical chokepoints for global trade and energy transportation. Any instability in this region has repercussions on a global scale.

Recent Houthi attacks in Yemen and regional tensions have made the security of the Gulf of Aden, the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Red Sea route more fragile. Furthermore, the possibility of Israel unilaterally recognizing the Somaliland administration, or engaging in political contacts in this direction, is making the issue of Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity even more sensitive. For such a step would imply that Israel is jeopardizing Somalia’s national integrity in pursuit of its own security and geopolitical interests in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

This situation could have serious consequences not only for Somalia’s domestic politics but also in terms of the emergence of a new crisis of legitimacy and sovereignty in the Horn of Africa. Furthermore, there is growing discussion that such a scenario could increase the likelihood of the Houthis in Yemen targeting the Somaliland administration or locations in the region believed to be linked to Israel. In this context, ensuring Somalia’s stability and maritime security holds national, regional and global significance. The ability of vessels flying the Somali flag to navigate this high-risk region more effectively is one of the factors enhancing the country’s geopolitical value.

Alongside these developments, the fact that vessels flying the Somali flag will now be able to sail across the globe represents a significant step forward. This situation holds, above all, symbolic and strategic importance for Somalia’s international representation. Furthermore, the Federal Government of Somalia aims to establish the Somali flag as one of the region’s trusted flags. Particularly at a time when threats in maritime chokepoints are on the rise, Somalia’s friendly relations in the region and its balanced foreign policy could transform the Somali flag into a key advantage in potential future crises.

Furthermore, the enactment of the cabotage law in Somalia has further strengthened this process. Under this law, vessels not flying the Somali flag will be restricted from conducting commercial activities in Somali territorial waters; such vessels will only be permitted to utilize the right of transit passage. This represents an extremely important step in strengthening Somalia’s sovereignty over its maritime zones.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he does not want to see “a new conflict in the Horn of Africa,” he is not making a throwaway remark about a distant region. He is speaking after high-level talks in Addis Ababa and phone calls that range from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, at a moment when Red Sea tensions, Ethiopia’s search for sea access and Somalia’s first offshore drilling project are all converging. I don’t read this as a routine diplomatic line. To me, it is a sign that, for Ankara, stability from Ethiopia to Somalia has become a strategic test of its broader foreign policy narrative.

Over the last few years, Türkiye has steadily expanded its footprint along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Somalia hosts Turkish trainers, engineers and aid workers. Ethiopia has become one of Ankara’s largest investment destinations on the continent. Sudan, Djibouti and even Eritrea now enter Turkish debates about sea lanes, energy routes and security risks. Erdoğan’s latest message simply makes explicit what policy choices have already been saying quietly: the Horn of Africa is no longer a side file.

That matters because the region sits at the intersection of several fires at once. Civil war in Sudan, unresolved tensions inside Ethiopia, maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the persistent threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia all blur into one another. For a country that sees itself as both a regional stabilizer and a rising middle power, ignoring this arc of instability is not really an option.

From a “Somalia file” to a regional vision

Türkiye’s entry point into the Horn of Africa was Somalia. What began as humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine turned into a long-term relationship that combines military training, infrastructure projects, and political support. Ankara built roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu, opened an embassy when many others stayed away and later established a major military training base to support Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.

Over time, this “Somalia file” stopped being just about one fragile state. Turkish diplomats and security officials increasingly framed it as part of a wider picture that stretches from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Turkish Airlines routes, port projects and naval deployments all reflect the same logic: what happens around the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden directly affect Türkiye’s trade, energy security and diaspora connections.

As Ethiopia’s leadership began to talk more openly about its need for sea access, and as Sudan’s war threatened to fragment another coastal state, Ankara’s calculus shifted again. It was no longer enough to work only with Mogadishu. Relations with Addis Ababa deepened around investment, defense cooperation and discussions on how Ethiopia could secure access to ports without triggering a wider conflict. The message coming out of Erdoğan’s meetings has been consistent: any solution on sea access should be based on regional consensus, not unilateral moves that risk pulling everyone into a crisis.

This is happening in a crowded field. The United States, Gulf countries, Egypt, the European Union and China all have their own military bases, port concessions and political projects in and around the Horn. Türkiye is not the biggest player in terms of money or firepower. Its difference lies in what it is not: it has no colonial history in the region; it presents itself as a partner from the Global South and it speaks the language of both security and development at the same time.

Security that tries to reduce, not export, risk

Erdoğan’s Horn of Africa message is rooted in very concrete security concerns. Ethiopia is still managing the aftershocks of internal conflicts. Sudan’s civil war threatens to spill over into Chad, South Sudan, and the Red Sea. Eritrea remains a closed but influential actor. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has not disappeared, even as security forces have made gains. Across the water, Yemen’s conflict and Houthi attacks on shipping lanes have turned the Red Sea into a zone of permanent alert.

In such an environment, escalation rarely stays local. A border clash between Ethiopia and a coastal neighbor, a miscalculation in Sudan or a major attack on shipping could quickly draw in Gulf states, Western navies and regional rivals. Trade routes, energy flows and migration patterns would all feel the shock.

Türkiye’s answer has been to invest in local capacity rather than posture as a front-line power. In Somalia, Turkish officers train army and police units, while naval forces contribute to anti-piracy and maritime security missions. The aim is to help local institutions stand on their feet, not to replace them. The same logic applies to Ethiopia and Sudan, where Ankara stresses respect for territorial integrity and advocates political dialogue even as it supplies equipment and technical support.

From Ankara’s perspective, stability in the Horn is tied directly to its own security. New refugee flows, disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, or the spread of extremist networks would quickly reach the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. At the same time, a more stable Horn offers opportunities: safer trade corridors, energy cooperation with Somalia, and a friendlier environment for Turkish investment in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ports, planes and people-to-people ties

Security is only part of the equation. The Horn of Africa has also become an economic and diplomatic laboratory for Türkiye. Turkish companies are active in ports, construction and logistics projects, seeking a role in upgrading infrastructure that links landlocked states to global markets. Every port concession, every logistics hub has a dual meaning: commercial opportunity and geopolitical leverage.

For a middle power with limited resources, every naval mission, every training base and every trade deal has to serve more than one purpose. A presence in Mogadishu is not only about counterterrorism; it is also about giving Turkish firms a foothold in a market that others have long ignored. Investment in Ethiopian manufacturing is not only about cheap labor; it supports a political partnership that Ankara hopes will last through leadership changes on both sides.

Soft power runs alongside these hard interests. Scholarship programs bring Ethiopian and Somali students to Turkish universities. Development agencies support health, education and agriculture projects in remote areas. Turkish NGOs operate clinics and schools that often outlast news cycles. In quiet times, these efforts build goodwill. In moments of crisis, they provide channels to actors who do not always sit at official tables.

In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.

Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.

While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.

Coordinated engagement in Somalia

In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.

Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.

A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.

This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.

In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.

The Sudan crisis and the balance of power in the Red Sea

A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.

Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.

Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.

Resolving conflicts rather than competing with each other

Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.

In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.

Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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lthough the announcement of Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is a diplomatic move, it reveals a process that undermines the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity in the Horn of Africa. This move is also a strategic step toward shifting the balance of power in the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and the Indian Ocean. The timing of this move is no coincidence.

Recent regional developments include renewed momentum for southern secession in Yemen, discussions of a de facto division in Sudan’s Darfur region, successful direct elections in Somalia’s Benadir region (including the capital), the crash of an aircraft carrying the Libyan chief of staff and his delegation, and Israel’s decision to recognize Somaliland. These events have transformed the situation into an issue of regional security architecture, especially given the more visible anti-Türkiye alliance in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean.

It is important to understand which negotiations and settlements recognition opens the door to, as well as the consequences it will have on the regional process. Recognition is more than an outcome; it creates a situation that gives rise to new demands, risks, and precedents. Furthermore, today’s events raise concerns about the principle of state integrity across the continent, including Somalia, as well as the fundamental pillars of the international order.

The strategic logic of recognition: Sea routes, platforms and corridor policy

The best way to understand the Somaliland issue is to look at a map of the region. In today’s global politics, geopolitical analyses and efforts to understand the transformation of the global system necessitate an update to traditional methods of interpretation. It is now imperative to understand the process within the context of security, the immediate environment, alliances, balancing, multilateralism, geo-economics, connectivity, and capacity.

Therefore, the Bab al-Mandab Strait, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea are too dynamic to be viewed merely as bottlenecks of global trade or vital transit points of the global economy. At the same time, this region is a force field where military access, intelligence, pressure, and deterrence are produced. The Houthis’ ability to target maritime traffic in Yemen strengthens the pursuit of a “southern encirclement.” In this context, Somaliland’s geography offers external actors a lower-cost, higher-leverage option through its port infrastructure and access opportunities. Thus, recognition is a strategic instrument that goes far beyond a political gesture, paving the way for the construction of a platform on the ground.

The second axis of this process can be interpreted as corridor politics. The trade and energy links stretching from India to the Gulf, Eastern Mediterranean, and Europe should be discussed as the backbone of geopolitical competition, not just economic projects. Israel’s deepening relations with India, the UAE’s regional networks established through its ports and logistics, and the emerging alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean with Greece and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus (GCASC) place a potential recognition of Somaliland within a broader strategic context.

If recognition is detailed through port, access, and base agreements at this point, the debate will move beyond legal status and actively enter the field. Therefore, this situation represents the most critical threshold. The nature of the issue will shift from Somaliland’s independence to whether Somalia’s sovereignty is effectively curtailed. Thus, recognition, beyond the debate of international law, will open the door to establishing a permanent settlement, which will bring numerous potential crises.

Regional chess and multi-front pressure on Türkiye

Although the recognition of Somaliland is presented as a single issue, it should actually be understood as part of a broader regional chess game. The rapprochement between Israel and the UAE, and its consequences in Libya, Sudan, Gaza, Yemen, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, are particularly significant for Türkiye.

Prominent issues include the emergence of anti-Türkiye coordination in the Eastern Mediterranean, the establishment of spheres of influence through port and logistics power in the Gulf, overlapping moves in the Sudan and Syria files, and competition centered on oil, port, and space projects in the Horn of Africa. All of this makes it possible to interpret the Somaliland move as a means of applying pressure to regions where Türkiye’s capacity expansion is at stake, rather than as a form of recognition.

Five critical issues stand out here: Ethiopia, Yemen, Sudan, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean. First, prior to the Ankara Declaration, Addis Ababa’s search for access to the sea clashed with Somalia’s sovereignty sensitivities, escalating tensions. Second, Israel’s move towards recognition could set a precedent for Ethiopia. It could encourage other countries to more readily consider recognizing Somaliland. This would put pressure on Somalia from two fronts simultaneously. The erosion of international legitimacy and the growing debate over coastal access and sovereignty are indeed among the pressures.

The second issue is the southern division shaped by Yemen and the Southern Transitional Council (STC). The new balance of power over control areas and oil regions in southern Yemen is fueling another wave of division around the southern Red Sea. Read in conjunction with the recognition of Somaliland, this perception is reinforced, suggesting that a fragmented sovereignty pattern is being encouraged in the southern belt rather than a state-centered order. This perception pushes regional countries toward tougher security measures and deepens the security dilemma.

Warnings that the presence of the Darfur-based Rapid Support Forces (RSF) carries the risk of de facto division highlight the danger of the Somaliland example. If the option of “recognition” is offered as a lifeline to proxy structures trapped on the ground, the Sudan file could become the second link in a similar chain of fractures. In this case, the Red Sea basin would experience multiple separation crises simultaneously. This situation could lead to the further militarization of maritime security discourse and a prolonged period of instability.

Finally, Türkiye is under multi-pronged pressure, combined with issues in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. In every issue that could potentially harm Türkiye, Israel’s overt engagement and moves such as those in Somaliland appear to be linked to Türkiye’s regional projects and spheres of influence. This interpretation is reinforced by the simultaneous increase in rhetoric challenging Türkiye, accompanied by imagery and statements from the Eastern Mediterranean.

While maintaining steadfast support for Somalia’s sovereignty and territorial integrity, it is crucial to address the issue in terms of regional stability and the fundamental principles of the international system, rather than merely at the level of bilateral relations. This is because recognizing Somalia would set a precedent that concerns not only Somalia, but also all of Africa and the future of the principle of sovereignty.

What might happen in the coming period?

This process considers three main scenarios for the future. The first, and least likely, scenario is the emergence of a controlled tension process. In this scenario, while recognition remains a political message, it does not turn into a broad wave of recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland gains practical advantages. Its level of representation increases, and it makes more bilateral agreements. However, there is no significant progress regarding ports, bases, or access. Mogadishu increases its diplomatic mobilization, and the territorial integrity of Africa is more visibly defended. Tensions remain manageable. Nevertheless, the fragilities do not completely disappear.

A second scenario is emerging: a wave of gradual recognition. In this scenario, Somaliland could become a platform. One or more countries will take steps toward recognizing Somaliland. Through port access and surveillance systems, Somaliland effectively transforms into a security platform. This reduces Somalia’s sovereignty. It also increases pressure on Ethiopia to gain access to the sea. It also deepens the security dilemma in Djibouti and neighboring countries. The region settles into a state of constant yet manageable tension. A process of “normalized militarization” emerges in the region.

In the final scenario, a domino effect occurs, resulting in a fragmented order along the Yemen-Somalia-Sudan border. The separation of South Yemen accelerates in this scenario. Following Somaliland’s recognition, new fractures are created in the region and on the continent. There are attempts to politicize the de facto areas of control in Sudan. The Red Sea basin simultaneously experiences multiple “recognition/separation” crises. This could extend as far as Morocco, Mali, and other Sahel countries. The discourse on maritime trade security becomes more militarized. Proxy networks harden and the capacity for compromise diminishes. This scenario is considered the highest-risk scenario. Once a fragmented sovereignty order becomes entrenched, the cost of reversal becomes prohibitively high.

Ultimately, while it may appear to be a mere statement, the recognition of Somaliland could evolve into a framework on the ground in the future. The fundamental issue is the trade-offs on which these frameworks are built and the new precedents they will set. Stability in the Horn of Africa will not be determined by individual moves, but rather by the new architecture created by linking these moves together. If this architecture erodes sovereignty, both Somalia and the entire Red Sea region will become a long-term zone of tension.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n December 26, 2025, Israel became the first United Nations member to officially recognize Somaliland’s independence, significantly transforming the geopolitical landscape of the Horn of Africa. This move marked a crucial shift in how global powers vie for influence over the Red Sea, one of the world’s most disputed maritime routes. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu framed the decision within the framework of the Abraham Accords, linking this recognition to a broader network of Israeli-Gulf Arab cooperation aimed at containing Iran and promoting regional cohesion.

However, this action is perceived as the projection of Israel’s tumultuous Middle Eastern policies onto the Horn of Africa, a region already plagued by ongoing conflicts. It also signifies a potentially misguided reassessment of power dynamics in an area where critical maritime chokepoints, terrorist movements, and shifts in strategic alliances intersect. The repercussions will echo well beyond the agreements of individual states.

Israel’s move was a clear violation of international norms, prompting a swift and categorical international response. The African Union, Arab League, Gulf Cooperation Council, Egypt, Türkiye, Somalia, Djibouti, and the UN Security Council issued coordinated statements rejecting the move.

The African Union’s chairperson, Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, explicitly invoked the 1964 Organization of African Unity (OAU) Border Inalienability Principle, a cornerstone of continental stability, warning that the recognition “sets a dangerous precedent with far-reaching implications for peace and stability across the continent.” However, this overwhelming diplomatic consensus obscures the fact that this move will accelerate instability and conflict in a region already teetering on the brink of catastrophic fragmentation.

To understand why Israel moved at this precise moment, we must examine two overlapping calculations: First, maritime security and the strategic importance of the Red Sea. Second, the role of the UAE as an architect of fragmentation in the Horn of Africa.

The Red Sea as a strategic pivot

The Red Sea is no longer just a shipping lane. It has become a critical arena where the balance of power between the traditional, Western-led maritime order and emerging threats to global trade is being contested. For example, since November 2023, the Houthis in Yemen have attacked over 190 commercial vessels, forcing hundreds of ships to reroute around South Africa. This has increased transit times by up to 50 percent and imposed costs of an estimated $180 million per month in protection fees paid to shipping agents, according to the Africa Center for Strategic Studies.

The Houthis’ main justification for these actions was to demand an end to the genocide in Gaza. However, analysts contest this claim in the context of a possible Israeli move into Somalia, as there are reports suggesting that Israel plans to evacuate Palestinians to Somaliland in exchange for recognition. When discussing the strategic importance of the Red Sea, it is important to mention the Bab el-Mandeb Strait. This 70-mile-long chokepoint, which separates Africa from Arabia, processes approximately one-third of global maritime commerce, including critical energy and container shipments.

Therefore, Somaliland renders the northern region of Somalia strategically indispensable to any actor seeking to project power over this maritime domain. Somaliland’s coastline along the Gulf of Aden positions it as a natural complement to Israeli objectives in three critical ways. First, it could serve as a naval logistics hub, offering berthing capacity for Israeli vessels seeking a continuous presence in the Red Sea. Second, it could counterbalance Houthi control of Yemen’s coastline. Third, it could provide a tangible foothold in the evolving geopolitical architecture of the Abraham Accords, as well as in the developments of world powers in the Horn of Africa.

According to a 2025 Institute for National Security Studies memo, Israel explicitly frames the Red Sea as “a distinct strategic arena where geopolitical and economic maneuvering, rather than security alone, is a fundamental component of Israel’s national security strategy.”(P. 16) Recognizing Somaliland operationalizes this doctrine, positioning Israel as a legitimate power broker in East African maritime governance. Previously, this posture was unavailable without some form of diplomatic entrée into the region.

The UAE’s involvement

Conducting this analysis without including the UAE’s involvement in this critical issue will be less imperative. Understanding Somaliland’s recognition requires examining the UAE’s footprint in the Horn of Africa over the past fifteen years. Since 2010, Abu Dhabi has systematically pursued a strategy that could be called “port-based imperialism”: establishing commercial and military footholds in strategically important harbors to project power while maintaining commercial legitimacy.

The UAE’s relationship with Somaliland exemplifies this doctrine perfectly. In 2016, DP World, a Dubai-based port operator majority-owned by the Abu Dhabi government, invested $442 million to develop the Port of Berbera. This secured a 30-year concession with an automatic 10-year renewal, effectively ensuring Emirati control over one of the Red Sea’s most critical deep-water facilities for the next four decades. Initially, the UAE sought to establish a military base in Berbera. However, facing international pressure and clear objection from the Somali government, the UAE recalibrated in 2019, presenting the arrangement as purely commercial. This is a textbook example of how great power competition in the 21st century operates through obfuscation rather than direct colonialism.

The strategic importance of this arrangement lies in its deniability. By linking Somaliland’s economic viability to Emirati port investments, the UAE established a structural dependency that grants influence without exercising formal political control. For example, when Ethiopia sought recognition of Somaliland in exchange for maritime access to Berbera in early 2024, it was not negotiating with an independent state with an autonomous foreign policy. Rather, it was responding to incentive structures designed by an external power that manipulates regional actors toward fragmentation.

A security paradox

Israel’s recognition of Somaliland is more than just a cause for concern about the country’s and the wider region’s future stability. It will undoubtedly create a security paradox that transforms recognition into an operational advantage for transnational terrorist movements.

Recognition of Somaliland coincides with a critical security development. Documented evidence shows that Al-Shabaab and Yemen’s Houthis are coordinating more closely. In February 2025, United Nations investigators reported that, in 2024, the two groups had progressed from communication to physical meetings and materiel transfers. The Houthis provided al-Shabaab with weaponized drones, ballistic missiles, and specialized training. This collaboration could intensify if Israel’s intention to transfer Palestinians to Somaliland is discussed.

The collaboration between these organizations generates multiplied threat cascades across the Red Sea and Indian Ocean. Al-Shabaab’s extensive network of smugglers, fighters, and sympathizers provides the Houthis with expanded logistics corridors for transporting weapons from the Indian Ocean to the Gulf of Aden. In return, al-Shabaab gains access to precision weaponry and drone capabilities, exponentially increasing its ability to strike fixed military targets and high-value civilian infrastructure.

The implications for maritime security are catastrophic. Currently, the Houthis extract an estimated $180 million per month from shipping companies that pay protection fees. This figure would increase substantially if al-Shabaab successfully integrated maritime piracy into a coordinated regional attack strategy. Fundamentally, the geographic distribution of threats—the Houthis controlling Yemen’s western coastline, al-Shabaab controlling Somalia’s central territory, and Puntland in northern Somalia hosting ISIS members—creates a zone of contested sovereignty where traditional maritime law enforcement becomes impossible.

Somaliland’s separation from Somalia, formalized by Israeli recognition, undermines the already fragile unified maritime response to this threat. Somaliland operating as an effective client state of the UAE—with its port under Emirati concession and its foreign policy oriented toward maximizing external investment rather than regional security—becomes another vector through which external powers pursue influence while ignoring the security implications of this multiplication.

Security and political implications for the Horn of Africa

The preceding analysis reveals the facts and strategic rationale behind Israel’s recognition of Somaliland. The critical question for analysts is: What will happen next, and why does this specific move pose an exceptional danger to regional stability?

Scenario 1: The Somaliland legitimization trap

Israeli and Emirati strategy seems to be based on the idea that recognizing Somaliland’s statehood will increase their regional influence and presence. This logic is fundamentally flawed. The Horn of Africa region requires stability through the establishment of moderate, democratic, and cooperative governments. Otherwise, Israel’s move will be fallacious. Recognizing Somaliland without simultaneously resolving Somalia’s political fragmentation creates a perverse incentive structure. Resources that would otherwise strengthen Somalia’s central capacity are instead invested in Somaliland’s infrastructure, widening the development gap between north and south.

More critically, recognizing Somaliland solidifies Ethiopia’s strategic calculations regarding maritime access. Ethiopia has been negotiating with Somalia and Somaliland regarding port access and trade corridors. The formalization of Somaliland’s independence will likely accelerate Ethiopia’s strategic alignment with Somaliland. This could include formal recognition and military cooperation arrangements, which would further isolate Somalia’s federal government and create more conflict and competing power centers within the region.

Scenario 2: Al-Shabaab’s opportunistic expansion

Al-Shabaab has begun to analyze and discuss the Somaliland recognition narrative as a recruitment and legitimacy tool. Through encrypted channels and propaganda platforms, the group’s messaging emphasizes that foreign powers are deliberately fragmenting Somali territory to prevent unified resistance against terrorism and maintain conditions of state weakness that enable exploitation.

This narrative has substantial credibility in recruitment contexts. Young men in areas contested by Al-Shabaab observe that their government is fractured and that external powers are carving up their nation’s territory. They see that the only cohesive institutional force that can offer them structure, purpose, and material incentives is the insurgency itself.

Scenario 3: Maritime Instability as the New Normal

If Somaliland achieves de facto independence and aligns strategically with Israel and the UAE, the Red Sea will be divided into multiple competing maritime jurisdictions: Houthi-controlled Yemen, politically unstable Somalia with competing authorities, UAE-aligned Somaliland, and an expanding Israeli naval presence. Managing maritime security in such an environment would become exponentially more complex.

Houthi attacks on commercial ships already pose challenges to global trade routes and create shipping delays that affect global supply chains. These attacks would likely intensify if the Houthis perceive an Israeli military presence in Somaliland as a direct escalation. Alternatively, operational coordination between the Houthis and al-Shabaab could extend maritime threats southward from the Bab el-Mandeb Strait toward other maritime states in the region, such as Kenya and Djibouti, creating what military strategists call “distributed threat zones,” where conventional maritime security approaches are inadequate.

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omali pirates have resurfaced in the western Indian Ocean, posing renewed threats to global shipping companies and adding to the challenges already faced by the industry. After lying dormant for nearly a decade, recent pirate raids are escalating, driven by a security vacuum left by Houthi strikes and a reduction in international naval operations.

The resurgence of piracy was starkly illustrated when a Bangladeshi-owned bulk carrier, the Abdullah, fell victim to a pirate attack. Despite sending out distress signals, the crew found themselves helpless as Somali pirates boarded the vessel, taking the captain and second officer hostage. While no injuries were reported, the incident underscores the risks faced by ships traversing the region.

According to industry representatives, there have been more than 20 attempted hijackings since November, driving up costs for shipping companies. Prices for armed security guards and insurance coverage have soared, raising concerns about potential ransom payments. Pirates, taking advantage of reduced international naval operations, see an opportunity to exploit the situation.

A resurgence of piracy?

While the current threat level is not as severe as it was during the peak of piracy incidents in 2008-2014, there are growing concerns that the problem could escalate if left unchecked. Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud emphasized the importance of addressing the issue promptly, warning that failure to do so could lead to a resurgence of piracy on the scale seen in the past.

Recent interventions by the Indian Navy have resulted in the rescue of hostages and the surrender of pirates, demonstrating the potential deterrent effect of robust naval presence in the region. However, concerns remain about the capacity of regional maritime law enforcement agencies, with limited resources and infrastructure hindering their effectiveness.

In response to the escalating threat, industry stakeholders are calling for a coordinated effort to bolster maritime security in the region. This includes strengthening Somalia’s law enforcement capacity at sea and on land, as well as maintaining a robust international naval presence to deter pirate activity.

Busy shipping lane

The waterways off Somalia constitute some of the busiest shipping lanes globally, with an estimated 20,000 vessels navigating through the Gulf of Aden annually. These vessels transport a wide range of goods, including furniture, apparel, grains, and fuel, traversing between Europe and Asia via the Red Sea and Suez Canal, which offers the shortest maritime route.

During the peak of Somali piracy in 2011, the International Maritime Bureau reported a staggering 237 attacks launched by pirates, resulting in the capture of hundreds of hostages. The Oceans Beyond Piracy monitoring group estimated that these activities cost the global economy approximately $7 billion, with ransom payments amounting to hundreds of millions of dollars.

While the frequency of attacks has decreased significantly since then, maritime risk managers and insurers note that pirates now tend to target smaller vessels in less patrolled waters. According to data from EUNAVFOR, since November, Somali pirates have successfully seized at least two cargo ships and 12 fishing vessels, indicating a resurgence in their activities.

As the situation remains fluid, the resurgence of Somali piracy serves as a stark reminder of the ongoing challenges faced by global shipping companies operating in one of the world’s busiest and most strategically significant maritime regions.

Source: Reuters

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he security and defense agreement signed between Turkey and Somalia in February 2024, although not talked about enough in Turkey, made a major impact and generated discussion globally on the role of Turkey especially in the Horn of Africa. The impact and interaction of this 10-year agreement is likely to be felt in the region for many years. However, what does this agreement mean for Turkey and its overall Horn of Africa policy? How should we understand it in a broader perspective?

First of all, this agreement is part of the Turkish strategy in recent years whereby any crisis should be utilized to the maximum level for the benefit of Turkey’s national foreign policy. In the past, during the crisis of Qatar and the Gulf countries in 2017, Turkey acted quickly and decisively, increasing its military presence in the Gulf and opening a military/training base in Doha. After several years of criticism and complaints, it is now clear that Turkey has a firm military place in the Gulf.

What we see here is a similar case. When Ethiopia and Somaliland signed an agreement granting the former naval and commercial access to Somaliland’s coast, Somalia’s central government saw it as an existential threat. Not only did a security crisis occur, but many inside the Somali government interpreted this as a sovereignty crisis between Somalia and Ethiopia. Ankara quickly responded to the Somali request for help to the central government in Mogadishu. Ankara evaluated the crisis and signed an agreement to increase its military presence in Somalia.

This agreement is important in two aspects for Turkey. First, it will increase Turkey’s military in Somalia and possibly lead to the addition of a small airport for military planes in the military training center in Somalia, the lack of which came to the fore during the evacuations in Sudan. Second, it can clearly pave the way for Turkey’s presence in the open seas in the region and, therefore, its effectiveness in the developments in the Gulf of Aden.

The agreement is both a continuation of the deepening military relations between Turkey and Somalia in the last decade, and a reflection of the self-confidence that Somalia has gained over al-Shabaab, allowing it now to act more independently in regional politics. In addition, the agreement can be interpreted as the most effective playmaking move made by Somalia in the geopolitics of the region after 2010.

Effects and Reflections

The United Arab Emirates is likely the country most disturbed by the Turkey-Somalia security and defense agreement. The UAE has been conducting serious diplomacy for the last year to sign a very similar or even more advanced security agreement with Somalia. However, the response from Somalia has been reluctant—which is why there is both reaction and disappointment on the part of UAE about this development.

Ethiopia also was shocked and uncomfortable with the agreement, but, at the same time, attaches great importance to relations with Turkey. Ethiopia-Turkey relations experienced their golden period in 2020-2021 when Turkey helped Ethiopia in its fight with the Tigray region by supplying drones and other military equipment. It will be difficult to return to the same period again, however, multidimensional military-security relations between Turkey and Ethiopia are at a point of no return with mutual trust on this issue being well established.

For this reason, Ethiopia, which is experiencing serious economic difficulties, does not want problems with a country with which it works closely in the field of security. Nevertheless, one should expect that we will see the reflections of Ethiopia’s discomfort with the relevant agreement in its relations with Turkey in the coming period; however, the continuously deepening security-centered relationship is likely to balance this.

Turkey in the Horn of Africa

The most important question now is “What should Turkey do next in the Horn of Africa?” The geopolitics of the region will be reshaped as an atmosphere of insecurity has emerged: Somalia is dealing with al-Shabaab; Ethiopia is struggling with internal problems such as Tigray and Oromia; Somaliland is seeking independence; Kenya is preoccupied with domestic political issues; and the civil war in Sudan deepens and becomes a stalemate.

Turkey’s Horn of Africa policy in the 2010s was to strengthen the Sudan-Somalia line against the Ethiopia-Kenya line, and ensure the historical regional order. This approach manifested itself in Ankara’s activities that contributed to state-building efforts in Somalia and to socio-economic stability in Sudan. But in 2011, Sudan was divided into two, and a military coup and, most recently, the ongoing civil war destroyed the regional balance.

Despite this, Somalia has made progress in re-establishing order economically, politically, and militarily beyond expectations. The Somali diaspora has supported this process economically, and Somalia has presented itself as a new actor in the region. Turkey recently provided serious support to the Somali central government in the fight against al-Shabaab terrorism and made an sizable contribution to the strengthening of the country’s military.

Alongside its support to the Somalia-Sudan axis, Turkey has also established serious relations along the Kenya-Ethiopia axis. Political and military relations with Ethiopia, and commercial relations with Kenya came to the fore. This process has made Turkey one of the key countries in the region’s geopolitics.

The main axis of Turkey’s future policy in the region is likely to be based on further strengthening its presence there. Ankara may consider opening a consulate in the restored former Turkish Consulate General in Harar, Ethiopia. This move will strengthen Turkey’s social and religious ties on the Harar-Hargeisa-Djibouti line.

The second move may be paying special attention to Mekelle, the second-largest city in Ethiopia, in order to develop social bonds with the local population. Recently, the Turkish Maarif Foundation opened a school in Mekelle as a sign of Turkish interest in developing relations with the Tigray region. In the past, the tomb of King Negus in Mekelle was restored by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), but it is currently abandoned. The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs can establish a presence in Mekelle by hiring a local imam and re-establishing ties with the region. The school opened by the Turkish Maarif Foundation in Mekelle is currently the most popular school in the region and is working at full capacity.

Turkey has been conducting a mediation process between Somalia and Somaliland for a long time without any serious progress. It would be appropriate now for the regional countries to support the Turkish effort to establish workable relations between the two countries and between Somalia and Somaliland and the other countries in the region, including Ethiopia. Following the security agreement between Turkey and Somalia, such a constructive move will reinforce Turkey’s constructive influence in the region, bringing an end to the disturbances between Somalia and Ethiopia. This, though, can only be achieved with the help of the regional countries.

Today, Turkey is visible everywhere in the Horn of Africa in a multidimensional manner and continuously emphasizes the tantamount importance of regional peace. Turkey is the only country that has established schools across the region, namely in Djibouti, Hargeisa, Mogadishu, Harar, Mekelle, and Addis Ababa. Regional countries need to utilize Ankara’s presence and relations with different countries in the region for the benefit of the entire region. Only under such circumstances, will everyone win, including Turkey.

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he agreement signed between the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia on February 8, 2024, has had a significant impact on national, regional, and global politics. At the current stage, there is no official statement regarding the details of this agreement, and examining its possible repercussions is a more promising endeavor than attempting to make assertive statements about it.

Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mahamud stated, “Our Turkish brothers will only protect our seas for ten years under this agreement. After ten years of cooperation, we will have a navy that will protect our seas.” The president’s statement reveals an important detail about the content of the agreement between Ankara and Mogadishu, namely the signing of a 10-year cooperation agreement between the two countries regarding maritime security. It also discloses that Turkey’s presence in Somalia, which began in 2011, and its influence in the Horn of Africa are on even more solid ground following this latest development.

If the agreement with Somalia is evaluated alongside the defense agreement signed with Djibouti on February 19, it becomes clear that Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa has increased. The U.S., the United Kingdom, France, China, Italy, and Japan have military bases in Djibouti, while Germany and Spain have military assets in the region, but no military bases. In the medium term, Turkey’s growing presence in the Horn of Africa may also lead to the establishment of a naval base in Somalia or Djibouti.

In addition, given Turkey’s recent rapprochement with the West and its already good relations with Djibouti, Turkey can be expected to contribute to the risks and threats in the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea. If Turkey were to become a security actor in the Gulf of Aden, this would likely put Iran in a position of concern. Thus, although the agreement was signed between Turkey and Somalia, it has regional implications as well.

Moreover, as Turkey continues its rapprochement with Saudi Arabia, one of the critical issues is likely to be the Houthis. One way to eliminate the parameter of Houthi violence in terms of the security of the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden is to stop the arms shipments. This, however, could create a situation that directly concerns Iran and Saudi Arabia; as a result, the moves in Somalia and Djibouti are seen as very critical in the context of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea.

The Houthis’ asymmetric attacks, especially in the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Gulf of Aden, have continued since October 19. The attacks are perpetuated primarily with weapons of Iranian origin; if arms smuggling in the region is prevented, the Houthis could be neutralized—a situation that could become a concern for Iran.

The agreement with Somalia paves the way for Turkey to make frequent naval deployments in Somali waters. The presence of the Turkish navy in Somali waters could create a situation that would help curb the illegal, unreported, and unregulated fishing activities of countries such as Iran and China, as well as the recent resurgence of piracy off the Somali coast. Both in the long and medium term, the Turkey-Somalia agreement is likely to strengthen Somalia’s navy and coast guard, with the potential to further deter illegal fishing and piracy. In this context, it is projected that Somalia is losing at least $500 million in revenue annually due to illegal fishing activities.

The economic problem, in fact, is as significant as the current terrorism problem in Somalia. After being elected president of Somalia for the second time, in his speech during his visit to SETA in Ankara July 2022, President Mahamud stated that he would focus very seriously on the fight against terrorism. At the same time, Somalia’s economic development will eliminate many of the security problems caused by al-Shabaab and other militants.

Regional implications of the agreement with Somalia

President Erdoğan visited Somalia in 2011 when the country had been left to its fate. That year was a new beginning for Somalia, and now, the new agreement between Turkey and Somalia, which heralds a renewed alliance between the two countries, can be regarded as a “second 2011.”

The agreement has the potential to allow steps to be taken towards the security of Somalia’s territorial waters, allowing investments in Somalia and tourism activities in the coastal area to increase. What is more, economic prosperity in Somalia can be expected to increase and security problems to decrease. At the same time, the improved security environment, supported in part by Turkey, will also provide an opportunity to increase investments in relevant regions.

An important aspect of the agreement is the compatibility of the development with Egypt’s foreign policy. Recently, immediately after the meeting between President Erdoğan and Egyptian President Sisi, the Egyptian Deputy Foreign Minister for African Affairs visited the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The possible cooperation between Turkey and Egypt in Africa was discussed during the meeting, establishing that Egypt has accepted the presence of Turkey in East Africa.

In addition, the Turkey-Somalia agreement has the potential to affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan equation in the context of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of regional competition in the Horn of Africa and East Africa. Of course, the agreement does not directly affect this issue; however, the expectation of increased cooperation with the Egypt-Turkey normalization can potentially affect the security perspective of Egypt’s attitude towards Ethiopia regarding the dam with Ethiopia. It should be noted, though, that Turkey should not be expected to intervene directly on the issue.

Egypt also supports the Federal Government of Somalia against the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU. At this point, Turkey and Egypt stated that they stand by international law against Ethiopia’s move into Somalia. Yet, it should be noted that the agreement that Turkey made with Somalia was not related to the Ethiopia-Somaliland MoU, and that Turkey has good relations with Ethiopia. In fact, in addition to the economic ties between Ethiopia and Turkey, which is the second country with the most investments in Ethiopia after China, they seem to stay away from attitudes that would negatively affect mutual relations.

Global Actors’ Reactions to Turkey’s presence in the Horn of Africa

After the agreement signed by the defense ministers of Turkey and Somalia, the United States and the United Kingdom, which had previously been active in Somalia, took initiatives to hold meetings there with the Somalian government. Global and regional actors are likely to be concerned about Turkey’s increased influence and footprint in the Horn of Africa, and the U.S. can be seen to have expectations of cooperation with Turkey in the region.

Somalia has a federal structure, and the U.S. and the UK are working closely with the administrations of Puntland and Somaliland, respectively. It is possible that the U.S. will cooperate with police forces and maritime security in Puntland, which borders Somaliland and has a coast on both the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean. In fact, Puntland’s maritime security forces are being trained by the U.S. At the same time, the UK is implementing a similar plan in Somaliland.

Following the agreement with Somalia, the U.S. expects cooperation with Turkey in new areas. Turkey and the U.S. are already cooperating against al-Shabaab terrorism in Somalia. However, the gains that Turkey and Somalia can achieve together in Somali waters, especially for Somalia’s blue economy, can potentially affect U.S. economic interests. On the whole, Turkey and the U.S. are not expected to directly confront each other regarding the conflict and challenge in Somalia, and have the potential to cooperate on specific files both in Somalia and throughout Africa. At the forefront of these issues is the fight against terrorism.

Overall, although Turkey and the U.S. are two allied countries within the NATO alliance system, they pursue very different policies in the context of Africa. Energy and economic policies play an essential role in U.S. policy in Somalia and Africa as a whole. On the other hand, Turkey’s success story in Somalia and across the African continent is rooted in a policy that is “people-oriented,” and based on the principles of “winning together” and “partnership.” In this light, Turkey and the U.S. have different approaches to Africa.

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n a strong statement on Sunday, January 21, 2024, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi affirmed that Egypt would not tolerate any threat to Somalia’s security. This declaration follows Ethiopia’s consideration of recognizing Somaliland’s independence in a deal that includes access to a strategic seaport.

The remarks indicate Egypt’s potential involvement in a dispute that has heightened tensions in the Horn of Africa, where it already maintains frosty relations with Ethiopia.

Somaliland declared independence from Somalia in 1991 but has not gained international recognition. The proposed port lease deal, yet to be finalized, would provide landlocked Ethiopia access to the sea through the port of Berbera on the Gulf of Aden. The deal has sparked outrage from Somalia and now draws Egypt into the geopolitical fray.

Egypt will protect Somalia

“Egypt will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia or affect its security,” President Sisi stated during a joint news conference with Somali President Hassan Sheikh Mohamud. He warned against attempts to challenge or threaten Egypt, particularly if its intervention is requested by its brothers.

In a memorandum of understanding signed on January 1, Ethiopia expressed its willingness to consider recognizing Somaliland’s independence in exchange for the port access. The agreement includes a lease of 20 km of coastland around the port for military and commercial purposes over 50 years. Ethiopia’s primary port for maritime exports is currently located in Djibouti.

President Sisi emphasized the need for cooperation on development rather than attempts to seize land, suggesting a more strategic and peaceful approach to resolving conflicts. Ethiopia rejected criticism from Egypt, characterizing the deal as a commercial agreement aimed at securing sea access rather than an annexation attempt.

Tension

The tension surrounding the Ethiopia-Somaliland deal further complicates relations between Egypt and Ethiopia, already strained due to the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam constructed on the Blue Nile. Talks over the dam’s operation and water release have yet to yield an agreement, contributing to ongoing disputes between the two nations.

As Somalia rejects the deal and seeks international support, the involvement of Egypt introduces a new dimension to the complex geopolitical landscape in the Horn of Africa. The situation underscores the broader implications of regional conflicts on global diplomacy and stability.

Sources: Reuters, and Aljazeera

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n East Africa, radicalization has targeted specific societal groups that experience real or perceived threats that are easy for terrorist organizations to exploit. The terrorist groups recruit members willingly into the ranks of their organizations to gain support for their acts of violence against groups they perceive as enemies.

It continues to be an issue of debate whether radicalization actually leads to violence. One side argues that there is no causal link between radicalization and violence, and that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence. They contend that individuals should be allowed to hold radical views and that this should be recognized as part of social freedoms, including freedom of thought and expression.

The argument goes that there should be a limit to the extent to which security services should intervene when people believed to be radicalized are involved in violent acts. People believe that there are other factors that contribute to involvement in violence and radicalization, the surrounding environment being one of them.

A second group places more emphasis on the root causes of radicalization. They argue that individual factors, including psychological factors, are the main cause, and that certain types of people are more prone to being radicalized than others. Of course, in addition to these two groups, there are also those who argue in favor of social factors causing radicalization.

However, this argument raises the question of whether every individual is equally susceptible to radical views and beliefs. The social primacy thesis is gaining momentum because it tends to link radicalization to social interactions and factors in the individual’s social environment which include exposure to poverty, education, environmental challenges, technological equipment, and access to technology.

The nature of radicalization and the means it uses have led to new debates including the question of whether individuals can become radicalized on their own, without the help or radical views of a third party. Even with little exposure to radical content, individuals have gained enormous potential for self-radicalization with the help of the internet whose impact on the field of radicalization has led to further differences of opinion.

For example, why when the internet provides easy access to radical content, some segments of society and individuals are potentially radicalized simply by accessing and consuming radical content, while others are not? Radical content is being accessed and processed differently by an increasing number of different internet users, but mass radicalization is not occurring. Online communication technologies have increased the likelihood that individuals who do not engage in violent acts will become radicalized.

How and why are they radicalized?

How do these actors conduct their radicalization and terror campaigns in East Africa? Who are their main targets and why? Violent actors have proven to be highly adaptable, particularly in response to counterterrorism measures implemented by legitimate authorities in the region. Initially, groups such as al-Shabaab used public spaces, including mosques and schools, to disseminate radical ideologies, particularly to young people. In Kenya, for example, where counterinsurgency operations can claim to be the most discreet, a number of iconic public mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa were infiltrated by pro-al-Shabaab clerics who conducted radicalization campaigns targeting young people.

Some of the clerics were high-profile Islamic figures who commanded respect among their followers, likely increasing the impact of their message and popularizing calls for violence in the name of jihad.

In addition to illiterate segments of the population, al-Shabaab also benefits from large numbers of educated and highly skilled but unemployed youth. The organization places great emphasis on using ethnic diversity, regional circumstances, and even family connections for radicalization and recruitment. Individuals targeted for radicalization are approached by people who are familiar and close to them, such as wives tasked with radicalizing their husbands. The increased reconnaissance and surveillance of open areas suitable for radicalization has limited the group’s activities to rural areas, where it targets young people.

Closer surveillance of open areas has also forced these groups to turn to online communication technologies, where they can target wider audiences with tailored messages, including translation into local languages. However, better regulation and control of online content by the authorities is preventing prolonged online radicalization. A fierce competition has emerged between the authorities and terrorist groups to open and close social media accounts, which, in turn, has led to almost instantaneous censorship of many online channels.

Measures against extremism and terrorism

It is important to focus on the counter-radicalization measures taken by the authorities in East Africa. In terms of the effectiveness of these measures, the authorities have initiated three main approaches in partnership with civil society organizations and other groups within society, while developing key measures to increase society’s overall awareness and resilience to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. In the case of Kenya, key interventions have been decentralized to the county and grassroots levels for maximum impact.

Through public awareness programs such as “Epuka Ugaidi” (Shunning Terrorism), community members in Kenya were sensitized and equipped with the necessary skills to prevent radicalization at onset. Other measures include the use of intercommunity forums and even sensitizing critical sectors of society to increase the effectiveness of their role in countering radicalization. Somalia has prioritized the sensitization of academics, religious figures, and community leaders to maximize their influence in eradicating al-Shabaab narratives.

The second category of measures are more specific interventions targeting groups considered high risk and vulnerable to radicalization. However, such classifications are essentially meaningless and can undermine the effectiveness of counter-radicalization programs. Such profiling potentially fuels resistance and increases the likelihood of mass community radicalization.

Secondary measures to counter this are, therefore, more comprehensive and more likely to be community-led violence prevention initiatives. Reputable civil society organizations and faith-based groups have been involved in supporting community-led processes. The implementation of targeted secondary measures prioritizes the highest levels of transparency, respect, and honesty to achieve better results.

The final category of measures, called tertiary, targets those who have already been radicalized and joined violent groups. Rather than actively preventing violent groups from recruiting new members, tertiary programs aim to disadvantage violent groups by creating discord and discontent among new members, potentially leading to defections. Interventions have included disarmament, demobilization, deradicalization, and reintegration programs, particularly for those who have defected, been rescued, or returned from al-Shabaab.

For counter-radicalization purposes, the Kenyan and Somali authorities have granted amnesty to defectors and returnees in return for them sharing their views on their horrific experiences within the organization. The employment of defectors and returnees sends a strong anti-radicalization message to the general population. The exploitation and victimization of these individuals for the purposes of radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence using religious texts to justify or explain acts of violence and terrorism.

August 2021 marked a decade of multifaceted cooperation between Somalia and Turkey. The 10^th anniversary of this sophisticated diplomatic engagement was celebrated both in Mogadishu and Ankara with ceremonies and conferences that evaluated and reflected upon the developments and outcomes of this relationship during the last ten years.

Turkey-Somalia relations have raised eyebrows in international politics and regional geopolitics, and consequently received an array of praise, scepticism, and scrutiny. Nevertheless, the two countries have maintained well-coordinated diplomatic relations.

What is the nature of Turkey-Somalia relations? What role is Turkey playing both in Somalia’s state-building and capacity-building processes? How has this relation reconfigured the geopolitics of the Horn of Africa region?

A momentous visit

On August 19, 2011, then Turkish prime minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan paid a surprising visit to Somalia. The Turkish prime minister was the first head of government or state to visit Somalia since the civil war broke out in 1991.

In 2011, Somalia and the whole East Africa region were facing one of the most calamitous famines in decades. Given Somalia’s feeble state capacity and the threat of Al-Shabaab terrorism, the country’s population was hard hit by the famine. Starvation and death alarmed international humanitarian organizations and the world at large. Images of malnourished Somali women, men, and children flooded the global media.

Today, Somalia has doctors and nurses who graduated from Turkish universities and have played significant roles in Somalia’s efforts against COVID-19 and the shortcomings in the health sector. Moreover, most of the students who graduated have become junior bureaucrats and government workers, the most famous being the current Minister of Justice Abdulkadir Muhammad Nur.

In 2015, a brand-new hospital, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan Research Hospital, was inaugurated in Mogadishu. Over the years, the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA) has renovated numerous hospitals and health facilities across the country that were dilapidated from the civil war.

More crucially, Turkey has become Somalia’s prime partner in the security sector alongside the European Union mission in Somalia and the United States. Turkey’s military base in Mogadishu, Camp TURKSOM, saw the graduation of its third class of military cadets in August 31, 2021. The camp has trained approximately 10,000 military officers since its establishment in 2017. What is more, Turkey is training the Somali Haramcad Special Police Unit and Gorgor Commando Brigade in Turkey – both bodies have dealt heavy blows to the Al-Shabaab terror group.

In the last decade, Turkey has achieved its substantial goals of capacity-buildings in Somalia while simultaneously closely considering regional politics and geopolitical sensibilities.

Walking a tight rope

Both Turkey and Somalia treaded a tight rope geopolitically in enhancing their diplomatic and strategic interests. Turkey’s diplomatic overtures in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan brought the country into the fields of interests of the U.S., the UK and, the Gulf states leading to strategic encounters and confrontations.

The Turkish military base in Mogadishu was perceived as an entrance of a new power into the geopolitically strategic Horn of Africa and Red Sea region – a region that already hosts American, French, Chinese, and British military installations.

Consequently, the different Somali governments in the last decade have faced both implicit and explicit pressure regarding their diplomatic relations with Turkey. The debacle that surrounded the UAE military base in Somalia crisis is just one example, and resulted in the Emiratis suspending all military and social assistance to Somalia.

However, all the Somali governments that came to power maintained strategic balancing acts in their diplomatic relations with Turkey. In my opinion, they are cognizant of their own strategic interests and objectives, and consequently calibrated their foreign policy accordingly. Hence, Somalia maintained strategic relations with Turkey, the U.S., the UK, China, and Saudi Arabia in the security sector and military capacity-building, and avoided diplomatic tensions in the region.

What does the future hold for Turkey-Somalia relations?

Over the years, Turkey has become Somalia’s prime partner in state-building. Moreover, the two countries have long-term bilateral economic agreements regarding Somalia’s offshore oil, gas, and fishing explorations.

The Somali diaspora, which was traditionally based in Europe and North America, is increasingly investing and relocating to Turkey, indicating deep-rooted, people-to-people good relations between the two nations – another aspect of the efficacy of Turkish cultural diplomacy towards Africa. Hence, Turkey-Somalia relations are deepening in numerous fronts from state-building to security, and education to cultural and diaspora mobility.

As long as the perception of extra-regional and extra-continental solutions are given priority, the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean will remain on paper.

International actors that lead the maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean have often used the issue of piracy as a security pretext to realize their hidden interests of maintaining hegemonic power.

Overall, on different occasions, their involvement in the counter-piracy operations on the Somalia coast has been portrayed as a morally justified act to maintain law and order in the strategically important waterway through which more than 33,000 ships navigate annually.

Maritime piracy has existed since ships first went out to sea. However, the issue has been making headlines since the late 1990s, reaching a peak between 2005 and 2008.

The dramatic escalation of maritime piracy along the coasts of Somalia in the 2000s posed a great challenge to the international community which passively stood by and watched.

Piracy in the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean has certain distinguishing characteristics. The first and foremost difference is that unlike pirate attacks in other parts of the world, such as the Straits of Malacca (located between Malaysia and Indonesia), pirate assaults in the Horn of Africa mostly target large vessels and bulk carriers that often transport coal and iron ore, and tanker ships that transport petroleum, chemicals, and crude oil.

In other words, in the Horn of Africa, larger and strategically important ships on international waters are targeted more frequently than smaller vessels.

Certain news outlets associated the acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden with local governments. Undermining the capacity of regional actors in the fight against piracy serves ulterior motives.

Additionally, the Horn of Africa region was depicted as a lawless region and the regional powers’ commitment to maritime law enforcement was questioned. Certain news outlets associated the acts of piracy in the Gulf of Aden with local governments. Undermining the capacity of regional actors in the fight against piracy serves ulterior motives.

As efforts to develop regional and continental plans to ensure the Gulf of Aden’s maritime security faded away and some earlier initiatives failed, the military presence of international actors was strengthened.

There are two reasons behind the intentions of international actors to establish military bases in the Gulf of Aden. The first motivation is the presence of oil and the Gulf of Aden’s geopolitical significance.

The second is the Western perception of the continental powers’ innate inferiority. Western powers perceive themselves as superior, as redeemers, and as the guarantors of maritime security in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of Indian Ocean. This, in turn, further legitimatizes their guardianship of the Horn of Africa’s regional actors.

While regional attempts to solve the piracy problem in the Gulf of Aden proved unsuccessful due to legal and political complications, the Western media outlets, political elites, and academics magnified the weak law enforcement, economic desperation, and the absence of a workable legal system in the region, creating the image of an environment in which international actors could and should intervene.

They ignored the capacity of regional powers such as, among others, Ethiopia, Kenya, Eritrea, and Sudan, in the fight against piracy.

In addition, the international actors’ active maritime law enforcement activities in the coast of Somalia have not been sufficiently observed. Political administrators in Mogadishu, for example, were not empowered by global powers so as to be able to strengthen their country’s internal stability.

So far, the political havoc in Somalia is used as a leverage to justify non-regional global actors’ presence in the western coast of Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Aden.

The piracy in this region is still a challenge for maritime security and regional and global stability. If not halted, it is likely that piracy in the region will sponsor terrorism.  However, the appropriate solution to overcome the maritime security problems in the Gulf of Aden and the western coast of the Indian Ocean is not the military deployment of global powers.

Rather, a final solution to the long-standing maritime security problem of the region could be achieved through the empowerment of the regional authorities. Meanwhile if the binaries of superior/subordinate and weak/strong are not left behind, politics will continue to generate self-created differences that will not solve the maritime security issue of the Gulf of Aden and the Western Indian Ocean  or any other issue for that matter.