The political atmosphere in the Middle East has been increasingly fragile. Recent developments in the Persian Gulf, Israel’s aggressive policies towards Palestine and continuing confrontation between Iran and the United States have created a new environment where the possibility of a region-wide conflict is more obvious than ever. In addition to these dynamics, mutual tensions, rivalries and hostilities have been dragging a number of regional actors to resort to new ways of confrontation. There are a number of developments that have an impact on the current stalemate in regional politics.

First of all, the Arab revolutions process has had the biggest impact on today’s political atmosphere in the region. While the revolutionary uprisings that started in Tunisia and then spread to Egypt, Libya, Syria and Yemen shook the political structures in these countries, they also forced regional forces to implement a new Middle East strategy. During this period, Turkey and Qatar supported the revolutionary wave, in opposition to Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Israel, which supported counter-revolutionary movements. The most obvious example of this was in Egypt. Mohammed Morsi, who came to power with a democratic election, received Doha and Ankara’s support, while Riyadh, Abu Dhabi and Tel-Aviv were behind the military coup on July 3, 2013.

Recent developments in the Persian Gulf, Israel’s aggressive policies towards Palestine and the confrontation between Iran and the U.S. have created a new environment where the possibility of a region-wide conflict is more obvious than ever.

The conflicts in Syria and Yemen have also led tension to grow between regional rivals. In both cases, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have taken a sharp stance against Iran, fearing the expansion of Tehran’s regional influence. While Riyadh and Abu Dhabi tried to overthrow the Assad regime in Syria, they embarked on a military operation to stop the advance of the Iranian-backed Houthis in Yemen.

The leadership change in Saudi Arabia has also had a lasting impact on Middle East politics. Following the death of King Abdullah in January 2015, King Salman became the ruler of the monarchy. During King Salman’s rule, Saudi Arabia has been undergoing a serious transformation in both domestic and foreign policy. King Salman’s appointment of his son Mohammad bin Salman as the defence minister and then as Crown Prince of Saudi Arabia was a decisive moment for the Saudi leadership. Mohammad bin Salman soon became the most influential figure in the country as he eliminated domestic opposition with widely criticized crackdowns on influential figures in the Kingdom. Bin Salman also tried to dominate the political arena in the Arab world by forcing smaller Gulf and Middle Eastern nations to follow Saudi foreign policy, which prioritized anti-Iranian strategies.

Another dynamic that had an impact on the current status of Middle East politics is the rise of the United Arab Emirates as a foreign policy actor. Since the start of the Arab revolutions, it can be observed that the United Arab Emirates has followed an active and aggressive foreign policy and directly involved in regional political developments. With the support of Saudi Arabia and Israel, the UAE’s hostile policies target countries like Turkey and Iran.

The power struggles in the post-Arab revolutions period has led to the establishment of new political alliances, thanks to the support of external actors such as the U.S. & Russia.

Last but not least, Donald Trump’s rise to the presidency in the United States in 2017 had a significant impact on Middle East politics. Trump’s policy towards the Middle East was significantly different from his predecessor, Barack Obama. While Trump strongly backed Israeli policies in Palestine by recognizing Jerusalem as the capital of Israel and moving the U.S. embassy to the city, he also targeted Iran by withdrawing from Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action and bringing new sanctions against Tehran. Trump also supported Saudi Arabia and the UAE and forced these countries to work together with Israel.

It is obvious that Middle East politics is on the brink of a serious breakdown. The starting point of this regional transformation was the Arab revolutions of 2011. The recent popular uprisings in Algeria and Sudan illustrate that the spirit of the Arab revolutions is still alive and has the potential to affect regional political dynamics. The power struggles in the post-Arab revolutions period in the region has led to the establishment of new political alliances, thanks to the support and instigation of external actors such as the United States and Russia. Therefore, the Middle East has come to a point where the possibility of a violent conflict between powerful forces in the region is higher than ever. It is not known whether on-going tensions will create a conflict environment, but it is certain that the search for a new regional order will continue.

The anti-government protests that erupted in different cities across Sudan on December 19, 2018, rapidly evolved into a mass popular movement that started to threaten the rule of Omar al-Bashir, who had been in power in the country for three decades. Increasing pressure on the government in Khartoum forced Al-Bashir to seek for regional and international support that would help him keep his grip on power. As part of these efforts, Al-Bashir made visits to regional countries, including Qatar and Egypt, as well as war-torn Syria. He became the first leader to meet with Bashar Assad since the start of the civil war in Syria in 2011. While all these countries, and others such as Saudi Arabia and Ethiopia expressed support for the continuation of Al-Bashir’s rule, the Sudanese people continued to protest against the government.

As the protests grew, pressure on the Al-Bashir regime intensified. Thousands of demonstrators gathered around the Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the Sudanese Army in the capital Khartoum and called for the resignation of Al-Bashir. Protestors even called the military to dismiss him from his position. These developments opened a new chapter in the country’s history. On the morning of April 11, the Defense Minister, Awad Ibn Auf, made a televised address and said: “I announce as minister of defense the toppling of the regime and detaining its chief in a secure place.” Ibn Auf also stated that President Al-Bashir has been removed from his duties and that a transitional military council, which will be headed by Auf himself, would govern the country. Following two years of a transitional period, democratic elections will be held, leading the country to civilian rule.

Increasing pressure on the government in Khartoum forced Al-Bashir to seek for regional and international support that would help him keep his grip on power. As part of these efforts, Al-Bashir made visits to regional countries, including Qatar and Egypt, as well as war-torn Syria.

It can be argued that the motivations of protestors that led the toppling of the Al-Bashir government were similar to that of the masses during the Arab revolution protests that began in December 2010 in Tunisia, and which followed in Egypt, Libya, Syria, and Yemen. The main motivations of these revolutionary movements were establishing democratic political systems, respect for rights and freedoms, the elimination of economic problems and the tackling of income inequality. Such motivations were also present in the protest movement that led to the termination of a 30 year old regime in Sudan.

In addition, the methods and instruments utilized by Sudanese protestors were also similar to that of the Arab revolutions period. The masses gathered in largely peaceful protests and the youth played an important role in generating solid political opposition. The protestors also utilized social media and traditional media tools in order to make their voice heard both in and outside of the country. The military’s position was also crucial, as the army did not take a direct stance against the masses.

Just like the Arab uprisings that began in 2010, the main motivations of the revolutionary movement in Sudan are establishing a democratic political system, the respect for rights and freedoms, elimination of economic problems, and the tackling of income inequality. 

During the Arab revolutions period, each revolution attempt experienced a different path. Sudan has also been following a unique process. Although the military’s seizure of power cannot be considered as a revolutionary act, it is an important development that would eventually pave the way for a smooth transition rather than a civil war or institutionalized instability. Despite grip pictures coming from the country, the fall of the Al-Bashir regime would be considered as a change for the emergence of a new and civil regime in the country. As the Defense Minister reassured protestors for a democratic future, it is now the army’s responsibility to gradually rescind from political duties. These developments are a reminder of the early post-revolutionary period in Egypt as the transitional council led the country to elections less than a year following the fall of Hosni Mubarak. However, the democratization efforts of the Muslim Brotherhood were unsuccessful and the counter-revolutionary forces, including the Egyptian army, staged a military coup that led to the establishment of the most repressive regime in the country’s history.

For this reason, one of the biggest threats for the future of Sudan is the unwillingness of military actors to transfer power to civilian forces. Such a path would further destabilize the country and lead to increasing confrontation between revolutionary actors and counter-revolutionary forces. This possibility is strongly visible given the fact that regional countries that support the counter-revolutionary developments would be seeking the opportunity to establish an autocratic regime that would work for the failure of revolutionary forces in the country. This is the most serious threat that revolutionary actors would be facing in the upcoming period in Sudan.

The developments in Sudan are a reminder of the post-revolutionary period in Egypt, as the transitional council led the country to elections less than a year following the fall of Hosni Mubarak. However, democratization efforts were unsuccessful and led to the most repressive regime in the country’s history. 

Looking from the perspective of revolutionary forces, the developments in Sudan prove the fact that the possibility of social uprisings is still a reality and should be expected in any country that is oppressive, corrupt, unaccountable and undemocratic. For this reason, the counter-revolutionary actors are still making every effort to eliminate the potential of revolutionary uprisings in the region. These counter-revolutionary forces, including Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, even try to punish countries such as Turkey and Qatar, which are supportive of the revolutionary processes in the region.

For this reason, it can be argued that the protest movements in Sudan and Algeria have seriously disturbed these counter-revolutionary actors that perceived such developments as direct threats to the regional status quo. Therefore, it is of great importance for revolutionary actors to put pressure on military powers to hand over power to civilian administrators. This is also a responsibility of the Sudanese and Algerian armies – if they are to contribute to the successful revolutionary transformations of their countries.

Although it’s been over 8 years since the beginning of the Arab revolutions, the developments in Sudan show that revolutionary appetite is still alive across the Middle East and the Arab world. Social unrest and the toppling of long-time leaderships in Algeria and Sudan, civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, the on-going competition and power struggle in regional politics, and the continuing dissatisfaction of the Arab masses illustrates that Middle East politics will continue to witness popular uprisings in the coming years.

Algeria has been witnessing anti-government protests for over a week. President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, who has been serving as president since 1999, is at the center of the criticism of the protesters. The demonstrations started after the announcement that 82-year-old Bouteflika will be a candidate for the upcoming presidential election on 18 April. Since this announcement, various social groups and civil society movements have participated in nation-wide protests in almost all major cities across the country. The group driving the protests are students. In almost all major universities, students have organized mass protests. The mobility capacity of the youth has been essential in the rapid organization of demonstrations and the high levels of participation.

The most striking feature of the protests is that they are the first kind of demonstrations that have been organized in the country since the civil war ended in 2002. The war claimed lives of over 100,000 civilians in the country since the beginning of the conflict in 1992. The psychological effects of the civil war prevented many Algerians to shy away from political discussions, let alone organize popular protests. However, it seems that Algerians have no patience left against their regime. There are several particular reasons as to why this protest movement has been taking place recently.

It is absurd for a country where the median age is 28 to be ruled by someone who is 82 and cannot function as a statesman due to his severe health conditions. So, the Algerian youth said “enough” to the continuation of Bouteflika’s term.

First of all, Bouteflika’s candidacy for a fifth term in office was perceived as a humiliation for Algerian people. Bouteflika has not been able to walk or talk after he experienced a stroke in 2013. Following that year, his health condition has deteriorated gradually and he was seen in public only on a couple of instances. It is argued that under such conditions, he cannot serve or represent the country, of which the majority of the population is under 30 years old. It is obviously absurd for a country where the median age is 28 to be ruled by someone who is 82 and cannot function as a statesman as we know it due to his health conditions. Therefore, the Algerian youth have basically said “enough” to the continuation of Bouteflika’s term.

The second important reason behind the demonstrations is that the political elites, who have ruled the country since the civil war lost their legitimacy in the eyes of Algerians. Corruption, management, nepotism, socio-economic problems, lack of civil rights, and political pressure on the opposition has caused a widespread reaction against the regime. The dissatisfaction has further been triggered by the announcement of Bouteflika’s candidacy, which led all segments of society to join the protest movement.

Finally, the majority of the Algerian youth have been increasingly engaging with social media tools that have allowed them to see developments in a regional and international sphere. Moreover, the effects of globalization have been visible on Algerian society, as the country’s new generation is actively engaged in global developments. The Algerian people have also been following the regional political atmosphere and have been witnessing demands for change in other Arab countries. These developments in other Middle Eastern countries have also affected the Algerian youth and allowed them to raise their voices for democratic demands.

Apart from this, especially young Algerians with fellow citizens in diaspora who live in European countries like France, exchange views on how their country should be governed. In addition to this, they are also witnessing how Muslim countries can be democratic and developed at the same time as they increasingly observe the experiences of Turkey and Malaysia.

Such reasons and dynamics have motivated Algerian youth to participate in demonstrations. Despite the protests that were initially against Bouteflika’s candidacy, they have now turned into mass gatherings of Algerians demanding democratic rights, and changes in the economic and social structure of the country.

Arab nations prefer to ensure the cost of a revolution, rather than living under oppressive regimes that have been in power for decades. Algeria is not an exception.

The ongoing protest movement in Algeria is a clear reminder of the Arab revolutions period that began in Tunisia in 2010. Millions of people in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and Syria, poured into the streets with both democratic and economic demands by asking for the removal of their decades-long oppressive regimes. While this process was successful in some countries and resulted in the overthrow of existing regimes, it did not turn out that way for others, where revolutionary uprisings caused long-lasting civil wars and political instability.

One of the characteristics of the demonstrations in Algeria that are similar to the protests of the Arab revolutions is that young people, who are the main actors of the demonstrations, intensively use social media. In the country where internet and phone access is strictly controlled, social media tools such as Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube, are important instruments for protestors to communicate, organize, exchange ideas, interact, and encourage their audience.

The most important message given by the protests in Algeria is that the revolutionary wave that started in 2010 in the Arab region is still continuing despite the counter-revolutionary attempt in Egypt and the instability in Syria, Libya, and Yemen. It can be argued that the Arab nations prefer to ensure the cost of a revolution, rather than living under oppressive regimes that have been in power for decades. Algeria is not an exception. The unprecedented wave of protests in the country is an obvious sign of this. Therefore, the ghost of Arab revolutions will continue to haunt the oppressive regimes in the Arab world, despite their counter-revolutionary attempts.

8 years after the Arab Uprising, which sought radical institutional reform, the primary obstacle to the just rule of law in Egypt is ‘political.’ The entrenched military elite have remained reluctant to any alternative judiciary system that attempts to create a center of authority beyond their control. The political transition, indeed, created a possibility of institutional reform, where the state and society would be equally accountable to the rule of law. However, Egypt’s judiciary erected barriers to any practice that fiddled with the traditional impunity and supremacy enjoyed by the authoritarian institutions.

Since the overthrow of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, on July 3, 2013, the Egyptian judiciary has operated under severe authoritarian strain. While the judiciary exercised limited checks over the executive bias, the executive interference has undermined all other state institutions. This helped to contain, at least marginally, the authoritarian coercion during the Mubarak regime and during the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief government.

A day after the coup against the elected MB government, Military General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi appointed the Chief of Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansoor, as interim president. On July 5, 2013, Mansoor dissolved the Shura council, allowing the executive to manipulate the rule of law. This was the first judicial misconduct after the overthrow of Morsi. Morsi, no doubt, attempted to consolidate power – at least, misuse the people’s mandate. But Egypt enjoyed considerable space for dissent. On September 23, barely two months after the coup, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood and ordered for the confiscation of its assets. A month later, on November 24, the interim government issued the Demonstration Law, essentially criminalizing any organized form of dissent “at the slightest indication of disorder.” Such unlawful action axed whatever pluralism was left in the political chaos of Egypt.

After Sisi assumed power on June 8, 2014, the Egyptian judiciary became complacent to cumulative degrees of injustice and oppression. The judges that remained in service either voluntarily abided to authoritarian dictates or didn’t dare to raise their voice for judicial impartiality. Take for example the case of Judges for Egypt – a group of judges who challenged the authority of Sisi in overthrowing the elected president. In March 2016, the Supreme Disciplinary Board forcefully removed 47 judges who were part of a group being charged of being “pro-Islamist.” However, adherence to any political idea is the right of a citizen devoid of the professional position one holds. The explicit muzzling of this right and the conspicuous silence of the judiciary shows the extent of compromise Egypt’s judicial system has fallen for. It also explains Sisi’s authoritarian insecurity towards religio-political dissent.

But in the case of Egypt, religio-political discourse is essential – not only because it serves as a counterbalance to state structures, but also because it propagates the idea of equality and accountability, a notion that the ruler is not above the law. These are the basic premises that uphold human dignity. Thus, the intent of central actors of transition considerably determines how religion is allowed to shape the political discourse thereof. Egypt failed to strike a balance, partially given to the miscalculation given to the miscalculation of the street and partially because of ‘external factors,’ whose interests lie in authoritarian Egypt. Sisi and his regional allies understood that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only force capable of re-emerging and taking an independent decision or challenging the existing norm. Hence, the decision to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood was to eliminate any possibility of opposition and to legitimize the authoritarian brutality against any form of dissent.

The Egpytian Criminal Court sentenced Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death in masses in “unfair trials.” Such “grotesque parody of justice” further strengthened the institutionalized authoritarian coercion.

An explicit judicial disparity reigns the court proceedings. The Criminal Court sentenced Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death in mass in “unfair trials.” Such “grotesque parody of justice” further strengthened the institutionalized authoritarian coercion. Not all these death sentences were to be carried out, but the message went out very clear – no institution is above the authoritarian norm, not even the judiciary. These mass convictions and the uncensored enthusiasm of the Egyptian executive to crackdown upon any form of opposition shows the level of irrelevance the Egyptian judiciary enjoys.

The activists detained for opposing the government have been “unnecessarily” held for lengthy periods before their court proceedings. In October 2014, Sisi expanded the jurisdiction of military courts to “public and vital” facilities. This further manipulated the ambit of judicial impartiality; thousands of civilians were referred to military trials based on media reports; hundreds of “suspected” MB supporters were tried in mass and “unfair” judicial proceedings. On the other hand, members of the security forces, those affiliated to Hosni Mubarak, and the supporters of the Sisi regime were freed on bail.

The renewed Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2015 drew curtains over whatever miniscule space for dissent and the rule of law remained in Egypt. The law bestows the security forces with unrestricted impunity from persecution and penalizes the press for negating the official version of military attacks.

The renewed Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2015 drew curtains over whatever miniscule space for dissent and the rule of law remained in Egypt. The law bestows the security forces with unrestricted impunity from persecution and penalizes the press for negating the official version of military attacks. It sets a fine of up to $64000 for journalists who publish or spread news reports contradicting that of the state’s version. Such expansion of surveillance established the consolidation of an absolute authority within the executive. It also illustrated that legal reform is pursed in order to protect the regime rather than the citizens of Egypt.

Then came Law No 13 of 2017, which amended the Judicial Authority Law (Law No. 46 of 1972). This law stipulates that the President of Egypt must directly appoint the Chief Justice for each of the main four judicial bodies of the country. The silence of the Egyptian judiciary over this legislation explained that the judiciary preferred allying itself with the regime at the cost of institutional dignity.

The greatest low of the judiciary came in early December 2018, when a group of Egyptian lawyers filed a petition seeking to amend Article 140 of the constitution in order to grant Sisi a “lifetime” presidency. Though courts are yet to take any substantial decision on this petition, such endeavors explain another judicial misconduct aiding authoritarian sustenance in Egypt.

A just political system cannot be consolidated without a strong and impartial judiciary; thus, in the absence of a judicial system supportive of the principles of democracy, the rule of law will always remain subject to authoritarian manipulation.

Around 6 years after overthrowing the democratically elected government, Sisi managed to establish a brutal authority, but not a secure government. A just political system cannot be consolidated without a strong and impartial judiciary; thus, in the absence of a judicial system supportive of the principles of democracy, the rule of law will always remain subject to authoritarian manipulation.

Egypt’s judicial reform has neither been indigenous, nor comprehensive, nor locally supported. Any successful reform aims to restructure the social and political variables exogenous to the judiciary that promotes judicial independence and the superiority of the “rule of law.” This “decisional” independence requires, essentially, that judicial ranks are not staked in advance through the appointment or promotion of people that approve a particular set of ideas. Since Sisi assumed power, the Egyptian judiciary has served to legitimate and facilitate the authoritarian rule. Other than a feigned opposition against the transfer of two islands – Sanafir and Tiran – to Saudi Arabia in 2016, the Egyptian judiciary has served as a channel through which Sisi presses his oppression.

The Middle East has been going through a transformation period that was triggered with the Arab uprisings, which began in Tunisia in December 2010. This process is an opportunity to re-shape the political and social structure in the region. While this regional transformation has led to societies question the existence of autocratic governments, which have been in power for many years, it also forced international actors to recognize their relationships with regional governments. As a result of these transformative events, the region has witnessed regime changes in many countries and continuing civil wars in others.

The wave of regional transformation came under attack with the intervention of actors who support the status quo in the Middle East. The main aim of these actors was to prevent any regime changes as well as an establishment of a new regional order. One of the most visible interventions of these actors took place in Bahrain, where peaceful demonstrations were violently dispersed by the Saudi Arabian security forces. Another example was experienced in Egypt, where counter-revolutionary actors initiated a military coup and prevented the country from turning into a democracy. In Libya, Syria, and Yemen, popular protests were faced with tough responses from the regimes, or were led to a proxy war with other regional actors such as the U.S., Russia, Iran, and Saudi Arabia.

In the light of all these developments, a number of analysts claimed that the process of Arab revolutions were all failed attempts. Although these claims have some truth attached to them, they fall short of reasonable accounts. It should be remembered that political and social transformations can still take place after long periods. More, since the region has, for centuries, been a battlefield for international actors, such a substantial transformation would require the extensive efforts of regional actors. However, there are four main reasons why we should be hopeful about the future of regional transformations.

First of all, despite all the discouraging events and developments, there is still a strong will among the populations of the regional countries for the continuation of the revolutionary processes. Despite the fact that political leaders aimed to protect their privileged positions, the calls for regime changes have been continuing. The general public and political oppositions in these countries demand the toppling of repressive regimes and the formation of democratic political structures.

Secondly, despite a region-wide alliance that aims to prevent the revolutions in the Middle East, there are various countries and political actors that have strongly revealed their support for regional transformation. Among these countries, Turkey and Qatar have relentlessly been supporting the people of the region, who seek for democratic regimes in their countries. In addition to this, as one of the strongest social and political actors in the region, the Muslim Brotherhood movement also supports the democratization efforts in the region.

Thirdly, it is important to question the success of counter-revolutionary actors who consider regional transformation as a threat to their own regimes. These actors have failed in their campaigns to prevent revolutionary uprisings so far. This can be observed in the cases of Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Additionally, their newly established alliances have proven to be fragile. Last year’s regional blockade on Qatar, which was imposed by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Egypt, has not produced the desired outcomes – causing further anxiety among these actors.

Finally, global actors have different policies and approaches regarding the transformation process in the Middle East. For instance, European countries do not embrace U.S. policies towards the Gulf region, Iran, and the Palestine issue. These different approaches prove the fact that there is a strong division among Western countries in their policies towards the Middle East. In addition to this, the regional policies of other international actors such as Russia and China are also significantly different from that of the U.S. and Europe. Therefore, there exists a strong competition among international actors in their policies towards the Middle East.

It may be misleading to state that the wave of regional transformation, which began in 2010, has come to an end despite the downward course of events in recent years. Many factors, both regional and international, have the potential to reactivate the wave of transformation in the Middle East.

Unlike many other Arab countries that experienced unsuccessful transition experiences in the post-2011 period, Tunisia has been considered a success story with its exceptional journey from an authoritarian regime to a functioning democracy. Thanks to the culture of reconciliation in the country’s politics Tunisia was able to overcome many political crises since 2011. The key factor for achieving political stability is the consensus that Islamist, secular and socialists groups have so far embraced. The Ennahda Movement, for instance, had even sacrificed the leadership position in 2013, in order to overcome a political crisis that the country experienced in the summer of that year. The group withdrew from the government and accepted to work with technocrats for the transition period. This was a key move that prevented the deepening of the crisis.

Thanks to the culture of reconciliation in the country’s politics theTunisia was able to overcome many political crises since 2011.

This withdrawal of Ennahda, however, had a negative effect on the perception of the party in the eyes of its voters. The party bore the consequences in the parliamentary elections in 2014, as they experienced significant losses in terms of votes. Nevertheless, the party continued to be an important actor in the political scene and played a serious role in the successful continuation of the post-revolutionary transition period in Tunisia.

Despite the relative stability, the country’s political life has also problems that have the potential to harm the transition period. Particularly, the developments that have been experienced during the last two months are increasingly jeopardizing political stability in Tunisia.

Prime Minister Youssef Chahed’s dismissal of Interior Minister Lotfi Brahem on June 6 has triggered a controversial period in the country’s politics. It is argued that the minister was sacked as a result of a boat accident, where up to 80 Tunisians migrants died in the Mediterranean. However, a number of international media outlets and observers suggest that there was another reason for that development.

It is argued that the Interior Minister Breham met with the head of the intelligence service of the United Arab Emirates in Djerba on May 29 and they discussed the possibility of a regime change in Tunisia, similar to the one that took place in July 2013. According to the plan put forward by the UAE official, the Prime Minister would be removed from office and replaced with Kamel Morjane, who was the former Defence Minister during the deposed President Zeinal Abidin Ben Ali.

It is claimed that the main purpose of this Emirati plot was to exclude the Ennahda movement from Tunisian politics.

It is claimed that the main purpose of this Emirati plot was to exclude the Ennahda movement from Tunisian politics. This is part of a much bigger strategy of the Emirati leadership that targeted the Islamic political actors in the Middle East. The first example of this was the Muslim Brotherhood leadership in Egypt. The UAE-backed local groups initiated a military coup that toppled Mohammed Morsi. The military regime in the country started a crackdown on the members of the Muslim Brotherhood.

A similar scenario would be thought for Tunisia, as the Ennahda movement has gradually increased its power in Tunisian politics. Despite its low profile during the past years, the movement won the local elections last April by receiving 5% more votes than its biggest rival Nidaa Tunis. The Ennahda movement has also continued its civil activities in the fields of economy, social solidarity, culture, religion, and youth.

The Ennahda movement has long been the target of a region-wide anti-Muslim Brotherhood alliance led by the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt. This alliance aims to remove all Islamic political movements such as the Muslim Brotherhood and is making an intense effort in this context. These countries have also considered the Ennahda movement as a close associate of the Muslim Brotherhood. As a result, they have been involved in Tunisian politics since the revolution in 2011 and aim to exclude Ennahda from politics.

Despite such external interventions, the political groups in Tunisia, especially Ennahda, have been sensitive about continuing the stability by choosing the path of reconciliation. Following his meeting with President Beji Caid Essebsi, Ennahda leader Rachid al-Ghannouchi emphasized that the consensus must be achieved in order for the Tunisian revolution to remain a successful example.

It is of great importance that Ennahda and other Tunisian political groups show a unified front against foreign intervention in order to maintain political stability and become a strong democracy.

Eventually, these efforts have been successful and Prime Minister Youssef Chahed has appointed Hichem Fourati, who has been working in the Interior Ministry for many years, as minister. Following the vote of confidence in parliament, Hichem Fourati started his duty on July, 31, ending the two-month-long political crisis.

Foreign actors have not succeeded in their attempt to shape Tunisia’s politics according to their interests. However, it is expected that the governments of Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia are expected to maintain their campaign against the Ennahda movement in Tunisia. They will continue to work for preventing the possible success of Ennahda in the upcoming presidential and parliamentary elections, which will take place in late 2019. Therefore, it is of great importance that Ennahda and other Tunisian political groups show a unified front against foreign intervention in order to maintain political stability and become a strong democracy.

The Arab uprisings, which began in 2010, brought serious challenges to almost all countries in the Middle East. Morocco is not an exception. The country has continuously witnessed widespread protests during the past seven years. With the momentum of region-wide unrest, the first wave of protests in Morocco took place in 2011. In this case, Mohammed VI was quick to control the situation with various reforms that he introduced. However, in the following years, poor economic conditions and the increase of democratic demands in the country caused further dissatisfaction within Morocco’s youth.

The dissatisfaction can also be observed in the new wave of protests that began in October 2016 and which lasted until the summer of 2017. Following the footage of a fisherman being crushed in a garbage container in the town of Al-Hoceima in the northern region of Rig, which is predominantly Berber (Amazigh)-populated, hundreds of thousands of people participated in street demonstrations in many cities across the country. Demonstrators have called for the government to introduce reforms in order to solve economic problems, end social injustice and bring more democratic rights.

Since January 2018, the city of Jarada has also been experiencing a similar wave of protest. Jarada is famous for its coalmines and the city’s economy has been dependent on these mining activities since the 1930s. The government’s decision to close down coalmines in 2001 was a turning point for the residents of the city. Increasing unemployment, which came as a result of this decision, forced former mine workers to illegally extract coal in irregular mines. This evidently brought about a new problem. Since 2001, the number of miners who died in irregular mines has gradually been increasing, which has in parallel, caused widespread anger against the regime. The death of two brothers working on an irregular mine in December 2017 ignited widespread protests in Jarada. The protesters demanded the government to solve the socio-economic problems of the city.

While protesters in Morocco have been focusing on democratic and economic issues, the ethnic dimension also requires special attention. Berbers – who constitute half of Morocco’s population – have long been complaining about discrimination and negligence by the regime of King Mohammad VI. They claimed that the administration in Rabat has intentionally tried to damage Berber identity and have focused on Arabization policies since the early years of independence. Although the demands of this ethnic group were voiced during the 2011 protests, which eventually led to the regime accepting Berber language as one of the official languages of the country, the group has continued to raise its voice against ethnic discrimination.

A recent example of this was experienced in the city of Agadir. The decision made by the City Council of Agadir to replace all the street names in the city with the names of cities in Palestine has attracted heavy criticism from the Berbers who have been living in the city for centuries. While the municipal authorities claimed that the decision to-rename the streets in this way was an aim to show solidarity with the Palestinian cause, the Berbers argued that this act was within the context of the regime’s Arabization policy. Berbers in the city stated that they also support the Palestinian cause. However, at the same time argued that damaging the cultural identity of the city of Agadir could not be accepted.

The recent protests that have occurred in the country can also be evaluated from an ethnic and economic context. The main reason for these demonstrations are the jailing of the leaders of the Rif protests that took place between October 2016 and the summer of 2017. During those protests, the Berbers utilized more aggressive means in expressing their demands to the King Mohammad VI regime. In response, they faced a tough reaction from the government and a number of protesters were detained. As the majority of these detainees were Berbers, the group continued to voice their anger against the government.

The decision to jail Rif protest leader Nasser Zafzafi and 39 other protesters to 20 years in prison brought a new wave of demonstrations throughout the country. Demonstrators gathered in many cities, especially in the capital Rabat, and demanded the cancellation of these prison sentences. In addition to the Berbers, left-wing opposition groups, human rights activities, and the banned Islamic political party – El-Adl and Ihsan, also participated in the demonstrations.

Unlike other countries that experienced violence and instability during the wave of the Arab uprisings, Morocco has achieved relative stability. However, deteriorating economic conditions, the democratic demands of the youth and ethnic discrimination have contributed to widespread dissatisfaction among Moroccans against their long-standing regime. This has thus accelerated the process of establishing a wider opposition bloc, which includes different segments of society including Berbers, socialists, unemployed youth and Islamic movements. Therefore, it is possible to argue that the anti-regime alliance in Morocco will further expand in the upcoming period.

Despite the fact that it has been put on the back burner after the failure of the Arab Spring, the debate on alternative models of political order within the Islamic world still keeps its vivacity. These models are usually tended to be categorized with reference to their legitimacy base. And it constitutes the crux of political struggles within the Islamic world.

While the Iranian model is based on Shiite sectarianism, the Saudi model offers Sunni sectarianism or Wahhabism as its legitimacy base. Similarly, the Egyptian model wields secular Arab nationalism as its legitimacy base whereas the Turkish model rests on Islamic civilization.

These varieties of legitimacy base embody divergent political realities with national, regional and international dimensions. Iran, for instance, assumes a political community of the Shiites within its national boundaries, while it strives to structure its region on the basis of polarization between the Shiites and the rest and an international order which is grounded on the antagonism between the Islamic world led by the Shiites and the imperial West.

The Saudi case, on the other hand, embraces a political community of the Sunnis within its national borders whereas it seeks a regional order shaped around the polarity of the Sunnis and the Shiites or traditional monarchical forces and the reformists and an international order that underlines the hegemony of the West.

The Egyptian model puts forwards a political community of secular-nationalism within its national sphere especially after the coup in July 2013. This is accompanied by a regional order that rests on the polarity of traditional authoritarian political forces and their democratic enemies. Like the Saudis, this leads Egypt to team up with Israel and the Emirates and gives an unconditional backing to Western hegemony in international politics.

The Turkish model, offered by the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) after 2002, presents a political community of Muslims and non-Muslim peoples in a post-nation-state framework, which is in a way reminiscent of the Ottoman “millet” system. This post-nationalist politics, therefore, puts an enormous pressure on both the Turkish nation-state and the Westphalian order in the Middle East and challenges sectarian frameworks as well. This reformist ethos also echoes on the international level by suggesting an idea of a equal and multi-civilizational world order.

Indeed, the Turkish model trumps the other models not only with its inclusiveness but also its conformity with democratic politics. Despite their vast ideological differences and a high degree of animosity towards each other, the other models share a common ground in their denial of democratic politics. These authoritarian models equate or rather reduce politics to the state and the state is identified with a particular group or political force: The Mullahs in Iran, the royal family in Saudi Arabia and the military in Egypt. Hence, there does not exist an independent sphere of politics where the plurality of political groups and societal forces encounter each other.

The Turkish model posits a democratic option. Turkey’s transition from authoritarianism to democracy has taken place in three steps. First of all, in 1950 with the introduction of multi-party politics, the state lost its monopoly over politics. Politics finally gained its independence to an extent. Power began to be shared by the bureaucrats and the representatives of the people, that is the politicians.

The second step in democratization was the enlargement of the sphere of politics at the expense of state bureaucracy. The AK Party’s first period of rule, encompassing the years from 2002 to 2010, testified the roll back of the bureaucratic tutelage after the EU reforms and constitutional referendums of 2007 and 2010. After all, the relative share of politics in power has increased dramatically.

The third step in democratization involves constructing a new institutional framework that puts the nation’s will at the center of politics and guarantees the supremacy of politics over other sectors or power centers. Turkey’s gradual switch to a presidential system started with the 2007 referendum, reached a level of maturity with the election of Erdogan to the presidential post in 2014, became the institutional structure of the country on the paper after the April 16 referendum (2017), and is now waiting to be the institutional framework in practice after the June 24 elections. The June 24 elections, therefore, is important with regards to the fact that it will complete this final round of democratization in Turkey.

Jordan had experienced minimum level of protests during the Arab uprisings that started in late 2010. The regime of King Abdullah had utilized strategies that allowed him to keep his regime alive despite the regional turmoil. In the early days of 2011 protests, the main allies of King Abdullah were the Hashemite and Christian communities in the country. Strong support from powerful elites of these communities caused marginalization of protesters. As a result, civilians who went to the streets for protests lost their popular and intellectual support. In the following period, it was not a difficult task for the security forces to disperse the protesters. At the political stage, King Abdullah removed the cabinet and implemented a number of reforms to appease protesters.

However, the following years witnessed the continuation of chronic problems in the country. Human rights issues remained source of discomfort for the public, and problems regarding political participation, civil society, and freedom of expression have continued. The reform requests in these fields were not met by the regime.

The economy was another source of disappointment for the public in Jordan. While unemployment has reached 18%, the country’s debt currently represents 96% of its GDP. Decreasing foreign aid has recently forced the Jordanian government to ask the International Monetary Union (IMF) for fresh credit. Following the agreement in 2016, the IMF requested a number of reforms from the government. As part of these reforms, Amman has recently decided to increase income tax and raised prices in a number of products such as oil and electricity by 5.5 % and 19 %.

The downturn of the economy, discontent of the poor and the government’s austerity measures have forced Jordanians to protest against the bad management of the economy. On May 2018, thousands of protesters went to the streets in the capital Amman and other cities to protest the economic conditions in the country. Mainly syndicates and labour unions in many sectors organized the protests. In the following days, there were calls for a general strike in which thousands of professionals such as doctors, dentists, bankers and journalists participated. Following the demonstrations and strikes, King Abdullah took Prime Minister Hani al-Mulki from office and appointed Omar Al-Razzaz, who was Minister of Education and had previously worked in the World Bank. Despite the government reshuffle, the protesters seemed determined to continue until their demands were fully met.

The protests in Jordan are another disturbance for the King Abdullah leadership, who is also experiencing problems in foreign policy. Despite the conflicts in neighboring regions such as Syria, Iraq and Palestine, Jordan is known for its relatively stable political and economic structure. However, particularly during the past year, King Abdullah has been facing challenges with regards to its relations with traditional allies. Jordan’s hesitance in joining the Saudi-led political campaign against Qatar caused disappointment for Riyadh. Jordan has also hinted that it can have better relations with Iran and may develop a strategic partnership with Turkey.

Another reason for the tension between Jordan and Saudi Arabia is the Palestine issue. While Saudi Arabia, the United States and Israel have been joining their efforts and perspectives in dealing with the crisis, Jordan chose not to stay on the table anymore. Around two thirds of Jordan’s population is of Palestinian origin, and there are thousands of Palestinian refugees living in the country. This makes Jordanian population as a natural supporter for the Palestinian cause. Therefore, it is almost impossible for the King Abdullah leadership to join the Saudi-U.S.-Israel alliance. For this reason, Muhammad bin Salman, the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, now considers Jordan as a burden.

King Abdullah’s response to young crown prince in Saudi Arabia came in the last days of 2017, with the decision of removing his two brothers and one cousin from the important ranks in the Jordanian security establishment. The reason for this decision was a Saudi initiated coup attempt in which two brothers and a cousin of King Abdullah would be involved. This development has been one of the turning points in Saudi Arabia and Jordanian relations.

Considering the recent developments, it can be predicted that Jordan will have to face more serious challenges in the coming period. Its economic problems will continue to exist as the country needs external support, the new political setting in the region will put more pressure on King Abdullah’s regime. As the region will focus more on the Palestinian issue, it will also bring Jordan on the spotlight in regional politics.

In recent years, Turkey’s defense industry has been developing rapidly. At the very beginning of the 2000s, the country’s rate of dependency on foreign industrial suppliers was around 80%. It now is able to create weaponry and systems with its local resources. In this regard, The 13th International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF 2017) was important in demonstrating the development of Turkey’s defense industry.

Turkish firms showcased their weapons and weapon systems. The National Corvette MilGem, National Attack Helicopter T129 ATAK, National Main Battle Tank ALTAY, National Assault Rifle MPT-76, National Combat Aircraft TF-X, Turkish Light Utility Helicopter T625, Armed Hürkuş, Missiles (Cirit, Kaplan, Mızrak, Hisar, Som, Bora), National Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) Bayraktar TB2, Anka and Karayel, Göktürk-1 Satellite and Armored Combat Vehicle are some examples.

There are many other ongoing weapon and weapon systems projects like these that have been completed and are being used by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the police force. The era of direct procurement from abroad is soon to be over. From joint production and partial design, Turkey evolves towards creating genuine and unique designs.

Strategic Value

The defense industry is actually an integral component of a country’s grand strategy, national security strategy, defense strategy and hierarchy of military doctrines. The success of these strategies mostly relies on military capacity, consisting of national weapons and weapon systems. Therefore, we can talk about the development of military technology in accordance with the aims determined by the hierarchy of strategies.

While the security threats that emerged with the Arab Spring in the Middle East indicated the scope of possible threats posed by states and non-state actors, it also underscored the importance of having and utilizing domestic military technology. Turkey has repeatedly experienced the said strategic value of the defense industry. From the hardships faced before and after the Cyprus Peace Operation to the ones that are faced in fighting terrorism, from direct and indirect embargoes from Western countries to internal and external actors trying to halt the development of the Turkish defense industry, the country has experienced many difficulties. However, despite these past experiences, the Turkish defense industry has started to attract increasing international attention and become a rather hot topic over the last fifteen years. Two Turkish defense firms are now among the world’s top hundred defense firms. According to a 2016 evaluation by Defense News, ASELSAN has risen from 62nd rank to 58th, while TUSAŞ from 78th to 72nd. It should be pointed out that no other member of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation is on this list.

Despite being in a better condition than in previous decades, the Turkish defense industry has to employ multiple methods to meet its strategic aims in shorter periods. The defense industry has critical projects for the future; the national combat aircraft TF-X is one of them. There are alternative solutions for Turkey to eliminate the deficiencies in terms of qualified personnel capacity and technical infrastructure in a short time. According to TUSAŞ General Director Temel Kotil, “The TF-X will be a fifth generation combat aircraft. When we develop this aircraft, we will become the fourth ranking country in this field. TUSAŞ will collaborate with BAE Systems for the initial stage of the project. We are planning to have the first flight in 2023 and employ the aircraft by 2029.”

Political Value

In fact, President Erdoğan’s will for the development of national defense industry allowed the sector to become what it is today. He enforced an approach that relied on local solutions and national power to ensure security and stability. In this respect, it was decided to minimize external dependencies with all kinds of incentives and support for the domestic the defense industry. While the rate of domestic resources being used to meet security needs was 24% in 2002, it rose to 41.6% in 2007 and 54% in 2011. Today, it is around 68%. Having 80% locality in terms of the defense industry, which is seen in developed countries, is what Turkey aims to achieve in the shortest time possible.

Fighting against terrorist organizations like the PKK/PYD and Daesh in recent years, Turkey once again observed the necessity of a local defense industry in its struggle for power with regional and global actors. The US’ strategic armament support to the YPG, and Western countries enforcing a direct or indirect arms embargo on Turkey as a tool during times of strained relations are now frequent occurrences. European countries are either not delivering the promised products or doing whatever they can to delay the delivery. Meanwhile, the systems that are being developed entering the inventory to ease Turkey’s anti-terror strategies and extraterritorial operations are necessary for building up a military power capacity. Looking at the transformation in anti-terror operations due to the use of UAVs is a telling enough sign.

http://thenewturkey.org/securing-turkeys-borders-a-proactive-strategy-with-high-tech-approach/

Müjdat Uludağ of the Undersecretariat for Defense Industries (SSM) stated the following: “The tensions between countries are undoubtedly affecting defense industry cooperation negatively. Especially countries with powerful defense industries are enforcing an industrial policy which aims to prevent new actors from emerging, just to protect their own positions. Turkey’s priority is to establish a completely independent defense industry. Yet, Turkey is also open to cooperation in the defense industry with allied countries; because the real threat is common issues faced by countries, like global terrorism. Common threats require common resolutions.

Keeping this in mind, our institution continues to have bilateral and multilateral cooperation with many countries around the world. We have ongoing cooperation projects with the countries of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), Asia-Pacific countries with developed technological infrastructure, South American countries and allies in the Middle East. Turkey will maintain its win-win policy in these defense industry cooperation strategies. In this respect, we expect more active support from our NATO allies against all terrorist activities that pose a threat to Turkey.”

Nevertheless, it is important to make this a goal not only championed by the political establishment, but also by the bureaucracy. Universities and research centers must be engaged in this process and collaborate with the defense industry. This will ease the development of the defense industry and allow its value to be understood by the public. It is obvious that there are certain deficiencies in the cooperation between the defense industry, universities and research centers in our country, especially when compared to other countries. However, according to Kotil, there are hopeful developments in this field:

“The interest in developing technologies in the universities, innovation, intellectual and industrial property, and entrepreneurship has increased in the recent years, showing a parallel with the diversification of support and incentive programs. In this respect, we can say that industrial cooperation both in our firm and country is rapidly developing. With a proactive approach, various policies are being developed and mechanisms created to strengthen the ties with universities. With the implemented applications, strategic cooperation with universities is expected. In this context, TUSAŞ has R&D cooperation protocols with 25 universities, KOOP (long-term internship) with two universities, integrated education program with three universities and Program for Training Defense Industry Researchers (SAYP) protocol with sixteen universities. As a part of these protocols, we are sharing certain information with university staff in engineering departments and research centers about our technological road map and how to conduct projects together. On the other hand, we are working on cooperation protocols regarding research and education with many other universities. A holistic view of Turkey suggests that the country has more potential in developing cooperation between the universities and the industry. For this reason, we try to understand the expectations of universities. We want to improve our cooperation with mutual trust, long-term common goals and win-win principles.”

Therefore, these kinds of cooperation will have positive outcomes in the future. Providing figures will clarify the importance of the subject: today, only at Teknopark Istanbul, there are 170 R&D firms and their 2,750 R&D personnel started around 600 national projects up to today. Moreover, the numbers of firms, personnel and projects are increasing by the day.

Economic Value

Beside its political and strategic yields, the defense industry also has important economic outcomes. Especially with the incentives for exporting and the development of products that can compete on the international market, the defense industry contributed to the economy of the country. Around $196 million in defense and aviation exports in 2004 skyrocketed to $1.673 billion in 2016. The total defense and aviation turnover of $1.855 billion in 2006 is now around the $6 billion mark. As the figures suggest, the capacity and the income of the sector were at lower levels thirteen years ago. Yet, it still lags behind powers that focus on this sector.

Uludağ evaluated the situation in his following statement:

“Our defense and aviation exports are sevenfold when compared to the 2002 data. While the said rise shows that our defense industry is improving in terms of competence, it also indicates to a huge potential waiting to be tapped. As platforms, we have achieved important exports in land vehicles in the past. We are aiming to reach high figures in exports in the global markets in parallel with our business development plans for ship and helicopter platforms along with UAV systems. To reach this target, we are working in coordination with certain public institutions in providing long-term loans for products by the defense and aviation industry that have high strategic value. Meanwhile, the platforms and systems we produce are being used by TSK and our security forces; this will prove to be an advantage for the firms. Yet, our firms focusing on the international markets and strategically prioritizing their efforts with a holistic outlook is also crucial for reaching higher figures in exports.”

Therefore, it could be said that the defense industry may build up a momentum with steady steps and cling onto the international markets. A $25 billion export target has been set for 2025. While this target may be deemed as impossible in the short-term, it is quite possible with the value-added that will be provided by nationalized production of software and hardware. According to the 2016 report of SSM, SSM has approved 269 projects which amounted to TL123 billion. Looking at the distribution of the projects, it could be seen that 47.58% is for domestic development, 8.18% for domestic direct procurement, 20.07% for R&D, 8.5% for joint production projects, and 10.78% is for foreign direct procurement. Therefore, support for projects that are more local than others will bring the desired economic value with it.

Turkey is the world’s sixth largest armament importer and fifteenth largest armament exporter. According to SIPRI data, Turkey spent $15 billion on its defense budget in 2016. Transitioning from a procurer of weapons to producer of weapons contributed to our exports. Turkey’s leading export partners in terms of the defense industry are the US, Germany, Malaysia, the Gulf countries and Azerbaijan. 34.3% of the exports were done with NAFTA members, 23.7% with the EU, 18.5% with Middle Eastern countries, 8.6% with Far Eastern countries, and 7.5% with CIS countries.

There are many steps to be taken for Turkey to have a defense industry that can compete globally; however, looking at the efforts, we easily can say that Turkey is on the right track. The more independent its military technology, the more powerful Turkey will be. In this respect, the private sector has to contribute more and take the initiative.

Turkey is fighting against multiple security threats in a region mired in conflict. To not have any vulnerabilities in its fight, Turkey has to increase and consolidate its military capacity. In this sense, the defense industry has to adopt the network-centric warfare doctrine and shape its efforts accordingly. On the other hand, there are certain risks that obstruct the national defense industry. The Gülenist Terrorist Organization’s (FETÖ) activities serve as a break for certain crucial projects. Similarly, embargoes enforced by Western countries bring the risk of slowing down these projects. However, the most important risk is that immense efforts to improve the defense industry may be halted by bureaucratic procedures. Despite all the hardships and challenges, Turkey must continue developing its national defense industry and seek ways to accelerate even further.