Relations between India and Pakistan—long shaped by historical rivalries and persistent conflict—are now teetering on the brink of a fresh crisis. On April 22, 2025, a deadly terrorist attack in the Baisaran Valley near Pahalgam, in Indian-administered Jammu and Kashmir, claimed the lives of 26 civilians. The attack, the deadliest since the 2008 Mumbai attacks, has reignited debate across India over long-standing issues such as the Kashmir conflict, cross-border terrorism, and nuclear brinkmanship.

Claimed by the Resistance Front (TRF), a group that emerged in 2019 in response to India’s Kashmir policies, the attack has once again placed Pakistan-India relations at the center of global scrutiny. India swiftly blamed Pakistan, accusing it of supporting cross-border terrorism. Pakistan, in turn, denied involvement and called for an international, independent investigation.

India’s reaction was multifaceted—diplomatic, economic, and strategic. Most notably, it announced the suspension of the 1960 Indus Waters Treaty, signed under World Bank auspices, and revoked visas issued to Pakistani nationals. Furthermore, India imposed a complete ban on imports from Pakistan, effectively freezing what little bilateral trade remained.

Pakistan, while rejecting the terrorism allegations, emphasized the need for a transparent, international investigation and urged global institutions to intervene. In response to India’s sanctions, Islamabad implemented symbolic countermeasures and declared its intention to suspend all bilateral agreements with India, including the 1971 Simla Agreement, which has long shaped India-Pakistan diplomacy.

Historical Echoes in a Modern Crisis

This latest round of hostilities bears the unmistakable imprint of history. The Kashmir dispute remains the epicenter of tensions, echoing the unresolved legacies of partition. Pakistan continues to advocate for Kashmir’s right to self-determination and insists the conflict is international in nature. India, however, treats Kashmir as a purely internal issue and frames all discourse about it as a matter of national security.

India’s strategy of blaming Pakistan for every major incident in Kashmir reinforces its longstanding narrative: Pakistan as a state sponsor of terrorism. This pattern—repeating in 2001, 2008, 2019, and now 2025—illustrates the historical continuity of arguments used by both sides. However, what sets this crisis apart is the mutual suspension of two foundational agreements: the Indus Waters Treaty and the Simla Agreement.

These developments raise the specter of renewed disputes over vital issues such as water resource sharing, the status of the Line of Control (LoC), and the internationalization of the Kashmir issue—topics that had, until now, been largely settled or frozen.

The Root Cause: Kashmir

The ideological and structural tensions between India and Pakistan have persisted since the 1947 Partition. Central to this divide are identity-based narratives and the Kashmir question. Pakistan’s founding ideology—the Two-Nation Theory—underpins its position. In the wake of the April 2025 attack, Pakistan’s National Security Committee cited the incident as further validation of the Two-Nation Theory’s relevance.

For both nations, Kashmir represents more than just territory—it is an existential concern. This has led to multiple wars (1947, 1965, 1971, 1999) and numerous skirmishes. Since the 2000s, the discourse has evolved to focus on terrorism and counterterrorism, with India accusing Pakistan of supporting armed insurgents in Kashmir.

Key turning points like the 2001 Parliament attack, the 2008 Mumbai attacks, and the 2019 Pulwama bombing have hardened India’s stance. Pakistan, meanwhile, maintains it merely supports Kashmiris’ right to self-determination.

India’s 2019 decision to revoke Article 370 of its Constitution—which had granted special autonomy to Jammu and Kashmir—further inflamed tensions. This move not only altered the region’s demographic dynamics but also underlined India’s insistence that the issue lies solely within its sovereign purview. However, this unilateral action has fueled demands for legal reforms and reignited grievances among the region’s Muslim-majority population.

Diplomatic Bridges in Limbo: Indus Waters and Simla Agreements

The fact that two nuclear powers are once again clashing over Kashmir raises urgent questions about regional stability. This time, the stakes are higher. India’s suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty, originally signed in 1960, could have far-reaching consequences.

The treaty allocated usage rights of eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas, Sutlej) to India and western rivers (Indus, Jhelum, Chenab) to Pakistan. As over 80% of Pakistan’s water supply relies on these western rivers, the treaty has been a lifeline for its agricultural economy and energy needs. As the upper riparian, India had been constrained from using water as a strategic weapon—until now.

Pakistan has warned that India’s withdrawal could be considered an act of war, underlining the treaty’s significance for its national security and food sovereignty.

In response, Pakistan has announced it will suspend the Simla Agreement 1971, which committed both countries to resolve all disputes bilaterally and peacefully. The Simla Agreement effectively prevented third-party intervention in Kashmir, favoring direct dialogue. India has historically used it to avoid internationalizing the Kashmir issue, while Pakistan has seen it as a path to maintain diplomatic engagement and avoid military escalation.

Another vital clause in the Simla Agreement defines the Line of Control (LoC), the de facto border in Kashmir. Though repeatedly violated, the LoC remains a critical buffer. Suspending the agreement may open new disputes about the legitimacy and control of this volatile frontier.

A Crisis Beyond Borders

The India-Pakistan conflict continues to be shaped by long-standing identity-based divisions and unresolved historical grievances. The April 2025 terrorist attack has not only reignited old hostilities but introduced new risks by dismantling key diplomatic safeguards.

With the Indus Waters Treaty and Simla Agreement effectively suspended, the crisis risks spilling into broader domains: water security, cross-border diplomacy, and international law. The specter of weaponized water and the disappearance of a legal framework governing the LoC make this moment particularly dangerous.

India’s emphasis on internal security and Pakistan’s push for internationalization reflect deeply rooted policy approaches. This confrontation, therefore, can be read as an updated version of a recurring pattern—but with higher stakes.

Given both nations’ nuclear capabilities, the ramifications of continued escalation are not just regional, but potentially global. As we advance, international actors and diplomatic channels must intervene and de-escalate tensions. Otherwise, the collapse of foundational agreements could open the door to unpredictable and potentially catastrophic outcomes—not just for India and Pakistan, but for all of South Asia.

The elections held in India and Indonesia this year have attracted considerable attention from scholars and practitioners, particularly in the context of security issues linking the regions to regional and international politics in the Indo-Pacific. The two countries are among the most important political actors in the region that are expected to be able to exert decisive influence, especially amid the prevailing rivalry between the United States and China.

The victories of Narendra Modi in India and Prabowo Subianto in Indonesia are not only indicative of domestic development priorities. They also reflect a new international behavior that can be interpreted as a reorientation of policy in the face of the urgency of engagement, stability and security in the Indo-Pacific region.

Questions about government conduct on this issue are not new. Historically, the geography of India and Indonesia on the Indo-Pacific map has been the most strategic, not only in terms of population and economic growth, but also in terms of relations with global powers. The parliamentary majorities formed by the newly elected president in Indonesia and prime minister in India and, lastly, the military capacity, have put these two countries in the limelight.

For all their potential power, the question remains whether Indonesia’s newly elected president and India’s newly elected prime minister will play an effective role in the global politics of the Indo-Pacific. Will the national leadership achieved by Prabowo Subianto and Narendra Modi transcend a union commitment to the projection of security and stability in the Indo-Pacific?

Mapping of the Indo-Pacific Concept

The Indo-Pacific extends from regions in the Indian Ocean to the Pacific Ocean. It precisely encompasses in the tropical land of the Indian Ocean which includes India, Sri Lanka, African nations on the western side of the Indian Ocean and Yemen up the northern side of the Indian Ocean. At the other end, lies central-western part of Pacific Ocean which includes Australia, Japan and South Korea. Between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean are all the ASEAN member states and their water zones, as well as the currently disputed South China Sea.

The Indo-Pacific concept emerged at the beginning of this century through strategists’ projections. Prioritizing economic cooperation and security between states, the growth spurt accelerated in the second decade. In the 2010s, the effects are being felt by all member countries across the region. It is now common knowledge that the introduction of the Indo-Pacific concept is directly linked to the strategic economic and security strategies of China, which is seeking a global role as a great power.

Under the leadership of the U.S. administration, especially in the face of the U.S.’s multiple disagreements with China, which have noticeably increased after Xi Jinping’s presidency in 2013, a new military alliance structure has been introduced in the Indo-Pacific in the last decade, similar to the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical entity. Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States, and later Japan and India are the states united in a military alliance, as seen in the case of the U.S.-led QUAD and AUKUS, and predominantly determined by the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical worldview that triggered the return of the ‘West’ to global security expansions from the Asia-Pacific to the Indo-Pacific outlook.

The electoral victories in India and Indonesia have once again raised the question of whether the countries’ fate in the growing Indo-Pacific rivalry is destined to be a historical repetition, or whether both countries will intensify their economic and military engagement in the Indo-Pacific by aligning themselves with one of the power orbits.

The Strategic Reefs of India and Indonesia

So what is the position of India and Indonesia in the emerging security and economic imagination of the Indo-Pacific? To answer this question, one must recognize the existing reefs that serve the natural rationale and strategy that guide directions in both countries’ foreign relations approach within the great power rivalry in the Indo-Pacific.

India is strong but also fragile. This means that the basic social and political infrastructures of the country, which include very diverse societies divided by ethnicity, religion, caste and ideology, demand equal human rights and distribution of wealth within the political framework of the nation-state. Ideally, the hurdles to securing these demands could mean that the Indian central government could be prevented from becoming a strong actor in the international arena. This situation goes beyond the Hindu majority-Muslim minority dichotomy. It leads the country’s political elite to give priority to improving their position in domestic decision-making.

Given its inward-looking domestic politics, this does not mean that India has sidelined proactive engagement in international politics. The trigger for engagement is based solely on a realist approach, where it sees its nation’s security at stake. It was triggered by several cases. A long-standing border dispute with China in the Himalayan region is one example. Another is the maritime infrastructure projects that China is developing in connection with the Maritime Silk Road project from the west to the east of the Indian Ocean, i.e. from Myanmar to Djibouti, as well as the Pakistan-China border infrastructure at the Khunjerab Pass and the Gwadar-Kashgar crude oil pipelines, which are seen as having the potential to serve as a decisive pattern organ that would allow the weakening of India’s influence as a regional power.

Despite these signals, Narendra Modi’s response has been a barking tree. For example, in the recent open battle between China and India in the Himalayas, in which 20 Indian soldiers died, there were hardly any strong decisions taken by India, which was under the so-called strong leadership of Narendra Modi and a government dominated by Hindutva, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). On the other hand, there is another concern surrounding the recent statement made by the Indian authorities. The competition between India and China for minerals in the Indian Ocean, such as cobalt, which is now being eyed by China and Sri Lanka, has led India to claim that the Indian Ocean is the ‘Indian Sea’, which requires official confirmation of territorial sovereignty due to China’s denial. Looking at the two examples above, it is quite early to say that India has failed to portray itself as a content regional power, especially in the rising global rivalry in Indo-Pacific affairs.

The natural strategic reef that Indonesia is facing is similarly displayed through the disputes in the oceans involving the South China Sea, Natuna Island, economic ventures with China, and military strengthening partnership with the U.S. Although Prabowo Subianto will officially hold the seat of the presidency in November 2024, numerous media outlets and critics highlight his realist and constructivist approach, equipped with a strategy to gain a position in international politics, as a higher priority compared to that of his predecessor, who focused heavily on achieving domestic goals rather than international recognition. In the last two months alone, his visits to Malaysia, Singapore and the meeting with the US Secretary of State in Jordan have given the impression of his commitment to active participation in international affairs.

His realism and constructivist approach in considering international engagement comes from his military background as Defence Minister during Joko Widodo’s second term (2019-2024), his entire career in the army and war experience since the Soeharto era, his entry into national politics four times as a presidential candidate, and his role as spokesman of certain opposition circles in the country speak volumes about what Indonesia would serve to international states and communities. The dispute over China’s nine-dash line claim played a role in the victory of Prabowo, who was known as an efficient and responsive actor during China’s possible encroachment on Indonesia’s Natuna Islands. Prabowo, who was then Defence Minister, initiated an important military construction in Riau Province that provides an eagle view of the military engagement that could result from the South China Sea dispute.

However, as much as Prabowo may be a realist and constructivist, good economic relations with China and the U.S. in recent decades would prevent any lone ranger from strategizing a move. Like India, Indonesia would probably seek to balance and hedge its foreign policy in the Indo-Pacific, forcing the Prabowo administration to first strengthen and leverage cooperation with ASEAN (the Association of Southeast Asian Nations) and the United Nations before aligning with any of the Indo-Pacific power blocs.

The atrocity of silence is worse than the atrocity itself”. This statement by the makers of the BBC documentary Murder in the Snow, which shows the shooting of Tibetan refugees as they attempted to flee across the Himalayas into Nepal, captures the feelings of Tibetans in the north Indian state of Himachal Pradesh about the plight of their country, which has been occupied by China since 1950.

The 2006 documentary, the first recorded footage of Tibetan refugees trying to cross the border, was screened at the Hope and Stories Café in Mcleodganj, home to the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s spiritual leader, and the Tibetan government-in-exile. The town of 11,000 – many of them saffron-robed monks and refugees – is a mini Tibet with the large Tsuglagkhang complex. At its heart lies Namgyal Monastery, the personal retreat of the Dalai Lama. It is a magnificent structure that houses a community of dedicated monks. The melodious chants and rhythmic sounds of ceremonial instruments that echo through its walls offer a glimpse of the deep spiritual practices that have flourished here for centuries.

Kundang Tenzin, a Tibetan photographer who founded the Hope Café in 2017, is a man with a mission: to preserve and promote Tibetan culture and to record, document and expose the oppression of the Tibetan people by the Chinese government. He calls his café Hope because he came to India with the hope of returning to Tibet.

“I still have that hope,” the soft-spoken, gentle man with an engaging smile told Politics Today. “We always talk about harmony, humility, peace, love and compassion. Our cause [freedom from Chinese oppression and respect for the human rights of the Tibetan people] is based on these ideals”.

The Dalai Lama was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 1989 for promoting peaceful solutions based on tolerance and mutual respect to preserve the historical and cultural heritage of the Tibetan people.

“The nonviolent movement works,” said Tenzin with confidence and pride.  It is not just a fairy tale. Most of the news is about war, terrorist attacks, robbery and rape.  The younger generation may think that violence works, but the awarding of the Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama shows that non-violence works.

Following China’s communist revolution in 1948, it invaded Tibet in 1950. Overwhelmed, Tibet was forced to surrender its independence. After a failed uprising against Chinese rule in 1959, the 14th Dalai Lama – Tibet’s political and spiritual leader – fled into exile in Dharamshala, India, followed by tens of thousands of Tibetans. Since 1959, the Chinese government has exercised total political control over Tibet, using all means of repression, including forced abortion and sterilization, to deter and punish Tibetan resistance.

In this haven of peace, a tireless, dedicated team of five run a weekly program. Monday is the day for sharing stories. Niyma Samdup described his hometown of Meto Junga, near Lhasa in Tibet. “It was where the mountains touched the sky. I lived there with my two sisters and my parents. My father had a small bicycle and he went to Lhasa to look for work to feed the family. He did some cleaning, but there was no steady work, so we decided to flee with a kettle, a blanket and some clothes. I was five years old. It took us six months to walk to Nepal.

On Wednesdays, visitors to the café can spend a day living as a Tibetan.  Each morning, Nyima Samdup leads a fascinating walk through Tibetan culture, starting with donning a traditional costume and visiting the Dalai Lama’s monastery, where the 89-year-old leader gives public lectures.  Near the monastery is a chilling photo exhibition of Tibetans who have set themselves on fire in protest at the Chinese occupation. According to the Free Tibet Campaign, more than 150 people have set themselves on fire inside Tibet since March 2009. The number dropped in 2012 when the Dalai Lama said he did not condone the practice but praised the courage of those who had made the ultimate sacrifice for Tibet.

Friday is the day of documentaries and discussion. Tenzin and his colleagues are handing out leaflets about the event in Mcleodganj and have a personal message for those who come to the café in support of Tibet. Murder in the Snow tells the story of more than 70 young people who travelled for three nights in the back of a lorry as it climbed into the mountains. The refugees then walked for another 10 nights, with inadequate clothing and limited food and water, to the foot of the infamous 6000m Nangpa Pass, an ancient trade route to Nepal. As they made their way up the snow-covered pass, a group of mountaineers from a nearby camp watched in horror as Chinese border police opened fire on the refugees. The story went global when American mountain guide Luis Benitez emailed his account of the shooting to a popular climbing website. In 2006, about 100 Tibetans a month were fleeing their country. Today, only about ten a year are able to make the treacherous journey, as the Chinese have stepped up surveillance following demonstrations against their rule in Tibet in 2008.

Like the flight over the mountains, preserving Tibetan culture is an uphill struggle against seemingly insurmountable odds, but Tenzin is undeterred. “Good things are difficult to achieve,” he says philosophically, stressing that preserving the Tibetan language is essential to keeping the culture alive.

In August last year, US Secretary of State Antony Blinken, citing a recent UN report on the ‘forced assimilation’ of one million Tibetan children forced into Mandarin-speaking state boarding schools far from their homes and families, called on China to stop trying to erase Tibet’s distinct identity. In December, the European Parliament adopted a resolution calling on China to immediately abolish the boarding schools.

According to reports in various Tibetan-language news media monitored by ChinaAid, an international human rights organization working to promote religious freedom in China, students in Tibetan regions will be required to take full Mandarin Chinese classes from March 2023.

In his first address to the US Congress, Penpa Tsering, the head of Tibet’s government-in-exile based in India, known as the Sikyong of the Central Tibetan Administration (CTA), said his country was dying a ‘slow death’ under Chinese rule. “We are often asked why we don’t hear about Tibet anymore,” Tsering said.

He blamed this silence on China’s “Orwellian gridlock system, using all means of artificial intelligence to monitor people, control the flow of information and close Tibet to the outside world”.

The Chinese government continues to spread disinformation about Tibet through official statements and propaganda, paid online commentators and even fake social media accounts.

The United Nations has repeatedly challenged China over human rights abuses in Tibet, including finding that Tibet is the worst area in China for child malnutrition. In 2023, the watchdog group Freedom House again ranked Tibet as the least free country in the world, tied with South Sudan and Syria. It was the third year in a row that Tibet was at the bottom of Freedom House’s rankings, with an overall global freedom score of 1 out of 100.

The United States Commission on International Religious Freedom’s 2024 Annual Report, released on May 1, highlights the deterioration of religious freedom in Tibet due to the Chinese government’s intensified repression and “Sinicization” of Tibetan Buddhism – a policy aimed at bringing Tibetan Buddhism under the control of the Chinese Communist Party.

The Chinese government has consistently objected to the Dalai Lama’s visits to other countries, particularly his trips to Arunachal Pradesh, a north-eastern Indian state over which China claims territorial sovereignty. Countries that host the Dalai Lama often face repercussions from China. When he visited Mongolia in 2016, Beijing responded by imposing an economic blockade on the landlocked country. It also unsuccessfully pressured Sri Lanka not to invite the Dalai Lama in April this year.

Although King Charles held an informal meeting with the Dalai Lama during his European tour in June 2012, the Dalai Lama did not attend the coronation. In light of this, senior Conservative MPs have described the presence of China’s Vice President as ‘outrageous’.

From chanting ‘Tibet needs freedom’ in the streets to participating in protests and political lobbying, Tibetans around the world are resisting China’s policies despite 70 years of occupation.  The voice of the Tibetan people is carried to the outside world by a number of vocal pressure groups such as the Free Tibet Campaign.

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n a recent commentary piece published on Newsweek, the ongoing debate surrounding U.S. grand strategy has been reignited, with analysts and policymakers divided over the implications of adopting an “Asia First” approach at the expense of European alliances.

The commentary, penned by Paul Cormarie, delves into the emerging concept of “selective isolationism,” where the United States would strategically isolate itself from certain regions while prioritizing others. Specifically, the “Asia First” approach advocates redirecting resources and energy towards geopolitical efforts in Asia, citing the growing threat posed by the People’s Republic of China.

Cormarie argues against this approach, highlighting the already diminished U.S. military presence in Europe compared to the Cold War era. He emphasizes the importance of maintaining strong alliances with European partners through organizations like NATO, especially in the face of potential Russian aggression. Cormarie contends that isolating European interests in favor of Asia could strain U.S. relationships with allies across both regions.

Lack of resources?

Moreover, he challenges the notion that the United States lacks the resources to maintain a robust presence in both Europe and Asia. He points out that current defense spending in the Indo-Pacific region far exceeds that in Europe, suggesting that any perceived imbalance is not due to over-investment in European security.

The commentary also touches on the recent conflict in Ukraine and its implications for U.S. foreign policy. While acknowledging the need to support allies like Taiwan, Cormarie argues against prioritizing one region over another, warning of the potential negative repercussions on U.S. credibility and global stability.

Cormarie asserts that selectively isolating regions could undermine U.S. alliances and exacerbate tensions with adversaries like China. He advocates for a more balanced approach that maintains U.S. commitments to allies in both Europe and Asia, arguing that such engagement is crucial for navigating complex geopolitical challenges and promoting stability worldwide.

The commentary has sparked debate among policymakers and analysts, with proponents and critics alike weighing in on the merits of the “Asia First” strategy and its implications for U.S. global leadership. As the discussion continues, the future direction of U.S. grand strategy remains uncertain, with important implications for international relations and security dynamics around the world.

Source: RAND

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ay by day, international interest in the Turkic republics and Central Asia, in general, is growing. It seems that global interest in the region has increased, especially after the decisions taken by the Organization of Turkic States at its 9th Summit in Samarkand on November 11, 2022. One of the main reasons for this interest is undoubtedly the weakening of Russia’s influence in the region due to the war in Ukraine. Since the beginning of 2023, China, the European Union, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Germany, the United States, and the United Kingdom have held important summits and bilateral meetings with the aim of developing solid cooperation with the Central Asian states in the future.

The population of the five Central Asian countries, namely Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, is around 80 million. Their geographical area covers more than four million square kilometers and the sum of their cultivated land exceeds 28.5 million hectares. These countries are very rich in natural resources such as oil, gas, gold, and uranium, and investment rates in the landlocked Central Asian region are increasing every year. In 2022, Kazakhstan attracted the most foreign direct investment in Central Asia with $6.1 billion.

While Uzbekistan followed Kazakhstan with $2.53 billion, Turkmenistan attracted almost $1 billion, Kyrgyzstan almost $300 million, and Tajikistan around $170 million. As these are the official figures, the actual figures are much higher. According to data from Uzbekistan, after the reforms that began in 2017, foreign investment in the country has increased tenfold in the last six years. In January 2024, during his visit to China, the president of Tajikistan signed a $400 million investment agreement with the country. In addition, the volume of e-commerce in Central Asia, which is developing rapidly, is expected to exceed $66 billion by 2028.

In 2022, Turkey’s exports to Central Asian countries grew by around 30%, reaching approximately $12 billion. Turkey’s trade volume with Turkmenistan is increasing every year, with $4.7 billion exported to Kazakhstan, $3.3 billion to Uzbekistan, and $1.9 billion to Turkmenistan. In a few years, Turkey’s trade volume with Turkmenistan, which has reached $2.5 billion in 2023, is expected to exceed $5 billion, while in 2023, Turkey’s share of the construction sector in Turkmenistan will be $3.2 billion.

European organizations are planning to invest €1.5 billion in the region to develop the Trans-Caspian transport route (Central Corridor) to transport Kazakh oil to the West. The main purpose of this corridor is to reduce dependence on transit routes through Russia.

The Turkic republics are located at the center of the East-West trade routes, along the transit route, and the importance of this corridor is increasing every year. Factors contributing to this importance include international imports, the development of exports, the desire to reach markets in the region, the aim to transfer energy resources and precious metals safely and at low cost, the need to establish logistics bases for long-distance transfers, and the need to create alternative lines and routes in order to increase predictability. In this context, alternative railways and roads are constantly being built in the Central Asian region and work continues on the establishment of major logistics bases.

A new diplomatic format: “C5+”

On May 18-19, 2023, a summit of heads of state was held, known as the “C+C5” (China + Central Asia 5). At the invitation of Xi Jinping, the summit brought together Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the president of Kazakhstan; Sadyr Zhaparov, the president of Kyrgyzstan; Shavkat Mirziyoyev, the president of Uzbekistan; Emomali Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan; and Serdar Berdimuhammedov, the president of Turkmenistan. This summit had a new format as it was the first China-Central Asia leaders’ summit to be held at the point where the Silk Road began after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It was commented that China wanted to take advantage of the historical conjuncture  as the summit was held at a time when Russia’s relations with Central Asia had stagnated due to the Russia-Ukraine war.

The programs and cooperation agreements signed at the summit drew attention to China’s determination  to develop more solid and predictable relations with Central Asia in the future. China’s exports to the Central Asian region will amount to $62.3 billion by 2023—overall, it should be noted, not a very large figure for the Chinese economy. Moreover, the Central Asian countries are of geostrategic importance to China, particularly in terms of trade routes from the region to the West, while China’s efforts to develop alternative routes for Central Asia continue. Uzbekistan received a $398.8 million loan from China in 2023. Most of these loans will be used for energy, transport, agriculture, and water management. China, in fact, is the main source of financing for Kazakhstan and other countries in the region.

European Union-Central Asian Heads of State Summit (EU+CA)

After China’s C+C5 format, meetings and visits have shown that there is great interest in the Central Asian countries. The President of the European Council Charles Michel visited Kyrgyzstan to host the 2^nd Summit of Central Asian Heads of State on June 2-3, 2023. The summit, which took place in the Kyrgyz city of Cholpon-Ata, was attended by President Sadyr Zhaparov of Kyrgyzstan, President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev of Kazakhstan, President Emomali Rahmon of Tajikistan, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev of Uzbekistan, Deputy Chairman of the Turkmenistan Council of Ministers Nurmuhammet Amannepesov, representing President Serdar Berdimuhamedov of Turkmenistan, and President of the European Council Charles Michel. Multilateral and mutually beneficial cooperation and the future of relations between the European Union and Central Asia were discussed in the context of international relations.

The summit also reaffirmed the determination to continue the high-level dialogue between Central Asia and the EU, and to develop the EU-Central and Eastern Asia (CEA) (EU+CA) partnership in accordance with the priority areas identified by the parties, with the aim of achieving common prosperity and security in Central Asia. The participants expressed their intention to adopt the EU-CA Cooperation Roadmap at the next ministerial meeting and underlined their commitment to making Afghanistan a secure, peaceful, stable, and prosperous country. The heads of state and government also instructed the foreign ministers and the EU High Representative Josep Borrell to formalize and advance the implementation of the joint roadmap to deepen relations between the European Union and Central Asia.

Intense interest in Central Asia has led Germany to pursue a more active policy in the region. German Chancellor Olaf Scholz invited the Central Asian leaders to his country and hosted a major summit on September 29, 2023. The visit was the first time the leaders of these five countries visited a European Union country together. Following the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, when oil supplies from Russia were cut off, Kazakhstan began supplying oil to the Schwedt refinery in Germany. At this point, Germany sees Kazakhstan as an alternative in energy supply and as a geography where investments can be made in the production of green hydrogen energy.

At the summit, Germany declared it would establish a Strategic Regional Partnership with the C5 countries in the fields of economy, energy, natural resources, climate, environment, and regional cooperation. In the short term, it is understood that Germany attaches great importance to strengthening energy security and creating alternative energy supply routes, especially with Kazakhstan, in order to prevent a possible energy crisis in the country. The statement made at the summit on continuing efforts to develop the EU “Global Gateway” project as an alternative to the “Belt and Road Initiative” also attracted attention.

Growing Arab interest in Central Asia (GCC+C5)

While countries such as Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and Lebanon have recently opened embassies and consulates in Central Asian countries, they have also begun to establish important trade links and invest in projects in the region.

Following the European Union-Central Asian Heads of State Summit, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, president of Qatar, one of the most important states in the Arab world, made an important official visit to Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan on June 5-9, 2023. During these visits, agreements were signed between Qatar and the regional countries in the fields of energy, tourism, and education. Qatar’s intention to invest in the region’s subsurface and surface resources, as well as the common goals of exploiting the region’s resources by supporting key projects in the region, were clear from the meetings held during the visits.

The Summit of Heads of State and Government of the Gulf States and the Cooperation Council for Central Asia (GCC+C5), also under the leadership of Saudi Arabia, was held in Jeddah on July 18-19. This summit is seen as the beginning of a new phase of joint cooperation mechanisms between Central Asian and Gulf countries. The latter independently maintain trade relations with the former; the Gulf countries have serious mutual project-based trade relations with the region, especially Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. The summit set the goal of creating a way and an opportunity for the countries of the region to mutually improve their cooperation in the economic and cultural fields.

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n a bold move to revitalize its economy, Chinese Premier Li Qiang unveiled an ambitious economic growth target of around 5% for the year 2024 during the annual meeting of the National People’s Congress, China’s parliament. The announcement comes against the backdrop of challenges posed by bankrupt property developers, indebted cities, and the need for a revamped growth model.

Premier Li emphasized the necessity to “transform the growth model,” signaling a commitment to structural changes aimed at enhancing performance and quality. The growth target, set at a similar level to the previous year, indicates a prioritization of economic growth amidst a waning post-COVID recovery. Analysts noted the increased difficulty of achieving 5% growth this year due to a higher base number.

The economic plan also focuses on defusing risks associated with the property crisis and local government debt. As China faces challenges laid bare by uneven growth in the previous year, Premier Li pledged bold new policies without providing immediate detailed plans, emphasizing stability as the foundation for transformative efforts.

Proactive fiscal stance and military measures

Acknowledging the challenges ahead, Premier Li stressed the importance of a “proactive” fiscal stance and “prudent” monetary policy. The growth target considers the imperative to boost employment, incomes, and prevent and defuse risks. In parallel, China announced a 7.2% increase in defense spending, consistent with the previous year. The report dropped previous references to “peaceful reunification” with Taiwan, showcasing a more assertive stance.

The economic plan outlines a budget deficit of 3% of economic output and the issuance of 1 trillion yuan ($139 billion) in special ultra-long-term treasury bonds. The special bond issuance, not included in the budget, is a key element of China’s economic strategy. Other policies include raising the consumer inflation target to 3%, aiming to create over 12 million urban jobs in 2024, and lifting all foreign investment restrictions in the manufacturing sector.

Addressing demographic challenges, the plan vows to improve policies supporting childbirth and raise benefits for the growing elderly population. In the property sector, financing will be directed to “justified” projects, and social housing initiatives will be expanded.

Focus on new productive forces

Highlighting a shift in the model of growth, Premier Li emphasized moving from the pursuit of speed to a focus on changing the growth model. The plan allocates resources for tech innovation, advanced manufacturing, and the removal of foreign investment restrictions in manufacturing. China aims for technological self-sufficiency, underlining its commitment to emerging technologies like quantum computing, big data, and artificial intelligence.

China’s economic policies underscore a proactive approach to address challenges, embrace technological advancements, and ensure stable economic growth. The transformative measures reflect the country’s strategic vision in navigating complex economic and geopolitical dynamics in the coming year.

Source: Reuters

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ri Lanka’s State Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tharaka Balasuriya, emphasized the need for a significant transformation in the international political and economic framework during his participation in the Antalya Diplomacy Forum (ADF) 2024 in Turkey. Speaking at the NEST Congress Center in the Belek Tourism Region, Balasuriya conveyed that the current structure, established by the victors post-World War II, requires reevaluation in response to contemporary challenges.

“Especially in times like these when tensions are high, it is absolutely imperative that world leaders come together, discuss current issues, and look for a way forward,” noted Balasuriya during an interview with Anadolu, the “Global Communication Partner” for ADF 2024. He stressed the crucial role of forums like ADF in facilitating broad discussions on political, economic, and technological issues to avoid resorting to conflict when diplomacy falters.

Encouraging collaboration between nations, Balasuriya acknowledged the intricate nature of current global challenges, expressing his intrigue with the diverse discussions at ADF. The forum, bringing together leaders from various countries, aimed to address pressing issues such as political tensions, economic challenges, and technological advancements.

Sri Lanka and Turkey

Praising the historical ties between Sri Lanka and Turkey dating back to the 11th century, Balasuriya highlighted the need to enhance economic relations between the two countries. He underlined the strategic locations of both nations and called for expanded negotiations, particularly in areas such as logistics, renewable energy, technology, manufacturing, and agriculture.

While commending Turkey’s success in the tourism sector, Balasuriya encouraged Turkish investors, especially hoteliers, to explore opportunities in Sri Lanka. He emphasized the economic progress made by Sri Lanka following reforms after the 2022 economic crisis and welcomed foreign investments to further boost growth.

Reflecting on Sri Lanka’s political and economic journey, Balasuriya acknowledged the bitter measures taken during economic crises, emphasizing the necessity for stability and international cooperation. He credited the support of countries like India in assisting Sri Lanka during challenging times.

Solidarity with the Palestinian cause

Addressing broader geopolitical issues, the Sri Lankan minister expressed solidarity with the Palestinian cause, emphasizing the need for a two-state solution for lasting peace in the region. He criticized the existing international architecture, calling for a fair representation of countries in global institutions.

“We think it is not fair to have an international architecture designed by the victors of the Second World War. We do not see this as a fair world,” Balasuriya declared, advocating for a change in both political and financial structures on the global stage.

The minister’s statements reflect the broader sentiment among some nations calling for a reevaluation of the existing global order to better address contemporary challenges and ensure fair representation for all countries.

Source: Anadolu Agency.

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n a move that underscores China’s expanding influence in the Pacific region, uniformed Chinese police officers have been quietly deployed to Kiribati, a remote atoll nation situated in the Pacific Ocean near Hawaii. The initiative, not publicly disclosed by Kiribati authorities, is part of Beijing’s broader efforts to strengthen security ties in the Pacific Islands, heightening its rivalry with the United States.

Kiribati, with a population of around 115,000, holds strategic importance due to its proximity to Hawaii and its control over one of the largest exclusive economic zones globally, spanning more than 3.5 million square kilometers. The nation hosts a Japanese satellite tracking station.

According to Eeri Aritiera, Kiribati’s acting police commissioner, the Chinese police collaboration involves community policing, martial arts (Tai Chi) Kung Fu training, and assistance in developing the country’s crime database program. However, Aritiera emphasized that there is no official Chinese police station in Kiribati.

Police assistance

“The Chinese police delegation team works with the Kiribati Police Service – to assist on Community Policing program and Martial Arts (Tai Chi) Kung Fu, and IT department assisting our crime database program,” stated Aritiera in an email response.

The Chinese embassy in Kiribati has not provided an official comment on the role of its police. In a January social media post, the embassy did acknowledge the leader of “the Chinese police station in Kiribati.”

Aritiera, who attended a meeting in Beijing between China’s public security minister Wang Xiaohong and several Pacific Islands police officials in December, revealed that Kiribati had requested China’s policing assistance in 2022. A group of up to a dozen uniformed Chinese police officers arrived last year for a six-month rotation.

A secret security pact

While China’s security and trade proposals were rejected by the Pacific Islands Forum in 2022, the Chinese government has since established a police presence in the Solomon Islands under a secret security pact. This move drew criticism from Washington and Canberra for potentially undermining regional stability.

According to Graeme Smith, a Pacific expert from the Australian National University, China’s deployment of police abroad serves to extend its reach over the Chinese diaspora and provides valuable insights into the domestic politics and diplomatic partnerships of host countries.

“Australia and the United States are concerned about that prospect, in Kiribati and around the region, and are taking measures to protect their position,” said Meg Keen, Director of the Lowy Institute’s Pacific Islands Program.

From Taiwan to Beijing

Kiribati, which switched diplomatic ties from Taiwan to Beijing in 2019, has seen increased Chinese investment in infrastructure. China’s efforts also include plans to rebuild a World War Two U.S. military airstrip on Kanton Island, raising concerns in Washington.

While Kiribati’s Kiritimati island is approximately 2,160 km south of Honolulu, the United States has responded to China’s activities by pledging to upgrade the wharf on Kanton island and expressing a desire to open an embassy in Kiribati. Australia has been providing security support, donating two patrol boats and contributing to major upgrades in Kiribati’s policing infrastructure.

Papua New Guinea, another Pacific Island nation, recently rejected a Chinese offer of police assistance and surveillance technology amid concerns from traditional security partners, the United States and Australia.

Source: Reuters

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n a surprising turn of events, Asia’s defense spending reached an unprecedented $510 billion in 2023, raising concerns about the sustainability of such ambitious budgets amidst a potential economic slowdown. The region experienced a nominal 2.8% increase in defense expenditure from the previous year, with a real increase of 4.6%.

This surge is primarily attributed to China’s continuous military modernization and North Korea’s escalating belligerence, heightening tensions across the continent.

China, marking its 29th consecutive year of increased defense expenditure, announced a budget of RMB 1.55 trillion (USD 219.5 billion) in March 2023, reflecting a substantial 7.2% nominal increase. The military giant accounted for 43% of regional defense spending in 2023, causing unease among neighboring states.

Beijing’s assertive behavior in the South China Sea, establishment of overseas military bases, and increased aggression have triggered concerns about its military intentions, particularly in the context of Taiwan.

Increasing defense budgets

In response to China’s militarization, neighboring countries have escalated their defense budgets. Taiwan proposed its largest-ever defense budget of TWD 606.8 billion (USD 19.1 billion) for 2024, focusing on enhancing its defense industrial capacity and acquiring advanced weaponry.

Other major players like Australia, Japan, and South Korea are positioning themselves for long-term security by investing in cutting-edge capabilities.

Australia, under the AUKUS partnership, is not only investing in nuclear-powered submarines but also advancing technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and quantum technologies.

Japan, facing its most severe security environment since 1945, has plans to double military expenditure by raising defense and related security spending to 2% of GDP by 2027. South Korea, countering North Korean threats, has allocated KRW 348.7 trillion (USD 266.07 billion) for its 2024-2028 mid-term spending plan, emphasizing reconnaissance satellites, submarines, advanced missile interceptors, and electromagnetic pulse weapons.

Increasing defense budgets

In response to China’s militarization, neighboring countries have escalated their defense budgets. Taiwan proposed its largest-ever defense budget of TWD 606.8 billion (USD 19.1 billion) for 2024, focusing on enhancing its defense industrial capacity and acquiring advanced weaponry.

Other major players like Australia, Japan, and South Korea are positioning themselves for long-term security by investing in cutting-edge capabilities.

Australia, under the AUKUS partnership, is not only investing in nuclear-powered submarines but also advancing technologies such as artificial intelligence, hypersonic missiles, and quantum technologies.

Japan, facing its most severe security environment since 1945, has plans to double military expenditure by raising defense and related security spending to 2% of GDP by 2027. South Korea, countering North Korean threats, has allocated KRW 348.7 trillion (USD 266.07 billion) for its 2024-2028 mid-term spending plan, emphasizing reconnaissance satellites, submarines, advanced missile interceptors, and electromagnetic pulse weapons.

India is less interesting in in increasing defense budget

However, not every country is following this trend. India, for instance, increased its defense spending by only 1.5% in 2023, a reduction in real terms considering the inflation rate. This discrepancy raises concerns about the affordability and sustainability of such ambitious defense plans.

The economic backdrop adds another layer of uncertainty, with advanced Asian economies projected to grow by a modest 1.7% in 2024. Questions arise regarding the financial feasibility of these defense budgets, particularly for nations like Japan with a large national debt and Australia facing significant costs associated with AUKUS-related expenditures. The reality of maintaining these budgets becomes even more challenging as the economic momentum in the region shows signs of slowing down.

As tensions rise and defense spending grows faster than economic growth, the Asian region faces a crucial juncture where financial realities may collide with security ambitions. The prospect of a return of former U.S. President Donald Trump, with his isolationist tendencies, adds another layer of uncertainty, potentially impacting the geopolitics of the region.

Observers are closely watching how Asian nations navigate these challenges to ensure the security and stability of the continent.

Source: IISS

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n a recent forum held in Hawaii, Philippines President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. brought to light the escalating conflict in Myanmar, marking it as a significant and complex challenge for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

The situation in Myanmar has seen over a million people displaced, following the military coup in 2021, which overturned years of tentative democratic progress and led to both internal conflict and economic downturn.

President Marcos highlighted the commitment of ASEAN to address the crisis, despite the intricacies involved, including the substantial humanitarian impact.

The United Nations reports that the displacement numbers have been rising since the coup, as the military faces resistance from an alliance of ethnic-minority groups and pro-democracy fighters.

ASEAN response

ASEAN, in response to the junta’s actions post-coup, has excluded the top generals from its meetings, demanding adherence to a peace roadmap established two years ago. This move signifies ASEAN’s ongoing efforts to promote peace and stability in the region.

The Philippines is set to chair ASEAN in 2026, taking over from Myanmar as host, and President Marcos’ statements come at a critical juncture. He acknowledged the loss of support for the military junta from within its own ranks, according to recent analyses.

Furthermore, Marcos pointed out the ‘exponential’ growth of the humanitarian cost of the conflict over recent years, which has also affected the Philippines, with reports of Filipino citizens being among the victims of human trafficking linked to the turmoil in Myanmar.

The turmoil in Myanmar

The ASEAN bloc has been facing increased pressure to mediate and provide solutions to the Myanmar crisis, as the military-led offensive continues to displace thousands more.

President Marcos’ call to action underscores the need for ASEAN to navigate this difficult issue effectively, taking into consideration the broad humanitarian and political implications.

As the situation develops, ASEAN’s role in shaping the outcome of the Myanmar crisis remains pivotal, with the world watching closely how the bloc will manage one of the most pressing regional conflicts in Southeast Asia.

I

f you’re traveling in Pakistan, you’ll have come across long stretches of road that the locals call CPEC (pronounced see-pack, short for China-Pakistan Economic Corridor). In fact, you may hardly have to leave the CPEC during intercity travel. The average travel time between Lahore and Karachi, Pakistan’s two largest cities which are about 1,200 km apart, has dropped from 20 to about 13 hours, on what represents just one part of the 3,000-kilometer-long road.

Thanks to the CPEC-related power projects, electricity outages have been reduced significantly. Tens of thousands of Pakistanis are employed in projects related to the CPEC, itself a part of China’s grandiose Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) for the seamless connection of Eurasia.

Yet, if you ask a common person how the CPEC has changed life in Pakistan, they’d probably be evasive, if not dejected. They would tell you about the crushing inflation, inflated bills, the dismal status of law and order, and there being no sign of respite, exacerbated by the confusion surrounding delayed elections. There would be no mention of the CPEC or its magic.

Yet, the CPEC and the heat of the New Great Game that Pakistan faces may be behind much of what is rattling Pakistan these days.

Backdrop: The Dragon and the seas

A decade ago, the CPEC—a combination of roads, railways, special economic zones, and power and energy projects—was anticipated by many in Pakistan as a game-changer for the heavily indebted South Asian nation, comparable with the Marshall Plan, according to some analysts.

The original promise of $46 billion over 15 years came as serendipity for Pakistan at a time when the outlook was otherwise bleak—the figure has since risen to $62 billion.

The expertise and investment from a country that had the distinction of creating thriving port cities like Shenzhen out of virtually nothing garnered much fascination in Pakistan.

In turn, the deep-sea, warm-water port of Gwadar, situated in Pakistan’s Balochistan province, near the Strait of Hormuz, offered China the closest access to sea from its landlocked easternmost province of Xinjiang. It’s now the gateway of the CPEC, the BRI’s main artery, to the oceans and a commercial hub in the making.

Gwadar offers China a much faster trade route to Europe and the Middle East, reducing travel time by 10-20 days, in addition to providing an alternative route for its energy needs. It has reduced the 12,000 km sea distance to less than 3,000 km on land. Considering that Saudi Arabia is among China’s top two oil suppliers, the importance of Gwadar to China is clear.

Politics in the line of cross fire

Much that has transpired in Pakistan in the political arena over the last year may be the burden of the CPEC that Pakistan is finding hard to sustain. Imran Khan, the former prime minister, now behind bars in relation to one of the more than 150 cases against him directly accused the U.S. of overturning his government, the veiled instructions for which allegedly were conveyed by the U.S. in a diplomatic cable after his visit to Russia.

Khan had flatly declined to provide air bases to the U.S. for striking Afghanistan a few months before this and even praised the Taliban for having broken the “shackles of slavery,” shortly after the U.S. exit from Afghanistan.

However, the possibility of revival of Pakistan-Russia relations, reinvigorated by the Russian offer to export wheat and oil to Pakistan on concessional terms when the U.S. and EU were looking to isolate Russia, was the last nail in the coffin for Khan’s government, who seemed to have visited Russia without the assent of the powerful Pakistani military establishment.

Several articles in Chinese government-aligned media published after Khan’s ouster were critical of the regime change in Pakistan. The Khan administration, though initially suspicious of the CPEC agreements signed with China under the previous government, had developed a better understanding with the Asian heavyweight over time.

Still, perhaps given the scale of the country’s investment in Pakistan and the imperative to continue working with any government, China avoided an official reaction. The Russian Foreign Ministry minced no words, however, accusing the U.S. of “shameless interference” in a plot to remove the “disobedient” Khan.

As the new government assumed power in Pakistan, relations with the U.S. improved significantly. A package worth $450 million was approved for the maintenance of Pakistan Air Force’s F16 program. The much-needed IMF Standby Arrangement was signed. And most recently, Pakistan renewed a security pact with the U.S., namely the Communications and Information Security Memorandum of Agreement (CISMOA), after a lapse of three years.

Reports of Pakistani munition supplies to Ukraine mediated by the U.S. have emerged as well, reflecting Pakistan’s considerable warming up to the West after Khan.

Meanwhile, the U.S. showed complete aloofness to the overthrowing of Khan and the virtual dissolution of his party domestically. The Western media coverage of Khan’s ouster mostly depicted Khan as an anti-freedom enemy of the West.

Turbulence in perspective: The Dragon-slayers

It’s not just politics that is becoming a victim of the New Great Game. Pakistan is facing a resurgence in terrorism. India has often been accused of being present in Balochistan, supporting separatist insurgencies, and in the Pakistani tribal belt in the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province, where it is blamed for backing the insurgent group, Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP).

Pakistani officials have repeatedly linked India to attacks on Chinese workers employed at CPEC projects, which includes the infamous case of Indian spy Kalbushan Yadav tasked with sabotaging the CPEC.

Being a counterweight to China, India is now a close U.S. ally. This has resulted in a situation where Pakistan’s stance on Indian involvement in its territory is largely ignored by the West.

For India, the Gwadar port is a competitor to its investment in Iran’s Chabahar port, just 76 nautical miles west of Gwadar, and the recently announced grand India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC). That may mean even more trouble for the CPEC and its host country.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

Joko Widodo is an Indonesian politician, businessman, and the 7th president of Indonesia. He previously served as the mayor of Surakarta from 2005 to 2012, and the governor of Jakarta from 2012 to 2014. He was elected president in July 2014 – the country’s first non-elite and non-military political leader.

Widodo is bound to the idea of change and reform in contemporary Indonesia. Although he has tried to transform the country into an Asian power, several crises, ranging from COVID-19 to some popular Islamist movements, have challenged his career. As the first English-language biography of Widodo published by Penguin Specials as a Lowy Institute Paper, Ben Bland’s Man of Contradictions shows how Widobo’s presidency mirrors a range of modern Indonesia’s paradoxes: democracy and totalitarianism, openness and protectionism, Islam and pluralism.

Although Widodo’s presidency has not yet come to an end, the author has delivered a great book. Bland, a Financial Times correspondent in Jakarta, has had unconditional access to the president, interviewed him on several occasions, and has gotten to know many of his officers and consultants. Apart from this, the author has lived in Indonesia among the ordinary people whose daily lives have been affected by Widodo’s domestic and international policies.

Bland professes that Man of Contradictions is not a “conventional biography.” His work follows what he considers the contradictions and paradoxes of Widodo, best exemplified in his manner and style. For the author, the unique manner of his leadership is an outcome of the hopes and dreams of the tens of millions of Indonesians who have voted for him.

The author has intentionally tried to prepare a book that is comprehensible to the general reader and does not become entangled with the conventional theories of policy-making and politics nor the challenging methods of biography writing. The book is an accessible source of understanding the highest-level political situation in the most populous Muslim country in the world.

Man of Contradictions familiarizes readers with Joko Widodo, the challenging leader of Southeast Asia, and at the same time, is a fresh and up-to-date political biography that opens a door to a political and social aspect of Indonesian history and society.

Ben Bland, Man of Contradictions: Joko Widodo and the Struggle to Remake Indonesia (Penguin, 2021) ISBN 978-1760897246, 164 pages.

The Azeri crushing military defeat of (pro)Armenian forces in the Second Karabakh War (September 27–November 9, 2020) resulted in Turkey’s surging popularity not only in Azerbaijan but also across the entire Turkic-speaking world.

Ankara’s decisive military-diplomatic support for its strategic ally, including military training, consultancy, and military-technical support showcasing the might of Turkey-produced unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) made leading Russian conservative thinkers grudgingly admit Turkey’s growing role and increasing popularity in different theater, including, among others, the post-Soviet space.

In Moscow, understanding seems to be growing that the idea of the “Great Turan,” built on the ideology of the unity of the Turks, is rapidly spreading not only across South Caucasus and Central Asia, but it is also gaining popularity in ethnically and religiously diverse parts of Russia as well. This is clearly visible in the rhetoric of both Russia’s conservative thinkers and representatives of the military-political leadership, which is demonstrating a growing uneasiness over Turkey’s growing influence.

In this regard, Russia’s concerns could be conditionally broken down into three interdependent macro-areas.

First, on the domestic level, the following entities, are heavily populated by Turks: Tatarstan, Bashkortostan, Chuvashia, Dagestan, North Ossetia, Chechnya, Crimea (unlawfully annexed from Ukraine in 2014), Yakutia, Tuva, Karachay-Cherkessia, Khakassia, Kabardino-Balkaria, Gorno-Altai Republic, and Taymyrsky Dolgano-Nenetsky District.

Russian experts admit that Turkey’s foreign policy and military successes have resulted in its increasing popularity among Russia’s Turkic-speaking peoples.

Russia’s concerns rest on two main pillars. On the one hand, Russian experts admit that Turkey’s foreign policy and military successes, ambitious domestic projects and elaborate use of “soft power,” which rest on the highly revered conservative values and traditions of the Muslim world as well as the idea of pan-Turkism, have already resulted in its increasing popularity among Russia’s Turkic-speaking peoples.

On the other hand, memories of the past, of the time of internal Russian crises, when many of the aforementioned entities openly demanded either broader autonomy or vouched for full independence and sovereignty, are still very much alive. While in some regions Russia managed to find peaceful solutions – albeit having to cede sizable economic benefits, and political and cultural autonomy– in others, confrontation took the form of open armed conflict.

Russian elites are concerned that in the case of internal crises, these sentiments (separatism/secessionism) could recur, now under the banner of pan-Turkic ideology. At this juncture, a particularly telling case is that of Tatarstan. Aside from having several pro-Turkic organizations operating on its territory, Kazan has always stood independent from Moscow.

Perhaps, the most alarming example – for Moscow, of course – was the post-2015 developments, that is the downing of the Russian fighting jet in Syria. Instead of breaking up with Ankara loud and clear, Kazan opted to remain silent causing visible confusion in Moscow.

Interestingly, amidst the crisis in the bilateral relations between Ankara and Moscow, conservative Russian commentators openly wondered whether in the case of a (para)military escalation Tatarstan would act as Turkey’s “silent ally” in Russia’s rear. Even though escalation was not meant to occur, Tatarstan’s ambivalence – undoubtedly, construed in Moscow as tacit siding with Ankara – most certainly did not go unnoticed.

The second major area is Central Asia, dubbed as Russia’s “soft underbelly,” which entered the sphere of Turkish interests after the collapse of the USSR. Specifically, starting in 1993, Turkey stood behind the creation of the first regional organizations, including, among others, the International Organization of Turkic Culture (Türksoy).

A pivotal milestone that showcased Turkey’s regional success was the emergence of the Cooperation Council of Turkic-Speaking States (Turkic Council) in 2009. The latter offers its members multifaceted cooperation in the fields of economy, science, education, transportation, customs, and tourism.

Russian commentators and experts agree that a combination of Russia’s own mistakes – the foreign policy blunders of the 1990s and the derogatory treatment of foreign workers from Central Asia, which, incidentally, continues – and Ankara’s proactive position has led to the gradual erosion of Russia’s regional “soft power.” Another uninviting regional news for Russia came after an informal summit of the Turkic Council on March 31, 2021 which declared the city of Turkistan in southern Kazakhstan as “The spiritual capital of the Turkic world.”

Coupled with Kazakhstani determination to boost its ties with China through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and the diminishing role of the Russian language – trendy in the whole macro-region – this news is yet another cause for worry, signaling Russia’s forfeiture of its formerly strong stance in Kazakhstan, a member of the Eurasian Economic Union, to both China and Turkey.

These developments, however, tarnish in comparison with another regional trend. Starting in 2020, Ankara has profoundly increased its activities in the fields of military-technical cooperation, offering its services and (para)military education to regional players, including Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan. This has resulted in growing pro-Turkish sentiments and strengthening of the pro-Turkish lobby among the local military-political elite. In effect, Central Asia, a region where some countries are challenged with security threats, could largely benefit from the experience Turkey could offer in the area of counterterrorism and/or non-linear (para)military operations.

In this regard, it must be understood that Ankara’s increasing participation in Central Asian military-political affairs gravely upsets Russia from a moral-ideological point of view. For decades, Russia has perceived itself as an exclusive provider of military-technical assistance to Central Asian countries – perhaps, the only remaining vestige of former Soviet regional dominance. However, this seems to be withering down. Even though some influential Russian thinkers are calling on the Russian leadership to “learn the Soviet mistakes and renounce from ambitions in Central Asia,” it is dubious whether the Russian leadership is prepared to do so.