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ustralian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese said Friday that the AUKUS defense partnership with the United States and Britain remained “full steam ahead” following a lengthy call with U.S. President Donald Trump, while urging Washington to exempt Australia from U.S. tariffs.

Albanese said the two leaders reviewed progress under AUKUS and agreed that the trilateral security pact would continue to benefit all three countries.

“We reviewed the significant progress that has been made under AUKUS, which remains full steam ahead,” Albanese told reporters in Canberra.

AUKUS, established in 2021, is Australia’s largest defense project and is designed in part to strengthen the three countries’ military capabilities in the Indo-Pacific amid growing Chinese influence in the region.

Submarine program moves forward

Under the pact, U.S. Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines are expected to be based in Australia from next year. Australia is also due to acquire several Virginia-class submarines from around 2030, while Britain and Australia are developing a new class of nuclear-powered submarine under the agreement.

Australia has committed about A$368 billion ($260 billion) over three decades to the project, including major investments in U.S. and British submarine production facilities.

The United States has said it is satisfied with progress since a review of AUKUS conducted last year. Pentagon policy chief Elbridge Colby said Washington saw increasing alignment between the three countries and expected Australia to continue meeting its commitments.

AUKUS has faced concerns over the availability of U.S. submarines and production capacity. Colby previously warned that American industry faced challenges meeting both U.S. and allied demand for nuclear-powered submarines.

China has strongly criticized the agreement, warning that it could contribute to an arms race in the Indo-Pacific.

Australia seeks tariff exemption

Albanese described his conversation with Trump as productive and said he had asked the president to exempt Australia completely from U.S. flat tariffs of 12.5%.

Trump agreed to consider the request, Albanese said.

Australia has argued that it should qualify for an exemption because it runs a trade deficit with the United States and imports large amounts of American machinery, technology and aircraft.

The leaders also discussed the conflict involving Iran and Australia’s recent defense agreements with Papua New Guinea and Fiji.

Albanese said he told Trump that Australia wanted to see an end to the conflict in the Middle East while maintaining that Iran should not be permitted to develop nuclear weapons.

The call came as Australia seeks to deepen its security cooperation with the United States while managing economic concerns linked to Washington’s trade policies. For Canberra, the future of AUKUS remains central to its long-term defense strategy and efforts to strengthen its position in the increasingly contested Indo-Pacific.

(Source: Reuters)

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ustralia and Indonesia signed a landmark security agreement on Friday, deepening defense cooperation in what Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese described as a “watershed moment” in relations between the two neighbors.

The deal was signed in Jakarta during a meeting between Albanese and Indonesian President Prabowo Subianto, marking a significant expansion of security and defense collaboration between the two Indo-Pacific nations.

“It represents a major extension of our security and defense cooperation and demonstrates that our relationship is as strong as it has ever been,” Albanese said ahead of the visit.

The agreement with Indonesia is part of a broader push by Canberra to strengthen ties across the Pacific region. Since taking office in 2022, Australia’s center-left government has signed multiple defense, police, and aid agreements aimed at reinforcing its regional influence and counterbalancing China’s growing presence.

Expert view: Indonesia in a different category

This effort has intensified under US President Donald Trump, whose administration has encouraged allies to shoulder more responsibility in deterring Beijing’s expanding military power.

Late last year, Australia concluded a security pact with Papua New Guinea, and in January Albanese signed a new aid and support agreement during a visit to East Timor.

“The government can be very pleased with the agreements it signed across the Pacific,” said Sam Roggeveen, director of the security program at the Lowy Institute.

However, he noted that Indonesia stands apart.

“Indonesia is in a different category because of its size and also because of this historic commitment to non-alignment,” Roggeveen said, referring to Jakarta’s long-standing effort to balance relations between major powers.

Diplomacy and the South China Sea

The new pact builds on earlier agreements, including a 1990s security deal signed by former Australian prime minister Paul Keating and Indonesian leader Suharto, as well as the 2006 Lombok Treaty, which laid foundations for defense cooperation.

Relations between Canberra and Jakarta have evolved from Cold War-era tensions to more stable and cooperative ties in recent years, as Indonesia continues to pursue a balanced foreign policy between Western nations and the developing world.

Roggeveen said Indonesia’s rising economic and demographic power is likely to make it a major regional force, potentially surpassing Australia economically.

Canberra, he added, is signaling that Indonesia is as vital to Australia’s security as the United States.

“Indonesia’s interests and China’s ambitions in Southeast Asia are going to clash more directly over time,” Roggeveen said, pointing to existing tensions in the South China Sea.

As China’s maritime reach expands, the new agreement may help Indonesia strengthen its defense capabilities while preserving its strategic independence.

(Source: South China Morning Post)

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.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth hosted Australian Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Richard Marles and UK Defense Secretary John Healey at the Pentagon on Wednesday for high-level talks on the AUKUS security partnership, emphasizing renewed commitment to delivering the pact’s ambitious military programs.

The meeting came ahead of the annual AUKUS defense ministers’ conference, with all three officials highlighting progress on the trilateral initiative launched in 2021 to bolster stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Speaking at a joint news conference, Hegseth praised the UK and Australia for “stepping up” and reaffirmed Washington’s commitment to strengthening deterrence in the region.

“AUKUS reflects a pragmatic, practical application of hard power between our countries,” he said. “Our goal is peace on behalf of our peoples — and we pursue that together.”

Under the agreement, Australia is set to acquire Virginia-class nuclear-powered submarines, with the first delivery expected in 2032.

Marles: AUKUS marking ‘real progress’

Australia’s defense chief Richard Marles said Canberra is “very excited” about the pace of work on the long-term submarine program.

He pointed to the recent maintenance of the USS Vermont at HMAS Stirling, calling it the most extensive servicing of a US nuclear-powered submarine ever conducted outside American territory.

“This is a massive project,” Marles said. “The last 12 months has seen a lot of progress — and there is so much more to do.”

He said discussions at the ministers’ meeting would include timelines for submarine delivery and further integration of naval capabilities.

Healey: Time to ‘deliver’ the Apex submarine

UK Defense Secretary John Healey described AUKUS as “the most important military collaboration of the last 70 years,” comparing its significance to the landmark 1958 US-UK nuclear cooperation agreement.

“All three of us are now determined to reboot AUKUS with a new commitment and new determination,” Healey said. “The reviews are done — it’s time to deliver.”

He said the goal is to produce “the most powerful, most feared attack submarine the world has ever seen — the apex predator of the seas.”

Healey added that AUKUS demonstrates how alliances can be leveraged to ensure national security, saying both the Indo-Pacific and Euro-Atlantic regions need more advanced submarine capabilities.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

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ustralia on Wednesday became the first country in the world to ban social media access for children under 16, implementing a sweeping new law that compels major tech platforms to block young users or risk hefty penalties. The policy, which took effect at midnight, is poised to reshape online habits across the nation and influence global regulatory debates.

Under the legislation, ten of the world’s largest platforms — including TikTok, YouTube, Instagram, Facebook and Elon Musk’s X — must remove or deny access to underage users or face fines of up to A$49.5 million (US$33 million). X became the last major platform to confirm its compliance just hours before the deadline, stating it had “no choice” but to follow Australian law.

Prime Minister Anthony Albanese hailed the rollout as “a proud day for families”, describing the ban as one of the most transformative social policy reforms in decades. “This will make an enormous difference,” he said. “It’s a profound reform that will reverberate around the world.”

Teens say goodbye online

In the hours leading up to the ban, many of the approximately one million affected children posted farewell messages to their followers.

“No more social media… no more contact with the rest of the world,” wrote one teenager on TikTok, while others shared the tag #seeyouwhenim16.

Some young users have voiced concerns about losing essential support networks, particularly LGBTQ+ teens and those who rely on online communities to discuss mental health. “It’s going to be worse for queer people and people with niche interests,” said 14-year-old Annie Wang. “For some, it could actually worsen their mental health.”

Platforms will use a mix of age-inference algorithms, selfie-based age estimation, and optional ID or bank-linked verification. Officials say the list of regulated platforms will expand as new apps emerge and children move to different online spaces.

The law follows growing concerns about the impact of social media on young teens, including rising anxiety, cyberbullying, misinformation, and harmful body-image content. Countries such as Denmark, New Zealand, and Malaysia have already signalled interest in studying or emulating Australia’s approach.

Australia’s eSafety Commissioner Julie Inman Grant said she was hearing increasing demand for similar reforms in the United States. “Parents tell us they wish they had a government putting tween and teen safety before technology profits,” she said.

With global regulators watching closely, Australia’s experiment may shape the future of online child protection — and the limits of government intervention in digital life.

(Source: The Assosiated Press)

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ustralians are expressing more positive and pragmatic views toward China than at any point in the past five years, even as concerns over security, interference and regional tensions remain high, according to the latest UTS: ACRI/BIDA Poll released on November 18, 2025.

The annual survey, conducted by the Australia-China Relations Institute at the University of Technology Sydney in partnership with BIDA, shows a notable shift toward a more settled national mood after years of volatility in the bilateral relationship. The findings draw on responses from 2,045 Australian adults surveyed nationwide.

Seven in ten Australians (71 percent) now believe the country should continue strengthening ties with China — a 10-point jump on 2024 and the strongest support since the poll began in 2021. Recognition of the economic benefits of the relationship also surged, with 72 percent agreeing China brings economic advantages, up from 62 percent last year.

Concern about the bilateral relationship, which had dominated public sentiment through years of trade tensions and geopolitical friction, has fallen sharply. Just over half of respondents (54 percent) expressed concern — the lowest level in five years and a 20-point drop since 2021.

Public mistrust of the Chinese government remains widespread but has eased: 64 percent say they distrust Beijing, down from 76 percent in 2021.

The authors, Elena Collinson and Paul F. Burke, say the data points to a “more open yet still cautious” national outlook. “While fundamental concerns remain, Australians appear increasingly willing to balance risk with opportunity,” the report notes.

Government handling and political judgments

The Albanese government continues to enjoy modest but steady improvement in public approval for its management of China relations. Satisfaction has risen from 32 percent in 2021 to 41 percent in 2025.

Labor has also extended its lead over the Coalition as the party most trusted to manage China policy, with 48 percent backing Labor compared with 29 percent for the Coalition — continuing a pattern established after 2022.

China policy appears to be gaining influence in federal elections. Thirty-seven percent of Australians said it shaped their vote in 2025, up from 27 percent in 2022.

Two-thirds of respondents want Canberra to communicate disagreements with Beijing privately rather than publicly, indicating strong public support for a restrained diplomatic style.

Security concerns ease, but strategic risks persist

Perceptions of China as a security threat have softened slightly but remain high: 66 percent view China as a threat, down from the low 70s in previous years. Around half of Australians continue to believe a conflict with China is a “serious possibility” within three years, a view that has held steady since 2023.

Support for higher defense spending has reached a record 72 percent. Backing for AUKUS has also firmed modestly, with half of Australians believing nuclear-powered submarines will enhance security, and 68 percent supporting deeper tech cooperation under AUKUS Pillar II.

Only a quarter favor reducing AUKUS involvement to ease tensions with China.

Notably, Australians are more wary of U.S. pressure than Chinese pressure for the first time. Fifty-seven percent believe Washington will eventually force Canberra to choose sides — slightly more than those who expect similar pressure from Beijing.

Economic views show reduced anxiety

Perceptions of economic risk have moderated considerably. Concern that Australia is too reliant on China has dropped to 66 percent, its lowest level since 2021. Only 39 percent now see the economic relationship as “more of a risk than an opportunity,” a steady decline over five years.

Support for trade engagement is strong: 60 percent say the China–Australia Free Trade Agreement has been beneficial, and 70 percent believe Australian companies should pursue opportunities in China. Support for Chinese tourism and student flows remains high.

On investment, Australians remain cautious but less negative than in earlier years. Views on Chinese investment in residential real estate show persistent concern, but trends have softened amid wider housing market pressures.

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hat if the solutions to humanity’s greatest challenges — from the climate crisis to cycles of violence and displacement — begin with something profoundly personal: the awakening of each individual’s inner sovereignty?

Across cultures, peoples who have faced genocide or dispossession continue to demonstrate ways of thriving that arise from deep spiritual grounding. Their resilience points toward a form of governance not built solely on power, but on relationship — with land, each other, and the wider universe.

Governance and belonging

Since the beginning of human history, societies have asked: How do we organize ourselves so that everyone can flourish? Who gets to make decisions, and how do we define our place within the vast cosmos?

In Australia, these questions echo through the Uluru Statement from the Heart, which calls for Voice, Treaty, and Truth — an enduring expression of Indigenous leadership in shaping the nation’s moral future. The statement’s strength comes not from political systems alone, but from a worldview that understands law as lore — the sacred pattern connecting people, ancestors, land, and stars.

Growing up in Cloncurry on Kalkadunga country in the 1970s, I heard many Indigenous languages spoken and saw two very different worlds side by side. The colonizing white presence was visible everywhere, yet it could not overpower the quiet, unbroken sovereignty of Country itself. Across more than 500 languages, ancestral wisdom continues to live in the waters, skies, and landscapes of the continent.

Indigenous governance, led equally by women and men, has long operated through balance, consensus, and reciprocity — systems that stand in contrast to patriarchal, capitalist models that separate power from care. The continuing call for Indigenous self-governance in Australia reveals how colonial structures still struggle to understand this deeper order.

Truth, healing, and grassroots renewal

The defeat of the 2023 Indigenous Voice referendum in Australia, driven by fear and misinformation, was a blow to many. Yet it also catalyzed a quiet transformation. Across the country, individuals began confronting their personal complicity in the colonization of stolen lands. Speaking these truths aloud — in families, communities, and local gatherings — has become its own form of healing.

This movement, emerging from within rather than imposed from above, reflects a shift from external authority toward inner responsibility. It is an expression of the same principle that sustains Indigenous cultures: sovereignty begins within and radiates outward into collective life.

Parallel lessons from Tibet

A similar story unfolds in Tibet, where cultural genocide under Chinese occupation continues. Ancient monasteries and homes have been destroyed, and Tibetan children are removed from their families and language. Yet the Tibetan people persist through the strength of their inner life.

The Dalai Lama’s Middle Way proposal offers a model for shared governance grounded in compassion and cultural autonomy. It envisions a political future where Tibetans control their spiritual and environmental well-being — echoing Indigenous Australian calls for self-determination and guardianship of land.

In exile, Tibetan communities maintain extraordinarily low rates of mental illness and social breakdown, despite displacement. Their resilience springs from practices that cultivate inner sovereignty — meditation, ethical conduct, and compassion for all beings. This same current of love and non-violence runs through Indigenous Australian traditions, where the earth is mother and relationship itself is sacred.

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ustralia and Papua New Guinea (PNG) have signed a landmark defense treaty that will allow Australian troops access to PNG military bases and enable up to 10,000 Papua New Guineans to serve in Australia’s armed forces, in what analysts describe as a major step to counter China’s growing influence in the Pacific.

The agreement — formally named the Pukpuk Treaty, after the Tok Pisin word for crocodile — commits the two close neighbors to come to each other’s aid if either faces an armed attack. It also deepens cooperation across defense, cyber, and maritime domains, marking the most significant security partnership between Canberra and Port Moresby in decades.

The signing took place at Australia’s Parliament House in Canberra on Monday, with Prime Ministers Anthony Albanese and James Marape hailing the deal as a new chapter in regional partnership built on “mutual trust and shared destiny.”

“By continuing to build our security relationships in the region, we safeguard our own security,” Albanese said at a joint news conference. “This treaty strengthens our collective resilience and ensures the Pacific remains peaceful, stable, and prosperous.”

Marape, for his part, stressed that the deal was not a product of geopolitical rivalry but of a longstanding friendship between the two countries. “We have told China clearly that Australia is our security partner of choice, and they understand this,” he said. “Our broader relations with China — in trade and investment — remain intact and transparent.”

A treaty with ‘bite’

According to excerpts published by the Australian Broadcasting Corporation (ABC), the treaty describes an armed attack on either nation as “dangerous to the peace and security of the other,” pledging both to “act to meet the common danger.”

Nicknamed the Pukpuk or “Crocodile” Treaty, the pact symbolizes strength and mutual defense readiness. “Like a crocodile, it has bite — its bite force speaks of the interoperability and preparedness of our forces,” said PNG Defense Minister Billy Joseph.

The agreement will allow the full integration of Australian and PNG forces through annual joint military exercises, intelligence sharing, and expanded training programs. It also extends cooperation into cybersecurity, electromagnetic warfare, and maritime surveillance, areas where both countries face increasing challenges.

Countering Beijing’s growing reach

While both leaders framed the treaty as a natural extension of bilateral friendship, experts say it is clearly aimed at limiting China’s influence in the region.

“China will not have the same access to infrastructure in PNG as it does in other Pacific Islands,” said Oliver Nobetau, project director of the Lowy Institute’s Australia–PNG Network. “This deal ensures that Port Moresby’s key facilities remain under the purview of its trusted regional partner — Australia.”

China has expanded its presence across the Pacific in recent years, establishing security and policing agreements with Solomon Islands and Kiribati, and investing heavily in ports, data cables, and government buildings across the region.

In response, Canberra has accelerated its own regional outreach. In the past two years, Australia has signed major security and development deals with Tuvalu, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands, committing more than A$500 million to policing, cyber infrastructure, and climate resilience projects.

“Canberra is positioning itself as the Pacific’s primary security guarantor,” said Anna Powles, a security studies expert at Massey University in New Zealand. “The Pukpuk Treaty gives Australia a central role in a new ‘hub-and-spokes’ defense system across the Pacific.”

Boost for PNG’s military and Australia’s manpower

One of the most notable aspects of the deal is the provision allowing up to 10,000 Papua New Guineans to serve in Australia’s military, with the option to apply for Australian citizenship after service. Analysts say the arrangement could help alleviate Australia’s military recruitment shortages while providing PNG citizens with new professional and economic opportunities.

“Australia’s defense force has struggled to meet recruitment targets for years,” said Nobetau. “PNG, with its young and able population, can fill that gap — and in return, its soldiers will receive world-class training and prospects for citizenship.”

PNG’s army, long under-resourced, will also benefit from modernization and joint training programs funded by Canberra. “This will bring a significant boost in both material and morale terms,” said Powles. “It helps PNG professionalize its defense forces and gives it a clearer role in regional security.”

Despite strong backing from both governments, the treaty has stirred debate within PNG about its implications for national sovereignty and foreign policy independence.

Former PNG Defense Force commander Jerry Singirok warned last month that the treaty “could come at a high cost” if it aligns PNG too closely with Western defense strategies. “China is not our enemy,” Singirok said. “While it’s important to maintain security cooperation with Australia, we must ensure our sovereignty and neutrality are respected.”

PNG’s foreign policy has long been based on the principle of being “friends to all, enemies to none.” Critics worry the treaty could be seen as taking sides in the strategic rivalry between Beijing and Washington — especially after the Trump administration’s sharp reduction of U.S. aid to the Pacific under its “America First” policy.

Powles also cautioned that both sides need “greater clarity on expectations and commitments.” “PNG will want assurances that this partnership remains mutually beneficial and not simply an extension of Australian foreign policy,” she said.

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n a dramatic diplomatic shift, Canada, Australia, and the United Kingdom announced on Sunday that they are formally recognizing the State of Palestine, breaking with decades of alignment with Israel and joining a growing international push to end the war in Gaza.

The coordinated move by three of Israel’s closest Western allies piles pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s government and places them at odds with the United States, which continues to oppose unilateral recognition outside of direct negotiations. France is expected to follow suit at next week’s UN General Assembly, further isolating Israel as it pushes forward with a large-scale offensive on Gaza City.

In their joint statements, leaders from Ottawa, London, and Canberra cited frustration with the collapse of peace talks and the humanitarian catastrophe unfolding in Gaza, where UN agencies warn of famine and where dozens were reported killed Sunday in renewed Israeli strikes. The three countries said recognition was necessary to “keep alive the possibility of a two-state solution.”

Netanyahu vows: “There will be no Palestinian state”

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu rejected the move outright, vowing, “there will be no Palestinian state.” He accused the three governments of “rewarding terror” after Hamas’ October 7, 2023 attacks, and pledged to continue expanding settlements in the occupied West Bank. “The response to the latest attempt to force a terror state upon us in the heart of our land will be given after my return from the United States. Wait for it,” Netanyahu said in a fiery statement.

Palestinian officials, by contrast, welcomed the announcement. A senior Hamas figure, Basem Naim, described it as “a welcomed step” toward affirming Palestinians’ rights, but insisted it must be followed by concrete action. “The highest priority now is to stop the genocide and ethnic cleansing in the Gaza Strip and to end the humanitarian blockade,” he told CNN.

Diplomats noted that the recognition marks a watershed moment in international politics: three G7 countries openly challenging Washington’s approach to the conflict. Analysts say the decision may accelerate momentum toward broader recognition within Europe and beyond, though the absence of U.S. support continues to limit immediate diplomatic impact.

Gaza city offensive

The announcements come as the war in Gaza enters a new and deadlier phase. Israel has pressed ahead with its ground invasion of Gaza City, insisting Hamas’ leadership remains entrenched there. Aid groups warn the humanitarian situation is collapsing, with food, water, and medical supplies running dangerously low for Gaza’s 2.2 million residents.

With more nations signaling readiness to back Palestinian statehood, the diplomatic battle is likely to intensify at the UN General Assembly. For Israel, already under scrutiny at the International Court of Justice over allegations of genocide in Gaza, the recognition drive represents both a legal and political challenge. For Palestinians, long denied sovereignty, it represents a symbolic but significant step toward international legitimacy.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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elations between Australia and China have been shaped in recent years not only by commercial and diplomatic agendas but also by intelligence and security-based crises. Most recently, the espionage case that erupted in Canberra has once again brought the fragile balance between the two countries to the fore. The allegation that an individual accused of acting on behalf of the Public Security Bureau of China infiltrated the Guan Yin Citta Buddhist community has had a wide resonance in Australia, beyond state security, in terms of the fabric of society and multiculturalism. This incident is, in fact, a concrete manifestation of the ongoing ‘trust deficit’ in Australia-China relations.

Allegations of espionage and foreign interference have been an integral part of international relations, even during the Cold War. However, what we are witnessing today paints a different picture from classic intelligence struggles. It is no longer just state institutions that are targeted; religious communities, universities, research centers and technology companies are also becoming targets. This situation demonstrates that espionage is not merely a military or diplomatic threat, but also a multidimensional security issue that can infiltrate the most fundamental structures of society. The case in Australia is one of the most recent examples of this transformation.

The current crisis is not only a turning point in Australia-China bilateral relations but also critically important for understanding the new form that the global power struggle is taking in the Asia-Pacific. China’s rise poses a strategic challenge to the Western alliance led by the U.S., while Australia is forced to take the front line due to the responsibilities imposed by its geopolitical position. The AUKUS agreement, competition over rare earths, cyber security and social security debates are intertwined in this context. The recent espionage case uncovered in Canberra signals the displacement of a piece on this grand chessboard that may appear small but has far greater implications.

Background: Australia-China espionage tensions from past to present

To understand the background of the espionage crisis between Australia and China, one must first look at the legal and institutional framework developed by Canberra over the past decade. The ‘foreign interference’ legislation, which came into force in 2018, introduced stringent regulations aimed at preventing foreign states from covertly influencing Australia’s political processes, academia, media and civil society. These laws marked a turning point in the country’s security policy, covering not only espionage activities but also indirect influence attempts by foreign actors.

The case in question is the third major case opened under this framework. Previously, investigations had been conducted into the influence of Chinese intelligence in both government-linked circles and the media and business world. Each of these cases demonstrated Australia’s vulnerability to foreign interference and also shaped the direction of its national security strategy.

During this process, the Australian Security Intelligence Organization (ASIO) played a critical role. Since 2022, 24 large-scale espionage attempts have been thwarted. These activities are estimated to cost the country’s economy approximately 12.5 billion Australian dollars (approximately 8 billion U.S. dollars) annually. These espionage activities target rare earth elements, advanced technologies, scientific research projects and, in particular, defense initiatives under the AUKUS security agreement.

On the political front, although Prime Minister Anthony Albanese’s government demonstrated its willingness to soften relations with its official visit to China in July 2025, espionage crises are forcing the government to take a tougher stance. Canberra, which wishes to maintain economic cooperation with Beijing, is being forced to abandon its policy of ‘avoiding conflict’ when it comes to security and adopt a more robust and transparent stance.

Guan Yin Citta spy

The latest development to shake the Australian public began with the arrest of a Chinese-born woman living in Canberra. Authorities stated that the individual in question had infiltrated the Guan Yin Citta Buddhist community on behalf of the Chinese Public Security Bureau and gathered information about community members. This case was recorded as the first local espionage case in Australia targeting a religious or cultural community. The incident brought about a perception of threat not only to state secrets but also to the fabric of society.

The investigation was conducted as part of an operation called ‘Autumn Shield’. Searches of the suspect’s home uncovered luxury items (Hermès bags, Rolex watches, large amounts of cash) as well as a Chinese passport. The findings pointed to intelligence activities supported by financial incentives, as well as the existence of a potential escape plan. Details reflected in court documents suggested that the operation was not only symbolic but could also extend to a wide-ranging espionage network.

Another striking aspect of the case was that the allegations were directed not only at the government or strategic institutions, but also directly at the social structure of a religious community. Conducting espionage within civil society reveals a new area of vulnerability that challenges Australia’s cultural integration policies by undermining the social trust of immigrant minorities.

Although there has been no official response from the Beijing administration regarding this case, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun made a brief statement saying that they had ‘no information about the details of the case.’ Chinese officials had previously described similar incidents as ‘exaggerated accounts.’ This situation once again highlights the ongoing diplomatic tension between Australia’s security concerns and China’s international image management.

Beyond being a legal case, the Guan Yin Citta case has become a turning point that has brought suspicions about China, trade dependency and concerns about national sovereignty to the forefront of the Australian public’s attention. The increased sensitivity surrounding immigrant communities in particular indicates that the social and political repercussions of this incident will continue for some time.

The great power struggle

The Guan Yin Citta case should be viewed as part of a broader competition that directly concerns Australia’s geopolitical position. Particularly within the framework of the AUKUS alliance, Australia, alongside the United States and the United Kingdom, aims to counter China’s rise in the region. AUKUS’s agenda is not limited to submarine technologies; it also extends to areas such as artificial intelligence, quantum computing and cyber defense. In this context, every espionage incident serves as evidence reminding the Australian public and its allies of the rationale for the alliance. China’s efforts to expand its influence to the point where it could target even civilian areas confirm the threat perception underpinning AUKUS’s security architecture.

Another dimension of this context revolves around technology and rare earth elements. ASIO’s latest reports emphasize that China’s espionage activities target critical minerals, technologies for the energy transition, and defense research. Therefore, the issue goes beyond military competition and becomes a contest over who will control the global economic order and technological superiority. Australia’s potential in terms of rare earths directly intersects with Beijing’s energy and industrial policies.

However, the impact of these crises is not limited to the strategic level; it also brings the balance between security and freedom in democratic societies back to the agenda. While foreign interference laws strengthen national security, they can also heighten sensitivities among migrant communities and require more careful implementation of social cohesion policies. From the perspective of Australia’s liberal democratic identity, there is an increasingly difficult search for balance between ensuring security and preserving multiculturalism.

Finally, such cases reinforce the perception of China as an actor capable of influencing social structures, beyond being a military and economic rival. Thus, Australia’s geopolitical narrative is being reshaped around a multi-layered security concern. That is, a battle map expanding from submarines to data centers, from mines to religious communities.

A turning point in Australia’s security architecture

The Guan Yin Citta case emerged as a turning point in Australia’s security architecture, pointing to broader implications beyond a single court case. First, the incident demonstrated how delicate the ground is on which trust-building with migrant communities progresses in Australia. While espionage investigations aim to reduce the risk of foreign interference, they can produce outcomes that trigger xenophobia within society. This highlights the need for national security measures to be implemented within a transparent and inclusive framework.

Secondly, the functioning of the foreign interference laws enacted in 2018 has been brought back into focus with this case. While the law positions Australia as a leader among similar liberal democracies, the question of whether fundamental rights are protected in each case is also being debated in the public sphere. This makes the balance between the rule of law and security more visible.

Thirdly, Australia’s findings are linked not only to the national context but also to the need for international cooperation. The scale of espionage activities necessitates closer information sharing and early warning mechanisms with allied countries such as Canada and Japan.

Ultimately, this incident demonstrates that raising social awareness is an integral part of security strategy. Raising citizens’ awareness of cyber security and foreign interference methods strengthens not only the state’s but also society’s resilience.

In general terms, the Guan Yin Citta case has once again highlighted the ‘trust deficit’ in Australia-China relations. On a global scale, the fundamental finding for liberal democracies is this: the tension between security and freedom is being felt more acutely through incidents such as espionage.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ustralia has announced a landmark $6.5 billion deal to buy 11 state-of-the-art warships from Japan, a move analysts say could elevate Canberra into a top-tier Pacific maritime power while propelling Tokyo into the ranks of major global weapons exporters.

The vessels — upgraded Mogami-class stealth frigates built by Mitsubishi Heavy Industries — are described as among the most advanced surface combatants afloat, rivaling or surpassing anything fielded by China or even the United States.

Australia’s Defense Minister for Industry Pat Conroy framed the purchase as a strategic counterweight to growing Chinese naval activity, including a task force that circumnavigated Australia earlier this year and staged live-fire drills off its coast. “This is another step towards delivering a much larger and more lethal navy, with stealth frigates that will reassure our allies and deter our adversaries,” Conroy said.

Bigger, longer-range, more firepower

The Australian version of the Mogami will be larger than those in service with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, featuring an extended range of about 11,500 miles — roughly half the Earth’s circumference without refueling — and a lean crew of 90. That is nearly half the complement required for Australia’s current ANZAC-class frigates, a crucial advantage for countries facing military recruitment shortfalls.

Weaponry will center on 32 US-made Mk 41 vertical launch cells, allowing each ship to fire up to 128 air-defense missiles — quadrupling Australia’s current surface fleet capacity. The cells can also accommodate Tomahawk cruise missiles with 1,000-mile strike ranges, as well as long-range anti-submarine rockets, potentially giving Australia an edge in detecting and neutralizing nuclear-powered submarines.

“It’s stealth, it’s reduced manning, it’s modularity — all at a relatively affordable price,” said Alessio Patalano, professor of war and strategy in East Asia at King’s College London. Carl Schuster, a former US Navy captain, called the ship “slightly superior” to China’s Type 054B frigate, with particular strengths in air defense.

Beyond hardware, experts stress the Mogami’s software and sensor systems may be its most decisive features. “Superior sonar software could be the difference between tracking a hostile contact or missing it entirely,” noted Sidharth Kaushal of the Royal United Services Institute in London.

Japan’s shipbuilding reliability

Both Schuster and Patalano highlighted Japan’s track record for delivering complex naval platforms on time and on budget — a point of contrast with US shipbuilding delays. The US Navy has not had frigates since 2015, and its Constellation-class program, launched in 2020, is already at least three years behind schedule.

“In my opinion, [the Mogami] is superior to the Constellation class,” Schuster said. Patalano added that the US has “a lot to learn” from allies like Japan, South Korea, and the UK in innovation and efficiency.

For Japan, the deal marks its largest-ever arms export since it began loosening post–World War II restrictions on lethal weapons sales. Previously, Tokyo had sold surveillance radars to the Philippines and Patriot missile interceptors to the US, but the frigate contract — with the first three ships to be built in Japan and the remaining eight in Australian shipyards — represents a leap into high-end defense manufacturing for export.

Exporting not only the warships but also the production technology “would catapult Japan into the space of major defense industry exporters,” Patalano said.

The arrangement is also expected to create 10,000 jobs in Australia and strengthen interoperability between two members of the US-led Quad security grouping, which also includes India. Canberra anticipates the first ship will be operational by 2029.

Historic builder returns to form

The deal also spotlights Mitsubishi Heavy Industries’ storied naval legacy. The firm built the Yamato and Musashi, the largest battleships ever constructed, for the Imperial Japanese Navy during World War II. Those behemoths, armed with 18-inch guns, were rendered obsolete by aircraft carriers before seeing decisive action; both were sunk by US air power in 1944–45.

Eighty years later, Mitsubishi is again producing cutting-edge warships — this time as part of a democratic alliance network seeking to maintain stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Analysts say the Australia–Japan frigate deal fits into a broader pattern of allied maritime rearmament, aimed at deterring China’s naval expansion and securing vital sea lanes. It also underscores how technological partnerships among US allies can sometimes advance more quickly than US-led programs, potentially shaping the future balance of naval power in the region.

As Patalano put it: “This is not just a ship sale. It’s a signal — that in the Pacific, America’s closest allies are investing in each other to ensure they can stand together against shared challenges.”

(Source: CNN)

O

n March 13, 2023, U.S. president Joe Biden, British prime minister Rishi Sunak, and Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese made a joint statement in San Diego indicating that Australia will acquire nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs) as part of AUKUS.

The SSNs will be powered by highly enriched uranium (HEU), which can also be used in nuclear weapons, will use the UK’s latest design, and incorporate technology from all three partner nations. SSN-AUKUS will be equipped with intelligence, surveillance, undersea warfare, and strike missions.

According to Australian PM Albanese, the deal is expected to cost between $268 billion and $368 billion, making it the largest investment ever made for Australia’s defense capabilities. While concerns about potential atomic proliferation have been raised, Australian officials have emphasized that the country has no intention of acquiring nuclear weapons or developing a civil nuclear capability.

SSNs to counter China’s growing assertiveness

On March 14, 2023, the Chinese Mission to the United Nations criticized the AUKUS nuclear submarine cooperation deal in a series of tweets, noting that it poses serious nuclear proliferation risks and undermines international non-proliferation efforts.

The tweets criticized the double standards of nuclear-armed states transferring enriched uranium to a non-nuclear-weapon state.

The deal has sparked criticism from China, which has denounced it as a “dangerous move” that threatens regional peace and stability. China has urged the UK, U.S., and Australia to address the international community’s concerns and fulfill their obligations in regards to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). The U.S. has defended the AUKUS submarine deal as a necessary response to China’s “coercive behavior” and “unilateral attempts to alter the status quo” in the region.

China and Australia 

The agreement has also impacted trade relations between Australia and China. The relationship between the two nations had deteriorated even before the deal’s announcement due to human rights, security, and trade issues. Notably, China is Australia’s largest trading partner, and it views the submarine deal as a hostile move threatening its interests and sovereignty in the region.

The deal was seen to help Australia acquire nuclear-powered submarines to counter China’s growing military modernization and assertiveness in the South China Sea and Taiwan Strait. It is also seen to challenge China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to create a global network of trade routes and infrastructure projects to give Beijing leverage over many countries in Asia, Africa, Europe, and Latin America.

Australia, the NPT, and the IAEA

Based on the provisions of the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), it is allowed to transfer fissile material and nuclear technology from a nuclear-weapon state to a non-nuclear- weapon state for peaceful purposes.

However, some critics argue that the provisions were not designed to cover naval nuclear propulsion, and the agreement could undermine the credibility and effectiveness of the NPT.

According to reports by the Australian government, Australia is committed to upholding non-proliferation standards as it continues to develop its defense capabilities. The document outlines Australia’s history in the international nuclear non-proliferation regime, including its commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons, its advocacy for nuclear-weapon-free zones, and its support for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty.

The document also highlights Australia’s two safeguard agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which underpin the country’s outstanding non-proliferation credentials. By adhering to international law and agreements, Australia is working to ensure its defense capabilities.

Details of the AUKUS deal

The AUKUS agreement consists of four phases, beginning in 2023 when Australian navy personnel will embed with the navy personnel of the U.S. and UK and their submarine industrial bases. Australia will receive three SSNs from the U.S. in the early 2030s, while the UK is set to begin construction of its first SSN-AUKUS in the late 2020s to be delivered in the late 2030s. Australia plans to start building its first SSN-AUKUS by the end of the 2020s, with delivery expected in the early 2040s.

AUKUS is considered a significant development in the Indo-Pacific region as it aims to counter China’s growing military assertiveness. According to James Hackett, the AUKUS submarine deal has sent shockwaves through the international community since its announcement in 2021. With China’s naval presence in the world seas, the AUKUS partnership is perceived as a step towards balancing the naval power dynamics in the Indo-Pacific region.

Three years ago, when the Wall Street Journal reported that China had signed a secret agreement with Cambodian Prime Minister Hun Sen granting Chinese armed forces exclusive rights to a Cambodian naval installation in the Gulf of Thailand, Beijing denounced the report as “fake news,” saying, it has “never made any such agreement as reported by foreign media outlets.”

But it turns out the reporting was indeed accurate, with Western officials telling the Washington Post on June 6 that China has begun building a naval facility in Cambodia for the exclusive use of its military, and that Chinese and Cambodian officials are taking “extraordinary measures” to conceal the operation, although a Chinese official in Beijing confirmed to the newspaper that a “portion of the base” will be used by “the Chinese military.”

Beijing, however, continues to deny the reports, even as Cambodian and Chinese officials took part in a ground-breaking ceremony at the Ream Naval Base on June 8, making it the second such overseas outpost for the Chinese military, but the first in the strategically significant Indo-Pacific region, raising fresh fears in the United States and its Western Pacific allies, particularly Australia, which have been on high alert since China signed a security pact with the Solomon Islands on March 30.

While Beijing denies it plans to build a Chinese military base in the Solomon Islands by calling such allegations “completely fabricated,” the undeniable reality is the deal specifies that China would be allowed to send security forces to the Solomons at the request of the Solomons government, which, in recent times, has become completely subservient to Beijing in exchange for bribes worth little more than hundreds of thousands of dollars.

Leaked documents also reveal Honiara held secret talks with Beijing to allow China to bring weapons, including machine guns and other light arms, into the capital.

Beijing’s covert move on the Solomon Islands has put the “Blue Continent,” an oceanic territory that spans three million kilometres and includes a dozen countries and 13 million people, at the centre of a great power struggle between China and the United States, but with Australia playing the lead role. Revelations the Chinese Navy will soon be operating from a naval base in Cambodia, despite Beijing’s earlier denials, only adds fuel to this simmering fire.

Seeking to add further wins to its “island hopping” campaign, one mirrored on the United States’ strategy to dislodge Imperial Japan from its territorial conquests during the Second World War, Beijing has launched a charm offensive in the region with the aim of cutting off the US from its allies in Indo Pacific, but without firing a shot. The geography hasn’t changed but the tactics have.

China is following the dictum prescribed by Chinese general Sun Tzu, who remarked that the supreme art of war is to “subdue the enemy without fighting.”

Last month, Beijing tried to cajole and coerce 10 small Pacific nations into endorsing a major cooperation agreement covering everything from security to fisheries in what Micronesia warned to be a ”game changing” attempt by Beijing to wrestle control of the region.

A leaked draft of Beijing’s sweeping proposal show it wants to train local security forces, expand law enforcement cooperation, and partner on “traditional and non-traditional security,” while also cooperating on developing fisheries, improving Internet access, and establishing a Chinese cultural presence.

But the deal was flatly rejected for a couple of reasons. Firstly, Pacific Island nations were put offside by Beijing’s attempt to bypass the Pacific Islands Forum in Suva, with Samoan Prime Minister Fiamē Mataʻafa summing up the collective mood in saying, “You cannot have regional agreements if the region has not met to discuss it.”

Secondly, Australia has launched an effective charm offensive of its own in the region, with the new Labor government deploying its Foreign Minister, Penny Wong, to three Pacific countries in her first 10 days in office, compared with the handful of visits her predecessor made during her four years in the job.

“We will increase our contribution to regional security: we understand that the security of the Pacific is the responsibility of the Pacific family, of which Australia is a part,” she told reporters on the eve of her visit to Samoa and Tonga earlier this month.

She promised Australia would stand “shoulder with our Pacific family” in combatting the existential threat of climate change, while also deepening cultural and sporting ties, and building on the conservative coalition government’s $500 million “Step up” commitment in 2017 towards promoting economic cooperation and greater integration within the Pacific and also with the Australian and New Zealand economies, and tackling security challenges.

Dr Shi Yinhong, a professor of international relations at Renmin University in Beijing, says China’s unsuccessful attempt to ram through its major cooperation package with 10 Pacific Island nations will have not only emboldened the US and Australia, but also encourage them to more in the region to counter China, warning, “The strategic competition will be far from easy for both sides.”

But having failed to woo Pacific Island nations, Beijing is now offering the new Australian government the arm of friendship in congratulating new Prime Minister Anthony Albanese on his electoral win, marking the first direct communication between the senior leadership of the two countries in nearly three years.

“The Chinese side is ready to work with the Australian side to uphold the principle of mutual respect and mutual benefit,” said Chinese Premier Li Keqiang.

To liberate Asia Pacific from Japanese Imperialist Forces during the Second World War, the United States devised an “island hopping” strategy meant to secure as many islands as possible, with the aim of forcing the enemy back to its home soil.

Two battles were crucial to the Allies’ success: the Battle of Midway in 1942, where the U.S. Navy inflicted mortal wounds on its Japanese counterpart, and the Battle of Guadalcanal spanning 1942 to 1943, where the U.S. Army and Marines defeated Japanese land forces in the Solomon Islands.

A full 80 years later, the Solomon Islands has suddenly become the centre of superpower confrontation once again, but this time between the United States and an ever-increasingly militaristic and imperialistic China.

Unlike, Japan, however, China has effectively seized the South Pacific country, comprising six major islands and hundreds of smaller islands, without firing a shot. This Chinese move has left the U.S. and Australia, along with their regional allies, in a state of frenzy rage because the islands, particularly Guadalcanal, are a choke point connecting the U.S. to Australia and New Zealand, which is why Japan wanted the islands eight decades ago, and why China wants them today.

If the U.S. is cut off from Australia and New Zealand, then it is essentially cut off from the South Pacific, giving China a huge leg up in its ambition to dislodge the U.S. from the entire Western Pacific and Asia. Suddenly, the memory of Japanese submarines torpedoing Australian vessels in Sydney Harbor, and Japanese warplanes bombing the Australian city of Darwin in 1942 has invoked a security crisis in Canberra and Washington DC.

Australian Strategic Policy Institute executive director Peter Jennings predicts Chinese warships and warplanes could arrive in the Solomons within weeks, saying, “Their model is what they’ve done in the South China Sea, which is to move quickly and decisively before people are able to gather their thoughts and resist,” adding he expects Beijing to move while Australian policy elites are distracted with the national election, scheduled for May 21.

Solomon Island’s Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare has given verbal assurances he will not allow China to construct a military base on its soil, but nobody in Canberra or Washington DC is buying it, given the deal was revealed only after details of it were leaked; revelations Sogavare has allowed Beijing to secretly bring dozens of weapons into Honiara; and because Beijing has essentially bought the Solomon’s parliament by paying $40,000 to parliamentarians who voted for Sogarvare.

On Friday, a U.S. delegation by Indo-Pacific envoy Kurt Campbell arrived in the Solomon Islands to discuss concerns the U.S. and its allies have over the security pact with China, which they fear will extend China’s military presence in the region, igniting a new regional arms race. Australia has also shuttled diplomats to Honiara, with Japan announcing it will do likewise later this month, and New Zealand and Tonga saying they will raise their concerns at the forthcoming Pacific Islands Forum.

Chinese state media has slammed opposition to Beijing’s security pact with Honiara, even accusing Australia of having a “colonialist mentality,” while Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Zhao Kijian said Australia and US should “respect the sovereign and independent choices made by China and the Solomons and not instigate confrontation.”

But these claims and statements are patently absurd, given the Australian government, unlike its Chinese counterpart, has not sought to bolster its relationship with the Pacific Island country by bribing and extorting its political class.

Moreover, Australia’s Pacific “Step Up,” which has allocated $2 billion to building infrastructure in the region, does not saddle countries with unrepayable debt, unlike China’s debt trap diplomacy, or what is known as its One Belt Initiative.

“In Mr. Sogavare, the Chinese government has found a willing partner. And his commitment to such a secretive deal has shown how a single politician cosying up to Beijing in a small country can create geopolitical risks worldwide,” observes the New York Times.

Most significantly, Solomon Islanders view the move as anti-democratic, with recent polls showing 90 percent of the country wanting closer ties to the U.S. and Australia over China, and 79 percent opposing financial aid from Beijing. They also remember that the country was rocked by anti-Chinese violence in November of last year, after it was revealed Sogavare used Chinese government money to sway votes in the parliament.

The country’s opposition leader, Hon. Mathew Wale, slammed the China deal, calling it does not represent the interests of Solomon Islanders, but “for the personal and self-interests of the Prime Minister.”

“His election campaign was said to be funded by PRC state-owned companies. The payment of members for his political survival in November was also bought with PRC money. This personal secret military deal with the PRC is no different. This deal is not for the military protection of Solomon Islands. There are no external threats to Solomon Islands. The deal is to maintain Sogavare’s hold on power and to undermine the democratic freedoms available to Solomon islanders,” he said.

The opposition leader also called out the Prime Minister over promises closer ties to China would herald a flood of Chinexe investment, which, until now, have not materialized.

While most analysts believe the Solomon Islands can be persuaded to walk back the China deal, Jennings says it will take a “focused effort” on Australia’s part and “more money than we would like to spend,” but it’s a price Canberra and its regional allies must be prepared to pay if they do not wish a repeat of the same threat they endured from an expansionist Japan eighty years ago.

Middle powers are states that rank neither as great powers nor as small actors in international relations. There is no single definition or straightforward approach to conceptualize their role other than the commonly held view that such countries are key players in the geopolitics of their regions. The variety of roles and aims assumed by middle powers also vary according to their regional context. Some middle powers such as Turkey are traditionally seen as key military allies by the West, while others such as Canada and Japan are considered major trade partners.

However, despite such fundamental differences in their strength or standing, countries like Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, India, South Korea, South Africa, and Turkey are increasingly involved in international crises and developments. Below, I shall outline both challenges and opportunities provided by the current global context for middle powers. I ultimately argue that middle powers can implement collective strategies on the basis of their common interests and gain more say in global affairs.

Middle Powers’ Organizational Capacity

The foremost challenge facing middle powers is organizational. There are many international organizations populated by middle powers, but almost none of them are exclusively middle-power oriented. Middle powers are often members of the global institutions dominated by great powers, like G20 and BRICS, whose agendas mainly benefit the great powers involved. An exclusively middle power organization is yet to be formed, the closest organization of such a nature being MIKTA. MITKA is an exclusive club of a number of middle powers with quite limited membership, namely Mexico, Indonesia, Turkey, South Korea, and Australia.

In the absence of an organization representing their interests vocally, middle powers cannot assume a bigger role in international politics. The security architecture of the UN privileges the five permanent members of the UN Security Council; NATO, the world’s most significant military alliance, is under American leadership; and the EU, the largest trading bloc, is led by a Franco-German alliance. Middle powers such as Turkey, South Africa, Brazil, and India are all key players in their region but none seems capable of exerting global influence. An alliance or an organization exclusive to middle powers can change the overall dynamic.

Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and India can agree among themselves on pushing for a reform of the UN.

One of the first goals of any middle power club should be a reform of the UN system. Middle powers individually, or collectively, should have more say in the UN’s decision-making on international security crises. Such reform may stipulate more quotas for each region and some rotational representation for middle powers, and particularly African, Latin American, and Middle Eastern middle power states should be afforded more representation at the UN’s Security Council. However, the reform proposal first requires a consensus among middle powers and that may prove hard to achieve.

Middle powers such as Brazil, Turkey, and India are all part of the liberal international system. As democratic countries with huge potential for economic growth and no significant military or strategic conflict with the West, they can agree among themselves on pushing for a reform of the UN. More established and traditional middle powers like Australia, Canada, Japan, and Sweden may also join the reform call, as this may benefit them as well. The less democratic, or authoritarian ones, such as Egypt, Iran, or Saudi Arabia, however, may have more radical demands concerning the UN reform and might not join a collective reform movement.

As mentioned above, the most straightforward path forward could be a reform of the UN’s security architecture allowing more say to middle power states, maybe through a recognition of their status which may provide them some form of collective representation. In order to make that happen, middle powers need to agree on their common interests and goals.

Middle powers are mostly liberal democratic states, so they should highlight the fact that they are in favor of the liberal order, e.g., the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the UN system. Mediation and peacekeeping should remain their most preferred means of international crisis diplomacy, though they must publicize their efforts and seek more recognition for their contributions.

An effective alliance or organization of middle power diplomacy should be formed and take sides in global crises since leaving such crises to be mainly decided by great power politics will only downgrade the middle power cause.

In short, middle powers need more concerted actions and efforts in highlighting their undeniable role in world affairs. The world is no longer divided into two or three competing strategic blocs. Global affairs are much more complex and require collective action of actors with different levels of international standing. Middle powers are no longer bound to side with one or the other alliance; these days, more than ever before, they collectively command a much more serious economic and military might.

Organizational problems can be tackled and collective interests can be furthered particularly if the leading middle powers such as Australia, Brazil, Canada, Japan, India, Mexico, South Africa, South Korea, and Turkey can agree on a collective initiative. The list of countries mentioned is just indicative – more states can be welcomed into this group, and even small nations can join their forces with middle powers as they see that international peace and stability can be furthered through a collective movement.

Since September 15, 2021 the global security agenda has been occupied with a security pact designed to pave the way for a technology transfer by the U.S. to Australia, replacing France as a supplier of nuclear-powered submarines. The argument goes that this strategic initiative is only the beginning of a much larger cooperation plan regarding the future of the Indo-Pacific security complex.

Global security analysts and scholars directly focused their attention on the Indo-Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea looking into possible implications. The pivotal argument is that world security is going to shift towards the East, and the U.S.-China competition will broaden itself into another dimension with this strategic step.

This claim holds certain validity as the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan and Syria should lead to the accumulation of a certain amount of tangible sources that will need another direction to flow into.

Thus, several scholars have been supporting the literature that hypothesizes a global U.S. channeling into the Indo-Pacific security complex. An alternative approach advocates that the U.S. is not entirely eager to interfere with China due to the potential implications of such a move, yet its partners are forcing a U.S. presence in the region.

This approach is an alternative that derives its legitimacy from the middle and great powers that cooperate with the U.S. – the superpower. This argument also has its merits as international relations are not solely the enforcement of the interests of a superpower but an interaction between the latter and its partnering countries.

The global understanding of such events represented in pacts such as the AUKUS Pact is vital. However, a regionalist approach is required to better present the impact on the regional and state-level dimensions. The French involvement in the pact is the part of AUKUS that is going to cause major implications for the MENA region.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align. Recent military procurement deals such as the Turkish S-400 acquisition, the Pakistani JF-17 fighter aircraft production contract with China, Saudi-UAE procurements of F-35 aircraft, and THAAD air defense systems from the U.S. are recent comparable cases.

These procurements created different levels of leverage and tensions for the buyer countries as they were forced to choose a side. Despite the balancing literature and the conceptual history of the practice, it becomes more apparent that a bipolar system is very antagonistic in its buildup process.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align.

Remembering the two world wars that created the Cold War structure, it is plausible that the “playmaker” states force certain great and middle powers with strategic geopolitical significance to align with them. In this sense, AUKUS might have created a rift between the U.S. and France (and the EU in a larger context, considering the UK also left the organization) that will have certain implications for the MENA region.

For the last 30 years, the U.S. was able to embark on its Middle Eastern policy vis-à-vis its European partners, but strategic gains that directly hinder EU profitability will cause certain fractions in this practice.

The most significant impact of AUKUS on the MENA security complex is expected to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the EU has practically perceived the Turkish pivot for energy resources towards this area and North African interests in this area as threats, the U.S. has supported European interests in securing the energy routes and protecting the integrity of South European shores. However, a political dissemination process that was potentially started with AUKUS might divide this unification in foreign policy.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation. This escalation might give middle powers like Turkey broader room for maneuver. If the U.S. stops supporting these interests in the region, the EU backlash and the hawkish French position will lose a certain share of their influence and capacity. A significant shift towards the Indo-Pacific Ocean might reduce the pressure on great and middle powers competing for interests.

An alternative power-centered approach might suggest that the void left by a U.S. strategic shift towards the East would trigger a great power to take responsibility and fill the vacuum. The current power balance propounds a Russian pivot towards the Eastern Mediterranean; however, Russia’s aircraft carriers are quite worn, and its only ship, Admiral Kuznetsov, is on the maintenance deck.

This does not mean Russia cannot control this area – it holds a submarine force of 58 known units which can only be challenged by the U.S. and maybe China in the next decade. Both scenarios imply that Turkey might have more room for maneuver with less focus and escalation from rival powers.

Meanwhile the possibility that France might become even more hawkish and hyper-emphasize its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean must not be excluded. Yet, this is less likely since if France and Germany plan to keep the union together, they have to align in foreign policy following Brexit. When push comes to shove, Germany will most likely balance the French hawkish reactionary stance towards these events and prioritize economic growth in the next decade.

Under American hegemony, Asia Pacific has experienced the longest period of peace since the start of the Industrial Revolution, but the emergence of China as a rival power has created a sense of insecurity not felt in the region since Imperial Japan invaded Nanjing in 1937, and then soon after the rest of southeast Asia.

In response, Australia, United Kingdom and the United States have formulated the AUKUS security alliance to challenge what it and its Asian allies, including India, South Korea and Japan, perceive to be an increasingly militaristic and hyper-aggressive China.

But when security analysts talk about the “China threat,” they mean the direct military threat it poses to Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, India, the Philippines and Vietnam, among others, but not the three AUKUS signatories – Australia, U.K. and U.S.

In fact, China is not only Australia’s number one trading partner, but also has never threatened Australia militarily, or implied such a threat. Moreover, the UK is located on the other side of the planet, while the US maintains a huge and ever-expanding lead over the Asian power’s military capabilities.

So, who’s insecurity is this trilateral security partnership meant to resolve?

Well, if you listen carefully to American security elites, AUKUS is President Biden’s way of outsourcing some of the heavy lifting that will be required to deter or prevent a Chinese invasion of Taiwan at some point in the next two to three decades, with the construction of eight-nuclear powered submarines in Australia the centrepiece of his strategy.

Should a shooting war between China and the U.S. materialize, the Pentagon anticipates Australia’s submarine fleet will allow it to lighten the burden of its Pacific Fleet, especially given Canberra has established a track record of blindly following the U.S. into every war since and including World War Two.

Expectedly, Beijing has responded by calling Australia “brainless,” and warning it has made itself a target.

Expectedly, Beijing has responded by calling Australia “brainless,” and warning it has made itself a target.

“Armed with nuclear submarines, Australia itself will be a target for possible nuclear attacks in the future,” Victor Gao, the vice president for the Centre for China and Globalization, told ABC’s China Tonight.

“The watershed moment will be if Australia will be armed with nuclear submarines to be locally produced in Australia. That will mean Australia will lose that privilege of not being targeted by nuclear weapons to other countries and that should be a wake-up call for all Australians.,” he said.

This is exactly the blowback some of Australia’s top security elites have warned, including the venerable Professor Hugh White, who stated, “[Prime Minister] Scott Morrison has tied Australia to a deal that undermines our sovereign capabilities, overspends on hardware we can barely be confident of operating, and drags us closer to the frontline of a war we may have no interest in fighting.”

That said, China’s unlawful actions in the South China Sea has put it into direct conflict with no fewer than a half-dozen countries, and there’s no doubt China is guilty of violating international maritime law, and therefore threatening the freedom of the seas and the world’s busiest shipping lanes, including those which so many Asian countries depend upon for their energy needs.

So, Beijing has only itself to blame for escalating tensions in the region. The question is whether AUKUS encourages security or heightens tensions in Indo Pacific, but there are already clear warning signs it has formalized a regional Cold War and incited a new arms race.

Why is it that white Australians still refuse to acknowledge the past and can’t talk about racism in the present? I thought. Oh, this denial of white privilege is hegemonic. Yes, the invisibilization of white privilege is that. I recall the white Australian founding fathers designed and wrote a political entity and constitution that excluded women, people of color, and First Nations to render a white patriarchal possession.

I remember the colonists designed the police force and prisons during British colonial and then (after Federation 1901) Australia’s frontier wars. I think to myself, disavowed still, when will we discontinue incarcerating First Nations out of the way of the white nation? Are not most people in jail there for poverty-related issues? Shouldn’t they be alleviated of poverty or given housing instead of locked up? My stomach burns as I envision abolition, a world without prisons.

My indeminably helpful cousin who sent me the photograph of our white great grandfather did so while assisting his mother, Elizabeth, my paternal aunt, pack up her home of thirty years to move into a nursing home.  Melbourne and surrounding areas, as far out as my country cottage rented in West Gippsland, was ninety days into a one-hundred-and-twelve-day strict lockdown at the time. We are back in lockdown again as I write (June 2021).

I think of my aunt’s brother, John Koerner, my deceased father, and I turn my attention back to the photo of their grandfather, John Heithersay, leading the gold prospecting expedition in Coolgardie in 1893. The image transports my senses to the land and skies from my childhood in Tennant Creek, Alice Springs, and Katherine, camping with my family and, when I was old enough, bushwalking with my father.

The four Indigenous men sitting on the ground at the front of the photograph capture my attention, sidelining happy childhood memories, safe with my father experiencing the bush’s magic he deeply loved.  We were camping on stolen ground, under land rights claims in the 1970s and 1980s.

All the Indigenous men look at the camera. Their physique reminds me of my now deceased father, John Koerner (1930–2005), grandson of John Heithersay. Like the two middle-aged Indigenous men in the front row, my father was very fit in his middle age. Unlike these men, he ran marathons, kayaked, played tennis, hiked right up until his death. Of course, my father was a free man and a white Australian, but I recognized the quality of that lean, fit physique familiar to me. Dam, I miss him, I thought. I recall our last hike together on the Milford track, Aotearoa, where he died.

Did my father know about his grandfather’s prospecting expedition to Coolgardie? During the 1970s and 1980s, Dad was a public-school teacher who advocated for Indigenous children to attend and complete school. I remember he visited some of the small Aboriginal communities around Katherine, N.T., to connect with Elders and parents. Dad returned, feeling hopeful that as Principal of Katherine State High (KSH), my school, Dad, could do more.

The rights for whites aggressively desired to keep the school for their white children and keep out the Blacks.

In the process, he accrued many enemies in the N.T.; those who were quite content with Indigenous non-attendance and low graduation rates would have much preferred Dad to have let sleeping dogs lie. The rights for whites aggressively desired to keep the school for their white children and keep out the Blacks. They campaigned hard and secured government support against the Jaowyn land claim encompassing Nitmuluk Gorge and rivers. I relax as I remember the stunning Nitmuluk where Dad taught me how to swim and canoe, as families have done since the beginning of time.

If his actions mean so many people died as a direct result? We find people guilty of manslaughter if they accidentally run over someone. The land theft is intentional. The environmental degradation is intentional and was never remedied. And who sold you the mining licence? That would be the British before Federation 1901 and Australian Governments after 1901. There was no treaty. They had no legal grounds to seize land and sell mining licences or land leases, I logicize.

I knew that John Heithersay had gone on to prosper from his gold mining activities. My great-grandfather had twelve children, including my grandmother, Elsie May. My grandmother told her daughter, Aunty Elizabeth, that when she (Elsie May) was a small girl, she used to wrap up gold nuggets as toy babies and push them around the house in her doll’s pram.

With that gold, John Heithersay bought a family home in Adelaide’s elite areas, sent his children to the best public schools through scholarships, and put his sons (not daughters) through university via scholarships. They became renowned for their academic abilities in engineering. John Heithersay mined gold in South Australia until the Great War in 1914, where, sadly, four of his sons died.

I look at the second photo sent of John Heithersay with his four sons in 1914. I think of my grandmother (Elsie-May) who grieved her four brothers’ deaths at war. My great grandfather never returned to mining. White patriarchy kept his daughters and granddaughters from completing their education. The wealth flows to the patriarchal line designed to keep white women dependent on white men to benefit from white privilege. First Nation women, however, form matriarchal societies the sophisticated design ensure no social hierarchies, political autonomy and no poverty. Never achieved under patriarchy.

In the last week of October 2020, Victoria emerged from its 112-day lockdown response to the COVID-19 pandemic. While Victoria celebrated coming out of lockdown, I hear on The Saturday’s 7 am podcast (29/10/2020) that the Andrews Government organised the forced removal and evacuation, including arrests of Djab Wurrung people in Victoria. Djab Wurrung had held a tent embassy site in protest for several years against the Victorian Government designated removal of ancient sacred ancestor trees to make way for a highway.

1200 Australian academics sign a petition to the Victorian State Government to stop this unjustifiable travesty with more ancient trees in danger. During a climate crisis, it is nonsensical. Indeed every sacred site destroyed is further proof that the Uluru Statement from the Heart needs to be the foundational document of a new Australia. To survive the climate catastrophe, First Nations must be in the centre of everything we do. They managed this place as the first human civilizations more than 100,000 years ago, I contemplate.