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rominent left-leaning leaders from across the world are convening in Barcelona this weekend in a coordinated effort to strengthen progressive alliances and push back against the growing influence of far-right movements globally.

The gatherings are spearheaded by Spain’s Prime Minister, Pedro Sánchez, and Brazil’s President, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, who are co-hosting a series of high-level meetings bringing together political leaders, activists, and civil society representatives.

The initiative, dubbed the “Global Progressive Mobilization,” aims to rally support for multilateralism, democratic institutions, and coordinated action on issues such as climate change and social inequality. Organizers say the meetings will culminate in a joint declaration outlining shared priorities and strategies.

The summit comes amid shifting global dynamics, including policy changes under U.S. President Donald Trump, whose administration’s cuts to humanitarian aid, military actions, and critical stance toward NATO have unsettled traditional alliances and prompted renewed debate over international cooperation.

Prominent leaders to attend

Several prominent leaders are expected to attend, including South African President Cyril Ramaphosa and Mexican President Claudia Sheinbaum. Sheinbaum’s visit marks the first trip by a Mexican president to Spain since 2018, following years of diplomatic tensions related to historical grievances over Spain’s colonial legacy.

A parallel event organized by Spain’s ruling Socialist Party is set to draw around 3,000 participants, including current and former heads of state, hundreds of mayors, trade unions, and grassroots organizations. The two-day gathering will focus on mobilizing support for progressive policies and strengthening political networks across borders.

The meetings also reflect concerns among left-wing leaders following the rise of far-right parties in recent years, particularly after gains in the 2024 European Parliament elections. Organizers describe the Barcelona summit as a response to that trend, aiming to demonstrate that alternative political pathways remain viable.

International cooperation is important

Speaking ahead of the event, Sánchez emphasized the importance of international cooperation among progressive forces. “It is important that progressive parties and governments unite to show that there is something beyond domestic politics,” he said during a recent visit to China, where he met President Xi Jinping to discuss closer ties.

The summit follows recent political developments in Europe, including the electoral defeat of Hungarian nationalist leader Viktor Orbán, which Sánchez has pointed to as evidence that far-right momentum can be challenged.

Organizers say the overarching goal is to present a unified front against what they describe as “extreme right-wing movements” and to reinforce commitments to democratic governance and international collaboration.

The Barcelona meetings are expected to conclude with a joint statement from participating leaders, outlining coordinated efforts to address global challenges and strengthen progressive political movements worldwide.

(Source: Reuters)

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n early October, the ANO party won the Czech Republic’s parliamentary elections with the support of more than a third of the electorate. The Spolu Union, the largest party in the ruling center-right coalition, lost power after dropping 4.4 percent in the vote count compared to the previous elections. More importantly, the far-right ANO party’s first-place finish has created a political situation in which no coalition is possible without it.

Following the October 3–4, 2025 elections, discussions intensified regarding the ANO party and its leader, Andrej Babiš. In the Czech Republic, a member of the European Union, there is increasing speculation about a possible political reversal in the event of an ANO-led government due to the party’s stance on the EU. ANO chairman Andrej Babiš has begun indirect preliminary talks with the far-right parties Motoristé Sobě (Drivers’ Party) and SPD (Freedom and Direct Democracy) regarding the formation of a coalition or a minority government supported by these parties. However, both parties being discussed as potential coalition partners for ANO have drawn attention due to their far-right and racist statements.

The SPD’s opposition to the EU and the Drivers’ Party’s anti-EU stance have already raised doubts about the potential new coalition or minority government, despite the latter’s claims to the contrary. The most striking aspect of these doubts is the ANO party’s position. Prior to the 2024 European Parliament elections, ANO was part of the liberal ALDE group. However, after the 2024 elections, ANO joined the newly formed far-right, racist Patriots for Europe group. After meeting with the Czech president on November 3, 2025, the ANO party leader will most likely be tasked with forming a government and will begin negotiations to form a coalition or minority government with the two aforementioned parties. Europe’s first far-right, racist coalition or partnership now appears likely to be formed in the heart of Europe.

Fragmented and divided politics

Looking back at the period before the most recent elections, the differences in Czech politics become more apparent. The ANO party, which won the elections, does not have a long political history. Established in 2011, it held six ministerial posts in the Bohuslav Sobotka-led coalition government from 2013 to 2017. Under Babiš’s leadership, ANO became the leading party in the 2017 Czech Republic elections, winning nearly 30 percent of the vote. However, this also led to a political stalemate. Although ANO had previously been part of a center-right coalition with the Social Democrats and Christian Democrats, no party was willing to form a coalition with it after the 2017 election.

Other political movements focused more on Babiš himself than on the ANO party. Despite these reactions, ANO formed a minority government with the external support of the far-right Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) party. While receiving support from the far right in government, ANO also cooperated with the far-right SPD and the Communist Party in parliament. In mid-2018, however, ANO formed a coalition with the Social Democrats (CSSD) and established a minority government with external support from the Communist Party, which lasted until 2021.

Although ANO has been classified as an anti-EU party since its inception, it was part of the ALDE group, composed of European Liberals, in the European Parliament from 2014 to 2024. Following the most recent European Parliament elections, however, its inclusion in the newly formed Patriots for Europe group appears to be the main reason why a clear political assessment of this party—set to govern the Czech Republic in the coming period—remains difficult.

Another noteworthy point is Steve Bannon’s earlier involvement with extreme political movements in the country. He was one of the first to mention the Patriots across Europe. In 2018, Bannon traveled extensively throughout Europe, attempting to organize far-right political movements with high voter potential and broad appeal to large constituencies in various countries. Bannon served as a chief advisor during Trump’s first presidential term and stated at a conference that the future of Europe would lie with an elite group of European patriots. Prior to the 2019 European Parliament elections, Bannon organized programs and conferences with leading far-right political movements in Europe. Prague was one of the European capitals Bannon visited during this process.

Steve Bannon was received by then-Czech president Miloš Zeman in September 2018. Bannon shared his experiences from the U.S. elections with Zeman for the 2019 European Parliament elections. Petr Bystron, a member of the German Federal Parliament and the Alternative for Germany (AfD), accompanied Bannon on this visit.

It is also noteworthy that former Czech president Miloš Zeman has increasingly shifted to the right and embraced anti-immigrant and anti-Islam political views since leaving the Social Democratic Party (CSSD), which he once led.

Brussels tense and cautious

As the leader of a political movement shifting from liberal to conservative values, Andrej Babiš ran his campaign under the slogan “Czech Republic First,” employing a tactic similar to Trump’s “America First” motto. Babiš won the election by prioritizing the interests of Czech citizens in his political discourse, including cutting off support to Ukraine during previous government terms. He frequently stated that he would prioritize the social interests of his citizens and that their needs came first. He emphasized his determination to end the supply of ammunition to Ukraine via the Czech Republic.

Experts say that Babiš clearly changed his political stance after the 2024 European Parliament elections, adopting a pro-Russian position within the EU and becoming one of Russia’s “Trojan horses.” The Czech Republic’s vocal objections to EU policies—alongside Slovakia and Hungary within the Visegrad Group—have drawn attention. Previously viewed as a reliable partner for Brussels under Prime Minister Fiala, the Czech Republic is now under Babiš’s leadership.

The presence of the Drivers’ Party (Motoristé Sobě) and Freedom and Direct Democracy (SPD) within the Patriots for Europe group as potential coalition partners is causing concern in Brussels regarding the Czech Republic’s future direction. Both parties are anti-EU and pro-Russia in their rhetoric and oppose aid to Ukraine. Brussels is also concerned that the Czech Republic’s new government may drift further from the European path. Together with countries such as Slovakia and Hungary, it could contribute to the expansion of an anti-EU movement.

The Czech Republic: Where the roads cross

The Czech Republic is located in the heart of Europe and is a member state of strategic importance to the EU in every respect. The Gazela pipeline, which transports natural gas from the Nord Stream pipelines to southern Germany and other Central European countries, gives the country strategic importance for European energy security. During the Fiala government, efforts were made to reduce dependence on Russian gas by highlighting alternative LNG supplies from Qatar and the United States via Poland. However, the lack of serious initiatives in this regard has led to increased energy costs due to supply shortages or transportation challenges in this economically struggling country.

Furthermore, the governance of the Czech Republic—an important NATO member—is significant in terms of Europe’s energy and military security, as well as the new groupings emerging in the EU political arena. Although ANO leader Babiš has made pro-EU and pro-NATO statements, EU leaders in Brussels remain unconvinced.

The future of the far right in the European political arena

The victory of a party that founded the Patriots for Europe group—which includes Europe’s far-right and racist parties and was established after the 2024 European Parliament elections—in an important EU country is also significant for the future of the far right or populist right. It is concerning that a party that can be categorically described as populist and right-wing, yet appears liberal in its rhetoric, is turning to the far right for power and embracing far-right and racist political discourse. However, focusing specifically on the Czech Republic, the loss of votes by far-right and racist parties such as the SPD suggests that relatively moderate right-wing parties could rise to power in other countries by adopting the rhetoric of the far right.

Moreover, these new political developments indicate an increase in political movements within EU member states that prioritize national interests over European interests. The EU bureaucracy itself is partly responsible for this situation. For a long time, EU bureaucrats and leaders have failed to foster a cohesive European identity, which has become increasingly diluted. Negotiations over issues not inherently European or not directly related to Europe, coupled with the vilification of national leaders and politicians defending their countries’ national interests against the EU in recent years, have paved the way for far-right or right-wing populist political movements in national elections. This has contributed to a shift from the center-right to the political fringe. This is precisely what is happening in the Czech Republic.

Following the October 3–4, 2025 elections, the Czech Republic is approaching a political turning point. The country continues to experience polarization and political fragmentation in an environment where the balance of power has shifted to the far right. Ultimately, Andrej Babiš is the leader of the party that was elected. Whether or not the EU favors Babiš, it must engage with him politically. It is within the EU’s power to leverage this relationship to its advantage. Time will tell whether Babiš—whom President Pavel will task with forming a government on November 3, 2025—will be truly pro-European or whether he will distance himself from his European partners. This new situation is of vital importance to the stability of Central Europe and the EU.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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n a political shift that reflects a broader trend in Europe, Portugal’s centre-right Democratic Alliance (AD) emerged victorious in Sunday’s general election, according to the party’s leader, Luis Montenegro. However, the path to forming a government remains uncertain, as Montenegro ruled out negotiations with the surging far-right Chega party, whose parliamentary representation quadrupled to at least 48 seats.

The rise of Chega has given the combined right a majority in the 230-seat legislature. This outcome signifies an unexpected move towards the far right in Portugal, a country that has historically been considered immune to the rise of right-wing populism in Europe. The election results echo a wider trend expected to manifest in gains for far-right parties across the continent in the upcoming European elections in June.

Pedro Nuno Santos, the leader of the left-leaning Socialist Party (PS), conceded defeat after a closely contested election. The PS, in power since 2015, secured the second position by a narrow margin. Montenegro, addressing supporters, emphasized that the AD had won the election and called for responsible actions by parties in the new parliament to fulfill the wishes of the Portuguese people.

A “negative alliance”

While Santos ruled out supporting the AD’s platform, which includes across-the-board tax cuts, Montenegro expressed hope that the PS and Chega would not form a “negative alliance” to thwart the desired government. President Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa is yet to formally invite the AD leader to form a government, a step that Montenegro anticipates.

The AD, along with conservative allies in the Madeira region, won a total of at least 79 seats, surpassing the PS’s 77. Four seats were pending attribution after the final count of ballots from abroad.

The far-right Chega party campaigned on an anti-establishment platform, focusing on eliminating corruption and expressing concerns about what it perceives as “excessive” immigration. Chega’s leader, Andre Ventura, asserted that the election results demonstrated the Portuguese people’s desire for a government comprising the AD and Chega.

A severe housing crisis

Amid concerns of potential political instability, AD supporters voiced their expectations at the election night party. Paula Medeiros stated that there was “no doubt that instability will be constant.” The PS and the Social Democratic Party (PSD), leading the newly formed AD, have alternated in power since the fall of the dictatorship in 1974.

Key issues dominating the campaign included a severe housing crisis, low wages, healthcare challenges, and widespread corruption. Despite these challenges, Portugal, under Socialist leadership, achieved solid economic growth and budget surpluses, earning praise from Brussels and investors. The AD’s approach to fiscal prudence will be closely monitored as it navigates forming a government in this new political landscape.

Source: Reuters

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ar-right and racist ideology in Europe has a deep-rooted history and has shown the ability to transform itself into a political movement through political parties. Due to the basic functions of political parties in pluralist democracies, namely representation, agenda setting, public relations, awareness raising, and aspirations to power, political party status is a tremendous tool for the social organization of far-right and racist movements.

Especially in recent years, far-right parties have experienced a serious upward trend in European politics and have strengthened their presence in all regions of the European geography. Far-right parties have gradually gained popular support in several European countries, especially in Germany, France, and Italy, and have achieved significant electoral success. They have thus succeeded in becoming integrated actors in European countries’ political institutions.

Political parties are an important instrument for the functioning of democracy. They represent different segments of society, formulate policies, and seek to reflect the will of the people through elections. The inability of left-wing, liberal, and conservative political parties to offer convincing alternative solutions to the electorates’ problems, and the fact that they are too fragmented and divided to form coalitions, is seen by far-right parties as a window of opportunity to gain power in the coming years.

Ideology of European far-right parties

Although the ideologies of far-right parties in different parts of Europe differ to some extent, they are based on common points and references. These can be defined under four headings:

– Nationalism and cultural identity: Far-right and racist parties emphasize nationalism and cultural identity, placing great importance on the superiority and interests of a country or nation. Far-right parties try to attract support by focusing on national pride, national values, and cultural identity. They usually seek to unite society under the guise of a “sense of belonging” by distinguishing between “us” and “them.”

– Authoritarianism and strong leadership: Strong authoritarian leaders influence their followers by advocating discriminatory and authoritarian policies. They try to exploit society’s security concerns by emphasizing issues such as safety, order, and harsh punishment. Authoritarian leadership is used by the far right to achieve its political goals and to govern society.

– Racism and anti-immigrant sentiment: Far-right parties adopt ideological elements such as racism and anti-immigrant sentiments and show discrimination and hostility towards other groups, while defending the superiority of their own ethnic or national group. Anti-immigrant sentiment is central to the policies of these parties and often includes harsh restrictions on immigrants, racial or cultural discrimination, and policies of ethnic cleansing.

– Populism: Far-right and racist parties often use populist rhetoric. Populism aims to mobilize support by exploiting people’s emotional and economic concerns. Far-right parties present simplistic messages and answers to appeal to broad sections of the population.

The ideologies of far-right parties are based on elements such as nationalism, authoritarianism, racism, and anti-immigrant sentiments. These ideologies can spread under the influence of factors such as social discontent, economic crises, cultural conflicts, and security concerns.

Following another devastating war in Europe, destruction and humanitarian disasters were omnipresent across the continent. The suffering caused by the war led to discontent and insecurity in society, and political instability and economic difficulties paved the way for the emergence of far-right parties. Meanwhile the banning of ideologies such as Fascism and Nazism caused some far-right groups to operate underground.

Thus, Europe’s dominant countries, especially Germany, did not accommodate far-right parties into their political systems and ensured that they remained marginalized for a long time. During this period, far-right parties transformed themselves in order to win votes in elections, taking into account local social developments and the cyclical variability of world politics.

Until the 1980s, neofascist political parties generally carried on the mission of the Fascist and Nazi parties of the past. Labor migration in Europe in the 1960s and 1970s led to an increase in the immigrant population. With the periodic economic crises since the 1990s, some segments of society have become concerned about immigrants and different cultures. Economic uncertainties such as rising unemployment, ever-worsening financial difficulties, and income inequality have led to anti-immigrant sentiments among the local populations.

Since the 2000s, there has been a new wave of migration to Europe and an increase in the foreign population on the continent due to terrorist attacks, economic problems, and the Arab Spring. Although far-right parties have not completely changed their neofascist formation so as to turn this dynamic into an opportunity, they have mobilized and expanded their existing support base by resorting to populist politics that rely on social discontent and concerns, anti-immigration sentiments, and xenophobia in order to reach large masses. Now, far-right parties have changed their guise and softened their neofascist and Nazi rhetoric in order to win the support of non-radicalized conservative masses. Islamophobia and anti-immigrant policies against “non-white” immigrants have increased their popularity and begun to win votes.

Since the beginning of the twentieth century, far-right parties have undergone their second evolution. True to their racist and anti-immigrant agenda, they have declared war on the globalizing world. Globalization refers to worldwide economic, political, social, and cultural interaction and integration, including elements such as advances in communication and transport technologies, free trade and investment policies, and the strengthening of international institutions. Globalization also features drawbacks such as income inequality, social and cultural conflicts, environmental degradation, and inequitable distribution of resources. The main reasons why far-right parties oppose globalization are nationalism, concerns about the loss of national sovereignty, economic effects (loss of wealth), and the preservation of cultural identity. While globalization brings about economic and cultural change, some parts of society react to this change.

Far-right parties, which have become the self-proclaimed “protectors” of the masses that find themselves on the losing end of the new globalized world, aim to convince the isolated masses that there are easy solutions to their problems through populist discourses and by mobilizing their thoughts and emotions against a specific enemy. Far-right parties, with their hatred of Islam and immigrants, and their stance against globalization, have gained serious momentum with the economic crisis triggered by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War.

The rise of far-right parties in Europe

The rise of far-right parties in Europe has attracted attention and concern in recent years. Understanding the factors behind this rise will help us to understand the popularity and influence of far-right parties. Factors such as migration, economic uncertainty, cultural concerns, emphasis on national identity, and political crises are important factors influencing the rise of the far right.

Migration is an important factor in the rise of extreme right-wing parties. The large waves of migration and the so-called refugee crises in Europe have raised security concerns and fears of cultural conflict in certain milieus. Far-right parties use the issue of migration to spread fear and anxiety among the population and advocate harsh and restrictive immigration policies.

Economic insecurity and social injustice are other factors that have increased the popularity of far-right parties. Problems such as economic recession, unemployment, and income inequality drive people towards far-right parties. In particular, the loss of people’s welfare due to the global economic devastation caused by the pandemic and the Russia-Ukraine War have led to the far right’s emphasis on economic nationalism and protectionist policies finding a response in society.

Cultural concerns in Europe and the emphasis on national identity can also be linked to the rise of far-right parties. The issues of cultural diversity and the protection of cultural values are an important concern for a significant part of society. By emphasizing national identity, far-right parties exploit cultural concerns and advocate cultural protectionism.

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he global ascent of the far right has become an alarming phenomenon, amplified by the distressing normalization of right-wing extremism. From the U.S. to countries across Europe, far right movements have branched out by displaying variation while retaining their core foundations of violence and hatred, and have adeptly aligned themselves with contemporary political issues, exploiting the expansive reach of online platforms to propagate their ideologies.

Right-wing terrorism has swiftly emerged as the rapidest growing and, in some cases, the most prominent domestic security menace, as underscored by the UN Security Council Counter-Terrorism Committee—not to mention the far right’s harmful everyday rhetoric towards migrants and people of color.

In the United States, the number of far right extremist attacks has surpassed other acts of terrorism. The reverberations of heinous incidents like the Pittsburgh synagogue shooting and the Christchurch mosque shootings remain indelible reminders of the terror wrought by far right militants. From eco-fascists to white supremacists, this month’s book bundle encompasses various prominent and influential far-right movements.

By examining the complexities of far right ideologies, their metamorphosis over time, and the necessary measures to confront them, this collection presents an invaluable resource for comprehending and engaging with this pressing global concern.

In Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism, Daniel L. Byman presents a comprehensive analysis of the global white power movement, its appeal, and the imminent threat it poses. Byman’s authoritative account spans the movement’s evolution in the United States and worldwide, shedding light on its multifaceted nature.

Drawing from a wide array of sources, Byman dispels prevalent myths surrounding white power terrorism and exposes critical deficiencies in current policies. This negligence towards growing far-right terrorism has resulted in shocking acts of violence, corroding trust in democratic institutions. Byman emphasizes that mitigating this threat necessitates swift and resolute action from governments, treating white power terrorism with the same urgency as jihadist violence.

Byman highlights how white power terrorists exploit mainstream debates, amplifying polarization and yielding significant political impact, even if the death toll remains relatively low. Contrary to popular belief, the movement is not entrenched in a rigid ideology: it is dynamic, draws inspiration from global sources and leverages cutting-edge technologies, particularly social media.

While white power terrorists exhibit vulnerabilities, such as internal divisions, lackluster leadership, and attracting not only dangerous and deluded individuals but also the inept and criminal, their potential for harm remains potent.

Mitigating the dangers of right-wing terrorism entail measures such as robust law enforcement, international intelligence cooperation, stringent regulations imposed by technology companies, and other forceful interventions. Byman not only examines policy solutions but also synthesizes extensive scholarly research, making Spreading Hate essential reading for those concerned about an increasingly interconnected movement that in the years to come harbors the potential to escalate in perilousness.

Daniel Byman, Spreading Hate: The Global Rise of White Supremacist Terrorism (Oxford University Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780197537619, 288 pages

The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right delves into the connection between the climate crisis and the rise of the far right, examining their historical roots and contemporary manifestations. By exploring the far right’s evolving stance on the environment, Sam Moore and Alex Roberts reveal a shift in strategy as they come to recognize the impending crisis as an opportunity for resurgence, moving beyond climate denial to conspiracy.

Far right ecologism is brewing within online circles and manifesting as violence on the ground. The authors argue that ecofascism’s dangerous ideology, steeped in hatred is not the answer. Instead, a genuine commitment to climate justice is crucial to combat both the far right and the environmental challenges we face. A must-read for anyone interested in learning about the trend in right-wing extremism or advocating for climate justice, this book offers a powerful critique of emerging ecofascism.

Sam Moore and Alex Roberts, The Rise of Ecofascism: Climate Change and the Far Right (Polity Press, 2022) ISBN: 978-1-509-54537-7, 160 pages

When the Hood Comes Off: Racism and Resistance in the Digital Age is a timely and comprehensive exploration that delves into the manifestations of racism in the digital realm, shedding light on the emerging antiracist strategies deployed to combat it.

Rob Eschmann skillfully weaves together meticulous research and captivating personal anecdotes to uncover how racism thrives online, challenging the notion of a colorblind society. From viral videos capturing police violence against unarmed Black individuals to the exposure of racist messages and hurtful comments on social media platforms, online communication lays bare the workings of racism in our world.

In this thought-provoking study, Eschmann not only examines the impact of online racism on communities of color and society at large, but also uncovers the unexpected ways in which digital technologies facilitate innovative tools of everyday antiracist resistance.

By drawing from a vast array of data, including insightful interviews with students of color and meticulous analyses of millions of social media posts spanning a decade, Eschmann delves into the influence of online communication on face-to-face interactions.

When the Hood Comes Off underscores the internet’s potential as a powerful organizing tool, exposing the transformative power it holds. Furthermore, the book serves as a poignant reminder that online racism can serve as a profound wake-up call, prompting us to reflect on our own responses and actions.

In a world grappling with the implications of pervasive online racism, When the Hood Comes Off: Racism and Resistance in the Digital Age invites readers to contemplate the crucial question of how we will collectively respond to this urgent challenge. Eschmann’s work is a vital contribution to the ongoing conversation surrounding racism and provides valuable insights into harnessing the potential of the digital landscape for meaningful antiracist efforts.

Rob Eschmann, When the Hood Comes Off: Racism and Resistance in the Digital Age (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520379749, 312 pages

Ukraine’s Azov Movement has emerged as one of the most audacious and perilous far-right movements worldwide. What are its core values and goals? From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right is groundbreaking as the first book to be written in English about Azov. Michael Colborne unveils the origins and rapid evolution of the movement, transforming from a militia composed of marginal far right individuals and football hooligans fighting against Russian-backed forces to a multifaceted social movement that has attracted global far-right admiration.

Colborne delves into the intricate mechanisms through which the Azov Movement emerged and adeptly exploits Ukraine’s fragmented social and political landscape, including the ongoing conflict following Russia’s invasion. From the Fires of War astutely reveals the movement’s grand ambitions and the threats it poses.

Michael Colborne, From the Fires of War: Ukraine’s Azov Movement and the Global Far Right (ibidem Press, 2022) ISBN: 9783838215082, 200 pages

On February 19, 2020, the right-wing extremist terrorist Tobias R. shot nine people with a migration background in a café in Hanau, Germany. The xenophobic attack targeted Muslims and showed that Germany has a serious problem with radical right-wing terror. The new German government declared that it wants to fight right-wing terror, and now, the question is how serious Germany is about this declaration.

Right-wing extremism is not a new phenomenon

Since the end of World War II, right-wing extremist ideas have been a taboo in Germany, and the aim has been to “de-Nazify” the German population. The strategy was to prevent a similar scenario to that which occurred between 1933 and 1945. Despite this, right-wing extremist political currents can still be found today. In addition to the minor parties NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) and Der Dritte Weg (The Third Path) or the right-wing extremist movements PEGIDA (Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the Occident) and Identitäre Bewegung (Identitarian movement), the AfD (Alternative for Germany) is a symbol of how strongly right-wing extremism is present at the political level in Germany.

The entry of the AfD into the German parliament in 2017 as the biggest opposition party and the re-election of the right-wing extremist party to parliament in 2021 show that right-wing extremism is not a temporary problem but one that has deeper roots.

Although right-wing extremist attacks were a problem for society as a whole in Germany, it was not until the reunification of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1990 that the Federal Criminal Police Office of Germany (BKA) began to collect statistics for victims of right-wing extremist attacks. In 2002, the BKA introduced the system of definitions known as “Politically Motivated Crime” (PMK-System) in order to better record the number of victims. The system is considered inaccurate, and as a result the BKA’s victim figures differ from the victim figures of non-governmental organizations.

The federal government has been recording the number of victims of right-wing extremist attacks since 1990; as of September 2020, 109 victims have been registered. The newspapers Frankfurter Rundschau, Der Tagesspiegel, and Die Zeit, after a joint investigative research, recorded 187 victims for the same period; the Amadeu Antonio Foundation counts at least 213 victims.

Muslims are the main target

Since the reunification of Germany, Muslims have been the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. Between 1991 and 1993, there was an increase in racist attacks among the German population. At that time, the asylum debate was a very controversial issue, which is why asylum seekers were the main target of right-wing extremist attacks. The riots in Hoyerswerda (1991) and Rostock-Lichtenhagen (1992) were sensitive because the police, in particular, took a passive stance and even fuelled the mood against foreign citizens through populist statements.

Attack in Hanau – Insecurity grows for Muslims

On February 19, 2020, a right-wing extremist attack occurred in Hanau in which nine people with migration background were killed, six of them were Muslims. Politicians reacted to the attack with shock. Angela Merkel, chancellor at the time, said that racism is a poison and that such attacks were aimed at dividing society. The far-right party AfD did not make a clear statement and did not classify the attack as politically motivated or right-wing extremism, but as an act of a a lone wolf.

German public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize the problem of right-wing extremism.

The fact that the general public reacted with shock to the attack in Hanau shows that Germany does not realize – or does not want to accept – the problem of right-wing extremism, especially against Muslims. The number of right-wing extremist attacks on Muslims and their religious institutions increases every year. In 2020, the German Federal Ministry of the Interior (BMI) recorded 1,026 Islamophobic attacks, 103 of which were directed against mosques.

In 2010, the BMI recorded “only” 22 attacks on mosques. In 2022, armed attacks on mosques and Muslims continue. A desecration of 30 Muslim graves in Iserlohn, an arson attack on a mosque in Chemnitz, and an armed attack on praying Muslims in Halle are current examples of how Muslims in Germany have to live – namely, in fear of hate attacks because of their faith.

Federal government remains passive – until now?

Under Merkel, Germany did not always prioritize the problem of right-wing extremist attacks. The statements by former interior minister Horst Seehofer (CSU) that Islam does not belong in Germany, the book by Thilo Sarrazin (SPD) Germany Abolishes Itself (Deutschland schafft sich ab), and the xenophobic statements by Tübingen mayor Boris Palmer (Greens) show that Islamophobic ideas can be found in all political parties. With the murder of politician Walter Lübcke (CDU) in 2019, Germany was punished for its passivity: the district president of Kassel had spoken out in support of refugees and was subsequently killed by right-wing extremist Stephan Ernst.

The roots of right-wing extremism in Germany run deep. The AfD and other parties have members who hold xenophobic views. The new minister of the interior, Nancy Faeser (SPD), at least gave some hope of Islam being accepted in German politics and society when she stated, “Islam, of course, belongs in Germany.

However, the number of victims and attacks on mosques show that the tendency further excludes Muslims from society. If Germany wants to preserve a stable political environment and avoid further polarization in society, it must be more active. Otherwise, Otherwise, more German state officials could become victims of right-wing extremist terror along with countless other innocent civilians, as in the case of Walter Lübcke.

The Chilean protests which started in October 2019, triggered by a rise in metro fares and expanding to demand an overhaul of the dictatorship constitution, eroded the veneer of a so-called prosperous country, if the World Bank were to be taken seriously. One of the fastest growing economies that thrives upon social inequalities, Chile’s restricted affluence can be traced back to the neoliberal experiment unleashed upon the country on September 11, 1973.

The US-backed coup which ousted socialist President Salvador Allende and backed dictator Augusto Pinochet, embarked upon a terrifying operation to rid the country of any left-wing mobilization. Torture, murder and disappearances of dictatorship opponents in over 1,200 detention and torture centers ushered in the neoliberal phase for Chile.

An essay penned by Orlando Letelier who was assassinated in the US by the Chilean’s National Intelligence Directorate (DINA),  illustrates how the “Chicago Boys” – a group of Chilean economists trained by Milton Friedman, were involved in the dictatorship coup and supplemented the repression with neoliberal policies. An economic plan for Chile that was funded by the CIA.

Closer to home, the US-backed Brazilian dictatorship also played a role in Chile’s destabilization. The US perceived Brazil under dictatorship rule as a strategic partner for the US in Latin America, to “try and prevent new Allendes and Castros and try where possible to reverse these trends.” Brazil also made a first bid to lead the US-funded Operation Condor in Latin America which resulted in the killing of at least 60,000 people – a plan that sought to purge the region of left-wing influence, failing to take the helm only due to opposition from other countries, including Chile and Argentina.

Decades later, Chile and Brazil are still plagued by their right-wing history of repression, re-enacted in democratically elected governments which rely upon military tactics for population control, particularly the indigenous communities, which stand as a final bulwark against the exploitation of land and resources.

The Chilean experience may be somewhat ahead in terms of collective memory and human rights, but the military still holds sway over government and society. The right-wing in Chile has, for example, lobbied for clemency with regard to dictatorship-era agents and torturers serving life sentences, while the military continues to hold their archives away from scrutiny, thus leaving many gaps in dictatorship narratives, particularly when it comes to the disappeared, which number over 3000 people who were buried in mass graves or disposed of in the ocean through the death flights.

US President Joe Biden has announced a multi-million dollar deal negotiation with Brazil, ostensibly to fight deforestation. Activists, however, have warned of the likelihood of the deal rewarding Bolsonaro to the contrary. In 2020, 40% of deforestation occurred in Brazil, spearheaded by the same environment minister Ricardo Salles who is negotiating the deal with the US.

It is likely that Brazil is looking for accomplices in deforestation rather than conservation, given that billions of untouched funds for the Amazon have been refused by Salles due to disagreements about conditions.

In a similar manner, the Chilean anti-terror legislation from the dictatorship era has been applied to the Mapuche people. The infamous Pinochet statement negating the existence of the Mapuche was not mere marginalization. It set the scene for agrarian industries in the Araucania region and a permanent loss of land even after the fall of the dictatorship, when ancestral Mapuche lands were exploited by multinational companies – forestry, mining and hydroelectric power.

One of Piñera’s electoral promises was the industrialization of the Araucania region and modifications to the anti-terror law, making it easier to prosecute Mapuche activists and thwart resistance for land reclamation and conservation.

The systematic targeting of the Mapuche, as well as environmental activists – the most prominent recent case being that of Camilo Catrillanca who was killed by a special squad known as the Commando Jungla – has led to increased state violence, with several activists being found dead in suspicious circumstances after Chile withdrew from the Escazu Agreement. A definitive confirmation of the Pinera government’s refusal to sign the agreement was communicated in 2020.

The result of such policies in both Brazil and Chile is the impoverishment of territory that is rich in resources, while at the same time exacerbating social inequalities. Chile’s transition to democracy, for example, and the election of center-left governments, did little in terms of policy to reverse Pinochet’s legacy.

Civilian mobilization since 2019 can be credited with the government’s relenting to public pressure and holding a referendum on whether the dictatorship constitution should be scrapped. The senate has agreed to postpone electing a constitutional assembly to rewrite the constitution due to an increase in coronavirus infections in Chile.

Currently, both Piñera and Bolsonaro are facing backlash in their respective countries, where mismanagement of the coronavirus pandemic as well as social inequalities have risen to the helm. However, both countries are somewhat shielded by the normalization of their dictatorship history, where neoliberal profit was an incentive to gloss over human rights violations against civilians.

The regurgitated story of economic gain as a result of US-backed coups is not just part of a historical narrative that obliterates the story of the repressed. While intervention may not be the preferable political option, maintaining the status quo enforced through dictatorship violence has become a key feature of both right wing governments in Brazil and Chile.

Following the terrorist attack on Christchurch mosques, on March 15, 2019, the Royal Commission of Inquiry took on an investigation to cast light on the dreadful incident in order to reduce the risk of future attacks to stand in solidarity with those who lost family members and the community as a whole. Nihan Duran interviewed Anjum Rahman, a founding member of the Islamic Women’s Council of New Zealand, on the overall conditions of Muslim communities in New Zealand.

Q. The terrorist attacks in Christchurch shocked the world and caused deep sorrow. As a founding member of the Islamic Women’s Council of New Zealand and as a member of the community that has suffered from the attacks, how do you evaluate the overall situation of the Muslim community in New Zealand?

New Zealand is generally a peaceful place and I think Muslims have so long felt comfortable and peaceful here. We are able to build our businesses, build mosques, pray, fast, wear hijabs – we can do all the activities that we wish. And generally, we can do them without too much interference. But there were undertones of discrimination, and we particularly felt it when there were incidents overseas, such as the September 11 attacks in the U.S. in 2001, or the more recent attacks in France.

When things happen overseas, there is often a reaction against Muslims locally. So, from around 2015 and onwards, we could feel that there was an increase in the level of negativity, such as people yelling at you, not serving you well in a store, making unpleasant comments in the classroom. And we know that Muslim women are particularly targeted since they are more visible with their hijab.

Q. So, especially after 2015, one could foresee or perhaps expect a terrorist attack against Muslims, given the rise of social media where anti-Muslim sentiments spread instantly. Could you elaborate on this?

This is where the chapter in the life of the terrorist is quite important. Brenton Tarrant grew up in Australia. As is common in many terrorist profiles, there was family violence in his childhood and, in this case, Tarrant experienced violence from a partner of his mother to the extent that they had to seek legal protection against him.

Tarrant grew up in an environment where there was a lot of anti-Muslim talk in the media and in the political realm; he grew up during the John Howard years when there was a lot of negative commentary in the media against Muslims.

Consequently, in March 2017, we met with high-ranking officials and discussed the rise of white supremacy, far right extremism, and the neo-Nazi movement. We found that they were becoming more organized in New Zealand. We felt that they were more active but, of course, we are a community organization, so we couldn’t collect statistics or data as evidence. All that we could present were reports of incidents from Muslim women.

We also met with the Minister for the Secret Intelligence Service and the Government Communications Security Bureau, which are the agencies that engage in intelligence gathering activities for counterterrorism. We told the Minister that we are concerned by events overseas and domestic, and that we wanted to be assured that the agencies are taking care of such a threat.

At that time, in March 2017, we were told not to worry, that it was only an overseas problem, and it was not a particular problem in New Zealand. Clearly in the Minister’s mind, it was not perceived as a threat.

Q. In line with your last remark, what drew my attention in the report is that the Commission admits on page 15 that “the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service had concentrated its scarce counter-terrorism resources on the threat of Islamist extremist terrorism.” Do you think that this contributed to the attack on the Christchurch mosques not being properly foreseen?

Yes, what we see in the report is that the state agencies were focusing on “Islamist extremism.” Due to their overseas partnerships, they received intelligence mostly about one particular type of extremism. As New Zealand is a small country, they didn’t have tools for complicated intelligence activities, at least not until 2018.

But what is disappointing in the report is that intelligence services were not looking for far-right extremist or white supremacist threats. Consequently, there was nobody to be held accountable before the incident happened.

Why do we have security and intelligence services if they are unable to prevent attacks like this? We believe that if they had been vigilant to different types of extremisms in the country, they would have stood a chance to prevent the Christchurch attack. We are deeply disappointed with this finding in the report.

Q. How well do you think the findings in the report expose the dreadful incident? Do you believe the new measures are sufficient to tackle the existing challenges and help reduce the risk of future attacks?

The report’s time scope is very limited. We do not have an inquiry by the Australian government on the terrorist Brenton Tarrant’s life and the stages of his radicalization. We know that by January 2017, his sister had concerns for his mental health.

We know that in December 2018, a couple of months before the terrorist attack, his mother came to visit him in New Zealand and she had significant concerns about him, with regards to his views and his state of mind. These examples show the stages of radicalization. If he had got the appropriate help at that time, maybe something could have been different.

The bigger question is how we prevent people from going down this path of extreme hate

The report states that there are many people making similar hateful comments so there is nothing that makes a person like him special. However, the number of hateful comments was so high. I don’t know how the government monitors hate speech.

It is clear that such a high level of hate speech and threats did not alarm the government agencies. But we need to stop people going down that track. So, the bigger question is how we prevent people from going down this path of extreme hate.

Q. What about the role of biases in impeding your efforts to warn the government for a potential upcoming threat?

When we spoke to high-level state officials in 2017, they did not take our experiences into account. And I think this is somehow linked to their biased view that Muslim women are “weak” and “submissive.” They just did not take us seriously and this needs to change.

Yes, we are still able to speak to the government, to speak to ministers or civil servants, and express ourselves in the media. Also, when the report came out, we had the opportunity to share our views and to speak clearly about the things that we were unhappy with. And I think, for me, as a Muslim, our duty is to make the effort. You are there to make sure that they are accountable to your community.

Q. In the report, it is frequently stated that New Zealand is home to Muslim communities and that Muslims should feel safe there. How do you feel today as a Muslim woman in New Zealand?

Despite everything, I do not think I would live anywhere else. New Zealand is still one of the safest countries. The response by the country to the attacks was overwhelmingly positive.

Every mosque in the country had thousands of visitors, people kept coming, brought gifts, flowers, and as if they were our neighbors and friends, they sincerely asked what they could do or how they could support us.

Yes, all the concerns that I addressed are still there. There are people who are being radicalized, going down the path of hate in social media. The systemic and institutional discrimination is still there. But for me, this is my country, and this is my home. I do not belong anywhere else.

Norberto Bobbio (1909-2004), the erudite Italian philosopher, noted that the distinction between ideological right and left lies “in the different attitudes that both sides automatically assume towards the idea of inequality.”

Latin America is a region with the highest inequality gap – even higher than Sub-Saharan Africa. For instance, in the report by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), dated December 2019, the richest 10% in Latin America owns 37% of the total wealth, while the poorest 40% owns a mere 13%.

According to the recipient of the Nobel Prize in Economics Joseph Stiglitz this gap is a legacy of the region’s colonial past. At the same time, history has usually placed corrupt leaders in power.

But how can a place like Latin America with such shameful indicators and a notorious legacy of violence and social turmoil experience a surge in the arrival to power of regimes identified as ultraright? Of regimes whose purpose is to defend the privileges of a small portion of the society at the expense of the majority. It seems that the colonial mentality never really left the Andes.

Slightly more than 13 years ago, in November 2007, at the Ibero-American Summit in Santiago, Chile, the President of Colombia Álvaro Uribe, the icon of the continent’s right-wing politics, was the summit’s black sheep when seen alongside his counterparts from Chile (Michelle Bachelet), Brazil (Lula da Silva), Venezuela (Hugo Chávez), Argentina (Cristina Fernández), Ecuador (Rafael Correa), and a handful of other Latin American presidents from the left.

Today, if a picture at the same summit were to be taken, it would be very different. Even though countries like Argentina and recently Bolivia have seen a comeback to power of leftist leaders, nations like Colombia, Brazil, Honduras, Guatemala, Chile, Uruguay, and Paraguay keep moving towards the right.

In countries like Venezuela, Mexico, and Bolivia, where left governments steer the wheel of their democracies, right-wing supporters are in constant watch for any opportunity to seize power in the next elections.

The right-wing Venezuelan opposition seems confident of the support of the hawkish U.S. establishment and doesn’t even consider that a democratic path to regain power is necessary as several pleas have been made for a U.S. military intervention to overthrow President Nicolás Maduro.

The right-wing Venezuelan opposition seems confident of the support of the hawkish U.S. establishment and doesn’t even consider that a democratic path to regain power is necessary.

According to some thinkers, Latin America is conceptualized as “America’s Backyard.” As the United States’ empire faces increasing challenges as a dominant superpower as a result of the rise of China, Russia, and smaller regional powers in Asia, Africa, and Europe that are stepping up their influence worldwide, Latin America seems to be turning into an “Alamo” of U.S. foreign diplomacy.

Right-wing regimes in Colombia, Brazil, Guatemala, and Honduras have some common values with Republicans in Washington, where the Evangelical voters matter the most. Jair Bolsonaro was elected with nearly 58 million votes as the president of Brazil, the most populous country in Latin America.

Evangelical voters, which constitute 30% of Brazil’s population, support the most radical right-wing parties and proved a goldmine for Bolsonaro’s victory.

Evangelical voters are having an ever-growing influence on Central American countries as well. Forty percent of voters in Guatemala, the most populated country in the subcontinent with more than 17 million people, are evangelical Christians; in Honduras, evangelicals account for 32% of voters, in El Salvador 31%, and in Costa Rica around 25%. El Salvador, one of the countries with higher immigration rates from the Middle East and whose president Nayib Bukele is a descendant of Palestinian immigrants, is very obedient to what Washington dictates.

Evangelical voters are having an ever-growing influence on Central American countries as well. Forty percent of voters in Guatemala, the most populated country in the subcontinent with more than 17 million people, are evangelical Christian.

Bukele, who considers himself “not religious” as he stated once on social media, relied on the evangelical vote to win the presidential elections. Bukele even had close contact with Trump’s evangelical pastors and one of his first visits to a foreign country after his inauguration was to Israel, a time-honored tradition of every U.S. president.

Guatemala’s president, Jimmy Morales, a declared Christian Zionist, moved his country’s embassy in Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem in May 2018. Morales stepped down from the presidency of Guatemala last January 14, 2020, when the elected Alejandro Giammatei, an ultra-conservative politician assumed power after winning the election with 58% of the votes.

But the growing influence of evangelical Zionists is not the only drive for the establishment and solidification of far-right regimes in Latin America. Colombia’s turbulent political past is perpetuated by the current president, Iván Duque, who follows in the tradition of right-wing leaders who claim that “Colombia will become another Venezuela,” if a leftist government is elected.

Even though some voices in the Colombian political spectrum consider Juan Manuel Santos, a former president and a winner of the Nobel Peace Prize, a leftist, he undoubtedly belongs to the traditional establishment.

Gustavo Petro, a former leftist guerrilla fighter in the 1970s and 1980s, lost the 2018 presidential elections by nearly two million votes to a candidate most of the country calls “Uribe’s candidate” – a reference to the controversial former Colombian president Álvaro Uribe, who was known to be a close ally of the U.S. and an advocate of neoliberalism and ultraright politics.

Gustavo Petro, proposing a more liberal agenda in the social, environmental, and economic fronts, will probably run again next year, but his past as a militant of a revolutionary guerrilla scares a big portion of Colombia’s population. This fear is exacerbated by the pro-right media in the country, which depicts him as a “new Chávez” or a “communist thug.” As Colombians have fresh memories from the 50-year-long internal conflict with Marxist guerrillas, this profile is not appealing.

Despite cases like Cuba, with 60 years of resistance against the U.S. sanctions, Venezuela and its more than two-decade-long legacy of Chávez, and the strong growing liberal movements in Chile, Argentina, and Mexico, the shadow of old-fashioned colonialism in new clothes is being cast over the region’s shores and mountains more strongly than ever. Operation Condor seems to have found plenty of loyal allies among the people of Latin America.

According to the official French narrative, the “values ​​of the Republic” express the citizens’ affiliation to the country and their perception of themselves. Therefore, the concept of the nation is inherent in the concept of the “Republic.”

The French concept of the “Republic” is not limited to the abstract political system and its institutions; it also evokes historical moments and symbols dating back to the French Revolution and with it comes a package of values, meanings, ideas, charters, and legislation.

On this basis, specific values and intellectual commitments are presented as conditional to the French identity, defining whether one belongs to the “French nation” or is excluded from French society. Currently, French Muslims are subjected to this trial.

In a speech on October 2, 2020, President Emmanuel Macron coined the term “Islamic separatism” by stating that the Muslim suburbs, which he described as “ghettos,” have been witnessing a tendency to secede from the Republic. He then asked the representatives of Muslim institutions in France, when he summoned them on November 18, to illustrate their commitment to a “charter of republican values” and sign it within a few days. He stipulated the inclusion of specific contents in this charter, one of which was to strictly define Islam as a belief and not a political movement.

It should be noted that Macron exclusively asked the Muslim citizens of France to declare this special loyalty to the Republic by resorting to drawing up this new charter — as if the general charters and legal texts do not suffice or make an exception for Muslims citizens, like for instance the Charte de laïcité, which has been present in every classroom for years.

The campaign against “separatism” does not target mosques alone; it also pursues civil society organizations such as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), an organization that works against racism and discrimination.

In the context of the 2013 debate revolving around Islam and Muslims, warnings were raised about secularism being “under threat” and that “the values ​​of the Republic are in danger.”

This resulted in the “secularism charter” being issued for schools. However, the political values, which emphasize the strict separation of religion and politics, did not prevent senior French politicians from dictating a specific direction of religious practice and Muslim presence, enforced through a Council of Imams that would allow control, for example, of the sites of the imamah and the rhetoric in mosques.

The above official orders are accompanied by the cultural examination and placement of French Muslims, their mosques, and institutions under the political microscope, and successive announcements of the closure of dozens of their institutions and mosques.

The campaign against “separatism” does not target mosques alone; it also pursues civil society organizations such as the Collective Against Islamophobia in France (CCIF), an organization that works against racism and discrimination.

These developments came in the context of a wave of heightened populism that has been mounting in France since the end of the summer of 2020. On September 17, for instance, deputies boycotted a parliament meeting attended by Maryam Pougetoux, the president of the Students’ Union at the Paris-Sorbonne University (UNEF), because she is a Muslim who wears a headscarf, which allegedly contradicts the stipulated “values ​​of the Republic.”

This coincided with the start of the trial against those accused of carrying out the Charlie Hebdo attack, and the satirical newspaper’s continued publication of comics that are insulting to Muslims and their beliefs.

Following this, a number of bloody assaults took place, including the brutal murder of a French teacher and the killings in Notre-Dame de Nice by a homeless man who had just entered the country a few days prior to the attack.

One of the possible interpretations of “separatism” in this context includes some aspects of cultural diversity and the right to difference.

However, this concept of “separatism” is hazy and loose, raising the fear that it could be abused by politicians and the executive bodies in a country where the extreme right is aggressively rising and trying to sweep the elections.

One of the possible interpretations of “separatism” in this context includes some aspects of cultural diversity and the right to difference. In any case, it is clear that some of the leading French elites are used to showing discontent with manifestations of diversity in the public sphere. Even the former French Minister of the Interior Gerard Collomb described the appearance of Pougetoux on a French television screen on May 19, 2018 as a “shocking matter” due to her being “different from French society.”

There are clear contradictions emerging from this cultural campaign of the new ruling class in France that mixes political and electoral interests and politically aligned business leaders and entrepreneurs.

The most evident example is that the same government that speaks of freedom is now seeking to restrict other freedoms and expand the powers of the police and security forces, causing nationwide fear and protest.

The brutal attack on the black music producer Michel Zecler on November 21 was a shocking point in this development, since the recorded incident brought to mind the persistent complaints of suburban residents in regard to police brutality and the suspected racist motives behind it.

Freedom of expression as a public value has increasingly been stressed during the cultural escalation in France, especially since the armed attack on the Charlie Hebdo office in 2015. At the time, President François Hollande rallied with world leaders in a march that was also joined by French Muslims and representatives of their institutions despite the fact that they were being targeted by the humiliating comics in the satirical newspaper.

These comics together with the slogan “Je suis Charlie” turned into a cultural expression linked to the values ​​of the Republic. However, the unprecedented emphasis on freedom of expression has paradoxically been accompanied by increasing insults and contempt directed at Muslims and their religion, with officials not expressing the slightest discomfort about these offenses.

Invoking freedom of expression in this selective manner has placed the French official discourse in a crisis of credibility. The French leadership ignores the reference to this freedom in other situations and does not welcome content that does not suit its taste – in fact, it even resorts to measures to curb it.

Marco Perolini, a discrimination and racism researcher at Amnesty International, wrote, “The French government is not the champion of free speech that it likes to think it is.”