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urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said Wednesday that he “sincerely believes” Türkiye and Greece should keep dialogue channels open on the basis of cooperation as two neighbors and NATO allies.

Erdoğan spoke at a joint news conference in Ankara with Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis following their talks held within the framework of the 6th meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council.

Erdoğan said they once again discussed their positions on the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean in an open and frank manner.

“Although the existing issues are complicated, they are not unsolvable within the framework of international law. What is needed is goodwill, constructive dialogue and the will to reach a solution,” he said, adding that he was pleased to see that he and Mitsotakis shared a similar understanding.

The Turkish president recalled his visit to Athens on December 7, 2023, when both sides registered their commitment to maintaining dialogue and improving relations through the Athens Declaration. He said the leaders reviewed how to advance ties further through a positive agenda.

Trade and economic cooperation

Erdoğan expressed hope that the documents signed during the visit would strengthen the contractual basis of bilateral relations.

He noted that the two countries continue to work toward their goal of increasing bilateral trade from nearly $7 billion last year to $10 billion. Business councils from both sides also met to explore new opportunities, he added.

Erdoğan said he also conveyed Türkiye’s expectations regarding the fight against terrorism and organized crime.

“We must act with a sense of historical responsibility regarding minorities, which constitute the human dimension of our relations,” he said. Erdoğan reiterated expectations that the Turkish minority in Western Thrace should fully benefit from religious freedoms and educational opportunities.

Regional developments

The two leaders also discussed regional issues, including Gaza and Syria.

Erdoğan said Türkiye rejects Israel’s recent decisions aimed at expanding control in the West Bank and weakening the Palestinian administration. He stressed that lasting peace and stability in the Middle East can only be achieved through a just two-state solution.

He voiced hope that Greece, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council for 2025-2026, would keep the two-state perspective on the council’s agenda.

On Syria, Erdoğan underlined the importance of stability and preserving the country’s territorial integrity, adding that Türkiye’s constructive role contributes not only to Syria but also to the security of Greece and Europe.

“As two neighbors and allies, I sincerely believe we must keep dialogue channels open with an understanding based on cooperation,” he said.

Mitsotakis: Meetings show value of good neighborly ties

Mitsotakis thanked Erdoğan for the hospitality and said the meetings in Ankara demonstrated how valuable dialogue and good neighborly relations are.

He recalled that in 2023 the two sides made a strategic choice to develop contacts based on political dialogue, a positive agenda and confidence-building measures.

“Through open channels of communication, we had the opportunity to address the issues between us,” he said, adding that Greece remains committed to continuing cooperation in good faith and mutual respect.

Mitsotakis said cooperation with Türkiye on irregular migration had been very productive, noting a 60% decrease in illegal migration in 2026.

He also praised the short-term visa scheme that enabled hundreds of thousands of Turkish citizens to visit Greek islands, saying it helped bring the two peoples closer. Athens will work with the European Union to continue the practice, he added.

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evelopments in the Aegean Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean, which surround Turkey’s 4,000-kilometer coastline and over which Turkey has sovereign rights, are of great importance to Turkey. In light of recent developments in the Aegean Sea and Eastern Mediterranean, predictions of possible developments in 2024 are also important in this regard. In the recent past, Turkey has shown a determined attitude in defending its sovereign rights in the seas and airspace of these two important regions.

In the Aegean Sea, Turkey has maintained its stance against Greece’s expansion of its territorial waters and the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands, as well as its legal position on the delimitation of the continental shelf. In the Eastern Mediterranean, Turkey has continued its actions to protect its continental shelf rights and to protect the rights of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC). At the same time, Turkey has sought to improve its bilateral relations with Greece, Egypt, and Israel. As a result, local tensions stemming from fundamental problems in both the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean have decreased significantly.

This analysis will focus on whether there are threats to this positive trend in 2024, especially after Israel’s ongoing attacks on Gaza that began in early October 2023 and possible Turkish positions vis-à-vis such threats.

Turkey’s Approach to the Aegean Problems in the Recent Past

The deterioration of relations between Turkey and Greece, especially since 2016, has led to serious tensions over existing core issues in the Aegean. Issues such as the arming of the Eastern Aegean islands and Greece’s national airspace have led to concrete frictions. In early 2021, consultative talks between the two countries resumed, but they were broken off after only three rounds. Greece’s efforts to persuade the U.S. to take a position against Turkey led to the suspension of all talks, including high-level ones.

However, both countries are aware of the fact that even if bilateral problems cannot be solved, as neighbors, it is necessary to ensure that bilateral relations remain good. Even at the NATO summit in Vilnius, Lithuania, on July 11-12, 2023, President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis met and agreed to activate several channels of communication between the two countries and to initiate a High-Level Cooperation Council at the level of heads of state or ministers.

Another positive development is the economic diplomacy initiatives, or “Positive Agenda” meetings, which started in April 2021 with an agreement between Foreign Ministers Çavuşoğlu and Dendias in Ankara. These initiatives made progress after the disasters experienced by both countries and paved the way for new areas of cooperation in the economic context. An important step in this positive process was the visit of Greek Foreign Minister Giorgos Gerapetritis to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, a meeting was held with Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan in Ankara.

Finally, President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens on December 7, 2023 marked the first meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council in almost seven years since its inception in 2010. The fourth meeting of the Turkey-Greece High-Level Cooperation Council was last held in Izmir on March 8, 2016.

During his visit to Athens, President Erdoğan met with Greek President Sakelaropoulou and Prime Minister Mitsotakis. The official statements following the talks indicate that, as expected, mainly Positive Agenda items were discussed and progress was made. At the end of the talks, the “Athens Declaration on Friendly Relations and Good Neighborliness between Turkey and Greece” was issued. Some concrete decisions were also announced within the framework of the understanding stated in the Athens Declaration. Accordingly, the parties agreed to hold “continuous, constructive and meaningful” consultations on the basis of the specified “pillars.”

Another important stated intention was to continue “confidence-building measures,” including military measures, which would contribute to the elimination of unwarranted sources of tension and related risks. The parties undertook to refrain from any declaration, initiative, or action that would undermine this declaration or jeopardize the maintenance of peace and stability in their region.

Aegean Forecasts for 2024

Turkey’s position on sovereignty issues in the Aegean Sea will continue with the same determination. Indicative of this was Foreign Minister Fidan’s statement that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected. It is clear from the official statements made before President Erdoğan’s visit to Athens that there was a “sovereignty issues are not up for discussion” approach on the Greek side. This essentially meant that the core issues could not be the subject of negotiations.

However, the main objective at this stage will be to maintain the moderate atmosphere in relations and strengthen the positive agenda. As President Erdoğan has stated, Turkey wants to conduct a process in which both sides will win. Although it was stated that the Athens Declaration would not be a binding international agreement for the parties in accordance with international law, the commitment to continue dialogue, good relations, and cooperation was expressed by stating that the letter of the document should not be violated.

There are some important expectations for the next period. The first is that the good atmosphere created between the two countries at the beginning of 2023 will now be transformed into a system of bilateral cooperation, and that the political dialogue and cooperation mechanisms will continue. As stated in the Athens Declaration, the parties are expected to avoid statements and attitudes that would complicate this process, and, even beyond that, to take steps to strengthen the process. The most important aspect of this process is that third parties, such as the U.S. and the EU, should not be allowed to undermine it.

The second expectation is to resume the process of consultative talks in order to resolve the main issues that cause tension between the two countries. The question of when it would be appropriate to start this process can be evaluated separately; however, in order to achieve results, it is important that the process start at a stage that is free from elements that could disrupt or stop it again.

President Erdoğan’s proposal, just before his visit to Athens, that “not only the delimitation of the continental shelf, but all Aegean problems should be taken to the International Court of Justice” is of great importance. This proposal both negates Turkey’s allegations that it “does not abide by the law” and forces Greece to change its “single problem” approach that blocks the solution of the problems. President Erdoğan’s approach is expected to have important repercussions in the context of the solution of fundamental problems in the future.

Recently, Turkey has taken a harsh stance against Israel’s attacks on Gaza, which have been ongoing for the past two months. On the other hand, most EU countries, including Greece, and the U.S. have taken almost the opposite stance and supported Israel, creating an anti-Turkey atmosphere which has the potential to have an impact on Turkey-Greece relations as well.

Meanwhile, Greece’s skeptical and exaggerated “fear of Turkey” persists. Even a routine statement by Foreign Minister Fidan that Turkey’s rights in the Aegean Sea and the rights of the Turkish Muslim minority in Western Thrace and the Dodecanese Islands will be protected was presented as a matter of concern in the Greek press. In the coming period, such situations threaten to have a negative impact on bilateral relations, which have been progressing with a positive agenda.

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urkish-Greek relations, which navigated a strained course after 2016 with harsh discourse and even frictions on the ground, have ushered in a new era with the earthquakes disaster that occurred in Turkey on February 6, 2023. Greece was among the first countries to offer help and dispatch search and rescue teams to Turkey.

Shortly after the disaster, on February 12, Greek Foreign Minister Nikos Dendias came to Turkey and paid a visit to the earthquake-hit region alongside his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu. With this visit, the diplomatic relations, which were suspended completely during the era of frayed relations, were somewhat revitalized.

The official statements given by both sides in the course of the ensuing months became moderate. In addition, Turkish President Erdoğan and Greek Prime Minister Mitsotakis held a meeting in the Lithuanian capital, Vilnius, on the margins of the NATO Summit. The meeting, which involved the participation of the foreign ministers as well, was stated to be held in “good atmosphere,” and the statements on the heels of the meeting included expressions such as “both sides agreed to build on this positive momentum and activate the multiple channels of communication between the two countries in the upcoming period.”

They also agreed that the next meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council at the leaders or the ministerial level be held in Thessaloniki in autumn. It was indicated that the leaders tasked their foreign ministers with “guiding the processes and reporting on the progress.”

The meeting between Foreign Ministers Fidan and Gerapetritis

Another crucial step of the abovementioned positive process was the visit of the Greek foreign minister to Turkey on September 5, 2023. During the visit, Giorgos Gerapetritis held a meeting with his counterpart Hakan Fidan, both of whom had newly assumed their positions. The statements of the foreign ministers during the press release following their meeting, offered hints of a deepening of the dialogue between the two parties.

First and foremost, Foreign Minister Fidan proclaimed the inauguration of a new era. “We have entered a new and positive era in our relations with Greece,” he stated. He said that the relations were exhaustively reviewed in Vilnius in line with the directives of the countries’ leaders and that they have been working on a road map for the forthcoming periods. He went on to add that the “Political Consultations and Joint Action Plan” meetings at the deputy foreign ministerial level would be held in Greece in October, and emphasized that the meetings of “Confidence-Building Measures” and exploratory talks were also on the agenda.

Another important matter, expressed in Vilnius, was that the decision to hold the fifth meeting of the High-Level Cooperation Council under the chairmanship of their leaders in Thessaloniki before the end of the year. This statement revealed that both parties are determined to resume relations at the highest level. In addition, the two leaders would meet at the inaugural meetings of the UN General Assembly in mid-September.

Fidan affirmed that they were pleased with the Joint Action Plan, and that the deputy foreign ministers would hold a meeting in Greece in December during which they would also discuss the progress made. The steps to be taken on the commercial matters would also be discussed.

Another remarkable point, which is equally important as the concrete steps in the dialogue process, is Turkey’s vigorous will to uphold the process. Minister Fidan indicated that revitalization of the channels of dialogue and the high-level contacts were a positive step, and that Turkey retains the will to maintain this by reaffirming that Turkey is ready to carry on with the process unconditionally and to develop relations in all aspects on the basis of common interests. Turkey has always espoused this approach and Minister Fidan reiterated that the problems between the two neighbors and allies can only be resolved through constructive dialogue.

Beyond the clear-cut determination regarding the dialogue process, it is important to clarify the developments that took place or are likely to take place on the settlement of the problems between the two countries. Explaining that the problems regarding the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean were also comprehensively assessed, Fidan revealed that a tangible dialogue has begun for the settlement of the problems. He highlighted that these problems had been addressed in the past during the consultative talks, and that they have been in talks to restart the process. More importantly, Fidan affirmed that they are in consensus about “introducing novel ways to resolve the problems.” He also stressed that Turkey has always defended the principle of equitable sharing in the context of the Eastern Mediterranean.

Nearly all important matters were, thus, discussed during the Fidan-Gerapetritis meeting. While demanding more cooperation on the fight against the PKK, FETÖ, and the DHKP-C terrorist organizations and irregular migration, the Turkish side also raised the issue of the need to resolve the problems facing the Muslim Turks in Western Thrace. Addressing regional problems and the questions of Ukraine, Russia, and Syria, and EU-Turkey relations, Turkey stressed that the bilateral problems can be settled “on the basis of mutual rights and interests as well as respect to international law.”

Gerapetritis’s statements indicated that the Greek approach is quite similar to the Turkish one. Rather than discussing the specific issues that were addressed in the meeting, Gerapetritis underscored the need to keep the lines of communication open and stressed the principles to form the basis of the settlement of the problems. Underlining that attempts to commence and maintain dialogue would contribute to the development of bilateral relations, he indicated that this is of paramount importance for the tranquility of the region. In this vein, he explained that the commitment which was assumed was a historical one and that this assigned the task of “maintaining good neighborly relations, observing the mutual interests of the people, and taking initiatives within the framework of a sustainable peace” to both countries.

Athens’s move to express that it is in favor of dialogue with such unambiguous and conclusive terms indicates that dialogue is an irrevocable process for Greece, which is promising.

The emphasis on building new and positive approaches by setting aside mutual biases, and even overcoming the animosity between the two countries that stems from historical events, constitutes an integral part of good relations and the settlement of bilateral issues. Reaching a reconciliation by making mutual compromises requires the alleviation—and if possible the elimination—of biases and animosity.

In this respect, a few points that Gerapetritis touched upon in his speech are worth noting. He conceded that the grief of the past cannot be erased with a stroke of a pen, but underlined that they were compelled to contain crises-prone disagreements and stereotyped understandings by investing more in sincerity and mutual understanding. Stating that it is difficult to harbor hopes to patch up all problems in the near future as their settlement requires a milder environment, Gerapetritis stressed that it is better to focus on the unifying factors and to stay away from what has set the two countries apart.

Emphasizing the fact that the dialogue is a three-pronged process, Gerapetritis explained that the first stage would be the “level of political talks,” the second was the “Confidence-Building Measures” negotiations soon to be started, and the third the aides agree that the positive agenda ought to be chaired by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece Konstantinos Fragkogiannis,. The last stage would cover areas such as trade, maritime sector, communication, and climate and environmental problems.

Athens does not appear to have had a change of heart with regard to its attitude towards Ankara-Brussels relations and Turkey’s EU membership bid. As Gerapetritis expounded, Greece has long bolstered Turkey’s EU orientation but has not backed away from referring to the preconditions (which extend beyond the membership criteria) that vex Ankara. By the same token, Gerapetritis was not unaware of politically driven and unilateral preconditions to Ankara’s membership when he suggested during a press conference in the wake of the meeting that Greece backed Turkey’s bid provided that the latter fulfill the EU criteria.

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istorically, Cyprus has always been a complicated place. For more than 3,000 years, the island has been caught up in disputes between opposing powers. When Britain took control of Cyprus in 1878, the island was once again thrown into turmoil after more than three centuries of stability under Ottoman Turkish rule. Apart from a few hiccups, the island’s Turks and Greeks had largely lived peacefully side by side, with the Greeks enjoying a degree of socio-economic autonomy within the millet system. But the day the British flag was raised over Nicosia, everything changed.

Britain became the new power broker in the region, but it wasn’t necessarily peace and stability that the British had in mind. Their priority was to secure their trade routes and supply lines to India, the “Jewel in the Crown” of the British Empire, at the expense of Russia, which had its own designs on the region in its search for warm waters. The problem for Britain, however, was that when it took control of Cyprus, it wasn’t quite sure what to do with it once the Russian threat had subsided. While London was still considering what to do with its newly acquired asset, many factors on the ground were changing.

The Ottoman Empire collapsed, leaving a void that invited various rival factions, each with their own dreams of glory, vying to become the next regional superpower. All the while, Britain acted as a mediator, ensuring that the region didn’t descend into complete chaos, but also making sure that no nation rose to such prominence that it could survive without Britain’s blessing. Britain could not leave the region to any single power that was strong enough to tell it to step aside, nor could it leave a vacuum that might allow the Russians to creep in.

So, a delicate balance of power had to be struck in places like Cyprus. Even when Russia decided to abandon its Mediterranean campaign in 1917, Britain had no choice but to remain on the island, if only to prevent Turkey, Greece, or any other claimant from taking it. But this was never going to be a long-term solution, as sooner or later Britain would have to reduce its overseas presence across its vast empire. By the end of World War II, as Britain began to bring most of its forces home, the spread of Soviet-inspired communism meant that the Russian threat was back.

Only this time, the Russians were not just a foreign invader from a distant land. They had managed to hack into the minds of locals who had become disaffected with British rule. In the case of Cyprus, communism affected both the Turkish and Greek populations of the island. Communism was fast becoming the ideology of peaceful coexistence that would unite the two communities in a future without Britain, and one that, had it succeeded, would probably have turned Cyprus into a Soviet vassal.

On the other hand, there were two opposing nationalist movements on the island, one calling for the annexation of Cyprus to Greece (enosis), the other for a divided Cyprus with the Turkish Cypriot community having closer ties with Turkey. Another problem was that, despite being at loggerheads over Cyprus, Turkey and Greece were both members of NATO, a military bloc formed in 1949 to keep the Soviets at bay. Direct conflict between these two allies had to be avoided at all costs, as this would lead to the collapse of NATO in the Eastern Mediterranean, opening the door for the Russians to enter the region from the Caucasus and the Balkans. So, despite the underlying tensions, it was absolutely vital for Britain that the right balance be struck in Cyprus before it lowered its flag there, and that balance had to be protected by some kind of guarantee.

After the Greek Cypriots joined the EU in 2004, the dynamics changed. There was no longer any incentive for the Greek Cypriots to recognize the Turkish Cypriots as their long-lost compatriots and equals at the negotiating table. With the EU’s support, the Greek Cypriots began to see the peace process less as a solution-oriented discussion and more as a conversion on the terms of Turkish Cypriot surrender. Even the UN, which is as guilty as the EU of legitimizing the Greek Cypriot regime despite the obvious collapse of the Republic of Cyprus in 1974, is now struggling to get a word in, with UN-backed models of reunification being spat on after having been agreed, and UN representatives who criticize the Greek Cypriots for doing so being all but banned from the island.

So, with very little to persuade the Greek Cypriots to compromise with the Turkish Cypriots, where does this leave the Treaty of Guarantee? As far as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots are concerned, the treaty still stands. Britain, as always, continues to send mixed messages about it. Meanwhile, Greece and the Greek Cypriots argue that the treaty has expired because it is not appropriate for an EU state to be bound by such an agreement. But the situation in Cyprus remains delicate, and Russia is as much a threat to regional stability today as it was during the Cold War. The EU has no unified army to defend Cyprus if it were ever attacked, and without the Treaty of Guarantee, Cyprus has no NATO members to protect it in a worst-case scenario. Ultimately, what the EU has done is to destabilize Cyprus further and cast a shadow over its only real international security agreement.

As a member of the EU at the time, Britain should have recognized the threat that Greek Cypriot accession would pose to its interests in the region, and London should have used its veto to block it. Even then British foreign secretary Jack Straw, now an advocate of a two-state solution in Cyprus, admitted in a recent article in Politico that the EU “could and should have put Cyprus’ accession on hold at this stage and made clear to both sides that only a united island would be allowed to join the EU.”

Now that Britain has left the EU, its vital military bases in Cyprus are at the mercy of a Greek Cypriot regime drunk on the political leverage handed to it by Brussels. There is even talk of France, arguably the EU’s most powerful nation, now seeking to establish its own military presence in Cyprus. President Emmanuel Macron, who has long called for a unified European army that would make Europe less dependent on NATO for its defense, is undoubtedly using the EU as a mechanism to project French soft power onto Cyprus. France may even be seeking to replace Britain in Cyprus, trying to make London subservient to Paris when it comes to securing British interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

But Britain can reverse this. It could call for international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state, thereby securing an alternative ally in Cyprus that can protect its bases if the Greek Cypriots fail to do so. Alternatively, Britain could work with Turkey to sideline the EU in the peace process. By ratifying the 1960 treaty, Britain would cast doubt on the legitimacy of the Greek Cypriot regime, which openly violated Article I of the treaty when it joined the EU in 2004. If Britain cannot ratify the treaty, it should work with Turkey to establish a new arrangement that will secure a future reunification agreement in Cyprus.

One possible way forward is the establishment of a joint peacekeeping force on the island made up of soldiers from Turkey, Britain, and Greece. This could take the form of a new force set up by the three nations or under the auspices of NATO, of which they are all members. This force would replace the UN peacekeeping mission in Cyprus and work to ensure stability on the island, in the same way that NATO forces have worked to stabilize Kosovo since 1999.

Another option, which could actually go hand in hand with the first, is to put Cyprus on the road to NATO membership. This is a process that would take many years, if not decades, but if there is genuine will and cooperation, it can be accelerated. Turkey has shown good will towards other countries’ bids for NATO membership when they have taken the necessary steps of rapprochement, as in the case of Sweden and Finland. There’s no reason why Ankara shouldn’t do the same for Cyprus if it feels that Turkish Cypriot rights on the island are guaranteed. Perhaps if Cyprus were to join NATO, there would be no need for a treaty between Britain, Turkey, and Greece, as the existing policies of the military bloc would provide that protection instead.

For there ever to be a chance of reunification in Cyprus, a path to NATO membership must be charted, and it must be Britain that takes the first step to make this happen, if only for its own interests. Britain must stop parroting EU and Greek Cypriot rhetoric on the Cyprus problem and make its own voice heard. British spokespeople, diplomats, parliamentarians, and cabinet ministers all need to be briefed to this effect. An open invitation to begin discussions on a new approach to the Cyprus problem should be extended to all relevant parties. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots would no doubt welcome such a proposal. Greece, if convinced of its strategic merits, would probably also welcome it. The EU would thus become irrelevant to the peace process, and the playing field would be levelled for a resumption of talks based on a newfound mutual respect.

Of course, all this depends on how willing the Greek Cypriots are to go down this road. For them, it would mean giving up the leverage offered by the EU. It would also mean diluting their ties with Russia. If they are serious about ending the island’s division, these are sacrifices they should be prepared to make. If they prefer to continue on their current path, with no foreseeable end to the island’s current status quo, then they should be prepared to accept a two-state solution. London needs a reliable partner in Cyprus, and if the Greek Cypriots do not fulfil this requirement, Britain must seek to protect its interests there by other means. With Turkey acting on its own, the Turkish Cypriots may only ever get limited recognition from friendly nations such as Azerbaijan, but if Britain gives the green light, many more countries are likely to jump on the bandwagon.

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s a result of the general elections held in Greece on June 25, eight parties entered the parliament. The New Democracy (ND) party, which won 158 parliamentary seats with 40.55% of the vote, won the majority in the 300-seat parliament. The Radical Left Alliance (SYRIZA), which won 48 parliamentary seats with 17.84% of the vote, is back in the main opposition, while its center-left rival PASOK won 32 seats with 11.85% of the vote. Among the other parties that passed the 3% electoral threshold, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) won the right to be represented in the parliament with 20 MPs, Spartans with 12 MPs, Greek Solution (EL) with 12 MPs, Democratic Patriotic Movement – Victory with 10 MPs, and Course of Freedom (PE) with 8 MPs.

The result shows that in the coming period there will be a divided opposition in the parliament against a strong government. Due to the rivalry and differences of opinion among the opposition parties, it will be much more difficult for them to define a common position against the policies of the government than in the past. This situation will allow the second Mitsotakis government to act more decisively and boldly. The weakening of the left and the rise of the far right in Greek politics are also expected to affect the political dynamics of the new period.

The Decline of Left Politics

The June 25 elections resulted in a right-dominated parliamentary arithmetic in Greece. It was the first time since the 1974 elections following the military regime that right-wing parties won so many seats and left-wing parties so few. Considering that the radical left came to power only eight years ago, Greek politics has undergone a rapid and sharp transformation.

Greece’s debt crisis in 2009 led to the imposition of strict austerity measures under EU supervision. SYRIZA, which promised to solve people’s economic problems with radical steps, was seen as a savior in this period and a leftist party outside the mainstream came to power for the first time in the 2015 elections. SYRIZA’s success was also attributed to the fact that its leader Alexis Tsipras was young, dynamic, and politically untainted.

However, Tsipras’s adoption of a soft transition during his term in office, his agreement with the European troika, and the continuation of austerity measures disappointed SYRIZA voters and caused many members with radical views to break away from the party. SYRIZA, thus, became a mainstream center-left party.

SYRIZA, which has been in the main opposition since 2019, stood against the economic and social policies implemented under the ND government and promised to implement the principles of the welfare state to the fullest if it came back to power. In the run-up to the 2023 elections, Tsipras emphasized his party’s “progressive” credentials and included elements such as improving wages, reducing indirect taxes, and greater state responsibility in areas such as education, health, and housing in his election program.

Despite all this, he failed to evoke the same excitement in the electorate as in 2015. While the disappointment of Tsipras’s tenure has a partial share in this, the main problem stems from SYRIZA’s inability to develop a holistic and realistic alternative to ND’s pro-Western neoliberal policies that combine geopolitical and economic goals. No matter how valuable SYRIZA’s program based on social justice, humanitarian values, and multilateral foreign policy may be in principle, it cannot offer a package that can provide a short-term solution to the economic problems and geopolitical risks facing Greece. This is more a matter of conjunctural realities—in other words, the spirit of the times—than SYRIZA itself.

There is fierce competition among left-wing parties to fill the vacuum left by SYRIZA’s decline. The Course of Freedom (PE) party, led by Zoe Konstantopoulou, a former SYRIZA member, managed to enter the parliament with a program close to the radical views that SYRIZA advocated before it came to power. The idealistic goals of the European Realistic Disobedience Front or MeRa25, the party of Yanis Varoufakis, another former SYRIZA member, to restructure the whole of Europe are not seen as realistic by the Greek public under the current circumstances. On the other hand, the KKE, representing the revolutionary left, is far away from all other parties in terms of its principles and goals.

While these relatively small parties are not expected to have a serious impact on politics, PASOK has become a strong alternative for the leadership of the left. PASOK has adopted a balanced line between ND and SYRIZA in economic policies, while in foreign policy it has adopted almost the same stance as ND in terms of relations with the West and its approach to the problems with Turkey. PASOK, which has shifted from the left to the center, aims to be a mass party alternative to ND as it used to be.

However, ND, which has expanded its base under the leadership of Kyriakos Mitsotakis and has recruited some former PASOK members, has gained a very strong position in central politics. If SYRIZA fails to renew itself, PASOK could once again take the leadership of the center-left and become the second-largest party in the country.

Of the three small right-wing parties that entered parliament in the last elections, the Spartans party is the most notable in that it includes former Golden Dawn members and received more votes than the others. As a result of the ban on the National Party-Hellenes, led by former Golden Dawn MP Ilias Kasidiaris, its candidates participated in the June 25 elections from the lists of an unnamed nationalist party called “Spartans.” In this way, the far right of the Golden Dawn line re-entered parliament after a four-year absence. Kasidiaris, who is still in prison, has signaled that he will lead a fierce opposition in parliament after the elections. However, given the recent sensitivity of the judiciary to far-right activities, the party may face judicial investigations if it pushes the boundaries of legitimate politics.

The other two right-wing parties in parliament, Greek Solution (EL) and Victory, have so far not shown any aggressive behavior, but have very strong nationalist conservative views. Since the 2019 parliamentary elections, EL’s leader Kyriakos Velopoulos has previously called for the death penalty for serious crimes and the laying of mines on the border to counter threats from Turkey and the influx of migrants. The Victory party, founded in 2019 under the leadership of religious studies teacher Dimitris Natsios, entered the parliament for the first time with a surprise vote thanks to the support it received especially from the church and monastic circles. Defining his party in terms of Greek Orthodoxy, chairman Natsios states that they aim to achieve unity in the country through the reconstruction of religious consciousness.

The right-wing parties advocate common themes such as anti-immigration, anti-vaccination, protection of national identity, and family structure. Paying special attention to disputes with neighboring countries, these parties oppose the Prespa Agreement resolving the Macedonian name dispute and demand rights for the Greek minority in southern Albania. Regarding the Aegean, Eastern Mediterranean, and Cyprus, they argue that Greece should not back down from national stances and work for international sanctions against Turkey. They also agree that Turkish identity in Western Thrace should never be tolerated, and they argue that relations with the Western world should be determined according to national interests and that Greece should cooperate with countries outside the Euro-Atlantic alliance when necessary.

Although it is inevitable that right-wing parties will spark various debates over these and similar views in the coming period, their influence on political decisions and practices is expected to remain limited as they are not strong enough to set the agenda. Especially in the current economic and geopolitical conditions, it is unlikely that the ND government will deviate from the Euro-Atlantic line.

Moreover, given the EU’s increased emphasis on enlargement in the aftermath of the Russia-Ukraine war, it is unlikely that Greece will take any action that would hinder the membership perspectives of North Macedonia and Albania.

Nevertheless, the fact that left-wing parties are weaker than in the past and are competing among themselves can be considered a handicap in terms of balancing far-right tendencies. Demands from the far right on issues directly related to national identity and interests, such as anti-immigration, minority rights, and relations with Turkey, could put pressure on the government.

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lthough on May 21 New Democracy (ND) won the general election in Greece securing the high percentage of 40.79 of the votes, it didn’t win the parliamentary majority which required an additional five seats. In May 2023, ND returned the mandate to form a government without seeking a coalition, as an amendment to the electoral code stipulates that the winning party will be granted additional parliamentary seats effective from the most recent election. As none of the other parties could form a coalition government, runoff elections were set for June.

On June 25, in line with expectations, ND won the elections with 40.55% of the vote, winning 50 additional parliamentary seats. In 58 out of 59 constituencies, ND came first, lagging behind the Coalition of the Radical Left – Progressive Alliance (SYRIZA) only in Rhodope, a region in Western Thrace that is home to people of Turkish origin.

It is not surprising that ND, the flagship of the center-right in Greek politics, has become so powerful given the country’s economic and geopolitical situation. When the 2009 debt crisis took its toll, SYRIZA, with its radical rhetoric, was seen by the masses as a savior against the center-right ND and the center-left PASOK. However, despite winning both elections in 2015, SYRIZA failed to secure a parliamentary majority and had to share power with the nationalist Independent Greeks (ANEL) party.

A rapid privatization drive

During this period, the party stepped back from its radical rhetoric, concluded a debt restructuring agreement with the EU, and failed to implement its own program on economic policies, civilianization, secularism, and human rights. Therefore, no one was fully satisfied with its volatile economic and foreign policies. In the 2019 general elections, New Democracy came back to power on its own, promising economic growth and full alignment with the Western world.

In its first term in power, ND implemented these promises. Since coming to power in 2019, the first Kyriakos Mitsotakis government has launched a rapid privatization drive and sought to attract foreign investment by offering incentives and facilities to various entrepreneurs. It has focused on tourism, production, energy, and technology. The harmonious relations it has developed with the West provided confidence to foreign investors and facilitated the procurement of foreign resources. As a result, in 2019 and 2021, Greece achieved the highest levels of foreign investment in its history in proportion to its annual income. It also prepared a comprehensive program of reforms and projects in 2021, securing €17.77 billion in grants and €12.73 billion in loans from the EU Rescue Fund.

As a result, since the COVID19 pandemic, the Greek economy has grown at an average annual rate of more than 7%. Exports, which were less than $40 billion a year before the pandemic, reached $57.5 billion in 2022. Last year, the EU terminated the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) on Greece with the view that the structural conditions that led to the crisis. In the near future, international credit rating agencies are also expected to rate Greece “investment grade” for the first time since 2010. Thus, Greece will be able to attract even more foreign investment and cash money in the coming years.

Turkey and the EU

New Democracy’s economic policies make even more sense when considered in conjunction with its foreign policy. In foreign policy, as in the economy, the Greek government has identified the Euro-Atlantic alliance as its sole and undisputed geopolitical direction. Presenting itself as a loyal and reliable ally of the Western world, Greece has taken advantage of its geographical position in the increasing competition between Russia and the West, and has aspired to be assigned to various tasks and responsibilities. By doing so, it has increased its geopolitical importance by strengthening its interdependence with the Western world, especially in the fields of defense and energy.

For the same purpose, the Mitsotakis government did not hesitate to use Turkey’s problems with the Western world to its advantage. Killing several birds with one stone, Greece obtained diplomatic and military support from countries such as the U.S. and France, and ensured decisions against Turkey were being taken at the EU level. At the same time, Greece sought new cooperation opportunities with its active diplomacy against Turkey in various regions of the world, especially in the Eastern Mediterranean. These opportunities found support in the Western world.

Between 2019 and 2023, a period characterized by numerous crises and security risks at the global and regional levels, ND achieved visible results in both the economy and foreign policy by pursuing neoliberal economic policies and a purely Western-oriented foreign policy. Of course, these policies had negative consequences as well. The easing of taxes on big capitalists in the name of investment incentives, the significant burden of public revenues on middle- and low-income citizens through indirect taxes, and the limited increases in the minimum wage and public salaries have led to a steady increase in income inequality under ND’s rule.

Train crash

The opposition has blamed the Greek government for the train crash on February 28 in which 57 people were killed, while the Greek government failed to adequately address infrastructure deficiencies due to frugality in public spending. In the name of order and stability, the government has pursued ruthless policies against asylum seekers, and it was revealed that the phones of politicians and journalists who were considered to be a threat to the government were tapped. In foreign policy, the confrontation with Turkey posed a significant security risk for the country, while increased military expenditures put an additional burden on the budget.

Despite such criticisms, it appears that the Greek public prefers a decisive and consistent course in the fields of economy and foreign policy. Faced with three major crises in recent years—the refugee crisis, the coronavirus pandemic, and the Russia-Ukraine war—Greece needs Western support as the severe effects of the debt crisis continue. Given these factors, by virtue of its political-ideological profile New Democracy stands out as the party that can maintain relations with the West at the most advanced level. Moreover, ND, which has a nationalist-conservative base as well as a liberal one, can appeal to a wide audience through populist rhetoric and practices. Thus, for example, the statements made by ND officials regarding the conflicts with Turkey and the support that Mitsotakis receives in the Western world have a positive effect on the party’s image in the eyes of the public.

When Mitsotakis came to power in Greece for the first time, he said that it would take two terms for the country to truly recover. At the end of the first term, macroeconomic indicators led the public to believe that the crisis was being overcome, while steps taken by the government in production, exports, and development gave hope for the future. Moreover, in a period full of crises and geopolitical risks, the support that Mitsotakis has received from the Western world is considered important by a large part of the Greek public.

Thus, despite all the existing problems, voters in Greece brought ND back to power. We can already foresee that the policies of New Democracy, which has solidly won the approval of voters in two consecutive elections, will continue in the same direction. However, time will tell for how long the public will remain patient while awaiting the concrete effects on daily life of the macro indicators of economic policies. Moreover, the preference of the second Mitsotakis government to feed on disputes with Turkey instead of seeing the post-earthquake détente as an opportunity to strengthen mutual understanding and co-operation could lead to larger crises in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean than those of the past.

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lexandroupolis is a port city in Greece, known as “Dedeağaç” in Turkish. Back in the nineteenth century, this small town was located on the transportation and trade routes of the Ottoman Empire. Under the Greek administration, Alexandroupolis, which lies in the north easternmost part of the country, did not make a breakthrough for about a century. However, due to the developments in the energy sector and the changing security perceptions in the West, today, the city is emerging as a vibrant hub.

Energy transmission capacity

Alexandroupolis brings together a highway, railway, and airport network stretching from the Aegean Sea to the Black Sea. The highway and railway are directly connected to the port, and  Alexandroupolis is also the connection point of TAP and TANAP, two major pipelines of the Southern Gas Corridor.

More recently, the Alexandroupolis Independent Natural Gas System (INGS), which includes both LNG storage with a capacity of 170,000 m3 and a regasification unit with a capacity of 5.5 billion m3, was constructed. The Alexandroupolis Floating Storage and Regasification Unit (FSRU) will be stationed 17.6 km southwest of Alexandroupolis at a depth of 40 m in the Thracian Sea.

The energy brought from the FSRU will be transmitted to the National Natural Gas System (NNGS) and distributed to consumers in Greece via power plants being built across Western Thrace. North Macedonia- and Bulgaria-linked companies are making investments to carry the energy via interconnectors to their own countries.

With the LNG terminal, planned to be built by the end of 2023, the Alexandroupolis port has the potential to become an energy hub. A plan to expand its capacity has been prepared by the port authority with the support of the Greek government. This includes a new electric rail line connecting the port to the Trans-European railway, the addition of much more quay space, a new cargo terminal, an additional 500-meter pier, and a bypass to the local highway.

Greece will make significant economic gains not only from the port and FSRU, but also from carrying the LNG as it holds more than 22% of the global LNG carrying capacity. With an interconnector extended into Bulgaria from TAP’s processing facilities in Komotini, and another from Sofia to Niš, gas will be transferred into Bulgaria and Serbia. Thus, a non-Russian gas option will be born in the region.

Greece’s Alexandroupolis policies

Alexandroupolis’s potential for the transmission of energy is strongly linked with Greece’s policies to be the key country in Europe’s energy security. To this end, Greece strengthens its diplomatic ties with both energy-exporting Gulf countries and importing European countries.

The Greek authorities’ rhetoric reveals that Greece aims to compete with Turkey’s role as an energy hub. At a recent meeting, Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis and Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman signed important agreements on energy. Prince Salman stated that Saudi Arabia is interested in hydrogen energy and making Greece a hub for hydrogen energy in Europe.

In his statement after the agreements with Saudi Arabia, the Greek Minister of Development and Investments Adonis Georgiadis claimed that Greece has very close strategic relations with Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Israel, and added, “What a great foreign policy the Turks have had for all these years, the opposite is happening now. Turkey is completely isolated and the biggest player in the region is undoubtedly Saudi Arabia, with which Greece has the strategic relationship I mentioned above.” Such developments are not only limited to Saudi Arabia.

As soon as Turkey and Israel declared that they were going to normalize diplomatic ties and reappoint ambassadors, Mitsotakis paid a visit to Qatar which is considered a geopolitical ally of Turkey. In the meeting, Mitsotakis, by pointing out that Qatar is a natural gas producer, mentioned the importance of Greece, especially Alexandroupolis, in energy transportation. More recently, President of the United Arab Emirates Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed met Mitsotakis as part of his visit to Athens. In the meeting, Mitsotakis briefed Zayed on the infrastructure facilities being built in Greece for LNG import, storage, and regasification. He claimed that these efforts, combined with Greece’s strategic geographical location, make the country an energy hub for the Middle East and a bridge connecting the East to Europe.

U.S. interest in Alexandroupolis

Alexandroupolis saw several development projects worth 2.3 million euros in order to reach the capacity to serve Arleigh Burke-class U.S. destroyers. In the context of NATO and U.S. military shipments, numerous military vehicles were delivered through the port. These include Black Hawk, Apache, Sikorsky, Chinook, and Romeo helicopters, and M1 Abrams tanks. Only in the summer of 2022, 2,400 pieces of military equipment passed through the port, making this the largest number of U.S. weapons ever to pass through a single port.

Numerous other mechanized units were reported to have been sent to the port, some of which were then sent to the islands that Turkey claims should be demilitarized. In the first stage, the claimed intention by Greece and the U.S. was to transfer them to Ukraine. In addition to arms transfers, in the context of Operation Atlantic Resolve, the U.S. Army 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team with 4,000 soldiers and 2,000 pieces of equipment deployed in the region. U.S. jets were sent to Alexandroupolis to replace those is Larissa.

Moving beyond NATO, in 2019, the U.S. provided funds for the dislodging of a sunken dredger ship from the port basin. This provided access to the full capacity of the port and opened the possibility of serving large vessels. In the same year, Greece and U.S. signed a protocol which extended the scope of the 1990 Greece-U.S. Defense Cooperation Agreement and provided the United States access to the Alexandroupolis port.

In 2020, the U.S. Congress released funds for the installation of precision approach radars (maritime domain awareness) throughout the Aegean Sea. Consequently, Alexandroupolis came to the agenda in terms of Greece-U.S. cooperation before the Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, the Russian-Ukrainian war accelerated the port’s development attempts and provided a legitimate explanation for the policies being carried out in the port.

On the other hand, the privatization of the Alexandroupolis port is on the agenda, and two of the four candidates planned to participate in the tender have ties to Russia. Considering that the Port of Piraeus is operated by a Chinese state-owned company and the Port of Thessaloniki is operated by Russia-backed companies, Greece maintains its relations with non-Western powers too. Knowing the U.S. and European sensitivity toward Alexandroupolis, Greece may use these two candidates as a trump card to obtain potential U.S. or European aid under the excuse of aligning foreign policy objectives.

Fruits of lobbying

Greece’s initiatives in Alexandroupolis are supported by the Greek, Armenian, and Jewish lobbies in the United States. A report published by the Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA) focuses on Greece, particularly Alexandroupolis, in all seven solutions it proposes for resolving the energy crisis created by the Russia-Ukraine war. The report emphasizes the importance of solidarity between the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus (GASC), Israel, Egypt, and Greece. In this context, the report calls for the U.S. to take the financial and diplomatic leadership in the axis of the Three Sea Initiatives to develop the railway and road infrastructure of Alexandroupolis and increase defense aid to Greece. In the report, there is no mention of Turkey, NATO’s easternmost corner.

Moreover, in an interview with the Greek daily Kathimerini, Jonathan Rue, director of foreign policy at JINSA, explained his perspective with the statement that Turkey has deliberately abandoned its traditional role as NATO’s southeast anchor against Russia and other threats and that Alexandroupolis, bypassing the Turkish Straits, became an important alternative to Turkey in securing a position for the NATO forces in the region.

Meanwhile, Greek lobbying efforts appear to have borne fruit as witnessed in the statements of Bob Menendez, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who recently paid a visit to Alexandroupolis and gave a statement claiming that the port has unlimited possibilities for Greece and its allies. He also claimed that Turkey, a NATO member, is the biggest threat in the Eastern Mediterranean.

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n October 15, Greece accused Turkey of abusing 92 migrants discovered naked and injured close to the Meriç River (Evros River), which serves as a natural border between the two countries.

The UNHCR demanded an urgent investigation and called the incident shocking, declaring that the images of the migrants were deeply distressing.

The Greek police stated that their investigation together with Frontex, the EU’s border agency, found evidence that the migrants crossed from Turkey to Greece in rubber dinghies.

It was claimed that the migrants had been forced by Turkish authorities to board three vehicles that took them to the border, and forcibly stripped naked before being placed in dinghies.

However, a recently leaked report by the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) raises concerns about systematic misconduct from both the Greek border and coast guard authorities and Frontex.

Greek and Turkish officials exchange accusations

Notis Mitarachi, the Greek Minister of Migration and Asylum, said that Turkey’s behavior exceeds all limits. On October 16, he tweeted, “Turkey’s behavior towards 92 migrants whom we rescued at the borders today is a shame for civilization.” “We expect Ankara to investigate the incident and protect, at last, its border with the EU.”

Ibrahim Çataklı, Deputy Interior Minister of Turkey, replied to the tweet as follows, “As you couldn’t find one single case of a human rights violation by Turkey, you just seek to expose the image of your own cruelty as if Turkey did it.”

The Turkish Presidency’s Director of Communications Fahrettin Altun responded a day later with a series of tweets saying the allegations were “groundless and unfounded” with the intention of “putting our country under suspicion” and that “Greece once again showed the whole world that it does not even respect the dignity of these oppressed people, by publishing the photographs of the refugees it has deported, extorting their personal belongings.”

On October 17, Mitarachi claimed that Turkey deliberately directed immigrants across the EU border as migration has become a sensitive topic for the upcoming 2023 elections in Turkey.

He told the Greek-based channel SKAI TV that Turkey is in a very difficult position because these 92 people were found by Frontex itself which confirmed the incident.

Turkey denies the claims

Turkey’s Ministry of Internal Affairs  released a lengthy statement. In the statement, the ministry claimed that Greece was desperate on account of its inhumane treatment of migrants being made public by Turkish officials.

“It is very apparent that Greece is trying to cover up the systematic unlawful pushbacks they have been doing routinely by confiscating all the belongings of the migrants including their money, phones, IDs, and passports, throwing them into the sea, by taking all their clothing and shoes, battering them naked with batons, injuring them with electro-shock devices, shooting at them with rubber bullets or putting them on worn-out lifeboats,” the Turkish ministry said in the statement.

It added that these incidents have been documented in images and reports.

“Just last month they punctured the boat of a group of migrants including babies and infants who were trying to reach Italy from Lebanon. Having lost all their valuables, these people were left to die,” the ministry stated.

The statement also highlights that Athens is under pressure due to its violations of international law, and that a report by OLAF found abuse, irregularities, and cover-ups by the EU border agency, Frontex.

“Within this context, we underline that the fact that the Greek Minister for Migration and Asylum still holds his office and continues his baseless allegations against our country, whereas the Executive Director of Frontex was discharged from his position during the investigations and supervisions on the pushbacks, is unacceptable and we leave this to the discretion of the public opinion.”

Greek violations have become “an entrenched practice”

On October 14, a report by OLAF was leaked, in which it found individuals at Frontex, the European border and coast guard, complicit in pushbacks violating migrants’ “fundamental rights” and in partaking in misconduct.

The report shows that Frontex in collaboration with the Greek government mishandled and failed to report or investigate pushback accusations and evidence.

The investigation was conducted with information from open sources, media reports, documents from Frontex and the European Commission as well as interviews with 20 witnesses.

“OLAF concludes, based on the evidence collected during the investigation, that the allegations are proven,” the report reads. Frontex stated that it took remedial action and did not refute the accusations.

Human rights NGOs and leading media outlets have frequently reported the Greek pushbacks and other human rights breaches that violate international law.

A 2021 Amnesty report found that Greek human rights violations have become “an entrenched practice.” It revealed that especially in the Meriç (Evros) region, Greece used excessive violence against immigrants and refugees in February and March 2020.

Around 61,800 migrants have been pushed back by Greek authorities since 2020, 152 of which lost their lives, while 200 were injured, according to the Turkish Ministry of Interior Affairs.

Turkey regularly accuses Greece of violently pushing back migrants before they can file asylum claims, while Greece accuses Turkey of pushing forward migrants to pressure and destabilize the EU. Meanwhile, tensions remain high between the fallen-out neighbors due to issues such as maritime border altercations and Greece’s armament of the Aegean islands.

Written by Dilara Özer

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he Lausanne Peace Treaty of 1923 was used to settle many disputed aspects of the Greek-Turkish traumatic relations in the early 1990s—but not all. In addition to the conclusively unsettled issues like the title to some islets in the eastern Aegean Sea, newly emerging rules of international law concerning maritime and airspace have created new areas of disagreements, such as the extent of the Greek territorial waters, national airspace, and the delimitation of the continental shelf in the Aegean Sea.

The Aegean Sea is characterized by disputes rather than friendly relations and cooperation. The two countries do not even agree on what constitutes the dispute in the Aegean Sea: while Greece maintains a “single-dispute approach,” Turkey argues that there are multiple disputes to be settled.

Greece’s long-standing insistence that there is only the continental shelf delimitation dispute leads to a restrictive approach. Greece submits the issue as such to the International Court of Justice (ICJ), which implies  one way of settlement. On the other hand, Turkey insists that there are many disputes such as the title to certain islets, the violation of the demilitarized status of the eastern Aegean islands, the illegitimate attempt to extend the Greek territorial waters beyond the current six miles, and the illegal extension of the Greek national airspace which is four miles wider than its territorial waters. Turkey’s perspective is that all these issues should be negotiated as a whole with any unresolved dispute eventually being brought to international adjudication.

With this approach Turkey insists that Greece acknowledges all the existing disputes that are key to a sincere negotiation. The next step, according to Turkey, would be bringing the unresolved disputes to the international courts in order to find durable solutions acceptable to both sides. However, Turkey’s stance is regarded by Greece as refusing to go to international adjudication, which is actually not the case.

The Greek obstructions

The first concrete sign of Greece’s single-dispute approach was to unilaterally submit the continental shelf dispute to the ICJ in 1976. The court ruled that it lacked jurisdiction to handle the case due to the lack of Turkey’s consent. This move is used by Greece to argue that Turkey is “against a legal settlement.”

The picture is, however, quite the opposite. Greece obstructed the process of finding a legitimate solution by bringing the dispute to the ICJ unilaterally. This is unequivocally evidenced in Greece’s 2015 declaration whereby it announced that it recognizes the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ ipso facto and without special agreement in relation to all legal disputes with any other state accepting the same obligation.

At the same time, Greece puts quite comprehensive restrictions on the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ. The first exception covers “any dispute relating to military activities and measures taken by the Hellenic Republic for the protection of its sovereignty and territorial integrity, for national defense purposes, as well as for the protection of its national security.”

This exception is vague and ambiguous enough that any issue which constitutes a dispute between Turkey and Greece could fall under its jurisdiction—therefore, all bilateral disputes can be excluded from the jurisdiction of the ICJ, thus obstructing the way to judicial means.

Greece goes even further by putting a further exception: “[a]ny dispute concerning State boundaries or sovereignty over the territory of the Hellenic Republic, including any dispute over the breadth and limits of its territorial sea and its airspace” is to be excluded from the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ.

This exception directly refers to the disputes in the Aegean Sea that Greece refuses to acknowledge. These are the disputes over the extent of the Greek national airspace, the territorial waters, and the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf.

A third exception includes two categories of states with which Greece encounters disputes. First, the exemption prevents Greece from accepting the jurisdiction of the ICJ in regard to states which have accepted the the compulsory jurisdiction of the court “only in relation to that dispute.” Secondly, states which have accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the court “less than twelve months prior to the filing of the application” are also excluded.

These restrictions are far-reaching because any issue which does not fall under the first two exceptions would still be excluded due to the fact that the other side has accepted the compulsory jurisdiction only in relation to that dispute or has accepted the jurisdiction less than a year prior to the filing of the ICJ application.

Reflections on the settlement of the Turkish-Greek disputes

Contrary to the distorted perception successfully created by Greece, it is not Turkey but Greece that has closed the doors to international jurisdiction as a way of settling Aegean disputes.

A review of the Greek declaration demonstrates that Greece excludes all the Aegean disputes from the jurisdiction of the ICJ. This is even true for the continental shelf dispute for which Greece once turned to the ICJ. The Greek refusal to go to the ICJ is so strong that the declaration lists the disputes by name such as the extent of the Greek national airspace, the territorial waters, and the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf.

Ironically, Greece does not give any chance to negotiation either. Despite many meetings and even a process of talks initiated in 2002, which lasted for 14 years, all the meetings were declared by Greece as “exploratory.” The underlying reason behind the failure of the talks is the Greek refusal to acknowledge the disputes as real and existing.

Despite its limited capacity, Greece assumes itself to be a major playmaker in regional politics, and thus follows an aggressive foreign policy towards Turkey. It’s worth asking why Greece pursues this strategy and what it hopes to achieve.

Neorealism, also known as structural realism in International Relations, offers a simple answer to this question: “Greece is trying to balance Turkey.” Drawing on Kenneth Waltz, the pioneer of the Neorealist School, states try to balance other states, which they lag behind, or try to limit others’ ability to some extent by resorting to internal balancing and/or external balancing mechanisms.

Internal balancing is the first and most common method of a balancing strategy. This happens as states strengthen their material capacity and power, and when they try to survive by their own means in the anarchic world system. If this is not enough, they resort to external balancing either to defend themselves or to minimize the threats they face. This generally occurs when states look to form alliances with stronger states. In this regard, Greece applies both internal and external balancing methods in order to counterbalance Turkey.

Initiatives for internal balancing

Following the Kardak (Imia) crisis with Turkey in 1996, Greece launched an armament program as part of an internal balancing against Turkey and came a long way towards this purpose. However, it temporarily paused the program due to the 2008 economic crisis and its effects.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations.

Thanks to the relative economic recovery in recent years and due to the current high tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, Greece resumed its armament program. In order to counterbalance Turkey, it launched a new armament and military modernization program. The Athens administration increased its armament expenditures fivefold in 2021 compared to 2020, and launched a 10-year armament program worth 10 billion euros.

Since Greece’s domestic and national defense industry is weaker than Turkey’s, the country needs the support of other nations. For example, Greece ordered a total of 18 fighter jets from France last year, with a cost of 2.3 billion euros. In 2021, it signed a contract to buy three frigates from France. Again in the same year, it purchased four warships worth $6.9 billion and signed an agreement with the U.S. for the modernization of its existing frigates worth $2.5 billion. These examples indicate that since Greece is incapable of modernizing its army by using its own sources, it needs outside support to activate its internal balancing elements.

Aside from the French and American military support, Greece uses its EU membership as a political and economic leverage against Turkey with the unconditional support of the GCA as its main ally in the region. So much so that Greece, acting together with the GCA, imposed sanctions on Turkey for its activities in the Eastern Mediterranean by using the EU’s legislative bodies, the European Parliament and the European Council. However, Turkey has not compromised its stance at the table and on the ground, and has insisted on protecting its rights in the region.

Can Greek counterbalance against Turkey work?

The question now is whether Greece will succeed in counterbalancing Turkey. In terms of internal balancing, Greece has almost no chance. There are two reasons for this. The first is related to Turkey’s current capacity which is incomparably greater than Greece’s. So much so that according to the rounded Armed Forces data, Greece, with a population of 11 million, has 100,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $5 billion. Turkey, with a population of 85 million, has 350,000 active soldiers and an annual defense budget of $20 billion.

Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries.

All of Greece’s land and air forces lag behind Turkey’s. For instance, in terms of ground power Greece has 1,300 tanks, 3,400 armored vehicles, and 1,200 artilleries whereas Turkey has 3,000 tanks, 11,500 armored vehicles, and 2,500 artilleries. Likewise, although Greece is rapidly modernizing its air power, it cannot compete with Turkey in this field either. In terms of the most important elements of air power, Greece has 600 aircraft, 200 multirole aircraft, and 270 helicopters whereas Turkey has 1,500 aircraft, 250 multirole aircraft, and 650 helicopters.

Moreover, while Greece does not have any armed unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) in its inventory, Turkey has 170 unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and UCAVs, and almost all of them are produced domestically. These UAVs and UCAVs are Turkey’s strong trump card: they are battle-proven and have proven to be game changers in conflict zones such as Syria, Nagorno-Karabakh, and Libya. As for naval power, Turkey and Greece have more or less similar numbers of warships, frigates, and submarines. Overall, it is not possible for Greece to compete with Turkey in terms of total military power – at least not on its own.

Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

The second pillar of Greece’s balancing strategy against Turkey is a relatively more functional deterring capacity. Undoubtedly Athens enjoys a high-level military cooperation with the U.S. and also benefits from the advantage of EU membership vis-à-vis Turkey, which is an EU candidate country. However, both Turkey and Greece are members of NATO and therefore Greece’s repertoire of moves against Turkey is limited.

It should never be forgotten that relations between states are interest-oriented and may change according to new conjunctures. Although Athens seems to have “secured” the support of the U.S. and France, nobody can know how long this alliance will last. In fact, the “AUKUS incident” experienced by France recently stands out as an example of how states can act against their allies when their interests are in question. Accordingly, Turkey’s determined stance to protect its rights in the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean can foil Athens’s attempts to counterbalance Turkey politically, militarily, and economically.

To summarize, the Greek aggressive foreign policy to counterbalance Turkey pushes the Athens administration toward an extensive armament project and the modernization of its army. Greece has strengthened its cooperation with the U.S. and France and secured the political and economic backing of the European Union.

However, given the fact that the Turkish army is getting stronger every year by relying on its own domestic and national capacity, and given that Athens’s cooperation with France and the U.S. is susceptible to change in the long run, Greece may face disappointment in the future. Greek initiatives carry the risks of creating further tension and serious consequences if the country opts to lead Turkey toward security dilemmas instead of looking for ways to cooperate and establish permanent peace.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a relatively narrow strip in the Mediterranean Sea surrounded by the coasts of ten different states, making coastal relations between these countries a technically complex issue. In addition, the area contains islands including the island of Cyprus and numerous Greek islands, which further complicate the maritime delimitation.

Such technical matters, however, do not represent the whole picture. There are fierce political confrontations in the Eastern Mediterranean such as the well-known Palestine issue, the Cyprus issue, as well as the uneasy political relations between Greece and Turkey, Egypt and Turkey, Syria and Turkey, Israel and Syria, and Israel and Lebanon.

All these difficulties make maritime delimitation quite complicated. Although some maritime delimitation agreements have been signed to date – such as the Greek Administration of Southern Cyprus [GASC]-Egypt Agreement of February 17, 2003; the GASC-Lebanon Agreement of January 17, 2007; the GASC-Israel Agreement of December 17, 2010; the Turkey-Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus [TRNC] Agreement of September 21, 2011; the Turkey-Libya Agreement of November 27, 2019; and the Greece-Egypt Agreement of August 6, 2020 – there are many matters yet to be settled.

Firstly, all these agreements have been objected to by one or more of the other concerned regional states making the agreements another source of friction. Secondly, there are maritime areas that are yet to be delimited; some of them directly concern Turkey such as the delimitations between Turkey, on the one hand, and Greece, the GASC, Syria, Egypt, and Palestine, on the other.

The Legal and Political Challenges of a Delimitation Agreement between Turkey and Egypt

Legally, Turkey and Egypt have opposite coasts in the Eastern Mediterranean, which do not involve complicating geographical features such as islands. Establishing maritime borders seems a relatively straightforward matter between the two countries. However, there are legal and political elements that adversely affect this process.

Egypt has so far established delimitation agreements with the GASC and Greece, which Turkey objected to on the premise that they are “violating the continental shelf areas of Turkey in the region.” Turkey considers some parts of the maritime borders established by Egypt as partially infringing the Turkish continental shelf areas.

It should be emphasized that Egypt has so far preferred to proceed with the GASC and Greece when it comes to maritime arrangements despite Turkey’s continuous objections. There is, therefore, a possibility of Egypt not proceeding with Turkey so as to revise the existing agreements simply because it may not want to sacrifice the established relations with Greece and the GASC.

Egypt still seems sensitive about its relations with Greece and the GASC while handling the process with Turkey. When noting that the relations between Egypt and Turkey would improve steadily, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Sameh Shukry also pointed to the fact that it will not be easy. Therefore, it is not appropriate to expect that Egypt will unconditionally support Turkey’s all desired moves in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Moreover, the historic rivalry or political competition between Turkey and Egypt over the Middle East will not disappear anytime soon. As a result, the improvement in the existing relations may take more time than expected.

Legal and Political Challenges to a Border Agreement with Palestine

Some argue that Turkey may establish a maritime border with Palestine as the coastal projections of the two countries overlap, which according to the international jurisprudence on maritime delimitation is the necessary legal element for two states to sign a maritime delimitation agreement.

Though technically possible, there are some legal and mostly political impediments to this proposal. As the potential delimitation will be based on the coasts of the Gaza Strip, the political division inside the state of Palestine creates the issue of who the “legitimate legal authority” is to sign such an agreement with Turkey.

Politically, the issue is even more complicated. The Palestinian Authority government has so far followed a policy which is closer to the Egypt-Greece forum on the Eastern Mediterranean maritime issues. Palestine is a member of EastMed Gas Forum along with the GASC, Egypt, France, Greece, Israel, Italy, and Jordan. It would be immature to expect that the Abbas administration would sign a maritime delimitation agreement with Turkey at the expense of negatively impacting its relations with the above countries.

A similar attitude may be expected from Israel. Although the relations between Turkey and Israel are currently at an improvement stage – President Erdoğan congratulated Prime Minister Naftali Bennett and the two heads of state held a phone call recently –  there are no appropriate circumstances for Israel to support a possible Turkey-Palestine delimitation agreement. Israel is in a process of an accelerated application of the EastMed Energy Project to deliver its natural gas to Europe through an EastMed pipeline.

Israel, Greece, and the GASC have already signed a deal on January 2, 2020, to build a 1,900 km long subsea pipeline to carry natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean’s rapidly developing gas fields to Europe. Moreover, Israel already ratified the agreement in July 2020. Therefore, one can expect that Israel would prefer to avert any possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine, which would further complicate the exiting issues.

Since the maritime area to be delimited by a possible Turkey-Palestine agreement has already been delimited through the Egypt-the GASC Delimitation Agreement of 2003, it is inevitable that Egypt may also oppose such a delimitation agreement.

Considering the above legal and political complications that emerge from both the Palestinian internal rift and the well-known positions of two closely related States, namely Israel and Egypt, a possible delimitation agreement between Turkey and Palestine seems not to be an easy one to conclude. The fact that such a delimitation agreement is legally appropriate does not therefore make it politically prospective in the near future.

Turkey and Greece have many differences which gain new dimensions through regional and international incidents. It is a curious question whether there could ever be a path toward a long-term dialogue between the two nations and a sustainable solution to their differences. So far, to promote dialogue and peaceful settlement, third parties such as the EU, the U.S., and NATO have played important roles. Some observers argue that the Greek-Turkish NATO partnership has kept the bilateral problems under control, while others think that the post-World War II order and the U.S. role in Greek-Turkish disputes have worsened the situation.

A number of experts believe the EU still has the potential to push Greece and Turkey to reach a solution and others argue that the EU created further tension and turbulence by recognizing the membership of the Greek Cypriot government as representative of the whole island before a resolution to the conflict had been reached. What is certain, however, is that the role of third parties in Greek-Turkish disagreements will determine to a great extent the success of the bilateral talks. Regional and global actors will play a decisive role in the disputed matters according to their interest definitions or priorities.

Exploratory talks between Turkey and Greece started after a crisis between the two countries at the end of the 1990s. Talks and rapprochement were stimulated when Turkey’s EU initiative for accession was supported by Greece. Turkey and Greece have held 60 rounds of talks over 14 years. However, rivalry in the Eastern Mediterranean turned the Aegean crises into a larger problem premised on the delimitation of maritime borders and especially in relation to the islands near Turkey’s coast.

Bilateral relations deteriorated in the 2010s, not because of the delimitation of the maritime borders, but due to the July 15, 2016 coup attempt in Turkey and the Gülenists who sought refuge in Greece. After the coup attempt, exploratory talks were hindered by Greece’s refusal to extradite the Gülenists to Turkey. Moreover, other regional problems poisoned the bilateral disagreements, such as the Syrian civil war and the flow of immigrants to the Aegean Sea and the region of Evros in Greece.

These new problems are no longer excluded from the agenda of the bilateral relations. Greece continued the EU-ization of Greek foreign policy priorities and Turkey rejected any kind of fait accompli. In this context, Greece’s naval exercises with the inclusion of numerous third actors as a show of strength and Turkey’s exploration ships in the Eastern Mediterranean will be regarded as the continuation of previous problems and are seen as having a multilateral character.

Recently, the most prominent issue in the Eastern Mediterranean has been the drilling activities around the island of Cyprus. Officially, this is out of the frame of exploratory talks between Greece and Turkey, but there is no doubt that the issue of Cyprus has always been poisonous for Greek-Turkish relations. In 2003, the Greek Cypriot leadership signed a maritime deal with Egypt for gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The deal aimed to create an Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) that complicated the Cyprus problem of how to share sovereignty between Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Greeks belittle the Cyprus problem reducing it to “occupation” in reference to the 1974 Turkish operation on the island after the brutal murders of Turkish Cypriot civilians by the Greek Cypriot militias backed by the Greek military junta with an idea of uniting the island with Greece. The real cause of the problem has been kept hidden: what will the rights of the Turkish Cypriots be?

In the 1960 constitution, Turkish Cypriots had the same rights as Greek Cypriots as constituent citizens of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). Problems were exacerbated when the Greek side argued that the number of Greek Cypriots were higher than their Turkish counterparts, and therefore Turkish Cypriots should not have equal rights and that this should be addressed by introducing several amendments in the founding constitution.

Despite the existence of EU mechanisms, the exclusion of Turkey from all multilateral platforms and a maximalist insistence on using these platforms and mechanisms to achieve Greek national priorities are still the dominant attitudes in the Eastern Mediterranean. This irreconcilable attitude was reflected in the use of maps such as the Seville Map to decide the delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in international summits – a move that triggered Turkey’s reaction.

The most recent example of Greece’s efforts to exclude and marginalize Turkey from international platforms is the Philia Forum.

In 2006, the concept of “Blue Homeland” (Mavi Vatan) which includes Turkey’s EEZ was introduced by Admiral Cem Gürdeniz. With the studies of Turkish Navy Commander Cihat Yaycı, in 2010, the concept became a doctrine (of the Turkish Republic). The first application of Blue Homeland came in 2017 when Turkey started to send seismic exploration ships to the region. The peak in the tensions in Greek-Turkish relations came when Turkey signed a delimitation agreement with Libya on November 28, 2019. Today, Turkey’s Eastern Mediterranean policy depends on the Turkey-Libya EEZ deal that challenges  the Mediterranean Energy Plan of Israel, Cyprus, and Greece.

In 2013, the EastMed pipeline project was designed under the European Commission Regulation without referring to any probable cooperation with Turkey and Turkish Cypriots. This was taken as another sign of how Greece tries to use its EU membership to its national advantage. The most recent example of Greece’s efforts to exclude and marginalize Turkey from international platforms is the Philia Forum. The Greek government aims to utilize Turkey’s tensions with several regional countries in order to delegitimize and minimize Turkey’s rightful demands and rights in the Mediterranean.

As part of this strategy, the Greek government wants to find a solution to the delimitation issue with other neighboring countries such as the agreements with Italy on June 6, and with Egypt on August 6,  2020. The Albanian-Greek EEZ border had several problems despite continuous efforts since 2009. In 2018, the Tsipras government tried to push the negotiations with no success. On October 20, 2020, Albanian and Greek authorities confirmed that they had reached an agreement to take the issue to The Hague.

As a result of the rising tension in the Eastern Mediterranean, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg took the initiative to reduce the risk of incidents between the Greek and Turkish navies. With the support of Germany, Turkey and Greece resumed exploratory talks in Istanbul on January 26, 2021 with the hope to create a base for bilateral negotiations after months of tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. After a five-year break, the 61st Round of Exploratory Talks were launched in the hope of supporting the EU efforts to promote a positive agenda in Turkish-EU relations.

Turkish Deputy Foreign Minister Sedat Önal and retired Greek diplomat Pavlos Apostolidis represented their countries at the negotiation table. However, both sides approach each other reluctantly and do not act in good faith. To gain diplomatic benefits, both try to project the image of a peaceful actor towards the international community. Some analysts say diplomats know how to solve the problems in the Aegean Sea while others claim no progress is being made. However, making progress in the exploratory talks is now a matter of a deeper question.

The relations between Greece and Turkey are part of the EU-Turkey relations. Greek officials state it clearly, and believe that the European Union can provide a solid victory for Greece by implementing sanctions against Turkey. On the other hand, Turkey wants a positive agenda – but the question is at what expense. Turkey accuses the EU countries of being unjust but is equally aware that the solution will come through an international meeting which must include all actors in the Eastern Mediterranean. So, the lack of trust and the existence of many different actors with a range of different priorities make the exploratory talks less promising in terms of reaching a comprehensive resolution in the near future.

Third parties play an important role in the game and according to Turkey it is not a fair game. This is the main reason why Turkey is active in the field with military exercises that manifest its decisiveness to preserve its maritime borders. However, the beginning of the exploratory talks shows that both Greece and Turkey do not want to increase the tension further. This creates a motivation to back the dialogue channels. To this day, the only reliable method to solve the existing problems between Turkey and Greece is peaceful negotiations through fair international summits with the participation of all relevant actors.