During the past weeks, Egypt has witnessed unexpected anti-government protests. The demonstrations were triggered by the social media posts of businessman Mohammad Ali, who did construction projects for the Egyptian military, but did not receive payments for some time. Mohammad Ali heavily criticized the Sisi regime and the Egyptian army by revealing their serious malpractices. As his videos became popular, the interest among the youth to organize protests against the regime increased. On September 20 and 21, thousands of Egyptians took to streets to protest the regime despite the fear of arrest by the security forces. While protests didn’t last long, it was surprising for many that some people would actually go to streets and protest. The regime’s responses were harsh. Hundreds of protesters were arrested in the following days. However, the demonstrations failed to produce tangible results.

The lack of international support for the protesters and the continued backing of Sisi by global actors are the main factors behind this. Egyptians know that the increasing regime pressure on civilians will not be condemned, and human rights abuses will continue to occur. Therefore, even though Egyptians wish for the regime to topple, activists were cautious to go to the streets to protest. This applies to Muslim Brotherhood members as well. As the group experienced the harshest pressure in its history under the Sisi regime, they rightly abstained from participating in protests in order to prevent further oppression.

However, the Muslim Brotherhood’s peaceful struggle for democracy has been the main motivation for a handful of protesters who could stand up against the regime. As the movement lost the opportunity for civil opposition inside the country, it had to carry its struggle outside. The movement was keen on staying peaceful and sought every means to establish a democratic system in Egypt. 

One of the most important factors behind the protests in Egypt is the continuation of the democratic struggle of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, especially through the use of traditional and social media. One of the most important tools in this sense is the regime-critical television channels. Istanbul-based Mkemmelin and Sharq are two major TV channels that the Egyptian opposition use to broadcast critical coverage of the Sisi regime. These channels have millions of viewers in Egypt where state media allows no critical coverage. While the discussion programs broadcast on these channels reach millions of Egyptians via satellite, they are an alternative source of news for media organizations, which are one of the propaganda tools of the oppressive regime in the country. These programs, which have widespread popularity among young people, reveal the true face of the regime in Egypt. The Muslim Brotherhood is also supported by other political and intellectual figures in its struggle for a democratic Egypt. These efforts represent a hope for the domestic masses in Egypt and encourage them to continue their struggle for democracy.

Another dynamic that triggered the protests was the use of social media. In an environment where oppositional discourses cannot be expressed in the public sphere, young people often use social media tools for political activism. While Facebook, Twitter and YouTube, which were used extensively in the early periods of the Arab revolutions, remained popular, it has been observed that regime critical posts and publications have increased significantly.

In addition to criticism on social media, Egyptians have shown their dissatisfaction towards the Sisi regime in street as well. Sisi’s regime has not been able to provide political stability, find a solution to the economic crisis, and prevent deepening social inequalities. The regime’s spending on various sectors was also source of discomfort. The most obvious example of this is the expenditures in the defense industry. In an environment where inflation is increasing and purchasing power is gradually decreasing, the Sisi regime’s purchase of billions of dollars of defense industry products has been met with public reaction. A similar situation can also be said in the context of giant projects such as the construction of the new capital and the expansion of the Suez Canal. It is widely argued that these projects did not produce intended outcomes and were waste of public resources. 

It is unclear how anti-Sisi protests will have an impact on the future of the regime. As a matter of fact, although there is dissatisfaction with Sisi within the army and political bureaucracy, there is no clear indication that regional and global actors have disregarded Sisi. On the other hand, these protests will strengthen the perception that Sisi’s image, which has been damaged in domestic public opinion, has become even more negative before these actors. Therefore, since 2013, the countries that support Sisi have been forced to consider an alternative name in case of a possible change in government.

Sisi was placed in power by regional and global actors led by the US, Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE with the aim of ending the revolutionary process in Egypt in 2011. Sisi fulfilled his duty by preventing the revolutionary process, prioritizing Western interests, guaranteeing the security of Israel and eliminating the Muslim Brotherhood from political life. However, given both the lack of internal stability in Egypt and the growing reaction against Sisi, it is seen that although Sisi is still a functional actor, and he has completed the mission given to him in the counter-revolution process, there may be an increasing demand for a new and more charismatic actor in Egyptian politics. Therefore, the future of Sisi will depend not only on the developments within Egypt, but also on the attitude of regional and global actors that have an impact on this country.

Saudi Arabia has become a frequently mentioned actor in the international media. The King, “the Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques,” and his troublesome son Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) are accused of being involved in many international criminal activities, including the civil war in Yemen and the Khashoggi murder. In 2015, just after becoming defense minister, MbS led many transformational endeavours, both in foreign and domestic policies. Since the infamous Ritz-Carlton hotel imprisonment of many royals, MbS is now trying to pave his way to the throne and is ready for executing a number of Sahwa leaders in the upcoming days.

Historical episode

A decades long history reveals that there is no room for political Islam or any form of it in Saudi Arabia. Further, Riyadh does not want to see any Islamist leader in power across the region. This is because it directly poses an existential threat to the al-Saud family – the ruling elite. Therefore, it is the al-Saud’s strategy to eliminate significant Islamist opposition. The preachers of Sahwa are among those Islamists. They strongly opposed the government during the 1990s, saying that the settling of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia is against Islam. They took their position and began an awareness campaign in society, revolving around the idea that the al-Saud regime has lost its credibility and that they have become servants of Western powers, especially of the U.S.

Since the infamous Ritz-Carlton hotel imprisonment of many royals, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman is now ready for executing a number of Sahwa leaders in the upcoming days.

During these years, the threat coming from Saddam to the Gulf monarchs was at its peak. To balance this threat, the Saudis invited the U.S. army to deter Saddam. The sheiks of Sahwa, especially al-Hawali and al-Awdah criticized the regime during their preaching. In May 1991, 52 scholars signed a declaratory Letter of Recommendation that was presented to King Fahd, urging him to revise his policies. However, the al-Saud family perceived this as a threat from the Sahwa movement. As the name implies, Sahwa means the “awakening” of society. Therefore, Al-Awdah was sentenced to imprisonment in 1994. After receiving the attention of the opposition, he was released in 1999 on the basis that he remained “moderate.”

Two days before his brutal murder, Jamal Khashoggi warned that al-Awdah will be executed for being moderated. According to UN experts, al-Awdah is considered to be a reformist, and that MbS also sees him as a threat. Therefore, 37 separate accusations were filled against Al-Awdah. Among these accusations include leading a terrorist organization, opposing the blockade against Qatar, cooperating with the Muslim Brotherhood, rivaling the success of the government, being in contact with the royal family in Qatar, threatening national security, and provoking violence.

Sahwa: Synthesis of Ikhwan and Salafism

Sahwa is a mergence of Ikhwan, i.e. the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafism. The preachers, scholars and members of this movement are Salafi, but they are not from the traditional current that obeys the Saudi establishment. They differ from the traditional Salafist concept of Islam, which obeys the status quo government –whoever that may be. Therefore, Sahwa is an alternative that goes against the classic Wahhabi ulamas in Saudi Arabia, as they are considered to be Salafists but with Muslim Brotherhood ideas. The connection between the Sahwa and the Ikhwan can be traced back to the 1970s, when members of the Ikhwan, who were under pressure in Egypt and Syria, densely migrated to Saudi Arabia, bringing their ideas to the Kingdom.

Members of the Ikhwan settled in Saudi Arabia and managed to establish a university in which al-Awda and al-Havali were active members. During the reign of King Faisal, they had a chance to meet with several prominent educational institutions. Al-Hawali met with Mohammed Qutb, brother of a prominent Egyptian MB Sayyid Qutb and al-Awdah was educated by Mohammed Surur, who was a significant figure of Ikhwan in Syria. Al-Havali and al-Awdah were impressed by the Sahwa’s ideology.

The preachers, scholars and members of Sahwa movement are Salafi, but they are not from the traditional current that obeys the Saudi establishment.

The Sahva movement was significantly influenced by the Ikhwan political thinkers such as Muhammad Ahmad Al-Rashid, Muhammad Qutb, and Muhammad Surur. Standing against imperialism and having a plan to implement Sharia in the state system, Hassan al-Banna was an ideal for Sahwa’s proponents. In comparison with Ikhwan, Sahwa has no hierarchical organization with a certain structure, and is rather a loose system.

Another distinctive feature of Sahwa is that it has a different ideology from the modernist and liberal Islamists. They differ from liberal Islamist thinkers who are influenced by Western liberal philosophies and who believe that religion and politics must be separated from each other. According to them, the Islamic faith is applicable in all walks of individual and public life, including statecraft and public policy. The political factor is seen as an essential element of Sunni Islam from their point of view. Modernity and secularism are seen as two ideologies that contradict the Sunni Islamic understanding.

While Saudis generally perceive Islamists as a threat in general, the Sahwa scholars are considered as an existential threat.

Another factor that differentiates the Sahwa from other Islamic movements is that it does not urge for violence and revolution as a means to achieve its goal. Therefore, they also differ from jihadist groups that see violence as a legitimate tool in order to achieve religious goals. They believe that political reforms should not be implemented in Saudi Arabia through a revolution. Instead, the Sahwa urge for building a consensus among society for embracing reconciliation between scholars and the ruling elite, which will eventually bring political reform. Therefore, the sheiks of Sahwa are considered as prominent figures for all the Muslim world.

While Saudis generally perceive Islamists as a threat in general, the Sahwa scholars are considered as an existential threat. Therefore, the regime wants to deter society and intends to do this by executing them in order to install an empire of horror, imitating the Egyptian style of treating Islamists. In his quest for the throne, MbS needs to buy legitimacy from outside the kingdom. The traditional role of such leaders is to act as the “warrior against terrorism” and jump on the western ship. However, even if he succeeds in installing the empire of horror, or paving his way to the throne with the blood of Sahwa leaders, he still has to overcome a great obstacle within the royal family. Preventing a coalition between the regime and Islamists can effectively hinder his ascendance to the throne.

The sudden death of Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, caused shock waves in Turkey and across the Muslim world. The main reason for this was due to the fact that Morsi was a symbolic figure in Egypt’s popular uprising, which toppled a decades-long oppressive regime and aimed for a democratic and prosperous country. This has been a dream not only for Egyptians, but for millions of Arabs who suffer from oppressive regimes across the region. With years-long struggle for democratic rights, Turkish people felt sympathy for Egyptians, particularly for its leader Morsi, and supported the struggle led by him. Likewise, Turkey’s ruling AK Party also supported the success of Egypt’s political transformation led by the Muslim Brotherhood – the most organized civil society movement in the Middle East.

There was also a strong reaction in Turkey when Morsi was toppled by a military coup on July 3, 2013, led by the then Defence Minister, Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi. With its infamous military intervention experience during its democratization process, Turkey was the harshest critic of the military coup in Egypt- both at the political and social level. In addition, the Turkish public and political elites showed solidarity with Egypt’s popular movements, particularly the Muslim Brotherhood, which was subjected to an unprecedented deprivation of basic rights and human rights violations by the military junta in the country. This feeling of sympathy and solidarity has been alive since the first day of the military coup in Egypt and Turkey’s popular support for Mohamed Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood continued.

With years-long struggle for democratic rights, Turkish people felt sympathy for Egyptians, particularly for its leader Morsi, and supported the struggle led by him.

For this very reason, regardless of ideological differences among society, Morsi’s sudden death has made a huge and upsetting impact in Turkey. This is mainly because of the fact that with its Muslim identity and strong belief in democratic values, Turkish people felt sympathy with their fellow brothers in Egypt, who struggled for their democratic rights at the hand of an oppressive regime. That is why social and political actors in Turkey supported Egypt’s historic revolutionary uprising in 2011 and welcomed the election of Mohamed Morsi as the first civilian president of the country. It is widely believed in Turkey that Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood movement would be a transforming power in the Egyptian political landscape and lead the country to become a democratic one. Therefore, the Turkish public consider the death of Mohamed Morsi as the symbol of that struggle.

It is also believed that Morsi’s removal from power in 2013 was not directly related to his leadership, but rather related to the concerns of other regional and international actors. Especially in terms of their opinions on the future status of the Muslim Brotherhood in the greater Middle East. Regional autocratic regimes consider the Muslim Brotherhood as the most serious threat that would initiate a region wide democratization agenda. In addition, the institutionalization of the Muslim Brotherhood’s political leadership in Egypt was seen primarily as a threat to Israel’s security as well as the interests of Western powers.

The death of Morsi is a big damage to the revolutionary struggle in Egypt. Morsi was unlawfully kept in prison under harsh conditions and without the medical treatment he required.

Morsi’s close relationship with Turkey’s strong leader, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was also another dynamic that fed such concerns of these actors, as they are also uncomfortable with Turkey’s increasing influence in the region. The possibility of Turkey’s formation of a powerful alliance with Egypt under the Morsi administration was one of the turning points for these actors and led them to step up their anti-Muslim Brotherhood agenda. While supporting the fall of the Morsi administration in Egypt, countries that held counter-revolutionary approaches towards the Arab revolutions also followed policies to limit Turkey’s increasing influence. As a result, the Turkish leadership and public considered these attacks on Morsi as attacks on Turkey’s interests and national security. Thus, it can be argued that these unjust and hostile attitudes of regional and international actors on the Muslim Brotherhood leadership and Turkish government caused strong solidarity in Turkey towards the Morsi administration.

The illegal detention and unlawful trial of Morsi and his followers have been considered a major injustice by the Turkish public, which is traditionally respectful for democratic values, human rights and the rule of law. It was widely believed that the charges directed against Muslim Brotherhood members and Morsi were politically motivated. The AK party, which has struggled for years for a democratic transition in Turkey, has shown the strongest reaction to the Sisi regime’s violent pressures on Muslim Brotherhood members, who have only peacefully sought their democratic rights. Turkish people considered this struggle as a historic moment that can transform the political landscape in the Middle East and therefore Morsi’s death was perceived as the greatest loss of this democratic struggle. It should be noted that in the eyes of millions of Turkish people, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood was a real hope for a regional transformation that could eventually benefit Turkey’s regional policies.

Morsi’s legacy will always be remembered and kept alive in Turkey.

The death of Morsi can be interpreted as the greatest damage to the revolutionary struggle in Egypt. Morsi was unlawfully kept in prison under harsh conditions and without the medical treatment he required. Despite the heavy pressure and policies of the Sisi regime, Morsi and the Muslim Brotherhood stuck to peaceful protests in order to prevent the country to slide into a violent civil war. However, counter-revolutionary actors aimed to exclude the Muslim Brotherhood from political and social life in the country and followed a brutal policy towards the organization. The trial and illegal detention of Mohamed Morsi and thousands of other Muslim Brotherhood members could be seen under this policy, which eventually led to the death of Egypt’s first and only democratically elected president.  

This honourable struggle gave Morsi a symbolic status in Egypt’s democratization experience, not only inside the country but also across the Islamic world. As explained, Morsi’s story is widely respect in Turkey, a country that has lived through years of democratic struggle. Therefore, Morsi’s legacy will always be remembered and kept alive in Turkey. The democratic struggle of the Egyptian people will receive never-ending support from Turkish people who resect democratic values, human rights and freedoms.

It has recently been reported that U.S. President Donald Trump is trying to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Local sources related to the subject state that the necessary procedures are in the process of completion in order to finalize the decision. Such initiatives were also in place in 2016, 2017 and 2018, as a number of senators, including current Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, made attempts to declare the Muslim Brotherhood movement a terrorist organization. Such initiatives were not successful as the bills did not meet with the criteria of designation. During these attempts, the U.S. Secretary of State reported that there was no clear evidence that the Muslim Brotherhood was a terrorist organization.

As the efforts in the Senate did not realize the decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, this time, the president himself has taken the initiative to finalize the act. This process has clearly shown that there is a strong campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood among U.S. policy-making circles. It can be argued that the figures against the Muslim Brotherhood receive strong lobbying funds from anti-Brotherhood countries including Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and most importantly, Egypt.

However, despite immense efforts and lobbying campaigns, these actors were not able to reach their goal. This also indicates that there is a strong resistance within the U.S. establishment that aims to prevent the decision to list the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. This resistance does not necessarily mean support for the Brotherhood, but rather is due to the negative repercussions that could amount from such a decision. Therefore, a number of policy circles that shape U.S. foreign policy, including the Pentagon, are trying to prevent such a decision from taking place. These actors argue that the legal and political implications of the act against the Muslim Brotherhood would have a negative impact on U.S. interests.

Figures working on declaring the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization receive strong lobbying funds from anti-Brotherhood countries including Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt. 

Such a decision has the potential to cause serious political and social consequences for the United States. As former National Security Council Director on Egypt and Israel, Andrew Miller, argued, “the designation will consume huge energy of number of crucial agencies such as FBI, Intelligence Community and Treasury which will be expected to work on identifying persons and organizations related with the Muslim Brotherhood. This will reduce the time that these organizations will spare for other terrorist groups such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda that are already planning attacks on US subjects.” Miller also argued that Trump’s decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization as a political gesture for Cairo, Riyadh, and Abdu Dhabi, may have “real-world implications” for U.S. security.

Another repercussion of such a decision on the U.S. is related with the Muslim Brotherhood’s active engagements in U.S. social, political and intellectual life. Muslim Brotherhood affiliate organizations are the most organized groups among Muslims in the U.S. All these institutions are legal non-governmental civil society organizations that provide services in religion, education, health and other civic rights. By accusing members of these organizations with terrorism-related claims, the U.S. government will draw harsh criticism from Muslims not only within the U.S. but throughout the Muslim world. These U.S. citizens who are associated with the Muslim Brotherhood that will face criminal charges will significantly impact U.S. social life as a large number of these people are employed in political institutions, education, law and other sectors. In addition, the activity of many businessmen related to these organizations in the U.S. may also be damaged by the decision.

Trump’s decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization as a political gesture for Cairo, Riyadh, and Abdu Dhabi, may have “real-world implications” for U.S. security.

The designation decision would also have foreign policy repercussions for the U.S., particularly with its relations with countries that have a positive attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood, including long-time allies Turkey and Qatar. With an already developing crisis with Turkey, the U.S. administration will allow for another area of confrontation with Ankara by designating the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization. Since the start of the Arab revolutions in 2011, the Turkish government has been on positive terms with the Muslim Brotherhood mainly due to political calculations in regional politics. Turkey hosted Muslim Brotherhood members in exile and allowed for the organization to operate media organizations that had a very critical stance against the Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi regime, which is strongly supported by Donald Trump. Another country that would not welcome such a decision is Qatar. Doha has been considered as the most important supporter of the Muslim Brotherhood in the Middle East. At the same time, Doha hosts CENTCOM, a crucial U.S. institution in the region. Such a decision by Trump on the Muslim Brotherhood would thus create tension between Washington and Doha.

Finally, Trump’s decision to list the Muslim Brotherhood as terrorist organization may also create practical problems considering U.S. policy in the Middle East. The main problem in this regard is about the definition. The Muslim Brotherhood is a transnational civil movement that has branches in almost all countries in the Islamic world, particularly in the Middle East. In some countries the organization held (and still holds) political office. In Egypt, the movement played a crucial role in political life from 2011 to 2013. Muslim Brotherhood member Mohammad Morsi served as the first democratically elected president of the country from June 2012 to July 2013. The movement was, however, removed from the political scene in July 2013 with a military coup, which was supported by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia.

The U.S. administration cannot even sustain the decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization.

In other countries such as Algeria, Morocco, Jordan, Tunisia, and Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood established political parties that officially served as political actors. The movement, which has millions of members across the Middle East, advocated democratic political systems and adopted a moderate Islamic approach. Therefore, Trump’s decision to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization would create huge problems for Washington’s political actions in the region.

The decision to place the Muslim Brotherhood in the same category as Daesh, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram and the PKK – groups that have been responsible for the killing of thousands of civilians – will be refused by the international community and will bring new criticism towards Washington. As the international community showed discontent to Trump’s recent designation of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist organization, a similar decision about the Muslim Brotherhood will also face criticism and create repercussions for the U.S. Therefore, it would be a serious mistake for the U.S. administration to designate the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization, if not because of all the abovementioned reasons, for the difficulties in sustaining such a decision.

The ongoing protests in Algeria are regarded as reminders of the early days of the Arab revolutions in 2011, when millions poured to the streets in many countries across the Middle East. The protests had caused regime changes in countries like Egypt, Libya, and Tunisia. One of the most important organized movements during the revolutionary uprisings was the Muslim Brotherhood. The movement was actively engaged in political transformation in both Egypt and Tunisia. Despite the fact that the movement has been going through a bitter experience in Egypt since 2013, it is trying to be part of the political struggle in Algeria.

As the country experiences a postponed revolutionary moment since February this year, the Muslim Brotherhood has been trying to gain more ground in the country’s political spectrum. Since the start of the Arab revolutions in 2011, the Muslim Brotherhood movement has been following an active agenda in the country’s political transformation. Will the movement ever have the chance to lead the country to becoming a full-fledged democratic setting?

Although it has not been deeply engaged in the country’s political life for many years, the Muslim Brotherhood has a long history in Algeria. Sheikh Ahmed Sahnoun was one of the intellectuals of the period that founded the movement in 1953. Despite the fact that the movement did not have a significant presence in the country’s independence war against France, Muslim Brotherhood members made efforts to motivate the Algerian people during this period.

Will the Muslim Brotherhood ever have the chance to lead Algeria to becoming a full-fledged democracy? 

Following independence, the movement kept a low profile in the country’s volatile political environment. During the 1980s, as tension between Islamist groups and the government increased, the Muslim Brotherhood did not have a sharp stance (unlike other conservative Islamic movements). Some groups called for an Islamic state at the time, but the Muslim Brotherhood leadership did not. Tensions between the regime and Islamic groups increased especially in the late 80s. During the 1990 election, the Islamic coalition, which included a minor Muslim Brotherhood group, Nahda, gained 70% of the total votes. This was a turning point in the country’s history as the army cancelled the elections. The following period was a catastrophe for Algeria, as the country was dragged into a decade-long civil war.

During the civil war, the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria did not position itself against the army. In contrast, it followed a political pragmatist approach by siding with state institutions. The leading organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Movement of Society for Peace (MSP) was established during these years. In return to its loyalty to the state, in 1995, the MSP was given political ranks by the Algerian state. In 1997, both Nahda and MSP ran for parliamentary elections and won a total of 15% of the vote, with 69 seats in the parliament. Following the election, together with two secular political parties, the MSP became a member of the political coalition that governed the country for about two decades. As a coalition member, the MSP was given 7 ministerial positions and in 2004, the group supported the continuation of the Abdel Aziz Bouteflika presidency for another term.

Despite years-long pragmatist alliances with secular ruling elites and the army, the Muslim Brotherhood took a different political stance in the post-Arab revolutions period. The organization believed that the wave of uprisings in the region must pressure the Algerian regime for democratic reforms. Due to its increasing disagreements with the establishment in Algeria, MSP announced its withdrawal from the coalition in 2012. It can be argued that one of the most important factors in this decision was the early success of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Tunisia. With a new discourse and activism, the movement also wanted to frame itself as a moderate organization that can play a leading role in the country’s democratization process.

In the post-Arab revolutions period, MSP became more aggressive in terms of its political discourse. In 2012, the then leader of the movement, Bouguerra Soltani, stated that the revolutionary wave would eventually arrive to Algeria if the political leadership cannot complete political reforms demanded by the people. The movement also harshly criticized Israeli policies towards Palestine and commented against the regional policy choices of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.

The political stance adopted by the Muslim Brotherhood throughout the ongoing political protests against President Bouteflika in Algeria illustrate that the organization will no longer keep a low profile in the country’s political arena. 

Finally, MSP also actively supported anti-government protests that started in February 2019, when Abdel Aziz Bouteflika announced his candidacy for a fifth term in office. The MSP leadership called on President Bouteflika to resign immediately. The leader of the movement, Abdul Rezzaq Al-Makri, stated that the ruling elite should take into account the demands of the people and stressed that the tension in the country would increase and that political instability would deepen.

These statements and the aggressive stance adopted by the movement illustrates that the Muslim Brotherhood in Algeria will no longer keep a low profile in the country’s political arena. It can be argued that the organization wants to play a more important role in the future of Algerian politics. The movement’s decision to nominate a candidate in the presidential election for the first time indicates that the Muslim Brotherhood aims to become a political force for a change in the country.

Despite Bouteflika’s announcement of postponing elections, protests have been continuing throughout the country. People have demanded the resignation of the president and have called for new free and fair elections to take place. Both the continuation of protests and the determination of protesters highlights that the country’s political realm will be a scene of historical developments in the coming period. As one of the most organized social and political forces, the Muslim Brotherhood is likely to play an important role in this political transformation.

8 years after the Arab Uprising, which sought radical institutional reform, the primary obstacle to the just rule of law in Egypt is ‘political.’ The entrenched military elite have remained reluctant to any alternative judiciary system that attempts to create a center of authority beyond their control. The political transition, indeed, created a possibility of institutional reform, where the state and society would be equally accountable to the rule of law. However, Egypt’s judiciary erected barriers to any practice that fiddled with the traditional impunity and supremacy enjoyed by the authoritarian institutions.

Since the overthrow of Egypt’s first democratically elected president, Mohamed Morsi, on July 3, 2013, the Egyptian judiciary has operated under severe authoritarian strain. While the judiciary exercised limited checks over the executive bias, the executive interference has undermined all other state institutions. This helped to contain, at least marginally, the authoritarian coercion during the Mubarak regime and during the Muslim Brotherhood’s brief government.

A day after the coup against the elected MB government, Military General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi appointed the Chief of Supreme Constitutional Court, Adly Mansoor, as interim president. On July 5, 2013, Mansoor dissolved the Shura council, allowing the executive to manipulate the rule of law. This was the first judicial misconduct after the overthrow of Morsi. Morsi, no doubt, attempted to consolidate power – at least, misuse the people’s mandate. But Egypt enjoyed considerable space for dissent. On September 23, barely two months after the coup, the Cairo Court for Urgent Matters dissolved the Muslim Brotherhood and ordered for the confiscation of its assets. A month later, on November 24, the interim government issued the Demonstration Law, essentially criminalizing any organized form of dissent “at the slightest indication of disorder.” Such unlawful action axed whatever pluralism was left in the political chaos of Egypt.

After Sisi assumed power on June 8, 2014, the Egyptian judiciary became complacent to cumulative degrees of injustice and oppression. The judges that remained in service either voluntarily abided to authoritarian dictates or didn’t dare to raise their voice for judicial impartiality. Take for example the case of Judges for Egypt – a group of judges who challenged the authority of Sisi in overthrowing the elected president. In March 2016, the Supreme Disciplinary Board forcefully removed 47 judges who were part of a group being charged of being “pro-Islamist.” However, adherence to any political idea is the right of a citizen devoid of the professional position one holds. The explicit muzzling of this right and the conspicuous silence of the judiciary shows the extent of compromise Egypt’s judicial system has fallen for. It also explains Sisi’s authoritarian insecurity towards religio-political dissent.

But in the case of Egypt, religio-political discourse is essential – not only because it serves as a counterbalance to state structures, but also because it propagates the idea of equality and accountability, a notion that the ruler is not above the law. These are the basic premises that uphold human dignity. Thus, the intent of central actors of transition considerably determines how religion is allowed to shape the political discourse thereof. Egypt failed to strike a balance, partially given to the miscalculation given to the miscalculation of the street and partially because of ‘external factors,’ whose interests lie in authoritarian Egypt. Sisi and his regional allies understood that the Muslim Brotherhood is the only force capable of re-emerging and taking an independent decision or challenging the existing norm. Hence, the decision to outlaw the Muslim Brotherhood was to eliminate any possibility of opposition and to legitimize the authoritarian brutality against any form of dissent.

The Egpytian Criminal Court sentenced Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death in masses in “unfair trials.” Such “grotesque parody of justice” further strengthened the institutionalized authoritarian coercion.

An explicit judicial disparity reigns the court proceedings. The Criminal Court sentenced Muslim Brotherhood supporters to death in mass in “unfair trials.” Such “grotesque parody of justice” further strengthened the institutionalized authoritarian coercion. Not all these death sentences were to be carried out, but the message went out very clear – no institution is above the authoritarian norm, not even the judiciary. These mass convictions and the uncensored enthusiasm of the Egyptian executive to crackdown upon any form of opposition shows the level of irrelevance the Egyptian judiciary enjoys.

The activists detained for opposing the government have been “unnecessarily” held for lengthy periods before their court proceedings. In October 2014, Sisi expanded the jurisdiction of military courts to “public and vital” facilities. This further manipulated the ambit of judicial impartiality; thousands of civilians were referred to military trials based on media reports; hundreds of “suspected” MB supporters were tried in mass and “unfair” judicial proceedings. On the other hand, members of the security forces, those affiliated to Hosni Mubarak, and the supporters of the Sisi regime were freed on bail.

The renewed Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2015 drew curtains over whatever miniscule space for dissent and the rule of law remained in Egypt. The law bestows the security forces with unrestricted impunity from persecution and penalizes the press for negating the official version of military attacks.

The renewed Anti-Terrorism Law in August 2015 drew curtains over whatever miniscule space for dissent and the rule of law remained in Egypt. The law bestows the security forces with unrestricted impunity from persecution and penalizes the press for negating the official version of military attacks. It sets a fine of up to $64000 for journalists who publish or spread news reports contradicting that of the state’s version. Such expansion of surveillance established the consolidation of an absolute authority within the executive. It also illustrated that legal reform is pursed in order to protect the regime rather than the citizens of Egypt.

Then came Law No 13 of 2017, which amended the Judicial Authority Law (Law No. 46 of 1972). This law stipulates that the President of Egypt must directly appoint the Chief Justice for each of the main four judicial bodies of the country. The silence of the Egyptian judiciary over this legislation explained that the judiciary preferred allying itself with the regime at the cost of institutional dignity.

The greatest low of the judiciary came in early December 2018, when a group of Egyptian lawyers filed a petition seeking to amend Article 140 of the constitution in order to grant Sisi a “lifetime” presidency. Though courts are yet to take any substantial decision on this petition, such endeavors explain another judicial misconduct aiding authoritarian sustenance in Egypt.

A just political system cannot be consolidated without a strong and impartial judiciary; thus, in the absence of a judicial system supportive of the principles of democracy, the rule of law will always remain subject to authoritarian manipulation.

Around 6 years after overthrowing the democratically elected government, Sisi managed to establish a brutal authority, but not a secure government. A just political system cannot be consolidated without a strong and impartial judiciary; thus, in the absence of a judicial system supportive of the principles of democracy, the rule of law will always remain subject to authoritarian manipulation.

Egypt’s judicial reform has neither been indigenous, nor comprehensive, nor locally supported. Any successful reform aims to restructure the social and political variables exogenous to the judiciary that promotes judicial independence and the superiority of the “rule of law.” This “decisional” independence requires, essentially, that judicial ranks are not staked in advance through the appointment or promotion of people that approve a particular set of ideas. Since Sisi assumed power, the Egyptian judiciary has served to legitimate and facilitate the authoritarian rule. Other than a feigned opposition against the transfer of two islands – Sanafir and Tiran – to Saudi Arabia in 2016, the Egyptian judiciary has served as a channel through which Sisi presses his oppression.

Following the military coup in 2013, the new regime in Egypt has taken serious steps to limit the activities of civil society. The regime led by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi took the initial attack on the Muslim Brotherhood movement, the largest non-governmental organization in the country. During 2013 and 2014, the Sisi regime targeted NGOs, health institutions, religious and educational centers, which were claimed to be associated with the Muslim Brotherhood. The number of organizations that were closed in the post-coup period reached to over 10 thousand at the best estimate.

Non-governmental organizations and activists with secular and liberal ideology such as the 6 April Movement, Revolutionary Socialists, the Kefaya movement, and even the Tamarod movement became the targets of the Sisi regime.

On the other hand, non-governmental organizations and activists with secular and liberal ideology were also the targets of the Sisi regime. The 6 April Movement, Revolutionary Socialists, and the Kefaya movement as well as members of these organizations were subject to pressure from the regime and some were arrested for long prison terms. Even the Tamarod movement, which supported Sisi during the coup, failed to receive support from the post-coup regime that has been in place since July 2013.

In 2017, the Sisi regime took a step to institutionalize pressure on civil society with a new law that re-arranged the activities of civil society organizations. However, rather than liberalizing the functioning of civil society, the law further restricted their activities. The law made it difficult for 47,000 NGOs in the country to carry out their activities. In addition, the law stipulated that foreign NGOs need to pay $16,500 in order to start their operations in Egypt – a requirement that attracted concerns in regards to the motivation of the law. It is also requested that both domestic and foreign NGOs be approved by the committee established by this law and that they carry out their activities following this approval.

Following the NGO law of 2017, many civil society organizations were shut down and some foreign NGOs had to stop their activities in Egypt. Egyptian police stormed some of their offices.

Despite pressure from the government, NGOs have tried to remain active. However, following the NGO law of 2017, many were shut down and some foreign NGOs had to stop their activities in Egypt. In this context, on February 9, 2017, Egyptian police stormed the office of the country’s leading human rights organization, the Al-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence.

In addition to Nadeem Centre, Nazra for Feminist Studies and the Center for Egyptian Women’s Legal Assistance (CEWLA) also suspended their activities due to pressure from the government. The Cairo Institute of Human Rights Studies (CIHRS) relocated to its new headquarters in Tunis. Organizations such as the Association for Freedom of Thought and Expression (AFTE) and the Arab Network for Human Rights Information (ANHRI) have limited their activities and tried to avoid government pressure due to their critical coverage. However, they continued to remain visible in the public sphere.

The Sisi regime’s repressive policies towards civil society continue in different ways. Recently, the arrest of 31 people, including workers of the human rights organization called Egyptian Coordination for Rights and Freedoms, attracted the reaction of many civil society movements both inside and outside of the country. It is reported that one of the detainees is Aisha Al-Shater, the daughter of Hairat Al-Shater, who was one of the leading businessmen and influential figures in the Muslim Brotherhood organization before he was arrested in the post-coup crackdown on the movement.

Civil society in Egypt is far worse than it was during the Mubarak era. Government pressure has been increasingly limiting the activities of local and international civil society organizations in the country.

Meanwhile, many human rights organizations in the country have issued a joint statement against the operation, demanding the release of the detainees. The Egyptian Commission for Rights and Freedoms, Al-Nadeem Center for Rehabilitation of Victims of Violence, the Adala Center for Rights and Freedoms, the Cairo Center for Human Rights Studies, the Egyptian Front for Human Rights, and the Community for Justice have jointly stated that the Egyptian government’s policies towards civil society is unacceptable. Amnesty International also condemned the raid and called for the release of human rights activists.

Civil society in Egypt is far worse than it was during the Mubarak era. Government pressure has been increasingly limiting the activities of local and international civil society organizations in the country. Many experts also agree that the situation of human rights, rule of law, and freedom of expression in Egypt is worse than that of the Mubarak era. From this point of view, it’s clear that the current regime in Egypt – far from any form of democratization – dragged the country into a more totalitarian rule.

On 10 September, U.S. Secretary of State Mike Pompeo confirmed that Washington has released $1.2 billion military aid to Egypt. The aid package includes $1 billion for the budget of fiscal year 2018 and $195 million, which was originally allocated for the previous fiscal year. The U.S. administration had decided to suspend the transfer of the $195 million due to the human rights records of the Sisi regime in Egypt. However, increasing cooperation between the two countries led Washington to eventually release this aid.

It was surprising for many that the U.S. government’s decision came a day after an Egyptian court sentenced 75 people to death, including a senior member of the Muslim Brotherhood Mohamed Beltagy, the Deputy Head of the Freedom and Justice Party Essam al-Erian, Salafi preacher Safwat Hegazy, former youth minister Osama Yassin and al-Jamaa al-Islamiyya leader Tarek al-Zumer. The court also sentenced the Muslim Brotherhood’s supreme leader, Mohammed Badie, to life in prison and the son of former President Mohammad Morsi, Osama Morsi, to 10 years in prison. A total of 739 people were charged after their supposed responsibility during the dispersal of Rabaa Square protests. Many international human rights organizations and civil society groups criticize the Sisi regime for its unjust treatment of the civilian opposition.

The U.S. government however, falls short of criticizing the Egyptian regime on its human rights record and continues to provide military assistance. This was reflected in the recent statement released by the State Department, in which the Trump administration emphasized that, “Cairo is a vital partner in the regional politics of Washington and that cooperation between the two countries in security will continue.”

There are three main dynamics for Egypt’s strategic role in the U.S. foreign policy regarding the Middle East. The first reason is ultimately the security of Israel. Traditionally, the most important element in ensuring Israel’s security – which is the main determinant of U.S. policy in the Middle East – is the existence of a government in Egypt that is loyal to the U.S. A government in Cairo that does not cause problems for Israel has always been a key factor for Washington and Tel-Aviv. This was the case during the periods of Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak.

The second dynamic is forcing the Egyptian regime to follow a foreign policy pattern, which is in line with the priorities of the U.S. The U.S. has aimed to control Egypt’s regional and international policy via various instruments such as financial aid, military assistance, intelligence sharing, and diplomatic support.

Finally, as one of the most influential Muslim countries, Egypt is of great importance for the U.S. in regards to its political agenda in the Middle East. By keeping Egypt under control, Washington aims to strengthen its hand in confronting other regional actors such as Russia, Iran, and to some extent, Turkey. In this regard, the U.S. is thus able to prevent Egypt from forming a close relationship with these actors, which would otherwise form a coalition against Washington.

U.S. policy towards Egypt has been in line with these dynamics in the past years, particularly since 2011. Washington did not support the presidency of Mohammad Morsi – an individual that had been elected in the first free and democratic elections the country held in decades. The main reason for Washington’s attitude was Morsi’s affiliation with the moderate Islamic civil society organization, the Muslim Brotherhood. Thus, the U.S. was quick to support the military coup of July 3, 2013, which toppled the Morsi government. U.S. support for the post-coup Sisi regime was evident in many regards. This became much clearer after the election of Donald Trump in January 2017. During the Trump era, relations between the two countries transformed into a strategic alliance.

Despite the fact that thousands of civilians oppose the military coup in Egypt, the U.S. administration continues to support the Sisi regime. Washington also ignores the Sisi regime’s violations of human rights, pressure on civil society, and the repression on the freedom of expression. There is no doubt that the U.S. clearly ignores democratic values and is continuing its support for a repressive regime. This attitude of the U.S. only encourages other repressive regimes in the region and prevents the emergence of democratic political structures throughout the Middle East. For this reason, it should be underlined that the U.S. administration’s statements of democratization in the Middle East do not reflect reality. Rather, Washington is currently the largest obstacle for democratic governments in the region.

On August 14, 2013, Egypt suffered its largest civilian massacre; one that had never been witnessed in the country’s history. Egyptian armed forces massacred at least 1,500 people who were participating in a large sit-in at the Rabaa Adawiya Square in Cairo. The majority of these people were members of or affiliated with, the Muslim Brotherhood. The crowd was simply organizing a peaceful protest against the military coup that took place on July 3, 2013, and their demands were simple: the return to democracy and the release of the legitimately elected President Mohammad Morsi, who was imprisoned during the military coup.

The brutal attack of the Egyptian military on the peaceful protesters was essentially a turning point in the course of the 2011 revolution process. The Egyptian military, led by Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi, ended the dreams of millions in the country who hoped to have a democratic political system that ensured them their basic freedoms, welfare, and dignity. The Rabaa massacre marked the beginning of a new era in Egypt in which a regime, even more repressive than Mubarak, came to power.

As a matter of fact, no members of the army or state officials were held responsible for the crimes committed during the Rabaa massacre. In contrast, thousands of Muslim Brotherhood members were arrested in relation to the protests that were organized in Rabaa Square. Many of those arrested were either imprisoned or sentenced to death. On the fifth anniversary of the military coup, the Egyptian parliament approved a bill that proposed to exempt security personnel and army officers from any prosecution that could emerge for any possible crimes since the military coup of July 3, 2013. It has been argued that this law was designed in order to protect members of the Egyptian army who were responsible for the Rabaa massacre and other mass killings.

Thus, this was an additional attempt by the Egyptian regime to protect those responsible for the massacre in Rabaa. The Sisi regime has also made efforts to prevent any claims against its personnel. In addition, regardless of providing social services such as education, healthcare, and religious activities, the regime labeled the Muslim Brotherhood movement as a terrorist organization and initiated a large-scale campaign in order to arrest its members and leading figures. Not only were members and leaders targetted, but anyone that displayed any form of sympathy was also targetted.

The regime was not alone in its oppressive policies. A number of regional and international actors supported the Sisi regime and legitimized its actions. Many Western governments have established normal relations with Cairo and have made efforts to live down its violent repression against the dissidents, including the massacre at Rabaa Square. Among these states are the U.S., Germany, France, the U.K., and Italy, while regional supporters include the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In a strong message of solidarity with Cairo, on the fifth anniversary of the Rabaa Massacre, King Salman of Saudi Arabia hosted Sisi in the Red Sea resort of Neom on August 14, 2018.

Despite the endless efforts of the Sisi regime, the international community still respecs the memory of the Rabaa massacre and reiterates the call for punishing those who are responsible for such atrocities. In stark contrast to their governments, members of civil society, media, and academia have particularly shown solidarity with the survivors of the Rabaa massacre. During the past week, a number of articles and press statements that criticized the brutality of the Sisi regime were released.

Egyptian figures and groups that are not affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood have also criticized the Rabaa massacre. The socialist, secular and liberal groups in the country see the Sisi regime as responsible for the events that occurred in Rabaa Square and have maintained their critical stance against the regime in this regard. As a response to their position, the Sisi regime has widened its oppression against these groups. In recent months, a number of leading figures from the Egyptian socialist and secular movements were arrested as part of a wide-scale crackdown of the opposition. With such a policy, the repressive regime in Egypt has enlarged the path to radicalization in the country. These oppressive policies of the Sisi regime also maintain the continuation of violence and instability in the country.

The Rabaa massacre will always be remembered as a crime against humanity conducted by the post-July 3 military regime in Egypt. With snipers killing hundreds of peaceful protests, people being burnt alive or killed under military vehicles, August 14, 2013, was, without doubt, the darkest day in Egypt’s history. For this reason, despite all efforts of the Sisi regime to live down the massacre, the memory of the Rabaa will live for generations.

Egypt has been experiencing continuing instability since the military coup that took place on July 3, 2013. The coup was a turning point for the political life in Egypt and in the Middle East. A number of regional and international actors closely followed the developments taking place in Egypt since the coup. These actors supported the military coup and the regime that came to power in the following period. This international support for the post-coup regime in Egypt can be analysed on two levels: regional and global.

On the regional level there are three major actors that supported the military coup in Egypt: Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The main motivation behind this support for the coup was to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from becoming a regional power base. Therefore, a strategy to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from the regional political arena was developed. As the movement rose to power in Egypt, the anti-Ikhwan alliance suspected that the movement would increase its influence in regional politics. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in particular have undertaken this strategy. While Abu Dhabi and Riyadh did not provide any political and financial support for the Morsi regime, they funded anti-Morsi protests that took place on June 30, 2013.

Israel, on the other hand, also preferred the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt. The possibility of Morsi’s more aggressive policy towards Israel and his aspirations of establishing a strong regional alliance with Turkey were the main reasons for Israel’s support for the regime change in Egypt. Tel-Aviv also believed that the increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region would seriously affect Israel’s policies in the Middle East.

On the international level, almost all Western countries, especially the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Italy, supported the military coup in Egypt. There are four main reasons for this support: (1) Removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power, (2) Establishing a pro-Western secular-militarist regime, (3) Instating a government that would serve the interests of the West; and (4) Preventing new regional alliances.

In the aftermath of the coup, the Sisi regime in Egypt paid back its debt to Western countries with large purchases of defense products. Despite economic hardships, Egypt bought around 10 billion USD worth of warplanes and ships from France and the regime became one of top weapons importer from Germany. Similarly, Egypt’s imports of arms from Britain and Italy have also increased.

The support given by the U.S. to the military coup in Egypt was particularly important. In response to this support, the Sisi regime gave full support to Washington’s policies towards the region. The most recent case of this support was the low-level reaction of the Sisi regime in regards to the U.S.’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Cairo also followed a similar policy line with Washington when it comes to U.S. policy toward the Gulf region.

A similar situation can be observed in relations between the Gulf and Egypt. The most enthusiastic supporters of the military coup were the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In return to their support, these countries expected the Sisi regime to meet their demands in regional politics. As a result, the Sisi administration transferred the strategic Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia and supported the political blockade initiated by the UAE against Qatar. Cairo also followed Saudi and Emirati instructions in its policies toward regional issues such as Libya and Yemen.

It is obvious that the current Egyptian regime cannot follow an independent foreign policy. It is simply because the Sisi regime is directly or indirectly controlled by the actors that supported the military coup in 2013. It can also also argued that as the regime in Cairo has no political legitimacy or popular support, it would be far from achieving a peaceful political environment in the country.

Egypt has been witnessing a new wave of political oppression against civil opposition figures. The pressure has intensified following the election of Abdel Fattah al-Sisi to presidency in the last election in March. What’s different with the current wave of arrests in Egypt is the fact that the Egyptian regime has been mainly targeting the Muslim Brotherhood so far. However, this time the regime is focusing on secular or socialist activists. This is mainly because of the fact that these activists have been criticizing the Sisi regime and its domestic and external policies. Their successful use of social media and the Internet allowed these activists to spread their criticism to a large audience. The wave of arrests, therefore, could be interpreted as the regime’s new strategy of dealing with the opposition. As the Sisi regime has completed its destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood, it now directs its iron-fist on the secular and socialist opposition.

In early May, the secular activist Shadi al-Ghazali Harb and the revolutionary socialist Haitham Mohamedeen were arrested in the raids on their homes with the accusations of insulting the president and spreading false news with the intent of destabilizing social peace and national security. In another incident a housewife, Amal Fathy, was arrested along with her family for joining a terrorist organization, promoting terrorist acts over the internet, and spreading false news that harms national security and public order. Fathy became popular after she posted a YouTube video in which she detailed how Egyptian men sexually harassed her. Another person arrested with similar charges was the comedian Shadi Ebu Zeyd. He was taken into custody following a raid on his home with around 20 policemen.

As the Sisi regime has completed its destruction of the Muslim Brotherhood, it now directs its iron-fist on the secular and socialist opposition.

Finally, the most prominent activist who was taken into custody during the latest wave of arrests was Wael Abbas, a prominent figure during the 2011 revolution. As a secular activist Abbas was known with his critical stance against corruption, torture and human rights abuses. He severely criticized the government both before and after the revolution of 2011. His criticism towards the Sisi regime was on the basis of human rights issues and mistakes in foreign policy. It is announced that Abbas, who was arrested during the police raid on his house in Cairo, will be tried on charges of spreading false news and forming an illegal organization. In December 2017, Twitter shut the account of Wael Abbas, arguing that the account was violating Twitter’s rules. It is suspected that Twitter may have taken the decision on the request of the Egyptian regime.

Another indication of oppression against regime opponents is the 10-year prison sentence for Ismail Alexandarani, a researcher at the Wilson Center in the United States, known for his work on the North Sinai region. Alexandarani, who was detained at the airport when he was entering Egypt in 2015 and remained in pre-trial detention for 2.5 years, was sentenced by a military court to 10 years in prison for joining a terrorist organization and reporting false information.

A recent arrest of a PhD researcher from Washington University also caused concern. Walid al-Shobaky was conducting field research on the judicial system of Egypt when he suddenly disappeared. On the forth day of his disappearance, the state prosecutor informed his family that he was taken into custody. Following initial investigation the prosecutor decided to arrest al-Shobaky for a 15-day detention. Despite the fact that there was hardly any clear information on the case, he was reportedly arrested with the charges similar to other opposition figures that were previously arrested.

The wave of recent arrests in Egypt is a clear indication of the regime’s intention for continuing oppression against dissidents.

This event reminded another brutal incident that took place three years ago. Giulio Regeni, an Italian citizen and doctoral student at Cambridge University, disappeared in January 2016, while he was conducting field research on trade unions and workers’ associations in Egypt. About a week later, Regeni’s body was found on the roadside outside Cairo. It turned out that Regeni was subjected to torture and was killed. During the investigations, it was alleged that intelligence services had killed Regeni. Egyptian authorities deny allegations.

The wave of recent arrests in Egypt is a clear indication of the regime’s intention for continuing oppression against dissidents. Unlike previous initiatives that were mainly focused on Islamic movements, the Sisi regime will be targeting secular and socialist opposition, hoping to permanently eliminate all kinds of opposition towards the regime. However, such a policy would lead to unification of opposition groups, increasing human rights violations and deepening instability caused by the distrust between state and society.

The Northern Sinai region of Egypt has recently become the scene of intense operations of the army. The attack on a mosque in November 2017 that claimed lives of more than 300 hundred civilians was a milestone in Egypt’s policy towards the armed groups in the region. Following the attack, President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi announced a new strategy to clean up the region from armed groups by intensifying security-oriented policies. In this context, the Egyptian army launched a comprehensive operation in February 2018. The operation aimed to terminate the logistical capacities of these groups while intensively targeting the armed groups in the region.

On the other hand, it was alleged that the on-going operations in the region have been targeting civilians and that the Egyptian army seriously violates basic human rights – thanks to the years long State of Emergency. A recent video that showed Egyptian soldiers killing a young civilian in the Northern Sinai has sparked criticism throughout the country. Human rights advocates have argued that the operations carried out by the Egyptian army in the region are in full secrecy and that civilians have been frequently targeted in these operations.

Another dimension of the recent criticism to the military operations in the Sinai is the establishment of a buffer zone along the border between Egypt and the Gaza. While initial works for the buffer zone had started in July 2013, the Egyptian army accelerated the process in October 2014. The government announced that the buffer zone would cover an area of 79 km2 and all human activities in this area would be terminated for safety reasons. In this context, the Egyptian government has decided to destroy houses, shops and agricultural areas in this region which includes the whole of the city of Rafah, which hosts the Rafah Crossing Point between Egypt and Gaza.

Tens of thousands of civilians were forcibly removed from their homes and the Egyptian army destroyed their habitat. It is reported that between July 2013 and August 2015, the Egyptian army destroyed nearly 50% of the houses in the city of Rafah and the people of the region were forced to move to other parts of the country.

In January 2018, the Egyptian regime decided to extend the scope of the buffer zone between Egypt and Gaza. This was part of the large-scale operation of the Egyptian army to the armed groups that operate in the Northern Sinai region. The civilians in the region and human rights groups heavily criticized the operation. It is argued that the Egyptian army has widely ignored the basic rights and freedoms during the operations with torture, arbitrary arrests and extrajudicial killings practiced at a frequent level.

The situation in the Northern Sinai region was recently revealed in a report published by Human Rights Watch. The report included interviews with the people of the region and accounts that were previously published. It gave a detailed account of how the Egyptian army destroyed houses in the cities of Rafah and Al-Arish. The destruction of these cities were also illustrated with satellite images. According to the report, the Egyptian army also targeted homes of opposition activists in order to punish them because of their stance towards the Sisi regime. The report also detailed various methods of human rights abuses of the Egyptian military.

These operations in the Northern Sinai region will apparently increase the hostility of the people in the region towards the regime. By targeting civilians and destroying their homes, the army will further deepen the problems in the region. This situation has already been causing radicalization of the youth. Reports suggest that there is a considerable amount of youth from the Sinai region, who have joined the armed groups in protest of Egyptian army’s operations.

In short, there are three reasons behind Egypt’s operations in the Northern Sinai. The first reason is to fight against terrorist groups in the region. The major armed actor in the region is the Wilayat Sinai, a local branch of Daesh. The second reason is to suspend tunnel activities between Egypt and Gaza. The Egyptian army particularly targets the tunnels that are considered as lifelines of the Gaza region. By demolishing tunnels, the Egyptian regime aims to weaken Hamas, citing their ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. Finally, Egypt’s operations in the Sinai take place through direct consultation with Israel. As relations between the two countries grow to a strategic alliance, Cairo and Tel-Aviv may join their efforts to restructure the Northern Sinai, starting from eliminating “dangers” that constitutes threat for both countries.

Egypt has been making headlines recently with its two legendary football players: Liverpool’s award-winning striker Mohammed Salah and former Egyptian international and Al-Ahly player Mohamed Aboutrika. While the former came to fore with his success story, the latter surprises many because of the judicial proceedings against him in his own country.

Even though he does not publicly reveal his political views, it is certain that Mohammed Salah is cautious about antagonizing the Sisi regime. That’s why it can be argued that the main reason for Salah’s political silence is his fear of possible alienation by the regime in Cairo. By not stating his political views, Salah aims to prevent the regime’s pressure against him. Witnessing the experience of Aboutrika, Salah is aware that in order to keep his popularity high in the country, he needs to maintain a compromising relationship with the regime. That’s what he does perfectly. He made a donation to the Tahta Masr Fund, which was created by Sisi in the post-coup process. He also keeps a low politic profile.

Mohamed Aboutrika, on the other hand, is the latest civilian victim of the political pressure of the Sisi regime. While he is considered a national hero in his country, Abou Treika is a more popular figure than the president Abdal Fattah Al-Sisi. However, because of his support for the democratically elected president Mohammad Morsi, Aboutrika is being targeted by the regime.

The process with Aboutrika began in the period following the military coup in 2013. He was accused of being a member of the outlawed Muslim Brotherhood organization and subjected to inquiry. While the investigation continues, his assets were frozen and properties were taken under state control in 2015. He was then moved abroad and started to live in self-exile in Qatar. He continuously refused his alleged ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. Despite this, the judicial processes against him continued. Many believed that the famous player was being punished for his support to the presidency of Muhammad Morsi.

In January of 2017, an Egyptian court decided to place Aboutrika on a terror list, which included a number of leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood as well. The Egyptians heavily criticized this decision and there were thousands of support messages for Aboutrika, especially on social media.

Another Egyptian national team player and Tottenham Hotspur striker Ahmed Hossam “Mido” showed solidarity with Aboutrika. On his twitter account Mido stated, “I do testify before God that Aboutrika is one of the best personalities I have dealt with in my life and a kind, forgiving man to everybody.” He further called on the Sisi regime to clarify whether they had clear evidence that Aboutrika was linked to terrorism.

Following the decisions on Aboutrika, lawyer and activist Khaled Ali made a statement in support of the national footballer: “When Aboutrika becomes a terrorist, Egyptians defending Egyptian islands become traitors and the presence of cultural and human rights centers becomes a threat to national security. We know that we need to place different definitions on those words.”

In April 2018, the Egyptian prosecutor office suggested that Aboutrika should be excluded from the terror list. Despite this suggestion, in May, Cairo Criminal Court added Aboutrika on the terror list for a second time. After the decision, the Egyptian national player published a statement on social media and asked Egyptian authorities to end this unlawful process against him. He also stated that he could not wait to return to his country.

Despite the negative attitude of the regime, Aboutrika continues to be accepted as one of the country’s greatest heroes. In a poll by FIFA at the beginning of 2018, Aboutrika was named as the best Egyptian player ever. He was chosen Africa Best Player of the Year award four times and played a big role in 2013 when Cairo’s Al-Ahly won the African Champions League cup.

Sisi regime and the future of oppression

Human rights abuses have remained the biggest problem in Egypt in the period since the military coup in 2013. Thousands of civilians are subjected to judicial proceedings on the basis of their membership to the Muslim Brotherhood, a civil network that has peacefully existed in the country since 1928. A large number of these civilians were taken to military courts, while they remain in jail for long periods during the court proceedings.

One of the unlawful practices of the regime is placing individuals on a terror list. Once placed, suspects are issued travel bans and their properties are confiscated. This practice is increasingly instrumental for the Sisi regime and applied particularly to Muslim Brotherhood members.

This attitude of the Sisi regime can be understood from a much wider perspective. The Muslim Brotherhood was a civil organization that has been operating in the country for years as a civil society movement and has never resorted to any kind of violence during the Hosni Mubarak period or following the 2011 revolution. However, the post-2011 revolution period considered this organization as a direct threat to the existing structure of politics in the Middle East. Therefore, a number of counter-revolutionary initiatives were established. The most prominent of these initiatives was the one in Egypt. Considering the Muslim Brotherhood organization as a possible power base in the region, these counter-revolutionary forces aimed to remove such groups from the political arena. Aboutrika’s story shows that this policy is so rigid that even national heroes, such as himself, can be victim to such political pressure.

Palestinian politics witnessed a significant turning point during October 2017. Having been in conflict since 2006, the two main Palestinian political parties, Hamas and Fatah, agreed to form a government as a result of negotiations mediated by Egypt.

In the coming phase, the Hamas government, which is in control of Gaza, agreed to transfer the administration of the region to the consensus government to be established with Fatah. It can be argued that the reason behind Hamas taking a step in this direction is the worsening humanitarian situation in Gaza, the increased pressure of the Israeli and Egyptian governments on the movement and the regional repression politics towards the Muslim Brotherhood.  While in light of these reasons many analysts have interpreted Hamas’s decision regarding a reconciliation government as a “step backwards,” when evaluated carefully, it can be argued that this decision can be read as a strategic move of the Palestinian group.

Regional dynamics in flux

Since the deterioration of relations in 2006, two previous attempts were made in order to restore relations between Hamas and Fatah and to establish a government in Palestine. However, these initiatives failed. The reason for this failure was partially due to the fact that the requirements laid out by Hamas were not fulfilled. Hamas was able to leave the negotiation table in 2011 and later in 2014 due to the political atmosphere that was prevalent during those times. While already maintaining the support of regional powers such as Turkey and Qatar, Hamas also received the support of the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power in Egypt in 2012. Thus, Hamas determined its political orientation according to the conditions of the time.

However, developments in regional politics in the following period took place against Hamas. The Egyptian military coup staged on July 3, 2013, political sanctions imposed on Qatar in 2014 and the attempted coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016 not only caused a loss of power within these countries, but also led to a reconfiguration of priorities, which is why support for the Palestinian group declined. More, in parallel with Israeli policies, the aggravation of sanctions imposed on Hamas-led Gaza by the Sisi regime in Egypt, Turkey’s focus on military operations, especially in Syria, and sanctions launched on Qatar in June all indicated that Hamas was in need of a new strategy.

No step back on vital issues

Within this strategic framework, Hamas gave its approval for the unity government projected to be established in Palestine and made some decisions in this respect. These decisions include ending the administrative body governing Gaza, the transfer of control of border gates to the unity government and the establishment of a police force to be formed in the Gaza strip by the new administration. Despite these decisions, an important aspect of this new strategy employed by Hamas is that it has not stepped back on some issues that the movement considers “vital.”

One of the most vital issues include refusing to abolish the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades – the military wing of Hamas. The Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Brigades, the most powerful armed force in Palestine, is estimated to have at least 20.000 fighters. It is known that the Brigades caused significant losses in the Israeli army during Israel’s attacks on Gaza in 2014. While the killing of 64 Israeli soldiers during a 50-day clash came across as a shock for Tel-Aviv, it was also a reflection of the military capability of the Brigades. As a matter of fact, the increasing loss of military personnel was reported as a reason for Israel to terminate its operations.

The ‘red lines’ of Hamas

Another issue that Hamas identified as a “red line” in negotiations was the future of the status of thousands of people recruited as state officials in Gaza. While these officials were asked to leave their posts, Hamas displayed a demanding attitude in this regard and ensured that the officials continued with their duties on condition of some adjustments in their salaries. Thus, many members of Hamas who were assigned to administrative bodies by the organization, will continue to serve and receive their salaries by the unity government.

Another key aspect of Hamas’ new strategy is its approach towards Israel. Being a movement of resistance, which was found on the principle of refusing to recognizing the state of Israel, Hamas has not given up on its conventional position and declared that it will maintain its resistance. Hamas officials reacted to Israeli Prime Minister Netayahu’s prerequisite for the recognition of the reconciliation government that “Hamas must lay down arms and recognize Israel,” which the organization interpreted as an intervention of Palestinian internal affairs. Meanwhile, following the decision on reconciliation, the Gaza-based Popular Committee against the Siege of Gaza announced that their fight to increase international pressure on Israel will continue.

Two equal parties in Palestinian politics

With the reconciliation government, Palestinian politics will have a structure consisting of two equal parties.  Hamas’s approval of the unity government as a strategic move is of vital importance as this will enable the organization to display a more legitimate struggle within the political realm. At this point, the attitudes of regional allies such as Turkey and Qatar are important for Hamas.

As a matter of fact, the Turkish government developed close ties with Hamas, exerted serious efforts for the removal of the blockade on the region and even froze its relations with Israel for a period. During this period, former Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal’s participation at the AK Party Congress in 2012 could be interpreted as a demonstration of Ankara’s positive attitude towards the movement. Likewise, Qatar has also developed close ties with Hamas within the recent period.

These relations reached a record high when Mohammad Morsi, one of the leading figures of the Muslim Brotherhood, was elected as the President of Egypt. Then ruling Emir of Qatar, Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani paid a visit to Gaza in October 2012 and kicked off a multi-million dollar investment in the region. Consequently, it can be contended that both Turkey and Qatar will want to maintain their close interest in Palestinian politics through Hamas. In this respect therefore, it is of utmost importance that the organization is represented as an equal and legitimate actor in Palestinian politics.

Did Hamas lean towards Egypt and the UAE bloc?

Lastly, it can be argued that comments alleging that Hamas has diverged from Turkey and Qatar and has leaned towards Egypt and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) do not entirely reflect the approach of the organization’s decision makers. In this context, Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh’s former advisor Ahmed Yusuf said: “We have no intention of siding with one Arab country against another because our goal is to garner all the Arab support possible for the Palestinian cause. So any alliance with Egypt and the UAE at the expense of Qatar or Turkey will lead the Palestinian cause to lose great momentum, and our relations with Egypt do not infer a rift with Qatar and Turkey.” This statement indicates that the strategy upheld by the organization displays a more rational demeanor.

As a result, Hamas’ new strategy concerning the unity government in Palestine will lead to the recognition of the organization as a major actor in regional politics. In recognition of the destruction created by the political conditions that led to the process of the coup d’etat in Egypt, Hamas displayed a refreshed rational stance and adopted a new political strategy by pursuing the path of the Ennahda Movement in Tunisia.

During a period in which Qatar is subject to regional isolation, where Turkey is busy in ruling out immediate threats as part of its foreign policy, and where the political bloc inclined to the Muslim Brotherhood is in eclipse across the Middle East, the most reasonable strategy Hamas could adopt in order to remain as an element of the equation was to agree on the unity government. Consequently, it must not be forgotten that the decision taken by the movement aims to prevent a plot in which Hamas could have been completely excluded from the political arena due to pressure exerted by Egypt, Israel’s aggressive policies and the political irregularities within Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Last month, two developments that are of vital importance for Palestinian politics occurred. The Hamas movement, which is one of the leading actors in Palestine’s fight with Israel, released its much-anticipated new political document after working on it for a long time. The new political document, which employs a new strategy with regard to both the international community and the Fatah movement, was released in early May by the Hamas leadership. The second development that occurred in conjunction with this is the change of duty in Hamas leadership. Khaled Mashaal, who was assigned as Hamas’ political bureau chief in 1996, announced on May 6 that he quit his office and Ismail Haniyeh would replace him. The change of leadership and the new political document undoubtedly denote upcoming changes in the movement’s policies. Some articles included in the new document led to interpretations that Hamas adopted new approaches in some of its policies.

The Hamas leadership had to determine a new strategy in the face of the exclusionist policy of Fatah and the recent pressure of many regional and international agents. Therefore, some commentators on the new political document suggested that Hamas took a step back in some of its policies. Consisting of 42 articles, the new political document shows a continuation with the previous documents in terms of the general principles of Hamas; however, new approaches have been adopted, particularly in three aspects.

The first change is the clear expression of Hamas’ recognition of the establishment of a Palestinian state within the borders determined in 1967. Although this new approach of Hamas does not necessarily mean that the Zionist Israeli state is officially recognized, relying on the 1967 lines in the text indicates an acceptance of the establishment of an independent Israeli state.

Another prominent aspect stated in the document is that the fight against the displacement of Palestinian refugees will continue and the placement of Palestinians in any other region than their own country will be strictly objected to. This statement also responds to the recent news reports alleging that Palestinians might move to a new residential area that will be formed in the Sinai specifically for Palestinians with a possible agreement between Israel and Egypt.

Armed Resistance and Political Resolution

The second aspect catching the attention in the document is the emphasis that Hamas’ anti-Israel resistance is not against the Jewish people but the establishment of the Israeli state, which has a Zionist ideology. Stressing that the peaceful coexistence of different faiths is one of the principles of Islam, the document also underscores that Hamas’ resistance is not against the Jewish people but Zionism. Hamas explicitly describes this approach in order to make clear to the international community that the movement does not have radical motivations and struggles solely in the political realm.

Another important aspect in the document is that the movement, which previously defined itself as an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood, has adopted a discourse indicating that the previous situation has changed. Hamas defines itself as “a Palestinian Islamic national liberation and resistance movement whose goal is to liberate Palestine and confront the Zionist project and whose frame of reference is Islam, which determines its principles, objectives and means.”

Hamas particularly highlights in the new document that it is not an offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood in order to prevent possible pressure by countries such as Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, who recognize the Brotherhood as a terrorist group. However, it cannot be said that the movement has completely cut off its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood. In a statement he issued, Khaled Mashaal confirmed that Hamas is a movement that comes from the Brotherhood’s school of thought.

As these three new approaches are considered, it can be argued that Hamas adopted a new and revised policy due to changing regional dynamics and global political developments. With its new political document, Hamas can be said to have taken a step back in its resistance struggle when compared to the previous years. In other words, in Gaza, where both civilian and military losses led to great damage, the Hamas leadership had to put an emphasis on political resolution by pushing armed resistance into the background.

Various factors effecting this choice include Israel’s stronger position in regional policies with the election of Donald Trump as the U.S. president, the growth of economic problems in the presence of the ongoing embargo of Tel Aviv, Qatar and Saudi Arabia’s push on Hamas for a political reconciliation, and the recognition of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group by some regional countries following the military coup in Egypt.

Quest for Legitimacy in International Arena

Some of the reasons for Hamas’ strategy shift are more specific. By stepping back on the three issues mentioned above, Hamas aims to gain legitimacy in the eyes of regional and global actors as part of its struggle for Palestine. After winning the elections held in Gaza in 2006, the Hamas administration was subjected to international isolation, in a campaign led by Israel. The large-scale military attacks Tel Aviv organized against Gaza, the exacerbation of the effects of the blockade in the strip over time, and the failure to make progress in the political fight against Israel obliged Hamas, whose future role started to be questioned by the Palestinian public, to create a new political vision.

It can be said that Hamas started to reshape its political approach quite a while ago. In this framework, particularly in 2016, the movement attempted to normalize its relations with the Sisi regime in Egypt, which came to power by overthrowing the Morsi government through a military coup, and accomplished this to a certain extent. Hamas was inclined to such a policy since the occasional opening of Gaza’s Rafah border crossing, the only remaining gateway in Gaza to the outside world due to Israel’s blockade, was dependent on the normalization of relations with the Sisi regime. In the aftermath of the coup, the Sisi regime closed the Rafah crossing, increased its military operations in the region where a state of emergency was declared, and kicked off a major campaign to close the tunnels going from Gaza to Egypt. All these developments forced Hamas to come to terms with the Sisi administration.

One of the goals of Hamas’ new political document is to underline that it adopts a more moderate tone, which will enable the recognition of Hamas as an agent favoring peace and negotiation in its fight for Palestine. The latest tensions Hamas has had with Fatah, the main agent of the Palestine fight, also played a role in this approach of Hamas. Disturbed by the emergence of Hamas as a political agent, the Fatah leadership criticized the movement’s new political document.

It must be noted that Hamas’ new political document will apparently influence politics in the Middle East. Responding to the new document by throwing it into the trash in a video he released, Benjamin Netanyahu showed his anxiety with regard to the possibility of Hamas’ emergence as a legitimate actor in its fight for Palestine.

Hamas, which inflicted serious casualties on the Israeli army in the atrocious operations against Gaza, has an opportunity to become a more legitimate actor in the international community thanks to its strategy of underlining political dialogue. Consequently, since Israel’s possible military intervention will stir more reaction, Tel Aviv is to face a deterrent factor. The new political document will also strengthen actors such as Turkey and Qatar who favor Hamas. Defending Hamas in many platforms, Ankara and Doha will be able to act more confidently in their support for Hamas if the movement prioritizes political dialogue and avoids violence.