F

ollowing the mass protests that erupted in many Arab countries after 2010, regional actors adopted significant policy changes and formed alliances with like-minded countries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were among the most prominent examples of such alliances. Posing as anti-revolutionary, these two countries coordinated their actions in many countries. This partnership included the air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar, another Gulf country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also cooperated in Yemen. Their cooperation escalated to the point of military intervention.

Over time, both the political alliance formed on the basis of opposition to Qatar and the military cooperation established in Yemen have become increasingly damaging for both countries. One of the first signs of this was seen in the different approaches to normalising relations with Qatar following the crisis. While Saudi Arabia rapidly normalised relations with Qatar through the Al-Ula Summit in 2021, the United Arab Emirates, although involved in this process, did not exhibit the same willingness or warmth as Riyadh.

For Saudi Arabia, intra-Gulf reconciliation meant ensuring regional stability and reasserting its leadership claim; however, the UAE preferred a more distant, cautious approach to relations with Qatar. This divergence can be interpreted as an early sign that the two countries’ strategic priorities were beginning to diverge subtly.

By the end of 2025, this divergence had transcended mere competition over Yemen, revealing that serious problems between the parties could no longer be concealed. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE confronted each other directly in Yemen, marking one of the most severe crises in recent years. The crisis escalated to the point of open accusations, ultimately reaching a new phase with the UAE’s announcement of its complete withdrawal from Yemen.

What happened?

In December 2025, events in Yemen exposed the long-suppressed strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Arab coalition, formed in 2015 under the banner of ‘restoring the legitimate Yemeni government’ and countering the Houthis, had evolved by 2025 into an increasingly covert power rivalry, having started out as a joint security intervention. Differences in goals, means, and priorities within the coalition became particularly pronounced from 2018 onwards, and December 2025 marked a turning point at which these differences were formalized.

Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes targeting Southern Transitional Council (STC) elements in Mukalla, Hadramut, and Mehri between 26 and 31 December 2025 concretised this rupture. By targeting forces that were effectively its partners, which had been trained and supported by the UAE, Riyadh created an unprecedented situation in the history of the coalition. Consequently, Yemen became a conflict zone where actors within the same alliance used force against each other.

Hadramut and Mehri have assumed a central role in this new phase. These two eastern provinces, which remained relatively uninvolved in direct conflict with the Houthis for a long time, have now become the main testing ground for intra-coalition rivalry. The STC’s expansion into these provinces, which consolidated its control over South Yemen by early December 2025, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as crossing a red line. In an article for The Conversation, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an expert on the Gulf, noted that the timing of this move, which coincided with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, reinforced Riyadh’s belief that Abu Dhabi was aware of and approved this step.

This crisis has once again confirmed that the divisions within the coalition are nothing new. The clashes in Aden in 2018, between UAE-backed Security Belt forces and Yemeni government troops, were the first serious test of the coalition’s unity. In 2019, Riyadh interpreted the UAE’s reduction of its military presence and continued influence through local armed groups as the Emirates’ abandonment of Saudi Arabia. Betül Doğan Akkaş of Ankara University explains this process in her article for Anadolu Agency as a ‘buck-passing’ approach.

According to this approach, while the UAE remained part of the coalition, it largely shifted the political and military costs of the Yemen intervention onto Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh Agreement, signed in the same year, and the Presidential Council, established in 2022, were arrangements that masked, but did not eliminate, this structural division. Competition shifting to the eastern provinces in 2023 and 2024 set the stage for a process that culminated in the coalition becoming effectively dysfunctional in December 2025.

Why is South Yemen important?

The competition over Hadramut and Mahra is driven by deep geostrategic considerations. According to the US-based MBN, Hadramut holds Yemen’s most significant oil and natural gas reserves. This makes it critically important for the country’s economy and energy security, given its long coastline on the Arabian Sea and its potential export ports. In contrast, Mahri is directly linked to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, thanks to its proximity to the Omani border, access to the open sea, and alternative energy and transport corridors. The UAE, however, views these areas as part of a broader network of ports and maritime trade extending from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, the crisis in Yemen reflects a clash of strategic approaches between the two countries regarding the future of the regional order, rather than a temporary military dispute. Saudi Arabia considers Yemen strategically important to its national security and regional position within its 2030 Vision, whereas the UAE is pursuing a riskier path, involving collaboration with non-state actors and establishing influence through ports and security networks.

Gulf rivalry beyond Yemen?

According to Arab News, a news agency close to Saudi Arabia, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deepened, extending beyond Yemen to broader regional politics. The report, citing CNN, suggests that the crisis may have been caused by misinformation conveyed to Abu Dhabi, namely that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had requested sanctions against the UAE from President Donald Trump during his November visit to Washington.

Riyadh categorically denies this claim and believes that the misinformation has led to the mobilization of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemeni provinces near the Saudi border. Tensions escalated into open conflict on 30 December, when Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes targeting what it claims is a military deployment in Yemen linked to the UAE that was not coordinated with the coalition.

According to Arab News, the disagreement is not limited to Yemen, pointing to a deeper strategic divergence between the two countries. Saudi Arabia believes the UAE is collaborating with destabilizing actors in Yemen, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Syria, and it criticizes Abu Dhabi’s normalization process with Israel, which began in 2020. Although the UAE has withdrawn its troops from Yemen and emphasized its commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, the situation reveals that the relationship between the two countries has shifted from one of tacit harmony to one of overt and structural competition.

T

he head of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), an ally of the UAE, Aidarus Al-Zoubaidi, has fled southern Yemen under cover of darkness, according to a statement released Thursday by the Saudi-led Joint Forces Coalition.

Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Malki said Al-Zoubaidi and several associates “escaped in the dead of night” aboard a vessel that departed from the port of Aden heading toward Somaliland.

According to the statement, the group boarded the vessel BAMEDHAF after disabling its maritime identification systems. The ship later docked at the port of Berbera.

Al-Malki said Al-Zoubaidi contacted Maj. Gen. Awad Saeed bin Musleh Al-Hababi, commander of joint operations of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, to inform him of his arrival.

Following this communication, Al-Zoubaidi and his companions boarded an Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft, flight MZB-9102, which departed without declaring its destination.

The aircraft landed at Mogadishu International Airport at 3:15 p.m. local time (1215 GMT), remained on the ground for approximately one hour, and departed again at 4:17 p.m. (1317 GMT) toward the Arabian Gulf.

Identification systems disabled mid-flight

The coalition said the aircraft switched off its identification systems while flying over the Gulf of Oman, reactivating them shortly before landing at Al Reef military airport in Abu Dhabi at 8:47 p.m. (1747 GMT).

Maritime records indicate that the BAMEDHAF is registered under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis—the same flag used by the vessel GREENLAND, which previously transported military vehicles and weapons from Fujairah to the port of Mukalla, the statement said.

The disclosure comes amid heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over southern Yemen. Riyadh has previously accused Abu Dhabi of encouraging STC forces to conduct military operations along Saudi Arabia’s southern border in Hadhramaut and Mahra provinces—an allegation denied by the UAE.

STC pushes for transitional phase

On Friday, Al-Zoubaidi announced a two-year “transitional phase” that would include dialogue with political actors in southern Yemen and a referendum on the future of the region.

The STC argues that successive Yemeni governments have politically and economically marginalized the south and has renewed calls for secession. Yemen’s internationally recognized government rejects these claims and maintains its commitment to the country’s unity.

The episode has deepened a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two most powerful members of the Gulf coalition backing Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Al-Zoubaidi had failed to appear in Riyadh for crisis talks on Wednesday amid escalating turmoil in southern Yemen, and Saudi claims that the UAE assisted his escape have raised the stakes in a crisis that erupted last month when STC forces swept through southern areas and reached the Saudi border, fracturing the coalition as it continues to battle Iran-backed Houthi forces.

(Source: Anadolu and Reuters)

A

t a cost of $500 billion, the city of NEOM lies at the heart of Crown Prince and Prime Minister Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) initiative to modernize and reform Saudi Arabia. The project, which covers an area of 26,000 square kilometers, is being developed in Tabuk, in northwestern Saudi Arabia, and will extend to the borders of Jordan and Egypt. According to some, NEOM will become Saudi Arabia’s “Dubai” and capture the appeal that regional rivals have gained from their cities. At the core of the project is The Line, a 170-kilometer-long, car-free, vertical-axis city designed to have zero carbon emissions. Sub-projects such as the Trojena ski resort, the Oxagon industrial city, and the Sindalah island complex will also contribute to NEOM’s multi-layered architecture. However, it is evident that NEOM has become as much of a problem as it is a project.

Recent developments concerning the NEOM project that have come to public attention indicate that the project is evolving into more than just a technical construction process; it is also at the center of economic and political pressures. Saudi Arabia’s Public Investment Fund (PIF) commissioning international consulting firms to conduct feasibility studies on The Line project reveals that the administration has its doubts about the project’s feasibility. Reports that the NEOM administration plans to lay off more than a thousand employees and relocate some of them to Riyadh during the same period suggest an administrative restructuring is underway.

Although NEOM was initially conceived as an economic development initiative, it was marketed as a symbol of Saudi Arabia’s modernization aspirations due to its central role in the 2030 Vision. However, recent developments centered on NEOM and other mega-giga projects show that this vision has not been realized at the same pace on the ground. The project is subject to a process shaped by technical limitations, financial pressures, and geopolitical tensions. Consequently, contrary to the grand narrative at its inception, NEOM’s current situation has become a multidimensional picture of fragility.

NEOM’s internal vulnerabilities

The loss of momentum in NEOM’s ongoing construction process is due to structural problems inherent to the project itself. Building a city of this scale in a desert climate like Saudi Arabia’s requires capabilities, technologies, and financing that go beyond traditional engineering practices. High temperatures, intense dust erosion, water scarcity, and topographical challenges have made adhering to the projected timeline difficult. In this context, the length of the 170-kilometer Line project and its planned population capacity, as initially announced, show a significant mismatch with the progress achieved on the ground. Building infrastructure networks suitable for desert conditions, integrating power lines, and managing water resources sustainably have posed serious technical challenges that have not yet been fully resolved.

The financial aspect of NEOM’s vulnerabilities exacerbates the situation. The Public Investment Fund’s (PIF) announcement of an estimated $8 billion loss by the end of 2024 suggests that financing sources are limited. A lack of coordination at the management level, frequent changes in leadership positions, and slow decision-making processes are weakening the project institutionally. Progress continues partially in some sub-regions, such as Sindalah, but there are significant deviations from the planned schedule. As this table shows, NEOM’s most fundamental problems stem from internal fragilities rather than external geopolitical pressures.

The pressure of geopolitical tensions

The main tensions shaping Saudi Arabia’s neighborhood today include the Houthi crisis in Yemen, attacks on ships and tankers in the Red Sea, the conflict in Gaza prior to the ceasefire, rising regional tensions, ongoing competition with Iran, and oil price volatility. Since October 2023, the Houthis’ attacks on ships and tankers linked to Israel in the Red Sea have prompted Saudi Arabia to decide to build an alternative land trade corridor to reduce its dependence on the Red Sea route. However, this preference for a circumventing route could disadvantage NEOM’s logistics strategy in terms of time and cost.

Due to its reliance on the Red Sea coast and imported materials, NEOM is experiencing longer shipping routes, higher insurance costs, and delayed deliveries of materials and equipment due to Houthi attacks. This has been observed to slow down the pace of construction. To reduce its dependence on the Red Sea, Riyadh is attempting to establish a land trade corridor, which could impose additional time and production cost burdens on the project and the Saudi budget.

The ongoing conflict in Gaza and growing security concerns are heightening caution among foreign investors, who are adopting a wait-and-see approach that could disrupt project financing. Recent developments, such as a strategic review of the Line project and a new Trojena project tender, indicate that plans are being revised against this backdrop. Therefore, internal technical and financial constraints remain decisive for NEOM, while geopolitical tensions form the external framework that narrows these constraints.

Concrete manifestations of the slowdown

Recent developments reveal that internal fragilities in NEOM are exacerbated by regional geopolitical pressures. The Line, the project’s symbolic core, has officially been placed under strategic review. This indicates that timetables, phases, and targets may be redefined. Similarly, the cancellation and reopening of the main tender processes for the Trojena ski resort suggest that technical and financial calculations have fallen behind initial plans. Another factor contributing to the international visibility of this situation is the assessment by Moody’s. The international credit rating agency has described the progress of Saudi Arabia’s megaprojects as “uneven,” a finding closely monitored by investment circles.

During the same period, attacks carried out by the Houthis in the Red Sea have extended maritime shipping routes, increased insurance premiums for companies, and made delivery times unpredictable. The resulting slowdown in the flow of materials and equipment critical to NEOM’s construction process has directly affected the pace of construction. Additionally, information disclosed to the public about the project’s internal expenditure items has raised questions about resource prioritization. These developments demonstrate that NEOM’s slowdown is not due to one factor, but rather, a combination of internal technical and financial constraints and geopolitical pressures that create a mutually reinforcing cycle. The overall picture shows that the project is progressing in a complex arena, constrained by economic and geopolitical conditions.

I

n recent years, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has embarked on a new identity-building process. This transformation, with Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman at its center, is not limited to the social dimension and is directly related to domestic/foreign policy and the economy. This multidimensional process of searching for a new identity and the changes that are taking place encompass reforms in the country’s political, economic, and social spheres, and aim to move Saudi society in a more open, dynamic, and contemporary direction.

The foundation of this identity-building process is the “Vision 2030” announced by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in 2016. This vision focuses on transforming the traditional profile of Saudi Arabia, a rentier state that derives its wealth and revenues from natural resources such as oil, into a modern one. “Vision 2030” aims to reduce the kingdom’s dependence on oil, diversify economic inputs with non-oil resources, build new cities and promote tourism, and modernize social life in ways that challenge the kingdom’s dominant religious and cultural codes.

Economic dimension

Saudi Arabia has undergone significant changes in the economic sphere, and these changes are innovative and directly related to efforts to reshape the country’s identity. The efforts take place within the framework of the comprehensive reform program called “Vision 2030.” This vision is a far-reaching goal that focuses on objectives such as diversifying the Saudi economy, strengthening the private sector, ensuring sustainability, and implementing social change and transformation.

One of the most notable steps taken in the context of economic transformation is the Kingdom’s efforts to reduce its dependence on oil and diversify the economy. Saudi Arabia aims to create a strong and sustainable economy outside the energy sector. In order to achieve this goal, efforts are being made to strengthen the country’s economic base through measures such as investing in renewable energy projects and encouraging the private sector. For example, the Kingdom has increased its investment in green energy projects, particularly solar and wind power. Similarly, having decided to reduce oil production, Saudi Arabia has increased its investment in natural gas. Many natural gas fields have been developed, including Hasbah-Arabiyah conventional gas field, and Karan, and new gas production facilities have been built, such as al-Fadili and Abu Hadriyah.

Another step in the economic context of Saudi Arabia’s search for a new identity is to invest in modern, non-traditional areas. By investing in sports teams, electric cars, tourism, films, and TV series through the $600 billion Public Investment Fund, Saudi Arabia is attempting to transform an economic system based solely on oil revenues. In addition, initiatives are being taken to increase foreign investment, focus more on Asian and African markets, and allow Saudi citizens to spend their money within the Kingdom. For example, the construction of new, modern cities such as NEOM and the Line is designed to encourage Saudi tourists to spend in Saudi Arabia and to make the Kingdom attractive to foreign tourists.

Similarly, by hosting world-famous international sporting events, attracting famous footballers to Saudi teams, and increasing investment in the entertainment sector, the aim is to keep spending within the Kingdom. Saudi Arabia’s new moves in the economy are directly related to the Kingdom’s search for a new identity, and are evident in the sweeping changes being made under “Vision 2030.” While these changes are in line with the country’s goals of economic diversification, social change, and becoming a more effective actor in the international arena, they also have significant implications for Saudi Arabia’s future role.

Social dimension

Saudi Arabia’s search and construction of a new identity have an impact on the social sphere as well. The influence of religious authority and the ulama in social life is limited. For example, since 2016, the powers of the morality police in Saudi Arabia, charged with shaping social life according to Islam, have been curtailed and some reform steps have been taken in the religious field. In the new identity of the 4th modern Saudi Arabia built by Crown Prince bin Salman, the role of religion is quite limited: instead of the Saudi Arabia that for years was identified with Wahhabism and Salafism, the administration is promoting a more modern, Western-integrated understanding of religion that emphasizes tolerance.

Accordingly, the aim has been to increase religious freedom in the country while promoting a more tolerant interpretation of Islam. Efforts are being made to promote a more open-minded understanding of religion among the country’s young population. This social change is clearly evident in the steps taken towards women’s rights; thus, for instance, the unwritten custom that prevented women from driving has been abolished and women have become more active in many sports, particularly cricket. At the same time, women have been given the opportunity and encouraged to take part in activities that are products of modern life, such as attending football matches, and going to the cinema and theatre.

Reforms such as the ones discussed above alongside giving women greater opportunities in business have led to significant changes in Saudi society and identity. Such steps were the Kingdom’s way of ensuring greater participation of women in social and economic life. The search for a new identity in Saudi Arabia is also manifesting itself in the direction of gender equality and encouraging the participation of the young population in the workforce. The reforms introduced to increase women’s participation in the workforce and to bring about changes in social norms are making a significant contribution to the country’s social transformation. Educational reforms aimed at maximizing the potential of the young population are also playing an important role in building Saudi Arabia’s new identity.

Political dimension

In the political sphere, Saudi Arabia has embarked on a new identity-building process in its regional and international relations with the search for autonomy in foreign policy and the processes of rapprochement with actors outside the traditional alliance structures being the most prominent developments. Problems in relations with Western actors such as the United States, Britain, and France have prompted Saudi Arabia to reshape its foreign policy identity. The Riyadh government has deepened its cooperation with non-Western alliance structures without severing relations with Western actors. For example, in 2024, Saudi Arabia officially became a member of the BRICS organization, which includes actors challenging Western hegemony such as China and Russia.

Second, Saudi Arabia, which has pursued an aggressive foreign policy since the Arab revolutions, has focused its foreign policy moves more on dialogue and cooperation since 2020. The embargo on Qatar, known as the “Gulf crisis,” was lifted in 2021, and relations with Turkey, Iran, and Syria were normalized. The Kingdom’s policy towards Yemen, where a war has been raging since 2015, has also changed radically. Having launched a negotiation process with the Houthis, Saudi Arabia aims to contribute to reducing the conflict and ensuring regional stability through the Presidential Council it established in 2022.

Foreign policy therefore plays an important role in the political context of Saudi Arabia’s new identity construction. The country is attempting to adopt a more constructive and conciliatory foreign policy in order to eliminate the criticism it has faced from Western actors. However, the Saudi process of identity construction has also been subject to criticism. Allegations of human rights violations in Yemen between 2015 and 2022, restrictions on freedoms such as the Ritz-Carlton hotel and the Khashoggi example, and harsh reactions to dissidents who criticize the kingdom, have put Saudi Arabia under scrutiny as it searches for its new identity.

The Kingdom’s oppressive modernization process and the search for a new identity have been interpreted as the construction of Saudi Arabian nationalism. Saudi Arabia’s search for a new identity has given rise to a new type of Saudi nationalism that has strengthened the power of the al-Saud family and the Crown Prince. Meanwhile, the process of Saudi Arabia’s new identity construction is bringing about significant economic, social, and political changes in the country, and attracting national and international attention. Overall, the process is seen as an important phase that will determine the country’s future role and leadership approach.

I

n an unexpected move, Saudi Arabia announced on January 30 that it has abandoned its plan to increase maximum sustainable oil production capacity from 12 to 13 million barrels per day (bpd) by 2027. The surprising decision, coming amid fluctuating global oil prices, has left analysts speculating on the kingdom’s motives and potential repercussions.

The Financial Times described the move as “a major policy reversal,” Reuters labeled it a “U-turn,” and the MEES energy newsletter referred to it as “a bombshell announcement.” The decision, reportedly at least six months in the making, seems to be a response to changing dynamics in the global economy, particularly a slowdown in China.

Unnamed industry sources suggested that the decision was top-down, indicating that Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman (MbS), the de facto leader of Saudi Arabia, played a key role in the move. The cutback reflects a reassessment of medium-term demand growth, aligning with a cautious outlook on the world economy.

Constant investment in existing oil fields

The revision means the kingdom will redirect its focus from expanding production capacity to maintaining current levels through constant investment in existing oil fields. While billions of dollars will still be allocated for this purpose, the total expenditure is expected to be significantly lower.

The decision has implications for the kingdom’s ambitious economic transformation plan, Vision 2030, spearheaded by MbS. This vision heavily relies on oil revenues and foreign investments. The slower-than-expected foreign investment in Saudi projects, including the ambitious NEOM city, raises concerns about the economic transformation’s pace.

For the week ending February 2, global oil prices experienced a 5 percent decline, with Brent crude, the main internationally traded benchmark, dipping slightly over $77 per barrel. While short-term price movements don’t necessarily indicate long-term trends, the drop signals potential financial challenges for Saudi Arabia.

The days of $100 prices are over

The Financial Times’ Lex column declared on January 31 that “Oil: The Days of $100 Prices Are Over.” It emphasized the enduring role of oil in our lives but highlighted a plateau in its value to consumers. The column pointed to the changing dynamics in China, forecasting a significant shift toward electric cars, with half of all new car sales expected to be electric by 2025.

Low oil prices, while beneficial for U.S. domestic interests, pose challenges for Gulf allies like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. These countries, crucial for regional stability, may find it difficult to balance their budgets, impacting their diplomatic support in addressing key regional issues, including Gaza and tensions with Iran.

As Saudi Arabia navigates this strategic shift, the long-term implications for the kingdom’s economic diversification and global oil dynamics remain uncertain.

Source: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy

For decades, the geopolitical and geo-sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out across the Middle East in various destabilizing ways. Since the Houthi rebels usurped control of Sana‘a in 2014, Yemen has been an important flashpoint in this competition for regional influence with Riyadh and Yemeni forces loyal to the UN-recognized Yemeni government waging war against the Iranian-backed insurgents for nearly seven years. The conflict(s) in Yemen still rages on. In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib. Meanwhile, Houthi missiles attacks keep on targeting their enemies, most recently including the UAE, at least according to the rebel group’s claims.

A major question that analysts have been asking since Saudi-Iranian talks began in Baghdad in April 2021 is, what could such dialogue mean for Yemen? It seems safe to conclude that although these talks have not led to major strategic or necessarily tangible changes in Yemen, there have been some tactical changes that could be grounds for some cautious optimism.

An important development in late 2021 was the death of Hassan Erlou who served as Iran’s ambassador to the Houthis. His passing called into question the relationship between the Houthis and their backers in Tehran, and how that could change the face of the war in Yemen. Erlou, who was smuggled into Yemen in 2020, was likely evacuated on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Iraq, before flying home to Iran where he died from COVID19 on December 18, 2021.

“Erlou was obviously, from the evidence that we have, someone who was quite closely tied into the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)] and the Quds force,” explained Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, in an interview with Politics Today. “He was on the U.S. Treasury watch list. Having someone like him leaving [Yemen] without being actually arrested and then flying over Saudi territory was quite a concession from the side of the Saudis. This was only possible because of Iraqi mediation.”

Yet there were many conflicting reports about Erlou and his situation in Yemen just before leaving the country. The Saudis and Iranians told different stories about what had happened as well as the significance of and reasons for his exit from Yemen. “According to the Saudis, Erlou’s return to Tehran reflected tensions between the Houthis and Iran, but there has been little evidence of a breach in the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran,” according to Dr. Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Some reports even claimed that the Houthis were pushing for Erlou’s exit due to rising domestic pressure to distance themselves from Tehran.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Krieg explained, beyond all the facades and information warfare, there is a renewed willingness to talk between Riyadh and Tehran. In fact, last month when the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Pakistan to address the situation in post-U.S, Afghanistan, diplomats from the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic met.

This meeting between Saudi and Iranian officials in Islamabad “suggests that there is a willingness and also permission from the superiors to actually have these talks continue and that’s the most important thing,” according to Dr. Krieg. Additionally, in late 2021 the Saudi government granted Iranian diplomats visas at the OIC—a development suggesting that Riyadh and Tehran could possibly restore diplomatic relations this year.

Last month, the Saudi-led coalition released video footage and photographs that purportedly confirmed that the Houthis are receiving support from Hezbollah and the IRGC. The videos purportedly show a Hezbollah leader giving Houthi leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim instructions, Hezbollah trainers teaching Houthis to operate drones, boxes of drone parts with the Hezbollah logo, and satellite footage showing how the IRGC has assisted the Houthis in transforming the Sanaa International Airport into a drone and missile launching pad.

“The Saudis want the Iranians to stop their surrogate operations across the region, whether it may be in Yemen or Iraq,” argued Dr. Krieg. “The problem with that is that the Iranians are saying there are no surrogate operations, and that these are local operations which we have no control over, which is obviously a lie. But it’s obviously this kind of surrogate game is one that’s based on dissociation and plausible deniability. Hence, why it’s very difficult to come to any conclusion because the Iranians will say in the first place ‘we have no forces on the ground, so we have no control over what’s going on’. It’s true to an extent. The control that the Iranians have over surrogate operations is limited. That’s something that the Saudis understand, and it always provides the Iranians with a degree of plausible deniability and disassociation to tell others that they’re actually not involved. That makes it difficult to come up with a solution that is sustainable.”

These recent developments leave us questioning how Erlou’s replacement will affect the situation in Yemen. Earlier this month, Iranian officials appointed Abdul Reza Shahlai as Erlou’s replacement without giving him an official diplomatic title, which some believe may be a sign of positive relations between Tehran and Riyadh. According to Gregory Johnsen, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: “If the narrative of a split between the Houthis and Iran is true, then it is notable that Shahlai will not be given a diplomatic title, and by selecting an official already in Yemen, Iran honored the Houthi commitment to Saudi Arabia not to bring in a ‘new diplomat’.” However, his appointment could also simply be a means of convenience. Shahlai has been in Yemen for several years, meaning that they would not have to go through the effort to smuggle a new diplomat into the country and he is already a seasoned military commander with experience in Yemen.

In the final analysis, Saudi Arabia will continue to see Iran as a threat in the long term, no matter the direction that dialogue between the two countries takes in 2022. Iranian influence in Yemen will continue terrifying the Saudis. Nonetheless, one can assume that thanks to Iraqi mediation the likelihood of a repeat of the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019 has decreased.

Within the context of the Iranians wanting to improve their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to create a new architecture in the sub-region, we might see Tehran begin to show more sensitivity toward Saudi security as it directly pertains to the Gulf. But beyond the Gulf, it is tough to imagine talks in Iraq between Riyadh and Tehran leading to the Islamic Republic winding down its surrogate or “proxy” operations throughout the greater Middle East.

The year 2021 has witnessed an escalated tension in the Middle Eastern and European security complexes. Early this year, Saudi Arabia and Greece strengthened their bilateral cooperation. Simultaneously, France encouraged Greece to increase its armament while blaming its European partners for turning a deaf ear to the threats the European Union is facing.

France, Saudi Arabia, and Greece seem to have twofold gains from this cooperation. They could both better materialize their energy cooperation and target Turkey’s gas explorations as well as challenge Turkey’s maritime superiority in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean.

Since early 2021, Turkey is voicing its concern over the Saudi F-15s to be based in the Souda air force base in Crete. The first quarter of the year signaled a potential escalation regarding the military drills to be conducted in the Aegean Sea. Turkey’s chief objection was to the Saudi F-15s that would be piloted by Greek lieutenants during military drills.

In February 2021, the Philia Forum brought Gulf states such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain together to integrate into the pre-established Greek-Egypt-Cyprus cooperation. The main actor behind this initiative was Saudi Arabia. France conducted the White Shark 21 maritime drills, which symbolized the new hawkish stance against the Turkish energy pivot in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Military drills jointly conducted by France, Greece, Israel, Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE in the heart of the Aegean Sea are obviously a significant development. The dynamic of this alliance is issue-specific and narrow-scoped; however, it has a potential to attain short-term goals.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In the last three years, one of Turkey’s most important advantages has been its natural gas exploration in the Eastern Mediterranean, which created political complications with states such as Greece, Egypt, Israel, Cyprus, and France as well as with institutions including NATO and the European Union. The current balance of power created room for maneuver for Turkey which is now being constrained by rival energy-seekers such as France, Italy, Greece, and Israel.

Nevertheless, this alliance has been forged to preserve the status quo, and an stalemate might be an actual gain for the guarantor states such as France. There are two interrelated motives behind the French foreign policy: defense exports and international prestige. France is a leading actor in defense exports and tries to be an alternative to the United States.

Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources.

In the last three years, France has been the second-largest defense exporter to Saudi Arabia after the U.S. For the last 5 to 10 years, only the UK has been able to compete with France. Besides, Greece and Israel try to increase their political influence to protect or obtain bargains from the European search for more reliable energy sources. There are a lot of pull factors of entering such a dynamic such as increased resolve to engage in conflict, better military resources, and the higher chance of deterrence, etc.

Such circumstances create a potential conflict on the Turkish maritime borders in the Eastern Mediterranean. It seems like the age-old Turco-Greek debate on the naval border is going to evolve into a bitter rivalry over the control of the Eastern Mediterranean energy flow. Certain stakeholders such as energy providers like Egypt, Algeria, and Israel will set the tone for which side will have the wind at its back.

Turkey can become a trendsetter by discovering natural gas reserves. It might also play a transmitter role with a plan that bypasses Cyprus and Greece, and transfers the Eastern Mediterranean gas directly to the EU. In this context, the problem for the gas alliance builders in the Eastern Mediterranean seems to be Turkey’s potential to be simultaneously a trendsetter and a transmitter.

Turkey’s potential to attain this power is perceived as a threat by its rivals. From an international relations perspective, such conflicts are quite natural; the most formidable alliance will once again force the other to succumb to its demands.

On July 11-12, Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tariq al-Said made his first overseas official trip since coming to power in January 2020, to Saudi Arabia. In the planned megacity of Neom, both King Salman and Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman received Sultan Haitham, and the leaders discussed a variety of means of enhancing the Omani-Saudi relationship, including through the creation of a joint council to foster bilateral ties.

Historically, Oman has distinguished among its GCC neighbors through its independent foreign policy, with a special focus on mediation. Indeed, Oman has not participated in a number of GCC-wide initiatives, including efforts to stop protests in Bahrain in 2011 using the GCC’s Peninsula Shield Force, the war in Yemen, and it remained neutral during the GCC crisis between June 2017 and January 2021.

Although it has been a member of the GCC since its founding in 1981, Oman has always been outspoken against efforts to expand the reach of the regional body, in particular opposing the expansion of a common currency and monetary union, in addition to openly challenging Saudi efforts to upgrade the union in 2013.

Today, however, as Oman faces economic challenges following the drop in oil prices in 2014 and the more recent downturn spurred by the COVID-19 pandemic, as well as dwindling oil supplies, its posture towards its neighbors may change. The IMF in February said that Oman’s economy decreased 6.3 percent in 2020 and would experience a modest 1.8 percent growth in 2021.

Given this economic context, Oman became the first GCC state to announce plans to implement income tax beginning in 2022. It also received $1 billion in aid from Qatar at the end of last year. And in a bid to attract investors, Oman announced a reduction in income tax for small and medium businesses for 2020 and 2021 and will offer long-term residency permits for foreign investors as part of Vision 2040, which aims to diversify the state’s economy in the face of diminishing oil reserves.

It is perhaps unsurprising that Oman this summer has experienced protests, largely linked to unemployment among Omani nationals, especially young people – the same cause of protests that emerged in 2011.

Considering these challenges, it is perhaps unsurprising that Oman this summer has experienced protests, largely linked to unemployment among Omani nationals, especially young people – the same cause of protests that emerged in 2011. There are at least 65,000 unemployed Omanis, many of whom argue that expatriates are given preference for jobs, particularly in the private sector, even when Omanis have appropriate education for such jobs.

Of course, only time will tell how strong the bilateral ties between Oman and Saudi Arabia will prove to be. Thus far, the two countries have set up a coordination council, and the Saudi cabinet is said to have approved the drafting of agreements with Oman “in a slew of fields including commerce, culture, investment promotion and post and transport” – fields which would assist Oman’s economic position and likely help it create jobs that its citizens are increasingly demanding.

In addition, Oman is likely to work more closely with the Saudi leadership in its capacity in having joined UN-led efforts to mediate a ceasefire in Yemen potentially hosting the next round of Iran-Saudi talks.

Perhaps as important as what the council does or does not do in the future, however, is the fact that it has been established, signaling a potential recalibration of GCC relations, especially as the UAE-Saudi relationship has become strained in recent years. Indeed, in 2016, Saudi Arabia and the UAE established a similar body (the Saudi-Emirati Coordination Council) to facilitate bilateral ties, but the council met for the first time only in 2018.

In the past two years in particular, with the withdrawal of Emirati forces from Yemen in 2019, increasingly public differences in opinion about normalizing relations with Israel, and the most recent spat in OPEC+ about oil pricing and sustained production cuts, it is unclear where the coordination council stands and how effective (or relevant) it remains.

Despite uncertainty about what the newly established Omani-Saudi council may achieve, the Omani sultan’s visit to Riyadh, the first such visit by a leader in Oman in 10 years, signals an increasing and notable willingness to work alongside the GCC’s largest country – something which the Omani leadership has been more hesitant to do in the past. It will be instructive to see how other GCC states react to an emerging Omani-Saudi alliance and whether competition will emerge among the GCC states to engage with Oman.

In addition, the visit, importantly, demonstrates that Oman under its new sultan intends to remain an active mediator in the region, even while trying to address increasingly urgent economic challenges at home. Indeed, its efforts at mediation may grant Oman greater access to financial assistance from neighboring countries and regional powers alike, while carrying on the legacy of its long-serving Sultan Qaboos who pioneered Oman’s mediating role in the region.

On April 18, news of Iran-Saudi Arabia talks to re-establish relations was reported in the media. Aside from the veracity of the news, recently there have been bilateral signs of softening. Both countries have their reasons that drive them to the negotiation table.

The Saudi-Iranian relations, although improved for a short period in the 1990s, cooled off with the geopolitical shift in the Middle East following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The rise of pro-Iranian politicians in “new” Iraq increased Iran’s role in the country’s turbulent politics, an influence that gradually expanded with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

However, the Arab Spring has put Iran and Saudi Arabia in a paradoxical situation. While considering the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya as a phenomenon inspired by its Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran regarded the mass protests in Syria and Iraq as a conspiracy initiated by its enemies: the Zionists, the West, and their regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia tried to seize the opportunity and, in an obvious contradiction, perceived the Syrian revolution as the people’s democratic right while considered the protests and events in Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon a result of Iranian intervention. Thus, the fierce proxy war between the two sides became inevitable.

It is clear that the hostile policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia are due to their pragmatic thinking. The two countries have always tried to prevent each other from acquiring more power by giving money and weapons to their governmental and non-governmental allies. The war in Syria caused the two to enter into a fierce proxy war; however, as the war entered an erosive stage, military spending on both sides increased sharply.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen. There were even large-scale demonstrations and clashes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which Saudi officials perceived as a result of foreign intervention, implicitly accusing Iran. Eventually, the Saudi influence in the Syrian war gradually declined after 2015 as they became heavily involved in the war in Yemen against the Houthi group, which maintains close ties with Iran.

The continuation of hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia has led to unpleasant results. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has tarnished Saudi Arabia’s prestige. After six years of intense conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has faced severe international pressure in addition to not being able to achieve its desired results.

The heavy cost of the war in Yemen and the increase in military spending, along with falling oil prices and the COVID19 pandemic, have led to a downturn in the Saudi economy and a budget deficit. Additionally, the competition with Iran has caused the latter to make its influence in the Middle East persistent by forming proxy groups, while the main goal of Saudi Arabia was to eliminate Iran’s influence.

Although Iranians have gained a lot of experience in fighting regional rivals, the overall consequences haven’t been favorable for the country. Iran sees the wars in the region as a conspiracy to curb its influence in the Middle East, and as a result, believes that groups such as Daesh (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra were formed by Saudi Arabia and its regional and international allies. Therefore, Iran has to defeat its enemies in erosive battles outside its borders.

However, the outcome of the bloody wars has shown that this policy isn’t sustainable for either country. Increasing Iranian influence has led neighboring Arab countries to seek refuge in Iran’s number one enemy, Israel. In addition, Saudi Arabia, due to its influence in the Arab world, has been able to seriously disrupt Iran’s relations with other Arab countries.

For example, after the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, Saudi Arabia encouraged Arab countries to close down their embassies in Tehran. Coinciding with the former U.S. President Donald Trump taking office in the United States, international pressure and sanctions on Iran increased to a high level and Saudi Arabia encouraged the United States and other Western countries to intensify pressure on the country.

The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran.

Nevertheless, an even worse scenario materialized when Saudi Arabia’s close allies normalized their relations with Israel in 2020. The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran. Since the UAE and Bahrain have already normalized their relations with Israel, it is possible that Israel will enter the region’s security mechanisms as a protector of these states.

Further efforts were made to re-establish relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia following an attack on a Saudi Aramco facility in September 2019. Even before this attack, the Iranian foreign minister had signaled that a “non-aggression pact” with Saudi Arabia and its allies was offered. The attack on Aramco showed the ability of Iran’s allies to reach the depths of Saudi territories.

However, after the attack, which put the two countries at risk of direct confrontation, Iran softened its approach towards Saudi Arabia. It is even said that General Soleimani, who was assassinated in Baghdad by the U.S. military, was carrying a message to Saudi officials during his visit to Iraq.

Saudi Arabia seems to have softened its stance as a result of the Houthis in Yemen targeting of its infrastructures almost daily. The purpose of these tactical attacks, which seem to have been somewhat successful, is to force Saudi Arabia to stop attacks on Yemen and to negotiate with Iran. Along with this, the pressure by the Biden administration on Saudi Arabia has made Saudi officials more flexible with Iran.

Today, with the resumption of Iran’s talks with the P5+1 group, there is a possibility that with the return of Iran and the U.S. to the nuclear deal, Iran will offer more support to the Houthis, who have been in control of Yemen’s northern governorates since 2014. Accordingly, the Houthis, in practice, have become an effective force vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and Iran can use them to pressure the Saudis.

Houthi missile and drone attacks have repeatedly closed Saudi Arabia’s airports, terminals, and other vital infrastructure. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that Yemen’s Houthis have become the second most powerful quasi-governmental force in the region after Lebanon’s Hezbollah, both of which are close to Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia does not have such a leverage.

Middle Eastern politics experienced the peak of Turkish-Saudi partnership during the 2015-2016 period as ASELSAN, one of the top Turkish defense companies, signed a tripartite memorandum of understanding (MoU) with promising Saudi defense companies TAQNIA and KACST.

TAQNIA also established a joint venture with ASELSAN in 2016 with the potential of initiating similar trends amongst Saudi Arabia’s strategic partners in the Middle East. These agreements were the outcome of former initiatives started in 2013 by Saudi Arabia to reduce the national manufacturing skills gap in the defense sector.

Saudi Arabia, then, turned to Turkey seeking military cooperation both in technology and training as its Western partners designated the country as a client of weapon systems and excluded it from all knowledge transfer programs. However, the Saudi struggle with the 2nd Obama administration regarding weapon sale deals worth over US$80 billion ignited an internal reaction against Western dependency in defense provision.

The Turkish-Pakistani defense cooperation was a clear example for the Saudis of Turkey’s eagerness to share know-how with a regulated sense of regional cooperation.

However, this process came to a halt when the potential regional independence succumbed to regional and political rivalry. The Saudi and Emirati position towards Turkey after the July 15th coup attempt in 2016 caused a root-to-branch transformation in the Turkish attitude towards these two countries.

The Gulf Crisis in 2017 forced Turkey and Qatar, strategic partners with function ties, to be in the opposite camp of the Arab states that gathered under Saudi leadership. The assassination of Jamal Khashoggi by Saudi officials in Turkey in 2018 caused a trauma in the bilateral relations with a resulting stiff political rivalry and a reciprocal antagonistic discourse.

Donald Trump’s presidency in the United States strengthened the aggressive political discourse by the Saudi leadership against Turkey. Moreover, Bahrain, the UAE, Sudan, and Morocco normalized their relations with Israel forcing Turkey to rehabilitate its bilateral affairs with the latter to avoid stigmatization as a “troublemaker.”

However, the Saudi stance toward the two-state solution may facilitate a common bilateral foreign policy with Turkey towards the Palestinian issue in the long run. This aside, the normalization with Israel and the Turkish-supported GNA victory in Western Libya, the Saudi-UAE de jure rule in Yemen, and the Turkish-Russian de facto rule in Syria stabilized regional affairs and put volatile stalemates on hold.

Under these circumstances, Saudi Arabia and Qatar agreed to cease the ill-functioning Qatari blockade with a potential of swift recovery for a region struggling with pressing economic conditions during the COVID-19 pandemic. One fundamental reason behind the Saudi retreat is the prospect of the four-year Democratic leadership in the U.S., which is going to corner Saudi Arabia in the region in several aspects.

The peak of the Turkish-Saudi bilateral affairs coincided with the second-term of Barack Obama’s Democratic administration – a fact that is no coincidence. The Biden administration will not endorse the Turkish and Saudi bargains in the region which, in turn, forces these two influential actors to build a single-issue alliance until the tide goes out.

However, the heightened hopes on both sides resulting from positive signals did not last long and the process seems to be currently on hold. The Saudi-Greek military drills in March 2021 escalated tensions and hindered a chance of reconciliation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

Defense Cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Turkey

However, there are potential areas for collaboration between Turkey and Saudi Arabia that would be reciprocally lucrative. The history of defense collaborations between the two countries indicates that there was a high Saudi demand for cooperation with Turkish defense experts on how to build a comprehensive road map for the country.

Turkey can collaborate with Saudi Arabia in the defense sector as Turkey is looking for alternative export destinations and investment flow.

The first area of collaboration between the two countries might be expertise and sectoral knowledge transfer to the Saudi side and its satellites in the region. A fundamental, intangible asset that the Turkish defense industry can offer the Saudi leadership comes in the form of defense industry capacity capacity development and maintenance.

In fact, extensive regulations and invisible barriers usually force industries in their infancy to seek to export. When it comes to collaborating with Saudi Arabia in the defense sector, another benefit for the Turkish side is that it is looking for alternative export destinations and internal investment flow that would regenerate the economic shortages in the defense industry.

Matching the security needs and demands of Middle Eastern states with the Turkish defense industry’s production is not only essential for Turkish exports but also for a recovery process. However, the history of Turkish defense exports to the Middle East bears clues to the sectoral demands through which potential collaboration and cooperation areas crystallize.

Before the diplomatic and political crises in the Middle East and the Persian Gulf, the arms exports and collaboration projects for armored vehicle systems were accelerating at a significant level. For instance, Turkey was modernizing the Saudi M113 armored personnel carriers (APCs) (over 1,200 in total during 2008-13) with an assembly line established in the receiving country while Turkish armored vehicles company Otokar and Emirati company Al-Jasur initialized the production of 400 Rabdan 8×8 APCs (2017) in the United Arab Emirates.

These two procurement and modernization processes alone were worth more than US$3.5 billion which is a considerable amount for APC exports. These exports also facilitated the Turkish exports to Egypt (BMC-Ejder), Kuwait (Ejder), Oman (FNSS-Pars), Qatar (BMC-Ejder Yalçın, Amazon, KIRPI II), and Tunisia (BMC-Ejder Yalçın, Vuran) with procurement deals worth more than US$2 billion.

The Land Defense Systems promises future export areas with Altay tank on the production line despite the power pack shortage, battle-proven FIRTINA self-propelled MRLs (multiple rocket launchers), and battle-tested HISAR-A/O (Short and Middle Range AD) systems being delivered in 2021.

Turkish defense collaborations and exports do not remain restricted to the land defense systems as Pakistan, Egypt, and Qatar have utilized Turkey’s naval system with several procurement deals including MILGEM corvettes, MRTP-20 Improved Fast Intervention Crafts, and MRTP-33 Fast Patrol/Attack Crafts. As the turmoil in the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of Aden disturbed international maritime trade, Middle East destinations such as Saudi Arabia, Oman, UAE, Qatar, and Kuwait sought more expensive European and U.S. alternatives; for some states, the reason was the impasse with Turkey, and for others, the increasing one-way dependency.

Turkey expresses eagerness in collaborating with countries that have the required capital and workforce. With the several procurement and collaboration prospects at hand, the members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) might be able to establish a know-how transfer platform.