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ollowing the mass protests that erupted in many Arab countries after 2010, regional actors adopted significant policy changes and formed alliances with like-minded countries. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Saudi Arabia were among the most prominent examples of such alliances. Posing as anti-revolutionary, these two countries coordinated their actions in many countries. This partnership included the air, land, and sea blockade of Qatar, another Gulf country. Saudi Arabia and the UAE also cooperated in Yemen. Their cooperation escalated to the point of military intervention.

Over time, both the political alliance formed on the basis of opposition to Qatar and the military cooperation established in Yemen have become increasingly damaging for both countries. One of the first signs of this was seen in the different approaches to normalising relations with Qatar following the crisis. While Saudi Arabia rapidly normalised relations with Qatar through the Al-Ula Summit in 2021, the United Arab Emirates, although involved in this process, did not exhibit the same willingness or warmth as Riyadh.

For Saudi Arabia, intra-Gulf reconciliation meant ensuring regional stability and reasserting its leadership claim; however, the UAE preferred a more distant, cautious approach to relations with Qatar. This divergence can be interpreted as an early sign that the two countries’ strategic priorities were beginning to diverge subtly.

By the end of 2025, this divergence had transcended mere competition over Yemen, revealing that serious problems between the parties could no longer be concealed. In December 2025, Saudi Arabia and the UAE confronted each other directly in Yemen, marking one of the most severe crises in recent years. The crisis escalated to the point of open accusations, ultimately reaching a new phase with the UAE’s announcement of its complete withdrawal from Yemen.

What happened?

In December 2025, events in Yemen exposed the long-suppressed strategic differences between Saudi Arabia and the UAE. The Arab coalition, formed in 2015 under the banner of ‘restoring the legitimate Yemeni government’ and countering the Houthis, had evolved by 2025 into an increasingly covert power rivalry, having started out as a joint security intervention. Differences in goals, means, and priorities within the coalition became particularly pronounced from 2018 onwards, and December 2025 marked a turning point at which these differences were formalized.

Saudi Arabia’s airstrikes targeting Southern Transitional Council (STC) elements in Mukalla, Hadramut, and Mehri between 26 and 31 December 2025 concretised this rupture. By targeting forces that were effectively its partners, which had been trained and supported by the UAE, Riyadh created an unprecedented situation in the history of the coalition. Consequently, Yemen became a conflict zone where actors within the same alliance used force against each other.

Hadramut and Mehri have assumed a central role in this new phase. These two eastern provinces, which remained relatively uninvolved in direct conflict with the Houthis for a long time, have now become the main testing ground for intra-coalition rivalry. The STC’s expansion into these provinces, which consolidated its control over South Yemen by early December 2025, was perceived by Saudi Arabia as crossing a red line. In an article for The Conversation, Kristian Coates Ulrichsen, an expert on the Gulf, noted that the timing of this move, which coincided with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) summit, reinforced Riyadh’s belief that Abu Dhabi was aware of and approved this step.

This crisis has once again confirmed that the divisions within the coalition are nothing new. The clashes in Aden in 2018, between UAE-backed Security Belt forces and Yemeni government troops, were the first serious test of the coalition’s unity. In 2019, Riyadh interpreted the UAE’s reduction of its military presence and continued influence through local armed groups as the Emirates’ abandonment of Saudi Arabia. Betül Doğan Akkaş of Ankara University explains this process in her article for Anadolu Agency as a ‘buck-passing’ approach.

According to this approach, while the UAE remained part of the coalition, it largely shifted the political and military costs of the Yemen intervention onto Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh Agreement, signed in the same year, and the Presidential Council, established in 2022, were arrangements that masked, but did not eliminate, this structural division. Competition shifting to the eastern provinces in 2023 and 2024 set the stage for a process that culminated in the coalition becoming effectively dysfunctional in December 2025.

Why is South Yemen important?

The competition over Hadramut and Mahra is driven by deep geostrategic considerations. According to the US-based MBN, Hadramut holds Yemen’s most significant oil and natural gas reserves. This makes it critically important for the country’s economy and energy security, given its long coastline on the Arabian Sea and its potential export ports. In contrast, Mahri is directly linked to Saudi Arabia’s efforts to reduce its dependence on the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, thanks to its proximity to the Omani border, access to the open sea, and alternative energy and transport corridors. The UAE, however, views these areas as part of a broader network of ports and maritime trade extending from the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden and the Horn of Africa.

Therefore, the crisis in Yemen reflects a clash of strategic approaches between the two countries regarding the future of the regional order, rather than a temporary military dispute. Saudi Arabia considers Yemen strategically important to its national security and regional position within its 2030 Vision, whereas the UAE is pursuing a riskier path, involving collaboration with non-state actors and establishing influence through ports and security networks.

Gulf rivalry beyond Yemen?

According to Arab News, a news agency close to Saudi Arabia, tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE have deepened, extending beyond Yemen to broader regional politics. The report, citing CNN, suggests that the crisis may have been caused by misinformation conveyed to Abu Dhabi, namely that Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman had requested sanctions against the UAE from President Donald Trump during his November visit to Washington.

Riyadh categorically denies this claim and believes that the misinformation has led to the mobilization of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council in Yemeni provinces near the Saudi border. Tensions escalated into open conflict on 30 December, when Saudi Arabia launched airstrikes targeting what it claims is a military deployment in Yemen linked to the UAE that was not coordinated with the coalition.

According to Arab News, the disagreement is not limited to Yemen, pointing to a deeper strategic divergence between the two countries. Saudi Arabia believes the UAE is collaborating with destabilizing actors in Yemen, Sudan, the Horn of Africa, and Syria, and it criticizes Abu Dhabi’s normalization process with Israel, which began in 2020. Although the UAE has withdrawn its troops from Yemen and emphasized its commitment to Saudi Arabia’s security, the situation reveals that the relationship between the two countries has shifted from one of tacit harmony to one of overt and structural competition.

Since the last months of 2021, the UAE’s diplomatic moves in foreign policy have been attracting the attention of Gulf scholars and observers. In an interview, Dr. Sultan Ahmed Al Jaber, the UAE’s minister of industry and advanced technology, noted that the recent diplomatic moves by the UAE are critical to the country’s new foreign policy. “The art of partnership is part of our DNA, and it has been key to our success over the years,” said Al Jaber. Signals of change and using diplomacy instead of military power from Hormuz to the Suez constitute a sharp rupture for UAE foreign policy.

Following the withdrawal of its military presence from Yemen in mid-2019, the UAE regional security policy entered a de-escalation mode. Political conflicts with neighbors started being replaced with an economic interests-driven foreign policy. The Gulf states’ regional loneliness, partly due to the Biden administration’s hesitancy to take an active role in regional affairs, forced the UAE and other GCC states to fend for themselves within the shifting regional security dynamics and alliances.

While the Al-Ula reconciliation ended the groupings of the GCC states, the post-reconciliation process sparked a diplomacy rivalry among the GCC actors which strived to present themselves as the region’s important stabilizers and peacemakers.

The rhetorical shift in UAE foreign policy can be best understood by looking into the “10 Principles” announced in the “Projects of the 50” campaign in 2021. The projects publicized the strategic roadmap planning for the UAE’s economic, political, and social development. Among the “10 Principles,” “good neighborliness” stands as one of the UAE’s essential principles for stable political, economic, and social relations with its neighbors.

While openness, tolerance, and peace were mentioned as the state’s core values, the UAE calls for peace, harmony, negotiation, and dialogue to resolve all conflicts by envisioning bilateral relations based on a non-security or non-military perspective. This new narrative will help the Emirates to overcome its thorny relations with Turkey.

The Saudi-Emirati tension

Following the UAE’s military withdrawal from Yemen, the UAE-Saudi relations entered a period of standoff where distrust rose. After the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, the UAE had adopted a common security understanding with Saudi Arabia that endured until the withdrawal of the Emirates from Yemen in mid-2019. Although the UAE was also militarily disengaged from several bases like Eritrea or Somaliland, its departure from Yemen made Saudi Arabia the foremost responsible for Yemen’s humanitarian crisis internationally.

The new pragmatism of the UAE foreign policy resulted from the Emirati decision-makers’ abandonment of a proactive foreign policy and military interventions in Syria, Yemen, and Libya. Although the UAE did not experience demonstrations such as those in Saudi Arabia and Bahrain, the potential for the rise of the Muslim Brotherhood, through the Al-Islah movement that was founded in 1974, was perceived as a threat to the existing state structure and the royal families of the seven emirates of the UAE. This fear caused the demonization and the labeling of the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist group working against the stability of the Gulf monarchies.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises.

The close rhetoric between Turkey and the Muslim Brotherhood for almost ten years, pushed Emirati decision-makers to adopt adverse policies towards Turkey in various regional crises like the Syrian Civil War and the Eastern Mediterranean until the visit of Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al-Nahyan (MBZ), the crown prince of Abu Dhabi and de facto ruler of the Emirates, to Turkey in November 2021.

Before visiting Turkey, Sheikh Mohammed and other UAE decision-makers made diplomatic visits to Jordan, Egypt, and Syria as part of the claimed Emirati diplomatic activism in the region. However, the visit to Turkey attracted more regional and international attention due to the lousy record of bilateral relations since 2011 and accusations over the UAE’s financial support to the foiled coup d’état attempt in Turkey in 2016.

Despite tense political relations, Turkey’s trade ties with the UAE have continued to improve, and UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020. The satisfaction on both sides following the Erdoğan-MBZ meeting and the agreements focusing on the strategic investments to generate steady and safe revenues in the long term, including the logistics, health, and energy sectors, demonstrated both states’ preference to overlook their political divergences for the sake of economic advantages.

As a result, regional cooperation, dialogue, and negotiation themes initiated new diplomacy rhetoric between Turkey and the UAE. Similarly, one might emphasize the change of Turkish foreign policy rhetoric towards the Gulf, such as referring to the six Gulf states as Turkey’s friends – not only “brotherly Qatar” anymore.

UAE exports to Turkey rose to 110 percent while total trade increased by 21 percent from 2019 to 2020.

Throughout the 2017 Qatar crisis, Turkey adopted a security-oriented approach and claimed to provide a security umbrella to the whole Gulf. Turkey adopted this controversial rhetoric to calm the anxieties of Saudi Arabia and the UAE after establishing a Turkish military base in Qatar. Still, it made Turkey’s relations with the prementioned Gulf states even tenser. Now, one can observe a change in the rhetoric of almost every Gulf state towards establishing non-military bilateral ties. This does not harm Turkey’s relations with Qatar, but allows Turkey to include itself in the Gulf regional security architecture through cooperation, trade, and peaceful means.

In contrast to Saudi Arabia, the UAE has been more willing to establish relations regional actors like Iran or Israel. The UAE’s maneuver capacity can be related to the abandonment of religious themes in its foreign policy rhetoric. At the same time, Saudi Arabia has historically adopted a “distinctive” status for itself in the Arab world.

While Oman, Kuwait, and Qatar have always cultivated significant relations with Iran, Saudi and Emirati decision-makers have viewed Iranian regional activities and proxy wars as working against the domestic security of regional states such as Lebanon, Syria, Yemen, or Iraq. Interestingly, Iran’s imports from the UAE reached $5.39 billion in the period of March-August 2021, illustrating the high volume of trade relations between the two even in times of crisis.

However, since April 2021, behind-the-scenes meetings between Iranian and Saudi officials were revealed, which jump-started efforts to normalize  diplomatic ties with Iran. The endeavors of the Gulf states came in the form of re-establishing diplomatic relations with Iran without waiting for the Biden administration’s steps to renew the 2015 Iran Nuclear Deal, which would bring Iran a vainglorious opponent to the diplomacy table.

Similar to the Saudi side, at the Baghdad Summit held in August 2021, the UAE’s Vice President and Ruler of Dubai Mohammed bin Rashid Al Maktoum met Iranian Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian to discuss the possibilities of a “neighborhood policy and diplomacy.”

In March 2010, at the last Arab summit held in Libya, then secretary-general of the Arab League Amr Moussa proposed to expand the Arab League to include Turkey. Moussa called on Turkey to be part of the Arab regional system in a strategic dialogue as a friendly neighboring major power with strong historical, cultural, and economic ties to the region. However, Moussa’s “Arab neighboring policy” was postponed to the next summit and was never realized after the region was shocked by the wave of Arab uprisings that started a few months later.

In the pre-Arab uprisings era, Turkey was enjoying the golden days in its relations with regional countries, in particular the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). On the Turkish side, economic considerations and the enhancement of its position in the Middle East were the driving force, while on the GCC states, the adverse impact of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, which strengthened the Shiite position in the country, and the rising Iranian influence in the region had an important impact on their consideration of Turkey as a potential partner.

Despite their domestic differences, Turkey and the GCC states agreed on the fact that without mutual cooperation, it would be quite difficult for the two sides to maintain the balance of power in the region in such a way as to favor their own interests. Thus, domestic factors did not play a large role in shaping the foreign policy decisions of Turkey and the GCC states when the nature of the regional developments, such as in Iraq, Lebanon, and Palestine, were more related to the balance of power in the Middle East. For the sake of their regional interests, Turkey and the GCC states did not allow their domestic differences to come to the surface and adversely affect their cooperation.

However, the harmony that Turkey and the GCC enjoyed ended fairly soon with the Arab uprisings, especially after Egypt’s military takeover in 2013. The regional security perceptions of two opposing alliances – one that supported the popular movements, spearheaded by Turkey and Qatar, and another that opposed them championed by the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Egypt – diverged significantly over regional crises, creating an “ideological proxy war” which preponderated over their mutual concerns.

In recent months, this picture has begun to change as several signs of a rapprochement between these actors have emerged. The era of military-based hard power politics that had led to subsequent crises between these actors seems to have closed and a fresh start is on the horizon.

Breaking the ice, but gradually

Following the recent visit of UAE National Security Adviser Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed al-Nayhan to Ankara, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held a rare phone call with UAE Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ). That was followed by a call between their foreign ministers. It was reported that Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani, a good friend of both Erdoğan and MBZ, helped facilitate the rapprochement between Turkey and the UAE – two countries that confronted on almost all regional issues concerning Libya, Egypt, the Horn of Africa, Yemen, and the Eastern Mediterranean throughout the past decade.

Triggering factors for rapprochement 

Due to external factors, both international and regional, and domestic factors related to economy and security, countries within these opposing blocs have equally started to recalibrate their positions and reset their relations, which had previously been predicated on confrontation. The main theme of this new era is realpolitik as actors seem determined to put ideology aside and focus on the economy for solid gains to end a period of intense regional rivalry.

International: The new U.S. administration under Joe Biden is determined to prioritize Asia, to deal with its own domestic issues, and to push for diplomacy in the Middle East, unlike the preceding Trump administration. This change in the global context came at a time when the U.S. is re-evaluating its military footprint in the region, which has been a triggering factor in pushing Turkey, Qatar, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia towards a de-escalation era.

Biden’s tenure not only led these countries to question the U.S. security commitment but also raised the importance of relying on regional cooperation just like in the pre-2011 era. Ultimately, the recent reconciliation climate aligns with the Biden administration’s policies in the region.

Regional: The signing of the Al-Ula declaration that officially ended the Gulf dispute created further incentives for Ankara to break the ice with Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. As such, Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations with Egypt paved the way to the rapprochement with the other Gulf countries as well. Turkey and Qatar started a dialogue with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, while in order not to remain on the sidelines of this regional era of rapprochement the UAE also rolled up its sleeves.

Another regional factor that triggered these developments was the growing relations between Egypt, Israel, Greece, and the Greek Cypriot administrations in the Eastern Mediterranean at the expense of Turkish interests. For Turkey, cooperation with Egypt on the issues related to Libya and the Eastern Mediterranean is vital, while the same applies to Cairo as well.

Domestic: Domestic considerations play a significant role in shaping a country’s foreign policy. In the domestic context, Turkey’s precarious economic situation and the UAE’s need to make investments in accordance with its “Vision 2030” have been a driving force in the Turkey-UAE rapprochement. Erdoğan underlined that trade was the main focus of talks with Tahnoun, saying that “serious Emirati investments” lay on the horizon. Cultivating economic ties not only benefits the two sides, but could also prove beneficial to both countries’ political and security interests.

To conclude, the Middle East has proven this several times: yesterday’s enemy could be tomorrow’s ally. Changing geopolitics and realities in the region have pushed countries to put aside ideological differences for the sake of national interests and stability in the region.

Now that the Turkey-Qatar and the UAE-Egypt-Saudi Arabia blocs seem to perceive this rapprochement as an opportunity to maintain their regional influence, it is unlikely that they will allow minor internal political calculations to hamper this rapprochement process.

Time will show whether regional countries will be able to build confidence similar to the pre-2011 era, when interest-driven pragmatism outweighed ideologically-driven foreign policy.

Regional security perceptions of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) concurred regarding regional crises and wars in the Middle East since the Arab uprisings, making the two countries work hand in hand in the economic and military fields. Cooperation of the Saudi and Emirati decision-makers rose to the occasion  during the 2017 Qatar crisis, the marginalization of the Muslim Brotherhood, the Yemen war against the Houthi militia since 2015, and lobbying activities in the U.S. against the Iran Nuclear Deal.

However, following the latest failure of the OPEC (Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries) negotiations at the beginning of July 2021, growing discord between the two state actors began attracting attention. On July 5, 2021, the OPEC meeting was cancelled without designating a new date. The disagreement emerged over the UAE’s disapproval of extending the oil production cuts from August 2021 to December 2021. However, on July 14, 2021, Saudi Arabia greed with the UAE to have a higher production baseline of 3.65 million barrels a day from April 2022. In return, the UAE side accepted the earlier decision of the OPEC to extend the production cuts until December 2021.

The OPEC crisis came at the same time as Saudi Arabia’s announcement to amend regulations to exclude the import of products made in free zones, which is the primary income of the UAE. Furthermore, the kingdom decided to impose a travel ban and suspended flights to/from the UAE to stop the spread of the Delta variant of the COVID-19 virus. All of these Saudi decisions, which seemed to come at once against the UAE, signaled the change of the threat perceptions of Saudis and Emiratis regarding regional security.

The recent deterioration of the UAE-Saudi relations did not come out of the blue for Saudis. It happened when Saudi decision-makers realized the emerging security realities in the region, which cannot be dealt with only through economic and military cooperation. Notably, after the decision of the UAE to downsize its military in Yemen in May 2018, Saudi Arabia understood that the humanitarian crisis there would fall on the kingdom’s shoulder. Following the OPEC crisis, Saudis and Emiratis adopted a new narrative shaped by the clash of perceptions based on drastic differences over strategic calculations in the regional security.

Following the OPEC crisis, Saudis and Emiratis adopted a new narrative shaped by the clash of perceptions based on drastic differences over strategic calculations in the regional security.

The traditional Saudi foreign policy of putting political and economic conditionalities to its neighbors in order for their relations to continue began to work against the UAE, undermining its image as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia.

The UAE’s elusive regional perceptions, particularly concerning its economy, forced the Saudi decision-makers to develop a multiple-ally perspective through building trust relations with other regional actors like Qatar, Oman, and Iraq. Likewise, Saudi Arabia underlined the “Gulf unity” in the Al-Ula GCC Summit in January 2021, despite the fact that the summit was facilitated by Kuwait and the U.S. as a sign of the kingdom’s intention to reconstruct its international image as a regional actor favoring stability and peace in the region instead of leading regional crises and wars.

The traditional Saudi foreign policy of putting political and economic conditionalities to its neighbors in order for their relations to continue began to work against the UAE, undermining its image as a regional ally of Saudi Arabia. The most recent demand by the latter was to ask international companies based in the Middle East to move their headquarters to Riyadh if they wish to continue their contracts with the Saudi government.

At this point, the impact of Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) on the domestic and foreign policies of MBS, as well as his access to U.S. decision-making circles, should be noted. As a young prince who spent his life in Riyadh beside his father, King Salman, MBS does not have sufficient diplomatic experience to build relations with international actors.

The threat perception of the UAE decision-makers regarding the tourism sector had been directed to Qatar, particularly after it was selected to host the 2022 World Cup back in December 2010.

Even though MBZ has been the primary supporter of MBS’s development plans as part of their personal relationship, the economic impacts of the pandemic on the UAE’s tourism sector transformed the UAE’s perception of this relationship. Saudi Arabia’s development projects like NEOM, Amaala, AlUla, and the Red Sea projects began threatening the UAE’s regional status of being a tourism and business hub.

The threat perception of the UAE decision-makers regarding the tourism sector had been directed to Qatar, particularly after it was selected to host the 2022 World Cup back in December 2010. During the 2017 Qatar crisis, the UAE successfully influenced the Saudi government to impose an air, sea, and land blockade on Qatar by publicizing the initiative as a Saudi-led intervention.

Overall, backing MBS’s development plans helped MBZ pursue the UAE’s economic and military interests without being the principal responsible actor – instead he led the process from behind the scenes.

The primary area of the divergence in regional interests was in Yemen when the southern separatists backed by the UAE ousted the Saudi-backed Abdrabbuh Mansur Hadi’s government from Aden in September 2019. Following this, the UAE downsized its troops in Yemen which left the Saudis alone on the ground and portrayed MBS as the principal architect of the humanitarian crisis of Yemen in the international arena.

The rapidity with which cooperation transformed into a standoff was a lesson concerning the UAE’s regional security policies towards the kingdom for the Saudi government, and particularly for MBS. The policies of the UAE changed, especially when it comes to preserving its economic interests.

The realization by Saudi officials of the UAE’s changing regional security perceptions reconstructed the country’s threat perceptions vis-à-vis the UAE. Accordingly, Saudi Arabia attempted to establish closer ties with Iraq and Oman, to reconciliate with Qatar, and even started a diplomatic dialogue with Iran. As part of its new perspective based on building multiple alliances, Saudi Arabia mentioned establishing a more cordial economic relationship with Oman, like developing an industrial zone in Oman for transporting commodities and goods between two countries.

More significantly, MBS redefined Iran as a respectful neighbor and emphasized the possibility of forging a reconciliation. Since his appointment as the minister of defence of the country in January 2015, MBS has fostered hostile rhetoric towards Iran, such as calling the country extremist, and accusing it of supporting terrorist organizations and interfering in the domestic affairs and stability of countries in the region. In contrast, from the point of view of the UAE, Iran does not constitute a significant concern as it has enormous commercial interests in the country.

The changing tone of MBS’s rhetoric towards Iran demonstrated the kingdom’s intention to decrease the number of its enemies while sending messages to its old or existing allies about the kingdom’s shifting perceptions of regional security dynamics. These shifting perceptions can transform old enemies into possible partners, and vice versa, depending on the commitment of the latter to a mutual understanding of the regional dynamics of the kingdom’s development strategies at home.

Another significant departure in the foreign policies of the Saudis and Emiratis is their threat perception towards the Muslim Brotherhood and their understanding of the regional implications for the normalization process with Israel. Although Saudi Arabia declared the Muslim Brotherhood a terrorist organization in 2014, the kingdom did not perceive it as an existential threat at home.

On the contrary, according to Emirati decision-makers, the Muslim Brotherhood-inspired organizations that adopt political Islam constitute a direct threat to the survival of the Gulf ruling families. To illustrate, the UAE showed a similar concern to the rise of political Islam in Libya by supporting Khalifa Haftar, the commander of the Libya National Army (LNA), with advanced weapons.

“Stop what you’re doing and read this. This leak is going to be the story of the year,” wrote the eminent NSA whistleblower Edward Snowden last month as Amnesty International and Forbidden Stories obtained a leaked list of 50,000 phone numbers of potential targets of the Israeli spyware company, NSO Group.

NSO’s main service is Pegasus, a malware that infects iPhones and Android devices to enable the tool’s operators to extract messages, photos, and emails; record calls; and secretly activate microphones. The geographical scope of both NSO clients and victims seems limitless – from the Middle East to Europe, the U.S., Africa, East Asia, and Latin America. Traces of the Pegasus malware were most recently discovered on phones in the United Kingdom and France, amongst 45 other countries where the virus was found.

The company’s usual targets, which were revealed over the last few years, were mostly journalists, activists, and dissidents – some of whom ended up being tortured, arrested, killed, or forcibly disappeared as a consequence. However, the formidable, leaked list included some targets with unbelievable portfolios; NSO has moved from spying on journalists to spying on presidents, prime ministers, royalty, CEOs, and public figures. One of the most prominent highlights in the leaked list was France’s president Emmanuel Macron and Morocco’s king Mohammed VI.

This prompted the French government to demand an explanation from the Israeli government, which then hurried to send its defense minister to Paris for a few hours to assure France that Israel will take this issue seriously. The French National Agency for the Security of Information Systems has confirmed finding traces of Pegasus malware on the phone of a senior journalist in its state-owned international news network France24.

This latest revelation underlines one crucial conclusion: NSO is out of control. Its malicious hacking services, which are virtually unconstrained, have become a major security threat in cyberspace, and it has the full backing of an Israeli government willing to turn a blind eye to the company’s activities in order to bolster its regional and international relations.

Israel is an international hub for spyware companies whose main personnel almost always comes from the Israeli military.

Indeed, NSO is just the tip of the iceberg. Israel is an international hub for spyware companies whose main personnel almost always comes from the Israeli military, especially the Israeli Military Intelligence Unit 8200. The Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) have perfected a multitude of surveillance strategies as a result of their decades-long abuse of Palestinians in the Occupied Territories in flagrant violation of their right to privacy.

The Israeli government under Benjamin Netanyahu was even NSO’s patron, whereby it promoted and pushed its spyware sales across the world. Wherever Netanyahu traveled on official visits, deals between the visited country’s government and NSO followed – from Hungary to Mexico, India, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and others.

This positions Israel as a force for regional and international destabilization where state-sanctioned – and state-sponsored – private spyware firms like NSO have been the informal arm of the Israeli government that are employed “off the record” to do the dirtiest work, such as espionage and interference in foreign countries.

This can also be seen in the activities of another Israeli cybersecurity firm, Psy-Group, which ran a $2 million voter suppression operation in support of Donald Trump’s 2016 campaign, according to the 2020 report of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. The operation was paid by George Nader, an advisor to de facto  UAE ruler Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ).

The Israeli government’s complicity with NSO’s cyberweapons should raise more than eyebrows. Accountability is paramount. The very least Israel’s government should do is to immediately revoke NSO’s export license and ban spyware trade.

NSO does not only offer security, it also provides infectious viruses. It does not aim to make the world safer – with its Pegasus cyberattack tool, it aims to make it more vulnerable, more at risk, and more afraid. If NSO can hack into the phones of statesmen, parliamentarians, and CEOs, no phone is safe from its malware until action is taken.

Following the First Gulf War, the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, and the six members of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), namely Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Oman, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), met in Damascus and agreed on a new security cooperation initiative for the Gulf which came to be known as the “Damascus Declaration.” Although the GCC states later moved away from implementing the declaration, it contained an important aspect related to Turkey which is key to understanding the dynamics that shape the region today.

The thorny relations between Damascus and Ankara in the 1990s due to water and terrorism issues had adversely affected Turkey’s relations with the Arab countries, including those in the Gulf. The declaration, which aimed to pressure Ankara on the international platform, criticized Turkey’s plan to construct a new dam on the Turkish-Syrian border, called foreign contractors not to cooperate with Turkey, and warned Ankara over its actions. The importance of the Damascus Declaration was that, for the first time, the GCC countries expressed public and clear support for Syria in its dispute with Turkey.

However, since then balances have changed rapidly in international politics. When it comes to the Middle East, one of the world’s least peaceful regions, dynamics change even faster. Turkish-GCC relations within the context of the Syrian war is an interesting case to show the degree to which several factors shape the convergence and divergence in their relationship in Syria, which is known as the “heart” of the Arab world.

When protests erupted in 2011 in Syria, the GCC stood by the opposition that aimed to topple the Bashar al-Assad regime and recognized the opposition bloc as the “legitimate representative” of the Syrian people. The GCC states, which were motivated by several factors, most importantly political and sectarian ones, aimed to weaken Iran’s hand and bring Syria, a country predominantly Sunni but ruled by a Nusayri family, back into the Arab sphere of influence. Ankara also was among the most vocal critics of the regime and the staunchest supporter of the opposition when it failed to convince the regime to make reforms.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era.

In Syria, Turkey and the GCC countries stood by the opposition, but supported different factions, as they harbored different visions for the post-Assad era. Thus, the Syrian theater became the first backdrop of rivalry between Turkey and GCC states, namely Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain, based on ideological differences.

In recent years, the power dynamics in the region have started to shift again as some Gulf countries, which cooperated with Turkey against the Syrian regime in the initial years of the crisis, seem to have put their differences aside and in varying degrees have approached Damascus, pitting Syria against Turkey as they did in the 1990s. Now their priority is their interests, both political and economic, rather than the fate of the regime as was the case a decade ago.

Normalization suit 

In December 2018, the UAE, which once supported the Syrian opposition forces alongside Saudi Arabia and Qatar, reopened its embassy in Syria. The UAE justified the move by declaring, “Given the regional expansionism of Iran and Turkey, there is an Arab role to play in Syria that has become even more necessary.” In March 2021, the UAE reiterated its position: “Syria’s return to the Arab fold is essential and has nothing to do with who wants or who does not want it. It is a matter of public interest and the interests of Syria and the region.”

A day after the UAE reopened its mission, Bahrain announced that its mission in Damascus continues its duty, underlining its keenness to maintain relations with what it referred to as a “brotherly” country. Manama, in particular, emphasized the significance of strengthening and activating the “Arab role” in preventing the dangers of regional interference in Syria’s internal affairs.

In October of last year, Oman sent an ambassador to Syria, becoming the first Gulf state to do so since they downgraded or shut missions in Damascus in 2012. Meanwhile Kuwait has said it would reopen its mission in Damascus if there was an agreement among the 22-member Arab League.

So far, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, two countries that firmly supported the opposition, have not taken any step forward. Traditionally, Riyadh pursues a “wait and see” policy and seeks gradual and slow partial normalization. Prospects for change in the Saudi position have increased particularly after the reports that Saudi intelligence chief Khalid al-Humaidan met with his Syrian counterpart in Damascus, the first meeting of its kind since the conflict broke out in Syria.

If there is a change of heart in Riyadh regarding the return of Syria to the Arab fold, Qatar – Turkey’s closest Gulf ally and a critical center for opposition meetings – will be the only Gulf country not involved in the normalization suit with Syria.

Factors driving normalization

The first factor of the Gulf rapprochement to Syria is Russia’s position. In 2015, when Russia, the regime’s staunchest ally, militarily intervened in the war, the balances on the ground rapidly changed. Russia’s interference became the game-changer that also altered the perception of the GCC towards the opposition and eliminated the idea of toppling Assad by force.

In this context, Moscow, which built a perception of Russia as a crucial geopolitical actor in the region, started to deepen its relationship with each GCC state, and engaged in dialogue over the Syria file. In recent years, there has been increasing support by the GCC states of Russia’s role in Syria, particularly at a time when the U.S. influence is fading away.

The second factor that drives the GCC rapprochement with Damascus is related to both the domestic and international context. The assertive members of the GCC, namely the UAE and Saudi Arabia, have started to move away from a foreign policy focusing on hard power (military tools), while prioritizing soft power (diplomacy).

The economy plays a central role in this diplomacy. Restoring relations with Damascus, not only politically, but economically, is significant and especially in terms of the reconstruction of Syria. On the international level, the election of U.S. President Joe Biden has significantly influenced the shift of the Gulf foreign policy from hard to soft power as the new administration, unlike its predecessor, pushes for de-escalation in the region.

The last factor is the antagonism of Turkey’s growing role in Syria. When Turkey conducted military operations in northern Syria (Operation Olive Branch, Operation Peace Spring, Spring Shield) to eliminate terrorist elements, Saudi Arabia, along with the UAE and Bahrain, opposed them on the grounds of “threatening Arab national security.”

For a long time, Jordan has been considered an island of stability in one of the world’s most volatile regions. Surrounded by chaos and failed states, it has turned into a haven for those running away from death and destruction. Despite its minimal resources, it became a destination for Palestinians, Iraqis, Syrians, and even Lebanese.

Just a few days before celebrating its first centenary, Jordan witnessed an unprecedented political crisis, at least on the royal family level. The typical picture of a stable Jordan was briefly shaken when the authorities arrested around 20 people and sought to restrain Prince Hamzah bin Hussein’s movement, the former crown prince and the half brother of King Abdullah bin al-Hussein, for being involved in a plot targeting Jordan’s stability and security.

This serious development came amidst a growing list of internal social and economic challenges exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic. Amid the financial hardship the country is facing, the rise of corruption, the skyrocketing of unemployment rates, and the long-lasting delay of serious political and economic reforms, the authorities seem sensitive, the critics seem encouraged, the people seem nervous, and the country seems more vulnerable than ever.

Supporters of Prince Hamzah and his sympathizers firmly believe that the authorities’ claim of foreign involvement and a collusion between Prince Hamzah and Bassem Awadallah, who is known to be opportunistic and corrupt, is bogus and fabricated. 

They argue that by doing this, the authorities aim to stir confusion, distract the people, and smear the reputation of the prince. Accordingly, pundits representing this camp swiftly excluded a scenario in which foreign actors might be involved or in which Prince Hamzah might have colluded with Awadallah, calling it “nonsense.” While the supporters of Prince Hamzah have no concrete evidence or proof of their argument, their rhetoric is mainly based on the following three assumptions.

First, Prince Hamzah is a nationalist who derives his support from East Bank Jordanians, a population not only incompatible with those who may support Awadallah (of Palestinian origins) but who also have no interest in a plot supported by foreign aid.

Second, Israelis have strong intelligence ties with their Jordanian counterparts and therefore, it would be counterintuitive to get involved in a plot of this kind against King Abdullah.

Several more qualified princes and crown princes were dismissed or demoted from their positions without creating such a ruckus, including the famous and capable former Crown Prince El-Hassan bin Talal, brother of late King Hussein and uncle of Hamzah.

From the perspective of those who would like to consider a possible foreign involvement in the latest turmoil, one main argument is that if the “foreign factor” is fabricated, why would the Jordanian authorities arrest senior figures known to be very close to the Saudi and Emirati authorities? Why would the Jordanian authorities risk seriously jeopardizing their country’s relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi if the whole issue is staged and has no concrete grounds?

Given that there is no lack or shortage of corrupt figures to be used in a staged operation, there is no sensible reason to force the government to do what it did unless there is evidence against those who were arrested.

The fact that Basem Awadallah previously worked as chief of the Royal Hashemite Court means that he has access to sensitive and critical details about the internal situation in Jordan, including which tribes, groups, and figures to contact, utilize, build relations with, pay, etc. In other words, this makes him the Saudi-based version of the infamous UAE-based Mohammad Dahlan.

Moreover, claiming that MBS and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) have no interest in plotting against another monarchy doesn’t add up when we take into consideration the fact that they have shown irrational and irresponsible behavior in the past – until last January, they plotted against Qatar and worked restlessly to overthrow its emir.

During Trump’s era, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Israel, and Jared Kushner put maximum pressure on Jordan and its king to accept the so-called Deal of the Century. Despite the U.S. pressure, King Abdullah refused to bow and thus was seen as a primary obstacle to their grand scheme.

Back in 2017, the aforementioned countries warned King Abdullah of their dissatisfaction with his signs of resistance. At the end of that year, MBS detained Sabih al-Masri, one of the most prominent Jordanian billionaires (of Palestinian roots), chairman of the Arab Bank, and a key player in the Jordanian economy. It is believed that detaining al-Masri was part of a plan to coerce King Abdullah.

At the time, several reports claimed that King Abdullah was summoned to Riyadh and warned not to attend a Muslim summit called by Turkish President Erdoğan to rally the Islamic world against Trump’s decision to recognize Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. King Abdullah turned a deaf ear to these threats and flew directly from Riyadh to Istanbul.

Not only did he attend the summit, but he also stood by Erdoğan’s side in the front row for the photo session. Later, he openly stated that Jordan and himself were under foreign pressure to accept the “Deal of the Century.”

In 2019, Jordan declined to list the Muslim Brotherhood as a terrorist organization despite repeated calls by the Saudi and Emirati authorities to do so. The UAE-Israeli normalization accords at the end of 2020 further undermined the status and role of Jordan. These accords allowed Israel to bypass Amman on the Palestinian issue, the Jerusalem (al-Quds) issue, the peace process, and to disregard its objections and protests.

The relation between Jordan and Israel significantly deteriorated after the Abraham Accords. The Hashimite Kingdom stopped renewing a 25-year-old agreement that granted Israel private land use in Jordan’s al Baqura and Ghamr.

The mere fact that Israel has somehow managed to keep the question of its recognition on the agenda is extraordinary in and of itself. There is no other country in the world that could afford the luxury of abusing any semblance of international law at leisure with calls for “recognition” of its legitimacy still in place.

Yet, since the warming up of ties with the monarchy in the UAE (and other states), the question of recognition has been gaining even more attention. What was once a sacrilege in Pakistan is becoming somewhat less questionable, at least among Pakistanis who see the West as their model. Some respected figures in the media have chosen to propagate the proposal of recognizing Israel vehemently.

But why does the question of Israel’s recognition keep popping up every few days in Pakistan? And what is the nature of pressures on the Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan, including from the U.S. as he suggested in a recent interview?

Of course, Israel has a penchant for working from behind closed doors and its foreign policy seems to be woven around the “fly like a butterfly and sting like a bee” ethos.

Even though it likes to play the card of being the original victim of ethno-religious persecution, Israel takes an eerie pride in covert “operations” – checkered by assassinations around the world – clandestine lobbying through elements in foreign governments, and even the charm offensive which can range from narrative building and subtle mobilization of the comprador classes within a country to the vulgar uses of human flesh, including its own.

So, whether you are a human rights activist, a person of refined artistic disposition, or even a mercenary, the menu has everything on offer, with added blessings from the United States, and not more than an eye roll from the European Union.

Pakistan is one of the countries on the radar of Israel, looking for more clout in the world. Historically, it has lent unflinching support to the Palestinian people – including having sent its pilots during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. At one point, in the mid-80s, Israel is even reported to have planned to strike the nuclear facilities in Pakistan.

You just have to view the Palestinians as “foreign” and inherently problematic people who dispossessed the “Israelis” who “had come first” to the “Promised Land” and who are now creating problems for the “original” owners of the land. Interestingly, even though many of the Palestinian Muslims and Christians may be traced back to what’s referred to as the “Children of Israel” in the Jewish scriptures, it is still deemed virtuous to erase their most basic rights.

Once you’re able to see the unmistakable credibility and consistency of this Israeli tale of the “Promised Land” – a view rejected even by many Jews –   you will get plenty of food for thought to sedate your conscience.

Pressures Facing Pakistani Prime Minister Imran Khan

Pakistan is one of the countries on the radar of Israel, looking for more clout in the world. Historically, it has lent unflinching support to the Palestinian people – including having sent its pilots during the 1967 and 1973 Arab-Israeli wars. At one point, in the mid-80s, Israel is even reported to have planned to strike the nuclear facilities in Pakistan. That kind of cold-blooded animosity has softened over time. But Israel still regards Pakistan as a significant force in the region.

Even though Pakistani PM Khan categorically denied the possibility of recognition of an Israeli state until a “just solution for Palestinians” is achieved, it is intriguing that the question was raised by journalist Kamran Khan, who is widely known for being close to Pakistan’s influential military.

Even though Pakistani PM Khan categorically denied the possibility of recognition of an Israeli state until a “just solution for Palestinians” is achieved, it is intriguing that the question was raised by journalist Kamran Khan, who is widely known for being close to Pakistan’s influential military.

Kamran Khan, who is the president of the Dunya News Group in Pakistan, is a popular TV analyst who boasts a Twitter following of four million. Every few months, he floats a series of tweets encouraging his audience to think about Israeli recognition which kicks off a debate even when there is none.

Some other pro-establishment journalists such as Moeed Peerzada, and more recently, Mubasher Lucman, also like to join the chorus using arguments revolving around realpolitik.

The Role of the Gulf

Interestingly, for at least the last two decades, the most influential cleric in politics, Maulana Fazal-ur-Rehman, who has been reviling Imran Khan for allegedly being “a Jewish undercover agent,” was happy to sit with the leaders of the secular ANP party to lend support to the UAE’s recognition of Israel, giving the move his blessings.

This is the same cleric who for years based his election campaigns on opposition to Israel and whose chief battle cry had been the mobilization against Zionism. What happened overnight that made this dealmaker – if not an outright kingmaker – of Pakistani politics change his mind is something left to the people’s imagination.

Madrasas in Pakistan, including those associated with Fazal-ur-Rehman – of which there are thousands – have the reputation of heavily relying on charity from the Gulf states. This represents a huge segment of the population which has traditionally been fiercely anti-Israel, but whose fervor for the Palestinian cause may just be dampening.

Yet, the influence of the Middle East extends farther than madrasas and the sway they have over religious parties.

Pakistan maintains a close relationship with the Gulf countries at the state level, especially Saudi Arabia – and the UAE of course – because of its reliance on financial aid, subsidized oil, the lion’s share of remittances it gets from expats in both countries, and the significant defense cooperation that bounds the countries together.

Perhaps the most concrete manifestation of the depth of this relationship was the appointment of General Raheel Sharif, ex-chief of the Pakistan Army, as the first commander-in-chief of the Saudi-led “Islamic Military Counter Terrorism Coalition,” which has 41 countries as members. General Sharif assumed the role in May, 2017 and still holds the position today.

No wonder, when in another interview PM Khan was asked to reveal if there were any Muslim countries pressuring him to recognize Israel, he tried to make light of it by telling the interviewer to ask that question once Pakistan had achieved economic independence.

Growing India-Israel Alliance

Another consideration in the relations with Israel is Pakistan’s archrival, India, which has become the 2^nd-largest arms importer in the world behind Saudi Arabia. In the 2014-2019 period, Israel was the 3^rd-largest arms exporter to India, providing 12% of Indian arms imports. “Defense purchases” from Israel account for over $1 billion each year (2019-2020), in addition to the significantly rising research and development collaboration.

When the Indian jets sneaked into Pakistani airspace to conduct a “surgical strike” on an alleged “terrorist camp” in the early hours of February 26, 2019, the Indian press claimed that they had used Israeli-made Rafael Spice-2000 “smart bombs.” The “strike” resulted in the downing of a few trees for which Pakistan lodged a complaint with the UN to express its outrage over hurting “voiceless” flora. The Pakistani military later clarified that no bombs were used, and that the jets had only dropped the payload to fly faster when they were scrambled after.

Nevertheless, the speculations about the use of Israeli weapons by Indian media were not out of the blue. Pakistan is wary of the aggressive collaboration between its neighbor and Israel. Some Pakistanis are of the opinion that bringing Israel around – by recognition – may tone down its cooperation with India, at the same time easing diplomatic pressures on Pakistan, even if this does not result in explicit and immediate defense deals. In addition, it may pave the way for upgrading Pakistan-U.S. defense ties.

Sceptics, however, argue that Israel has already chosen India as its ally in South Asia, and will have limited offers, if any at all, for Pakistan. The U.S.-Pakistan defense cooperation similarly has been losing weight since Pakistan has been tilting towards China for its economic and defense needs; 73 percent of Pakistan’s arms imports came from China in the period of 2015-2019.

This is especially true in the wake of the massive Chinese pledges and ongoing projects under the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) amounting to $62 billion, a flagship project of the massive Chinese Belt and Road Initiative