Georgia Meloni’s accession to power in Italy is seen as a remarkable turning point that has redefined Euro-Mediterranean relations in general and Euro-Tunisian relations in particular. Meloni was sworn in as president of the Council of Ministers on October 22, 2022. Her inauguration caused an uproar and raised questions about the future of the region, particularly in relation to the Italian state’s migration policy. In fact, an important factor to consider is that Meloni is the leader of Brothers of Italy, a direct descendant of Benito Mussolini’s fascist legacy, but she is also one of the iconic figures of the new right in Europe, propagating a strong sense of xenophobia and advancing a sterile populist discourse.

Why Italy? Demystifying the fundamental factors behind the unusual dispute

Geographical proximity

It is no secret that geopolitics is the fundamental parameter defining Italian efforts in the European-Tunisian equation. Separated by only 140 kilometers, Italy’s geographical proximity to Tunisia has a significant impact on the bilateral dynamics between the two strategically important countries. In fact, the implications go beyond the borders of Italy, as they directly affect the European continent. The answer to the question “Why Italy?” is therefore multifaceted and fraught with complications and interpretations. From a strategic point of view, the shared Mediterranean Sea serves as an important route not only for the promotion of trade but also for the movement of people, making migration a key issue in the Italian (and European) approach to Tunisia. It is important to stress that Tunisia has a significant position both as a home for illegal migrants and as a transit country for migrants from beyond the Sahara.

The main reasons for intercountry migration are often human capital-related, but also include asylum seekers fleeing the intense political instability in North African countries. Statistics confirm that more than 5.3% of the total population of the EU comprise migrants of non-European origin, amounting to 23.7 million people from Third World countries. In this context, Tunisia’s influence on the European Union depends more on the uncontrollable influx of immigrants than on trade and economic dynamics.

The number of Tunisian citizens arriving by sea on the island of Lampedusa in southern Italy has fluctuated over the years. In 2019, the number stood at 2,654 and in 2018 at 5,181. In 2021, it peaked with 15,671 arrivals, followed by 2020 with 12,883 arrivals. The statistics prove that the problems caused by the sea are a major incentive for the Italian authorities to work with Tunisia to find a solution.

Tunisia: A route for an alternative energy source for Europe

In conjunction with the previous section, we can conclude that the geographical factor has implications for energy reasons, namely, the dependency between Europe and the southern Mediterranean. It is worth noting that Italy is one of Europe’s largest energy consumers and its proximity to Tunisia, a potential producer of renewable energy (especially solar energy), could be beneficial for the country and for Europe at large.

It is useful for reasons of perspective to compare this approach with the trends in the global power struggle that have taken place since 2021. In this context, the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation is seen as the origin of a number of flaws in the concept of the “balance of power” between the continents.

The European Union is currently facing the direct consequences of its transcontinental policies. Many observers believe that the fighting between the two parties has led to a reshaping of the traditional relationship between the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbors. In particular, the military hostilities has to some extent broken the archaic “asymmetry of interdependence” that the EU has maintained at a steady pace since the signing of the Barcelona Process with Tunisia in 1995. The Russia-Ukraine war has created logistical difficulties for Europe, and given that Tunisia is a strategic partner, facilitating the transit of gas to Europe across the maritime border with Italy, the “Meloni factor” can be justified in the ongoing unrest over the past month.

The Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline and economic cooperation

Known colloquially as “TransMed,” the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline is a 2,475 km natural gas pipeline “allowing the transport of large quantities of high-quality energy” through Tunisia and Sicily. Although Tunisia’s share is comparatively small, it is nevertheless considered to occupy an important position that can solve the energy problem in terms of the European Union’s external interests, as well as securing potential containment solutions to prevent Tunisia’s economic decline. It is crucial to highlight that the European Union is still considered the country’s first economic partner, accounting for 73.8% of total exports, while maintaining rates of 45.5% of Tunisia’s total imports. Moreover, Italy’s role in Tunisia’s foreign policy has increased in economic terms in the post-Jasmine Revolution era. With the introduction of democratic elements, Italy became Tunisia’s leading supplier in 2017, ahead of France.

Italian-Tunisian relations are often seen as a projection of Euro-Tunisian relations, due to the sum of all the factors mentioned above. Put simply, the inter(in)dependence between Tunisia and Italy and/or the European Union is governed by multiple parameters, of which the economy and migration work together to define this web of complexities.

Migration at the heart of European diplomacy: the role of “Meloni” Italy

The strategy of bilateral cooperation is underpinned by a series of diplomatic all-round dialogues and coordination, mediated mainly by Italy, and has witnessed an urgent upsurge that comes to fulfil the legacy of the “shared history, geographical proximity and strong relationship” (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2023) between the European Union and Tunisia. From a European perspective, the problem of migratory flows is seen as a predator lurking behind the bushes and imposes a multitude of complexities on the Euro-Tunisian platform, exemplified by economic, political, and ethnographic difficulties.

The Italian perception of the situation has been translated on two different occasions by Meloni’s courageous efforts. Georgia Meloni first landed on Tunisian soil on June 6 and returned on June 11 to reaffirm the positive European perception of Tunisia, accompanied by European Union President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. The two parties worked out “a memorandum of understanding on the comprehensive partnership package to be approved by Tunisia and the European Union before the end of June 2023” in order to integrate the country into the European efforts to regulate migration. On the other side of the of the coin, President von der Leyen insisted that “against the backdrop of global uncertainties, it is in our common interest to strengthen our relations and invest in stability and prosperity.”

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hen Kais Saied won the landslide elections in Tunisia in 2019, he began to pressure parliament into ceding executive powers that the 2014 constitution had stripped the Presidency of. The constitution made parliament supreme in the country as opposed to the Presidency. Yet, Saied was adamant that he should be the one to appoint his own prime minister and government and should be allowed to rule directly. The elected parliament, in which Rachid Ghannouchi’s Ennahda party were the largest bloc, refused to cede these executive powers and proceeded to try to establish a working majority coalition in parliament that would back a coalition government.

However, Ennahda struggled to form a government and was met with resistance from other parties in parliament such as Tayyar al-Dimoqrati who sought to capitalize on the tension between Saied and Ennahda to demand the interior ministry post. Ennahda’s proposed candidate Habib al-Jimli failed to form a government. As the month designated by the constitution to form a government was approaching its end, Saied and his allies began to threaten to use the constitutional power of calling early elections that would be afforded to Saied after the designated month to form a government had come to an end.

The parties within parliament panicked at the prospect of facing a hostile electorate again and abandoned their polarized positions to come together to form a compromise government. Saied’s preferred candidate for Prime Minister would be accepted, however, the government would be divided between the parties in parliament. Ilyas al-Fakh Fakh was appointed prime minister.

Al-Fakh Fakh, however, did not last long, and was soon accused of corruption. His position became untenable and Ghannouchi moved to reassert the primacy of parliament by mobilizing a vote of no confidence which was read out by a member of Tunisia’s Parliament Issam Bargougui from the Popular Will party. Saied summoned al-Fakh Fakh to the palace on the same day the no confidence motion was read out, and it was announced at the end of the meeting that al-Fakh Fakh had tendered his resignation.

A constitutional debate

This triggered a constitutional debate. If al-Fakh Fakh was removed by a vote of no confidence, then the constitution stipulated that parliament had to present the next candidate. If al-Fakh Fakh resigned, however, the constitution stipulated that the president would appoint the next prime minister. A debate ensued as to whether the no-confidence motion had been submitted first, or the resignation.

In the end, Ennahda ceded to Saied again in order not to fuel further antagonism towards parliament from a hostile population, and Saied appointed his own prime minister Hichem al-Mishishi over which Saied was able to exert much more control.

However, Mishishi soon switched allegiances and began to work more closely with Ghannouchi and Parliament. Mishishi then sacked some of Saied’s loyalists, including the interior minister, and assumed the latter’s position himself alongside his role as Prime Minister. Saied raged at this ‘betrayal’, and it is within this context that he subsequently moved to seize all power, suspended parliament, and suspended the constitution.

Low turnout

However, the turnout for both his referendum and his subsequent ‘elections’ later in the year were abysmally low. The elections in particular saw less than 12% turn out to vote, and almost set a record for the worst-attended election in the history of global democracy. Neither the referendum nor the elections could credibly reinforce the ‘legitimacy’ of his coup internationally and domestically.

The humiliation was not lost on Saied’s supporters, who once again insisted that Saied’s failure to convict the democratically elected Speaker of Parliament Rached Ghannouchi and Saied’s failure to dissolve the most successful democratically elected party in the country would continue to undermine his coup. In other words, the continued freedom of the democratically elected leadership of the largest democratically elected bloc would continue to present a stumbling bloc towards any bid by the coup to establish ‘credible legitimacy’.

The turning point, however, was the notable shift in the stance of Washington which welcomed Saied’s ‘elections’ as a “essential initial step toward restoring the country’s democratic trajectory”. A jubilant Saied immediately moved to arrest former Prime Minister Ali Laareydh (who remains in prison to this day). Noureddine Bheiri, a former justice minister, was detained. The democratically elected member of parliament for the city of Kairouan Sayyed Ferjani was imprisoned.

The sudden surge in arrests and detentions reflected the growing confidence from Kais Saied that his ‘legitimacy’ was being recognized internationally. Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni publicly insisted on the need to help Tunisia secure funding, while Qatar sent a delegation to Kais Saied to discuss investments. The sudden turn in fortunes for Saied internationally resulted in a ramping up of his crackdown, to the extent that Saied openly declared that “any judge who finds [his opponents] innocent will be considered a co-conspirator”.

Why Saied arrested Ghannouchi

It is in this context that Saied moved to arrest Ghannouchi at the first opportunity. A video emerged of Ghannouchi addressing other opposition activists and asserting that “attempts to eradicate any political trend, whether Islamist, or leftist, or socialist, would threaten to plunge the country into civil war”. Media outlets, that have increasingly aligned with the new power dynamics in Tunisia, gave the video relentless coverage with pundits accusing Ghannouchi of ‘inciting civil war’. Ghannouchi’s house was reportedly stormed, and he was taken away. This time, instead of ordering his release, the judge ordered his detention and imprisonment.

International reactions have been rather muted. The White House took 48 hours to release a statement in which the contents suggested it was more protocol than any suggestion of anger at Saied or support for the democratically elected Speaker of Parliament. Moreover, Saied has received a boost in his resistance to the terms of the IMF loan being negotiated as the powerful trade unions, with whom Saied has been wrestling, announced their firm support for Saied’s rejection of the proposed conditions. The U.S. has also indicated it is prepared to revise the terms of the IMF loan deal.

In other words, the arrest and detention of the democratically elected Speaker of parliament, and leader of the most successful democratically elected party, has been met by the international community with relative silence, and instead, greater cooperation with the coup that has toppled the democratic transition. Even as reports emerge of security forces breaking down the doors of Ghannouchi’s family, and embarking on practices reminiscent of the dictatorships of the Ben Ali and Bourguiba regimes, the suggestion is that the international community remains undeterred in its current course of working with the coup.

Saied hopes that now he will finally be able to secure the verdict he has long sought against Ghannouchi. The exact charge of conviction is irrelevant. Saied simply hopes to assert to the Tunisian population and the world that the parliament he suspended and then dissolved was ‘illegitimate’ because the democratically elected Speaker was a ‘criminal’ who should never have been elected. Saied will hope that the conviction of Ghannouchi will finally secure international ‘legitimacy’ and ‘recognition’ for his coup against Tunisia’s democratic transition.

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nti-migrant racism in North Africa was thought to be a taboo, but in reality it never was. Racism against African migrants, coupled with unabashed anti-Black xenophobia, is alive and kicking in North Africa. Tunisian President Kais Saied’s recent comments on February 21 about sub-Saharan migrants surely shocked many people. Saied labelled migrants as “hordes” and a “demographic threat” to his country. Even more, Saied called for “the need to put a rapid end to this immigration,” which, to his view, has become a source of “violence, crime and unacceptable acts.”

For a country like Tunisia, a generator of migrants fleeing to find a better life in Europe, Saied’s speech may seem out of place and contradictory. Doesn’t the European far right, which applauded Saied’s speech, say the same about Muslim migrants?

President Saied’s invective is neither unprecedented nor isolated in the larger geographical area, the Maghreb. From Morocco to Libya, passing through Mauritania, Algeria and, of course, Tunisia, hateful allegations are not only the prerogative of what some people there call the “little people” to whom we could add the “uncultured” or the “intolerant.” In the upper echelons, at the highest level of the Maghreb states, the same ideas circulate.

For this discourse is not new. Since the Maghreb became the exit door for migrants from Africa to reach the fabled El Dorado, Europe, this immense territory has been transformed into a huge waiting room for tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of sub-Saharan migrants unable to reach the European coast. A waiting room that has turned into an open-air prison over time. Especially since, to curb this migration flow, the European Union outsourced its borders and entrusted their guarding to the Maghreb states by rewarding them financially, diplomatically, or both.

A migrant mass

The direct consequence of this strong policy of containment has been the creation of a migrant mass that has settled permanently in the Maghreb and lives on the fringes of society, waiting for a passage to Europe. It has also caused inevitable impoverishment and generated the phenomenon of criminalization that no one questions, especially not the local population in contact with migrants.

It is important to understand that as long as migrants were only crossing the territory, they were tolerated. It was only when they were prevented from doing so that their presence began to pose a problem and the old demon of racism resurfaced.

Over the past twenty years, many serious and sometimes bloody incidents have taken place against migrants in North Africa, without being properly reported by the press. Police raids followed by robberies and humiliations, assaults, lynching organized by neighborhood lords or angry citizens, and even rapes have targeted this vulnerable population.

Racism is as old as the world and knows no borders. The Maghrebi expressions for Black people, “âzzi” (black), “kahlouche” (negro), “âbid” (slave), or “oussif” (slave, servant), which have been heard with force recently, are not new and are not a relic of colonialism. As far back as the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun, a historian of Arab descent born in Tunis, wrote that “the only peoples who accept slavery are the negroes, because of their lower degree of humanity, their place being closer to that of the animal.”

Legacy of French colonization

These expressions are therefore the fruit of a mentality that predates the French colonization of Algeria and Mauritania, the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and the Italian occupation of Libya. What has changed is the violence of words and actions.

In 2012, the Moroccan weekly Maroc Hebdo devoted an entire dossier to the “Black Peril,” attacking without embellishment those who “live by begging, engage in drug trafficking and prostitution” and “pose a human and security problem for the country.” On Moroccan social media, there are regular calls for the expulsion of African migrants, the closure of borders, and the banning of mixed marriages in order to preserve an improbable “purity of the Moroccan race.”

On the other side of the border, in Algeria, a hashtag on Twitter resurfaces from time to time (in Arabic), #NotoAfricansinAlgeria, which immediately sets the world on fire by calling for the hunting down and deportation of migrants. Sometimes, the creators of these hateful messages deliberately confuse Black migrants with Black North African citizens. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Egyptian border, there is a Black Maghrebi population whose ancestors were slaves or settled in North Africa several centuries ago. They are certainly citizens, but they are still considered second-class ones.

A few years ago, in 2016, a Black model of Algerian nationality, Amina Hamouine, had to face an extraordinary campaign of hatred because she had the idea, or the “bad idea” as her detractors would say, of being photographed wearing a Kabyle dress—the Kabyle people are Berbers from the region of Kabylia. This was an unforgivable mistake for those who identify the Kabyle woman from the whiteness of her skin.

Too Black?

Recently, Khadidja Benhamou, an Algerian citizen from Adrar in the south of the country, was deemed “too Black” to wear the crown of Miss Algeria 2019—her skin color did not represent all Algerians, it seems.

But it is not only the “little people” who indulge in these feelings that sociologists and anthropologists call “systemic negrophobia.” Some Algerian leaders do as well. In 2017, five years before the Tunisian president’s remarks, senior officials of Algiers, which has a virulent anti-colonial past, were not kind to migrants either.

Ahmed Ouyahia, an Algerian politician who has been appointed prime minister ten times—an absolute record— and who at the time was head of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s cabinet as a minister of state, described African migrants on the private television station Ennahar TV as “[t]hese illegal foreigners bring[ing] crime, drugs and several other scourges.” At the time, Ouyahia was the secretary general of the National Democratic Rally (RND), one of the two crutches, along with the National Liberation Front (FLN), that support the government in Algeria.

His words were echoed and amplified a few days later by Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel, who identified the arrival of sub-Saharans in the country as a “threat to national security.”

But the ultimate horror was reached again in 2017 in Libya, when footage filmed by CNN journalists revealed to the world the unimaginable in the 21st century: an auction of migrants from Nigeria at a market near Tripoli.

Anti-racism laws

To counter this unfortunate litany of racist acts, Tunisia passed a law in 2018 penalizing racism and established January 23 as the “National Day for the Abolition of Slavery.” However, the 2018 law, historical, innovative, and the first of its kind in the Arab world, was annihilated by the verbal outrage of President Saied on February 21, 2023, when he evoked a “criminal plan prepared at the beginning of this century to change the demographic composition of Tunisia” and whose objective was to transform the country into an “African-only country” and to remove its “Arab Muslim” identity.

Of course, one can try to nuance this reality by recalling, for example, the decision of the Moroccan authorities to launch campaigns to issue resident permits, such as in 2014, which initially resulted in the regularization of 25,000 undocumented migrants. It can also be argued that, like Tunisia, Algeria adopted a law criminalizing racial discrimination in 2020. But these gestures of goodwill have little impact if they are not followed by campaigns to educate the local population on the need to accept the “other.” Campaigns that television stations refused to broadcast, as was the case in Morocco.

All crises, whether economic or security-based, produce exasperation that ends up finding a scapegoat, and African migrants have become the ideal candidates. They pay for the economic crisis and the criminal behavior of a minority in their own community.

As a scapegoat, they also pay the price for some of the services rendered by the Maghreb states to Europeans: to showcase its status as a paid gendarme of the European Commission, Morocco got carried away by its destructive zeal on June 24, 2022, when it violently curtailed an attempt by several hundred migrants, mostly Sudanese, citizens of a “brotherly Arab” country, to force their way into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory.

EU responsibility

The result—24 dead according to the Moroccan authorities, 37 according to a local association, not counting the missing—has not only tarnished Morocco’s image in Africa but also revealed another problem that is worth studying. In which state in the world, except for the former East Germany and the now defunct Berlin Wall and migrants escaping war to Greece and Italy, are dozens of people killed to prevent them from leaving a country that is not theirs to seek refuge elsewhere?

A tragedy that ended with a congratulatory gesture worthy of the former East Germany, as the president of the Spanish government, Pedro Sánchez, praised the brutal intervention of the Moroccan police force.

Finally, the European Union’s migration policy, which consists of preventing human beings from moving freely, by force if necessary, has helped this local outbreak of racism and intolerance, and dynamited several principles, some of them religious, that were thought to be immutable.

Pan-Africanism, the egalitarian and anti-slavery utopia propagated in most of the post-independence Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, has come to an end. The myth introduced by these countries of an integrating Islam that makes no distinction between a white and a Black person has been shattered. Despite many migrants adhering to Islam, they are treated as strangers to the Ummah.

There is some striking footage on Tunisian national television and the official Facebook page of the Tunisian Presidency showing scenes of Kais Saied‘s commemoration of Martyrs’ Day in Tunisia on April 9, 2022. He was filmed speaking to the leaders of the land, sea, and air forces in Tunisia, defending the coup he carried out on July 25, and portraying it as a response to the popular will. The generals were seen listening to him with full concentration, appearing to approve of what he said.

There is no doubt that these pictures were a deliberate message from Saied to his opponents at home and his critics abroad, emphasizing that he has the support of the armed forces, and will continue to carry out his coup unperturbed. Days earlier, on the evening of March 30, Saied had appeared on television from his office at Carthage Palace, also in the presence of army commanders, announcing the dissolution of the Tunisian parliament.

March 30, 2022 was a very important day in Tunisian politics. The Tunisian parliament succeeded for the first time since Saied’s declaration of its suspension last year to hold a virtual session with the presence of more than half of its members and voted on a new law abolishing and annulling all orders and decrees issued by Saied since the coup.

The online parliamentary session captured the attention of local and international media, many of which broadcasted the entire proceedings which lasted several hours. The session itself represented a clear defiance of Saied’s coup, and laid bare Saied’s violation of the constitution and violation of the law. The session was also significant as it refocused attention back to the parliament as an existing legitimate institution of authority in parallel to that exercised by Saied, the parliament being constitutionally and legally greater.

Saied was unable to bear this situation even for a few hours, and appeared on the same evening in a televised speech announcing to the leaders and officials of the armed forces that he had decided to dissolve parliament with immediate effect, despite publicly telling the National Security Council in a televised meeting two days earlier that he did not constitutionally have the power to do so. Saied had said something similar on the day he announced his coup last July.

It is in this context that the scenes of April 9, where Saied addressed the armed forces’ officers, are important. After being rattled by the parliamentary session that voted to end his emergency rule and annul his emergency measures, Saied sought to send a clear message: the armed forces are with me and support my decisions, and therefore, I will do whatever I want.

There is also Rashid Ghannouchi’s own personality and presence as a speaker of parliament and president of Ennahda, and as a person with a special status and long history in Tunisian politics, when by comparison, Kais Saied has virtually none. Ghannouchi is acting with reason and wisdom, while adopting a clear position that rejects the coup, and considers it a rebellion and a departure from the constitution.

Saied could have downplayed the importance of his opponents if his management of the country’s social, financial, and economic affairs had worked and improved Tunisians’ lives. But it has not. The financial, economic, and social situation in Tunisia today is worse than it was before the coup. These are facts that most Tunisians agree on, just as they agree that there does not seem to be any solution on the horizon.

As for international positions on the coup, so far Saied has found no real financial backers to rely on in the manner Abdel Fattah al-Sisi was able to in Egypt. Al-Sisi found reliable allies in Saudi Arabia and the UAE that supported his government with large sums of money from 2013 to the present.

If we consider all these facts and elements of the current political situation in Tunisia, we can say that the coup is facing real difficulties, but that it greatly benefits from the silence of army leaders and the support of the Tunisian General Labor Union. Meanwhile, the opposition has been able to maintain its presence and strengthened its moral authority by the decision of the parliament, which abolished Saied’s orders and decrees. It is also clear that neither Saied nor his opponents is capable of achieving a decisive victory in this battle.

My personal opinion is that the coup represents a major threat to Tunisia’s democracy, stability, and national unity. If its opponents want to overcome it and put a peaceful end to it, they should form a broad political front with a political platform that opposes the abolition or the change of the constitution before a representative parliament is freely elected. The opposition should agree and insist that early legislative and presidential elections must be held as soon as possible.

There are some opponents of the coup who want to take the opportunity to change the constitution now, before going to the elections. I see this as another coup. We must uphold the right democratic principles and the rule of law. Otherwise, I fear that Tunisia will fall into a dark hole for a long time to come, something that all Tunisians ought to reject and do their utmost to prevent.

The death toll has increased to 25 as Tunisian officials found five new bodies of migrants who lost their lives off the Tunisian coasts on their way to Europe. The bodies were found on March 18 and 19, 2022.

The total number of migrant deaths involved in the incident is unknown as there is no information on the number of people who were in the capsized boat, while the search for survivors continues by the Tunisian authorities.

The bodies of dead migrants washed up on Nabeul Beach, to the northeast of the country.

“Migration remains relatively muted in Tunisia, despite its increased popularity as a transit country and the growing number of people drowning off its coasts,” Michela Pugliese, a migration and asylum researcher at Euro-Med Human Rights Monitor, told Politics Today.

Many refugees choose Libya and Tunisia as points of departure for Europe. According to the International Organization of Migration (IOM), at least 348 migrants and asylum seekers have died or gone missing in 2021, joining over 23,000 others who have lost their lives since 2014.

The busiest and deadliest migration route to Europe

Many migrants use the Central Mediterranean route to reach Italy. In 2020, according to the UNHCR, 34,154 people arrived in Italy. Reports show that over 88,000 migrants arrived in Europe via the Mediterranean in 2021.

According to the IOM, 348 people have died or gone missing by the end of February 2022.

Thousands of North African and Middle Eastern refugees and asylum seekers try crossing the Mediterranean every year as a result of poverty and conflict in their home countries.

According to the European Council’s data published in February 2022, Bangladeshis and Egyptians use the Central Mediterranean route from North Africa via Tunisia to reach Italy (Europe).

The asylum researcher told Politics Today that “half of the EU member states consider Tunisia a ‘safe country of origin,’ meaning that when Tunisian nationals reach Europe, they tend to be quickly repatriated and their asylum claims impatiently rejected. What Europe mainly does for migrants leaving Tunisia is provide support to the authorities to increase their capacity to prevent migrants’ departures.”

“In reality, through forced returns, border externalizations, and bilateral agreements, Europe is committed to containing migration and systematically denying the right to seek asylum for people coming from Africa, while safeguarding the rights of Ukrainian refugees,” Pugliese concluded.

Tunisia is in a cascading political crisis which continues to to deteriorate rapidly. The latest sign of this is the huge security operation that was deployed against the January 14 demonstration in the center of the capital, Tunis, and which prevented the demonstrators from entering Avenue Habib Bourguiba, or “Revolution Street” as it is called by the regime opponents.

The Tunisian political scene seems open to various scenarios. Where before the coup, previous governments had failed abysmally to deliver on the aspirations of the Tunisian people, especially the youth and the poor, it has become abundantly clear since Saied’s coup that his administration and government advisers have only managed to exacerbate and worsen the rapidly deteriorating economic and social conditions across the country – in addition to overthrowing the democratic process.

In the past few weeks, Saied shocked the public opinion by engineering a four-year prison sentence against former president Moncef Marzouki for allegedly lobbying against Tunisia and the Francophone summit that was scheduled to be held in Djerba last year.

Ironically, and to the bewilderment of public opinion, Saied denied he had played any role in the sentencing of Marzouki, despite ordering the justice minister in front of live cameras on live television on October 30, 2021 to open a judicial investigation into Marzouki on the charge of high treason, adding that Marzouki “had joined the ranks of the enemies of the state.”

Then came the spectacularly public scandal of the kidnapping of the former minister of justice and vice-president of the Ennahda Movement, the largest party in parliament, Noureddine Bhiri. Having failed to persuade the judiciary to issue an arrest warrant for Bhiri on the charge of violating the laws of the land, Kais Saied decided to resort to illegal methods reminiscent of the behavior of armed militias in failed states.

Large sections of ordinary, apolitical citizens in Tunisia have not been especially bothered or concerned with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saied regime.

Bhiri was violently kidnapped a few yards from his home and transferred to a secret detention center. The move drew widespread political anger and condemnation, not only in the ranks of the Ennahda party, but also from across the political spectrum, from human rights activists and international organizations.

It should be stressed however that large sections of ordinary, apolitical citizens in Tunisia have not been especially bothered or concerned with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saied regime. The primary reason for this is the overwhelming preoccupation with the dire economic conditions that continue to deteriorate.

Despite these difficulties and challenges, Saied has decided to begin implementing his plans to change the constitution and the political system unilaterally in Tunisia. He has established an electronic consultation platform that he insists will engage the population in his plans for reforms. He has also announced that a constitutional referendum will be held on July 25, 2022, and then legislative elections on December 17, 2022 on the basis of the new constitution. Saied has hinted that the elections will not be supervised by the Independent Election Commission for which he has openly expressed disdain.

Saied has decided to begin implementing his plans to change the constitution and the political system unilaterally in Tunisia.

However, most political parties in Tunisia have called on the people to boycott this electronic consultation. Moreover, many people in Tunisia do not have the ability or access to participate in such a consultation, or the technical skills necessary even if they wanted to. This means that in reality, Saied is effectively using the electronic platform as a cover to make changes according to his own whims and desires, while knowing full well that such a process will not be recognized by the country’s political class. In other words, Saied’s “process” will only serve to deepen the constitutional and legal crises in the country.

Tunisia is at a crossroads. On the one hand, there is Saied’s individual and totalitarian project that threatens a return to the days of tyranny. On the other, there are the forces of political and civil society seeking to restore democracy, constitutional legitimacy, and the rule of law.

Support for Saied is decreasing day by day as the reality becomes clear to the people. There are no longer any prominent political groups that support the coup except for a pan-Arab nationalist-oriented political trend that only serves to remind people of the bitter experiences of tyranny that Arab populations have endured under regimes that touted nationalist slogans.

Meanwhile, the camp of the civilian democratic forces is growing in number, and there are increasing efforts to unite its components on a common political program that will enhance the chances of defeating the political coup and rescuing Tunisia from its clutches.

There is no doubt that the situation in Tunisia was bad before Kais Saied’s coup; however, it is even clearer that it is has become worse since the coup. Autocracy, combining all the powers in the hands of one person, is not the solution to the difficulties facing the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia.

Tunisians now find themselves facing a historical political battle to decide their fate, and to regain their freedom and dignity. There must be no doubt that to remain silent on what Saied is doing to democracy, the constitution, the rule of law, and the state institutions, will sooner or later bring the roof tumbling down on everyone’s heads.

When the news circulated that Morocco’s leading political group, the Development and Justice Party (PJD), has been trounced in the latest elections, held in September, official media mouthpieces in Egypt celebrated the news as if the PJD’s defeat was, in itself, a blow to the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement. Regionally, political commentators who dedicated much of their time to discredit various Islamic political parties – often on behalf of one Arab government or another – found in the news another supposed proof that political Islam is a failure in both theory and practice.

“Regionally, the news of the (PJD) failure was greeted with jubilation,” Magdi Abdelhadi wrote on the BBC English website. “Commentators regarded the fall of PJD as the final nail in the coffin of political Islam,” he added.

Missing from such sweeping declarations is that those who greeted the defeat of the PJD with ‘jubilation’ are mostly the very crowd that dismissed political Islam even during its unprecedented surge following the ‘Arab Spring’ in 2011; and the same intellectual mercenaries who unashamedly continue to sing the praises of such dictators as General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi in Egypt and the various Arab monarchs in the Gulf.

The PJD was not only defeated but almost completely demolished as a result of the vote, saving only 12 seats from the 125 seats it had obtained after the 2016 elections. The reasons behind such failure, however, are being misconstrued by various entities, governments and individuals with the aim of settling old scores and tarnishing political rivals. The ultimate objective here is to cement the status quo where the fate of Arab nations remains in the grip of brutal, corrupt and self-aggrandizing rulers, with no tolerance for genuine political plurality and democracy.

Those who insist on viewing Arab and Middle Eastern politics through generalized, academic notions have also found in the outcome of the Moroccan elections a perfect opportunity to delve further into sweeping statements. These knee-jerk, cliched reactions were boosted by the ongoing political crisis in Tunisia, the main victim of which, aside from Tunisian democracy, is the Ennahda Islamic party.

Democracy Crisis in Tunisia

On July 25, Tunisian President Kais Saied began a series of measures that effectively dismantled the country’s entire democratic infrastructure, while concentrating all powers into his hands.

Taking advantage of the poor performances and endemic dysfunction of the country’s major political parties, including Ennahda, as well as the festering economic crisis and the growing dissatisfaction among ordinary Tunisians, Saied justified his actions as a way “to save the state and society.”

Deterministic vs Dynamic Politics 

When the Arab Spring first began, starting in Tunisia in early 2011, it seemed that the fall of dictators and the rise of democracy was inevitable; also certain seemed the rise of Islamic parties, which has, indeed, registered substantial victories in various democratic elections throughout the Middle East and North Africa. Egypt’s Freedom and Justice Party (FJP) – which was founded by the country’s Muslim Brotherhood Movement – won 37 percent of the votes in the parliamentary election in 2011; Morocco’s PJD secured over 25 percent of available seats in the parliament, while Ennahda obtained 89 of 217 seats.

Then, it was common to discuss Islamic parties as if they are all branches of the same ideological – in fact, in the view of some – even political movement. ‘Political Islam’ became synonymous with the ‘Arab Spring’. Some saw this as an opportunity for ‘moderate’ Muslims – marginalized, exiled and often tortured and killed – to finally claim what is rightfully theirs; others, namely Israeli and right-wing western intellectuals and politicians, decried what they saw as an ‘Islamic Winter’, claiming that democracy and Islam would espouse an even greater anti-western and anti-Israeli sentiment.

Often missing from most of these discussions is the national context, under which all Arab politics, whether Islamic-leaning or otherwise, operate. In Morocco, for example, King Mohammed VI played his own political game to ensure the survival of the monarchy in the age of democratization. He quickly drew the Islamists nearer to him, offered a veneer of democracy, while practically holding on to all aspects of power.

Though it will take time to reach a conclusive analysis, it is possible that the PJD’s downfall was a result of its willingness to compromise on its declared principles in exchange for a very limited share of power. Indeed, at times, it seemed as if the Islamic party, elected to steer the country away from the rule of a single individual, was serving the role of the King’s official political party. This was manifested in the PJD’s acceptance and eventual endorsement of Morocco’s normalization of ties with the State of Israel in December 2020.

The Islamists’ recent defeat in Morocco, however, must not be viewed as a crisis in political Islam, for the latter is a theoretical concept that is in constant flux and is open to various, often radically opposing interpretations by different scholars and under different historical contexts.

While the PJD, for example, signed off to the King’s normalization with Israel, Ennahda vehemently rejected it. Indeed, each Islamic party seems to behave according to different sets of priorities that are unique to that party, to its socio-economic setting, political objective and, ultimately, to its own unique interests.

Let me be clear from the beginning: what happened in Tunisia on July 25, 2021 is a coup against the constitution. There is no doubt about it and no argument.

As for the decision of the coup, it was not taken in haste on the Sunday before last nor was it a reaction to the widespread protests taking place that day. There is no doubt that Kais Saied has been planning this coup from at least the beginning of this year, which means that he had already consulted with the army leadership and secured the necessary support before taking these drastic measures.

There is no direct material evidence that there is any foreign involvement in Saied’s decision to embark on this coup. However, there is an important question to be asked: Kais Saied is over sixty years of age, a university lecturer, and was able to win the presidential elections. Is it reasonable to believe that he would suspend the parliament and move to monopolize all of the state’s power in his hands without having coordinated in advance with foreign powers such as the French president to secure international support, and then with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure the necessary financial support to cement his coup?

Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the international response to the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first public words on the coup were, “I had a good call with President Kais Saied.”

These words indicate that the U.S. administration will not seriously obstruct Saied’s plans to change the political course in Tunisia. The Americans are not interested much in competing with France for influence in Tunisia, and have far more important issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, and COVID-19.

The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is significant popular support for Saied’s decisions. The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011. Over the course of the past two years, the newly elected parliament, and the two governments which were bestowed with its vote of confidence, have resoundingly failed to improve the lives of ordinary citizens – just as the previous governments before it. The situation has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic that has ripped through the country with devastating impact.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has, of course, significant effects at home, as well as in Tunisia’s regional surroundings, particularly with regards to neighboring Libya. Among the countries that supported Saied’s measures immediately after they were announced, are two countries that have great interests in Libya, which outweigh their interests in Tunisia – namely, Egypt and the UAE.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has significant effects at home as well as in Libya.

The leaders of both countries fully understand that Tunisia is a lifeline for the Tripoli government, and that if a regime closer to them is established in Tunis, and they have a tangible influence on it, it will be possible to tighten the noose around the Tripoli government in coordination with their ally Haftar who is ever-present in the east.

Two years ago, Khalifa Haftar was about to enter Tripoli victorious, after he had besieged it with the support of Egypt and the UAE. But, Turkish support and an open border with Tunisia, where the Ennahda movement has enjoyed an advanced political position, saved Tripoli and its rulers from defeat.

But now that Ennahda has been removed from power with the coup of Saied, Egypt and the UAE may hope that what they failed to accomplish in 2019 can now be achieved in coordination with a friendly regime in Tunisia, and with more support for their ambitious Libyan ally, General Hafter.

Of course, the governments of Egypt and the UAE also have a strong alliance with France, with whom they share mutual interests and cooperation on regional issues, and in particular Libya: oil for France; the employment of Egyptian workers and the granting of construction contracts to Egyptian companies for the el-Sisi regime; and uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and ending its presence in Libya for the UAE (which Egypt and France also want to see).

It is very clear, then, that the Tunisian coup has a strong relationship with the Libyan issue. This naturally leads us to consider Algeria, Tunisia’s most important neighbor, and how it will react to the Tunisian coup and its repercussions in the region.

There are no official Algerian statements that can be relied on to know the actual mood among Algerian policymakers. However, there was a call between the Tunisian and Algerian presidents on July 26 and a visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Tunisia the next day, during which he met with Saied.

Algerian comments on social media and press leaks indicate that Algeria will not accept the control of Tunisian foreign policy by Egypt and the UAE – a control that would seek to facilitate Haftar’s bid to gain control of all of Libya’s regions. Algeria views Haftar as an opponent, and he, in turn, reciprocates this stance. Algeria also sees the UAE as an antagonist in the region. Abu Dhabi has established a consulate in the disputed Western Sahara, much to the chagrin of Algiers. Coupled with the normalization of ties with Israel, the intention of the UAE to flex against Algeria by drawing on international support in favor of Morocco is clear.

On this basis, Algeria may put pressure on Saied not to dissolve parliament and not to overextend the period afforded to him to wield emergency powers in order to preserve the position of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, and thereby to ensure there is a check on the governments of Egypt and the UAE that prevents them from exercising influence on the foreign policy of Tunisia.

Recently, there have been a number of high-profile meetings between the leadership of Libya’s Government of National Unity [GNU] and that of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Besides hosting discussions and affirming their support for the political transition and further cooperation on security, several economic deals have been announced.

Libya and Algeria agreed to resume flights, reopen land borders and launch maritime lines and on the measures to boost trade and investment. Following a visit at the end of May by Tunisia’s Prime Minister, Libya and Tunisia concurred on facilitating border crossings. Morocco just hosted another round of intra-Libyan talks.

While to some, this may seem like a new tangent for Libya’s complicated foreign policy, it is actually a logical and healthy continuation of previous initiatives. Proximity, shared culture, interdependence and shared threats give the countries of the Maghreb common interests. Despite some different circumstances and the intense rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, all three countries have tried to appear neutral and offer constructive diplomatic assistance while attempting to limit any contagion to their own fragile situations.

Historical Context

Besides geography, the countries of the Maghreb share a lot of culture and history. In more recent times, the late Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi attempted coups against the leaders of both Morocco and Tunisia as part of his numerous, failed attempts at a larger union. There has also been discord between other members, notably Algeria and Morocco, who have longstanding differences, especially over the fate of the Western Sahara.

Despite all this, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia established the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 to promote cooperation and economic integration. However, the issues that divided them proved too difficult to overcome and the organization quickly became dormant. Initially the poorest country in the region, the discovery of oil in the 1950s made Libya the richest nation and therefore an important economic motor for the whole Maghreb. Despite this new wealth, Qaddafi’s quixotic governance meant that Libyans often depended on their neighbors for goods and services.

Plenty to Deal with at Home

Besides good intentions, these three western neighbors may also have had domestic considerations for not getting involved militarily in the Libyan conflict. Without a source of considerable outside financing, it would have been very costly to start an unnecessary foreign adventure and these countries had plenty of drama to deal with. Having overthrown the authoritarian rule of President Zine el-Abidine Ben, Tunisia was going through many growing pains with its more open politics.

There was intense competition between Islamist and more secular parties. A truth commission appointed to investigate human rights violations of previous regimes accused President Beji Caid Essebsi of committing crimes while serving in the government of Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi died while in office in 2019. The process to replace him was somewhat ambiguous and a formal constitutional court had yet to be established.

Algeria had gone through its own civil war from 1991-2002 and had remained under emergency law until 2011. During the period of the Libyan crisis, long-time President Bouteflika had serious health problems and there were numerous protests demanding more freedom and political change. Following massive street protests, Bouteflika resigned in 2019.

Morocco has continued to deal with its conflict in Western Sahara with the Polisario Front, which rejects its 1975 annexation of the territory.  Following the Arab Spring, Morocco engaged in its own reform program. While avoiding the intense disturbances of many of its neighbors, some tensions have remained.

Common Security Worries

Besides the issues that they have sometimes foisted on each other, the Maghreb countries share many other concerns like radical cross-border groups and pressure by the European Union to stem the flow of migrants. People also flow within the region. After the fall of Qaddafi, an estimated 200-400,000 Libyans decamped to Tunisia [out of a population of around 11 million].

Several thousand Tunisians fought for jihadist groups in the Middle East or Libya between 2011 and 2016. Besides being the closest major theatre of operations, Libya also served as a launching pad for attacks like that of Daesh attack on the border town of Ben Guerdane, allegedly motivated by an air attack on its training base.

Tunisia reinforced its patrols and built a sand barrier covering 168 of the 468 kilometres of its porous border with Libya. An estimated 600 Tunisian extremist jihadis are reckoned to remain in Libya, primarily in the south. Others continue to fight in other countries, including the nearby Sahel region. Though reduced, the threat has not disappeared but the security restrictions are a heavy burden on the economy, particularly for pastoralists and other border communities.

Like Tunisia, Algeria shares a border with Libya and has been worried about infiltration by  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] like the attack on gas facilities at Ain Amenas and a possible return of radicalized Tuaregs who had served in Qaddafi’s paramilitary “Islamic Legion” such as happened in Mali. The Government reinforced its border with Libya by deploying an additional 30-40,000 troops but like Tunisia, it also has to worry about security restrictions disturbing border livelihoods.

Morocco does not share a border with Libya, but some recruitment of fighters to go to Libya is alleged to have taken place there.

Also… The Sahel

While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are concerned by issues in Libya, it is worth remembering that the southern part of Algeria is in the Sahel region and Morocco is close by, if not formally part of it. Several countries of the Sahel are experiencing serious problems of violent Jihadi attacks, inter-ethnic conflict and coups besides chronic issues of extreme poverty and climate change.

Even though they not among the most affected, the Maghreb nations must be watchful of threats and spillover coming from the Sahel as well. Morocco has started to take a keen interest in developments and has started to play a role in the G5 Sahel force.

Let it be clear to the public: there is no doubt that Tunisian democracy has been in a serious crisis for some time, although this article focuses on the events of the first weeks of 2021.

On Tuesday, February 2, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied visited the Interior Ministry, then toured the capital’s main street and heard people chanting for him to dissolve parliament.

Two weeks prior, the president addressed a number of citizens at a café in a popular neighborhood on the outskirts of the capital, and posted a video of his meeting with them on the official page of the Presidency. In it, people can be heard calling for him to dissolve parliament and all political parties.

Prior to this, Mohammad Abbou a former minister who met with the Tunisian president had publicly called for the army to be deployed in the cities, claiming these extraordinary measures are needed to combat what he considers the corruption of the political class.

There is now a serious constitutional crisis in Tunisia. On January 26, 2021, the Tunisian Parliament approved the inclusion of a number of ministers in the government of Hisham al-Meshichi with a large majority of nearly two-thirds.

However, President Kais Saied refused to swear them into office by allowing them to take the oath, a constitutional prerequisite for ministers to be able to carry out their duties officially.

This is an unprecedented dilemma, especially since the constitution has not anticipated that the president might refuse to confirm and deal with ministers approved by the constitutionally more powerful parliament.

Parliament Speaker and Ennahda President Rachid Ghannouchi said that in the future Tunisia should move towards a fully parliamentary system in which the president is a symbol of the state without any executive powers. His statement poured oil on the flames of the ongoing dispute between him and President Kais Saied and his supporters.

Behind this conflict lies President Kais Saied’s hostile attitude towards the political system in general and the way in which powers are divided in Tunisia’s 2014 constitution. Even before he was elected president, Kais Saied declared his aversion to partisan political representation, and refused to form any political party.

Throughout this political and constitutional crisis in Tunisia, Kais Saied has spoken with an undeniable self-confidence, and does not hide his negative and unfriendly view of the presidents of parliament and the government.

He constantly reiterates that he is ready to make “the right decision at the right time.” The majority of people understand the term “right decision” as dissolving parliament and preparing for new elections later in a new electoral system.

Public anger has turned to parliament because it is the one that gives legitimacy to Tunisian governments under the new constitution.

One might ask: why are people in Tunisia talking about dissolving parliament as if it were normal and acceptable? Isn’t the elected parliament the symbol of Tunisia’s democratic experience and the cornerstone of its political system in accordance with the country’s constitution, which was agreed upon after the revolution?

Unfortunately, the answer is that the failure of successive Tunisian governments since the December 17 revolution to achieve the social aspirations of the people, primarily employment and the fight against poverty, has made large segments of the population no longer care about the survival or demise of democracy. Public anger has turned to parliament because it is the one that gives legitimacy to Tunisian governments under the new constitution.

That second important reason is the growing anger towards the Ennahda party, the largest political force in the country and in successive governments over the past decade. Ennahda is a party with a sizeable backing, that came out on top at the 2019 legislative elections, winning 52 of the 217 seats. But for many of those who did not vote for it, their common denominator today is their desire to remove Ennahda from power.

Since Ennahda is the number one force in parliament today, and is seen as supporting the government of Hisham al-Meshishi with two other parties allied to it, the anti-Ennahda camp does not mind dissolving parliament as it means removing Ennahda from power.

For them, the democracy that put Ennahda in control of the country’s destiny and did not succeed in solving the country’s economic and social problems is not worth defending or shedding any tears over. Among them, of course, are the ideological enemies of Ennahda who cannot beat it in the polls, and believe that any other political order is better than one led by Ennahda.

Kais Saied knows all this and knows that he enjoys a broad popular support in Tunisia, more than Ennahda and any other politician in the country. He has also been able to find allies from within parliament, particularly through the Democratic Current party and the People’s Movement. He knows that if he dissolves parliament, the people will not shed any tears over it and he will not be attacked by influential media inside Tunisia.

Kais Saied also knows that although Democrats have regained power in Washington, governments such as France, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE will stand by him firmly if he makes such a move. His main problem, however, is that Tunisia’s current constitution does not allow him to dissolve parliament.

According to the constitution of Tunisia, if the prime minister in charge after the elections fails to win the confidence of parliament, the president assigns someone else to form the government. Only if this person does not have the confidence of parliament, does the president then have the right to dissolve parliament and call early elections.

This scenario is not currently available to President Kais Saied, as the government of Hisham al-Meshishi has the support of nearly two-thirds of the members of the People’s Assembly.