Japanese policy-makers have jumped at the Ukraine crisis as an opportunity to boost the country’s credentials as a reliable member of the Western alliance—a goal stated clearly at every juncture. Japan was quick to adopt sanctions in line with the United States, and has stressed at every turn that it stands shoulder to shoulder with its international partners in the West.

Japan at first balked at the prospect of stopping the import of Russian oil, but by that time so had the Europeans, so clearly a calculation was made that Japan would not stand out on that issue. Japan also quickly changed its restrictions on weapons exports (which had prohibited exports to a country engaged in conflict) to allow it to send defensive equipment such as bulletproof vests to Ukrainian forces.

Japan even announced it would admit refugees from Ukraine, a significant move since for decades the country has been criticized for flouting international norms of refugee protection—and was criticized by G7 partners for its stated reluctance to accept Syrian refugees during the 2015 crisis.

As of March 13, 2022, the number of Ukrainian refugees brought to Japan totaled a paltry 47 persons, but the political will appears clear.

The Ukrainian crisis as an opportunity for Japan

That Japan would see the Ukrainian crisis as an opportunity is not surprising. Geographically far from the fighting, the chances of Japan being destabilized from the conflict are slim. Economic relations with Russia are meaningful in terms of oil and other energy resources, but Russia is far from being a major source for Japan, with the country relying on West Asia for nearly 90 percent of its oil.

Bilateral relations are dominated by the dispute over the Kuril Islands, which Japan insists on referring to as the “Northern Territories,” but negotiations on that issue have been going nowhere for some time. On that front, a weakened Russia can only benefit Japan.

More to the point, however, the Japanese political elite has banked heavily on the military alliance with the United States, as a bulwark against China and a means towards regaining economic hegemony in the region. Those who honestly think that China is a national security threat believe that only the Americans can and will protect Japan. Recent initiatives including countries such as the UK and Australia (Quadrilateral Security Dialogue) are important, but Japan is not really hedging its bets.

The notion that the Americans are in Japan to protect the country (allowing the people to live in peace and the country to engage in economic pursuits) is dominant throughout the public discourse. Of course, that is only part of the picture: the U.S. military uses Japan as a springboard for military operations not only in the Pacific, but also in Afghanistan, Syria, and other areas of West Asia—facts which are rarely raised.

U.S. warplanes enjoy exclusive access to airspace over central Tokyo, forcing commercial aircraft to take a roundabout route towards the airport, and often hold dangerous training exercises above the city without the consent or even the knowledge of the Japanese government. For these dubious privileges, Japan pays the United States what is euphemistically called the “omoi-yari” (kindness or compassion) budget, amounting to almost $10 billion over the 2022-2026 period.

Particular excesses of U.S. forces in Japan have been subject to public criticism, and at times the government has taken action; however, fundamental questions are rarely asked. Some commentators have noted that members of the Japanese elite who dare to raise objections to the military alliance are instantly excluded from the mainstream. Like many colonized countries, the ruling class in Japan has vested interests in maintaining the status quo.

The same mistakes of WWII?

This relationship of fealty permeates throughout much of Japanese policy-making, and has become even more extreme in recent years, in particular during the reign of PM Shinzo Abe from 2012 to 2020. An overt right-wing ideologue, Abe’s premiership was characterized by numerous controversial “reforms” aimed at remilitarization and the oppression of dissent, including laws rammed through parliament that made it easier for the military to operate abroad—together with the Americans, of course.

Many Japanese were horrified that the country might be repeating the same mistakes that led to WWII. There definitely is that danger, but the fact is that any talk of remilitarization in the postwar era is aimed solely at making a larger contribution to the U.S. alliance, not independent action by Japan.

For all its faults, the Japanese right wing through WWII comprised of true nationalists: they believed that Japan needed to defend its independence, through both diplomatic and military means. The political elite now, on the other hand, is content to have Japan remain a virtual vassal state of the U.S. Indeed, it seems incapable of even contemplating a situation where that is not the case.

Will the United States protect Japan?

That may have made political sense for Japan and the region up till now, during the Pax Americana. However, one important lesson to be learned from the Ukraine crisis—as well as from the fallacy of the United States’ endless wars in West Asia, and from the four years of the Trump presidency—is that the Americans may no longer deliver on their promises.

It may be true that the U.S. has a treaty obligation to protect Japan should the country be invaded, whereas there were never any concrete assurances of protection or even NATO membership to Ukraine (publicly at least). However, it is clear that the U.S. egged the Ukrainians on, and anyway treaties are only as meaningful as the political will to implement them.

The Japanese political elite needs to reassess its strategy—and Japanese who naively believe that the Americans will always be there for us need to take a long, hard look at the situation. Banking on the Americans may no longer be a winning proposition.

A virtual summit for democracy was held on December 9-10, 2021, upon the invitation of the United States. At the summit, Joe Biden renewed his call for democracy and the fight against authoritarianism and corruption. Amongst more than 110 invited countries, 89 showed up. The question now is why the Biden administration initiated the Summit for Democracy. Let me address some important issues and their consequences in what follows.

The general assertion is that the summit was initiated in order to respond to the rhetoric that American democracy is in decay and crisis – a debate which has gone global. One of the key denominators of the democracy crisis in the U.S. has been the horrific attack on Capitol Hill on January 6, 2021 following the results of the U.S. presidential elections.

On August 30, 2021, this was followed by the withdrawal of the U.S.-led NATO forces from Afghanistan, another evident U.S. failure. These and similar events brought the image of U.S. democracy into question before a global public. In this context, the Summit for Democracy was designed to rectify the image of the U.S. both domestically and globally.

The exclusion of major U.S. partners

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy as they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries. There were also countries from the Asia-Pacific and Africa that were not on the invitation list: Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, which are considered de facto allies of the United States, were among the ASEAN members not invited.

China and Russia were not invited to the Summit for Democracy for they are regarded as the ideological rivals of democratically ruled countries.

Although Singapore and Thailand might not be fully democratic, and Vietnam has a single-party rule, they uphold – to a certain degree – democratic practices such as civil society organizations and a rule-based administration. They also have closer ties with the U.S. in fields including not only economy but also culture, academia, and the defence sector. Not only this, but they have been approached by the U.S. to adopt policies against China. Indeed, this is closely related to the well-established Asian pivot policy by former U.S. president Barack Obama.

The invitation of only Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines from the ASEAN region to the Summit for Democracy has led to speculations. Is there a rift between the rest of the member countries of ASEAN and the United States due to a widening ideological gap between democracies and non-democracies? Or is it because of these countries’ sociopolitical or socioeconomic alliances with U.S. rivals? If the former turns out to be true, there is definitely a certain degree of miscalculation by the Biden administration.

There is no doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy along with its capacity to defend democratic principles and values. Political elites in ASEAN member states, which rely on Western democracy as an ideal, can no longer satisfy or silence emergent anti-Western sentiments as now critical voices even within the ruling circles in Europe increasingly emerge and question the credibility of the U.S. “democratic” engagements abroad.

Concern over the Lack of Engagement

Japan is a highly acclaimed U.S. ally in the Asia-Pacific region and approached the U.S. decision not to invite certain ASEAN countries to the summit critically.

No doubt that the U.S. is losing credit as the leader of global democracy.

Japanese political commentators were in favor of inviting all ASEAN members, not only some, to the summit. According to them, direct U.S. engagement with ASEAN is essential to sustaining the security in the Asia-Pacific against China. The Japanese commentators seem right to criticize the imposition of a definition of democracy technically contrived by the U.S. alone.

On the subject of the exclusion of Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, Japan has implicitly reacted by expressing its concern about how to improve democratic rules in ASEAN without the U.S. facilitation and engagement through political, economic, and cultural mechanisms.

To highlight additional concerns, it should be emphasized that Singapore, a U.S. ally, and Vietnam, a potential partner of the United States, were not invited to the summit. Taking into consideration that Barack Obama was the first U.S. president to visit Hanoi after the Vietnam War, the exclusion of Vietnam from the summit is not an encouraging move for enhancing the partnership between the two capitals.

Categorizing certain Asia-Pacific countries as “non-democratic” may be true in principle. Nevertheless, the imposition of a Western-based democracy model may not be acceptable by a number of regional countries.

This miscalculated approach by the U.S. administration can potentially trigger more controversy among non-democracies in the Asia-Pacific, and may result either in an attempt to copy the model of the U.S. democracy, which could potentially end up in failure, or push them further towards strengthening their ties with China, the world’s second superpower.

Step Forward

The question remains whether the composition of the countries invited to the Summit for Democracy consisted of a wider alliance or the U.S. was simply playing the leadership role by marking its influence on democratically ruled countries. Then, the subsequent question is whether the U.S. administration intends to divide the world into democratic and undemocratic rules. If the latter is true, it is not difficult to guess the existence of a larger division and separation of countries by the United States as democratic and non-democratic ones.

The lack of U.S. engagement with Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam, as member states of ASEAN, can deter the democratization processes further if the United States’ formal involvement remains ineffective. The influence of democratic principles has decreased significantly around the globe in the last decades. This includes Western countries, where democracy was born, as has become evident in the treatment of people of color and migrants.

The task of major democratic countries such as the U.S. is not to judge other democracies apathetically, but rather to galvanize democratic engagements with countries that are undergoing democratic challenges by paying a degree of respect to their existing democratic institutions.

Since September 15, 2021 the global security agenda has been occupied with a security pact designed to pave the way for a technology transfer by the U.S. to Australia, replacing France as a supplier of nuclear-powered submarines. The argument goes that this strategic initiative is only the beginning of a much larger cooperation plan regarding the future of the Indo-Pacific security complex.

Global security analysts and scholars directly focused their attention on the Indo-Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea looking into possible implications. The pivotal argument is that world security is going to shift towards the East, and the U.S.-China competition will broaden itself into another dimension with this strategic step.

This claim holds certain validity as the U.S. retreat from Afghanistan and Syria should lead to the accumulation of a certain amount of tangible sources that will need another direction to flow into.

Thus, several scholars have been supporting the literature that hypothesizes a global U.S. channeling into the Indo-Pacific security complex. An alternative approach advocates that the U.S. is not entirely eager to interfere with China due to the potential implications of such a move, yet its partners are forcing a U.S. presence in the region.

This approach is an alternative that derives its legitimacy from the middle and great powers that cooperate with the U.S. – the superpower. This argument also has its merits as international relations are not solely the enforcement of the interests of a superpower but an interaction between the latter and its partnering countries.

The global understanding of such events represented in pacts such as the AUKUS Pact is vital. However, a regionalist approach is required to better present the impact on the regional and state-level dimensions. The French involvement in the pact is the part of AUKUS that is going to cause major implications for the MENA region.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align. Recent military procurement deals such as the Turkish S-400 acquisition, the Pakistani JF-17 fighter aircraft production contract with China, Saudi-UAE procurements of F-35 aircraft, and THAAD air defense systems from the U.S. are recent comparable cases.

These procurements created different levels of leverage and tensions for the buyer countries as they were forced to choose a side. Despite the balancing literature and the conceptual history of the practice, it becomes more apparent that a bipolar system is very antagonistic in its buildup process.

Partnerships like AUKUS that will direct interstate partnerships and even enforce them to align.

Remembering the two world wars that created the Cold War structure, it is plausible that the “playmaker” states force certain great and middle powers with strategic geopolitical significance to align with them. In this sense, AUKUS might have created a rift between the U.S. and France (and the EU in a larger context, considering the UK also left the organization) that will have certain implications for the MENA region.

For the last 30 years, the U.S. was able to embark on its Middle Eastern policy vis-à-vis its European partners, but strategic gains that directly hinder EU profitability will cause certain fractions in this practice.

The most significant impact of AUKUS on the MENA security complex is expected to be observed in the Eastern Mediterranean. Since the EU has practically perceived the Turkish pivot for energy resources towards this area and North African interests in this area as threats, the U.S. has supported European interests in securing the energy routes and protecting the integrity of South European shores. However, a political dissemination process that was potentially started with AUKUS might divide this unification in foreign policy.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation.

The Eastern Mediterranean is a quagmire of competing interests, and a transatlantic fracture will only escalate the situation. This escalation might give middle powers like Turkey broader room for maneuver. If the U.S. stops supporting these interests in the region, the EU backlash and the hawkish French position will lose a certain share of their influence and capacity. A significant shift towards the Indo-Pacific Ocean might reduce the pressure on great and middle powers competing for interests.

An alternative power-centered approach might suggest that the void left by a U.S. strategic shift towards the East would trigger a great power to take responsibility and fill the vacuum. The current power balance propounds a Russian pivot towards the Eastern Mediterranean; however, Russia’s aircraft carriers are quite worn, and its only ship, Admiral Kuznetsov, is on the maintenance deck.

This does not mean Russia cannot control this area – it holds a submarine force of 58 known units which can only be challenged by the U.S. and maybe China in the next decade. Both scenarios imply that Turkey might have more room for maneuver with less focus and escalation from rival powers.

Meanwhile the possibility that France might become even more hawkish and hyper-emphasize its interests in the Eastern Mediterranean must not be excluded. Yet, this is less likely since if France and Germany plan to keep the union together, they have to align in foreign policy following Brexit. When push comes to shove, Germany will most likely balance the French hawkish reactionary stance towards these events and prioritize economic growth in the next decade.

Moazzam Begg was a former detainee who was imprisoned by the U.S. government in Guantanamo Bay from 2002 to 2005. He is currently the Outreach Director at CAGE (a non-profit that conducts research and provides a platform for survivors of the war on terror), where he challenges the dominant narrative of suspecting minority communities and the threat of terrorism. Ayan Mohamed Ali spoke to him about how he overcame adversity and how, despite the hardships he endured, and he was not only able to not only reclaim his freedom but also empower and educate marginalized British Muslims.

Q. For people who may be hearing about you for the first time, could you tell our readers about yourself and what you do?

I am the director for an advocacy group called CAGE, which campaigns against ‘war on terror’ policies. I’m an author and former Guantanamo prisoner, media commentator and lecturer.

Q. Could you perhaps elaborate on the events surrounding your arrests and subsequent release?

I’ve been arrested a couple of times. One, the main one, of course, was in Pakistan in 2001, in January. That was by the U.S., CIA and the Pakistani intelligence services. I always say it wasn’t an arrest, it was a kidnapping because there were no uniformed officers. Nobody showed me an identification card, everybody was in plain clothes, and there was no warrant. They took me from my house in the middle of the night in Pakistan, which is where I was living.

Our friend evacuated from Afghanistan, where I had been working on a project to build schools and wells in Afghanistan. From there, they took me to secret locations in Pakistan, then into Afghanistan into Kandahar, Bagram, and then ultimately Guantanamo, where I was held in total, between Afghanistan and Guantanamo, for three years without charge or trial, and released in January 2005.

The ultimate thing about why I was taken into custody was primarily because of the role of British intelligence that offered false and fake information to the Americans, suggesting that I was a member of al-Qaeda, which I was not. That was used to hold me, as I said, without charge or trial. Eventually when I did return, I had a case against the British government and MI5 for complicity in my torture, and in 2010 I won an out of court settlement against them.

Q. What impact has your experience had on today’s young British Muslims? Has it gotten to the point that people don’t know what is and isn’t legal?

I think the impact really has spanned over the past 20 years, so you’ve seen Muslims targeted intentionally by anti- terror legislation almost with a new form every year and people are living in a state of being afraid of not knowing what they can or can’t say, what they can or can’t post on social media out of fear of being branded a terrorist or a terrorist sympathizer, having views on Palestine or similarly Afghanistan or a number of things around that.

I grew up in a generation where there was open racism and hatred towards all people of color. Whereas the past 20 years, there’s been very specific anti-Muslim hatred, Islamophobia that will target you even if you were white, it doesn’t matter. The effects of this has been only seen a generation that has been raised on the ‘war on terrorism’ and the result of legislation.

Q. What advice would you provide to young British Muslims who disagree with the assumption that Islam is synonymous with terrorism?

Well, first of all, terminology, because the terminology that’s used to describe terrorism in the Muslim world actually comes from the word ‘to frighten those who are the enemies of Allah’ but this is in a war context with frightening those people who are involved in killing, raping, oppression, and torture. In the western context, terrorism is the use of violence for a political or ideological goal and of course we can see that translates in some places to people that the government is not happy with and in other places where the government itself would fit that definition, but it’s involved in the use of violence for political aims, for example in Iraq, Afghanistan and so forth.

But Islam is not a religion of terrorism, it’s a religion of human beings, it’s a religion of submission to God. It’s not a part of our faith to be connected to violence for political aims but neither are we a passive religion, we’re not a religion of pacifism – we’re in between. Speaking truth to power from a religious perspective should never be synonymous with terrorism, and we must reject it at every level.

In Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting,” Professor Kerry K. Gershaneck, who has studied and written on the China-U.S. relationship for the past decades, focuses on China’s political warfare which he understands a threat to the United States. The author belongs to a circle that considers China an essential enemy of American freedoms and values. The book is Gershaneck’s explanation of how “‘contemporary totalitarian Sino-fascism’ threatens democracies insensitive to the danger.”

Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting” is a comprehensive analysis of the complexities of China’s challenge, including its tactics, ideologies, and organizational procedures. It entails comprehensive case studies of China’s political warfare operations against regional allies of the United States such as Thailand and Taiwan.

Gershaneck believes that China is at war with the world, and especially with the United States and its allies. He tries to explain the most important concepts and themes needed to appreciate China’s political warfare and offers a historical outline of the development of Chinese political warfare abilities and skills.

The book’s main idea is “political warfare,” a term that the author owes to the American statesman George F. Kennan (1904–2005). In April 1948, Kennan published The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare to prepare the “Free World” for the use of the political warfare needed to defeat the Soviet Union and win the Cold War. Gershaneck introduces China’s political warfare, and explains the most important terms and definitions of the concept. The book continues with China’s political warfare goals, ways, means, and wartime support, and elaborates on the country’s political warfare against Thailand and Taiwan.

Gershaneck believes there is an urgent need to establish an Asian political warfare center of excellence, to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute China’s political warfare activities.

Given that for Gershaneck China presents a substantial threat to the United States and its allies, he offers some conclusions and recommendations to empower the USA in this challenge. He discusses the need to develop a national strategy to counter China’s political warfare, and to rebuild national institutions and establish programs in this direction.

Gershaneck believes there is an urgent need to establish an Asian political warfare center of excellence, to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute China’s political warfare activities and to screen, track, and expose them. He also recommends that U.S. policymakers take legal action against China’s officials and affiliates engaged in civil rights offenses, encourage academic study that focuses on combating China’s political warfare, and finally, pass legislation to diminish the offensive power of China’s news and social media.

Kerry K. Gershaneck, Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting” (Marine Corps University Press, 2020) ISBN 979-8569771318, 215 pages

Once again, turmoil in Afghanistan forces us to face the contradiction between the world we are creating and the world we want to leave our descendants. As the Great Game between the United States and China unfolds on a global scale, it seems both ironic and fitting that our attention should return to a land that has endured so many deadly dances between Great Powers and ruined empires.

The more we ponder the Afghan tragedy the more we see it as a metaphor for our global predicament and as a warning for the future. American and Chinese leaders have to make a choice—will they clash more openly in a struggle to dominate Afghanistan and its neighboring regions or will they rein in their ambitions and jealousies to accomplish goals that benefit themselves and many others? The answer will go a long way toward promoting war or peace not merely in Eurasia but in the Pacific and the world at large.

The current trend is not encouraging. Washington and Beijing are locked in a classic security dilemma—a self-sustaining cycle of mistrust and belligerence in which rivals cast one another as enemies who are pitted in a fight to the finish on nearly all issues and in every region. In this sense, Afghanistan is a microcosm of the Great Game writ large—a planetary duel of encirclement and counter-maneuver, with each side carving out spheres of influence and enclosing once open seas, aiming to control choke points that can deny access to vital routes and resources.

Such unremitting brinkmanship invites miscalculation and escalation because political and military leaders consistently underestimate risk and convince one another they can control the next sequence of moves.

Under different circumstances, the path ahead for Afghanistan and its neighbors would seem straightforward. The country abounds in untapped resources, both natural and human, that can fuel post-war recovery while spurring development in surrounding regions and far beyond. Its vast and varied mineral wealth is a prize for any multinational mining company and a potential lifeline for battered supply chains struggling to support factories and construction sites on every continent.

Along with Pakistan, Afghanistan lies at the intersection of at least two planned energy corridors that can carry oil and natural gas from Iran to China in one direction and from Turkmenistan to India in another. Transit fees from these routes alone could transform Afghanistan’s economy and society within a single generation. On top of this, there is future role for Afghanistan as a land bridge linking the commerce of the Indian Ocean with Central Asia and, from there, to growing transcontinental railroads and highways reaching all the way to the Atlantic and Pacific coasts.

As usual, impressions in Washington and Beijing are increasingly at odds concerning the likely consequences for peace and development.

All of these enterprises fit perfectly with China’s ongoing efforts to build a New Silk Road, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative. Led by Chinese finance and engineering, the New Silk Road seeks to turn most of Eurasia and Africa into a single, integrated market held together with overlapping networks of infrastructure and connectivity that will span the oceans and continents. Such a vision can be both inspiring and terrifying, depending on one’s perspective. As usual, impressions in Washington and Beijing are increasingly at odds concerning the likely consequences for peace and development.

The Biden administration’s responses to Chinese ambitions have been glib and unsubstantial. Instead of a grand vision for economic development, they are floating a public relations campaign to Build Back Better Globally (3BG for short). The core members are supposed to be the advanced industrial democracies who will also promote high standards in human rights and anti-corruption.

This network is invited to partner with a new coalition of liberal democracies—The Summit for Democracy—supporting freedom and independence against authoritarian trends backed by China and Russia. The league of democracies, in turn, will overlap with an emerging naval alliance—The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue—committed to preserving free and open seas in the combined waters of the Indian Ocean and the western Pacific.

The anti-China tone of these initiatives is self-evident, but Biden’s team has sharpened the message by adding Taiwan to the mix in ways that are bound to provoke Beijing’s anger. Washington is elevating Taiwan’s diplomatic standing, increasing arms sales, and stepping up naval and air operations around the island and in nearby zones of contested territories. Biden feels the need to display American strength and resolve in a time of diminishing confidence in Washington’s protective umbrella. But he misreads the prevailing sentiments of East Asian leaders who worry that the U.S. might be inviting a fight it cannot win unless it is willing to widen the battlefield and wage all-out war in their backyards.

The Biden administration needs to abandon its chosen course of confrontation, ideological posturing, and rhetorical bluster. The last thing we need is an American version of China’s wolf warrior diplomacy. Pundits may argue that the world abhors power vacuums, but, today, what it hates even more are would-be hegemons that try to exploit them. If the U.S. insists on competing with China for the title of most benevolent hegemon, both sides will fail. No nation can provide any set of public goods—economic or military—that will earn legitimacy and acquiescence from independent states or from the newly assertive movements of global civil society.

With Afghanistan or without it, the New Silk Road offers a compelling vision for cooperation and progress on a scale that would have been unimaginable a decade ago. It is utopian in the best sense of the word. It is China’s brainchild, but it is not Beijing’s puppet or Trojan horse.

All the partners have wills of their own and their citizens are determined to recast the projects to suit local needs instead of foreign and elite interests. American leaders are wavering between trying to subvert the venture and mounting a rival effort on a smaller scale. Sadly, Washington is missing out on the best option of all—joining the emergent transnational community and taking its turn in steering the common enterprise in positive directions. If you can’t lick ‘em, join ‘em. Share in the credit, avoid being a spoiler, and don’t have sour grapes.

Mercenaries have been a part of war since humans first started to coordinate and live amongst each other in societies. In the classical era, Xenophon of Athens recounted how his mercenary force, “The Ten Thousand”, helped Achaemenid prince Cyrus the Younger in his failed attempt to usurp the Persian throne from his brother Artaxerxes II. This extended through to the famous mercenary armies of the Renaissance period, famously criticized by writer and philosopher Niccolo Machiavelli for being a threat to their employers.

However, and despite numerous national laws forbidding mercenary activity in the militarily advanced Western world, mercenaries have continued to flourish and thrive in the battlefields and cities of Iraq and Afghanistan – the two countries who suffered the most from the American imperial footprint in the 21^st century.

With the United States now openly stating that it intends to disengage from both countries, it is likely that, rather than reduce the number of mercenaries deployed, it will instead increasingly rely on its army of private military contractors to secure its interests.

The case of Iraq

As one of the world’s most fossil fuel-rich nations, Iraq has been blessed (and cursed) with bountiful natural resources. This has obviously attracted the avarice and attention of massive international energy companies who wish to exploit Iraq’s oil stocks and also its burgeoning natural gas fields.

ExxonMobil, one of the world’s largest oil and gas companies headquartered in Texas, operates two subsidiaries in Iraq, one of which deals with the Northern Iraq Region and one of which specializes in contracts relating to the richer oil fields in the Iraqi south. ExxonMobil is currently the lead contractor at the West Qurnah oilfield in cooperation with China’s PetroChina.

ExxonMobil’s operations have been targeted several times by pro-Iran Shia jihadist groups who were seeking to make the U.S. presence in Iraq as inhospitable as possible in order to give Tehran the diplomatic leverage it needed against Washington elsewhere. The American oil giant had to evacuate its employees on several occasions, including after rocket attacks struck their compound near Basra in 2019.

This will have the effect of emboldening mercenary companies as they know they can acquire billions in contracts while operating in a murky world devoid of accountability in a corporate war environment where violence equals profit.

The Iraqi experience is largely replicated in the Afghan theatre, with mercenary companies running logistics to various American and NATO bases.

The case of Afghanistan

The Iraqi experience is largely replicated in the Afghan theatre, with mercenary companies running logistics to various American and NATO bases, providing highway security for supply routes, guarding embassies and government installations, and even providing training to the Afghan police.

However, a series of scandals involving contractors using deadly force and engaging in corruption and black market smuggling operations caused enough of an uproar to force then-President Hamid Karzai to ban several mercenary companies, including Blackwater.

However, and commensurate with Karzai’s status as a president of an occupied country, international pressure forced the Afghan government to backtrack and they decided to allow mercenaries to simply rebrand themselves not as private security but as “risk management” companies. This was after NATO countries doubted the Afghan Public Protection Force’s capabilities of providing security in the country they were apparently sovereign over.

With the Taliban currently ascendant and the U.S.-installed Afghan government facing an existential threat, it is highly doubtful that the United States will entirely cut their losses and withdraw from Afghanistan. China has recently made a number of overtures by formally hosting Taliban officials and this will raise concerns in Washington as they already face off against Beijing in other strategic theaters around the globe.

It is therefore likely that the U.S. will want to secure the Afghan government by allowing international mercenary companies to continue to operate as “advisers” who will provide training. This may have the effect of allowing the Afghan government to maintain control over Kabul and other major population centers, effectively controlling islets surrounded by a sea of Taliban control in rural Afghanistan. Naturally, Kabul will pay through the nose for the pleasure of hosting mercenaries to ensure their survival.

Across Afghanistan, Iraq, and Syria, the U.S. Department of Defense has confirmed that, as at the fourth fiscal quarter of 2020, it had engaged the services of 27,388 contractors in these three theaters. Considering there are around 2,500 troops in Afghanistan, 2,500 in Iraq, and around 900 or so in Syria, one begins to appreciate the sheer scale of the “contractor” economy and how reliant the U.S. and its allies are on it.

While the approximately 30,000 contractors will obviously not all be combat oriented (about 10-20 percent are in combat roles while the rest offer support functions), a significant proportion of them will be armed and will be protected under U.S. federal laws that allows them to use “deadly force against enemy armed forces only in self-defense”.

This means that, with the U.S. drawing down uniformed personnel, this already extant addiction to hiring soldiers of fortune is not going to reduce, but in fact the U.S. will become ever more dependent on them to remain relevant in theaters of war they have been forced to abandon.

Wary of China’s demographic preponderance, powerful economy and rapidly advancing modernizing air and naval power projection capabilities, the U.S. has concluded that the emerging Cold War-like confrontation with Beijing presents different challenges from its confrontation with the Soviet Union during the second half of the 20^th century, hence requiring differing policy prescriptions.

This backdrop has seen the U.S. increasing its diplomatic and security cooperation arrangements with its existing partners in the Indo-Pacific – in particular, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Australia – along with rapid expansion of security cooperation arrangements with India. Notably, Japan, Australia and India are linked to the U.S. under the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, or Quad, for short.

The U.S. has begun to seek more diplomatic and security partners in the western Pacific. Washington’s new partners include Indonesia. In October 2020, Secretary of State Mike Pompeo arrived in Jakarta to pledge U.S. cooperation with Indonesia to ensure regional maritime security. Growing U.S.-Indonesian cooperation has been carried over with the transition to the Biden Administration, with U.S. funding for the construction of a maritime training centre in Batam Island.

A two-fold perspective underscores the mutual interests and logic behind U.S.-Indonesia rapprochement. The first of these concerns the geostrategic setting of Sino-U.S. rivalry. The Indonesian islands are located close to the Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) that connect the Indian Ocean to the South China Sea; this is further underscored by the location of three key maritime chokepoints: the Malacca Straits; the Sunda Strait; and the Lombok Strait.

Ensuring continued access to these chokepoints is a critical concern for China, given the extent to which Beijing is dependent on these SLOCs for its oil imports from the Middle East and East Africa, as well as its exports of consumer goods to Europe.

Beijing is fully aware that, in the event of heightened confrontation with the U.S., Washington is likely to seize the initiative to severe these SLOCs and thus starve China’s energy-dependent economy into submission

Beijing is fully aware that, in the event of heightened confrontation with the U.S., Washington is likely to seize the initiative to severe these SLOCs and thus starve China’s energy-dependent economy into submission. In particular, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) is aware that its domestic legitimacy is dependent on ensuring employment for its populace; by extension, any development that undermines China’s economy bodes the prospect of civil unrest and discontent that would be aimed at the CCP.

The CCP’s sense of vulnerability over these SLOCs is further accentuated by its limited air-naval power projection capabilities. Although China has joined the club of great powers with aircraft carriers and stealth fighter aircraft, its ability to seriously challenge the U.S. and its Quad partners beyond the South China Sea remains limited. Apart from China’s artificial islands in the South China Sea – whose lack of strategic depth renders them vulnerable to a U.S.-led amphibious assault – the only air and naval bases that China has been able to acquire in the Indian Ocean region are in Djibouti, and in Great Coco Island, Myanmar.

Set against this, the prospect of an increased U.S. air-naval presence at the heart of Southeast Asia underscores to Beijing the vulnerability of its SLOCSs. The U.S. already enjoys access to Singapore’s air and naval bases, which are capable of hosting up to two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups. Nonetheless, U.S. options for expanding its military footprint in Singapore are limited by the scarcity of land in the city-state.

U.S. options for expanding its military footprint in Singapore are limited by the scarcity of land in the city-state.

In contrast, sparsely-populated, under-developed Batam offers significant tracts of land that offer potential expansion of military infrastructure to host a scaled-up U.S. air-naval presence in Southeast Asia that would be capable of interdicting the SLOCs that China is dependent on, even as the PRC’s air-naval power projection capabilities remain well behind the U.S.

A second, further rationale to the Indonesia-U.S. rapprochement concerns the technical aspects of the efforts of the Indonesian National Armed Forces – the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI) – to modernize in the face of growing Chinese assertiveness in claiming the waters and islets within the ‘Nine-Dash Line’, which abut Indonesia’s Natuna Island. China’s modernization of its air and naval power projection capabilities underscore Beijing’s increased capacity to present the Southeast Asian with the fait accompli of Chinese control of the South China Sea.

Set against this, the TNI’s readiness to respond is limited. The Indonesian Army has traditionally held pride of place in Jakarta’s procurement programs, thence leaving the country’s Air Force and Navy equipped with obsolete, poorly-maintained platforms, a weakness underscored by the loss of the submarine Nanggala during a training exercise in April 2021. In response to China’s air and naval modernization, the TNI has switched its procurement priorities accordingly, with contracts for the acquisition of Korea-built Boramae stealth fighters, Japanese-built Mogami-class and Italian-built FREMM-class stealth frigates.

Jakarta has also announced plans to acquire upgraded variants of the U.S.-built F-15-EX fighter. Such acquisitions come as a timely response to China’s increased assertiveness in the South China Sea that signals Jakarta’s resolve not to be intimidated by China. However, their belated procurement, coming after decades of the Indonesian Government’s neglect of its air and naval capabilities, underscores the prospect of a steep learning curve for Indonesia’s pilots and sailors.

These new platforms are among the latest designs of their type in the world, and whose effectiveness is bound by the information-based Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA). Mastery of these platforms as part of a ‘system of systems’ will not be merely a case of retraining personnel to operate more advanced aircraft and warships; rather, it will place more emphasis on the ability of personnel to rapidly process combat information from a wide array of sensors for accurate targeting under wartime conditions requires a fundamental shift in training, doctrine and manpower organization. Such a level of military modernization would effectively require a paradigm shift in Indonesia’s war-fighting doctrine, requiring the TNI to make the transition from a 1980s-styled military to a 21^st-century one at very short notice.

Within such a setting, the establishment of a U.S.-Indonesian maritime training centre offers both sides a win-win arrangement for their respective military interests vis-à-vis China. For Washington, the training centre provides the U.S. military with the foundation to establish an alliance with a demographically large, but technically backward, regional power in Southeast Asia.

The Andes Mountains are the backbone of South America. Their snowy summits are exceptional witnesses to the greatness of the flight of the condor, a black-and-white bird of the New World vulture family that is native to South America and is part of the coat of arms of Colombia.

It is considered the king of birds by the Mapuche people of Chile, a symbol of the sky by the Quechua and Aymara indigenous peoples of Bolivia, and an icon of life and survival for the whole continent due to its status as an endangered species.

Maybe because of its symbolic meaning, the CIA cynically named Operation Condor after this South American bird, outlining its ambitious plan to dominate the destiny of all countries in the region and guarantee the implementation of its particular idea of “democracy” and neoliberalism through local puppets.

The infamous Monroe Doctrine, which was introduced by John Quincy Adams, the sixth president of the United States, and was attributed to James Monroe in 1823 is not very clear to many Latin Americans.

“America for the Americans” is the essence of this doctrine but many of those living below the river of Río Grande ask, “Aren’t we American enough?” This question is raised because Latin Americans haven’t seen many Europeans conspiring to overthrow their democratically elected governments but mostly leaders of their own with very strong ties to the imperialist establishment of the United States.

The history of the United States’ intervention in national affairs of other countries through direct military force or clandestine support for local paramilitary groups extends to more than 170 years. Mexico lost almost half of its territory between 1846 and 1848 to its northern neighbor; California and Texas became part of what is today the United States, while the locals sadly becoming the first victims of U.S. imperialism in Latin America.

In 1854, the U.S. bombarded Nicaragua, installing a banker named William Walker a year later as its president. Then, came the plan to expel the Spaniards from Cuba and Puerto Rico, a decaying empire against a rising one. Today, Puerto Rico is essentially a colony of the United States.

In 1903, the United States promoted the segregation of Panama from Colombia, in an effort to stop the French from building the Panama Canal which allows a quick passage from the Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and vice versa. The United States directly controlled the canal until December 31, 1999.

Since then, every country from Mexico to Argentina has been impacted by the bald American eagle’s twisting of destinies reaching its peak with the infamous Operation Condor. Operation Condor promoted the installation and support for United States-friendly dictatorships in several countries: Hugo Banzer in Bolivia (1971-1975), Ernesto Geisel in Brazil (1974-1979), Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-1990), Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay (1954-1989), Juan María Bordaberry in Uruguay (1973-1976), and Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina (1975-1978).

Chile’s case is especially exceptional. Chile is the country with the highest economic indicators and standards of living in Latin America. Recently, it has been rocked by intense social unrest with months of street protests, and scores of injuries and deaths among civilians due to torture. In October 2020,

Operation Condor promoted the installation and support for United States-friendly dictatorships in several countries: Hugo Banzer in Bolivia (1971-1975), Ernesto Geisel in Brazil (1974-1979), Augusto Pinochet in Chile (1973-1990), Alfredo Stroessner in Paraguay (1954-1989), Juan María Bordaberry in Uruguay (1973-1976), and Jorge Rafael Videla in Argentina (1975-1978).

Chile has voted in favor of amending its constitution, which according to the majority of its population, is a nefarious legacy of the Pinochet era.

Bolivia, with nearly 70% indigenous population, only saw a native president in 2006 when Evo Morales, a union leader from the Aymara people, won the presidency in the heart of South America.

Many years of internal conflict between leftist guerrillas and government forces, with the help of paramilitary organizations, has caused even more pain and misery there, especially in the rural areas of the country with evident consequences also in major cities.

Colombians ask why the U.S. fuels this war, which has only led to more bloodshed, with weapons and military support. Meanwhile, on the streets of Chicago and New York, where most of these drugs are consumed, they seem happy with the drugs industry. There is no answer to this question, it seems.

Bolivia, with nearly 70% indigenous population, only saw a native president in 2006 when Evo Morales, a union leader from the Aymara people, won the presidency in the heart of South America.

With a socialist and anti-imperialist approach, Morales achieved an impressive economic growth for Bolivia: an average of 5% growth in the GDP (one of the highest in the region). His economic plans resulted, among other important numbers, in decreasing extreme poverty from 36.7% to 16.8% between 2005 and 2015, and a reduction of the illiteracy rate from 13.3% to 3.7% during his first few years in office according to official UNESCO figures.

Accused of trying to cling to power through fraud and corruption, and following a victory at the polls for the fourth time, Morales resigned and left to Mexico due to pressure by the military and a portion of the Bolivian opposition led by the pro-United States politician Jeanine Añez. Añez entered the Presidential Palace one night in November 2019 carrying a copy of the Bible and claiming that God gave the Bolivian opposition the mandate to “save Bolivia from anarchy and evil.”

Evangelical groups in Latin America are, just like those in the United States, becoming important electoral support for pro-imperialist regimes. Eventually, in October 2020, Luis Arce, a politician from Morales’s political party, won the Bolivian elections with 55% of votes, allowing Morales’s return to his homeland.

Simón Bolívar, the Venezuelan hero attributed with the liberation of five nations in Latin America (Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Perú, and Bolivia) from Spain once said, “The United States seems destined by Providence to plague America with misery in the name of liberty.” His words are truer today more than ever.

Latin Americans wonder if someday a free mighty Andean condor, not the American eagle disguised as one, will cast its magnificent shadow over the Andes, without feeling endangered by extinction. Time will only tell, but the peoples from Mexico to Argentina still have the final say.