This past Saturday, the junior partner of the coalition government, the Social Democrats (SPD) announced the party’s election of its new co-leaders Norbert Walter-Borjans and Saskia Esken. It was a surprise that these two won, as the current Vice Chancellor and Finance Minister Olaf Scholz and his partner, Klara Geywitz, were expected to be elected by the party’s members. Nevertheless, the SPD base decided that Walter-Borjans and Esken will lead the party. The pair previously pushed for renegotiation of the coalition between the SPD and Chancellor Merkel’s CDU. It must kept in mind that over the past 10 years, there has been a CDU/CSU-SPD coalition government, which according to some circles is harming the country’s traditional political balance.

The results have been evaluated partly as a shock for the Berlin political establishment and elites while some media outlets used a more negative tone. Media representatives commented on the results with headlines like: “the SPD is abolishing itself”, “adieu, social democrats”, “the end of the grand coalition” and other similar negative statements and predictions. This is actually based on the fact that the new leaders previously stated that they will insist on renegotiating the current coalition agreement at the SPD party convention this upcoming Friday. Delegates will have to decide on the future of the remaining two years of the coalition.

How can the current conditions and the general perspective within the framework of German politics be assessed and evaluated?

First of all, the results should be taken cautiously into consideration without positive or negative exaggerations. Even though some supportive voices of the grand coalition describe the SPD’s vote as a negative outcome, it is no doubt a fact that this represents the SPD’s legitimate will – and is not limited to the votes of certain delegates. Some criticize the fact that a small number of SPD members, who took part in the elections (217,000), will determine the future of the country’s federal government. However, this kind of comparison is not fair or even acceptable because every party has its own legitimate means to determine who will lead and make decisions.

As a comparison, it shouldn’t be forgotten that in the past year, the Liberals (FDP), which on several occasions acted as the junior partner of the CDU-led coalition government, were the key actors in deciding the country’s future government for four years – despite having a low number of votes in comparison to other rival parties. Thus, in such situations, which are actually influenced by the country’s parliamentary tradition, the question arises, who decides where the line of legitimacy is to be drawn, and which point of view is the most legitimate one?

The second point regarding the new SPD duo and the future of the coalition government has to be addressed from the point of view of the party’s legitimate self-evaluation. It is no secret that the SPD’s popularity among voters has decreased more and more while it has participated in grand coalition governments. The building of coalition governments has not contributed to the SPD’s popularity but has had the opposite effect. Therefore, some voices in the party have called for a return to fundamental social-democrat positions and to reject positions that continuously resemble those of the CDU/CSU. Whether it is true that the SPD is increasingly resembling the CDU or vice versa is another interesting issue, which, however, goes beyond the limits of this piece. Nevertheless, the image of two main German centrist parties permanently echoing the same policy lines has disturbed both voters on the centre-left and centre-right.

If delegates ultimately come to a decision that ends the grand coalition government at Friday’s SPD convention, then Merkel will search for a new but unlikely coalition (with the Greens or/and FDP), or she will make efforts to govern the country under a minority government – an unprecedented situation in post-1945 Germany, and a situation which Chancellor Merkel does not favour and has ruled out several times. If both potential options also fail, new elections will be held subsequent to a pseudo-confidence vote which will intentionally trigger an early election. However, it is a risky move due to the obvious threat by the far-right AfD which may have the potential to increase even more of its votes and thus unfortunately become the country’s second largest party.

For this reason, the Social Democrats have to think carefully about where they currently stand and what kind of effect their upcoming decisions may have on the entire country’s future. In contrast to the other duo (Scholz and Geywitz), the new co-leaders Walter-Borjans and Esken seem very unpredictable, which, most likely will change once they are confronted with the reality federal politics. As one has witnessed recently, both politicians are currently in favour of not immediately ending the coalition at the party convention, despite heavy pressure from left-wing members of the party to conduct an election on the future of the coalition.

Over the past years the reputation and popularity of the SPD has gradually decreased, but whether this will fundamentally change by switching to the opposition is ultimately a risky gamble. As one of the previous SPD chairpersons and one of Germany’s most famous politicians, Franz Müntefering, recently stated, at the end of the day the voters will show whether they accept the decision to switch to the opposition, a decision Müntefering believes the people will not welcome.

As a final word, it is a very situation case that a high-profile political figure such as Olaf Scholz, who was once the Vice Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, was not able to be elected as a co-leader by his own party. This is an issue or problem that parliamentary systems appear to be occasionally facing. The same uncertainty also applies to prime ministers/chancellors and various types of coalition combinations which may occur subsequent to elections if the people’s will is not represented in the subsequently established coalitions.

In the past week, German political circles have been discussing whether a potential dispute will erupt between Angela Merkel and her party’s (CDU) chairperson, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer (AKK). While some media outlets argue that AKK has recently made a deal with the former chairman of the CDU/CSU parliamentary group (2000-2002), Friedrich Merz, it is not clear whether such an alleged step will cause other complexities. According to the news, AKK promised Merz a federal ministry as soon as she becomes Germany’s next Chancellor. However, it seems that current Chancellor Angela Merkel and the conditions of the current German parliament will not enable such possibilities prior to the 2021 elections.

The discussion become public subsequent to a piece published in Der Spiegel, according to which AKK and Merz made a deal for the time period after Merkel. Merz is a former conservative CDU politician, who challenged both Merkel and AKK in the race to leadership. However, lost the race against both. He quit politics in 2009 and changed to rather lucrative sectors such as consultancy and began lobbying for different companies. When in late 2018 it became clear that Merkel would leave as chair, Merz announced his ambitions to comeback, although he lost against the party’s former secretary-general and Merkel’s close ally, AKK.

But now there are interesting issues being discussed in the media and political circles as to whether AKK will push Merkel in order to become Chancellor at an early date, or whether AKK will continue to work closely with Merkel until 2021, respect her as the country’s Chancellor together with all her preferences – to which Merz definitely does not belong.

By this, it has to be stressed that there is no option that Merz might become a minister under the ongoing leadership of Merkel, while Merz excludes this option as well. Merz is making efforts to reinforce his dialogue with the country’s potential and future Chancellor, AKK. But one has to also keep in mind that Merz does not only want to become a minister (at the best the federal economy minister). He is also closely following both the EU elections and federal elections, which will determine the German federal government’s near future – consisting of a fragile coalition between the CDU, CSU, and SPD.

We will see how German politics and leadership struggles will be shaped in the upcoming months, in particular following the EU Parliament elections in May.

Although the coalition has been maintained for 15 months now and is likely to continue until the next federal elections in 2021, there are certain dynamics of potential importance. One of the most stressed points is the worsening economic conditions and the forecasts for a slowdown in the short term, which is most likely to begin next year. The other point that may trigger heavy discussions within all three coalition parties is the upcoming elections in the federal states of Saxony, Brandenburg and Thuringia. Therefore, the potential fields of dispute and the results of the CDU might have either a positive or negative effect on the remaining two years left of the Merkel tenure.

Finally, one has to also keep in mind that the current two major parties in Germany continue to lose votes according to the regularly conducted election polls. While the CDU/CSU parties still have difficulties in persuading their voters not to turn to the far-right AfD, the Social Democrats (SPD) are also facing similar difficulties in losing their voter base to the Green Party. In this sense, it is an interesting phenomenon that the co-leader of the Green Party, Robert Habeck, has become one of Germany’s most popular politicians. In addition to the Green Party becoming Germany’s second biggest party, thus overtaking the SPD, scenarios regarding a future CDU/CSU/Greens coalition is also on the table. This will lead to political deadlock due to the serious disagreements among the parties.

We will see how German politics and leadership struggles will be shaped in the upcoming months, in particular following the EU Parliament elections in May.

It’s estimated that the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) party convention on 7-8 December will concretize the likely future of German politics in a general perspective. On the one hand, it’s expected that a newly elected party chairperson will either cooperate with the current German Chancellor Angela Merkel in the format of a de-facto dual-head of the government or, on the other hand, trigger a new power struggle, in which Merkel won’t be able to end her current government until 2021. Thus, despite current polls stating that most Germans are satisfied with Chancellor Merkel and that circa 56 percent want her to serve out her full term until 2021, the December party convention result will clarify the uncertainties.

Will the new chairperson of the CDU cooperate with Angela Merkel, or will it give birth to a new power struggle? 

There are three different candidates running for CDU chairmanship, who aim to be elected as the new leader of Germany’s -sill- strongest conservative and center-right party. While the current secretary-general of the CDU, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, is as a close ally of Chancellor Merkel and who is supported by Merkel as a successor, both two other candidates are known as personalities opposing Merkel’s certain policies, such as migration and identity. Even though Friedrich Merz, a former active CDU-politician until 2009, does not accept that he has been reduced by media outlets to a so-called “anti-Merkel” image, the general political mood is perceived in this direction.

In addition, the current Federal Health Minister, Jens Spahn, who is also well-known for his sympathy regarding Austria’s populist and rightist young Chancellor, Sebastian Kurz, has also continuing hope to be successful during the party convention. But interestingly, despite some recent polls that indicate Kramp-Karrenbauer and Merz as the favorites, Spahn seems to have discovered how he might consolidate both CDU voters in general and the CDU delegates whose votes the candidates will need on 7-8 December.

Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, Friedrich Merz, and Jens Spahn are three candidates in the CDU race for presidency. Will the CDU remain on a pro-Merkel stance, or will it become more populist than ever? 

In this sense, it was not an unexpected move when Spahn recently addressed a very important topic for the German conservative and even rightist circles, namely, Turkey. Spahn stated that the accession talks between the EU and Turkey have to be ended due to the fact that “Everyone can see it, Turkey in its present state will never become a member of the EU. It would be honest to end the accession negotiations.”

My guess is that in the next days and in particular on the convention day, all three candidates will most likely address issues such as I) Turkey in general, II) Turks living Germany, III) Muslims in Germany, IV) dual citizenship of Turks living in Germany and V) Merkel’s refugee-friendly policies. In addition to the migration issue, emphasis may be placed on the Turkish community, Turkey, and Turkey’s EU path in general. Unfortunately, the declaration of similar –populist– positions have been seen witnessed several times in the past, and one should also keep in mind that not only conservatives in Germany but also certain leftist and social-democratic parties have thoughtlessly made use of accusing Turkey in order to consolidate their party constituent.

While the German media has begun to lightly discuss the distinctive features of the three candidates, one can expect for this to be the main agenda of Germany in the upcoming days. By this, the future goals in the case of becoming a potential CDU chairperson or even the next German chancellor must be elaborated in detail.

Both leftist and conservative parties in Germany have used Turkey in order to consolidate their party constituent. This is likely to happen during the race for CDU presidency. 

Due to this, some questions may be answered by the candidates in the coming weeks in order to exactly capture what their political position is, for instance, regarding relations with the United States. Do all three candidates agree with Chancellor Merkel in her backing of French President Macron’s initiative to establish a European army–even against the potential rejection by the U.S.–? What is the position of particularly Mr. Merz and Mr. Spahn with regard to these kinds of issues? We already know that Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer is quite close to Merkel, so the positions of Merz and Spahn would be more interesting to know.

Thus, similar additional concrete topics are also of great importance. For instance, what are the positions of these three Christian Democrats with regard to Muslims in Germany, German Muslims or Islam in Germany etc? Does Mr. Merz, who is currently known and active as a very business-friendly personality, still insist on his previously rightist position with regard to a so-called “German Leitkultur,” of which he was also the initiator? Furthermore, how do the candidates describe their main differences with regard to former policies of Chancellor Merkel, who was and still is being criticized for allegedly taking leftist positions. There are also several other issues, such as certain domestic and economic promises, which have to be addressed in a concrete way. Time will show whether we will have a fruitful debate on this issue until convention day, or whether populist topics will blockade our perceptions.

Germany is accepted as a successful case of a functioning parliamentary system of government. According to this, the main executive organ of the country’s system of government is dominated by a chancellor and his/her government, which is responsible to the parliamentary majority (Bundestag).

Germany is also a country that has lived through many years of coalition, with either conservative-led or social-democratic-led governments with an additional junior coalition partner. “Grand coalitions” have also been established in the past, in 2005, and this year in March 2018, when Germany’s two largest parties, the CDU/CSU and the SPD came together.

My main emphasis in this piece is that Chancellor Merkel’s recent decision to leave her party’s leadership will affect the country’s ever more complicating parliamentary structure in the long run.

Merkel became her party’s chairperson in 2000 right after her era as the party’s secretary general, during which she challenged the former German Chancellor and her mentor, Helmut Kohl (CDU). In 2005, Merkel defeated the social-democratic Chancellor, Gerhard Schröder while Schröder himself underestimated Merkel during that federal election – consequently it was the end of Schröder’s active political career.

Since then, Merkel has been ruling the country as Chancellor and has simultaneously transformed the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) into a more centrist, European-oriented, and a modern one. In the last 18 years as chair and 13 years as Chancellor, there have been many changes that may be addressed in the upcoming months, and years, following Merkel’s depart from the CDU in early December.

Even though Merkel always stressed the importance of combining the office of the Chancellor with the party’s leadership as a necessary act, she announced her decision to step down from being chair of the CDU. In addition, she added that she will not be a candidate (for the fifth time) during the federal elections in 2021.

I do not want to address in depth the apparent reasons as to why Merkel made such a decision to leave  the party leadership. As is addressed by several authors (I>;II), the decision is mostly based on the party cadres’ continuing pressure against Merkel and her both refugee-friendly policies and the high losses during the recent elections in Bavaria and Hesse. Furthermore, the disappearance of actual conservative politics in Germany and the CDU’s increasing resemblance with left-liberal parties caused an increase of far-right parties, which are ultimately seen as an “alternative” to the conservative and center-right parties such as the CDU/CSU.

However, in my opinion, the main interesting point in the recent developments is the party’s instruments that put pressure on the party leader and Chancellor Merkel. This mechanism is quite normal for a parliamentary system, which is the case in Germany. However, there has not been a broad discussion with regard to Germany’s system of government and the question regarding the election of the executive, there are some contemporary key points that need to be addressed.

Above all, during a time where presidents and certain prime ministers (or Chancellors as in Germany or Austria) are becoming more popular and becoming the main focus of the electorate, the question arises as to whether a German executive might be elected by popular vote as well. For instance, one might ask what would be the outcome if the executive organ would be directly elected by a popular vote, as in the United States, or a closer example, like in the case of France?

While Macron as the head of the executive has a direct connection to French citizens, Merkel has to struggle within her party and make several concessions to achieve a limited goal.

Similarly, Bünyamin Bezci rightly stressed that President Emmanuel Macron, who is also the key actor in France’s pro-European political perspective, has a broader field of executive action in contrast to Chancellor Merkel. While Macron as the head of the executive has a direct connection to French citizens through his popular election legitimacy, Merkel has to struggle within her party and try to make several and sometimes contradictory concessions in order to achieve a certain limited goal.

Furthermore, while according to polls most of Germany’s citizens still support Merkel as the country’s most popular political leader, the party structures are the main decision bodies. One of the striking points here is the fact that Merkel is elected by the German parliament while the French executive has a direct legitimacy based on the decision of its electorate. Thus, the image of a constitutionally strong and powerful Chancellor occurs, who is actually able to quasi-dominate the entire EU in general while she is, though, not able to stand against the own party’s complicated structures.

What would be the result in German politics if the head of the executive would be elected with a popular vote?

What would be the result in German politics if the head of the executive would be elected with a popular vote? Perhaps this question might be on Germany’s future political agenda. There are currently too many parties in the German party system, which might hinder the establishment of well-functioning coalition governments. Thus, alternative possibilities will be most likely considered.

It is time for change in German political system in an era in which “presidentialization and personalization of politics” is taking place globally.

In this sense, it might be interesting to mention that in the near past there have been some discussions in the context of the election of the federal president of Germany. While some voices and nearly 70 percent of the population supported political reform for popularly electing the president, some have opposed this idea due to difficulties and bad experiences in reference to Germany’s political history. But time is changing and Germany might need optimizing its own political system during an era when “presidentialization and personalization of politics” are globally and increasingly becoming obvious and common. We will try to continue and address similar questions and discussions in the upcoming weeks in a more theoretical point of view.

Even though the annual convention of the CDU’s youth wing held on 6 October got public attention due to some of the critical statements made against Chancellor Merkel’s leadership, one interesting stance by the CDU’s General Secretary Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, who is known as one of Merkel’s closest allies, has been partly disregarded in particular by the Turkish public.

The annual convention was elaborated as a first stage right before the CDU’s party congress in December, during which Merkel is hoping to be re-elected as the party’s chairperson. Despite several other potential and younger candidates, it seems quite obvious that Merkel is going to win the election in December. However, following the current period of her fourth government in three years, another CSU personality will most likely take over the party leadership.

It’s striking that potential candidates aim to push towards a rather nationalist bias by insistently making use of anti-Turkish discourse. This happened once again during the recent annual convention, as Mrs. Kramp-Karrenbauer addressed Turkey-Germany relations in the context of dual-citizenship for Turkish people living in Germany.

During her speech at the annual convention, Kramp-Karrenbauer criticized Turkey’s President Erdogan by stating, “If President Erdogan continues to push Turks into a loyalty struggle, the right to have dual-citizenship has to be reconsidered again. If Erdogan wants to divide the Turkish community in Germany, this topic will be on the table, in particular for Turks with a dual-citizenship.”

No doubt, the CDU’s General Secretary Kramp-Karrenbauer is trying to make us of anti-Turkish mood by falsely accusing the Turkish president in order to increase her profile in the eyes of the younger and more nationalist voters. One should remember that despite the CDU’s historical disapproval of the right for dual-citizenship, Chancellor Merkel was – together with and due to the pressure by the coalition partner SPD – able to pass an amendment to the citizenship law in 2014, which finally allowed for young and newborn Turks to hold both Turkish and German citizenship.

Other EU citizens already have this right. However, till this date, some CDU members have continued to problematize this step, in a rather blackmailing manner. Such politicians have implied, or directly threatened, Turks in cancelling this right, particularly in cases when either President Erdogan receives support from Turks in Germany, or if the CDU’s votes decrease due to domestic problems.

In such conditions, politicians do not hesitate to make use of a nationalist discourse as in the most recent case of Kramp-Karrenbauer. However, on the other hand, no concrete steps are taken or no sincere statements are made by CDU politicians when Turks or Muslims in Germany face difficulties in their daily lives, caused especially by far-right and anti-Islam circles.

It’s very likely that people would rather welcome statements by Germany’s conservatives who are not playing in the hands of far-right voters and dividing society by themselves. In recent years, the bias of conservatives in Germany has reached a peak of absurdity.

Although these kinds of topics have nothing to do with Germany’s current problems, politicians with certain future career goals regularly and insistently address similar populist and Turkey related topics. This is a fundamental problem for major conservative parties and circles.

My estimation is that Kramp-Karrenbauer will be the CDU’s next chairperson, unless more controversial and even more nationalist personalities such as Jens Spahn are able to mobilize more supporters. In this context, Kramp-Karrenbauer was appointed by Merkel as the party’s new General Secretary in February and quit her job in the German state of Saarland.

The reason for this was the fact that federal CDU members became increasingly critical against Merkel’s policies and her weakness to build a new federal government. Consequently, in order to silence criticism, Merkel brought a close ally into the federal stage who is also a rightist and more conservatively oriented in societal topics. Kramp-Karrenbauer appeared in the media in 2017 when she banned Turkish politicians from holding election campaigns in Saarland – despite the fact that no politician from Turkey had actually planned to campaign in Saarland.

One notices a similar pattern and a symbolic act of which certain politicians regularly make use of in order to achieve some populist goals within a party. But these kinds of abnormalities cause an unrest among the Turkish community, encourage far-right circles and contribute in a negative way to Germany’s image. One has to consider these ambivalent and populist maneuvers in depth and decide who is dividing German population.

On 14 October, parliamentary elections in the German state of Bavaria will be held. Bavaria is one of Germany’s most important political and economic federal states. The south-eastern German state is a fundamental part of Germany’s strong economy and is an attractive destination for many people due to the quality of education that it provides. Between 1966 and 2008, Bavaria has been ruled by a single party – the Christian Social Union (CSU).

As one may guess, the citizens of the federal state are more conservative in contrast to other parts of Germany. Following a coalition government with the Bavarian FDP (liberals) between 2008 and 2013, the CSU once again gained a majority enough to form a government on its own. Since 2013 the CSU has been ruling Bavaria alone. However, this will most probably change with the elections on Sunday.

The point with the so-called Bavarian conservatives is that on the federal level, the CSU is the sister party of the Christian Democrats (CDU). Accordingly, the CDU is represented in all other 15 federal German states, except in Bavaria, where the conservatives are quasi represented only by the CSU. On the other hand, the CSU is the usual ally of the CDU on the federal level. For example, one of the most important offices of the current federal government is in the hands of CSU Chairman Horst Seehofer. Seehofer was the previous state prime of Bavaria until he was challenged by Markus Söder, particularly during 2017.

Following, Seehofer decided to change to the federal level, and thus became his party’s main candidate in the 2017 federal elections. Subsequently, he was appointed as the country’s Federal Minister of the Interior by the CDU leader and Chancellor Angela Merkel. In this context, Markus Söder became Bavaria’s new state prime, while Seehofer is still continuing his efforts to become chair of the CSU.

Even though the CDU and CSU have many similarities, there are a lot of disputes between the leading figures and bases of both parties. Without getting into too much detail, it ought to be underlined that a serious disagreement, what one can actually call a dispute, arose between the former Bavarian state premier Horst Seehofer and Chancellor Merkel.

It’s no secret that Markus Söder, Seehofer, and the CSU in general, are at odds with Merkel due to a decision she made in 2015 to open Germany’s borders to over one million Syrian refugees and migrants. Since then, Seehofer and the CSU insisted that no other country is able to take in unlimited numbers of migrants and refugees. Thus, the federal decision-makers had to do something against this policy of Merkel, which ultimately happened.

Besides, several other disputes occurred within the cabinet, especially in the last 6 months, after the new fragile government consisting of the CDU/CSU and SPD had been formed as a final option. These include disagreements with regards to issues such as refugees in Germany, Islam as a part of Germany and recently the case of Hans-Georg Maaßen, the former chief of Germany’s federal intelligence.

The CSU is currently struggling to win the elections in Bavaria on Sunday. The party is increasingly shifting to the right due to the rise of the far right and populist AfD, which will most likely enter the Bavarian parliament, as it has not already entered the federal parliaments of various states but has also entered the federal parliament of Germany, the Bundestag.

By aiming to limit the loss of votes to the far-right AfD, the CSU on the one hand prefers more populist discourses and quasi nationalistic reflexes. However, on the other hand, the party tries to stress its differences with the AfD by addressing that the CSU stands for liberal values and does not tolerate anti-Semitism, xenophobia, or right-wing extremism.

However, despite all maneuvers resembling far-right populists, according to recent polls, the CSU has achieved a historic low. Under these current conditions, it does not seem possible for the CSU to form a single-party government in Bavaria. Theoretically, it is even possible for a potential coalition government of 4 parties in Bavaria – except the AfD – to come together to form a new coalition government. Of course, on Sunday evening we will see whether the polls rightly prophesied the historical defeat of the CSU. Currently, the CSU still rejects to build a potential coalition government with the AfD.

Thus, it does not, and should not, surprise anyone that the party’s leader Seehofer and the state prime Söder are currently looking for a scapegoat. While Seehofer has been trying to highlight that he does not make any campaigns for the Bavarian elections, Söder has been claiming that tensions on the federal level have contributed in a negative way for the CSU’s image in Bavaria. It’s quite obvious that both politicians do not want to take any future responsibility.

The main problem is that the AfD is increasing the number of its voters on both the federal and state levels. The Bavarian elections will thus have a crucial role in the long-term future of German politics and whether the pressure to build a potential government, in which the AfD might also exist, will become true.

There is some hope in the German public and media that the AfD will neither become the second strongest party nor the main opposition party. However, the more the CSU or other parties in Germany resemble AfD discourses, and even imitate similar stances, the more likely it is for people to vote for the original base of these ideas – the AfD.

The elections to be held on Sunday will show how the future of conservatives in Germany will be shaped, how the fragile federal government led by Merkel will react to a major success of the AfD, and how the people will elaborate a likely shift to a more far-rightist and populist type of politics in general.

Turkey’s President Erdogan paid an official visit to Germany last week. One of the striking features of the visit was the fact that it came after Erdogan called for extensive reform of the United Nations during his speech at the UN General Assembly in New York. This was a direct challenge to the U.S., which while is the hegemon of the international system, has grown isolationist, unilateral, and offensive in its foreign policy under Trump’s presidency. This isolationist turn undercuts international institutions, which are mainly the products of the U.S.-led liberal international order in the post-WWII era. Erdogan’s call for a new – just and democratic – international organization pointed at the opposite direction of current U.S. foreign policy.

Under Erdogan’s leadership, Turkey has developed a two-tier foreign policy in the last couple of years. On the one hand, it has highlighted the problems of the existing international order and has called for reform. “The world is bigger than five” is the motto of this reformist policy. On the other hand, it has sought to adapt itself to the emerging post-global international order.

This post-global order has two main features. One of them is that excluded social groups have begun to challenge and gradually increase pressure on the international system. Terrorism and refugee crises that have hit the global metropoles are examples of this pressure. In the face of this rising instability on the international societal level, the leading powers of the international system avoid taking responsibility.

The U.S. has started to withdraw behind its borders and has called for the others to take responsibility for global problems. However, important powers such as China, Russia, and the European Union do not show any eagerness to fill the vacuum that the U.S. has emptied. While the world cries for the need that great powers should carry out their leadership role, those powers, which are able to play that role, ignore the call.

The withdrawal of the U.S. gave pace to the emergence of regional hegemons, such as China and Russia. This gave start to the process of transformation of the unipolar international system into a multipolar international system. So, currently we have an international system where instability and multipolarity have become the norm.

Turkey struggles in its attempt to allay the instability by fighting against terrorism and extending its hand to refugees both in its vicinity and in distant places. Turkey also strives to adapt to the emerging multipolar and de-institutionalizing international environment. Alongside increasing its own capabilities to tackle with the dangers of international anarchy, it seeks to multiply and diversify its allies. Different from the past, Ankara tends not to take any side and keeps it options open.

German-Turkish rapprochement

President Erdogan’s recent visit to Germany can be seen in this context of adapting to new international realities. In fact, the German-Turkish rapprochement is a good example of how states seek to adapt to the new multipolar international system. Both Turkey and Germany bear the burden of instability in the Middle East and suffer the refugee crisis that came after it.

More, both countries are the victims of Trump’s trade war. Germany struggles to lay the foundation of a new security order for Europe as the U.S. retreats from sustaining European security. Turkey has the second largest army in NATO and this makes it a significant partner in forming a new security regime in Europe. The economic and political interdependence due to the large Turkish diaspora in Germany also bring the two countries closer together.

Yet the German state’s unrelenting support to terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO, bowing to the demand of its anti-AK Party and Turkish civil society and media outlets tends to poison bilateral relations. These negative attitudes create a rather irrational foreign policy for Germany in an international environment where ideology is pushed back to the backburner. In this new international environment, states are supposed to give weight to realpolitik and rational behavior, and thus prioritize security concerns.

However, Germany’s continuation of an ideological critique towards Turkey and its decision to cut economic aid to Turkey (the EU is supposed to provide Turkey with €70 million) do not respect those sensitivities. In turn, Turkey has started to discuss reconsidering its EU membership. President Erdogan stated that Turkey may bring its EU membership bid to a referendum if the EU keeps this anti-Turkey tendency. Turkey can rightly expect for the EU, and in particular for Germany, to leave its ideological foreign policy and to act in accordance with new international realities that are defined by multipolarity and rationality.

On Thursday, Turkey’s President Erdogan arrived in Germany for a three-day lasting official state visit. As was planned, he met with both Germany’s President Frank-Walter Steinmeier and Chancellor Merkel in Berlin. On the third day, Erdogan concluded his visit by opening one of Europe’s largest mosques in the German city of Cologne.

Several analysts and commentators addressed and stressed the meaning of this visit and its importance with regard to bilateral relations between Turkey and Germany. Of course, there are several aspects that might be analyzed in more depth in the upcoming days. However, the main question, which rose subsequent to the visit, is about the realist expectations right after a period of serious challenges that both countries have faced in recent years.

It has to be underscored that all in all the visit is with no doubt a positive and official step in order to, at least, try to overcome the disputes between the two countries. Besides various topics, it’s not that wrong to state that during the bilateral meetings and discussions, the focus was set on important issues such as the refugee problem, economic relations, and the security priorities of both countries. While there still remains disagreements in regards to the activities of certain groups in Germany, which are elaborated as a national security concern by Turkey, positive steps taken to strengthen economic relations and improvements in the dialogue to fix the political discourse in general seem promising.

From a broader perspective, Germany and the EU still have to face the refugee problem, while Turkey is also considering a burden sharing with potential future escalations in Syria; above all, in a potential future case of a worst-case scenario regarding the Idlib issue.

Apart from the fact that many German media outlets continue to problematize the -cautious- rapprochement of both countries from a single perspective, it’s an apparent success that nevertheless both Turkey and Germany were able to launch a new and fresh page.

With this, one has to keep in mind that Germany’s perception of Turkey is mostly shaped by three major circles. As Professor Kemal Inat recently emphasized, the official visit once again entailed the existence of 1) a circle consisting of rational German politicians and business people, 2) an aggressive anti-Turkey lobby and, finally, 3) a so-called group, which still perceives Turkey as a country to impose Germany’s own interests.

Despite the continuing efforts of the anti-Turkey lobby to prevent these steps, which includes utilizing certain German media outlets and broadcasting preferences, and through the support of groups such as the PKK-friendly Left Party, it seems that nowadays the first circle in discussion has gained fragile power. Steps taken by the first group, which have an ambition to continue dialogue, can be observed as positive. However, given the fragile conditions, one has to be prepared for the likely absurd and non-realistic engagements from the second and third groups, and even from parts of the first group due to some future elections in German federal states, such as in Bavaria on October 14.

Nevertheless, Turkey is aware of these conditions and President Erdogan simply does not accept the ambivalent behavior of some of Germany’s leading figures – including President Steinmeier – who attempted to criticize the Turkish President even during his speech at the official state dinner banquet. Dis-regarding these comments, President Erdogan once again stressed Turkey’s ongoing dissatisfactions by stating, “Unfortunately, hundreds and thousands of terrorists (such as FETO members) are walking freely in Germany. And we’re not going to talk about them? I didn’t want to bring this up tonight. But when the president (Steinmeier) mentioned these issues, I had to.”

Thus, while on the one hand it can be stated that a new era is launched with Germany, on the other, the negative ambitions of several circles in Germany in regards to Turkey will continue. Leading personalities of the two countries have to take these conditions into account, and German authorities ought to be aware of this trap that they may well easily fall in to. The focus on certain issues concerning the interest of both countries will most likely deepen the dialogue between the two and strengthen bilateral relations.

In his address to the United Nations on Tuesday, September 25, President Erdogan called on world leaders to take measures against the Gulenist criminal cult network. Two days later, this time during his trip to Germany, the Turkish President repeated his call and asked Germany to designate the Gulenist organization as a terrorist organization. Despite Turkey’s call for over two years now, the Gulenist cult members are still active in Western countries, from the United States to Germany and many others.

The organization operates in the disguise of charter schools in the U.S., think-tanks all over the Western world, and some online media networks such as news portals, and so on. While the Turkish public opinion is united against FETO, not everybody is well informed on the organization, and this is why they have difficulty in understanding Turkey’s insistence on this matter.

The very first question towards Turkish demands on the Gulenist network is on the terrorism charges. Many academics and journalists with some interest on this matter in the West question the terrorism charges. These questions are now being repeated after Erdogan’s recent remarks in the U.S. and Germany. They simply ask how an organization led by a “cleric” and which runs charter schools can engage in terrorism. Despite the amount of evidence delivered by the Turkish authorities, this evidence does not reach the ears that need to hear them.

Here is a brief story of the Gulenist network’s gradual and complex journey into terrorism:

It was quite uncommon to call the Gulenist organization – also known as FETO – a terrorist organization a few years ago. After all, terrorism is a form of political violence, and the group was not violent – until they became violent. With its school system to recruit and train young minds, the organization’s structure worked quite effectively in Turkey and abroad.

Gradually, the picture became clear as the recruits began to infiltrate state institutions – first in small numbers, then in masses. It became increasingly clear to the Turkish decision makers that the organization was stealing classified information, sometimes distorting it, and servicing it to foreign services or the media depending on the purpose.

By the end of 2013, there was no doubt about the fact that the members of the Gulenist criminal cult in various state institutions were well connected to each other and were well guided by a central authority in a clear command chain. This is essentially why they were called the “parallel state” by Erdogan – who was the organization’s primary target.

While it took the AK Party government some time to clarify the real purpose and structure of the Gulenists, once they did, there was no way back other than stopping them. As the government began to clean the Gulenists from state institutions, and as it became clear that the elected government will win this battle, Turkey witnessed the July 15 coup attempt in 2016.

The Gulenists in the military carried out a coup attempt, sent a squad to assassinate Erdogan, and killed 248 civilians and state security personnel in multiple spots. And this was the day that the Gulenists were no longer just a secret society infiltrating the state apparatus and being used by foreign services. The July 15 coup attempt also showed that the organization was capable of using violence on a massive scale.

We do not tend to call coup plotters as terrorists, neither in Turkey’s earlier coups nor on the global scale. However, this time, it is different. It was not the military that orchestrated the coup attempt but an organization whose leader is not a soldier and whose members were mostly civilians. This is how we saw a Gulenist ex-cop in military camouflage in a tank in Istanbul on that night. This is how we saw civilian engineers taking part in the coup attempt. This is how we saw civilian professors in the Akinci military base, the headquarters of the coup attempt on that night.

Gulenist academics and journalists also spent quite an effort to spread fake news that night about a manufactured story claiming that Erdogan was fleeing the country and so on. July 15 showed the entire Gulenist criminal network in its entirety on the mission. It was not a conventional coup attempt of soldiers unlike the coups that we know, but it was a joint coup attempt of Gulenist professors, police officers, engineers, and also soldiers. If terror is the use of violence by non-state actors targeting civilians in order to achieve their political objectives, Gulenists did this on the night of July 15 and, hence, they are a textbook example of terrorist organizations – a very innovative one.

In a joint conference held in Germany on Friday, President Erdoğan and German Chancellor Angela Merkel discussed bilateral relations. Both leaders announced that they have reached a consensus to revive bilateral cooperation mechanisms.

Angela Merkel emphasized the crucial role lead by Turkey in confining the refugee influx, especially from Syria, to Europe which has been a focal issue for Germany and for which Merkel has been criticized severely. She announced that the Leaders’ summit on Syria is planned for October.

Merkel also highlighted the distinctive connection between the two countries on account of over 3.5 million people of Turkish roots in Germany. Acknowledging the rise of Islamophobia in Germany, Merkel said that the attacks on mosques were ‘unacceptable’.

Both leaders stressed the mutual economic significance of the two countries and their need for increased cooperation. Merkel stated that “Germany wants a stabilized Turkey with an economy that is permanently growing”

In a bid to improve bilateral relations, President Erdoğan said that “Turkey plans to fulfill remaining 6 criteria on visa liberalization as soon as possible”. President also stressed that Turkey has been effective in fighting terror and has also assisted Germany and addressed Germany’s expectations on this matter.

President Erdogan underscored that he expects the same sensitivity from his German counterpart and said that “thousands of PKK terrorists and hundreds of FETO terrorist organization members are living across Germany”. He stressed the threat of terrorism that these malignant groups have for both countries and said “Extradition of criminals is highly significant for the safety & peace of both Turkey and Germany”

Merkel answered this call ambivalently and said that “more information was needed on Gulen movement (FETO) in order to classify it as a terrorist group, like PKK” despite the fact that countless evidence and solid documents have been submitted to German authorities by Turkey clearly indicating the ties between FETO terrorist organization and the July 15^th coup attempt of 2016.

Approximately two weeks ago, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence, Hans-Georg Maassen, had doubted the authenticity of a video showing racist violence in Chemnitz. Subsequent to this, the social-democratic members of the current grand coalition government called for Maassen’s dismissal.  However, the conservative wing of the government, which includes the extreme conservative Interior Minister Horst Seehofer (CSU), took Maasen under protection. Most of the opposition parties, apart from the far-right AfD, argued that Maassen has discredited himself and therefore he had to resign.

Following the event, the public discussed the issue and many German media outlets were frustrated with Maassen’s statements and urged Mrs. Merkel to dismiss him. Due to the first wave of public outrage, the coalition government agreed on a weird “deal.” Accordingly, Maassen would give up his job as the head of domestic intelligence, but would be appointed as a new Undersecretary at the Federal Ministry of the Interior and Homeland. This is the ministry of which Horst Seehofer is the head. Responses were not so welcoming. The public began to question why an individual – who made wrong decisions – would receive a pay rise and a new job.

The story becomes even more absurd as one remembers Maassen’s concrete statements. He had actually  harbored far rightist’s wrong narratives about the Chemnitz mob. Maassen did not also revise his statements. He just emphasized that he was misunderstood but he still insisted on his stance.

Due to the fact that the majority of the German public did not accept such a new job creation for Maassen and continued to problematize the issue. Heads of the three coalition parties had to discuss the case once again during the weekend. And finally, interior minister Horst Seehofer stated that the leaders agreed for Maassen to work in the ministry in the future, but that he would not receive a pay rise. Seehofer stressed that Maassen would be a so-called special advisor focusing on European and international tasks. That is to say; the government revised its previous decision.

As addressed two weeks ago, the head of Germany’s domestic intelligence Maassen has been transferred to a senior post of the secretary of state/undersecretary of the interior but the decision had caused an outrage among both citizens and political circles.

But what’s the main disturbing point in this issue?

The first question that arises is whether it is normal for a person, who is not even a politician – neither a rightist or leftist – but a high-profile bureaucrat, or even “the country’s spymaster,” to address certain sensitive topics by contradicting the country’s ruling Chancellor and the person whose authority he is working under.

Despite the lack of persuasiveness with regard to the Chancellor’s recent maneuver regarding Maassen, another fundamental question arises. One should remember that the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence, Bruno Kahl, who took a similar strange position in March 2017 by addressing the failed coup attempt of 15 July 2016. In his interview with the German magazine Der Spiegel, Kahl stated that he does not believe that Gulen was behind the coup attempt. Subsequently, Kahl received harsh criticism by German media representatives who accused him of either lack of knowledge regarding the order or deliberate manipulation and protection.

Thus, Maassen recently acted in a political way – in addition to his lack of authenticity during issues such as the NSU case – which he shouldn’t have done. But as a consequence, he has been ultimately -at least- “transferred” from his office as head of domestic intelligence. He was not fired and still holds an official position. The federal government most probably thinks that the public will buy this “maneuver.” However,  there is another case with the head of Germany’s foreign intelligence, Bruno Kahl.

Kahl spoke very similarly in a political way and deliberately disregarded or ignored a NATO ally’s official position regarding a top security issue. But no serious political voice in Germany warned him of not stepping beyond his bureaucratic borders. If the federal government is sincere in its actions, alongside Maassen, Kahl should have also been dismissed from office. Maybe then Germany’s domestic offices of security and bureaucracy may have been able to re-gain trust and confidence.

Nowadays such decisions not only support the decline of trust in the state’s domestic institutions, but also render the fragile coalition government weaker. At the end of the day, the winner seems to be the AfD and its political stance. AfD is a far-right political party, which according to recent polls is the second strongest party in Germany.

171 days after the federal elections when main parties such as the Christian and Social Democrats had suffered damaging losses, on March 12 the German parliament finally re-elected Angela Merkel as the head of her new-old federal government.

It is the fourth term of the CDU leader and Chancellor Merkel who was initially unable to arrange a coalition government with the environmentalist-leftist Green Party and the pro-business/liberal FDP. In the second attempt, subsequent to Federal President Frank-Walter Steinmeier’s appeal to the leaders of all parties to “not entirely preclude the possibility of forming a government,” the Christian Union parties (CDU/CSU) and the Social Democrats (SPD) finally agreed to negotiate for a new-old “grand coalition.” Otherwise, new elections would have mean new losses for both parties. The SPD’s initial unwillingness to talk with the CDU/CSU has been based on the fact that the right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD) would then be the main opposition party in the federal parliament. Unfortunately, having gained 12,6% of the vote in September 2017, the right-wing populists are currently represented as the strongest opposition party.

Nevertheless, subsequent to President Steinmeier’s appeal, the SPD had agreed to start negotiations with the CDU/CSU. These negotiations launched at the end of January and were completed successfully two weeks later. Finally, and despite a complicated inner-party struggle and a kind of splitting process among the Social Democrats, the three parties were able to sign the new coalition agreement on March 12, 2018.

It’s interesting that in Chancellor Merkel’s new cabinet, except from Merkel herself and her Minister of Defence, Mrs. Ursula von der Leyen, the entire cabinet has been changed. Some new people have occupied ministerial positions. These include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs by former Minister of Justice, Heiko Maas (SPD) and the Ministry of Finance by Olaf Scholz (SPD), who is also the Vice-Chancellor. Politicians known for their loyalty to Mrs. Merkel, such as the former Federal Minister of the Interior, Thomas de Maiziere (CDU), had to be replaced with a CSU politician, Horst Seehofer. Reasons for these kinds of maneuvers are based on the fact that Merkel had to make concessions to the CSU and SPD by aiming to build a coalition government. Consequently, even so-called traditional CDU ministries such as the Federal Ministry of the Interior were handed over to the Bavarian partner CSU, and the Federal Ministry of Finance to the SPD.

After 12 years as Chancellor, the popularity of Mrs. Merkel is shrinking. The electorate has increasingly become dissatisfied with her personality and particularly with her “liberal” decisions for instance regarding the refugee crisis – which is also the main reason for the right-wing AfD’s success. On the other hand, Merkel is still resisting against calls from her own party’s conservative wing to establish a new and more ‘conservative’ path.

Consequently, due to such a decrease in popularity, both within the electorate and within conservative voices of her own party, there is a concise belief that Chancellor Merkel may only have about two years left in office. Due to these ‘domestic’ conditions, it is assumed that Merkel will prepare her party for an era without herself – unless she does not exclude a fifth term. By this, a possible new future Chancellor candidate, Annegret Kramp-Karrenbauer, might be the new general secretary of CDU, who was until February prime minister in one of the smaller German federal states. Even though she represents a more conservative orientation of the CDU compared to Merkel, she would be a more moderate person in contrast to the younger and right-wing biased conservative circles gathering around Jens Spahn (37). Spahn, who publicly criticizes Merkel’s decisions regarding her refugee policy, represents a more ‘conservative’ generation. However, as a strategic move, Merkel appointed him as Minister of Health in her new cabinet in order to diminish his oppositional tendencies and possible future ambitions. While time will show whether Merkel will be successful, it is worth to note that she is known for previous similar kinds of strategic maneuvers utilized in order to terminate the political ambitions of potential opponents.

Thus, alongside global and regional challenges, during her fourth term, Merkel has to face serious domestic issues and in particular challenges within her own party. By this, she most probably will have to manage her succession against potential “conservative” and –unfortunately AfD alike – populist young circles. However, if Chancellor Merkel survives her new four year term, she will be catch up to the 16-year-era of former Chancellor Helmut Kohl (CDU, 1982-1998).

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim and German Chancellor Angela Merkel vowed on Thursday to improve strained ties between the two countries following months-long tensions between Ankara and Berlin.

Speaking at a joint news conference with Merkel in Berlin, Yildirim called for an intensified dialogue and stronger solidarity in the fight against terrorism.

“The PKK is a terrorist organization. The PYD/YPG is a terrorist organization.

“In fact, the YPG is the PYD/PKK’s Syrian offshoot. This is also confirmed by British and American intelligence.

“Whatever their names are, their main purpose is to violate peace in the region and create new troublesome fields,” he said, adding that Turkey wants to see its allies’ support.

The premier also said the decisiveness shown by the West in its fight against Daesh should also be displayed in the battle against the PYD/PKK and YPG terrorist organizations.

The German chancellor welcomed Turkish premier’s first visit to Berlin and backed the need for dialogue to improve ties.

“I believe that this visit is a signal, showing that both sides have an interest in improving German-Turkish relations,” she said.

But she also acknowledged that difficult issues were on the agenda of bilateral relations.

“We must continue our intensive discussions,” Merkel added.

Turkey’s right to self-defence

Despite the opposition pushing the German government to exert more pressure on Ankara due to Turkey’s ongoing counterterrorism operation in northwestern Syria, Merkel underlined that Turkey reserved the right to self-defense.

“Just like every country, of course Turkey has the right to pursue its security interests,” she said.

However, she voiced concern over growing tensions between NATO allies, the U.S. and Turkey, due to Washington administration’s support for the terrorist PKK/PYD group in northwestern Syria.

The German chancellor hoped Ankara and Washington would overcome their differences and reach an agreement.

Yildirim underlined that the goal of Turkey’s Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria was not only to protect Turkish citizens, but also for securing NATO’s borders and preventing a huge refugee influx to Europe.

It was not Turkey that started the war in Syria but it is Turkey that continues to face the consequences of it and today it is sheltering 3.5 million refugees on its soil, the Turkish premier added.

Ties between Ankara and Berlin have been strained since the defeated coup in Turkey in 2016, as Turkish politicians heavily criticized their German counterparts for failing to show strong solidarity with Turkish government against the attempted military takeover.

Ankara slammed Berlin for granting asylum to several coup suspects, turning a blind eye to outlawed groups and terrorist organizations like the PKK and FETO, which use Germany as a platform for their fund-raising, recruitment and propaganda activities.

German politicians, on the other hand, voiced concern over press freedom and human rights issues, and criticized large-scale investigations into FETO, which orchestrated the defeated coup in Turkey.

Deniz Yucel case

The court case involving German-Turkish journalist Deniz Yucel, who was arrested last year on suspicion of doing propaganda for terrorists, was continuing in accordance with Turkey’s principles of rule of law, according to the premier.

Yildirim said the Turkish courts were under a heavy load due to cases linked to the defeated coup of July 15, 2016.

“The case of Deniz Yucel, like other cases, is continuing in accordance with the principles of the rule of law,” he said.

“Turkey faced a huge coup [attempt]. There are thousands of people in these coup-linked cases.

“The courts are overloaded. There might be delays due to the work load. I hope [Deniz Yucel] appears before the court soon and there would be a development soon.”

The arrest of Yucel and around a dozen German citizens on suspicion of aiding terrorist groups has become a source of friction between Ankara and Berlin.

Despite repeated calls by German politicians for the release of their citizens, the Turkish government ruled out any political influence on the judiciary and advised them to wait for the decision of the courts.

Source: Anadolu Agency

The September 24, 2017 parliamentary elections in Germany seem to have a striking result. For the first time since the foundation of the Federal Republic of Germany in 1949 a party defined as neo-Nazi by most German politicians was able to surpass the 5% electoral threshold and hold seats in the parliament; this could be regarded as the most astounding feature of the elections. While perceiving itself as the insurance of the EU and successfully protecting itself from far-right movements, the victory of the xenophobic, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic Alternative for Germany (AfD- Alternative für Deutschland), which received 12.6% of the vote and obtained 94 seats in the Federal Parliament, marks a new era in Germany.

Besides being xenophobic, anti-immigrant and Islamophobic, AfD’s desire to revert Germany to its nation-state structure, thus standing against the EU, means that Berlin’s role within the union will be increasingly questioned. Seeing itself as the defender of European values and the leader of the EU, while being criticized by many European countries like Poland, Italy, Hungary and Greece for patronizing other countries, Germany will have a hard time maintaining its bid for EU leadership after AfD’s rise. Building extreme right pressure in Germany, similar to France, indicates that the worst is yet to come for the EU, which is already facing the risk of dissolution.

Another significant result of the election is that a three-way coalition government has become imperative for the first time since 1957. As it seems highly improbable that a coalition consisting a center-right, a liberal and a leftist party could be established, let alone stay intact for 4 years, it would not be unrealistic to suggest that serious instability awaits Germany. After 60 years, Germany is once again preparing for a three-way coalition government. While it may be asserted that the country already has a tradition of coalitions as it has constantly been governed by them since 1957, what is important to note is that they have always been two-party coalitions. Bringing business-minded FDP together with the leftist Greens and making them cooperate will be a challenging task to accomplish for the CDU/CSU – the greater partner of this coalition.

Moreover, CSU, the smaller partner of the Christian Union Parties, being in crisis and having issues in communicating with CDU are other factors that could cause instability. Lastly, having 6 parties in the parliament for the first time in 60 years could also cause instability resulting from the distribution of political power between these groups.

Centrist parties are losing power in Europe

Another significant trend reflected by the election results is that the centrist political parties in Germany are continuing to lose votes, as is also the case in other European countries. Although they are still the most powerful parties, unlike those in France, the Netherlands and Austria, Germany’s two powerful centrist parties have lost around 13.8% of the vote in comparison to the previous election. Their combined vote, 53.4%, is the lowest in Germany’s history. This should be regarded as an indicator that confirms the worries of those that fear of Germany’s instability.

Social Democratic Party (SPD – Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) receiving 20.5% of the vote, thus the lowest in their history, is another astounding result of the election. SPD’s votes, declining since Gerhard Schröder’s resignation from the Chancellorship and party chairmanship in 2005, could partially be explained due to the party sharing its voter base with other leftist parties like The Left (Die Linke) and Greens. Left votes in Germany declining to 38.5% signifies that leftist parties, especially the SPD, are unsuccessful in persuading German voters. When considering that the left had received more than half of the total votes in the 2002 election, which carried Schröder to power, the dissolution of Germany’s left becomes evident. SPD’s votes being distributed between the extreme left Die Linke and the extreme right AfD indicates that this is not an issue only about the German left. On the contrary, it is an issue concerning the whole country and Europe.

Another reality marked by the results of the election is that competing with far-right AfD in xenophobia and Islamophobia, along with competing amongst themselves in anti-Turkey sentiments, did not yield any benefits for centrist parties. AfD, tripling its vote and becoming the third most successful of the election, has shown other parties that advocating their own policies and principles instead of imitating AfD’s xenophobic and anti-immigrant sentiments would have been more credible for their voter base. As a result of the media’s editorial policy, which pumps insecurity, fear and concern, voters who maintain negative views towards migration and foreigners have found AfD’s anti-immigrant discourse more realistic.

Similarly, following the trend of The Left and Greens in terms of anti-Turkey sentiments, centrist parties CDU/CSU and SPD were unable to wrest any benefits from their hostile discourse towards Ankara. The power struggle these parties entered into with Turkey displeased voters who believe Germany is a country of commerce that ought to stay out of any conflict. The antagonistic policies towards Turkey, developed especially by leftist parties, were also punished by conservative voters of Turkish origin. Meanwhile, the anti-Erdoğan and anti-AK Party perception created through the smear campaign carried out by the media served AfD.

Effects of the election results on Turkish-German relations

According to the results of the election, there were two possibilities regarding a coalition. The most probable was the continuation of the “Grand Coalition” (between CDU/CSU and SPD) which was preferred by Chancellor Merkel. However, after SPD Chairman Martin Schulz stated that his party is to become the opposition, the only alternative is the coalition between CDU/CSU-FDP-Greens, which is also known as the “Jamaica Coalition.” Considering that all parties oppose a coalition with AfD, that the leftist parties lack seats to form a “leftist coalition,” and that the CDU/CSU categorically reject a coalition with Die Linke, the Jamaica Coalition becomes the only available option.

Formation and maintenance of this coalition is indeed challenging. Yet, how would this coalition affect Turkish-German relations?

Firstly, the Greens, who alongside Die Linke, have led an ideological hostility towards Turkey claiming that if they were to become partners of the coalition they would issue travel warnings as to wreck Turkey’s tourism. In an attempt to increase economic and political pressure on Turkey by claiming that Ankara only understands from stern language, it should be underlined that a party who has maintained this negative discourse sharing political power in a coalition will have negative consequences for Turkish-German relations. Considering that the party consorts Turkey’s domestic affairs into Germany’s agenda through anti-Turkey diaspora members and negatively affects Berlin’s policies towards Ankara, the Greens might exacerbate existing issues between the two countries if they maintain these policies when part of the coalition government.

In such a scenario, potential coalition partner FDP’s intervention and assertion that Germany is a commerce country which should refrain from constructing foreign policy based on ideology gains importance. It is highly likely that the CDU/CSU’s ideological approach towards Turkey was influenced during the election campaign due to Die Linke and the Greens. Within this framework therefore, the FDP ought to take duty in pulling the government back onto a rationalist doctrine.

Future relations between Germany and Turkey will be shaped by a possible Jamaica Coalition, whose major political lines will be determined by either the Greens’ ideological foreign policy or FDP’s expected pragmatism along with Merkel’s CDU/CSU’s approach to these two options.

Ankara’s position is clear. Turkey expects Germany to accept it as a sovereign and equal partner and to halt support to PKK and FETO as a requirement of the NATO alliance.