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group of EU countries, known as the ‘Friends of Western Balkans’, is advocating for increased cooperation between the European Union and the Western Balkan states in the realm of foreign policy. Spearheaded by Austria, the coalition includes Croatia, Czech Republic, Greece, Italy, Slovakia, and Slovenia, all of whom are pushing for the Western Balkans representatives to have more regular meetings with their EU counterparts.

The initiative, which was outlined in a non-paper seen by Euractiv, calls on EU institutions to establish a clear agenda for accelerated integration with definitive steps leading up to 2024 and beyond. The document was circulated in preparation for a joint ministerial meeting in Brussels with the six Western Balkan nations: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

Austrian Foreign Minister Alexander Schallenberg, who launched the ‘Friends of Western Balkans’ group, has been a vocal proponent of EU enlargement. The paper he initiated emphasizes the need for enhanced cooperation to effectively counter external pressures and harmful narratives from countries like Russia that are incompatible with EU values.

Proposals for deeper integration and security

The non-paper proposes a more structured exchange following established EU procedures and policies, including invitations to Western Balkan ministers to participate in EU Foreign Affairs Council meetings at least semiannually. It also suggests that Western Balkan ambassadors attend informal Political and Security Committee meetings on topics of common interest.

One of the prerequisites for joining the EU is alignment with the bloc’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which the document seeks to advance. The proposal includes providing Western Balkan ministers with Lines to Take (LTTs) to ensure their positions are in harmony with the EU during meetings with third countries.

Countering external influences and enhancing diplomatic ties

The initiative comes at a time when the EU is dealing with Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and subsequent economic sanctions imposed on Moscow. Some Western Balkan countries, like Serbia, have so far hesitated to fully align with the EU’s policy. The EU’s chief diplomat, Josep Borrell, has emphasized the importance of following the EU foreign policy more closely, especially for countries with a record of non-alignment.

The push for integration also includes more coordinated visits to the Western Balkans by EU diplomats, regular workshops on human rights to support the justice chapters in EU accession negotiations, and increased cooperation on cybersecurity issues.

Regional response and next steps

The ideas proposed have reportedly received substantial support from the Western Balkans, with some leaders from the region having raised the issue both publicly and privately over the past year. The ministers from the region have previously expressed frustration with the moving goalposts in the EU’s enlargement process and have advocated for progressive integration before full accession.

The EU-Western Balkans ministerial meeting will precede a significant EU-Western Balkans summit in mid-December, where leaders are expected to further discuss integration and alignment with the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Sources: Anadolu and Euractiv

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he Balkans are one of the regions adjoining Turkey and have a historical and emotional significance for the country as for centuries they constituted the central lands of the Ottoman Empire. According to the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Turkey itself is also a Balkan country. Turkey, along other regional powers, compete for influence in the Balkans. How did Turkey approach the Balkans throughout the 100 years of the Republic? What were its priorities and objectives? What were the main continuities and changes in the policies pursued towards the region?

Early Republican Period (1923-1945): National Security

When the Republic was founded, there were five independent states in the Balkans, namely Greece, Bulgaria, Yugoslavia, Albania, and Romania. After years of destructive wars, both Turkey and the Balkan states needed restructuring in every field. With the exception of Bulgaria, all Balkan states and Turkey were in favor of maintaining the status quo and stability in the region in order to focus on internal reforms.

What is more, with the demilitarization of the Straits and Thrace, Turkey was vulnerable to an attack from the west, and sought to strengthen relations with its neighbors in the Balkans to establish a lasting peace. With this in mind, Turkey did not claim any rights over its former territories in the Balkans, and between 1923 and 1925, it established diplomatic relations with all Balkan countries and signed friendship treaties with Albania, Bulgaria, and Yugoslavia.

After encountering problems over issues such as the implementation of the population exchange and the election of a new Greek Orthodox patriarch, relations with Greece finally took a positive turn in the late 1920s. With the mutual visits of the prime ministers and the signing of a series of agreements in 1930-1934, Turkey and Greece turned a page in their relations and became two friendly countries in the region.

During the interwar period, Turkey resorted to both bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to prevent the revisionist influence of the great powers  on the Balkans. Bilateral agreements were signed with Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Greece guaranteeing the inviolability of borders. Turkey also welcomed the idea of a “Balkan Union” first put forward by Greek statesmen and participated in the first Balkan conference in 1930 and organized the second one in 1931. In 1934, Turkey become one of the signatories of the Balkan Entente.

Although the entente was expected to bring long-lasting stability and interdependence, it was soon weakened when Yugoslavia and Romania came under the influence of Germany. After the outbreak of World War II, despite all of Turkey’s efforts, the Balkan countries failed to develop a common measure to preserve the status quo. Given the situation, Turkey focused on its own national interests and security. Through bilateral diplomacy, it ensured the non-aggression of the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, and Germany, and hence prevented the possibility of an attack from the Balkans. Despite all its concerns, Turkey did not object to the occupation of the Balkans by Germany and later the Soviet Union.

First Half of the Cold War (1945-1965): A Western-Oriented Policy

At the end of World War II, the Soviet Union was the biggest security threat to Turkey. While communist governments were established in all Balkan states except Greece, the rapprochement between Bulgaria and Yugoslavia was perceived by Ankara as the emergence of a Slavic-Orthodox bloc in the Balkans. If the communists won the civil war in Greece, Turkey would be surrounded from the north and west by the Soviet Union and its satellites.

Under these circumstances, Ankara saw getting closer to the Western bloc as a solution. Although it initially favored the idea of a “Mediterranean Entente” to be supported by Britain or France, Ankara, taking into account the growing U.S. interest in Turkey, later preferred to become a direct member of the Western bloc. Thus, Turkey adopted a foreign policy in full harmony with the United States, whose support was seen as vital against the Soviet threat.

After Yugoslavia broke away from the Eastern Bloc, Washington encouraged Turkey, Greece, and Yugoslavia to come together under a security pact. Consequently, the Balkan Pact was established in 1954. Ankara’s expectation from the pact was to create deterrence against the Eastern Bloc with the support of NATO. However, with the normalization of Yugoslavia’s relations with the Soviet Union and the deterioration of Turkish-Greek relations due to the Cyprus issue, the pact turned into a dead letter within a few years.

Second Half of the Cold War (1965-1989): Cautious Rapprochement

Turkey had anchored its security interests to the Western bloc due to threat perceptions from the Soviet Union and the Middle East, and did not pursue a specific policy towards the Balkans until the mid-1960s. Its cooperation with the region was largely limited to the Balkan Pact, which was almost an extension of NATO, rather than a genuinely regional initiative. During these years, thinking the Soviets were behind it, Turkey rejected the cooperation plan proposed towards the Balkan countries by Romanian Prime Minister Chivu Stoica.

While Turkey was distancing itself from the communist regimes in the Balkans, Greece started to improve its bilateral relations with these states and even found support on the Cyprus issue. Resulting from the disappointment towards the U.S. caused by the Jupiter affair and the Johnson Letter, Turkey realized that it was necessary to formulate its own policy towards countries outside the Western world. Thus, it began to pursue a more active foreign policy towards the Balkans and the Soviet Union. In the second half of the 1960s, the first high-level visits of the Cold War period took place in Bulgaria, Romania, Yugoslavia, and Albania.

Turkey’s main priority in its rapprochement with the Balkan countries was to find support for itself on the issue of Cyprus. Additionally, the foundations of bilateral cooperation in areas such as transportation, law, trade, and culture were laid during this period. However, despite these positive developments, Turkey continued to act cautiously in the Balkans. The different political and economic regimes of the countries limited the potential for relations and the rise of left-wing anarchist terrorism in Turkey kept suspicions of communist regimes alive. As a result, despite constant messages of “mutual respect,” “friendship,” and “good neighborliness,” no significant deepening of relations took place between Turkey and its neighbors.

In the 1980s, while relations with other Balkan countries remained calm, there were years of tensions with Greece due to disputes over the Aegean Sea and with Bulgaria over the forced assimilation of the Turkish minority. Although problems with Bulgaria were quickly resolved after the ousting of Todor Zhivkov in November 1989, crises with Greece continued into the 1990s.

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ilo Djukanovic and his party Democratic Party of Socialists (DPS) were in power in Montenegro for 30 years. Opinions about him are divided with some people viewing him as a strong and capable leader who modernized Montenegro and brought it closer to the West, and others of the opinion that he is an authoritarian figure who has undermined democracy and allowed corruption and organized crime to flourish. The fact remains, however, that since 2020 his grip on power has weakened for several reasons.

Montenegro has faced economic challenges in recent years, including high levels of debt and unemployment. The DPS’s handling of the issues was seen by some as inadequate, leading them to look for a party with fresh ideas and solutions. Additionally, Djukanovic faced criticism over his handling of the economy. Montenegro was hit hard by the COVID19 pandemic, and the government’s response was seen by some as inadequate.

Djukanovic’s government faced protests in 2020 over a controversial law on religious freedom which was viewed by a section of the population as an attack on the Serbian Orthodox Church.

Djukanovic was also criticized for his alleged involvement in corruption and was accused of undermining the country’s democratic institutions and norms. His popularity has waned in recent years, and many Montenegrins have grown tired of his long tenure in power.

As a result, the DPS lost power in the August 2020 parliamentary elections for the first time since Montenegro gained independence in 2006. The opposition parties united against the DPS and a coalition government led by the pro-Serbian “For the Future of Montenegro” was formed. This was followed by intra-governmental crises and changes.

Due to a combination of factors, including corruption, identity politics, economic issues, voter fatigue, and the rise of a strong opposition coalition, Djukanovic lost the presidential office in 2023. While Djukanovic remains an influential figure in Montenegrin politics, his grip on power is no longer as strong as in the past.

Jakov Milatović’s victory and Montenegro’s generational shift

Jakov Milatović entered politics in 2020 after completing his education in the UK and U.S. Between 2020 and 2022, Milatović was economy and development minister. He is considered one of the rising stars of Montenegrin politics and has been described as a competent and ambitious politician.

Together with former finance minister Milojko Spajić, Milatović founded the centrist Europe Now Party and became one of its candidates in 2022. He won the presidential runoff against Djukanovic on April 2 with around 59% of the votes.

Milatović’s victory indicates the continuation of the generational shift in Montenegrin politics that began in 2020. Current prime minister Dritan Abazović and Milatović belong to the same generation and are reputed technocrats with degrees from Western universities.

Djukanovic’s term expires on May 21. Parliamentary elections will be held on June 11, 2023 in which the parliamentary distribution of the DPS and the opposition is very important to forecast this small country’s domestic and foreign policy.

Djukanovic’s defeat brings potential changes to Montenegro

Djukanovic has been the dominant political figure in Montenegro for several decades, and his rule has been characterized by a pro-Western foreign policy orientation. There is no doubt that there will be significant changes in both Montenegro’s foreign and domestic policy following Djukanovic’s defeat.

In terms of foreign policy, a new president may take a different approach to Montenegro’s relationship with the West, particularly with regard to the country’s NATO membership and its aspirations for EU membership.

Djukanovic has been a strong advocate of Montenegro’s integration into these organizations, and his government has implemented numerous reforms in order to meet the standards required for membership. During his long term, accession negotiations with the EU began in 2012 and entry to NATO was finalized in 2017.

Russia is among Montenegro’s biggest trading partners, investors, and tourist sources, but the political relationship has been complicated due to the balance strategy between Russia and the EU. Djukanovic has controversially close personal ties with Serbian President Aleksandar Vučić who has a strong relationship with Russian President Putin.

As a result, some Montenegrin citizens and political groups have been critical of these efforts. Concerns regarding Djukanovic were also present in the annual European Progress Reports.

Milatović has promised to guide Montenegro towards its accession to the European Union in the following years, to balance relations with Montenegro’s neighbors and supporters, and to continue to be a reliable partner and NATO ally. Djukanovic has generally been wary of Russia’s influence in the Balkans and has sought to maintain a balance between the East and West. The new president will be expected to strike such a balance with a new approach.

It seems that one of Milatović’s main objectives and a key foreign policy priority for Montenegro will be to expedite the country’s accession to the EU, with the hope of becoming a member within his tenure.

In terms of domestic policy, Milatović may try to prioritize different issues and pursue different policies than Djukanovic. For example, Milatović may prioritize tackling corruption and improving the country’s democratic institutions, which have been the subject of criticism under Djukanovic’s rule. He may also prioritize economic policies that prioritize social welfare and address inequality.

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urkey’s influence in the Balkans needs to be examined in parallel with the question of how Ankara has become a reliable actor in the region. Here, one should point to the cultural and humanitarian diplomacy, which stands out as one of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) important foreign policy pillars. This doctrine has been at the forefront of the Turkish government’s vision for the Balkans.

In recent political history, Turkey-Balkans relations have been multidimensional and multilayered. While the Balkans have been a politically fragmented and economically fragile region, which was regarded by Europe as “other,” the religious, cultural, and ethnic ties of the region with Turkey, on the other hand, bestowed a unique dimension to Turkey’s relations with the Balkans.

What determines the Western perception of the Balkans is twofold: the Balkans’ overwhelmingly Orthodox Christian population and the long centuries under the rule of the Ottoman Empire. The Balkans have also had varieties of their own internal otherization problems. Dramatic ethnic conflicts took place after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, where Serbs forced the Muslim masses to assimilate through an ethnic genocide policy that resulted in the Bosnia and Kosovo Wars.

Turkey’s approach to the Balkans

The Balkans as a term in Europe largely signifies ethnic conflicts and regional rivalries of great powers. Due to its high geostrategic position, the Balkans fell victim to the great powers’ policies of disintegration and subjugation during the 1990s. Thus, the term “Balkanization” is widely used in English-language International Relations literature to refer to places which are inundated with conflict and instability.

Turkey, contrary to the major powers’ interest-ridden approach to the Balkans, initiated a refined foreign policy based on cultural and historical ties to foster socioeconomic, sociocultural, and eventually political-economic relations. Ankara took proactive steps in cooperation with capitals in the Balkans, and strengthened relations through mutually beneficial economic development projects, increasing trade volume and human capital, and providing educational opportunities.

Turkey’s official Balkan policy rests on the following four principles: high-level political dialogue; security for all; high economic integration; and protection of the region’s multi-ethnic, multicultural, and multireligious social structures.

Turkey is a balancing actor in the Balkans

During President Erdoğan’s visit to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro in September 2021, Milorad Dodik, an Orthodox Serbian nationalist and Serbian member of the Bosnia and Herzegovina Presidential Council, said that the countries of the European Union did nothing for Bosnia and Herzegovina, while Erdoğan did, and, for this, he should be accepted as a reliable person for the future of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

On another occasion, in January 2022, Dodik stated that the security and political future of Bosnia and Herzegovina depend on a dialogue of local politicians such as Serbian President Vučić and Croatian President Milanović with the support of Turkish President Erdoğan. Again, in January 2022, Albanian Prime Minister Edi Rama described President Erdoğan as “a person who does what he says and says what he does” both for Albania and regional peace, development, and stability.

This is also indicative of another EU politics impasse. The rising far-right populism in EU countries, the lack of an all-encompassing political will, vision and determination, and leadership issues all narrow Europe’s view of the Balkans. This negative course causes reactions and suspicion towards European politics in the eyes of the Balkan political and bureaucratic elites and societies at large.

EU enlargement

All the above are reflected well in recent studies. The Eurobarometer survey, for example, reveals that 52% of the EU population is against enlargement. The rate is 62% in the Netherlands, 58% in France, and 57% in Germany. We can highlight here that France, Denmark, and the Netherlands constantly undermine Albania’s EU membership process.

Albanian PM Rama’s reaction to this situation shows the distrust that lies therein. Rama stated, “Albania will not cry at the door of Europe.” Likewise, the sense of distrust and disunity in Europe during the global pandemic is perhaps best encapsulated in Serbian President Vučić’s words: “European solidarity is a fairy tale.”

In comparison to the grey picture of Europe-Balkans relations, recent public opinion polls in the Balkans indicate a rising interest in Turkey. According to a study by the European Council on Foreign Relations in August 2021, for Serbia, Turkey is the third country to be trusted after Russia and China. The cooperation and trust relationship that Turkey has developed with Balkan countries by resting on its soft power in the last twenty years is of key importance.

The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Presidency for Turks Abroad and Related Communities (YTB), the Yunus Emre Institute, the Maarif Foundation, the Turkish Red Crescent, the Turkish Religious Foundation, and various NGOs and international higher education institutions have played major roles in this.

Tensions between Serbia and Kosovo have returned to the forefront after on June 29 the authorities in Pristina announced their decision to impose a ban on cars with Serbian license plates crossing the Kosovo border. Following the violent reaction of ethnic Serbs living on Kosovo’s border, the Kosovo government has postponed the implementation of the order until September 1, 2022.

What is happening on the border?

New regulations proposed by the Kosovo government, which does not recognize identity cards and license plates held by Serbian citizens in Kosovar territory, escalated the tension between the two countries.

According to the new regulations, the owners of vehicles with the license plates “PR (Priština)”, “KM (Kosovska Mitrovica”, “PZ (Prizen)”, “GL (Gjilan)”, “UR (Uroševac)”, “PE (Peja)”, and “DA (Đakovica)”, which were issued by Serbia from June 10, 1999 to April 21, 2022 would have to get “RKS (Republic of Kosovo)” plates until September 30, 2022. This means that Serbian citizens entering Kosovar territory will be required to replace their license plates and personal identification cards with the new documents issued by Kosovar authorities.

As a response, ethnic Serb protesters living in the north of Kosovo blocked the access to two border crossings with Serbia on Sunday, July 31.

Serbia has been applying the same rule on IDs issued by the Kosovo government since 2011. Pristina reiterated its willingness to lift the restrictions if the Serbian government takes the necessary steps, but the proposal has been repeatedly rejected. This is due to the fact that Serbia does not recognize Kosovo’s self-declared independence.

As a preventative measure, the NATO peacekeeping force in Kosovo (KFOR) stated that the troops are ready to intervene in Kosovo “if the stability is jeopardized,” in accordance with Resolution 1244 by the United Nations Security Council, which was issued in 1999.

Since the Kosovo War in 1999, security in Kosovo has been provided by KFOR in line with the United Nations Security Council Article 1244 on the United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK).

Kosovo declared its independence from Serbia in 2008, a decade after the NATO bombing campaign against Yugoslavia in 1999. However, Serbia continues to view its former province as a part of the Serbian territory.

In 2013, Serbia and Kosovo initiated a reconciliation dialogue sponsored by the European Union to resolve ongoing issues between the two countries, but little progress has been made since then.

Path to independence?

Since its declaration of independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008, Kosovo has been officially recognized by 117 states, including the U.S. and most of the EU member states. Despite the initiations for UN membership, two permanent veto-wielding members, Russia and China, blocked the requests for membership by Pristina.

Although Kosovo, which was part of the Federal Republic of Serbia before the dissolution of Yugoslavia, was granted major autonomy in 1974 Constitution of Yugoslavia, this decision was overturned in 1989 by Serbian nationalist president Slobodan Milošević.

Kosovo’s autonomy was revoked during Milošević‘s presidency, bringing it under the direct control of Belgrade.

With the disintegration of Yugoslavia, Kosovo Albanians became uneasy with the rising Serbian nationalism and laid the foundations of the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA), which later played a crucial role in the country’s independence.

After a decade of unrest, the conflict between the Serbian government and Kosovar separatists heightened in 1998. Over 13,000 Kosovars and more than 8,000 Albanians were killed in the war, and thousands were forced to leave their homes.

The attacks of the Serbian forces in Kosovo came to an end with the NATO bombing of Yugoslavia as a result of the operation that started on March 24, 1999, and lasted for 78 days.

Kosovo-Serbia dialogue

Tensions between Belgrade and Pristina have been simmering for over two decades due to the unresolved Kosovo conflict, which began in 1999, when the province gained de facto autonomy after the NATO campaign against former Yugoslavia.

In 2011, the Belgrade-Pristina Dialogue process began for the first time under the mediation of the EU to improve relations between Kosovo and Serbia and ultimately recognize Kosovo’s autonomous status.

In April 2013, the EU-led talks between the two countries reached a historic agreement in Brussels, in which Serbia did not recognize the autonomous status of Kosovo yet partially agreed to Kosovo being governed as a sovereign state.

However, in practice, the terms of the agreement remained ambiguous, and the process came to a standstill after facing several setbacks.

The EU has been trying to mediate between Belgrade and Pristina since 2013. Yet, Belgrade and Pristina’s decade-long history of ethnic conflict frequently forestalled the reconciliation process.

After Kosovan authorities decided to postpone the new ID and license plate requirements to September 1, protesters removed the barricades that blocked the two crossings at the Serbian border.

On April 3, Viktor Orbán, the candidate of Fidesz – Hungarian Civic Alliance and the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP), claimed victory for his fourth consecutive term as prime minister against the six-party United for Hungary coalition’s candidate Péter Márki-Zay.

In the final days leading to the elections, the war in Ukraine reflected heavily on campaign narratives, increasing voter turnout to 69.54% and advantaging Orbán who largely dominates Hungarian media. The opposition maintains that the elections were not on fair grounds with checks and balances issues and gerrymandering.

Following his 53% win, Orbán mocked Ukrainian leader Volodymyr Zelensky as an opponent to overpower through his campaign, and sent a message to the EU saying that conservative civic and patriotic politics was the future. He was able to maintain a two-thirds majority in the parliament, which the opposition claims

Orbán used to his advantage in his prior terms. However, a referendum in which Orbán advocated in favor of banning educational material for minors claiming that it promotes homosexuality and sex reassignment was deemed invalid.

The war in Ukraine and the election in Hungary

On March 15, during rallies commemorating the Hungarian Revolution of 1848, an important event shaping the formation of the Hungarian national identity, the war in Ukraine shaped the electoral campaigns’ narratives. Orbán presented his followers with a choice of a “pro-peace right” or “pro-war left.” Similarly, Márki-Zay remarked a “single historic choice: to choose Europe over the East, freedom over tyranny.”

While Orbán’s idea of taking a pro-peace approach is keeping Hungary neutral and out of the war, his party accused his opponent of wanting to send Hungarian soldiers to fight in Ukraine. Márki-Zay stated that these were “slanderous claims.”

Márki-Zay criticized Orbán for serving Putin’s interests, and argued that Hungarians thought it was Putin and not Brussels that needed to be stopped for peace to prevail. The opposition ran with a promise for a new constitution to restore the rule of law that it claims Orbán has marred, alongside accusing Orbán of promoting a hate campaign towards minorities and certain persons, namely George Soros. The opposition mainly stood for a pluralistic political system and the repairing of alliances with the EU and NATO.

Opening to the East

During Orbán’s 12 years in power, Hungary has cultivated an amicable relationship with Russia alongside dissent from the EU. Their relations started flourishing in 2011, when Hungary introduced an “Eastern Opening” policy to trade with countries like Russia, China, and Turkey to counterbalance economic ties with the West.

Three years later, Hungary gave a construction project to Russia for expanding Hungary’s only nuclear plant with Russian financing, which has caused much speculation within the EU. Hungary has confirmed it will move forward with the project after calls from the opposition to scrap it in the wake of the Ukraine war.

Furthermore, during the Russian annexation of Crimea, Hungary was hesitant to sanction Russia. In November 2021, the Hungarian foreign minister was awarded the highest state honor for non-Russians, the “Friend of Russia” award.

Orbán’s reasoning can be summarized in an interview on March 3, where he stated Hungary was caught up between major geopolitical powers and that it was NATO expansions that triggered the war by not appealing to Russian security demands.

He described Russia-Hungary relations as balanced and fair, hailed China’s strong economic endurance post-2008, and articulated his interests in developing a beneficial relationship with China, which he acknowledged as an emerging world power in the shifting world order.

Orbán evaluated the current Anglo-Saxon order in a manner reminiscent of his issues with the EU, saying, “Anglo-Saxons want the world to recognize their position as morally right. For them, it’s not enough to accept the reality of power; they also need you to accept the things that they think are right. The Chinese have no such need.”

Hungarian voters and the Ukraine crisis

A recent Pulzus Research survey shows the differences in how voters of different parties perceive the war. It found that 25% of Fidesz-KDNP supporters said that Russia had launched a “justified war” to protect the Russian minority in Ukraine.

Fewer than half of Fidesz-KDNP voters agreed that the attack on Ukraine was a show of great power aggression, and 26% percent said they did not know why the war broke out. Meanwhile, 89% of opposition supporters view the conflict as a war of great power aggression.

The major difference in perception may be due to the government’s pro-Russia stance over the years in addition to some pro-government media rhetoric. Although most major pro-government outlets have displayed neutral reporting on the war, pro-Russia narratives were put forward by some experts.

China-Lithuania relations reached a breaking point in July 2021 over Lithuania’s decision to allow a Taiwanese representative office to open under the name of “Taiwan” in Vilnius. The de facto embassy officially opened in November of the same year.

This move was received by China as an attack on the “One China” policy. Only 15 nations have formal ties with Taiwan, while most others have informal relations with the country through trade offices under the name of “Taipei” to avoid conflict with China.

As a result, Lithuania was hit by sanctions like never before by China. These Chinese sanctions were “unconventional” and included Lithuanian exports, EU products containing Lithuanian parts, as well as raw material imports from China.

China downgraded its diplomatic ties with Lithuania and recalled its ambassador in August 2021, and three months later, its consular services were suspended until further notice. Last December, the Lithuanian embassy in China was shut down.

Earlier this year, Lithuania’s president Gitanas Nausėda stated on news radio Ziniu Radijas that the name of the office was a “mistake” and that the nation is now dealing with its consequences as both Lithuanian companies and European companies that procure parts from Lithuania express concern.

Tit for tat?

High-tech and infrastructure are issues of repeated dispute between China and Lithuania. In September, Lithuania’s Defense Ministry had urged consumers to dispose of their Chinese phones. The statement came after its National Cyber Security Centre prepared a report assessing the security of 5G technology mobile phones sold in Lithuania. It found that Xiaomi mobiles had a built-in censorship feature that could be activated remotely, and that Huawei’s devices had cybersecurity issues including data leakage.

Both companies have denied these claims. In 2019, Lithuanian intelligence made allegations that a Chinese company had been spying on Lithuanian individuals, with the Chinese Embassy considering these allegations “totally unacceptable.” In May of the same year, the Lithuanian Parliament had voted to ban “unreliable” manufacturers from the electronic communications market including China’s Huawei.

The legislation required high-technology companies to act in compliance with national security interests. In Huawei’s case, Lithuania’s military intelligence stated that Chinese law required companies to share information with the government. The decision came after a suggestion from the chairman of Lithuania’s Parliamentary Committee, Laurynas Kasčiūnas, who stated that manufacturers from “non-democratic” countries should be identified and that Lithuania would not be part of the “China-controlled technosphere.”

China, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, and Lithuania

As an ex-Soviet nation, communist regimes have a negative connotation for Lithuania. Therefore, it advocates a tougher stance against Russia and China. Especially with Russia being its next-door neighbor, the invasion of Ukraine has put Lithuania and former Soviet nations at unease.

China’s relationship with Russia and its unwillingness to condemn Russia over Ukraine paints an even more tainted image for Lithuania. The Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reaffirmed on Monday, March 7, 2022, China’s position on the issue and emphasized that China’s relationship with Russia was “rock-solid.”

In accordance with its value-based foreign policy, Lithuania distanced itself from China. The approach takes principles in the constitution such as democracy, independence, and rule of law as its basis. China has been criticized over the years by Lithuania on different occasions.

Last year, Lithuania signed a joint statement with 13 countries criticizing China over the lack of transparency in the WHO’s COVID19 report. A few months later, the Seimas, the parliament of Lithuania, passed a motion condemning China for committing genocide against the Uyghurs, calling on the UN to start an investigation into the issue.

The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) views Western values as “hostile and harmful,” and associates them with China’s competition with the U.S. Following the tensions resulting from the de facto embassy of Taiwan in Lithuania, the Chinese media claimed that it is the U.S. influence on Lithuania that shapes Lithuania’s foreign policy attitudes towards China.

The article describes the Baltic nation’s strategy as “to woo and follow the U.S. and be a ‘loyal puppet’ that barks the fiercest at the U.S.’ strategic rivals in exchange for protection.”

In light of ongoing tensions between the West and Russia, China’s ally in the region, the ties between the Baltic nation of Lithuania and China are likely to remain uneasy for now.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine will have a tremendous impact on all European countries. Nations that are heavily dependent on Russian energy are expected to suffer particularly hard if the Kremlin, for whatever reason, eventually halts gas supplies to Europe. What will be the implications of the Russo-Ukrainian war in the Balkans?

Hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian refugees have already entered the European Union. It is believed that more than seven million people will soon be forced to leave the war-torn country and go westward. Not all of them are expected to stay in the EU member states. According to reports, a few hundred displaced people from Ukraine have already arrived in Serbia – a Balkan nation that played a significant role during the 2015-2017 migrant and refugee crisis. The country’s officials estimate that the southeastern European country will eventually host more than 10,000 refugees from Ukraine.

Serbia, as well as other Balkan nations, is facing a large-scale emigration and brain drain. A significant influx of refugees from Ukraine could potentially reduce the consequence of a mass exodus that the so-called Western Balkans has been witnessing for years. It is highly uncertain, however, if displaced Ukrainian citizens have a desire to settle permanently in the region, or if they see the Balkans only as a temporarily shelter from the tragic events in Ukraine.

Politically, all Balkan nations that are not members of the European Union have already voiced their support for Ukraine’s territorially integrity, either voluntarily or under pressure from Brussels. The only country that has still not imposed any sanctions on the Russian Federation is Serbia. Moreover, to this day, Air Serbia continues to fly to Russia, being one of a few European carriers allowed to operate in Russian airspace.

Belgrade relies on Russia for its energy needs, and has developed close political relations with Moscow. At the same time, there are reports suggesting that the EU is demanding that Serbia immediately harmonize its foreign policy with that of Brussels, which means joining anti-Russian sanctions.

“Serbia is in an exceptionally difficult situation, there is less understanding than ever for the position of our nation. We are facing huge pressure,” said the country’s president Aleksandar Vučić.

In reality, Russian political and economic influence in the Balkans is not nearly as strong as many Western pundits tend to portray it. The Kremlin effectively controls sections of Serbia’s and Bosnia’s energy sectors. Russia’s Zarubezhneft owns oil refineries in the towns of Brod and Modriča in Republika Srpska – one of two entities of Bosnia and Herzegovina – while Russian state-owned energy giant Gazprom owns 51 percent of shares in Serbia’s NIS (Petroleum Industry of Serbia). In addition, in December 2021, NIS became the major shareholder in Serbia’s leading petrochemicals producer, HIP Petrohemija.

The problem for the Balkans is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy.

Until recently, Russia’s Sberbank was operating in both Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, but on February 28, the banking agencies of Bosnia’s two entities took control of the two local Sberbank subsidiaries. On the very same day, Serbian AIK Bank completed the process of acquisition of Sberbank Serbia, which will additionally reduce Russian economic presence in the region.

The problem for the Balkans, however, is that many countries in the region remain heavily dependent on Russian energy. Serbia, Bulgaria, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and North Macedonia are reportedly 100 percent dependent on Russian natural gas. Croatia, on the other hand, has been purchasing liquefied natural gas from other producers – namely the United States, Nigeria, and Qatar – which to a certain extent could play a role in the process of cutting reliance on Russian energy.

However, the war in Ukraine could have an impact on a deal that Gazprom signed with Croatia and Hungary on deliveries of natural gas via the TurkStream pipeline. In other words, if the conflict in Ukraine turns into a wider “energy war” between Russia and the West, and Moscow eventually stops selling gas to Europe – be it as a potential retaliation to the anti-Western sanctions, or as a result of the EU’s potential decision to stop buying Russian gas – the Balkan countries will undoubtedly face severe disruptions in energy supplies.

In November, Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed to peg Serbia’s current gas price of $270 until May. But after that, if Serbia joins anti-Russian sanctions, the country will unlikely be able to purchase natural gas from Russia below the market price, which is currently above $3,000 per thousand cubic meters, and has reached its historic maximum. In the short term, it will be very difficult, if not impossible, for Balkan and other European countries to find an alternative to the Russian energy, which means that blackouts in Europe could eventually become a norm.

For now, both Russia and the EU are expected to refrain from such radical actions, given their mutual energy dependence. Politically, however, the process of “decoupling” between Moscow and the West has already gone very far, and sooner or later, all Balkan countries will likely find themselves on the western side of a new Iron Curtain.

People have migrated throughout history in search of basic resources and better living conditions. According to Francis Fukuyama, after the catastrophic world wars and the collapse of communism, the liberal democratic bloc declared itself victorious and idealism was born prophesizing that state boundaries would disappear and economies would be integrated.

Alas, no great war was in sight! However, this peaceful world vision developed a boil and a new wave of unprecedented global immigration emerged. As liberalism offered a perpetual peace, Europe, the most important representative of this theory in practice, became a top destination for emigrants who are in search of a better life. The EU has become one of the largest recipients of emigrants starting from the nearby Balkans.

Indeed, it is very difficult to account for a single reason that triggers migration from the Balkans. Reasons vary and combine economic, environmental, political, and social factors. However, generally, the academic literature on emigration studies underlines the economic reason as the primary and dominant push factor.

Migration comes along with a brain drain as the skilled labor force of poor countries gets poorer due to economic and political conditions and emigrates to richer countries for higher pay. Currently, Western Balkan countries and specifically Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are losing their well-educated youth.

According to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Youth Studies, in 2018, one third of young people from the Western Balkans expressed a “strong” or a “very strong” desire to emigrate from their countries, ranging from 26% in Montenegro, 27% in Bosnia, 30% in Serbia, 34% in Kosovo, 35% in North Macedonia, and 43% in Albania. These figures are even higher in some other studies.

A population loss

The emigration from the Balkans is considered a permanent one. Balkan countries are now in jeopardy of losing a substantial portion of their population density and their demographic characteristics.

Migration has a very general effect on the Balkans. Economically, if the shortage of qualified workers continues, it will discourage foreign investments and directly affecting the GDPs of Balkan countries. Critical industries may not be able to find qualified staff, especially the health sector. Politically, emigrants are mostly young and educated, and don’t give credit to the old-fashioned political clichés and the incapable political leaderships, which hide behind nationalist rhetoric.

Migration from the Balkans in numbers

According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) of Albania, there have been  around 400,000 emigrants between 2011 and 2020. According to Hurriyet Daily, about 1.7 million, roughly 37% of the population, has left the country in the past 30 years.

Currently, the Albanian population is 2,837,740 and the primary destinations of emigration are Italy and Greece. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Albania ranks 4th globally in the emigration of a skilled labor force and most youth dream of a future abroad.

Additionally, some officials and researchers don’t trust KAS numbers. According to them, KAS estimates are lower and the real numbers are higher. Also, interestingly, between 2014 and 2015, around 100,000 Kosovars emigrated to the EU, a massive emigration wave that was dismissed by the government of Kosovo at that time. The number of emigrants in 2019 was 34,911, and the chief destinations were Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria.

It is hard to find an accurate data on Montenegrin emigration. According to data by the United Nations, in 2015 the population of Montenegro was 625,781. Additionally, based on UN statistics, the overall number of Montenegrin immigrants worldwide increased from 148,982 in 2010 to 153,009 in 2019. Germany receives the highest number of Montenegrin immigrants, and Italy and Luxemburg were among the most popular countries. However, in recent years, preferences have changed and intraregional migration has become more popular, especially to former Yugoslav states such as Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia due to the proximity and cultural similarities.

Lastly, the current population of Serbia is around 6,908,220. The UN estimated that emigrants from Serbia in 2017 reached nearly one million at a rate of between 30,000 and 60,000 a year since the breakup of Yugoslavia. The main destinations of Serbs are Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Urgent need to end brain drain

Can a common solution be found for the continuous emigration waves from the Balkans? First of all, the European Union should seriously step in and provide financial support in finding an applicable policy. Since the EU opened up for skilled labor from non-EU countries, it is partly responsible and should take responsibility for the brain drain in the Western Balkans.

Especially Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland should share the burden as they have benefitted the most. If the necessary precautions are not taken, Balkan countries will lose their youth and enthusiasm, and will end up empty villages within the so-called global village.

What is more, Western Balkan countries need to improve their databases on emigration. This is crucial to understanding the situation on the ground in order to formulate and recommend proper policies. Regular assessment is a must in line with accurate data and monitoring mechanisms.

The Western Balkan governments have to reverse this brain drain and encourage the sustainable return and placement of skilled emigrants in developing sectors such as IT, digitalization, robotics, design, etc. Countries could follow the example of Croatia.

I first entered Sarajevo after a long drive through the thick misty woods of Western Bosnia at the beginning of 1996, almost two weeks after the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) was signed which was supposed to end the 3.5-year-long war through reconstruction and reconciliation.

I faced grave contradictions on the road from the Croatian city of Split to Sarajevo after waiting for three days to catch a UN aid convoy that would take me to the war-torn capital. The winding road passes through misty mountains and thick woods setting one’s mind at ease with beautiful tall trees and greenery.

But once we pulled over for a short break, I witnessed one of the most shocking experiences in my professional life when we had to walk on a carpet of AK-47 shell casings scattered throughout the forest. I could barely find a scrap of earth to step on that was not covered in shell casings. All I could hear was their creaky sound as the smell of gun smoke still hung in the air.

At that moment, I had a clear understanding that one of the worst episodes of mass murder in Europe had taken place in Bosnia, which witnessed the worst human rights abuses and atrocities, betrayal, and genocide during the war in 1992-1995 as part of the break of Yugoslavia.

The scene in Sarajevo was even worse as the city was completely besieged by the Serb troops for more than three years and was the theater of a killing field for Serbian snipers who shot everything that moved including the elderly, women, and children. A thousand six hundred children were killed by Serb sniper fire in the city during the war. The headquarters of the famous daily Oslobodenje was almost in ruins as it was targeted from the beginning of the war by Serb troops led by Ratko Mladić, known as the “butcher of Bosnia.”  Mladić was later found guilty of orchestrating genocide in Srebrenica, crimes against humanity, and war crimes by the UN International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).

At the beginning of 1996, Bosnians with broken dreams seemed ready for reconciliation and to rebuild their lives, thinking that the DPA would pave the way for such a process. Esad Mavrić, who was my fixer in Sarajevo, didn’t seem that optimistic as I delivered him some basic foodstuff like milk powder, sugar, rice, and some fresh fruits which were really hard to find for civilians. The siege by Serb forces had made it hard to cover basic daily needs and for parents to feed their children. “Having a peace agreement is better than having a war. But I’m not sure how long it will last,” he said.

Shortly afterward, we found out that his name was on the Serbian “most wanted” list, pushing us to cancel our planned trip to Srebrenica as the road to the city was filled with Serbian checkpoints. Srebrenica was handed over to the Serbian army about six months earlier on July 11, 1995. The city was supposed to be protected by Dutch soldiers mandated to protect civilians as United Nations peacekeeping forces handed it over to the Serbs. At least 8,500 Bosnian boys and men were killed, and more than 20,000 civilians were expelled by the Bosnian Serb forces from the area – a process that was later declared a genocide by the ICTY.

The Srebrenica genocide compelled the West to press for a ceasefire which paved the way for the signing of the DPA.

According to many, including former president of Bosnia-Herzegovina Alija Izetbegović, the basis of the treaty didn’t constitute a just peace. “The peace is more just than continuing the war and a better peace couldn’t be obtained,” he said.

Indeed, the DPA was designed to create new multi-ethnic and democratic institutions in a war-torn society in order to ensure respect for fundamental human rights and freedoms, and the rule of law; to provide for post-conflict reconstruction towards sustainable peace for Bosnia-Herzegovina; and to prevent the recurrence of the conflict or its potential spillover in the region.

The DPA introduced an entirely different form of governance. According to this, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a semi-presidential republic with three representative presidents that are directly elected and who exercise their jurisdiction on the entire territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. According to the state structure and organization, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a complex state that consists of two entities and the Brcko District.

In terms of the political system, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a democratic state with the division of legislative, executive, and judiciary powers; rule of law; pluralism of political parties; general, direct, and secret voting; an independent media and judiciary; and respect for human rights. With regards to the relationship between central and local authorities, Bosnia-Herzegovina is a highly decentralized state with two highly centralized entities.

The Dayton Peace Agreement

The DPA may have stopped the war but, on the other hand, it also created a complex form of governance which might have complicated things even further leading to a new conflict – one that the world is facing now.

There was considerable debate and criticism of the DPA from the very start, in terms of structure, balance, and efficiency. Many argue that the DPA brought about unequal agreement among warring ethnic groups. The Bosnian Serbs who committed ethnic cleansing and genocide were rewarded with the ethnically cleansed “republic” while the Bosnians and Croats had to share a “federation.”

Therefore, the Serbs gained autonomous status, where the control belongs to them, whereas the Bosnians are politically and militarily checked by the Croats. Then, there has been poor implementation of the DPA in terms of freedom of movement, return of refugees, giving back the prewar voting rights of the people, and prosecution of war criminals. In fact, some argue that the DPA affected the partition of Bosnia-Herzegovina into ethno-nationalist entities that acknowledged and effectively rewarded the ethnic cleansing process.

Although the DPA has partially facilitated the creation of a sustainable state, the major ethnic groups that were involved in the conflict remained unwilling to form a functional state in the name of Bosnia-Herzegovina, especially the Serbs with their “Greater Serbia” motto always present in their hearts and minds.

Since 1995, national political parties have been using fear, ethnic enmity, and exclusive nationalism in their electoral campaigns. Thus, the democratization process in post-Dayton Bosnia-Herzegovina has been carried out by the nationalist parties locked in their ethnically separated constituencies which often obstructed the return of refugees and displaced persons.

Is the Dayton Peace Agreement Fractured?

In 2000, five years after the DPA was signed, the European Union, sidelining the U.S., became the leading international body to support the stabilization and association processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This seemed a turning point at the time since it raised hopes in Bosnia-Herzegovina for a full EU and NATO membership. But the need to reform military forces, the establishment of a defense ministry at state level, the introduction of a VAT taxation system, the restructuring of the judiciary and prosecution, and the establishment of courts were all blocked by ethnic aspirations from all sides.

In 2005-2006, attempts at constitutional and state structure reform proposed significant changes with regard to the power of the Council of Ministers and the Parliament Assembly of Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, these and similar attempts at constitutional reforms were all seen through the prism of the country’s territorial reorganization rather than attempts for the creation of a functional state that is ready for EU and NATO membership. As a result, they were all rejected.

China’s investments in Balkan countries that are not members of the European Union keep growing. The region remains stuck in the EU’s waiting room, as well as in the Euro-Atlantic sphere of influence, but is using every opportunity to deepen its economic, political, and, to a certain extent, cultural ties with Beijing.

The so-called Western Balkan states – all of them located in the central and southern parts of the Balkan Peninsula, not in the West – have always attracted the interest of the regional actors, Russia, Turkey, and the European Union. The United States, as the major global power, traditionally has the last say in the coal-rich region. Not so long ago, China, through its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), has expended its partnership with Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia.

The BRI, launched in 2013 by President Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan, aims to connect Asia with Europe and Africa through major infrastructure projects, trade facilitation, financial integration, and cooperation in other areas. In the Balkans, Beijing is mostly interested in infrastructure and energy.

According to the American Enterprise Institute, China’s investments and contracts in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia amounted to $14.6 billion from 2005 to 2019. The amount is relatively low, given the fact that the European Union still accounts for more than 70% of the overall direct investment in the region. On the other hand, China’s share in the Balkan countries accounts for only 5.7% of the overall trade in the region.

There are, however, fears that the EU could eventually lose its influence in the region. North Macedonia’s president Stevo Pendarovski has recently emphasized that if the EU appears disengaged in the Balkans, other countries would step in. “When you are absent, then the strategic void will be filled by somebody else. Everybody knows whom we are speaking about,” he said.

Back in 2017, Federica Mogherini, an Italian politician who served as High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, warned that the Balkans can “easily become one of the chessboards where the big power game can be played.”

The game apparently already started, although at this point the West does not force the Balkan countries to pick a side. Indeed, Washington and Brussels have mechanisms to reduce the Chinese influence in the region that is heavily dependent on the European Union. One call from the White House could easily expand the American de facto control over the Balkans, and reduce the Chinese economic presence.

The Washington Agreement, signed by Prime Minister of Kosovo Avdullah Hoti and the President of Serbia Aleksandar Vučić on September 4, 2020 at the White House, clearly demonstrates who the “real boss” is in the Balkans. The agreement committed Belgrade and Pristina not to use equipment supplied by “untrusted vendors” in their telecommunications networks.

It remains to be seen if Serbia will have to eliminate China’s tech giant Huawei completely – with whom Belgrade signed a strategic agreement in 2017 – from the ongoing installation of fixed broadband infrastructure, including the 5G network. For now, the country manages to relatively successfully balance between the West and China.

Serbia, the region’s largest economy that accounts for 44% of regional GDP, already hosts several large Chinese equity investments, most notably the Chinese Hesteel Group’s 2016 purchase of the Smederevo steel mill that was previously owned by the American company U.S. Steel. In addition, China is also involved in some huge infrastructure projects in Serbia, namely the construction of Corridor X, railway and highway sections, Corridor XI highway, as well as Kostolac thermal power plant.

The very fact that the U.S. companies operating in Serbia sold their assets to China is a clear indication that Beijing’s business in the country has Washington’s tacit support, at the very least.

Beijing also owns copper-gold assets in the Serbian town of Bor, which the Chinese Zijin Mining company purchased from the American Freeport-McMoRan Inc. in 2019. The very fact that the U.S. companies operating in Serbia sold their assets to China is a clear indication that Beijing’s business in the country has Washington’s tacit support, at the very least.

It is also worth noting that in June 2020 Serbia has publicly displayed six new military drones purchased from China. Such an action, however, did not seem to worry the United States, given that the Serbian Army has close ties with the Ohio National Guard. In addition, in 2019, Serbia, whose parliament declared armed neutrality in 2007, conducted 13 military exercises with NATO members. One of them, Montenegro, has also developed strong ties with China.

In 2014, the smallest nation in the Balkans took out a loan of nearly $1 billion from the Export-Import Bank of China for the construction of the Bar-Boljare highway that will link the Adriatic Sea and the country’s border with Serbia. The highway, which is located at one of the most challenging landscapes for building in the whole of Europe, will connect Bar, the largest coastal town and harbor in Montenegro, with the Serbian capital Belgrade.

The deal that Podgorica and Beijing signed provides a 20-year repayment period and a six-year grace period, while the first annual repayment of $67.5 million falls in July. So far, Montenegro has paid only 2% of the interest, but the country is already facing a debt crisis. Even though the Balkan state targets 2025 to be ready for E.U. accession, the bloc will not be paying the Chinese loan.

“Through its banks, China has provided the most favorable and competent loans, has offered reputable infrastructure contractors, and has given the possibility for domestic contractors as partners in these projects, allowing local enterprises to be involved,” wrote the former Montenegrin president Filip Vujanović for the Chinese Global Times.

Still, according to EU figures, Montenegro’s national debt could soar from 65% to around 80% of GDP once its loan from China is fully repaid.

North Macedonia is another Balkan state that relies on Chinese loans. Skopje has reportedly received both Chinese state bank loans and development cooperation funds. It was the first country of the “17+1” cooperation platform, formed between China and Central and Eastern European nations, to make use of the $10 billion credit line made available by China for infrastructure projects.

Kosovars are used to early parliamentary elections. Snap elections have become the rule of political life in the country as no single government has been able to complete its full four-year term in office since the country declared its independence from Serbia on February 17, 2008.

However, there are good prospects that things might change after the upcoming early elections set to be held three days before the thirteenth anniversary of the country’s independence. It is widely expected that the coalition formed by the socialist opposition party Self-determination Movement (Lëvizja Vetëvendosje LVV) and by a civic movement led by the acting President Vjosa Osmani (Albanian: LVV-Guxo) (English LVV-Dare Coalition) will emerge victorious by a wide margin.

Indeed, according to three recent polls, support for the LVV-Guxo coalition hovers around 41-46%, which would translate into 50-56 of the total 120 seats of the Kosovo parliament. Provided that it also gets the support of the ten seats reserved in the constitution for the non-Serbian minorities (Ashkali, Bosnian, Egyptian, Roma, and Turks), in practice, this means that for the first time since independence a mainstream Kosovar party will be able to form a government without the support of another mainstream party.

The importance of this potential development for Kosovo cannot be overstated as a (quasi) single-party government can  bring forth a long-awaited political stability that is indispensable for domestic institutional building, advancing reciprocity in negotiations with Serbia, and last but not least, implementing a more coherent and uniform plan in the fight against the COVID-19 pandemic.

Explaining LVV’s unusually high popularity

The unusually high degree of support for the LVV-Guxo coalition stems from two interrelated factors. First, the coalition’s popularity is connected to the plummeting legitimacy of the other three mainstream Kosovar parties.

As a direct impact of this flagrant mismanagement, Kosovo, having the youngest population in Europe, suffers one of the heaviest demographic hemorrhages in the region with Kosovars leaving their country in search of a better life in Europe and across the Atlantic.

Both the incumbent Democratic League of Kosovo (Lidhja Demokratike e Kosovës, LDK) and the two parties that came out of the insurgent Kosovo Liberation Army (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës UÇK), namely the former President and Prime Minister Hashim Thaçi’s Democratic Party of Kosovo (Partia Demokratike e Kosovës, PDK) and the former Prime Minister Ramush Haradinaj’s Alliance for the Future of Kosovo (Aleanca për Ardhmërine e Kosovës AAK), have ruled Kosovo together for two decades and have utterly failed to deliver any genuine and substantial reforms to the country.

They are now widely perceived as having used their glorious origins – the LDK being the party of the great Kosovar leader Ibrahim Rugova and the PDK/AAK being the successors of the rebel organization (UÇK) that fought for Kosovo’s independence – for merely “investing” in rampant state institutions , corruption, and organized crime.

As a direct impact of this flagrant mismanagement, Kosovo, having the youngest population in Europe, suffers one of the heaviest demographic hemorrhages in the region with Kosovars leaving their country in search of a better life in Europe and across the Atlantic.

This is why the charges coupled with the LVV’s main electoral message that pledges institutional reforms and to fight against corruption and organized crime resonated the most with the Kosovar public, and especially with the youth. In a sense, Kosovars want to dislodge “the old parties” from power and to give a chance to a party that has never ruled before.

Once the reformist Albin Kurti, the LVV’s leader, took over as prime minister in February 2020, he was not allowed to rule for more than 50 days.

A second and a more short-term reason for the unusually high popularity of the LVV-Guxo coalition is that the LVV is perceived as the only party that genuinely stands against the external engineering of Kosovo’s politics. The LVV emerged victorious from the October 2019 snap elections (winning 26% of the national vote), and after four months of political wrangling succeeded in striking a deal with the LDK for a coalition government.

However, once the reformist Albin Kurti, the LVV’s leader, took over as prime minister in February 2020, he was not allowed to rule for more than 50 days as his government was brought down in a no-confidence vote in parliament. The vote was initiated by Kurti’s coalition partner LDK, after overt pressure from the U.S. Embassy in Kosovo. Meanwhile, all this drama occurred in the midst of the first wave of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The Serbia Factor in the Kosovo Early Elections

Kurti’s government was brought down simply because it stood in the way of then U.S. President Donald Trump’s plan to stage a largely theatrical “economic normalization agreement” between Belgrade and Pristina in the White House. The subsequent LDK-led coalition government of Prime Minister Avdullah Hoti was largely seen as a puppet government, not least because it was a minority government supported by the Serb List, the hegemonic Serbian minority party in Kosovo that is totally subservient to Belgrade and does not recognize Kosovo’s independent statehood.

Hence, LVV’s popularity stems from its position of “self-determination” (as the party’s name itself declares) and opposition to external intervention. However, given the  popularity the U.S. enjoys in Kosovo as the country that offered the greatest support to Kosovars’ efforts for independence from Serbia, perhaps the strongest political weapon of the LDK/PDK/AAK in these elections is their consistent accusations that the LVV is “anti-American.”

Kosovo’s “old parties” are also using the “anti-American” accusation to present the LVV to Brussels and, especially, to Washington as not being subservient to their directives. In this manner, they seek to win the backing of both the U.S. and the EU. Such a thesis undoubtedly strikes a chord with Brussels and Washington given the LVV’s and its leader Albin Kurti’s rebellious past. In the past, Kurti even denounced the UN-prepared Ahtisaari Plan that became the basis for Kosovo’s independence, contending that it violates Kosovo’s right for self-determination.

Regional Implications of a Potential LVV Victory

If the LVV succeeds in forming a government on its own (with the support of the 10 non-Serbian minority seats), then reciprocity measures will likely be re-imposed in the negotiations with Serbia. What gives further credence to this claim is the leadership change in the White House.

As pointed out by foreign policy analyst Edward Joseph, the Trump administration during its tenure skewed the negotiations notably in favor of Belgrade, forcing Kosovo to make more concessions (most notably agreeing to suspend its efforts to join international organizations). This is why Kurti, who opposed concessions, was removed in March 2020.

Now that Trump is gone, and in light of an imminent LVV electoral victory, greater equity is expected in the negotiations. In reality, however, this does not mean we are heading towards a breakthrough in the Kosovo-Serbia negotiations. To the contrary, negotiations may stall with the LVV in office. Of all Kosovar political elites, Kurti adopts the hardest line towards Belgrade and resolutely opposes any further concessions to Serbia.

Ethno-religious diversity and the strategic location of the Balkans have always attracted global and regional actors. It is a geography where the interests of many neighboring and non-neighboring countries such as the EU countries, Russia, the U.S., Turkey, and the Gulf countries, intersect.

Although the Balkans are often associated with ethnic conflict, poverty, and corruption, the natural diversity, fertile lands, tourism opportunities and the peninsula’s location on the world’s major energy routes have mounted the interests of foreign actors in the region.

For Saudi Arabia, food security is a serious problem and, therefore, this is one of the most important reasons to maintain good relations with the Balkans. Turkey, on the other hand, uses its historical and cultural ties in order to exercise influence over various communities in the Balkans which for centuries were part of the Ottoman Empire, the ancestor of the modern-day Republic of Turkey.

To understand better the reasons behind the Turkish-Saudi competition in the Balkans, a brief history of the Saudi-Turkish ties is necessary.

Saudi Arabia-Turkey Relations

The relations between Turkey and Saudi Arabia are complicated. Although up to the 2010s, the two countries maintained good ties, after the Arab Spring, bilateral relations have deteriorated.

The Arab Spring is not the only reason behind this dramatic turn. The collapse of Yugoslavia and the Bosnian War were important events for the Saudi-Turkish relations, and following these two events, the Balkans started to occupy a place in the foreign policy agendas of Ankara and Riyadh.

However, the involvement of Saudi Arabia with its Salafi version of Islam in the Balkans has endangered the influence of Turkey on the region’s Muslim communities. The rising economic and political influence of Riyadh in the Balkans later deepened the geopolitical and ideological competition between Ankara and Riyadh.

Following Turkey’s support for Qatar during the Gulf-Qatar crisis in 2017, which was only recently settled, the ties between Ankara and Riyadh became further strained. However, the real blow to the bilateral relations came after the Saudi journalist Jamal Khashoggi was assassinated in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul.

Turkey’s disclosure of the Saudi government’s role in the Khashoggi murder and the elevation of the issue to an international level was followed by Saudi Arabia’s semi-official embargo on Turkish products. In addition to the above, the two countries support opposing sides in the Libyan civil war.

Riyadh’s intentions for cultural, economic, and political influence in the Balkans are reciprocated by Ankara, which triggered a competition between the two.

Especially after the instability resulting from the Arab Spring in the Middle East, Saudi Arabia realized the need for new allies.

The Balkans, which needed foreign investments and which are well-known for their agricultural produce and arms industry, were considered a perfect choice. However, Riyadh’s intentions for cultural, economic, and political influence in the Balkans are reciprocated by Ankara, which triggered a competition between the two.

The Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs, the Diyanet, provides solid assistance to the Muslim communities and religious authorities in Bulgaria, North Macedonia, and Albania through its official advisers. For instance, some Bulgarian Muslim leaders receive financial support annually from the Diyanet, in addition to books on religion and the training of imams.

Mosques are the major spaces of competition between Saudi Wahhabism and Turkey’s moderate Sunni Islam. Both countries find opportunities in mosques to spread their language and culture. Mosques financed by Turkey provide free Turkish language courses, while mosques financed by Saudi Arabia provide free Arabic language courses.

However, Turkey is one step ahead of Saudi Arabia in the Balkans, because Ankara promotes a version of Islam closer to Balkan Muslims, thanks to their common historical and religious heritage. Another advantage for Turkey is the Turkish communities living in the Balkans and the Balkan communities living in Turkey.

Turkey focuses its efforts on the promotion of the Turkish language and culture, and on preserving the historical monuments in the Balkans dating back to the Ottoman period through various programs and scholarships provided by the Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TİKA), Türkiye Scholarships (Türkiye Bursları), and the Yunus Emre Institute.

Ankara has also become a significant player in the region’s economy and infrastructure by building local schools and other public facilities. In addition, TİKA, which is engaged in the restoration of Ottoman historical structures, renovates schools, hospitals, and other facilities in Kosovo, North Macedonia, and other Balkan countries.

Turkish and Saudi Economic Influence in the Balkans

Economy is the easiest way to gain influence in the Balkans, where the investment percentages are low and the unemployment rates are high. These two reasons in particular push Balkan countries to re-establish their relations with Saudi Arabia and to strengthen ties with Turkey.

In the 2000s, Saudi Arabia provided various forms of aid to Muslims in Bosnia and Herzegovina and thus came to prominence in the Balkans not by using religion, but by the investments made by subsidiaries of Arab companies like the Al-Shiddi Group.

After the Arab Spring, Saudi Arabia realized the importance of new allies outside the Middle East, allies which can also function as reliable providers of agricultural products.

Riyadh’s purchasing of weapons from Balkan countries increases its economic influence, and, in turn, this increases the dependence of Balkan countries on Saudi Arabia.

Both Turkey and Saudi Arabia use economic tools such as direct and indirect investments in the banking, tourism, hotel management, real estate, and agriculture sectors. Although Turkey has strong trade ties with the Balkan countries, nowadays Saudi Arabia is becoming a serious rival to Turkey.

Saudi Arabia-based companies have been buying up land in Bosnia, Serbia, and Bulgaria. The Al-Shiddi Group is building hotels, has undertaken an entire residential area project in Belgrade, the Serbian capital, acquired Serbia’s largest airline carrier, and has invested in FlyBosnia.