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he Republic of Turkey hosted a NATO Summit once again after a gap of twenty-two years. Whilst the Ukraine–Russia War has triggered a shift in the perception of threats in Europe, the emergence of new security risks stemming from a potential US/Israel–Iran conflict has further heightened the importance of the Summit. Statements made by heads of state and government prior to the Summit indicated that it would be the most significant gathering in recent years in terms of ‘outcomes and decisions taken’.

In this context, the fact that NATO’s future vision was shaped in Ankara, given that NATO is itself a security organization, holds particular significance. Turkey’s central position within NATO, as well as its capabilities in the defense and aerospace sectors, are drawing attention in the context of the Alliance’s future. When the final communiqué is considered, it is evident that NATO is transitioning to a new security architecture referred to as the ‘3.0 era’.

Whilst Ankara hosted the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, defense spending and the defense industry were at the heart of the strategic decisions taken by the Alliance in Ankara. Ensuring that Alliance partners adhere to the stated commitment regarding the targeted defense spending limits was a priority. In parallel, the development of defense and security cooperation and relations came to the fore. Discussions held throughout the Summit centered on the role of the capabilities achieved by the Turkish defense industry in the Alliance’s future, and how and to what extent these capabilities could be utilized.

In addition to the statements made, the Defence Industry Forum held as part of the Summit addressed potential areas for Alliance partners to work together and build a sustainable ecosystem. Hosted by the President of the Turkish Defence Industry, Prof. Dr Haluk Görgün, and organized at TUSAŞ as part of the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF), a reception was held where the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area.

Burden-sharing among allies

As part of the Summit, the defense industry forum (NSDIF) – which marked a number of firsts – was held at the ATO Congresium. As announced by NATO, bilateral and multilateral military, security and cooperation agreements were signed for the first time under the NSDIF’26 framework. The agreements, estimated to have a total value exceeding 50 billion dollars, were primarily structured around the following key areas: defense investments and the Alliance partners’ ‘5 per cent’ commitment, capacity enhancement through multinational cooperation, the development of defense industry partnerships, and the improvement of processes from serial production to sustainment. Within the framework of NSDIF’26, emphasis was placed on the importance of developing high-tech and innovation-focused solutions tailored to the evolving battlefield.

NATO’s long-standing target of 2 per cent defense spending was accepted by Alliance partners as a radical increase to “5 per cent” in response to the growing and evolving threat perception. Recently, assessments have been carried out regarding the independent and collective activities undertaken to achieve this objective. Whilst the aim is to significantly increase burden-sharing within the Alliance, the objective is to enter a new era in which allies outside the US (Europe and Canada) directly assume their own security responsibilities. Whilst the concept of “strategic autonomy” is being defined within the Alliance, the initial objective is to establish the financial infrastructure.

The aim is for Alliance partners to increase their defense spending to 5 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), which represents a significant economic volume, whilst also developing production capabilities beyond mere procurement. However, the fact that multinational projects implemented, particularly in Europe, have failed to deliver the desired results, due both to their lengthy timelines and their structural nature, has opened the door to alternative approaches: the “Trusted Partner”. Although Turkey has been a NATO member for a quarter of a century, the fact that its capabilities in the defense industry have not been ‘effectively’ utilized within the Alliance has been a subject of debate, particularly over the last 10 years. Turkey, an Alliance member that has also been subject to both covert and overt embargoes, is now being highlighted as a central actor in NATO’s new era.

Mass production capacity and centralized production

The Ukraine–Russia War has highlighted the inadequacy of stockpiles and inventories amongst the world’s armed forces in the face of protracted conflict. Furthermore, a similar scenario has manifested itself in various forms within the US-Israel-Iran triangle. In the face of the reality of the ‘war of attrition’, which has been redefined in the present day, it is imperative that allies ensure their stocks of ammunition and military equipment are sustainable. The signing of supply agreements at the summit, totalling over 50 billion dollars, aims to transform the defence industry from a purely commercial sector into a direct deterrent. In this context, particular attention was drawn to items with high consumption rates, such as artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs and air defence missiles. In this regard, the allies’ efforts – for example, Canada’s increase in artillery ammunition production capacity and Turkey’s allocation of additional funding for the ‘Iron Dome’ air defence systems – were the first examples to be highlighted.

Attention was drawn to the negative effects of projects implemented in a multinational framework in European countries, both on the execution of the projects and on production capacity and capabilities. In assessments aimed at improving this situation, ‘project management’ and ‘autonomous/centralised’ approaches emerged as key priorities. The aim is for key actors in projects to be carried out on a multinational basis, as well as allied nations acting as subcontractors, to implement more effective process management. In this way, both the production capabilities and key areas such as sustainment and logistics of projects carried out on a multinational basis are being improved. Furthermore, Turkey’s long-standing vision of “lifting covert and overt embargoes between allies” aligns directly with this topic addressed at the Summit.

NATO is demonstrating increasing sensitivity regarding the management of interoperability amongst allies. Multinational collaborations are being implemented whilst taking into account the operational needs of the allies. The decision taken at the Ankara Summit to strengthen the transport aircraft fleet, in addition to the NATO-led tanker aircraft fleet, underscored this commitment. The fleet to be established with A400M transport aircraft will be operated to meet the operational needs of the allies. In addition to the transport fleet, in which the Turkish defence industry also holds a share, Turkey will take a leading role in establishing a space-based communications and early warning system through the IMECE project.

The allocation of an additional $24 billion budget for the Iron Dome is significant not only for Turkey but also for the Alliance’s air and missile defence capabilities. Roketsan’s demonstration of its missile systems in the field of precision-guided systems also attracted attention. Turkey’s capabilities in mass production and high technology are being utilised more actively than ever before to meet diverse requirements. In particular, Turkey has gained increasing importance in recent times with solutions such as cyber security and encrypted communications. As emphasised at the Summit, NATO aims to structure its capabilities not only around assets such as ships and aircraft, but also through integrative elements such as cyberspace, communications and intelligence.

Conclusion: An increasing role and key messages

As part of the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations at a reception held at TUSAŞ, through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area. The delegations were greeted by the modern instruments of the battlefield on display: the Altay tank, ARMA armored vehicles, MKE’s TOLGA air defense solution, ROKETSAN’s ballistic missiles, and Baykar and TUSAŞ’s manned and unmanned aerial platforms. In addition to all this, demonstrations were held to showcase the current state of the aviation sector: the GÖKBEY general-purpose helicopter, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, the HÜRKUŞ basic trainer aircraft, the HÜRJET advanced jet trainer, the ANKA III strategic bomber, the ANKA-S, the Bayraktar AKINCI UAV and the Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicle, all of which demonstrated their capabilities through flight displays.

The capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to delegates not merely through a ‘catalogue’, but directly at the production facilities and via live flight demonstrations. The presence of both executives and project engineers from the relevant companies on site enabled the evaluation of both the products and potential partnerships. In short, the reception provided a unique platform for increasing defense and aerospace exports and establishing new partnerships.

Turkey’s production of systems that are fully compliant with NATO standards (STANAG) and have proven themselves on the battlefield supports strategic interoperability within the Alliance. This, in turn, enables Turkey to export significant quantities of defense systems to its Alliance partners. According to 2025 figures, 56 per cent of Turkey’s exports, totaling 10.56 billion dollars, were made directly to the European Union, NATO member states and the United States. These figures are, in themselves, a testament to the quality and reliability of Turkish defence industry products, which meet Western standards. Furthermore, there is a growing interest in products that have proven themselves on the battlefield.

This reinforces the desire to implement ‘joint projects’, as seen during Belgium’s recent high-level visit to Turkey. The Belgian firm developing the turret proposed to Turkish land vehicle manufacturers: “Let’s integrate our turret into your armoured vehicle and sell them together.” In every discussion regarding Turkey, the door to cooperation is being opened with the message: “You have high-quality products, and we want to benefit from working with you.” Meanwhile, Spain’s supply of the HÜRJET fighter aircraft, Portugal’s warships, Italy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Poland’s electronic warfare systems are strengthening Turkey’s central position within the Alliance in this field.

In short, the Ankara Summit is more than just a platform for delivering political messages; it represents a critical turning point where the obstacles to defense industry cooperation among allies will be discussed. It was clearly emphasized at this summit that any form of export restriction or covert embargo imposed by allies against one another under the NATO umbrella ultimately weakens the Alliance’s own collective deterrence. It is abundantly clear that Turkey’s high-tech production capacity is not a competitive factor to be excluded or restricted amongst allies. Turkey’s position should be viewed as that of a ‘regional production hub’ which will optimize the Alliance’s overall capabilities whilst also reducing logistical costs.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

The Turkish aviation industry has gained significant momentum, which is reflected in both exports and Turkey’s strengthening position in foreign policy. This increases Turkey’s influence as a smart power, not only in the region where it is located but also on a global scale. For example, BAYKAR has set a new record by exporting $5.5 billion worth of defense industry equipment. Similarly, other prominent Turkish companies such as TUSAŞ and ASELSAN have made significant contributions to this sector.

In 2023, Turkey exported 230 different types of defense equipment to 185 countries, making Turkey one of the leading nations in air combat and defense technology. Advanced aircraft such as Kızıl Elma, Kemankeş, and TB3 will further enhance the country’s capabilities.

Turkey’s first indigenous fifth-generation fighter, the KAAN, successfully completed its maiden flight last month. With this achievement, Turkey joins an exclusive group of nations, along with the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, capable of developing fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

Very recently, ASELSAN announced that it has begun test flights with F-16s of an advanced high-tech pilot’s helmet called “Tulgar”, a Helmet-Mounted Display System, which is integrated with advanced technology and powered by software developed in Turkey. This helmet is specially designed for KAAN. The question now is what these developments mean for Turkey’s defense technology and their broader strategic implications.

Obviously, Turkey’s broader national technology initiative is driven by a concerted effort of various private and state-owned companies. It aims to promote the production of critical technologies that are vital to the country’s security and sovereignty. Achieving this capability is key not only to becoming a global player in critical and cutting-edge technologies but also to strengthening national independence in defense capabilities.

The importance of producing a national fighter such as the KAAN is obvious, but the abilty to produce key components, such as the Tulgar helmet, is  a breakthrough. This development underscores the importance of both comprehensive projects and specific innovations that enhance their operational effectiveness.

Technical Insights for Tulgar and How It Compares to the F-35 Helmet

According to the information document provided publicly by ASELSAN, the Tulgar helmet features a visor-projected color display with a 40-degree field of view and integrates digital night vision. It employs a hybrid (inertial and optical) head-tracking system to provide high-fidelity tracking in pilot’s head movements, critical in modern combat scenarios. The helmet is lightweight, weighing less than 2.1 kg, including the oxygen mask, and supports the ARINC-818-2 and Display Port video interfaces, essential for modern avionics. These specifications are designed to enhance the pilot’s situational awareness and mission effectiveness by merging high-resolution images and environmental awareness directly into the pilot’s line of sight.

The Tulgar’s capabilities parallel those developed for the F-35 helmet used on the U.S. advanced fighter jet. Like its U.S. counterpart, the Tulgar uses sophisticated helmet-mounted displays to provide pilots with immersive simulations that enhance training and mission readiness. These displays incorporate augmented reality, night vision, and data-link capabilities to provide pilots with real-time, 360-degree views of their surroundings. Notably, the F-35 helmet is an integral part of the aircraft’s system, significantly impacting its operational capabilities at a cost of approximately $400,000 each.

The helmet’s design incorporates lightweight materials and is customized to fit the individual pilot, improving comfort and reducing fatigue during long missions. Active noise reduction helps minimize cockpit noise, allowing the pilot to maintain focus and situational awareness. Furthermore, compatibility with 3D audio systems enhances auditory signals critical to spatial awareness and threat identification.

Overall, the development of the Tulgar helmet represents a significant step forward for Turkey’s defense technology and promises to increase its autonomy in the field of advanced military technologies. By equipping the KAAN fighter with such sophisticated components, Turkey not only enhances its operational capabilities but also positions itself as a formidable player in the global defense technology arena, capable of producing world-class military hardware in line with its strategic security interests.

Moreover, ASELSAN’S development of the Tulgar helmet represents a significant leap forward in high-tech equipment for KAAN fighter pilots. More than just a protective gear, the Tulgar is designed to be an integral part of the pilot’s sensory apparatus, dramatically enhancing situational awareness and combat readiness. This initiative underscores Turkey’s commitment to integrating cutting-edge technology into its defense systems and positions Tulgar as a critical component in modern air warfare.

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n a historic move, Japan’s Cabinet has given the green light to a plan that signals a significant departure from the nation’s postwar pacifist principles. The decision, announced on Tuesday, paves the way for Japan to export future next-generation fighter jets developed in collaboration with Britain and Italy to other countries.

The decision to allow international arms sales represents a major shift in Japan’s defense posture and is expected to bolster the country’s role in global security efforts. Chief Cabinet Secretary Yoshimasa Hayashi emphasized that while the move reflects Japan’s evolving security environment, the nation remains committed to its pacifist principles.

Under the approved plan, Japan’s arms equipment and technology transfer guidelines will be revised to permit the sale of co-produced lethal weapons to countries beyond the project’s partners. Hayashi assured that strict approval processes will be enforced to ensure compliance with Japan’s commitment to peace.

Global Combat Air Program

The joint fighter jet project, known as the Global Combat Air Program (GCAP), involves collaboration with Italy and the U.K. The initiative aims to develop an advanced fighter jet to replace Japan’s aging fleet of American-designed F-2 fighters and the Eurofighter Typhoons used by the U.K. and Italian militaries.

This decision marks a significant departure from Japan’s long-standing policy of restricting arms exports under its pacifist constitution. However, amid growing regional tensions, particularly from neighboring China, Japan has moved to deregulate its arms exports in recent years.

The move to export fighter jets and lethal weapons is seen as crucial for Japan’s participation in the project and its efforts to maintain technological superiority in the region, particularly against rivals like China and Russia.

Strengthening Japan’s military capabilities

While the decision has faced criticism from opponents, who argue that the government has not adequately explained the decision or sought public approval, the government has assured that exports will be limited to codeveloped lethal weapons for the jet and will not be used in active wars.

The Cabinet’s decision comes amid broader efforts by Prime Minister Fumio Kishida’s government to strengthen Japan’s military capabilities and defense industry partnerships. Kishida is expected to emphasize Japan’s willingness to play a greater role in military cooperation during an upcoming state visit to Washington in April.

The move to export fighter jets and lethal weapons is also expected to benefit Japan’s defense industry, which has traditionally focused on supplying the country’s Self Defense Force. By expanding into international markets, Japan aims to support its defense industry while furthering its military capabilities.

Source: The Associated Press

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he KAAN fighter jet, developed as part of the National Fighter Aircraft Program, made its maiden flight on February 21, 2024. This was the first time the Turkish public witnessed the flight of a manned fighter jet developed entirely with domestic resources.

The contract for the KAAN development project was signed between Turkish Aerospace Industries and the Secretariat of Defense Industries (SSB) in August 2016. Turkish Aerospace, as the prime contractor, completed the KAAN preliminary design activities in 2018-2022. In 2023, the KAAN fighter made its runway debut, known in aviation as a rollout, before making its maiden flight on February 21, 2024. In other words, KAAN made its first flight eight years after it graduated from an idea to an active project.

By comparison, the United States, which has developed numerous fighter jets to date, took approximately five years from the initiation of the F-35 project to its first flight. The completion of the KAAN project in eight years is commendable for Turkey, especially considering that it is the first domestically developed fighter jet.

Turkey’s domestic and national defense industry

This important achievement can be attributed to Turkey’s “domestic and national defense industry” policy, which the country began to implement decisively, especially after 2004. In a key meeting of the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) in 2004, it was decided to forgo the purchase of many off-the-shelf systems from abroad and instead focus on “co-production” or production using “domestic capabilities.”

The KAAN fighter is a complex “system of systems” requiring the development of numerous subsystems and technologies. These include special materials for low radar visibility, air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, an AESA radar, electro-optical systems, communication systems, electronic attack and support systems, and flight computers. The significance of the first flight on February 21 underscores Turkey’s remarkable progress in defense and military aviation over the past two decades, demonstrating significant developments in advanced technology.

Within the Turkish Air Force’s inventory, the F-16 Block 30/40/50/50+ aircraft are classified as 4^th-generation aircraft. In contrast, Turkey’s upcoming procurement of F-16 Block 70 fighters is considered 4.5 generation due to the integration of the AESA radar, which enables more precise and long-range detection of air and ground elements. Similarly, aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon (Europe), the KF-21 (South Korea), and the Rafale (France) fall into the 4.5-generation category.

5th generation stealth capabilities

On the other hand, the F-35 (U.S.), F-22 (U.S.), J-20 (China), Su-57 (Russia), and KAAN are classified as 5th generation due to their stealth capabilities, which include low radar (RF) and infrared (IR) visibility, as well as advanced sensor systems and situational awareness. Notably, only four countries, including Turkey, currently operate 5^th-generation fighter jets.

The KAAN, which measures approximately 21 meters in length, is capable of operating at an altitude of 55,000 feet and reaching speeds of up to 1.9 mach. Currently, the KAAN is powered by F110 engines, which are identical to those used on the F-16. Unlike the single engine configuration of the F-16, the KAAN has two F110 engines. However, for KAAN to achieve 5^th-generation status, it must be able to reach supersonic speeds without relying on the afterburner. This is critical because the afterburner increases both fuel burn and the aircraft’s thermal, or IR, signature, reducing its range and making it more vulnerable to IR-seeking missiles. Efforts are underway within the SSB to develop an advanced turbofan engine to replace the F110 engine.

KAAN is equipped with internal weapon stations similar to many 5^th-generation fighters and as a result, it doesn’t visibly carry ammunition during flight. Instead, when engaging air or ground targets, the covers on the weapon stations and sides of the fuselage retract, allowing ammunition to be fired. This provides two significant advantages: maintaining a minimal radar cross section due to the reduced aircraft surface area, and maintaining operational secrecy by concealing whether the aircraft is armed or unarmed.

In essence, Turkey has acquired an aircraft that is significantly more advanced than the F-16 Block 70, Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, and even the F-35, especially in terms of air-to-air combat capabilities. This is a triumph not only for the Turkish defense industry, but also for Turkish diplomacy. Just as indigenous alternatives were developed following the Canadian embargo on the electro-optical cameras used in Turkish UAVs, the KAAN fighter jet foreshadows the indigenous development of the Eurofighter Typhoon, previously unattainable due to Germany’s veto. Despite the short- and medium-term challenges posed by embargoes, particularly in the defense industry, the eventual emergence of indigenous versions of these products offers significant strategic and economic advantages.

KAAN’s flight testing

The strategic importance of Turkey’s domestic and national defense industry becomes clear when one considers the procurement of 40 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, along with billions of dollars’ worth of ammunition and pods, which sparked significant public debate. The crux of the matter is that while Turkey can develop ammunition and other payloads domestically, integration into the F-16 Block 70 is hampered by the proprietary flight computers and software, or “source codes,” owned by the United States. As a result, the manufacturer mandates the purchase of ammunition, which poses a risk to the sustainability of ammunition stocks in potential war scenarios. Therefore, Turkey’s emphasis on developing its domestic defense industry is not just a preference, but an imperative.

Following its maiden flight, KAAN’s flight testing will continue with various prototypes until 2029, accompanied by ongoing design and hardware improvements. Then, between 2029 and 2033, the Turkish Air Force will add the first 10 KAAN Block 1 aircraft to its inventory, allowing Turkish pilots to gain flight experience with KAAN through intensive operations. From 2033 to 2040, Turkish Aerospace will diversify KAAN configurations and continue full-scale production.

While this timeline may seem long, it’s worth noting that the F-16 fighter jet, introduced in 1974, is still in production today and has evolved to its Block 70 configuration over nearly five decades. It’s important to note that KAAN is expected to reach full operational capability in about a decade.

KAAN is important not only for Turkey, but also for Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Both countries have recently decided, to varying degrees, to participate in the national fighter project. Pakistan, which currently operates a fleet of Chinese fighter jets, has decided to participate, while Azerbaijan, with an aging fleet of Soviet-made fighter jets, is undergoing modernization by the Turkish defense industry, rebranding its Su-25 fighter jets as “Su-25 LACIN.” As a result, these friendly nations are poised to become the second and third users of KAAN after the Turkish Air Force.

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holistic assessment of the defense industry as a comprehensive ecosystem, rather than the combat effectiveness of individual large platforms, will make it easier to understand its impact on the fight against terrorism. With the progress made, Turkey is now in a position to produce systems and subsystems that are vital in the fight against terrorism.

The establishment of a national defense industry, with the breakthrough achieved in the recent period, has strongly influenced Turkey’s defense strategies and the instruments used in this field. The technology-intensive dimension of the fight against terrorism is one of the most obvious indicators of this breakthrough. In the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey began to produce its own platforms and subsystems, which were considered essential for operations against the PKK and up to that point in time had to be procured from abroad.

This resulted in a number of important advantages, including the prevention of personnel losses, better intelligence gathering, access to hard-to-reach areas, maintaining the tempo of operations, and cost efficiency. In the process, Turkey has raised its offensive and precision strike capabilities to a higher level, particularly through developments in unmanned systems and national munitions. This development, in turn, initiated a process at the doctrinal level, which included an increased focus on targeting the so-called senior members of the terrorist organization.

The emergence of unmanned systems

The importance of armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) becomes clear when considering the fight against terrorism, in general, and the geographical characteristics of certain areas in northern Iraq occupied by the PKK as safe zones. Military technological developments have provided various solutions in these areas, which are very difficult to reach with conventional forces. Operations that were previously limited to fighter aircraft such as the F-16 can now be carried out more flexibly and over longer periods with UAV systems. In this sense, UAV systems have played a decisive role in operations that require approaching the target in closed and difficult terrain.

By using UAV systems, the safety of the pilot’s life is not jeopardized, and, at the same time, the flight time of fighter jets and the cost of their ammunition are saved. Similarly, due to their characteristics, UAV systems have eliminated problems such as aerial resupply, and the inclusion of a large number of UAVs in the inventory has enabled uninterrupted surveillance of PKK targets. Such an opportunity paved the way for the rapid neutralization of PKK targets, especially the so-called senior members of the PKK. In recent years, the security forces and the MIT have carried out numerous operations in this way, and statements by members of the terrorist organization indicate that they are feeling this pressure.

It should also be noted that Turkey has adopted a continuous development line in the field of unmanned systems, working on complementary products that can meet all kinds of needs. For example, the Alpin, a rotary-wing UAV system or an unmanned helicopter developed by Titra, began providing logistical support to security forces in mountainous, hard-to-reach areas last year, which is a significant development. In the coming period, we can expect UAV systems to become increasingly capable of performing some of the functions of not only fighter aircraft such as the F-16, but also helicopter platforms such as the ATAK and Sikorsky.

PKK efforts to acquire military technology

Meanwhile, the risk of military technology products falling into the hands of terrorist organizations or non-state armed groups should always be considered. The concept of UAV attacks, popularized by DAESH in Syria and Iraq by planting explosives in commercial drones, has been seen in other countries in recent years and has become even more sophisticated in regions such as Yemen. In recent years, the PKK has made similar attempts at a rudimentary level, attacking Turkish military posts and tactical units on Turkish soil and in Iraq and Syria with improvised explosive devices attached to commercial drones or model aircraft.

Although the PKK has not achieved any results from these attacks, it is likely that it will continue to invest in this area as part of its long-term strategy in a security environment where UAV systems are becoming increasingly popular among terrorist organizations. Past examples show that the presence of a supporter/supplier plays an important role in the acquisition of such capabilities by terrorist groups or non-state armed actors.

Border security

Undoubtedly, one of the most important factors in the fight against terrorism is to ensure strong border security and to deter members of a terrorist organization from using certain points. It is also important to deploy low- and very low-altitude air defense systems on the border line against old-generation rocket and mortar systems that can be fired by terrorist elements across the border. The problems caused by both the infiltrations from the border line and rocket attacks from the other side have been clearly understood aftermath the civil war in Syria and ensuing proliferation of terrorist groups such as the PKK and Daesh.

The Turkish defense industry is carrying out extensive work to strengthen the border line, from advanced radar systems to cameras that can provide high-resolution surveillance and low-altitude air defense systems to patrol robots. Given the length of Turkey’s southern borders, it is reasonable to assume that unmanned systems will become increasingly important for this area, too. For example, there is a global trend towards the increased use of robot dogs in border areas, particularly for patrolling. While the U.S. is known to have various plans in this regard for the Mexican border, it is understood that similar efforts are underway in Turkey. Similar platforms may also be used in specific missions such as for cave operations against the PKK which are riskier due to the advantages the caves provide to terrorist components.

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n a surprising turn of events, Germany has announced its decision not to oppose the sale of Eurofighter jets to Saudi Arabia. This unexpected move comes as a notable departure from Germany’s previous stance on arms sales to the Middle Eastern nation. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock conveyed this decision after a meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Israel Katz in Jerusalem.

Historically, Germany has been reluctant to endorse arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to concerns about human rights violations and regional stability. However, the latest statement by Baerbock suggests a shift in perspective, highlighting Saudi Arabia’s contribution to Israel’s security.

Baerbock emphasized that Saudi Arabia plays a crucial role in enhancing Israel’s security by intercepting missiles launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The Foreign Minister acknowledged Riyadh’s efforts to counter the threat posed by the Houthis and stated that Germany would not stand against the idea of Britain providing more Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia.

The decision underscores the intricate geopolitical dynamics of the region and how nations collaborate in response to shared security concerns. Baerbock noted, “Saudi Arabia is a key contributor to Israel’s security and is helping to stem the risk of a regional conflagration.”

Rationale Behind the Decision

The shift in Germany’s stance appears to be rooted in the recognition of Saudi Arabia’s strategic role in maintaining regional stability. Baerbock’s statement suggests that the German government sees Saudi Arabia as a valuable partner in addressing common security challenges, and this perception has influenced its decision on Eurofighter sales.

The Eurofighter is a joint project involving the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Spain. As Germany’s approval is required for sales of these fighter jets, the decision not to oppose the sale to Saudi Arabia reflects a coordinated effort among the participating nations.

Houthi rebels have been a source of regional instability, targeting vessels in the Southern Red Sea and threatening Israel-bound ships. In response to these attacks, the United States recently announced the creation of a multinational mission named Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter Houthi aggression.

A significant shift in German foreign policy

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has been further complicated by the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli onslaught on Gaza has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, with significant international concern about potential war crimes or genocide. This complex situation adds layers of intricacy to diplomatic relations in the region.

Germany’s decision not to oppose Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift in its foreign policy approach to arms deals in the Middle East. The acknowledgment of Saudi Arabia’s role in enhancing regional security and countering common threats demonstrates the evolving nature of diplomatic relationships in a dynamic geopolitical environment. The implications of this decision will likely reverberate across international relations, prompting further analysis of the evolving alliances in the Middle East.

Source: Anadolu Agency

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n Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space, Dr. Bleddyn E. Bowen presents the sobering reality of space technology; its development to enhance the killing power of the state.

Bowen discusses the political, strategic, and social causes and consequences of the Global Space Age and sees it as an outgrowth of the international system actors within it. The book provides a global view of international politics of space and its increasingly multipolar environment, and masterfully links technopolitics to power politics.

Q. What is the original sin? How did nations first decide to pursue space power?

It’s tied up in the Thermonuclear Revolution, through the pursuit of military power. If it wasn’t for the perceived military benefits of being able to launch nuclear weapons, you would not have had the very large sums of money poured into these very temperamental, exotic new technologies in the 1940s and ’50s. The scenario would be similar for satellite technologies; they were very temperamental and unknown. The potential benefits were so huge that both superpowers’ military industrial complexes in the early Cold War put resources into it, and got the things working that then opened up access to space for all sorts of other applications as well.

The original sin refers to the military interest in developing those very first technologies that opened up the entire space. It started with the Sputnik shock. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 was the product of the Soviet missile arms and nuclear project. It wasn’t just to have a demonstration; Khrushchev did not plan that. It was very much Sergei Korolev saying, “Well, we might as well put a demonstration satellite up there.”

They were building those rockets to launch nuclear weapons. Korolev was told he could only work on the satellite in his spare time, so that the work did not interfere with developing them as missiles with nuclear weapons. So, Korolev and his teams worked on Sputnik in their own time, not on the main line of work. Even the very first satellite launch was just the tip of the iceberg of what was a massive military nuclear buildup.

Q. How has the use of space technology evolved from back then?

What we have today are just mature and advanced versions of the same basic technological system. They are often decades old. GPS is 50 years old. We just have a very advanced version of it today compared to 50 years ago. So, it’s about the spread and the increased availability of the services rather than a change in the technology as such.

It didn’t happen overnight, but by the 1990s most of the kinds of satellite service types that we use today had been developed in their earliest generations, or sometimes even the second or third generations.

Satellite TV, for example, came out of military command and control systems. The Tokyo Olympics were broadcast by satellite in 1964; it was the first major sports event to be broadcast by satellite. That’s an example where the actual service and technology have been there for a long time, but it’s far more ubiquitous now.

Satellite navigation is another one. Various parts of the military and civilian economy in the United States were already using the very first services of GPS in the late 1980s. Today, those services are just far more accessible to everyone rather than just specialized organizations.

Similarly, with satellite imagery; one of the applications was in 1960 when the first Corona spy satellite images came back. Those things have been around for a very, very long time; now, you have a lot more commercial companies doing that, which means the private sector, and even individuals who have the money can purchase those kinds of images now, and get them much more quickly as well.

However, I’m not optimistic about that future, because if anything of value is found that is economically feasible to develop or exploit, then selfish interests will probably prevail because the precedent is already there in Earth orbit. If you want to look at the actual competition for resources in space, it’s been happening for decades already in the geostationary satellite belt.

At geostationary orbit, 36,000 kilometers above the equator, there’s a finite space and finite radio frequency spectrum to use, and different countries have to file at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to get the right to use the particular radio communication frequency and the location to put their satellite. They are given a time limit to get their satellites up there and to start using it. Then, they must continuously use it and have a satellite there, or they lose the right to that slot and somebody else can bid for it. It’s pretty much on a first-come-first-serve basis.

The geostationary belt and Earth orbit are so valuable for military and economic purposes that there is no truly equitable method of governance there. It may occur in the future; politics is about possibilities. However, that’s the precedence we’ve set over the last 70 years, and it’s not encouraging. I don’t think we’re going to have profitable moon mining anytime soon. I think that might take another 100 years or more. But if the moon becomes economically very valuable, there aren’t many positive precedents to use sadly.

Q. Do actors hog up these strategic locations? Is there any regulation that prevents such an act?

In terms of geostationary satellite slots and frequency use, it is first come, first served, and if you don’t use it, you lose it. The filings on the ITU are constantly watched because if countries or companies file for a certain frequency, and if it was approved, they own that frequency. Some countries like to file for very large satellite constellations and people evaluate this as an attempt to hog the spectrum or a location.

It’s up to the countries within the ITU to resolve those disputes before final decisions are made. If the ITU fails to make enough decisions that people think are fair, then the organization itself risks becoming desolate. There has to be some level of coordination to avoid jammed and incompatible satellite usage. So, you could end up with a situation where nobody can use satellites in a certain area, because too many people are trying to use it at the same time.

Q. How does more countries or actors stepping into the space arena translate to international relations?

That is a difficult question. I won’t have a clear answer for you, because I’m observing it just like everyone else. The phrase the “democratization of space” is being thrown around a lot. I don’t like that phrase because I don’t think that having more countries doing things in space is necessarily democratic.

Space governance is usually more a reflection of power politics rather than any democratic process, and a lot of countries that are doing more things in space are not democratic countries themselves, and even within democratic countries there are questions over how involved the wider electorates are in space policy, or whether they are actually interested or informed about their countries’ space policies and activities. There’s a representation and engagement question there that we would ascribe to any system we would call democratic.

So, whilst there’s more population in space now, perhaps in terms of the number of different countries, and also large private companies doing things in space, I wouldn’t call it democratic. We don’t have a truly democratic governance structure for outer space. There are votes of the UN General Assembly, but it’s not really the same as the domestic democratic system.

On one hand, more countries are paying more attention to space now, because it affects everyone, so more engagement and more awareness is a good thing. On the other hand, it means that the ways that a lot of countries have been using the United Nations to try to govern space activities needs to be revisited in a way that recognizes that dozens more countries now have a stake in it. It’s not necessarily the West versus the rest, and it requires a shift in mentality for many of the older traditional space powers, including China, Japan, and India, just like Western Europe, the United States, and Russia.

The older, bigger traditional space powers are used to being able to do what they want to, without having to consider the rest of the world too much—that is less and less the case now. If they can’t change the ways they behave, or try to get agreements or consensus built in various forums, that may be an issue. Space is becoming more like governing the seas now, with a lot of smaller states much more involved and influential in any sort of UN-level agreement.

Q. Do different countries take similar or different paths in developing and utilizing space technology?

There are variations, especially in the way countries might want to present themselves. Yet, they share a lot of the same technological hurdles because it’s the same base technologies that you need to use. As I do in Original Sin, you can look at six or seven significant space powers and they all must get over the same technological hurdles to have their own access to space, their own launch vehicles, their own satellite industries, their own educated and trained workforce in space technology and sciences, etc.

Especially early on, when space knowledge and technology were not as widespread, there were many common challenges that had to be faced. But then, within that broad similarity, in terms of the technological challenges, you have the variations in the way certain countries go about doing things.

Japan, for example, didn’t really have that much of an explicit military connection to its satellite and launch vehicle deployment. The logic of autonomy and avoiding complete dependence on the United States was supported by the Japanese government, just in case Japan might need to develop its own nuclear weapons program in the upcoming years. Having a nuclear energy industry and a rocket launch industry, you got the fundamental infrastructure there to develop nuclear bombs and missiles, if you need to down the line. India’s major space efforts were presented in terms of social and economic development, much more so than the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.

Today, there are even more variations because there are already six established space powers: the United States, Europe, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Other countries can now cooperate or purchase services and pick and choose which aspect of space industries they want to develop or take part in. Take Nigeria, for example. It has dropped its old ambitions of having its own launch vehicle, its own rockets, and its own astronaut in space, and focused on satellites and using satellite data. That means, Nigeria has really important stakes in what goes on in space, but it can’t launch its own satellites and it still buys satellites. It still hasn’t gotten a full satellite manufacturing capability yet, but it operates and uses its own satellites.

Brazil has major Earth observation satellites in a joint program with China. It tried to have a launch program which failed, and they eventually gave up on it because it was just too expensive. Other countries, for a fee, would launch their satellites for them. Britain, for example, doesn’t have its own launch capability, but it does a lot in space science, engineering and research, integrated with the European Space Agency. It relies on the United States for security and intelligence applications in space and services, and is a world leader in small satellites manufacturing. It’s not comprehensive, but it’s got very targeted, niche strengths.

Finland has a commercial radar imagery satellite company, and is a big player in terms of the space economy and technology development in the particular area, but it doesn’t have its own rockets.

Just like any other aspect of military, technological, economic, or diplomatic power, space power has so many different applications. What matters is what kind of space technologies and industries each country actually needs because they will be different for each case.

Different countries today can tailor their space strategies and policies according to their economic and security needs, etc. The United Arab Emirates is particularly interesting. They are throwing money at space in lots of different areas; they are investing in defense security, economic infrastructure, and space exploration. They have sent a satellite to Mars and wanted to send a payload to the moon, but they still don’t want to build their own rockets.

Space is still so expensive and you need a lot of trained people and highly specialized skills. You need to have loads of people go into rocket science, which would take them out of other sectors of high-technology skills and training that they could otherwise be deployed at. Therefore, space power must be targeted in countries that are new to space or smaller countries.

Q. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons in space but that’s not the case with conventional weapons. What measures can actors take to protect themselves?

This has been the case since 1967 based on Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty. There’s not a lot you can do in terms of governance, because there’s no appetite for any more restrictions on other kinds of weapon bans in space. The Russians and the Chinese have tried to push a treaty on it, but it has not gotten anywhere. It is seen by many as a bad faith diplomatic exercise; it is not something that’s done with genuine intent to try to make space warfare less likely to happen.

There’s not a lot you can do other than to build more satellites, so that if something happens to one, there are more ready to take over, or to build terrestrial alternatives or backups. If the satellites go dark, there’s not a lot you can do because if a determined enemy wants to shoot down your satellite and they have technology capabilities, direct defense of satellites is very difficult.

Against electronic warfare or cyber warfare, there are more options for defense. However, it’s difficult for us on the outside to observe it. The forensics of that become very difficult. It’s hard to tell when something is a deliberate attack or just accidental.

They are highly proliferated and the cost to entry is lower, so smaller powers can do cyber operations. It’s difficult to stop a missile from blowing up your satellite but you have more options to respond to enemy jamming or a cyber attack, the effects of those can be reversed. So, in terms of governance, there’s not a lot you can do. On the other hand, militarily depending on the kind of attack, there are some things you can do in some areas.

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here come times throughout history where military innovations or shifts in the character of warfare take great revolutionary leaps, allowing those able to reap their benefits first to position themselves at a substantive competitive advantage. Militaries that identify and exploit these periods of disruptive changes make major shifts in the balance of power, security, and prosperity for their nations. Those who fail to do so, or fail to adapt to change, risk exposing their country to danger. What will the next big thing in warfare be? And how can militaries successfully adapt to meet the challenge? The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers provides an authoritative take and the necessary foundation for healthy speculation.

Military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. discusses military revolutions—or shifts in the character of warfare—and specifically the most recent precision warfare revolution which is currently reaching its maturity.

According to Krepinevich, an even newer revolution is emerging. This is fueled by the advances of commercial and military-driven technology, such as AI 3D manufacturing, synthetic biology and quantum computing, and directed energy and hypersonic weapons, and is accelerated by the competition between the U.S., Russia, and China.

The precision warfare revolution was introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War. It gave the U.S. a monopoly over this form of warfare for several decades, but now other powers such as China have these capabilities.

In this era of increased competition amongst great powers, The Origins of Victory, first gives a preliminary assessment of the disruptive changes occurring in general war to identify the existing characteristics of the precision warfare regime, and goes on to offer speculation of the overlapping successor revolution.

Second, The Origins of Victory examines the crucial factor of how military organizations have successfully anticipated and exploited disruptive changes in warfare faster than their rivals.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I, Krepinevich considers the characteristics of the emerging competitive environment through trends over the years and identifies the ones that may show yield in the future. He discusses the maturing precision warfare and the overlapping new revolution, as well as their implication for deterrence.

Robert H. Latiff’s Future Peace, a sequel to Future War, specifically brings to attention a subtle, yet potentially destructive effect of technologies such as autonomous systems, advanced weapons, and AI: the provocation to violence. Against the backdrop of the brewing power rivalry between the U.S. and its adversaries, technology aggregates tension and catalyzes violence.

Future Peace touches upon the ethical, security-related, behavioral, and technical aspects of technology and warfare. It consists of four chapters: “A Giant Armed Nervous System” (referring to the military), “Urge to Violence,” “Stumbling into War,” and “Avoiding War.”

Latiff’s book comes as a warning to practice caution when adopting new weapons technology, and aids in understanding human and technical behaviors to attenuate its harms and decrease the chances of war. Not only does technology make war easier and speedier, hence enabling the rush to war, but hinders human reasoning. Such technical changes make the process of sound judgement difficult; for example, thinking and acting in a diplomatic manner. Furthermore, these changes enhance the potential for human error to get out of hand.

Latiff argues that it is vitally important to avoid entering conflict in the first place. He highlights the importance of the cooperative efforts of many segments of society, from the public and technologists to militarists and decision-makers. He implies that it is criminal negligence to leave everything to automation processes or politicians. Therefore, Future Peace also lays out long to short term recommendations to maintain peace and reverse the rush to war.

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utonomous features are not a matter of the future; they have been used in warfare for years. However, it is quite evident that with the advancement of technology and the weaponization of artificial intelligence, autonomous weapons systems are swiftly adapting and becoming accepted.

As these changes emerge, the question that is often raised by international organizations such as the UN, which set the norms of conduct in an effort to control and regulate the use of autonomous weapons, is “How will human beings maintain control of the use of autonomous weapons?” In their study, Ingvild Bode and Hendrik Huelss flip the script to reveal another perspective of this dynamic.

Bode and Huelss aim to explain how testing, developing, and using weapons systems with autonomous features shapes ethical and legal norms, and how standards manifest and change in practice. The authors also examine the consequences of autonomous weapons for international relations.

Bode and Huelss acknowledge the fear and risks that these developments bring but adopt the approach that autonomous weapon systems may push people away from taking immediate decisions on the use of force as norms adapt to the appropriate use of force.

In short, Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Norms analyses the normative repercussions of weaponizing artificial intelligence by examining them not as tools used by the military but as shaping forces. Chapters include “Autonomous Weapons Systems and International Relations,” “New Technologies of Warfare: Emergence and Regulation,” “International Law, Norms, and Order,” “Norms in International Relations,” and “How Autonomous Weapons Systems Make Norms,” and contain assisting tables and figures.

As the trend and debate of autonomizing weapons systems continues, Autonomous Weapon Systems and International Norms equips the reader with an understanding of the relation of human-machine interaction and the process of integrating new technologies into war.

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n War Virtually, Roberto J. González takes the reader behind the scenes to expose how scientists, programmers, and engineers developed technologies that automate war, predict conflict, and regulate human thought and behavior. Does this sound utopian? Not so when you factor in the persistent drive to arm for virtual warfare. In this quest, data comes a valuable commodity.

González evaluates autonomous weapons, robotic systems, predictive modeling software, advanced surveillance programs, and psyops techniques. He examines the foundation of the latest version of warfare in order to explain how it has taken its current form through contemporary military operations and their high-tech and cultural underpinnings.

However, War Virtually transcends the design, innovative, and transformative aspects of technology and warfare, and touches upon human engineering. González reveals the relations between U.S. intelligence agencies and Big Tech, and its implications. It is no secret that algorithms construct behavioral models for anticipating or even predicting human behavior, and, therefore, all of us risk having our digital lives become part of the military-industrial economy.

Adopting a critical approach, González examines how the U.S. military is weaponizing technology and data for new kinds of warfare, and questions the notion that technological advancements will lead to more efficient and less destructive warfare. In fact, he implies that such an aspiration comes at a great cost, and argues that in this world, there is little room for hubris.

War Virtually covers a large array of topics including automated battlefield robotics, social scientists’ involvement in experimental defense research, the blurred line between political consulting and propaganda in the internet era, and the military’s use of big data to craft new counterinsurgency methods based on predicting conflict.

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n Proto-Algorithmic War, Stefka Hristova offers a unique perspective on the Iraq War and the history of algorithmic and digital logic that came to be a crucial element of today’s warfare. She examines the military policy of the United States going into the Iraq War: the U.S. approached the war with the logic of digital and emerging algorithmic technology alongside the preceding numerical logics of the British Mandate in Iraq. In a sense, the Iraq War became an experiment in the early stages of development and utilization of such technology in warfare, and moreover war culture.

Hristova provides a case study of a comparative historical framework reaching back to the quantification techniques harnessed during the era of Mandatory Iraq (1918-1932) and analyzes the parallels and diversions between the numerical logics in both cases.

The author further evaluates the logic that moved beyond the British mandate for Iraq and reduced culture, society, and the physical body and environment into visual data-driven, sterilized, reproducible warfare, highlighting that it lacked cultural and historical context. Indeed, the actual experience of the Iraq War resulted in massive-scale death and destruction.

Proto-Algorithmic War offers an insight into the digitization and automation of war. Hristova aptly scrutinizes the ways in which the Iraq War attempted and often failed to see and incorporate population and territory as digital and further proto-algorithmic entities.

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en Buchanan and Andrew Imbrie use fire as an analogy to showcase how AI has a dual nature: destructive and constructive. Just like our distant ancestors learning to operate their newly discovered, full of potential tool, our responsibility is to understand and use AI potential wisely. With AI revolutionizing the world, democracies have a responsibility to harness that power constructively and come out on top. Transformation is on its way—can humanity use AI to light the way? Or will the fire burn wildly and ignite a new type of war?

In The New Fire, Buchanan and Imbrie help us understand AI better by breaking it down into its “sparks,” which are data, algorithms, and computing power. They further explain the tangible and potentially destructive consequences of these sparks such as disinformation campaigns, new hacking tools, and military weapons.

On a larger scale, The New Fire shows the urgency of democracies to adapt to the powerful tool that is AI, as autocrats may use it for domestic centralized control and asymmetric advantages in combat. In that sense, they argue that harnessing the power of AI is crucial for holding democracy in balance in the world. The New Fire also acknowledges that democracies have a harder time adapting to the age of AI given ethical and civil concerns, but that new ways could be forged based on the advantages of democracy.

Drawing on examples from geopolitical competition and its analysis, Buchanan and Imbrie show how AI can work for democracy while respecting civil rights. In the age of AI, this crucial topic may determine the choice of course between war and peace.

Written by Dilara Özer

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n December 14, the Bayraktar Kizilelma jet-powered drone made its maiden flight from Çorlu airfield in Turkey. The achievement was announced by the Chief Technology Officer of the Baykar Technology firm, Selcuk Bayraktar. Capable of carrying various guided weapons inside its body and under its wings, the stealth drone is planned to enter serial production in late 2023. The Bayraktar Kizilelma is one of the very few jet-powered combat drone projects in the world. Other examples include Okhotnik by Russia, MQ-20 Avenger and XQ-58 Valkyrie by the United States, and WZ-7 Soaring Dragon by China.

Before the maiden flight, another important milestone in the development process of the aircraft was Kizilelma’s taxi test on November 20. This was praised by Ukraine’s ambassador to Turkey, Vasily Bodnar. Pointing to the Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation on the project, Bodnar stated in a tweet in Turkish that “it is a Ukrainian engine that lifts the Kizilelma to the sky”: the Kizilelma is powered by an AI-25TLT turbofan engine, designed by Ukrainian Ivchenko-Progress.

Kizilelma is the latest product that benefits from the Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation, which has expanded significantly over the past five years. The most well-known product of this cooperation is the Bayraktar TB2 armed drone, which has been extensively used by the Ukrainian armed forces since the start of the Russo-Ukrainian War on February 24. Drones have been at the center of the cooperation as Ukraine has become the engine supplier for the Akinci and Kizilelma drones. The issue has become particularly important because of Ukraine’s war with Russia and the recent bombing of the facilities of manufacturer Motor Sich by Russia on November 20.

Turkish-Ukrainian Defense Cooperation

On February 3, 2022, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Ukraine’s President Volodymyr Zelensky signed an agreement on Turkish-Ukrainian cooperation in high technologies, aviation, and space. The agreement covered the manufacture of the Bayraktar TB2 armed drones in Ukraine through transfer of technology and know-how. Ukraine started acquiring the TB2 in 2019 for its air force and navy, and according to Ukrainian officials, local manufacture would be modified to incorporate local products and subsystems, such as a Ukrainian engine for the drones.

Three weeks after the signing of the agreement, Russian Armed Forces initiated a large-scale attack on Ukraine and started an invasion of the country’s southern and western parts. Since the start of the war, the TB2s have been used extensively, hitting many Russian armored vehicles and air defense systems. It is claimed that the drone participated in the missile attack on the Russian Black Sea Fleet’s flagship, Moskva, on April 13, which resulted in the sinking of the ship the next day.

Although the TB2 is the most popular product of the Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation and one of the symbols of Turkey’s defense exports, it is not the only area of collaboration in this Black Sea partnership: Ukraine has stood out as a major powerplant supplier for Turkey and has benefited from its indigenous solutions.

The Bayraktar Akinci is a heavy reconnaissance-surveillance and strike drone. With a maximum take-off weight of around 6,000 kg, the Akinci is designed to be equipped with various precision guided missiles and bombs, and different types of sensors, such as electro-optical camera, radar, and electronic intelligence/signals intelligence (ELINT/SIGINT) systems. Akinci is designed to be able to be equipped with engines. The baseline model, Akinci A, is powered by Ivchenko-Progress AI-450T, whereas Akinci B is equipped with Pratt & Whitney Canada PT6A-135A engines. During the SAHA Expo exhibition in 2021, Baykar Technology signed an agreement with Motor Sich for the MS500 turboprop engine.

At the same time, another agreement was signed with Ivchenko-Progress for the AI-322F and AI-25TLT turbofan engines for the Bayraktar Kizilelma. The AI-25TLT is powering the A version of Kizilelma, and the AI-322F will be used in the B model. According to Baykar Technology information, Kizilelma C will have two AI-322F engines and will be able to fly faster than the speed of sound.

Engine procurement from Ukraine is not limited to drones. In June of last year, Turkish Aerospace (TA) signed a contract with Motor Sich for TV3-117 turboshaft engines for use in the prototypes of the T929 ATAK 2 next-generation attack helicopter project. The Ukrainian company is also offering the same engine for TA’s T925 10-ton class general purpose helicopter project. TA plans to fly T929 for the first time in March 2023.

In addition to marine and aviation domains, there have also been talks over cooperation in the land vehicles sector. Ukrainian heavy vehicle engine and armored vehicle manufacturer Kharkiv Morozov Machine Building Design Bureau (KMDB) proposed a cooperation with Turkey on various fighting vehicles, namely Altay main battle tank and Firtina self-propelled howitzer. The sale of the latter to Azerbaijan was stalled because of Germany’s refusal to supply the engine and transmission, whereas the failure to obtain the engine and transmission from Germany for the Altay main battle tank prompted Ankara to look for alternatives, ending up with a South Korean solution.

Motor Sich

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Ukraine inherited the large research, development, and production enterprises specialized in gas turbines. Ivchenko-Progress and Motor Sich focus on aviation engines, with the latter being one of the leading manufacturers of aircraft and helicopter engines in the world. Based in Zaporizhzhia, privately owned Motor Sich also provides services for maintenance, overhaul, and upgrade of engines. Ivchenko-Progress, on the other hand, is a state-owned design bureau specialized in aviation engines, including gas turbines. The two companies work very closely: Motor Sich, while producing its own designs, also acts as a manufacturer for Ivchenko-Progress.

Motor Sich’s great experience in design and manufacture of aero engines made it a lucrative investment opportunity, especially for China. In 2017, the Chinese firm Skyrizon Aviation bought a 41% stake in Motor Sich. This agreement was met with a harsh reaction by the U.S., and subsequently shelved after Ukrainian President Zelensky took the decision to impose sanctions on Skyrizon in January 2021. Although there were reports that 50% of the company’s shares could be sold to an undisclosed Turkish company in May 2021, this did not happen.

The owner of Motor Sich, Vyacheslav Boguslayev, was taken into custody by the Ukrainian intelligence on October 22 on charges of treason for providing engine parts to Russia. It was alleged that the owner of the company, which manufactures engines for Mil and Kamov helicopters and provides maintenance and repair services, made a secret agreement with Russia, which had maintenance, repair, and logistics support problems due to the ongoing war.

On November 7, the management of Ukraine’s five leading companies, including Motor Sich, was transferred to the Ministry of Defense in accordance with the “Law on the Transfer of Goods Under Martial Law.” On November 20, the company’s production facilities were severely damaged after a missile attack by Russia. It is still unclear how much damage the production infrastructure and capacity have suffered, and how this will affect the Kizilelma, the Akinci, and the T929.

The Future?

Turkish-Ukrainian defense cooperation has rapidly expanded in the past five years, covering many complex programs and products. The most important aspect of this partnership is engine development and production. Having many ambitious aerospace development projects, Turkey has a stated goal of achieving self-sufficiency and independence in many critical components, including engines for its indigenous air, sea, and land platforms.

TUSAŞ Engine Industries (TEI) and Kale are the two major companies that are active in this field, and their projects have recently entered the test and production phase. TEI’s TF6000 and TF10000 engines are promising candidates for powering the Kizilelma and other platforms that Turkey will develop. Delivering an aero engine for a high-performance combat aircraft whether piloted or not, however, is a challenging task, requiring extensive infrastructure, skilled workforce, and an industry ecosystem. China, for example, has gone through a similar path for the past 25 years with the assistance of Russia and Ukraine.

Achieving operational independence is Turkey’s top priority when devising defense planning and industrial strategies. In order to increase the local content and indigenous solutions, a “top-down” approach has been selected: Turkey first started with platform projects such as Altay, Anka, and MILGEM, and then went for indigenization of the major subsystems and components of these platforms. Engine, transmission, and associated technologies are the most crucial elements of this endeavor. A reliable partner is therefore important to avoid risks, unnecessary cost, and uncertainties. Ukraine is a good candidate for being such a partner, since it is possible to establish a defense industry-military partnership with benefits for both sides.

That said, there are realities that may or may not limit Turkey’s opportunities. The most obvious and important risk factor is Russia’s invasion and war with Ukraine and all the political, military, industrial, and financial uncertainties it has produced since February 24, 2022. Turkey’s relations with the two warring sides are both crucial and fragile. Managing these risks is a challenging task, even more so than the challenges involved in developing an indigenous engine. In the end, the Russia-Ukraine War was a stark reminder for Turkey that complex aerospace and defense programs are important assets in foreign relations.

Baykar Technology has recently revealed a computer-generated video showing the features and capabilities of the Bayraktar Kizilelma armed drone. The company stated that the first flight of the Kizilelma is planned for 2023.

The Kizilelma is the latest member of the Bayraktar drone series by Baykar Technology. The design was first revealed to the public in July 2021. The program was previously known as “Muharip Insansiz Ucak Sistemi” (MIUS, Unmanned Combat Aircraft System).

The name “Kizilelma” (“Red Apple” in Turkish) was announced in March 2022. The concept of “red apple” is important in Turkish tradition, symbolizing an idea or ultimate goal for the nation or state. The name, therefore, has a special meaning, manifesting the significance of this challenging project for the company and for Turkey.

Kizilelma’s technical characteristics

The Kizilelma is an armed drone, powered by a single turbofan engine. The aircraft has delta wing and canard configuration: the small forewings (canards) are mounted forward of the main wings, which have triangular shape. The overall geometry of the airframe is consistent with contemporary stealth aircraft design with minimum protrusions and body angles seemingly optimized for decreasing the radar cross section (RCS). It can be assumed that the airframe coating and the paint will be of radar-absorbing material (RAM) for better stealth.

According to technical specifications shared by Baykar Technology, the Kizilelma will be able to remain airborne for five hours and will have an operational ceiling of 35,000 feet. The maximum takeoff weight of the aircraft will be six tons with a payload capacity of 1.5 tons. The maximum combat radius, which is the maximum distance from its base the Kizilelma can cover to perform combat missions, is stated as 500 nm (about 925 km).

The Kizilelma will have an internal weapons bay to carry precision-guided missiles and bombs, a feature that further contributes to the aircraft’s stealth characteristics. Although the images and videos released by Baykar Technology do not show any hardpoints under the wings for carrying weapons or other systems, their presence is highly possible.

The Turkish defense industry offers a wide range of precision-guided weapon systems for the Kizilelma. Among them are the SOM-J air-to-surface cruise missile, the HGK, the LGK, the Minyatür Bomba (MB), TEBER and Lacin precision guided bombs, ÇAKIR air-launched anti-ship missile, and Gökdoğan and Bozdoğan air-to-air missiles. The main sensor of the Kizilelma is planned to be an active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar system, currently being developed by ASELSAN as well as advanced electro-optical cameras and electronic warfare systems.

Baykar Technology presents fully automatic takeoff and landing and beyond line of sight (BLOS) data-link capability as among the Kizilelma’s capabilities. The Kizilelma is also claimed to be aircraft carrier compatible, being able to perform takeoff and landing operations from short flight decks.

There are three different ideas on the role of UCAS in the future of airpower. The first is an all-UCAS air force, where air-to-air and air-to-ground missions are undertaken by a single or various types of combat drones. The air-to-air missions include combat air patrol (CAP), interception of enemy aircraft, and the escort of friendly air, sea, or land assets against air threats.

Air-to-ground missions can be listed as close air support of friendly ground units, precision strikes, standoff strike of high value targets (HVT), tactical air support of maritime operations (TASMO), suppression of enemy air defenses (SEAD), and destruction of enemy air defenses (DEAD).

Armed drones so far have been exclusively used for air-to-ground missions, in addition to Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR). Air-to-air warfare requires agility, speed, and maneuverability, which are achieved through aerodynamic design and high-performance engines. Furthermore, aerial warfare, especially within visual range (WVR) combat, also known as “dogfighting,” requires instantaneous decision-making and reaction skills as well as full situational awareness.

These requirements put a heavy load on the sensors and computing systems of a drone. The software and hardware technology are promising in terms of providing effective solutions to these cognitive challenges, but the decision-making cycle and the delegation of authority to a fully autonomous system in air-to-air combat is the subject of a complex ethical, hierarchical, and organizational debate, rather than a technological issue.

The second school of thought regarding the future of airpower is creating a mixture of staffed and unmanned systems, deploying drones for high-risk missions such as SEAD/DEAD, electronic warfare, and precision strike of HVTs from standoff ranges. In this approach, known as “manned-unmanned teaming” (MUM-T), the most prominent scheme is to use a number of UCAS under the leadership of a piloted combat aircraft.

The UCAS deployed in this model is named a “loyal wingman.” A drone with enough flight performance to accompany fighters and the intelligence needed to semi-autonomously support them can be described as a “loyal wingman.” There are several loyal wingmen development projects in the world, such as the Kratos XQ-58A Valkyrie, Boeing MQ-28 (Ghost Bat), and Sukhoi S-70 Okhotnik.

The third approach is the incremental take-over of combat missions by UCAS. This argument can be considered as the middle ground between the previous two concepts. While it is true that building up a fully drone-based air force is more of an organizational, ethical, and doctrinal problem, it may indeed be an eventuality. UCAS are already suited for the majority of air-to-ground missions while optimizing them with air-to-air combat will require more research on AI and well-defined operational concepts as well as legal and ethical frameworks.

The Turkish Air Force today

The Turkish Air Force (TurAF) combat fleet consists of around 240 F-16C/D Fighting Falcon and 40 F-4E 2020 aircraft. These combat aircraft are supported by seven KC-135R tankers and four E-7T Barış Kartalı airborne early warning and control (AEW&C) aircraft. The earlier models of the F-16 fleet, around 35 Block 30 type F-16s have been receiving extensive structural upgrades which will allow them to operate well until the 2030s.

The TurAF originally planned to induct the F-35A Joint Strike Fighter to replace the F-4E 2020 fleet and operate with the Milli Muharip Ucak (MMU, TF-X) which will enter service in the late 2020s and which would replace the F-16s. However, after Turkey’s acquisition of the S-400 air defense system from the Russian Federation in 2019, the United States cancelled the delivery of the F-35As to TurAF and removed Turkey from the project.

This development affected the TurAF’s modernization plans. As a result, to fill the capability gap until the MMUs arrive, Turkey requested the sale of 40 F-16Vs and 80 kits to upgrade existing F-16s to the F-16V standard. The F-16V is the latest model of the F-16 family and incorporates advanced sensors and capabilities.

The TurAF armed drone fleet consists of the Bayraktar Technology’s Bayraktar Akinci and Turkish Aerospace’s Anka-S. The Akinci has recently started entering service and with its 1,500 kg payload carrying capacity and BLOS communication, significantly boosted the TurAF’s ISTAR and strike capabilities.

World military spending rose to almost $2 trillion in 2020, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report. The Russia-Ukraine war will prompt many countries to increase their annual defense spending. Against the backdrop of the ongoing war, it would be no surprise to expect an exponential rise in world defense payout in 2022.

Europe’s defense budget

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is compelling European countries to rethink their defense spending and security strategies. Many European Union countries including Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Denmark, France, Latvia, and the Netherlands, have declared their intention to increase their annual defense expenditures.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that this year, Germany’s budget will allocate €100 billion to defense spending—more than double Germany’s total defense spending in 2021 (€47 million).

During a special session of the Bundestag, Scholz further emphasized the importance of “more security to protect freedom and democracy in Germany.” However, it is interesting to note that for many years, Germany has resisted the pressure from the U.S. and other countries to raise its defense spending to 2% of the GDP, which is the guideline and expected target for all NATO members. The recent increase in defense spending manifests a major shift in Germany’s pacifist doctrine.

Sweden

In Sweden, the security threat created by Russia led the Swedish government to announce a significant boost in their military spending to 2% of the GDP. Sweden used to spend almost 4% of its GDP on its defense budget during the Cold War era. After the disintegration of the USSR and the subsequent end of the Cold War, Sweden’s defense budget was drastically reduced to about 1%.

The recent defense budgets enlargements in Europe are taken in response to the deteriorating security situation in Ukraine. Swedish Prime Minister, Magdalena Andersson, said in a news conference, “Today, we present a new initiative with a clear message to the Swedish people and to the world around us. Sweden’s defense capability must be greatly strengthened.”

Belgium

Eyebrows are raised in Brussels as well. Belgium’s defense minister, Ludivine Dedonder, has recently called for more funding of Belgium’s armed forces. This is said to be done in addition to the €10 billion that the federal government decided to invest in Belgium’s military forces in the coming years.

Like Sweden and Germany, Belgium also falls far short of NATO’s target. Considering the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in the coming days, Belgium is expected to announce an increase of its defense budget as well.

Poland

Poland, which has followed NATO’s 2% defense spending guideline, has also decided to raise the spending on its armed forces more than planned as the emerging security threat leads Poland to reconfigure its plans.

While addressing the lower house of the parliament, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the leader of the Polish ruling nationalist Law and Justice party, stated, “There will be an amendment (to the defense plan): 3% of GDP on defense next year, then we will increase it.”

Lithuania

Seimas, the unicameral parliament of Lithuania, voted unanimously to increase the defense spending by €300 million. The country’s defense minister, Arvydas Anušauskas, said “Lithuania’s defense budget increase will allow us to get arms earlier than planned before, which are needed for strengthening Lithuanian’s army and, additionally, to host NATO troops coming to Lithuania.”

Denmark

In a similar vein, Denmark’s prime minister Mette Frederiksen has also announced an increase in the country’s defense budget. Under an agreement between parliamentary parties in Denmark, it was decided that defense spending will reach 2% of the GDP by 2033. This is equivalent to an increase of 18 billion Danish crowns ($2.65 billion).

Frederiksen called this move the “largest investment in Danish defense in recent times.”

Romania

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Klaus Iohannis also raised the need to increase the defense spending to 2.5% of the GDP from the current mark of 2%.

Non-European countries defense expenditure

In addition, there are other countries that are contemplating an increase in their defense expenditure. Boris Johnson could increase the UK’s defense budget amid fears of the growing Ukraine crisis. The Canadian defense minister also said his country is considering “aggressive options to increase Canada’s military budget.”

The rising defense budget trend all over Europe has also become a source of inspiration for Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida talked about the formulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) to ensure the protection of Japanese people’s lives.

China also announced it plans to spend 7.1% more on defense in the year 2022. It is clear that Beijing is considering challenges that have emerged from several fronts ranging from U.S. naval and air missions in the South China sea, the issue of Taiwan, and a prolonged border dispute with India.

Increasing defense spending: what does it mean?

Since the advent of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine, countries from Germany to China are bluntly increasing their defense budgets. Meanwhile, many countries have experienced decades of underfunding, and political and systematic neglect of their defense portfolio.

The chief of the German army Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais criticized the German government over “long running neglect of military readiness in the country.” He further stated that “his forces are more less powerless.”

The critical question, therefore, seems to be the following: Would a sudden leap in countries’ defense budgets lead to sudden improvements in their defense capabilities.

Nayib Bukele, the president of El Salvador of Arab/Palestinian origin, made his first visit to Turkey in January 2022, where he signed a series of agreements covering economy, defense industry, and technology among others with his counterpart Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In a strained relationship with the Biden administration, Bukele finds in Ankara a potential partner to develop a broad cooperation agenda, while later visiting the United Arab Emirates (UAE) in his regional tour.

If geopolitics rules the dynamics of the Middle East and the Black Sea region, ideology is what matters most in Latin America’s regional and global affairs. Currently, Latin America has a complex mix of conservative populist leaders such as Brazil’s Bolsonaro and El Salvador’s Bukele and the return of a “pink” tide after the elections of Alberto Fernandez in Argentina, Pedro Castillo in Perú, and Gabriel Boric in Chile, in addition to the left-wing governments in Cuba, Venezuela, and Nicaragua.

Despite regional polarization, conservatives and leftists in Latin America have a common point: both are experiencing complicated relations with the Biden administration, so there is a need to diversify relations globally. How do they diversify? They are increasingly looking to engage with Eurasian regional and global powers from China to Turkey, despite pressures from the West. Among other reasons, this is why Jair Bolsonaro is soon visiting Moscow, Alberto Fernandez decided to join the Chinese-led Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), and Bukele visited Turkey.

Bukele’s visit to Turkey seems to be a turning point in Turkish-Latin American relations. It is not only the first Latin American presidential visit to Turkey in the COVID19 era, but it signals a series of elements that are shaping a new agenda in line with Turkish foreign policy. First, technology is becoming the forefront of a new wave of Turkish activism. Second, Turkish private investing in Latin America and the Caribbean is growing almost from scratch, thus showing a new face for companies’ internationalization, and third, Turkish soft power is capturing increasing attention.

Bukele’s visit to Turkey seems to be a turning point in Turkish-Latin American relations

Ankara’s opening to Latin America has reached unprecedented levels. From almost non-existent regular diplomatic ties and scarce trade flows in the early 2000s, Turkey took the lead with a multidimensional foreign policy which identified various opportunities in Latin America. Twenty years later, the outcome is more than positive. Turkey has 17 embassies in Latin America, Turkish imports jumped from less than US$3.5 billion in 2010 to 8.5 billion in 2018, while exports doubled in the same period, reaching US$3.2 billion.

Turkish Airlines has flights to several regional destinations in Latin America and Turkish television series are famous and appreciated in the region, while hundreds of Latin American students have completed their studies in Turkey. Finally, Turkey is an observer member of different regional organizations such as the Central American Integration System (SICA), the Pacific Alliance, and, lately, Parlatino, the Latin American Parliament.

Finally, renewables – especially solar, hydroelectric, wind, and geothermal energy – are central to Turkey’s energy strategy due to the energy bill cost and the aim to collaborate on sustainable development. The country’s renewable capacity will be expanded over 50% in the next five years according to the International Energy Agency, while Latin America is moving to a more sustainable approach over using traditional sources of energy. The potential investment of a geothermal plant in El Salvador can be an example of the current technological capabilities and visualize opportunities for investments in other countries where the development of green energy is yet to move forward.

At the same time, Turkish investments are growing in Latin America. Up to the mid-2000s, Kordsa, a Sabanci Holding subsidiary in Argentina, was the only company investing in the region, but nowadays more than 20 Turkish companies operate in the region, mostly in the automotive, mining, and transportation sectors.

For example, Turkish Airlines is present in several countries from Argentina to Cuba, Yildirim Holding is close to exploiting the mega mine project Cañaverales in Colombia, and the hazelnut producer Banu is developing a long-term investment in Chile. Until recently, Turkish businesspeople were reluctant to invest in such a distant region, but the growing presence of Turkish Airlines, a series of high-level visits (usually with the presence of businesspeople), and the sustained government support for trade missions is beginning to pay off.

Soft power is also offering returns along the cultural connection. Multiple players such as Anadolu Agency, Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), the Turkish Maarif Foundation, and, more recently, the Yunus Emre Institute, which opened offices in Mexico DF and Buenos Aires, are making important contributions, while television series have exposed the Latin America public to the Turkish way of life. Finally, the ongoing “Armenia-Turkey Normalization Process” can help ease the bilateral relations with countries with significant Armenian communities such as Argentina and Uruguay.

Despite the global gap during the peak of the COVID19 pandemic crisis, relations between Turkey and Latin America are reassembling on a new, tech-oriented agenda. Nowadays, Latin America sees Turkey as an extra-regional partner – such as Indonesia, South Korea, or Australia – with which it can cooperate on different bilateral and multilateral interests, and where it can look for opportunities to improve its economic development, the major goal of Latin American countries. Now is the time to mature and expand these relationships.