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overnments must strengthen and clarify their commitments to reduce food loss and waste (FLW) if the world is to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goal of halving food waste by 2030, the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) warned in a new report released Wednesday.

The report, Achieving Food Loss and Waste Reduction: From Targets to Action, finds that while many countries have made progress in measuring and addressing food waste, policy commitments remain fragmented, poorly coordinated, and often lack measurable outcomes.

According to the OECD, most governments have adopted broad national FLW reduction targets, but only a minority have set quantifiable goals with clear baseline years and delivery timelines. About one in four countries does not specify a target year, and most fail to identify a baseline, making it difficult to measure progress or hold stakeholders accountable.

“Countries have stepped up to the challenge, but many are still relying on soft measures and voluntary commitments,” the report says. “More precise, measurable targets — and stronger policy coordination — are urgently needed to turn ambition into action.”

Global food waste remains staggering

Food waste remains a vast and persistent global problem. The OECD notes that the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) first estimated in 2011 that around 30% of all food produced is lost or wasted, and according to the UN Environment Program (UNEP), households alone threw away over 1 billion meals per day in 2022.

The scale of the issue has major social, environmental, and economic implications. Food loss and waste contribute roughly 8–10% of global greenhouse gas emissions, while hundreds of millions of people face food insecurity.

OECD modelling shows that achieving SDG target 12.3 — halving per capita food waste and reducing supply chain losses by 2030 — could cut agricultural emissions by 4% and lift 137 million people out of hunger within the next five years.

Despite this, progress has stalled. The report highlights that few countries have included FLW reduction in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) under the Paris Agreement, and most rely on awareness campaigns or voluntary industry pacts rather than binding laws or fiscal measures.

Policy layering and weak coordination slow progress

The OECD warns that the proliferation of overlapping initiatives — what it calls “policy layering” — risks undermining effectiveness. Many countries now have five or more separate policy instruments to tackle food loss and waste, yet these are often implemented in isolation and without coordination across ministries or supply chain sectors.

“When strategies multiply without coherence, stakeholders struggle to understand what they are expected to do,” the report cautions.

Household and retail stages receive the strongest policy attention, typically through soft approaches such as public information campaigns and voluntary collaboration initiatives. By contrast, primary production and post-harvest handling — where substantial losses occur — receive far less policy focus.

Governance structures also complicate coordination, with responsibilities spread across ministries for agriculture, environment, and consumer affairs. This fragmentation makes it harder to track outcomes and assess which measures actually work.

Success stories: Japan, France, and Australia

The OECD points to several countries that have developed more coherent, measurable, and effective approaches.

Japan has made food loss measurement mandatory since 2000, carrying out regular sampling across the food processing, retail, and hospitality sectors. This long-term data collection has enabled Japan to set quantifiable targets and monitor private-sector performance.

France has taken a legislative approach, expanding its National Pact to Fight Food Waste to cover more stages of the food chain and more types of businesses, while linking waste reduction to food security and redistribution efforts.

Australia, meanwhile, emphasizes public–private partnerships that allow food industry stakeholders to develop innovative solutions, such as repurposing surplus food and valorizing by-products.

“These examples demonstrate that clear targets, stakeholder engagement, and regular evaluation can drive real progress,” the OECD report says.

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n a sobering announcement from the World Food Program (WFP) on November 7, 2023, the United Nations agency forecasted a grim future for the children of South Sudan. Over 1.6 million children under the age of five are anticipated to face acute malnutrition in 2024 as the country grapples with the repercussions of severe flooding and the ensuing spread of waterborne diseases.

The WFP, utilizing data from the Integrated Food Security Phase Classification (IPC), indicated that malnutrition rates are soaring, particularly in flood-affected areas where the population struggles with limited access to food and sustainable livelihoods. South Sudan’s youngest citizens are expected to bear the brunt of these challenges.

Mary-Ellen McGroarty, the WFP’s Country Director in South Sudan, highlighted the dire circumstances in a recent statement. “Living on the frontline of the climate crisis, we are witnessing an alarming increase in malnutrition rates, primarily due to overcrowded and waterlogged living conditions,” she said.

Significant flooding

Rubkona County has been identified as a region of concern, where catastrophic levels of hunger are predicted by April 2024. This area has experienced significant flooding since 2021, leading to a dramatic spike in food prices and forcing communities to inhabit makeshift islands. The WFP notes that staple food costs in the county have surged by over 120 percent since April.

The situation is exacerbated by the influx of refugees returning from Sudan, where recent conflict has resulted in significant loss of life and raised concerns about a potential regional humanitarian crisis. South Sudan itself is no stranger to conflict, having spent a substantial portion of its post-independence years in civil war, leading to devastating human and economic tolls.

According to the World Bank, despite its oil reserves, South Sudan remains mired in a “serious humanitarian crisis” with approximately 9.4 million people, or 76 percent of the population, in need of humanitarian aid in 2023.

World Food Program

The WFP adds that the persistent flooding in South Sudan can be attributed to the Nile basins spilling over, notably Lake Victoria, which experienced higher than usual rainfall last year, signaling that the excessive water levels may continue unabated.

The United Nations has repeatedly condemned South Sudan’s leaders for their contributions to the ongoing violence and political repression, as well as for widespread corruption that has depleted the nation’s resources.

As the international community responds to the WFP’s urgent call for assistance, the world watches, hoping for swift action to avert a tragedy of unimaginable proportions for the children of South Sudan.

Sources: AFP, Anadolu

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n an era marked by unprecedented global challenges, few issues resonate as profoundly as the quest for food security. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the grain shortage that followed showcased the grave vulnerability of existing systems. The imperative of ensuring that everyone, everywhere has access to safe, sufficient, and nutritious food looms large on the global stage. This month’s book bundle presents a curated selection of books that delve into food security, examining it from multiple angles, and offering insights, strategies, and solutions.

From the intricacies of international trade policies to the sustainability of food systems, and from the impacts of geopolitical conflicts to the strategic place of food, these books provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the realm of global food security.

Whether you are a policymaker, researcher, student, or simply a concerned global citizen, this collection provides valuable resources for understanding, navigating, and contributing to the discourse on global food security.

Food Security: Availability, Income and Productivity is a pertinent book that explores the pressing issue of global food security as our world population continues to grow. The author focuses on three key conditions necessary to achieve food security: food availability, adequate incomes, and increased agricultural productivity.

The book draws insights from history and contemporary contexts to thoroughly examine these conditions. It takes a close look at the obstacles preventing consistent food availability and discusses how to overcome these challenges. It also delves into the importance of ensuring sufficient incomes, highlighting programs like food stamps and food banks. Furthermore, the book provides valuable insights into the factors driving enhanced agricultural productivity.

Food Security caters to a broad audience, including agricultural experts, policymakers, and NGOs working in food aid. It’s also a valuable resource for students studying agriculture and public policy. The book not only informs but also encourages critical thinking about the complex task of feeding a projected nine billion people by 2050.

In a world where food scarcity is becoming increasingly worrisome, this book offers essential insights into the intricate web of food security. It provides a well-reasoned analysis that will contribute to ongoing discussions and efforts aimed at ensuring a sustainable food future for everyone.

William A. Kerr, Food Security: Availability, Income and Productivity (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023) ISBN: 978 1 03531 270 2, 234 pages

Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security by Matias E. Margulis is a groundbreaking exploration of the influence exerted by United Nations (UN) organizations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite their absence from the formal negotiation table. Margulis introduces the concept of “shadow negotiators,” illustrating how UN bodies strategically engage in political actions to shape multilateral trade negotiations.

The book’s primary focus is on the contentious issue of agricultural trade liberalization. It provides a detailed analysis of interventions by four UN organizations: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (SRRTF).

Margulis unveils the innovative strategies these UN entities employ to influence global trade regulations. Importantly, he emphasizes that their motivation isn’t rooted in competition with the WTO or ideological opposition to trade liberalization. Instead, it stems from their concern that certain trade rules could negatively impact global food security, running counter to their core mission of addressing world hunger and safeguarding the right to food.

Shadow Negotiators is a meticulously researched work that offers fresh insights into the often-unseen dynamics of international trade. It’s essential reading for those interested in the intersection of trade policy and global welfare, making a valuable contribution to the field of international relations and trade studies.

Matias E. Margulis, Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security (Stanford University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9781503633520, 292 pages

Universal Food Security: How to End Hunger While Protecting the Planet by Glenn Denning explores the path towards a world where hunger and malnutrition are eradicated, and everyone can access healthy and abundant food for a productive life. The book emphasizes the need to transform our food systems, focusing on sustainability and environmental restoration, from production to distribution.

Denning, drawing from his extensive experience in over fifty countries, offers a practical guide to making healthy diets accessible to all while ensuring sustainability. He identifies key priorities, including sustainable agriculture intensification, robust market infrastructure, responsible postharvest practices, promoting healthy eating, and establishing social safety nets. The book underscores the pivotal role of practitioner-leaders in driving this transformation, highlighting the importance of education and development in instigating change.

But beyond the roadmap, Denning reminds us that the engine driving this transformation is practitioner-leadership, underscored by education and development. This book stands as a testament to the potential for meaningful change when individuals and institutions commit to reshaping our world, making universal food security not merely a dream but a tangible and sustainable reality.

Glenn Denning, Universal Food Security: How to End Hunger While Protecting the Planet (Columbia University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780231197618, 448 pages

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security explores the global food security implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which occurred during a period of already high food prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The book highlights the importance of the Black Sea region for global food production and Russia’s role in supplying natural gas and fertilizers.

The potential disruption of trade in this region posed a significant threat, with the potential to raise food prices and worsen poverty and hunger in vulnerable countries. The conflict primarily impacted trade in cereals and vegetable oils, fertilizer exports, and energy costs, potentially pushing millions into hunger and poverty.

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) responded swiftly by providing information and policy advice. They established a blog series and online resources to disseminate critical information rapidly. This book compiles these blog posts, offering an overview of the crisis’s progression, international responses, and lessons for ensuring food security in the wake of disruptions.

This book provides essential insights into a rapidly evolving crisis with far-reaching implications for global food security, making it valuable for policymakers and researchers.

Joseph W. Glauber, Ed. and David Laborde Debucquet. Ed., The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security (IFPRI, 2023) ISBN: 9780896294394, 196 pages

Bread and Autocracy: Food, Politics, and Security in Putin’s Russia offers a compelling analysis of the pivotal role food has played in Russian politics from the 1917 Revolution to the present under Putin’s leadership. The authors, Janetta Azarieva, Yitzhak M. Brudny, and Eugene Finkel, argue that Russia’s transition from a grain importer to a global food exporter was a deliberate, long-term strategy aimed at enhancing national security and regime stability. This focus on food self-sufficiency sets Russia apart from other autocracies, as it prioritizes domestic food production over imports, highlighting its significance in maintaining autocratic rule.

The book’s relevance is heightened in today’s world, where food issues are once again at the forefront of global concerns and nations are emphasizing self-reliance. Bread and Autocracy provides a timely and comprehensive exploration of Russia’s unique approach to food politics, shedding light on its implications for both domestic and international affairs. It is a valuable read for those seeking a deeper understanding of Russia’s distinctive stance on food and its impact on political power. The book will be available in hardcover on September 1, 2023.

Janetta Azarieva, Yitzhak M. Brudny, and Eugene Finkel, Bread and Autocracy: Food, Politics, and Security in Putin’s Russia (Oxford University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780197684368, 525 pages

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any of us still remember the images of empty store shelves that surfed the internet during the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020. The images struck fear into the hearts of the public, which was worried about the onset of a food crisis. Sadly, similar images may resurface as news of India’s ban on non-basmati rice exports broke on July 20.

This is not the first time that India has imposed restrictions on its rice exports. In 2022, the Indian government imposed a 20% export duty on non-basmati white rice to ensure its domestic availability. This decision came at a time when the world was struggling with the economic impacts from Russia’s war in Ukraine while also recovering from the effects of the pandemic.

India is not the only country to impose export restrictions on certain food products. Other countries have taken similar measures over the past three years to protect their economic needs amid a growing global food crisis.

Food restrictions since COVID-19

When COVID-19 erupted in 2020, it caused chaos. People were in a state of panic as they rushed to stores to grab whatever they could get their hands on before the lockdown. This led to the disappearance of many food items such as rice, canned goods, meat, etc.

The food shortage alarmed governments worldwide, prompting intervention and restrictive measures to protect domestic markets from a potential food crisis. Restrictive measurements included price controls, export taxes, bans, and quantitative export restrictions.

According to a World Bank research paper, the aim of restricting food exports is to protect domestic markets from the developments occurring in the global markets. By reducing or banning exports, governments ensure that their domestic needs will be protected from global food crises.

To keep track of food export restrictions, the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) has created a Food and Fertilizer Export Restrictions Tracker. Since 2020, wheat, rice, and sunflower seeds/oil appear to be the most banned items in terms of export restrictions. Countries that have banned these products include Romania, Russia, India, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Cambodia.

IFPRI has compiled a full list of countries that restricted exports of certain food products since COVID-19 and has kept track of their developments.

The Black Sea Grain Initiative

On July 22, 2022, Russia and Ukraine, along with Turkey and the UN, signed the Black Sea Grain Initiative. The agreement allowed for the safe transportation of grain and foodstuffs from Ukrainian ports. According to the European Council, the initiative managed to safely export about 33 million tons of grain and foodstuff to 45 countries, making a significant contribution to the fight against the global food crisis.

On July 17, Russia withdrew from the initiative when its request for increased food shipments was not met. This sparked a wave of global condemnation since Russia is unilaterally blocking Ukraine’s main export route. According to the European Council, the Russian invasion is further exacerbating the global food crisis.

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused Russia of “weaponizing food.” Last year, Yale historian Timothy Snyder claimed that Russia’s move to starve the world is “a new level of colonialism.”

The prices of key commodities such as wheat and corn have skyrocketed, raising global concerns around hunger. Coupled with India’s ban on non-basmati rice exports, global warming, and rising inflation rates worldwide, a humanitarian food crisis is looming.

The impact of export restrictions on global food security 

As most governments impose restrictions on food exports to protect their domestic interests, the entire world suffers the consequences. According to a World Bank’s recent report, the global food crisis has worsened as food trade restrictions have increased.

Since June 5, 2023, 20 countries have implemented 27 food export bans and ten countries have implemented 14 export-restricting measures. The effects of these restrictions are driving up food costs and creating instability in the market. In addition, Aljazeera has reported that the local food prices in many developing countries continue to rise due to the devaluation of their local currencies.

The chief economist at the United Nations’ Food and Agriculture Organization Maximo Torero has warned about rising food prices which he believes will lead to a potential global food crisis if the trend is not reversed immediately.

A potential food crisis?

Following India’s steps, the United Arab Emirates and Russia have declared bans on their rice exports. On July 28, 2023, the UAE announced that it will temporarily suspend rice exports for four months. The next day, Russia also declared a ban on rice exports until December 31, 2023, to protect its domestic market.

Over three billion people worldwide rely on rice for their livelihood and its demand continues to grow. Pierre-Olivier Gourinchas, an economist at the International Monetary Fund, told Reuters that India’s ban could exacerbate food price inflation.

The World Food Programme (WFP) recently reported that more than 345 million people are struggling with food insecurity in 2023. In just two years, the number has jumped from 135 million to 345 million. Unfortunately, this number will continue to grow as countries continue to restrict food exports amid conflict and climate shocks.

The WFP warns that we are facing a global food crisis of “unprecedented proportions.” Unless governments cooperate to meet people’s immediate food needs, the world is destined for a global hunger catastrophe.

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hile the long-term effects of climate change continue, the COVID-19 epidemic, which spread at the end of 2019 and continued for almost two years, and the Ukraine-Russia war that followed, have had significant negative effects on agriculture and food security. While these negative effects were gradually decreasing across the world, Turkey was shaken by two devastating earthquakes in the middle of winter. So much so that a “level 4” alarm and an international call for help was made to tackle their effects. In response to this call, aid offers were received from 100 countries, and around 80 countries participated or contributed to the search and rescue efforts with approximately 7,000 personnel.

The first of the earthquakes occurred at 04:17 on Monday, February 6, 2023, with a magnitude of 7.7, centered in the town of Pazarcık in Kahramanmaraş province. The second earthquake occurred on the same day at 13:24, centered in the town of Elbistan of the same province, with a magnitude of 7.6 and 80.2 km from the epicenter of the first earthquake. The most important feature of these earthquakes was that they were very close to the surface at a depth of 8.6 and 7.0 km, respectively, in addition to their magnitude.

Unlike other big earthquakes that have occurred across the world, the fact that these two earthquakes occurred at a depth very close to the Earth’s surface increased their destructiveness and caused the Anatolian peninsula to shift 3 meters to the west. The many images reflected in the media in the form of massive crevices and collapses in the fields reveal the possible effects of the earthquake on agriculture.

Possible effects of earthquakes on agriculture

Depending on their magnitude, earthquakes can have different effects such as delays and pauses in agricultural activities, as well as damage to production resources and difficulty in reaching them. Landslides, and cracks and breaks in agricultural lands caused by earthquakes make it difficult and even prevent the use of agricultural lands. In addition, agricultural irrigation systems, in other words agricultural structures such as irrigation channels and pipes, may be damaged. Migration due to the effects of earthquakes may also hinder agricultural production.

On the other hand, earthquakes have negative effects on crop and animal production activities as well. These may be in the form of delays or inability to carry out agricultural production activities, as well as loss of product, stored input, and livestock. Slips and collapses can make harvesting difficult or even impossible, and cause harvest losses. There may also be a shortage of feed due to the fact that the animal feeds are under the rubble. Crop and animal production processes that need energy can cause losses due to long-term power cuts and lack of fuel.

Decreases in the quantity and quality of crop and animal production, which may occur due to negative effects of earthquakes on agriculture, may increase prices. Disruptions that may occur in many stages of the food supply chain, such as transportation, storage, processing, and wholesale and retail trade, may cause loss of agricultural products and increase food prices. These developments may trigger food inflation and then general inflation.

The importance of the earthquake zone in Turkey’s agriculture 

Each of the eleven provinces affected by the earthquake has a high agricultural potential. Approximately 15 percent of the total agricultural land in Turkey, that is, 3.6 million hectares of 23.9 million hectares of total land, is located in the earthquake zone, primarily Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, and Adana. The number of registered agricultural enterprises and farmers in the earthquake area is around 270,000. The earthquake area accounts for about 20 percent of the total crop production in Turkey, and about 15 percent of Turkey’s livestock.

The eleven provinces affected by the earthquakes have 2.6 million hectares of field crops containing cereals and other crop products, representing 15.5 percent of Turkey’s crop production. Vegetable production areas in the earthquake zone amount to 15.2 percent of Turkey’s vegetable production area with 110,000 hectares. The eleven provinces in the earthquake zone produce 25 percent of Turkey’s fruit, beverages, and spices with planting areas of 930 million hectares. Şanlıurfa, Diyarbakır, and Adana are at the forefront in field crops, Adana and Hatay in vegetables, and Gaziantep in fruit.

On the other hand, approximately 20 percent of Turkey’s exports of agricultural and forestry products come from the earthquake zone. More than half of the agricultural exports of the earthquake region are from Gaziantep. While the eleven provinces affected by the earthquake have a rate of approximately 9 percent in Turkey’s gross domestic product, their share of the gross domestic product of the agricultural sector is 14.3 percent. These figures show that the income of the earthquake region is predominantly from agriculture.

The effects of the earthquake on agriculture and food security

According to the latest figures, the earthquake caused approximately 45,000 deaths, while we do not have clear figures on deaths in rural areas. It has been stated that there were significant casualties in many rural areas and villages, and this varies from one province to another. The significant loss of life in the elderly population, which is predominantly in rural areas and villages, may lead to a further decrease in the population engaged in agriculture, which is already inadequate, and to interruption of agricultural activities. Those who have lost their relatives may not be able to work efficiently for a while due to psychological difficulties. In addition to loss of life, migrations in rural areas might have occurred as a result of grievances and hardship.

The collapse of barns and other buildings besides houses in rural areas has also led to loss of livestock; damage to machinery, equipment, and tools; has reduced inputs such as seed and feed; and caused loss of quality of seed and feed. Therefore, there may be temporary problems in the use of tractors, machinery, and equipment, and regarding the adequacy of feed and seed. There may be difficulties in the supply of inputs such as diesel, fertilizer, seeds, and pesticides used in agricultural production, which will start gradually in March, and thus, there may be disruptions in crop production. The difficulties that arise in the transportation, processing, packaging, storage, and wholesale and retail trade stages of the food value chain, along with the losses of agricultural and food products caused by the massive destruction in cities will affect food security.

Since the earthquake did not occur during the cropping period, there is no loss due to slides and collapses in the fields or disruption of production processes such as planting, hoeing, and harvesting. From this point of view, the decrease in agricultural products and thus increase in food prices may be limited, as there will be no reduction in production except livestock losses and damage to the products in the warehouses. If the measures that need to be taken for the next production period are not implemented effectively, this might decrease production and trigger food inflation resulting from the disruption of production processes in the region with approximately 15 percent agricultural potential.

Turkey has played a very important role in reining in the repercussions of the Russia-Ukraine war, which has been on the world agenda for a year now. One of Ankara’s main objectives will be the extension of the Black Sea Grain Corridor Initiative, which will expire in March. Turkey engaged in long negotiations with Russia for the initiative, which was extended for a period of 120 days in December 2022. Depending on the results of the efforts by Turkey, which acts as a mediator between the parties and takes an active part in the solution of the global food crisis, in the post-earthquake period, the world food supply security may also be affected by the earthquake.

Agricultural support for the earthquake zone         

Similar to the cities, facilities such as tents, containers, and temporary houses provided for those living in the region’s rural areas will ensure that farmers and their families whose houses are uninhabitable will stay in their villages. Other than housing aid, which will improve living and working conditions, other aid will ensure farmers do not leave the countryside and stay in their villages, thus preventing the interruption of agricultural activities. In this context, in addition to public aid, the aid of non-governmental organizations, the public, and the international community has fulfilled an important function and will continue to do so. In addition, emergency aid such as government support of 15,000 TL for each of the earthquake victims and the declared agricultural support are of great importance. In addition to this short-term and temporary emergency support, it is essential that a long-term, permanent rural transformation that will improve the working and living conditions in the countryside is planned and implemented as soon as possible.

The Turkish government has declared that the farmers engaged in animal husbandry in the eleven provinces affected by the earthquake will be compensated in kind. In this respect, the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry will supply free of charge bovine and ovine breeders with the same number of cattle and small ruminant animals as those lost, poultry breeders with the same number as their lost poultry, and beekeepers will receive the same number of hives as those damaged in the earthquake. Meanwhile the presidential decision of providing feed support per animal to cattle and small ruminant animal breeders in the provinces damaged by the earthquake until the end of 2023 entered into force. On the other hand, the urgent sugar need for the 1,483,000 hives of 12,000 beekeepers in the eleven provinces will be met immediately.

For the farmers registered in the Farmer Registration System (ÇKS) in the eleven provinces declared as disaster areas, diesel and fertilizer support payments for the 2022 production year will be made immediately in cash. For the farmers who lost their lives in the earthquakes, the support payments will be paid in cash to their legal heirs if they apply to Ziraat Bank. The Turkish Grain Board (TMO) also announced that the products in the licensed warehouses damaged by the earthquake are insured and that the farmers who are in the earthquake zone and registered with the ÇKS can sell their grain and pulses products to TMO without any type or quota limit.

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t has been two months since the United Nations and Turkey brokered the Black Sea Grain Initiative on July 27 in Istanbul. The agreement resumed Ukrainian grain exports, and paved the way for Russian grain, fertilizer, and food exports to reach the outside world. According to the UN, since the agreement, almost 5 million tons of food and grain have been shipped over the Black Sea Corridor. The agreement is, therefore, expected to mitigate the global food crisis.

Data by the UN Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) shows a recent sharp decline in food prices. The FAO Food Index is currently at 138 (August 2022), down from the all-time high of 160 in March 2022. (Fig. 1) However, food prices are still about 8% higher compared to the same period a year ago. On the other hand, in the past three months, wheat prices are down by almost 25-30%, according to the FAO.

In this sense, the global food crisis, increasing food security risks, and even a mass hunger risk, along with the significance of the recent grain export deal have been the most remarkable developments of—at least— the past few months. At this point, probably the most critical issues and questions facing the world economy and humanity are food security, which is getting more and more risky, living costs, and nutritional security.

Moreover, the UN World Food Program (WFP) data shows that for every 1% increase in global hunger or food security risk, there is a 2% increase in migration waves. The UN refugee agency statistics further reveal that the main reason for 67% of people leaving their homes in 2021 was food security. For war-torn 2022, these numbers hold little promise.

Meanwhile, according to WFP data, globally, the number of people experiencing food insecurity rose to 1.6 billion (up by 440 million) while 250 million people live on the poverty line. According to data from the British charity The Hunger Project, 811 million people in the world live below the poverty line with women making up 60% of this figure.

Many grain import-dependent countries from North Africa and the Middle East to South Asia are experiencing the effects of this global food crisis more intensely. Hence, the recent war in Ukraine is also an important wake-up call, reminding all world economies of how important self-sufficiency is, especially in strategic sectors like agriculture or food in general.

Global impacts

Agricultural products, energy prices, food prices, and commodity prices should all be expected to be impacted by this deal, and the resulting resumed supply and security enhancements. Indeed, as of mid-August, wheat prices were already down by 30-40% compared to May 2022. Wheat futures are also somewhere around $8 nowadays.

According to the UN FAO data, food prices were already at their 10-year peak by 2021. With the war, prices have escalated due to decreases in production, the disruption of the Black Sea-centered grain supply chain, rising insurance and transportation costs, and the increase in concerns about supply security.

Following the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the FAO Food Price Index (FFPI) rose 13% month on month to 159.7—the new all-time high—in March 2022. (Fig. 1) From April to August 2022, partial regressions took place and the FFPI index averaged down to 138. However, after the deal, and along with the grain shipments out of Ukraine, wheat prices were down by 30-40% below their peak in spring 2022.

In Turkey, on the other hand, the agricultural input price index of the Turkish Statistical Institute for July 2022 was at an unprecedented level of 133.4%. (Fig. 2) According to data from the agricultural input price index, there is clear evidence of price surges even in agricultural inputs. The highest increase in agricultural input prices is observed in fertilizers with 235% yoy (year on year), followed by energy with 201% yoy. The effects of these rising prices on agricultural production and harvest should begin to be reflected gradually.

Overall, the Black Sea Grain Initiative is

– helping ease the global food crisis,

– easing food shortages,

– decreasing the food and grain prices in general,

– helping empty the already full grain silos in Ukraine,

– encouraging Ukrainians to sow seeds for the next season, and

– decreasing insurance and transportation costs.

Production losses due to heatwaves, droughts, etc. will be also replaced. Food inflation will be limited and taken under control.

Turkey’s growing strategic importance

The Black Sea Grain Initiative is expected to mitigate the global food crisis and amplify food security, but it also bears the clear signs of

– the growing strategic and political importance of Turkey,

– the increasing importance of the Black Sea Grain Corridor, and

– Russia and Ukraine’s dominance in the global grain and food market.

In order to understand the situation better, one needs to understand the current global food crisis and the bigger picture. For instance, Russia and Ukraine are two major global wheat suppliers. Together they produce almost a third of the global wheat supply, provide almost one-third of all wheat exports, and a quarter of all grain exports. Approximately one-fourth of the $120 billion global grain trade is provided by Ukraine and Russia.

According to the 2020 UN FAO data, Ukraine supplies 92% of Moldova’s wheat imports, 81% of Lebanon’s, 64% of Qatar’s, and almost 50% of Tunisia’s, Libya’s and Pakistan’s imports. Twenty-six different countries import at least half of their wheat imports from Russia or Ukraine.

Due to its relatively high dependence on Russia, the prices of food and energy in Europe are rising the most, as the European economies are broadly the ones most affected by the war. Surging energy and food prices have led to 30-year high inflation rates in the European Union—in some cases, to a 40-year high. Unemployment rates are also on the rise. Meanwhile, this trend affects the poor disproportionately. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has a downward revised growth rate forecast of 2.6% for the euro area in 2022.

The Grain Deal between Ukraine and Russia, which was facilitated by Turkey and the UN and signed on July 22 in Istanbul, has undoubtedly been one of the few diplomatic milestones throughout the war in Ukraine.

By painstakingly exerting efforts to convince both Kyiv and Moscow of the agreement, Ankara added another significant diplomatic breakthrough to its list of diplomatic achievements—in addition to gathering Russian and Ukrainian foreign ministers at the Antalya Diplomacy Forum for the first time and hosting the latest peace talks between the two sides in Istanbul.

By helping to materialize the deal, in a way, Turkey once again affirmed its unique position, which entails striking a delicate balance between Ukraine and Russia, but also between the West and Russia.

On the other hand, what made Turkey’s latest diplomatic effort different from the previous ones is its target-oriented nature: this effort was exerted specifically towards paving the way for the export of the Ukrainian grain stuck in Ukraine’s Black Sea ports.

Turkey’s previous diplomatic efforts were valuable in their own right, aiming to keep the hopes for peace or de-escalation alive or, at least, to keep the channels of communication between the parties open. Those meetings’ goal was somewhat vaguer and only achievable in the mid to long term.

Thanks to the target-orientedness of the latest episode, it is to yield the most tangible outcome so far in the diplomatic efforts concerning the ongoing war in Ukraine. Likewise, the tangible outcome of this initiative directly impacts a considerable portion of the world population as opposed to the immediate impacts of the war on a much more limited region and number of countries.

The Grain Deal is largely different from previous initiatives both in terms of the global reach of the food security aspect of the war and the universal worldwide solution it provides.

Notwithstanding having an audience in the West hearkening to Russian claims, Moscow’s primary care is, in fact, its image and the goodwill it enjoys with mostly the “non-Western” portion of the world or the Global South, which also happens to have the highest level of dependence on Russian food products and fertilizers. Since the beginning of the war in Ukraine, Russia has fared relatively well in terms of its image and public relations, which in some cases has been transformed into either neutrality or the support of countries in the Global South for Russia.

The non-Western world has always been significant for Russian foreign policy and discourse especially under Putin, while the Global South has been dominated by the the strong emphasis on “multipolarity.” Russia’s growing isolation from the West with the war in Ukraine has made the relations of the former with the Global South even more important.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s visit to Egypt and other African countries within the scope of an “Africa tour” conveniently came right after the signing of the Grain Deal in Istanbul. Lavrov is and will be using the visits to ensure Russian partners about the uninterrupted flow of grain, and to sell the “Russian side of the story” on the war and the food crisis.

A Russian Way of Making a Deal

Less than 24 hours after the signing of the Grain Deal, Russian missiles hit Ukraine’s Odessa port, the main port from which the grain will be exported. Expectedly, this raised questions on the deal’s viability.

First of all, although outrageous, the attack was not unexpected behavior. Moscow has a track record of emphasizing the asymmetry between itself and its lesser partners in any deal, usually by hurting the other side through military power. By using provocative crude force against the ones with whom Moscow strikes a deal, it aims to send the message that the deal is not between equal powers and that Moscow is not the one who desperately needs the deal, but the other way around.

Moscow demonstrates and even “teaches” the other side its superiority and usually its indispensability for any given deal. As long as the other side caves in—and they usually do—the deals with Russia function by fits and starts, often tested by Moscow’s intermittent harassments and violations.

The Russian attack on the Odessa port was yet another reminder to all, either parties to the deal or its spectators, that those who strike a deal with Russia should not be mistaken by an “illusion” of parity with the latter. Moscow is keen to maintain its upper hand and initiative to decide on the fate of deals, and this will also likely be the case for the Grain Deal.

Maintaining the Grain Deal will be very challenging for Kyiv, Ankara, and the UN. Although Moscow is not likely to scrap the deal or put its core in jeopardy at this moment, the deal will be subject to interruptions as a result of any move by the West or Kyiv that would be deemed by Moscow as hostile.

The Russian military invasion of Ukraine has been impacting the world economy since it was first launched on February 23, 2022. Alongside threatening world peace, the global economy is experiencing major difficulties in energy and food supply. Since the start of the war, the international community has been warning against a global food shortage, which had already begun to be felt as an outcome of the COVID19 pandemic.

As the war continues, gloomy prospects gradually prove to be true. David Beasley, executive director of the United Nations World Food Programme, conveyed to Russian President Vladimir Putin that millions would die across the world because of the Russian blockade of Ukraine. President of the World Bank David Malpass similarly warned that the rising food prices would have devastating effects on the poorest and most vulnerable.

Considering that Ukraine and Russia are among the top grain-producing countries, the war is causing actual and potential food shortages by way of hampering the production and export of millions of tons of grain. Ukraine, along with Russia, is one of the largest cereal producers in the world. It supplies a tenth of global wheat exports and about 95% of those exports left the country through Black Sea ports. The current war in Ukraine is leading to food shortage, especially for developing countries, while Europe’s food security is also said to be threatened.

Ukraine and Food Shortages

Ukrainian farmers frequently complain about Russian assaults on their grain plants and farm equipment. Satellite images show the damage inflicted by Russian forces on three of the terminal’s grain silos, a conveyor, and a storage building, as well as on Ukraine’s second-biggest grain terminal and sunflower oil storage tanks at nearby Mykolaiv. As a result of Russia’s attack, the export capacity of the terminal has been reduced by at least a third.

The conditions of war in Ukraine have also led to ever increasing input coasts, especially energy costs, which eventually have extensive restrictive impact on the food production. The ordinary export of grain is also hampered by the reported expropriation of Ukrainian grain by Russia: Russia is said to have been stealing enormous amounts of Ukrainian grain through the Russian ports in the Azov Sea.

The Russian blockade of Ukrainian ports in the Black Sea is another obstacle. Despite Russia’s occasional denial, it has been openly blockading the few unoccupied Ukrainian ports and especially Odessa. This has hampered ships loaded with grain, sunflower, barley, or oat from transporting them to where they are needed the most.

The Food Corridor Agreement

Turkey has been mediating insistently for at least four months to broker a deal between Ukraine and Russia in order to create safe corridors in the Black Sea for the export especially of Ukrainian agricultural products. The consistent Turkish efforts, which have involved the UN secretary general, eventually yielded fruit. Representatives of Ukraine and Russia signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) which was co-signed by the UN secretary general and Turkey.

The deal, which will be valid for four months and could be renewed, creates three safe corridors from Ukrainian and Russian Black Sea ports. A Joint Coordination Center in Istanbul, which consists of the representatives of all parties, will be responsible for coordinating the safe passage of all trade ships coming to/from these ports.

Despite the initial Ukrainian objection to the inclusion of Russia’s agricultural products, the deal covers Russian products as well. Russia was already complaining that sanctions imposed against it by the U.S. and the EU interfere with normal free trade, encompassing, among others, food products, such as wheat, and fertilizers. Eventually a separate MoU was signed between Russia and the UN and Turkey so that Russian shipment of food products and fertilizers can be exported without any problems.

The Food Corridor Agreement is a major achievement for alleviating the growing global food crises by eliminating its most serious obstacle: the lack of safe corridors in the Black Sea. As long as the agreement is respected and applied properly by both Ukraine and Russia, grain will be able to be provided to countries in need.

There are, however, some risks both to the agreement and to the efforts to alleviate the food crisis. There is a risk of Russia attacking the farm plants and infrastructure, and expropriating the products of Ukrainian farmers. Such actions would lead to a fundamental decrease in the Ukrainian production especially for the upcoming season.

In the first phase, Ukraine is planning to ship around 25 million tons of wheat, and Putin had said his country could export around 50 million tons of wheat until the end of this year.

Legal Obligations

Blockading and mining ports during wartime are legitimate methods of warfare. However, there are many conditions that must be fulfilled by the warring parties in order to protect civilians, non-belligerents, and civilian infrastructure.

According to the Geneva Conventions, which regulate the conduct of international and internal wars, a war situation should in no way impair the obligations which the parties to the conflict remain bound to fulfil by virtue of the principles of the law of nations, as they result from the usage established among civilized peoples, from the laws of humanity, and the dictates of public conscience (Geneva Convention I, Art. 63; Geneva Convention II, Art. 62; Geneva Convention III, Art. 142; Geneva Convention IV, Art. 158.)

All methods and means of fighting must be conducted solely for military purposes and military ends without harming civilians. In the time of war, the Hague Convention relative to the laying of automatic submarine contact mines of October 18, 1907 (the Hague Convention No. VIII) provides that “every possible precaution must be taken for the security of peaceful shipping” by belligerents.

The MoUs signed between Ukraine, Russia, Turkey, and UN must be applied properly as these documents are legally binding for all sides. Here, the aim and purpose of the deal, i.e. safe transport of food products from Ukrainian and Russian ports, must be observed by all sides. They must refrain from all conduct which would impair the aim and purpose of the deal.

In this manner, Ukraine and Russia are bound by international law not to exploit the deals by using the safe corridors for military purposes; usage is exclusively restricted to civilian uses and civil trade purposes. Similarly, Russia is contracted not to attack farm fields and infrastructure within the Ukrainian territory, as well as port facilities—all such actions would ultimately undermine the aim and purpose of the Food Corridor Agreement.

Rising post-pandemic demand, droughts, high energy prices, confined food stocks, supply chain disruptions, taxes, and export restrictions have stressed the food market and sent global inflation soaring. The Russian invasion of Ukraine added insult to injury as farmers face further rising oil and fertilizer costs, and the lingering effects of COVID19 labor restrictions.

The conditions of the war in Ukraine disrupted agricultural exports from Russia and Ukraine, that together, according to the UN Comtrade Database, account for 24% of wheat exports, 57% of sunflower seed oil exports, and 14% of corn exports globally in the years 2016-2020.

Furthermore, due to damaged infrastructure, closed ports, blockades, and mines in the Black Sea, the Ukrainian grain stock is unable to be exported, potentially straining storage for the 2022 harvest. Shipping companies are also hesitant to transport wheat and oil from Ukraine due to the risk that their ships may be jeopardized in the fighting. This has reduced the global supply and caused the price of alternatives to soar. Global food prices are almost 30% higher than the same time last year, according to the UN.

As the war’s effects are felt in the global markets, Russia and the West play the blame game about who is responsible for the shortages and rising prices. UN Secretary-General António Guterres warned that the war had worsened food insecurity in poorer nations and that the only effective solution to the crisis was reintegrating Ukraine’s food production and fertilizers produced by both Russia and Belarus, back into the global market.

Who is responsible?

U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken accused Russia of causing food insecurity by holding 20 million tons of grain hostage in Ukraine due to its invasion. Russia dismissed these claims blaming the situation on Western sanctions and the naval mines floating near Ukrainian ports.

Russia’s UN representative Dmitry Polyanskiy argued that Russia is not the one to blame for the inoperativeness of the Ukrainian ports putting the blame instead on Ukraine for refusing to remove the mines from its ports. Both Ukraine and Russia accuse each other of laying underwater mines in the Black Sea.

Moscow claims that the issue is caused by the effects of the sanctions on its grain and fertilizer exports, and the consequent impact on shipping, banking, and insurance. The EU has cut Russia’s largest banks out of the Swift bank messaging system, hindering business with them.

European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen criticized Russia for misinformation, pointing out that the food crisis was rooted in Russia’s “brutal, unjustified war.”

On June 6, the Russian UN ambassador Vassily Nebenzia walked out of a Security Council meeting where President of the European Council Charles Michel solely held Russia responsible for the food crisis.

Michel posted a Twitter thread following the meeting reaffirming his stance. He wrote, “Russia’s tanks, bombs and mines that are preventing #Ukraine from planting and harvesting. The Kremlin is also targeting grain storages and stealing grain from areas it has occupied while shifting the blame on others.”

He continued, “The EU has no sanctions on the agricultural sector in Russia. Zero. And even our sanctions on the Russian transport sector do not go beyond our EU borders. They do not prevent Russian flagged vessels from carrying grain, food, or fertilizers to developing countries. This is cowardly. This is propaganda.”

The World Food Program spokesman Martin Rentsch told Deutsche Welle that even though food exports from Russia are not sanctioned, prices are high and there are administrative hurdles. Therefore, Russia has been accused of sweeping more revenues.

How can the issue be resolved?

Efforts to remove Russia’s blockade of Ukraine are ongoing. Lithuania has suggested a plan for the lift of the Black Sea blockade, where the UN would call on Russia to ensure safe passage of ships and Ukraine to remove mines from the port of Odessa. On May 31, French President Emmanuel Macron announced that he and German Chancellor Olaf Scholz had urged Vladimir Putin to end the blockade of Ukraine’s port of Odessa under the terms of a UN resolution.

The African Union warned EU leaders that blockades pose a catastrophic scenario. Its leader Macky Sall said he supported proposals for the UN to coordinate efforts to release supplies from Ukrainian ports. He also blamed EU sanctions on Russian banks for aggravating the problem. Before the war, African countries imported almost half of their wheat from Ukraine and Russia.

Alternatively, the EU has set the goal of moving 20 million tons of wheat out of Ukraine through solidarity lines via Europe before the end of July but logistical challenges pertain. According to Adina Vǎlean, the EU transport commissioner, 10,000 barges and almost 300 large ships are needed to carry 20 million tons of grains if it is to be exported from EU ports.

Russian President Vladimir Putin said that the blockade on Ukrainian ports can be lifted on his end, but only after sanctions are revoked. On June 3, Putin claimed that there were no problems in exporting grain from Ukraine. He added that Ukrainian ports, Russian controlled ports, or Central Europe may be used, but suggested exports via Belarus, which would depend on lifting sanctions. Ukraine has characterized Russia’s conditions as blackmail.

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov met his Turkish counterpart Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu on June 8 to discuss topics including a Black Sea corridor for grain exports. Lavrov stated that Turkey would help clear the mines near the ports and added that the safety of shipments could be guaranteed by either Turkey and Russia, or Russia alone.

Çavuşoğlu stated that mines could be cleared within one or two weeks, and mentioned the concerns of Russian and Ukrainian sides by stating, “Ukraine does not want Russian warships to enter through the Odessa port, and Russia does not want cargo ships to carry weapons into Ukraine. How will they be sure? There must be a control mechanism.” He also added that both Zelenskyy and Putin are willing to cooperate on this issue.

As tensions between Russia and the West regarding the food crisis remain high, diplomatic efforts may potentially offer viable solutions to alleviate the global food crisis.

The Russia–Ukraine war threatens global food security, especially in Asia and the MENA region, which heavily rely on Russian and Ukrainian wheat, oilseeds, and fertilizers. The world, already hit by the COVID19 global pandemic and struggling with the climate crisis, now faces another serious problem: food insecurity. Nihan Duran of Politics Today interviewed Caitlin Welsh, the director of the Global Food Security Program at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C., on the alarming consequences of the Russian invasion of Ukraine and the road ahead to address future global shocks on food security.

Q. On February 24, 2022, the Russian invasion of Ukraine started and the war doesn’t appear to be ending anytime soon. Meanwhile, the war has started to threaten food security globally. But, let’s start at the very beginning: what do we mean by food insecurity?

Food insecurity means the lack of access to a diet that allows for an active and healthy lifestyle. So, it is not only the lack of access to sufficient food but the lack of access to food of the right nutritional quality, which will encourage physical and cognitive development.

There are multiple ways to improve food security; such as long-term agricultural development and short-term humanitarian emergency assistance, as we are seeing in response to the Ukraine crisis right now. Ukrainians fleeing the country—and also populations inside Ukraine—are in urgent need of humanitarian assistance, as they are currently experiencing food insecurity due to the existing conflict situation.

Q. Apart from Ukrainians experiencing food insecurity due to the ongoing war, there are increasing concerns that the war will impact food security globally. Many countries heavily rely on Russian and Ukrainian wheat and oilseeds. What is this situation like?

It is true that Russia and Ukraine produce a significant amount of the world’s grains and oilseeds, in addition to fertilizers. So, a lot of agricultural commodities are not just produced there, but also exported from there. Worth noting is that Russia and Ukraine combined account for a substantial portion of the exports of those commodities around the world.

We have to consider that wheat is the most important part of the diets in the Middle East and North Africa. There are 26 countries that rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine to meet at least 50% of their wheat imports. And then, there are 50 countries that rely on Russia and Ukraine for 30% of their wheat imports. Therefore, the countries that are going to be most affected are the ones that import their wheat needs mostly from Russia and Ukraine.

Q. I understand that the situation may get worse and become dire for the MENA region. What would be the short- and long-term consequences of the Ukraine war on food security there?

The best-case scenario will be, of course, one in which the war ends quickly. However, even if there could be a ceasefire tonight, the damage will take some time to repair. There is a significant amount of infrastructure that has been damaged; we see fields plowed over by tanks, railroads destroyed, ports closed export facilities due to bombardments, and so on.

If the war were to end now, then two important things could happen in the agriculture cycle. One would be that the current crop of cereals, which is in the ground right now, could be cultivated and harvested in the summertime, and the next crop of cereals, which would be planted in late summer, could be put in the ground for harvest in 2023. Then those grains could be exported to global markets, which, as I mentioned, is critical for the countries that are dependent on Ukrainian wheat.

Q. What would the international response to such a threat be?

We actually already see some coordination among multilateral organizations. The G7 put out a call advising countries around the world not to impose export bans. The head of the World Trade Organization also said that the organization is calling member states and advising them against export bans.

When it comes to sanctions on Russia, most countries have so far avoided putting sanctions on Russian agricultural products. It remains critical for countries to continue not to attack Russia’s agriculture sector with sanctions.

Relatedly, it is incredibly important to keep fertilizer markets open. It is not just the grain that is being exported from Russia and Ukraine, it is also fertilizer. Russia and Belarus together are the main exporters of low-cost fertilizer. Threatening those exports would make farming more expensive for all types of farmers, from the poorest farmers to large industries.

Q. What about local responses to support the food and agriculture sector in war-torn Ukraine, and other countries that rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine?

It is crucial to support Ukraine’s agricultural sector even in the midst of the war. Ukraine’s Ministry of Agriculture did a survey about the input needs of its farmers. Listening to Ukraine’s Ministry of Agriculture and supporting their agriculture industry is vital at this very moment.

Equally important is to support the countries that rely on imports from Russia and Ukraine and to find other sources for food imports. This is a time to boost investments and social safety net systems to help the poorest of the poor to still access food during price increases.

Q. My last question will be a lessons-learned one. The world was trying to handle the climate crisis, was then hit hard by the COVID19 global pandemic in early 2020, and now the Ukraine war and global food insecurity! What lessons should we draw?

Right now, what we are seeing is another recognition that food systems are global, and that an event happening in one part of the world can affect food security in other countries that have nothing to do with that particular event. Two years ago, when COVID19 hit, we saw shocks throughout the supply chain with significant impacts on household food insecurity. The shock that we had during COVID19 had nothing to do with supply. Supply was there; it just had to do with markets.

When we probably thought that there would be several more years out from another shock like this, now we have the war in Ukraine. But this shock is completely different in nature.

As we are thinking about short-term responses to address the impact of this particular crisis, we also need to be prepared for other global shocks of different types and magnitudes. This current crisis is a reminder that we need to continue to be prepared for shocks of different natures. The former one had to do with a pandemic, this current one has to do with a war, and the next could be due to climate change and a severe weather event. We might not be able to anticipate what the nature of the shock would be, but in the longer term, we need to be looking at how we can strengthen our own national and global systems, so that we can withstand these shocks.

In two years, we went from living in a stable global economy and a relatively peaceful international order to a troubled global economy and shaky international order. This abrupt decline was mainly due to two major developments: the COVID19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pandemic disrupted not just our daily lives but also led to cracks in our interdependent world. From banning international flights and closing borders to limiting export of healthcare products, government interference in the global economy on the grounds of national interest has become widespread.

In response to the pandemic, many governments initiated national vaccine development programs and increased their efforts towards self-sufficiency in healthcare technologies. As the global shipping slowed because of COVID19-related restrictions, manufacturing industries were also urged to relocate their factories from China to the United States and Europe.

At the beginning of this year, many thought the pandemic would be over soon and we could go back to some form of normalcy. But when the pandemic slowed down, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered the hopes for return of normalcy to global economy and politics. Analysts caution that the war in Ukraine may spread to neighboring countries and pave the way for a world war. The global economic stability is also endangered by conflict, as many European nations, particularly Germany, depend on Russian natural gas for their energy needs.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West seek to trigger a regime change in Russia. However, thus far, the sanctions only led to Russia’s introduction of the export bans on some of its minerals and agricultural products, which hurt both Russian companies and the importers of their products.

The overall picture is thus one of tit-for-tat between Russia and the West, and the result may be the end of globalization and concomitant interdependence of the world economy. There is no doubt that the COVID19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine weakened global interdependence as a norm and brought self-sufficiency to the forefront.

Although self-sufficiency may appear ideal to deal with the challenges we experience today, I argue that self-sufficiency efforts are mostly futile. We are embedded in a “complex” interdependence which guarantees that every country and each individual will be worse off in the case of self-sufficiency replacing interdependence as the global norm.

The war in Ukraine was not unexpected; a full-fledged war between Russia and Ukraine was anticipated since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. That is why most commentators agreed that the EU should have prepared itself to cope with its dependence on Russian gas, and energy self-sufficiency should now be prioritized by the union. But this argument only holds if we assume that Russia is not dependent on the West, ignoring its dependence on European trade and goods.

Between the EU and Russia there existed some form of complex interdependence as each needed the other for something which may either be costly or inaccessible if sought from elsewhere. The removal of Russia from SWIFT and the withdrawal of Western companies and investment from the country are all towards disentangling Russia from the cobweb of complex interdependence, which will inevitably hurt both the Russians and their trade partners.

In short, there is no winner in moving towards self-sufficiency, both Russia and the West stand to lose. Disintegration of the liberal political and economic order of the world would lead to economic stagnation and political upheaval, the complex nature of the existing economic and political relationships cannot be undone in an efficient and peaceful way.

The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should target the Russian elites but not seek to exclude Russia from the global economic architecture. Sanctions such as SWIFT and Western companies’ withdrawal from the Russian retail market are counterproductive. Sanctions targeting ordinary people usually prove ineffective in authoritarian regimes and rather serve as justification of the governments’ self-sufficiency efforts.

Most efforts seeking to replace the complex interdependence at the international level with self-sufficiency at the national level are doomed to fail. The level of complexity has increased dramatically since the concept was first coined. Compared to the 1970s, today’s world relies on electronic devices, for instance. All electronic devices, such as computers and smartphones, are built with microchips and powered by sophisticated software. The design and manufacturing of the microchips and software are progressing so fast that no country can dominate either field or fully control both sectors.

Food self-sufficiency is also no longer a possibility; many nations currently have a much more reduced amount of arable land than they had in the 1970s and larger populations which make them ever more reliant on each other to feed their population. In brief, given the ever-increasing complexity of interdependence, even in the times of global crises, self-sufficiency cannot match the level of well-being provided to us by the sophisticated global economy.

The ongoing impact of the COVID19 pandemic and the long-term adverse effects of climate change have led to significant increases in food prices. Declining productivity in many parts of the world, rising global demand, and food supply chain problems have led to reduced stocks of grains and oilseeds. Prices reached the highest levels in the last decade.

Declining soybean yields in South America, reduced palm oil supply in Malaysia, and the use of palm and soybean oil for biodiesel production are driving vegetable oil prices to a record high. On the other hand, prices of energy-intensive basic inputs such as fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides continue to increase rapidly. Finally, the war in Ukraine is giving new impetus to food and input prices.

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine is threatening world agriculture and thus food security. Ukraine and Russia are agricultural powerhouses that make up a very important share of the world’s wheat, corn, oilseed, and fertilizer exports. The Ukraine war negatively affects all aspects of agriculture in the country and slows down exports from Russia.

Twenty-six countries across the world import at least half of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. Low supply and high prices are likely to hit these most food-insecure countries first. On the other hand, the low supply and high prices of maize, oilseeds, and fertilizers play an increasing role in the prices of other commodities with their expansionist effects.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced that the global Food Price Index for March 2022 reached an all-time high with steady gains. In addition to the effects of climate change, the UN estimates that the number of people experiencing food insecurity worldwide could be at its highest level of the last 15 years due to the effects of the COVID19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

FAO’s moderate scenario shows that wheat prices may increase by about 9% in the short term, and over 21% in the severe scenario. Undernutrition scenarios show that the additional increase in the number of undernourished people in the world could reach more than 13 million in a few years. In short, war threatens the food security of millions of people.

Figures on agricultural trade

Over the past 30 years, the Black Sea region has become a major global supplier of grains and oilseeds, including vegetable oils. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the early 1990s, the region was a net importer of grain, while Russian and Ukrainian exports today account for about 12% of the total calories traded in the world. The two countries are among the top five global exporters of many important grains and oilseeds, mainly wheat with 34.1%, barley with 26.8%, sunflower with 23.9%, and corn with 17.4%.

Ukraine is also an important source of sunflower seed oil, providing about 49.6% of the global market. When we add Russia to this figure, this share rises to 72.7%. Many importing countries depend on these products from Ukraine and Russia. North Africa and the Middle East import more than 50% of their grains from these two countries, and most of their wheat and barley. Ukraine is an important supplier to many North African markets, including Egypt and Libya, as well as the EU and China.

Risks created by the Russia-Ukraine war

The war causes a decrease in the agricultural production of the region, problems in the food supply chain, and logistics disruptions, as well as risks that have already reflected on the whole world and negatively affect global food security. These risks can be examined both globally, in terms of Ukraine and Russia, and in terms of Turkey, which imports substantial amount of agricultural products and inputs from these two countries.

The most obvious risks are the trade-related ones. Due to the sudden and sharp decline in shipments between and by Russia and Ukraine, as already seen, countries importing wheat from Russia and Ukraine will definitely find alternative sources, pay higher prices or, worst of all, face shortages of supply. The war has already caused the closure of ports, oilseed processing plants, and other critical commercial facilities. In this sense, Turkey also experienced difficulties in the shipment of sunflower oil.

Price risk is also one of the leading risks. The global Food Price Index published by FAO averaged 159.3 points in March 2022, up 17.9 points (12.6 percent) from February, making a giant leap to a new highest level since its inception in 1990. The latest increase reflects new all-time highs for vegetable oils, cereals and meat sub-indices, while those of sugar and dairy products also rose significantly. The price increases in food supplies such as flour and sunflower oil in March added to the constantly increasing food prices and increased Turkey’s March food price index by 4.73 percent.

On the other hand, logistical risks also come to the fore. These include damages to roads, ports, storage, and processing facilities as well as port blockades. Ninety percent of exports from Ukraine take place through ports. In other words, there is a risk of loss of more than 15 million tons of different commodities that Ukrainian farmers cannot export. The capacity of the Western Ukraine border and the railway connection is around 300,000 tons per month. Ukraine, which usually exports around 4-5 million tons of goods in the spring, will not be able to do this. Therefore, Ukrainian trade logistics are at risk.

Meanwhile, production risk threatens the next production period. Considering the livelihoods of the Ukrainian farmers, their families, and those living in the countryside, the situation is alarming. What will be the output of the harvesting of crops currently planted? Will farmers be able to plant next spring? According to a field study, farmers in Ukraine have only 20% of the diesel fuel needed and 65% of the other inputs. Multinational companies that stop their operations for the safety of their employees, for example, cannot process sunflower into oil. Damages caused between the fields and the processing facilities, production logistics problems, and labor supply difficulties are important production risks.

The energy risk is one of the most common risks raised by those concerned. Agriculture is completely dependent on energy for, among others, the production of fuel, electricity, fertilizers, pesticides, and lubricants. These risks concern not only the war zone, but the whole world. Russia is a very important supplier of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers and natural gas. This fact creates an additional layer of risk. Turkey, which imports a significant amount of these inputs from Russia, is also at significant risk.

Exchange rates, borrowing, and economic growth risks increase due to war. There is already a significant loss of value in currencies that will adversely affect investments. There are significant decreases in money conversion speed. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy in many developing countries of the world that borrow in U.S. dollars. The permanent appreciation of the dollar against the currencies of these countries due to the war causes very serious risks for these economies. The depreciation of the Turkish lira in the last three months gained a new momentum with the effect of the war and became a very serious source of risk.

Of course, the most important are human-centered risks. In this sense, besides the fact that Ukrainians are refugees in excess of three million, the risks to their lives and livelihoods come to the fore. Before the war, one in four Eastern Ukrainians was already receiving international support as they were food insecure.

We are entering a period in which the purchasing power of a whole nation will decrease with the decrease in agricultural production, decrease in economic activity, and increase in prices. It is clear that these developments will increase food insecurity and malnutrition in Ukraine.

The consequences of the Russia-Ukraine war will not only revise the geography of Eastern Europe and the chessboard of international politics, but will also have an impact on the global economy.

While Europe is trying to reduce its dependency on Russian gas, the Middle East and North African (MENA) countries could experience a serious food crisis due to their high dependence on Ukrainian and Russian wheat and other grains.

Russia is the top global exporter of wheat, while Ukraine is the fifth global exporter. Both countries have a 25% share of global wheat export.

Wheat is fundamental to the diet of MENA countries as it represents 37% of caloric consumption in the region. Across the Middle East and Africa, bread represents 18% of the total diet, according to Euromonitor data, while wheat price saw a 17% increase since Russian tanks entered Ukrainian soil.

The Russia-Ukraine war may cause severe shortages or even a food security crisis in the MENA region.

MENA’s Dependency on Russian and Ukrainian Wheat

Following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, several MENA countries announced that the war could cause a wheat shortage as most of them import wheat and other types of grain from Russia and Ukraine.

Lebanese Minister of Economy and Trade Amin Salam said that the country—which is cash-strapped— has wheat reserves sufficient for six weeks to two months.

The Tunisian government reportedly asked officials not to address the media regarding an impending wheat crisis. However, on February 25, the ministry of agriculture had stated that it was able to secure enough wheat for three to four months.

Egypt, the largest wheat importer globally, said it has no wheat shortage. Still, it banned the export of flour, lentils, and wheat to safeguard its food, and it is exploring alternative wheat sources amid the Ukraine crisis.

Turkey has said it wouldn’t experience wheat and sunflower oil shortages. However, the war in Ukraine sparked panic buying of sunflower oil in the last week.

In Turkey, last year, 78% of wheat imports came from Russia and 9% from Ukraine. The devaluation of the Turkish lira exacerbates the country’s food insecurity. Furthermore, the rising cost of fuel and fertilizers and sanctions on Russia may disrupt the food supply chain.

Turkey’s government had reduced the import duty on sunflower oil to zero earlier in 2021. As a further precaution, Turkey has extended the customs tax exemption on sunflower oil to the end of June 2022 and on wheat, rye, barley, oats, maize, chickpeas, and lentil imports to the end of 2022.

Afghanistan is facing the collapse of essential services as food aid runs out, according to U.N. agencies, who released a rapid appeal for more than $600 million on October 5, 2021 to sustain approximately 11 million people across the crisis-plagued country until the end of the year.

Due to security concerns, staff evacuations, closures, and legal difficulties, most of the former Afghan government is no longer operating due to the recent Taliban takeover. Humanitarian relief and other assistance given by the U.N. agencies and civilian groups as a result have been severely restricted. U.N. Secretary-General António Guterres said on August 31, 2021 that “a humanitarian catastrophe looms” in Afghanistan and asked donor countries to “dig deep” to support an emergency flash appeal. The United States and the European Union have declared that humanitarian help will continue to be provided to Afghanistan.

Following the Taliban’s takeover, the U.S. froze $7 billion in Afghan reserves, while the International Monetary Fund (IMF) froze  funding to the country, including hundreds of millions of dollars in Special Drawing Rights, which may be turned into currency during times of crisis, according to the IOM. The Central Bank of Afghanistan can only get a fraction of the money it needs. As a result, Afghan banks’ coffers are unable to be easily replenished, resulting in ATMs running out of cash and the imposition of withdrawal limitations.

The developing situation has created a significant disturbance and threatens Afghanistan’s critical winter wheat season, which is about to start.

An IMF spokesperson stated, “As is always the case, the IMF is guided by the views of the international community. There is currently a lack of clarity within the international community regarding recognition of a government in Afghanistan, as a consequence of which the country cannot access SDRs [special drawing rights] or other IMF resources.”

The developing situation has created a significant disturbance and threatens Afghanistan’s critical winter wheat season, which is about to start, the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO) warned of a major fundraising conference.

The complex set of sanctions imposed on the Taliban by the United Nations Security Council, as well as sanctions imposed by the United States, the European Union, and many other governments, should be reviewed to ensure that they do not obstruct the delivery of humanitarian aid by nongovernmental organizations.

Uncertainty looms about the type of administration the Taliban will form; it’s a crucial concern for both international actors holding Afghanistan’s reserves and humanitarian organizations halting programs and financing. However, at what cost will withholding the Taliban monetary assets negatively impact Afghan food scarcity and a growing humanitarian crisis?