T

he overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-long regime in 2011, following public uprisings, plunged Libya into a political, social, and military crisis. Even after 13 years, the country has yet to achieve unity and integrity. The uprising, ignited on February 17, 2011, is considered by some as the root cause of today’s conflict environment, while others view it as a justified and legitimate quest for a new order.

Revolution dilemma

Although the February 17 revolution emerged as a popular movement, the post-revolution phase, particularly two years later with the enactment of the “political isolation law’” that marginalized former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats from the political scene, followed by the military polarization of 2014, indicated that the revolution had been co-opted by certain political and military cliques into a struggle for power.

This scenario and the historical flow extending to the present day reveal that the masses, aspiring for better living conditions and a fairer governance model, have relinquished control of the revolution to the country’s political elites. The fragile and fragmented security atmosphere, perceived as a window of opportunity by tribal and militia groups active in the east and west, led to deep divisions and polarizations across various sectors, constructed through narratives and policies securitized within the narrow agendas and interests of the relevant actors.

Over time, this division evolved into armed conflict, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of Libyans in the civil wars of 2014 and 2019, and further laying the groundwork for the emergence of regional animosity and seeking of revenge. Despite being ethnically more homogeneous compared to many countries in the Middle East and Africa, the North African nation witnessed its initial revolutionary vs. anti-revolutionary divide deepen into Islamist vs. secular, east vs. west, and even city vs. town polarizations, all of which have hindered the processes of reconciliation and state reconstruction.

For instance, the city of Misrata stood out as both a stronghold of the revolution and in favor of the influential Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement, while the city of Benghazi transformed into a hub for revolution opponents and former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats, especially following the rise of militia leader Khalifa Haftar in the east. Additionally, the capital, Tripoli, along with influential western cities like Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan, became strategic points where armed groups are engaged in a power struggle, specifically aiming to expand their spheres of influence and augment their control over official institutions in the post-revolutionary era.

Disruptive interventions by external actors

Parallel to these internal balances, Western countries within NATO, which planned and executed air strikes against Gaddafi in 2011, have continued to intervene in the process. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established under the auspices of the UN, has remained inadequate in terms of providing a foundation for permanent and sustainable solutions, instead supporting interim governments and similar power-sharing agreements formed in 2015 and 2021.

More importantly, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the first peacekeeping operation implemented under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, neglected the responsibility to rebuild, a crucial component of the R2P approach. The post-Gaddafi reconstruction process was left to Libya’s incomplete institutions and a society lacking a developed sense of citizenship. Subsequent international conferences, such as those in Palermo and Berlin, witnessed meetings that veered into a dominance struggle, far from solving issues, and were marked by disagreements stemming from conflicting interests among Western nations.

On the other hand, the authority vacuum and weak borders have transformed Libya into a hub for mercenaries, on the brink of regional crises, where fighters are gathered and dispatched. The period during which Gulf countries and the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group financed numerous Syrian, Chadian, and Sudanese foreign fighters within Haftar’s ranks was documented in several open sources. From this perspective, it can be stated that external interventions have been as detrimental to Libya’s unity and integrity as internal factors.

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), convened under the auspices of the UN in Switzerland on February 5, 2021, designated the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by the businessman from Misrata Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, as the new transitional administration to guide the country towards the elections planned for December 2021. Gaining relative support from rival figures in a short period, the GNU prioritized economic and political reforms. However, the postponement of the planned elections due to controversies over candidate criteria and constitutional debates led to a broader division, culminating in the establishment of a new parallel government in February 2022. The developments following this date can be identified as primary causes for the conflicts erupting in and around Tripoli, closures of oil facilities, and the resultant economic and political crises.

Militias and Libyan politics

The current situation has enabled militia groups in the country to evolve into political entities over time, leveraging the privileges and powers they have accumulated. This transformation is elucidated by the concept of “militia diplomacy,” which denotes the distribution of shares in military and political institutions. According to this approach, militias affiliated with tribes or community-based in the east, west, and south aim to position actors sympathetic to them in government during transitional processes.

The deviation from this scenario not only questions the legitimacy of the new structure in the eyes of these groups but also leads to potentially destabilizing endeavors. Many analysts focusing on Libya argue that militia groups, which have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Presidential Council since 2011, have become “statized,” positing this as a significant impediment to democratic processes.

Currently, it is possible to discuss some initiatives regarding the reorganization of the December 2021 elections that were canceled. Alongside mechanisms involving local and international actors led by the UNSMIL, priority should be given to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. A united Libya requires unified institutions and, more importantly, a unified military. At this point, both the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), comprised of Haftar’s forces in the east, and the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west of the country indicate chronic problems for the future.

N

early 8% of the population of the Libyan city of Derna was killed or went missing after devastating floods hit the city on September 10, 2023, in the biggest natural disaster in the country’s modern history. A third of the city’s buildings were wiped out and swept away by the Mediterranean Sea, while hundreds of bodies are believed to be trapped in structures and buildings under water.

The disaster followed a warning issued last year by professor of civil engineering Abdelwanees Ashoor. “In the event of a major flood, the consequences will be catastrophic for the inhabitants of the valley and the city,” the Libyan academic wrote. Ashoor was not taken seriously by the authorities, resulting in one of the greatest flood tragedies in modern history in a country torn by conflict and war.

The floods have affected 200,000 Libyans, and the entire area of the old city of Derna was swallowed by water after the two dams surrounding the city exploded at 3:00 a.m. local time, giving people little time to flee. In fact, the local authorities had sent out a text message the day before warning people not to leave their homes because of the heavy rains caused by Storm Daniel, which hit the region from Greece.

Thousands dead and missing

Bad weather conditions made it impossible to use helicopters due to the strong winds at the time of the storm, in addition to the extremely difficult natural terrain of the area, which prevented the arrival of rescue equipment, teams, and vehicles.

Storm Daniel, which hit eastern Libya on September 10, killed at least 7,300 people and left around 11,000 homeless in a city with an estimated population of around 200,000. According to preliminary official figures, more than 36,000 people have been displaced.

The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs said the death toll from the floods in Derna had risen to 11,300, while 10,100 people were still missing. The UN warned that an epidemic could break out in the city due to decomposing bodies and water pollution. Some 150 people have arrived to hospitals due to poison after drinking from the polluted water of Derna.

The UN confirmed that 170 people had died in floods elsewhere in eastern Libya, and that the number of displaced people in northeastern Libya had reached approximately 40,000.

Warning against drinking unclear water

At the same time, the UN envoy to Libya, Abdullah Batili, said he had seen the destruction and devastation in Derna and left with a heavy heart. He noted that the disaster was beyond Libya’s capacity and went beyond politics and border issues.

Georgette Gagnon, assistant secretary-general, resident coordinator and humanitarian coordinator for Libya, confirmed that the UN is working with partners and local authorities to continue to deliver and coordinate much-needed humanitarian assistance to those in need.

The neglect of the city, which was previously a stronghold of armed groups opposed to Gaddafi and then Haftar’s forces, and the failure to maintain its dams and facilities and renovate its old buildings, in addition to the battles and wars it witnessed between 2015 and 2018, are among the factors that caused the death toll of Storm Daniel to rise dramatically.

Meanwhile, Libyans are still waiting for international aid to help them overcome one of the most tragic events in the country’s modern history. The city of Derna has experienced unprecedented destruction with residents being killed by both flooding and collapsed buildings. As time passes, the chances of finding survivors in Derna fades away.

M

ohamed Auajjar, the chair of the Independent Fact-Finding Mission on Libya (FFM), led a three-year investigation by the UN Human Rights Council to investigate human rights abuses committed by all parties to the conflict in Libya since 2016.

The mission urged the Libyan authorities to cooperate more closely to uncover the truth behind the widespread crimes committed against both Libyans and migrants in the country.

According to the FFM, there are reasonable grounds to believe that crimes against humanity have been committed. These crimes include arbitrary detention, murder, torture, rape, enslavement, sexual slavery, extrajudicial killings, and enforced disappearances.

The EU’s indirect support for human rights abuses in Libya

During the course of its investigation, the UN fact-finding mission visited Libya and urged local authorities to cooperate more extensively to establish the truth about these heinous and massive crimes.

The mission focused on identifying human rights violations and breaches of international humanitarian law in various Libyan cities.

FFM investigator Chaloka Beyani has stated that the European Union’s support for Libyan authorities has “aided and abetted rights breaches against migrants.”

Beyani clarified, “We’re not saying that the EU and its member states have committed these crimes. The point is that the support given has aided and abetted the commission of the crimes.”

The EU’s response to allegations

In response to these allegations, European Union Spokesman for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Peter Stano denied that the EU intends to “push and keep migrants in Libya.”

Stano emphasized that the EU “does not finance any Libyan entity and does not give material funds to partners in Libya.”

Despite the EU’s denial of involvement, the report highlights its indirect support in facilitating these human rights abuses. This raises concerns about the EU’s role in the ongoing crisis in Libya and the subsequent impact on human rights and international law.

Survivors speak out

The report found that the violations were carried out under the nominal or actual control of Libya’s Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration, the Libyan Coast Guard, and the Stability Support Apparatus.

According to the report, the FFM asserts that the “European Union and its Member States, directly or indirectly, provided monetary and technical support and equipment,” including boats to the Libyan Coast Guard and the Directorate for Combating Illegal Migration for the interception and detention of migrants.

The report revealed alarming crimes against humanity in Libyan detention centers, where migrants faced torture, rape, enslavement, and starvation.

One victim who was held in Maya, Ayn Zarah, and Gharyan detention centers said, “Our concern is not dying in the water, but our concern is to go back to the prison where we will be oppressed and tortured by guards.”

The report disclosed numerous survivors and witnesses of rape cases, indicating that such crimes were widespread and routinely experienced in detention centers.

Pregnancies resulting from rapes in detention centers were frequently observed according to the report, and women often gave birth without access to professional medical assistance.

In this regard, victims often became aware of being sold or bought only when confronted with new circumstances and abuse. Enslavement, including sexual slavery, occurred in detention centers, and the mission found evidence of such crimes in Sabratha and Bani Walid.

The report documented cases of migrants forced to work in factories, construction,   and agriculture.

“In a case of enslavement and forced labor, a child from Mali was taken to a farm and forced to work with animals, only to be told he had been bought when he asked to leave.”

The Spanish-American philosopher George Santayana once said, “Only the dead have seen the end of war.”

Considering the current situation in Libya, this would be among the best ways to describe the country’s current circumstances vis-à-vis the hope-filled attempts to have free and fair elections which were planned more than a year ago.

Libyans hoped to end their more than a decade-long war when the UN-sponsored Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF) elected Abdul Hamid Dbeibah to lead a new transition government in the country and lead Libyans to the polls on December 24.

Following candidacies of controversial figures like Saif al-Islam Gaddafi and warlord Khalifa Haftar, and the lack of a constitutional basis to hold free and fair elections in the country within the agreed timeline, the process literally became a born-dead one.

Although the UN-sponsored LPDF made it clear that the mandate of Dbeibah’s government was valid until June 2022, the pro-Haftar, eastern-based parliament House of Representatives (HoR) argued that the UN-backed Government of National Unity’s (GNU) mandate had expired.

The HoR and pro-Haftar figures’ opposition was followed by an attempt by the HoR to install a new rival government to challenge that of Dbeibah. Former UN-backed government, Government of National Unity’s Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha, after a series of negotiations with the HoR, was designated as the new PM of the transitional government, which was rejected by the GNU and the country’s west regions.

During this process, Bashagha tried to enter the capital, Tripoli, to assume power. His military convoy failed to do so, with Dbeibah saying he would hand over his power only to an elected government.

Dbeibah, on the other hand, announced his country’s plans to have elections while the UN was trying to bring different sides to the table to negotiate the constitutional basis for having elections amid the growing specter of military confrontation between the two sides.

Although the HoR initially refused to choose members for the joint committee, the rivals met on Tuesday, April 19, in the Egyptian capital Cairo, to discuss constitutional arrangements for new elections.

Aguila Saleh, the HoR’s speaker, Khalifa Haftar, and Fathi Bashagha are fully aware that the priority of the international community is not “legitimacy” but self-interest, a fact that can even be observed in their pragmatic statements.

The international community doesn’t want to abandon the pro-Haftar side to Russia; however, they also don’t want their so-called “pro-democracy” stance to be damaged in the eyes of the world by yielding up Dbeibah.

At this point, two strategies step forth. First, international actors will try their best to bring Dbeibah and Bashagha to the table to find a new and peaceful diplomatic final exit to have elections under their sponsorship. Second, they will recognize Bashagha’s legitimacy and offer a new political dialogue forum with a reshuffled Libyan team while not abandoning their rhetorical and democratic discourse.

The second option seems more feasible after considering what happened in 2019, as the U.S. played ostrich when Khalifa Haftar launched an offensive against the UN-backed government. Washington suspended the U.S.-citizen warlord’s trials about war crimes in Libya ahead of the December 24 elections.

As it is known, accessing the Mediterranean has been a consistent and significant goal of Russian foreign policy, which seeks to challenge NATO’s naval supremacy and the U.S. presence throughout the Eastern Mediterranean.

With its military existence in Syria, Moscow found a door to knock on: it sent infamous Wagner mercenaries in support of Haftar and built another passage for itself between Sirte and Jufra, critical spots in Libya neighboring the Eastern Mediterranean. Despite this, we have not seen Washington taking a solid stance against the warlord.

When Haftar’s military operation against the UN-backed government failed, thanks to Turkish forces’ support to the internationally recognized government, the U.S. was quick to broker a new political dialogue while hoping to force through elections.

As a new war and an oil embargo are at the international community’s elbow, the UN, the U.S., the UK, and others seek absolute legitimacy by any means. In their eyes, any sacrifice is worth protecting their interests, including sacrificing the democracy that Libya has been dreaming of after decades-long turmoil.

Time flies when it comes to the rapidly developing sequence of events in Libya. As of early 2021, there was an atmosphere that was regarded as promising for the first stage of elections in the country.

Fast-forward to December 24, and Libyan politics is debating how to have legitimate elections in order not to allow yet another tyranny in the war-torn country.

Representatives of around 30 countries arrived in Paris in November to discuss the recent political situation in Libya. Political actors such as the UK, Germany, Turkey, and Italy emphasized the need for a consensus on election law while France and Egypt are obsessed with having an election as soon as possible.

Due to the election laws unilaterally issued by the Aguila Saleh-led House of Representatives, Khalifa Haftar could now run for Libya’s presidency. The laws issued by Saleh have not been voted and passed in the parliament. Moreover, dual citizens, war criminals, and people who hold military posts are not permitted to run for the Libyan presidency, and Haftar faces several impediments to running for the elections.

Everybody, including France and Egypt, knows the warlord cannot even get 10 percent of the votes if elections are held freely in Libya.

Furthermore, it seems, Haftar’s ambitions are such that he is even ready to destroy his long-term supporters, showing no mercy. According to rumors, Saleh’s wish to run for Libya’s presidency was refused by Haftar and Egypt recently.

Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting Saleh as a candidate to run for the presidency.

When Saleh insisted, Haftar threatened people in east Libya against supporting him as candidates are obliged to collect 5,000 signatures to run for the presidency. Sending a message to Saleh’s potential supporters, Haftar stated that anyone who signs Saleh’s candidacy will be jailed. Despite all this, in a surprising move, Saleh announced his candidacy.

The overwhelming majority of Libyan people and politicians first want to have a solid foundation for an electoral system – a constitutional law that will be reached through consensus. That’s why the laws announced by the House of Representatives are considered flawed.

Yes, Libya needs elections to erase the traces of the civil war and chaos, and to heal its wounds, but not by unilaterally imposing “laws” which favor a warlord rather than a civil authority.

It is not only the High Council of State that demands a delay in order to reach a mutually accepted consensus on electoral laws, but also the Government of National Unity officials and political figures in the west along with the members of Tobruk-based House of Representatives.

France is among the countries which have been supporting Haftar at all costs, and the conferences organized in Paris, in general, have been a tool in its attempt to remain a key actor.

Nonetheless, even some of the Western participants of the most recent Paris Conference on Libya in November emphasized the need for change in election law.

Elections per se cannot enable Libya to rebuild its war-torn soul, but free, fair, and legitimate elections based on equitable laws can. And delaying elections to have a free and fair election is much better than having a flawed one.

Libya has been waiting for stability for more than a decade – the missed time can be tolerated, but the destruction of the efforts that have been made in this time cannot.

Recently, there have been a number of high-profile meetings between the leadership of Libya’s Government of National Unity [GNU] and that of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Besides hosting discussions and affirming their support for the political transition and further cooperation on security, several economic deals have been announced.

Libya and Algeria agreed to resume flights, reopen land borders and launch maritime lines and on the measures to boost trade and investment. Following a visit at the end of May by Tunisia’s Prime Minister, Libya and Tunisia concurred on facilitating border crossings. Morocco just hosted another round of intra-Libyan talks.

While to some, this may seem like a new tangent for Libya’s complicated foreign policy, it is actually a logical and healthy continuation of previous initiatives. Proximity, shared culture, interdependence and shared threats give the countries of the Maghreb common interests. Despite some different circumstances and the intense rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, all three countries have tried to appear neutral and offer constructive diplomatic assistance while attempting to limit any contagion to their own fragile situations.

Historical Context

Besides geography, the countries of the Maghreb share a lot of culture and history. In more recent times, the late Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi attempted coups against the leaders of both Morocco and Tunisia as part of his numerous, failed attempts at a larger union. There has also been discord between other members, notably Algeria and Morocco, who have longstanding differences, especially over the fate of the Western Sahara.

Despite all this, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia established the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 to promote cooperation and economic integration. However, the issues that divided them proved too difficult to overcome and the organization quickly became dormant. Initially the poorest country in the region, the discovery of oil in the 1950s made Libya the richest nation and therefore an important economic motor for the whole Maghreb. Despite this new wealth, Qaddafi’s quixotic governance meant that Libyans often depended on their neighbors for goods and services.

Plenty to Deal with at Home

Besides good intentions, these three western neighbors may also have had domestic considerations for not getting involved militarily in the Libyan conflict. Without a source of considerable outside financing, it would have been very costly to start an unnecessary foreign adventure and these countries had plenty of drama to deal with. Having overthrown the authoritarian rule of President Zine el-Abidine Ben, Tunisia was going through many growing pains with its more open politics.

There was intense competition between Islamist and more secular parties. A truth commission appointed to investigate human rights violations of previous regimes accused President Beji Caid Essebsi of committing crimes while serving in the government of Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi died while in office in 2019. The process to replace him was somewhat ambiguous and a formal constitutional court had yet to be established.

Algeria had gone through its own civil war from 1991-2002 and had remained under emergency law until 2011. During the period of the Libyan crisis, long-time President Bouteflika had serious health problems and there were numerous protests demanding more freedom and political change. Following massive street protests, Bouteflika resigned in 2019.

Morocco has continued to deal with its conflict in Western Sahara with the Polisario Front, which rejects its 1975 annexation of the territory.  Following the Arab Spring, Morocco engaged in its own reform program. While avoiding the intense disturbances of many of its neighbors, some tensions have remained.

Common Security Worries

Besides the issues that they have sometimes foisted on each other, the Maghreb countries share many other concerns like radical cross-border groups and pressure by the European Union to stem the flow of migrants. People also flow within the region. After the fall of Qaddafi, an estimated 200-400,000 Libyans decamped to Tunisia [out of a population of around 11 million].

Several thousand Tunisians fought for jihadist groups in the Middle East or Libya between 2011 and 2016. Besides being the closest major theatre of operations, Libya also served as a launching pad for attacks like that of Daesh attack on the border town of Ben Guerdane, allegedly motivated by an air attack on its training base.

Tunisia reinforced its patrols and built a sand barrier covering 168 of the 468 kilometres of its porous border with Libya. An estimated 600 Tunisian extremist jihadis are reckoned to remain in Libya, primarily in the south. Others continue to fight in other countries, including the nearby Sahel region. Though reduced, the threat has not disappeared but the security restrictions are a heavy burden on the economy, particularly for pastoralists and other border communities.

Like Tunisia, Algeria shares a border with Libya and has been worried about infiltration by  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] like the attack on gas facilities at Ain Amenas and a possible return of radicalized Tuaregs who had served in Qaddafi’s paramilitary “Islamic Legion” such as happened in Mali. The Government reinforced its border with Libya by deploying an additional 30-40,000 troops but like Tunisia, it also has to worry about security restrictions disturbing border livelihoods.

Morocco does not share a border with Libya, but some recruitment of fighters to go to Libya is alleged to have taken place there.

Also… The Sahel

While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are concerned by issues in Libya, it is worth remembering that the southern part of Algeria is in the Sahel region and Morocco is close by, if not formally part of it. Several countries of the Sahel are experiencing serious problems of violent Jihadi attacks, inter-ethnic conflict and coups besides chronic issues of extreme poverty and climate change.

Even though they not among the most affected, the Maghreb nations must be watchful of threats and spillover coming from the Sahel as well. Morocco has started to take a keen interest in developments and has started to play a role in the G5 Sahel force.

In recent weeks, Tripoli has seen a steady stream of visits by European officials after the Government of National Unity (GNU) won the confidence of the Libyan parliament to lead the country to elections in late December of this year.

At a time when the new Libyan government is rejoicing in a diplomatic watershed – illustrated by the intense schedule of visits to Tripoli by foreign dignitaries – the need for EU members to boost relations with Libya is already emerging as one of the most acute foreign policy challenges. Greek Prime Minister Kyriakos Mitsotakis’ visit to the Libyan capital on April 6, demonstrated the difficulty of this task.

“Let those who tried to question our relations in the past stay back,” said Mitsotakis during his meeting with his Libyan counterpart, Abdel Hamid Dbeibah, who was appointed in February to head the new Government of National Unity bringing together representatives from the west and east of the country for the first time since 2014.

In 2019, Faiz al-Sarraj’s Government of National Accord (GNA), backed by Turkey, had driven General Haftar’s forces out of western Libya. To further the cooperation and in exchange for vital support for the GNA, al-Sarraj signed two memoranda of understanding, “The Security and Military Cooperation” and “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions,”  with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Istanbul on November 28, 2019.

Mitsotakis asked Tripoli “to cancel the illegal documents presented as agreements between states when they have no legal value.” But days after his short visit, Erdoğan and Dbeibah reaffirmed their commitment to the “Restriction of Marine Jurisdictions” agreement.

This angered some of their neighbors in the Eastern Mediterranean as well as some EU members who were willing “to circumvent the agreement if it cannot be cancelled” as a European diplomat told Le Monde. Erdoğan and Dbeibah also signed numerous agreements following one-on-one and inter-delegation talks.

Italian Foreign Minister Luigi Di Maio said that Italy and the United States have “a common concern about the presence of foreign forces, both Russian and Turkish, in Libya,” meaning that there is a perception of “stronger” cooperation between the two countries on this matter.

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya.

During a meeting in Washington on Monday with his U.S. counterpart Antony Blinken, the two officials discussed the importance of the “full implementation of the ceasefire in Libya and the holding of elections [scheduled for December 24] on time.”

Europe has recently shown interest in the upcoming elections in Libya. Last month, the Libyan High National Electoral Commission held a meeting attended by foreign ministers from Italy, Germany, and France. The commission said the ministers “continued to support the commission in carrying out the elections scheduled for December 24 of this year.”

On Tuesday, French Ambassador to Libya, Béatrice Le Fraper du Hellen, signed an agreement with Gerardo Noto, the resident representative of the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) in Libya, by which

France pledged to contribute one million euros to support the UNDP project “Promoting Elections for the Libyan People,” bringing the total funds contributed by France to the said project to 1,850,000 euros. This is particularly interesting after France backed General Haftar with military support during his 2019 attempt to take over Tripoli.

In many ways, Libya presents unparalleled benefits to EU members and the ongoing EU diplomatic efforts are proof of Europe’s interest in the political upturn in this neighboring country after a decade of chaos.

Experts discussed the possibility of a peaceful transition in Libya at an online panel organized by SETA Brussels entitled “Libya’s Political Transition Process,” on February 23, 2021. Libya’s political transition process, the role of external powers, and possible future scenarios for the country were among the topics discussed.

Claudia Gazzini, an analyst at the International Crisis Group in Libya, outlined the efforts by the United Nations to create an interim government by uniting the two governments in Tripoli and Tobruk, boost dialogue, and end the ongoing civil war. Based on the current political events taking place in Libya, Gazzini was optimistic about progress in the country. She noted that “running transparent elections where candidates freely competed and accepted election results was an unprecedented step” and something new on the Libyan political scene.

During the panel, Gazzini emphasized the need to have trust in the cabinet and the House of Representatives. Rich in resources such as oil, all Libyans would benefit from a single unified authority in control of the state in the form of an elected government. Gazzini emphasized how revenues from hydrocarbon production and oil exports can be used productively by the government, once formed.

Francois Burgat, emeritus director of research at the French Center for Scientific Research and a senior research fellow, political scientist, and expert on Arab affairs, shed light on the role of external actors in Libya, especially the United Arab Emirates, and the geopolitical importance of Libya after the Arab Spring.

Sharing the optimistic view by Gazzini, Burgat focused on the UAE’s role in creating militias to fight “political Islam” as part of its years-long strategy. “The Emirates buy support and create militias to fight an enemy, whom they call ‘political Islam,’” said Burgat.

Tarek Megerisi touched on the internal dynamics of the political transition process in Libya. A heavily divided country, torn between warring governments and competing groups, does not give a positive impression for the future. Internal conflicts need to be settled for a country to progress, he stressed and continued, in Libya, reality makes it clear that having a dynamic field with several external actors leads to a relative pessimism regarding the transition.

There is a need for Libyans to organize themselves, select a representative party, and have free elections.

Murat Aslan noted that the scene in Libya is rapidly changing and evolving. The problem does not lie in forming a government, but rather in maintaining stability. This means that there is a need for Libyans to organize themselves, select a representative party, and have free elections. “Some challenges are posed by internal and external groups that might be expelled from the dialogue, which requires cautious steps while addressing the various interests of the different parties,” Aslan concluded.

When asked about the political dialogue in Libya, Gazzini reflected on the lack of common understanding among Libyans of the political process. The fact that there are representatives appointed by an external body, namely the UN, alongside the State Council and other 13 representatives, leaves Libyans without a clear road map for the coming elections. This suggests a better reconciliation of efforts to guide the country through its transition period. Certain external parties, such as Turkey and Europe, could be a great support to Libya in ensuring the proper launch of its economy.

In Burgat’s opinion, the UAE seems to be fighting its opponents rather than acting as a regional leader in the place of Egypt. “Political Islam” is a term coined  to signify “the enemy of democracy” by leaders such as Egypt’s president Abdel Fattah al-Sisi or the UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed. They both use the term repeatedly in their speeches and come together to fight a single opponent – the Muslim Brotherhood. The Muslim Brotherhood by and large is seen as the representative of “political Islam.”

The Libyan situation has seen the involvement of different actors such as the EU, Turkey, France, Egypt, the UAE, and Saudi Arabia. France might need to revise its strategy in the Middle East, especially under Emmanuel Macron, considering the tolerating of caricatures that mock Prophet Mohammed and cause offense to Muslims, and Macron decorating Sisi with the Grand Cross of the Legion of Honor in 2020, despite all the allegations made against the Sisi regime and its violations of human rights.

Maybe it is time for Libyans to handle their issues internally with the help of friendly countries and bodies. In fact, it is in the country’s best interest to handle its problems on its own, without external interventions. The existence of various actors and military groups in the country might adversely affect the transition process. Do Libyans lack trust in officials appointed by external institutions such as the United Nations? The truth is that they do not trust the intentions of countries such as France which supports Haftar and Sisi – the latter being the former U.S. President Donald Trump’s “favorite dictator.” Only time will tell.

Libya recently saw the conclusion of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), a peace process under the United Nations’s (UN) auspices. Its primary outcomes were an election date, set for December 24, 2021, and a new executive authority. The composition of the latter was a widely unexpected climax. In a process outwardly reverse-engineered to facilitate one result, the winning list of four candidates did not include the projected heavyweights.

Indeed, the combination of the Government of National Accord’s (GNA) Interior Minister Fathi Bashagha and the Tobruk-based House of Representatives (HoR) Speaker Aguila Saleh proved to be too toxic in list-form. The former had alienated some Tripoli armed groups and built rapports with adverse factions, while the latter damaged his political brand by legitimizing eastern ex-General Khalifa Haftar’s military adventures.

The winning list was not actively endorsed by LPDF delegates; it was more a case of voting against the other option, or, alternatively, “voting as veto.” Correspondingly, it was less ideology than opportunism that united the new executive authority. This can be both a boon and a bane – the former as it offers novel openings for pragmatism because this quadruplet has less baggage, and the latter as the lack of concinnity and the reliance on kickback-giving may prove to be unsustainable.

The designated Prime Minister (PM) and head of the Government of National Unity (GNU), Abdelhamid Dabaiba, is a wealthy and transactional businessman with handy experience in the construction sector. He has been angling for this position for some time, and was also part of the 2017 Misratan delegation to Moscow. His unscrupulous nature comes with drawbacks, however, as corruption allegations – he has links to his cousin Ali Dabaiba, a moneyed Gaddafi-era procurement official – and vote-buying accusations have bogged him down.

The new Presidential Council (PC) consists of three members, one for Libya’s historical three provinces. The member for Cyrenaica, and President-designate of the PC, Mohammed al-Mnefi, is from Tobruk. He markedly neither supported nor denounced Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli, and therefore how far his influence reaches in eastern Libya is still unclear.

A member of late Libyan hero Omar al-Mukhtar’s tribe, he was previously Tripoli’s ambassador to Greece, though he was expelled after the GNA’s maritime agreement with Turkey (Athens has ironically announced it intends to reopen its Libyan embassy).

Al-Mnefi recently met with Haftar in Benghazi; with accountability calls disregarded in modern-day Libya, this is a critical time for al-Mnefi to establish whether he will be the politician to demonstrate the east is not monolithic or if he will fall victim to recurrent missteps. His ambitious priorities in this 10-month preparatory period are military and institution unification, as well as national reconciliation.

The member for Tripolitania, Abdullah al-Lafi, is from Zawiya and a moderate HoR parliamentarian, while the member for Fezzan, Mossa al-Koni, is a Tuareg born in Ghadames; he was part of the HoR then the GNA’s PC before resigning in January 2017.

Considering the Saleh-Bashagha duo’s possible qualms with the executive authority’s on-paper transience had they won – candidates pledged not to run for December’s elections if selected – this result may be more propitious in the long-run. This is the silver lining; as they are permitted to run, this may make them more vested in seeing them happen.

Dabaiba’s likely balanced cabinet, which he has stated will include carrots for key constituencies and placate individuals like Bashagha, also needs the HoR’s approval. Yet, in an astute move by the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (USMIL) that suggests some past lessons are being learned, if the HoR fails to grant confidence (as Saleh recently threatened and given his post-Libyan Political Agreement actions), the responsibility will be transferred to LPDF delegates.

This crystalizes the rubber stamp nature of the HoR, which has planned a preliminary session— though its circumvention might provide a pretext for prospective spoilers such as Saleh and Abdullah Thinni, PM of the east-based Interim Government. While it would also be a polarizing issue at the LPDF (given February 5’s disapproval voting dynamics and the winning ticket still only earning 53 per cent), the prospects for pragmatism increase.

Having its eggs firmly in the Haftar basket, the UAE remains to be seen whether this new status quo will prove to be satisfactory.

As ever, the response of international sponsors will be vital. Although the expected carousel of lip-service did transpire, there can be a sharp dichotomy between what is said and done vis-à-vis Libya, as the last decade has exhibited. Indeed, how Egypt responds to seeing its preferred candidate Saleh lose will be consequential.

Whereas it would have liked to retain the HoR as an excuse to safeguard its perceived interests, UNSMIL’s foresight means that option is no longer directly on the table – though the precarious constitutional process it is hosting remains available. Conversely, backing December elections in good faith could be seen as risky in Cairo as it may stand to lose considerably if they are held fairly.

Another relevant actor is the UAE and how it chooses to respond. Having its eggs firmly in the Haftar basket, it remains to be seen whether this new status quo will prove to be satisfactory. Haftar has incidentally been elevated again at the expense of Saleh, who may lose his HoR speakership to a parliamentarian with Fezzan origins. Nevertheless, strong doubts persist as to whether Haftar’s powerbroker status is merited or merely imposed by his foreign backers.

For Turkey, it will be mostly content by this outcome; it has good relations with PM-designate Dabaiba, a Misratan who gave his first interview to a Turkish outlet and called it an “ally, friend, and a brotherly state.”

For Russia, its primary interests are preserving its influence in Libya, ideally with a military installation in Sirte, Jufra, or both. Given it implausibly insists on Private Military Company Wagner’s independence from Moscow, it is expected to keep working both sides. If regular Libyans are on board is another matter – protests recently resumed in Houn, a town beside Jufra Airbase, demanding the departure of mercenaries. 

Moving forward, Libya now has a new executive authority. If the GNU is endorsed, it replaces the GNA, a government that likely could have been sufficient had it received more material support from the international community. In any case, facilitating elections in December remains the priority.

On June 22, 2020, participating in Operation Irini, the German frigate Hamburg searched the Turkish merchant ship MV Roseline A.  It was subsequently stated that the soldiers who boarded the ship questioned the crew and conducted detailed examinations of the ship by opening the freight containers.

The Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately condemned the EU move in an official statement by declaring that no advance permission had been acquired either from the captain or from Turkey.

The ministry pointed out that information concerning the EU move was conveyed to Turkey exclusively through the ship’s staff. This rare incident that led to a formal objection from Turkey and caused serious tension deserves to be examined as it raises significant political and legal issues.

The Legal Framework of Intervention on the High Seas

The rules regulating the operation of merchant ships on the high seas are established by the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (hereinafter, Law of the Sea Convention). Although Turkey is not a party to the convention, the relevant rules reflect customary principles of international law and are abided by Turkey and all other states.

The doctrine of the high seas is based on the principle of the freedom of the seas. Therein, all states can enjoy the freedom of navigation of the high seas and the right of their aircraft to fly in the airspace over the high seas, to place submarine cables and oil pipelines, to fish, conduct scientific research, and construct artificial islands and other facilities permitted by international law.

The Legal and Political Reflections

Considering the legal framework summarized above, the first issue that needs to be addressed is whether there were “reasonable grounds for suspecting” the Turkish merchant ship was involved in any activities banned in the Law of the Sea Convention.

The intervention is described in the official statement of the Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs as “ambiguous” and “suspicious.” This implies that Turkey was not presented with satisfactory evidence that there were reasonable grounds to intervene.

Moreover, the fact that no weapon was found as a result of the search shows that the ship was searched based on a general suspicion rather than concrete one.

No weapon was found as a result of the search shows that the ship was searched based on a general suspicion rather than concrete one.

It was pointed out in the statement made by the ministry that the purpose and benefit of Operation Irini “are open to debate” and that the operation itself was not “impartial” as it did not control “the arms support to the outlawed Haftar” but instead it “punished the legitimate Libyan Government.”

The statement points out that neither NATO nor the governments of Turkey and Libya were consulted, and that the consent of the flag state, i.e. Turkey, was not obtained.

It is without doubt that there are controversial matters surrounding Operation Irini. First, the operation was not directly established by a UN Security Council resolution nor was there any UN supervision. In fact, the EU launched the operation with objectives that do not comply with the task of inspecting the arms embargo.

Considering that the task of Operation Irini is not limited to searching for weapons but also covers the prevention of oil smuggling and human trafficking, it becomes clear that it is, in fact, actually associated with the protection of the security and defense interests of the EU in the Mediterranean Sea.

The command council of the operation is dominated by France and Greece which are recently in serious conflict with Turkey in the Mediterranean Sea and Libya. The deputy operation commander is a French national and Italy and Greece will alternate the Force Commander every six months.

Therefore, the activities carried out under Operation Irini are inevitably partial against Turkey and lacking goodwill, which makes any activity illegitimate according to the fundamental principle of international law.

As can be understood from the UN Security Council resolutions mentioned above, it is not clear whether the arms embargo also targets the legitimate government of Libya. In some decisions, the legitimate government is held exempt from restrictions in order to ensure stability in the country.

The Libyan Government of National Accord has established defense agreements with certain countries, including Turkey. The arms embargo should therefore not prevent the arrival of armed elements from countries like Turkey given the signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements between the two countries.

Turkey’s Response

Following the search of the Turkish ship, Turkey’s priority is to prevent similar interventions on Turkish merchant vessels in the Mediterranean Sea. This said, there are legal measures against such unlawful interventions.

As the ships on high seas are under the jurisdiction of the flag state and are considered a part of that country, the flag state has the right to take all necessary legitimate measures to prevent such illegitimate acts on the basis of the right of self-defense.

These measures may include military measures as long as they are necessary and proportionate.

On the other hand, the flag state has the right to initiate the necessary legal procedures in the courts of the intervening state in order to get compensation for all damages that resulted from an illegal intervention.

The Law of the Sea Convention provides that all the damages should be compensated “if the suspicions prove to be unfounded.”

A criminal procedure against the personnel who intervened can also be initiated, if there is enough evidence that the intervention and the related acts constituted criminal violations.

The acts during the intervention were conducted on a Turkish-flagged merchant ship that is regarded as Turkish territory. The personnel who carried out the acts could therefore be subject to a criminal investigation in the Turkish courts in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code.

On October 23, a ceasefire was signed following the successful campaign by Libya’s internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA) to roll back General Khalifa Haftar’s offensive on Tripoli with Turkish military help. All units are supposed to return to their camps and all foreign forces [including training crews] to leave within three months.

Registration was to begin immediately with a view to integration or demobilization. Land and air crossings are supposed to be opened and media escalation and hate speech to halt. A joint security room will form a monitoring force. The 5+5 Joint Military Committee (JMC) will develop a mechanism with the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) to monitor the implementation.

Signs of hope in Libya

Some real progress has been made. Despite an attack by Haftar forces on Ubari November 28, the ceasefire has generally held and exchanges of detainees have continued. Flights between Benghazi, Tripoli, Sebha, Ghat and Ubari have resumed. Oil production, almost stopped after Haftar closed most sites in January, is now back to pre-blockade levels of 1.2 million barrels per day.

While the 5+5 JMC continues to meet, political and economic negotiations are also happening. On December 7, the Central Bank of Libya held its first unified board meeting since 2014 to discuss exchange rates. UNSMIL has facilitated virtual and in-person sessions of the Libyan Political Dialogue Forum [LPDF] on reforming the executive authority. Defying pro-Haftar Speaker Aguila Saleh, 127 out of 200 members of the House of Representatives met in Ghadames and agreed to choose a new speaker at their next session scheduled for December 21.

Saleh held a rival “official” session in Benghazi but less than 20 members showed up. His removal would be a blow to Haftar and his foreign backers: the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, Egypt and France. Saleh has been the effective civilian face of the eastern government despite Haftar’s attempted dismissal of all civilian authorities on April 27.

All of this is largely positive. So, has the civil war come to an end? Though we hope progress will continue, we are only at the beginning of the beginning. Recent history shows how difficult the road ahead will be.

Elections in Libya can be a step forward

According to the LPDF plan, presidential and parliamentary elections should be held December 24, 2021. This would be an important step, if they take place and are reasonably free and fair. However, as we saw before, elections are not a panacea. The results must be broadly accepted. Then comes the infinitely harder and more important challenges of making laws and governing. Between now and then other major obstacles remain.

The two sides have not begun to withdraw their combatants. Addressing the LPDF on December 2, UNSMIL acting chief Stephanie Williams noted that 20,000 foreign forces still on Libyan soil besides continued hate speech and human rights abuses.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills.

Haftar began his April 2019 offensive just days before a UN supported peace conference was to start, so the GNA is unlikely to want to give up its protector. Turkey has already indicated its forces will stay as long as the internationally recognized government wants them to.

While Turkish troops remain, Haftar’s foreign allies will not want to leave if the UAE and Saudi Arabia continue to pay the bills. One option would be a reasonably robust international peacekeeping mission to monitor the ceasefire and help separate the parties.

In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Qaddafi left hollowed-out security institutions. Most of the officers were colonels and most of the enlisted personnel were sergeant majors – generally near retirement age. Authorities constantly squabbled among themselves. In 2012, most combatant troops were revolutionary fighters with little formal training. The old guard and the revolutionaries did not trust each other much. With barely any regular junior officers and troops, revolutionaries did most of the work on the ground with minimal supervision.

Inevitably, many became used to their entitlements and reluctant to reform. While able to come together to combat existential threats like the so-called “Islamic State” [IS or Daesh] or Haftar’s advance on Tripoli, they tend to fight amongst themselves and against the Government when not under imminent danger.

There needs to be a comprehensive plan, accepted by most, if not all, with effective coordination. Transitional mechanisms will be needed for the different formations to come under an overarching structure with a generous, unified benefits structure for pay and retirement to avoid jealousy. This is essentially what South Africa did at the end of Apartheid.

Though that country still has issues, it has avoided falling back into civil war. A professional training mission should support this transition, focusing not just on basic training but also on effective democratic governance of the security sector. Ideally, this would be an international mission with a NATO backbone since it has the infrastructure. If it is composed of only a few countries, Libyans may not trust it. Fortunately, there are some plans created in 2012-2013 that lay out a vision of what Libyan security forces could look like, so the work does not need to start from scratch.

New player or new attitude in Libya?

A major factor will be the incoming American administration. Under President Obama, the U.S. did not get engaged much until IS arrived. President Trump was even more nonchalant, particularly given his indulgence to Middle Eastern autocracies, until Russia’s Wagner Group mercenaries started showing up.

President-elect Biden has declared that he will be less permissive. A recent report by the Defense Department’s Inspector General invoking UAE funding of these fighters is a factor in bipartisan Congressional opposition to arms sales to the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Egypt. As they fight back with their impressive public relations arsenals, we will have to wait a few more months to see whether real change will come.

Disclaimer: The opinions above are those of Mr. Reid alone and do not purport to represent the United Nations.

In the past few months Luigi Di Maio, the youngest Italian Foreign Minister since Galeazzo Ciano, who served from 1936 until 1943 in the nefarious government of his father-in-law, Benito Mussolini, has been involved in rebuilding the international supply chain and reopening borders to free circulation after the country was hit hard by COVID-19. However, Di Maio’s second priority has been to protect Italy’s interests in Libya in the new scenario that emerged after Turkish intervention in favor of the internationally recognized Government of National Accord (GNA).

Italian Foreign Policy on Libya

Irregular migration, energy and security are the three main Italian interests in Libya. Despite the diversification policies since the early 1970s, Libya still plays a relevant role in Italy’s energy policy because of the amount of oil imported, the exceptional quality of Libyan crude oil, and the Greenstream subsea gas pipeline laid by the Italian energy giant, ENI (State Hydrocarbons Authority), and opened in 2004. Moreover, for Rome, Libyan gas is probably the only reliable alternative to Russian natural gas.

As in all European countries, the issue of immigration is at the top of the political debate in Italy too. Most of the irregular migrants entering the country come from the shores of Libya. The issue has created enormous tensions domestically – just remember that the Catholic Church has pressed for a policy of open borders, but the Italian right is basing much of their populist discourse on stopping migration by all means. Irregular migration has also created significant tension at the EU level, which is refusing the modification of the Dublin Regulation.

Future perspectives

Thus, Di Maio’s priority is to provide stability in the country, to provide security, the flow of oil and natural gas, and the containment of irregular immigration. For Rome, the ideal option is to reach a political compromise between the different parts and maintain the unity of the country. However, in the present situation, where different regional and global actors have sided with opposing groups, it appears a remote option.

Turkish intervention in favor of the GNA has even reduced the chances for an Italian role and has created a situation that (from Rome’s viewpoint) resembles the first phases of the unending Syrian crisis. Consequently, Italy is now faced with a difficult choice of taking a leading role opposing Ankara or cooperating with it.

Di Maio initially attempted to reduce the GNA’s dependency on Ankara with a more active and independent role. Nevertheless, this would mean a radical shift in Italian foreign policy and unprecedented deployment of its military as well as economic resources. This is unlikely because of three constraining elements. Firstly, foreign policy choices must enjoy domestic support. The Italian media, however, continue to follow the Libyan crisis sporadically and without interest. Italian public opinion also deplores the use of military force as an instrument of foreign policy, as an “enemy” is not regarded as an implacable foe that needs to be confronted with military power and, instead, can be more effectively engaged using diplomacy.

Secondly, Italian defense policy, as stated by the White Book of the Italian Ministry of Defense, is concentrated on the Euro-Atlantic geopolitical area and on the Euro-Mediterranean geopolitical area. The Euro-Atlantic security is guaranteed by NATO, EU, “common values” and strong economic and cultural ties. The Euro-Mediterranean area, however, is characterized by anarchy and suffers political and economic instability and intra-state competition. Yet, despite its relevance, it is very unlikely that the Italian Armed Forces can intervene in the Euro-Mediterranean area outside the U.S.-led mission scenario –  something that the Trump administration is not considering.

Consequently, Italy has pointed to a UN-sponsored solution to the crisis and to the reinforcement of Mission Irini, the EU military operation to enforce the arms embargo to Libya. Both efforts appear difficult in materializing when key members of the EU and permanent members of the Security Council either backed Haftar (Russia and France), who aims to destroy the GNA militarily or are uninterested in the crisis (U.S., U.K., and China).

Italy has relatively small economic resources to invest in Libya or to apply pressure. Because of the huge public debt and the poor performance of its economy, the country cannot afford big investments abroad. Private investments are also unlikely. Major companies like FIAT or UniCredit, which have been important actors of Italian foreign policy in Libya and the East Mediterranean, are now focused on the American or internal market. The only relevant economic player is ENI, which has been active in Libya since 1959 and has lobbied the Italian government extensively.

Exactly because of these three restrictions, to not lose a role in North Africa, Italy should look into a compromise with Turkey, which deployed enormous resources in Libya. However, this compromise may need brave decisions: Turkey’s image with the Italian public is particularly poor, and the Rome-Ankara alliance may damage relations with France, Greece, and Egypt. With the first two countries, there is a high level of interconnection that will not be damaged by an eventual competition in Libya. Moreover, Paris has been frequently in conflict with Rome on the issue of migration and proved highly destabilizing in Libya. Italian policymakers define Egypt as an “inescapable partner” in the Middle East. This view has been maintained even after Giulio Regeni’s brutal killing in February 2016, presumably by members of the Egyptian security apparatus, and the fact that none have been brought to justice.

At the moment Italy appears to be in a cul de sac in Libya with a young Foreign Minister who will not be able to change Italian foreign policy because he lacks strong political support; his party is in turmoil and he recently lost its leadership. Everybody hopes, though, that he will not share the young Foreign Minister Ciano’s fate, who watched powerless the decline of Italy’s power in the Mediterranean.