Political parties are on the home stretch of the upcoming local elections. They have been trying to broaden their electoral base in the last weeks by bringing their floating voters back in line. Parties are also dedicated to attracting the votes of new voters in order to make a difference not only for these elections, but also for the future ones. Even if all parties conduct their own election campaign, as well as organizing some joint meetings with their allies, the priority issues of all parties are quite distinct from each other.

The members of the People’s Alliance – the AK Party and the MHP – see the elections as a matter of national survival. Understanding the motivation of the AK Party and the MHP requires examining the positions of these two parties in politics closely.

After the July 15 coup attempt, the AK Party and the MHP left their disagreements aside and collaborated on critical issues. The first issue agreed on was the need for a comprehensive fight against domestic and international terrorism. Turkey had to set up a detailed plan for discharging civil and military servants affiliated with the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) – the perpetrator of the military coup. The support provided by the MHP to the AK Party government during this process enabled the government to take the necessary action in this fight.  

Turkey has been facing a serious threat from PKK terrorism since the end of the resolution process. The PKK adopted urban warfare tactics and targeted city centers to broaden its impact. More, the PKK’s branch in Northern Syria, the YPG, became a serious threat for Turkey’s national security. The MHP supported the government in its cross-border operations in order to provide security for the country.

Nonetheless, contrary to the support provided by the MHP, other opposition parties came out against the issue. During the process, they made contradictory statements about the government’s actions. While they claimed that they were supporting Turkey’s fight against terrorism, they criticized the government severely because of the operations it held.

Indeed, this contradictory approach of the opposition parties is also effective in their election campaigns. For instance, Kilicdaroglu, the chairman of the CHP, announced that they were determined to fight against terrorism and that having a latent alliance with the HDP would not harm their position in this issue. Nevertheless, Kilicdaroglu and the rest of the CHP does not see the presence of the YPG in Northern Syria as a threat to Turkey, even despite the attacks that occurred in the last couple of years that were conducted by YPG-affiliated terrorists.

Contrary to the approach of the Nation’s Alliance, the AK Party and the MHP emphasize that Turkey should maintain its determined position in fighting against terrorism. For these parties, local elections are crucial in order to provide an effective battle on the ground. As President Erdogan claims, Turkey should focus more on fighting against domestic and international terrorism without losing any power in the local sphere.

The AK Party and the MHP also emphasize the threat posed by the HDP gaining power due to the CHP and Iyi Party. Almost two years ago, when the PKK broke the ceasefire, HDP municipalities in eastern Turkey declared their autonomy, which was against the Constitution. These municipalities were providing logistic support to the PKK against the state during the urban warfare. Due to these reasons, the AK Party and MHP are strongly in favor of preventing the PKK’s predominance over the HDP administrations.

Overall, the AK Party and the MHP see the upcoming elections as a matter of national survival. The results of the elections will show whether this approach has been welcomed by the electorate.

President Erdogan recently announced that Turkey’s next military operation against the YPG/PKK in northeastern Syria might be launched “within a few days,” which became the top high-level statement made in Ankara most recently. The details such as time, particular target place and duration of the military operation are not precise yet, but Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

More importantly, since Turkey previously conducted military operations in Syria, policymakers realized that without any military action Turkey could not reach any of its strategic objectives in Syria. Therefore, eliminating the PKK presence alongside Turkey’s Syrian border and maintaining an army presence there might provide Ankara with an additional political maneuver to consolidate its political stance within the Syrian crisis. This, especially, will be the case when the international actors begin to shape the future of Syria.

Turkey’s strategic objective is clear: to de-territorialize the YPG/PYD alongside its Syrian border, fix relations with the U.S. in Syria and recalibrate its military presence.

Although Turkey has an obvious agenda and strategic objective in the Syrian crisis and towards the PKK/YPG presence in Syria; others, especially the U.S., hold different strategic calculations and concerns regarding Turkey’s next military move in northeastern Syria especially a comprehensive military operation against the U.S.-backed YPG group. The U.S. attempt to establish observation points in the eastern part of Euphrates was clearly a strong signal to discourage Turkey to launch a military operation against the YPG’s strongholds such as Ayn El-Arab, Tal Abyad, and Rasulayn.

Following President Erdogan’ precise statement about Turkey’s next military operation, the Pentagon said that the military operation against the “SDG is not acceptable.” However, news coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.  Then two questions concerning Turkey’s upcoming military operation need to be answered. While the first one is the question of how Turkey is planning the military move on an operational level, the second one is the question of how Turkey’s next military action against the YPG will potentially reshape relations between Ankara and Washington.

News coming from the ground shows that the U.S. began to withdraw its military forces from Tal Abyad. This development strongly demonstrates that Turkey’s military operation is underway.

Regarding the operational dimension of military intervention, it seems that Turkey’s military operation at this stage will not be comprehensive compared to the previous cross-border operations such as OES and OOB. Even though there are different operational scenarios in the hands of the Turkish Armed Forces, such as conducting a comprehensive and full-scale direct intervention including the infiltration of ground troops into northeastern Syria, Ankara’s first aim is to discourage the U.S. from continuing its observation points alongside Turkey’s Syrian border to protect the YPG. Ankara believes that it would be too late if the U.S. continues to establish observation points.

Ankara’s primary objective is to create a militarily protected safe zone which will be liberated from the terrorist entities and then open up a territorial zone not only to protect Turkey’s border against the terrorist infiltration but also to prevent the YPG’s territorial continuity in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. This will undoubtedly be a game changer for Turkey on the ground. The new operation, therefore, would focus on forming a region liberated from the YPG along the Syrian border and controlling critical points. The first signal coming from the ground is that Tal Abyad might be the initial target of Turkey.

Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable.

Regarding relations between Turkey and the U.S., there are many strategic domains that both sides have to rethink through. If there is an agreement over Turkey’s military operation, then one side should certainly step back. President Erdogan said that the U.S. forces would not be the target of Turkey by underlying the potential cooperation between Ankara and Washington in the fight against the remaining element of Daesh. Erdogan strongly underlined that Turkey could take full-responsibility to fight against Daesh. More importantly, Turkey will certainly use its legitimate right of self-defense or intervention, as President Erdogan stated two days ago in Ankara. For Turkey, the YPG issue is not negotiable. Under this circumstance, Turkey, one way or another, will want to keep its eyes over the YPG and northeastern Syria until a political solution is reached across Syria.

Therefore, the most likely scenario for Turkey’s upcoming military operation is a limited intervention to clean the YPG presence by holding a small piece of territory to prevent the terrorist organization from consolidating its territorial and political order. If Turkey and the U.S. can find common ground to mitigate Turkey’s security concerns over the YPG, then the two countries might be able to establish a new modality to work in cooperation for Syria.

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared an expansion of Turkish military operations in Syria and pointed to the east of the Euphrates.

During his speech at the Turkish Defense Industry Summit yesterday, President Erdogan stated that a military operation will begin in the area controlled by the YPG in the west of the Euphrates River. Erdogan said: “While 80-85% of Manbij used to belong to the Arabs, at the moment there are terrorist groups there. In that case, we will take them out. It is our responsibility now.”

Further criticizing the U.S. administration, Erdogan stated, “We have not yet achieved any result in Manbij. Mr. President says that we will clear those (terrorist groups) in 30 days. We’ll see. We wish they would clear all the terrorists.”

“An undeniable diversion tactic has been carried out in Manbij. And at this moment it is still being carried out.”

Global media outlets have confirmed that the U.S. has taken a step to train 30,000 YPG terrorists in northern Syria. And President Erdogan asks the U.S. government “Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

“The north of Syria is our south. They are trying to build a corridor there. We say ‘these are terrorists,’ but our strategic partners, especially the U.S., say that ‘they are not terrorists.’ These are (referring to the terrorist organizations) a branch of the PKK, and all the proof is exposed. Why don’t you act with us, but act with them?”

“While the Americans speak positively to our faces, they preferred to use elements of these terrorist groups on the ground. Recently, they have taken the step to train 30,000 terrorists in the area. They say ‘there is no such thing.’ However, the global media has confirmed this. They have this information. Is this true? Are you aware of what you are really doing?”

What will be the scope of Turkey’s operation to the east of the Euphrates?

According to Abdullah Agar, terror and security expert, the operation will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Turkey’s new military operation to the east of the Euphrates will involve an area of 20 thousand square kilometers and this time Sinjar – an area in the west of Iraq – will also be included.

Regarding the possibility of Turkish and U.S. forces crossing each other, Agar highlighted the possibility of this risk but stated, “If the risk is big for Turkish soldiers, it is bigger for American soldiers. The U.S. has made a huge mistake by taking a path with terrorists.”

Confirming the importance of President Erdogan’s speech for reflecting the will of Turkey, Agar said, “An operation that will be executed in stages is ahead. We are talking about a process of 550 kilometers along the border and 40 kilometer square in depth. This means that the Turkish Armed Forces will conduct an operation in an area of 20 thousand kilometer square.”

The operation, announced yesterday by Erdogan could further damage the already tense relations between Turkey and the United States.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Even though Turkey and Russia have different strategic priorities in the Syrian conflict, they have both turned into vital actors. The Istanbul Summit held between Turkey, Russia, France, and Germany, last month proves this point. The Istanbul Summit is much more critical in terms of exposing the vital position of these two actors in the Syrian crisis, rather than the summit outcome.

Even though the summit was initiated and organized by Turkey, we should reflect on how it was made possible. Although the analyses that came out in 2016 claimed that Turkey had lost its impact in the Syrian crisis, now it’s the opposite. The main reason for Turkey’s transformation into a key country can be explained through several factors. The most effective one among these being Turkey’s direct military involvement in the Syrian crisis.

Turkey made its first military move with the Euphrates Shield Operation. With this operation, Turkey not only eliminated the Daesh threat, but also prevented the PKK from consolidating more power in the region. Turkey also proved its capacity to take more military action in Syria, and enabled the military opposition to re-organize.

Turkey’s second major move was to continue supporting the opposition groups when they were extremely disorganized, lost power and space against the regime, and more importantly, when they were isolated on a regional scale. Through the success of the Euphrates Shield Operation and the agreement made with Russia, the actions taken against the PKK in Afrin have consolidated Turkey’s gains on a more strategic level.

The Afrin Operation yields two significant results: The first one was to reveal that the PKK’s presence in the western Euphrates was unsustainable and to organize the armed opposition under its control. The second was to develop a unique relationship model with Russia and the U.S. Turkey has transformed itself into a critical actor for Russia, while reinforcing its position in Syria through the Astana process.

On the other hand, Turkey kept military options on the table by following a strategy against the U.S.’s PKK stance. Hence, Turkey has become a critical actor for Russia in the context of the solution of the Syria crisis, and for the U.S. in the PKK case in the eastern Euphrates. This strategy has enabled Turkey to achieve gains in relations with these two actors. Turkey resolved the Idlib problem after the Sochi reconciliation with Russia and removed the PKK from Manbij, while persuading the U.S. to establish control over the region along with Turkey and local elements.

One of Turkey’s most critical moves was to take the military and political initiative to solve the Idlib problem. Thus, in Idlib Turkey prevented the regime from organizing a massive operation and the emergence of a new refugee crisis. This move positioned Turkey more prominently in the Syrian crisis and most importantly, has legitimized its position in the eyes of secondary actors such as France and Germany. Additionally, Turkey took a very difficult responsibility to eliminate radical groups in Idlib and reinforced its military position in the region.

The Istanbul Summit came to the fore as a concrete output of Turkey’s achievements thanks to its series of successful military operations in northern Syria and efficient diplomatic initiative in Idlib.

The Istanbul Summit came to the fore as a concrete output of these achievements. Through the inclusion of Germany and France to the summit, Turkey ensured both the re-consolidation of the de-confliction zone and the ceasefire in the context of the Astana talks and diplomatically positioned Berlin and Paris against Moscow. In this way, France and Germany, which benefited greatly from the Idlib agreement, reinforced their support for the agreement. Although Putin repeatedly said that the Idlib agreement is temporary, Turkey has internationalized the political consensus in Idlib as a model for the political settlement of the Syrian crisis.

Now Turkey is waiting for the U.S.’s PKK move. If the U.S. does not give up on its current strategy concerning the PKK/PYD, then a military engagement in the eastern Euphrates seems highly likely.

Immediately after the Istanbul Summit, we saw that the Manbij agreement was put into practice between the U.S. and Turkey as planned. At that point, Turkey made a military signal against the PKK in the eastern Euphrates. Now, however, Turkey will be waiting for the U.S.’s PKK move. If the U.S. does not give up on its current strategy against the PKK/PYD, then a military engagement will emerge as a great possibility in the eastern Euphrates.

The Istanbul summit may not have produced a result yet. However, how Turkey has arrived at this summit is more important than the results. It is likely that the military presence of Turkey in the field, its close relations with the opposition groups, the connection it has built between Russia, Europe, and the U.S. link and its ability to make use of these connections in the field makes Ankara one of the most important addresses in the political settlement of the Syrian crisis. As Turkey responds to the changing dynamics on the ground, it becomes a significant player of the geopolitical game in Syria. Following a balanced foreign policy will further reinforce Turkey’s achievements.

Today in Istanbul, four governments — Turkey, Russia, Germany, and France — are meeting for a summit over Syria, attempting to consolidate the Sochi Agreement signed by Russia and Turkey over Idlib, and re-invigorate the international political process. There is little reason to think that these talks can succeed on either front.

Turkey was drawn into the “Astana process” with Russia and Iran at the end of 2016. One of the key aspects of this political track was the creation of four “de-escalation” zones, three of which were then systematically liquidated by the Bashar al-Assad regime and its backers in Iran and Russia. By July of this year, only the Idlib de-escalation zone, the last province in insurgent hands, remained. The pro-Assad forces gave clear indications that Idlib was next and this assumption took hold. Having destroyed or humbled nationalist rebels across the country, and deported jihadist insurgents to Idlib, packing them in among a desperate, displaced population, the regime coalition was able to frame the apparently imminent offensive in “war on terror” terms.

On 17 September, a deal between Turkey and Russia was reached in Sochi as part of the Astana process that called off the pro-Assad offensive, for now, and created a demilitarized zone (DMZ) in Idlib. The zone cut ten miles into the insurgent zone, where Turkey has “observation posts”, and leaves the Assad-Iran forces surrounding Idlib. The responsibility was put on Turkey to clear the DMZ of heavy weapons by 10 October and by 15 October to remove the “radical terrorist groups”—namely Tandheem Hurras al-Deen, al-Qaeda’s new faction in Syria; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), al-Qaeda’s former branch in Syria and the predominant insurgent force in the province; and the smaller jihadist groups that are dependent on HTS like the Turkistan Islamic Party (TIP).

It was unclear that HTS would comply with this arrangement, though they did through an ambiguously-worded eleventh-hour  statement. HTS announced that it was taking a “balanced” approach that prevented a sanguinary offensive by the regime coalition, yet at the same time they were not going to be dragged into a political process dominated by the regime’s allies.

The Turkish government has been engaged in a campaign to split apart HTS, drawing its reconcilable elements into the mainstream opposition, grouped with the Free Syrian Army (FSA) factions under the banner of National Liberation Front (NLF), while isolating and eliminating the extremist hard core. HTS understands this danger, and the danger of de-escalation, which has allowed the re-emergence of the protest movement—against Assad and the jihadists. To counter this, over the last two months, HTS has arrested scores of activists to try to dismantle civil society and bring the province under its sole control. The Turkish struggle with these al-Qaeda-linked and al-Qaeda-style jihadists poses a serious threat for the country  since their networks cross into Turkey itself. There is a risk of domestic terrorism from a Turkish crackdown on extremists in Idlib.

There is also a major trap-door in the September agreement for Turkey: assuming the jihadists are neutralized, the pro-Assad coalition remains poised to attack Idlib and might well take advantage of the reduced resistance either to launch a full-scale offensive or to impose a “reconciliation” (surrender) agreement in the province. While Turkey might, in theory, be open to a reconciliation agreement, it has to be known that such an accord would not prevent the wave of refugees and the scattering of terrorists inside Turkey that Ankara so badly fears. It would also invite in an Assad-Iran system that has close relations with Ankara’s sworn enemies, the YPG/PKK, perhaps bringing the Kurdish terrorists into another border area.

The primary factor determining whether a pro-Assad offensive is viable is whether Russia provides air support. The regime itself, as Russia knows better than most, is in tatters. But politically, the ongoing presence of HTS, a fact for the foreseeable future, could provide a pretext more or less at the time of Assad’s choosing. The dilemma for Moscow, finally made to choose sides, is that its feeble position leaves it trying to bluff its way into influence. Moscow has been able to temporarily delay an attack by Assad and Iran to preserve its relations with Turkey, since such relations are the easiest way to undermine and potentially fracture the NATO alliance. If and when the Assad-Iran ground force moves against Idlib, however, it is very unlikely the Russians will withhold airstrikes—they have already begun them, after all, if only to keep the pressure on Turkey, even as negotiations continue.

One way to prevent a regime coalition offensive in Idlib would be if the U.S. stepped in. If the U.S. could come to a more balanced position between Turkey and the PKK it could allow for a so-called “NATO zone” that would put nearly half the country out of reach of the pro-Assad coalition, and place Turkey’s territorial holdings in Syria under the political protection, if not the military protection, of the United States. This scenario remains unlikely since the U.S. has committed itself to the PKK. Over the summer, Russia was able to correctly read U.S. statements of support for rebels in the Deraa area of the south as hollow and managed to convince Israel to hold fire as Assad and Iranian militants seized the border zone. Similarly, while the U.S. and Turkey remain divided, it allows Russia to play one off against the other and advance its cause and that of its client regime.

This situation renders the efforts by Germany and France to energize the peace process moot. The Geneva process has in any case been significantly reshaped along Astana lines by the Russians so that it now favours “peace” on Assad’s terms, and, whether Russia lends an assist or not, the Assad regime—supported by Iran—retains a maximalist position that intends to reconquer every inch of Syria’s territory. The Europeans have no ability to stop this militarily and the belief that “reconstruction” funds do or can offer leverage over the regime is pure fantasy. Firstly, any funds fed into the Assad-held zone will be syphoned off to reinforce a patronage system of organised criminality and sectarianism. Secondly, a regime that has endured the last seven years of warfare will not be swayed from its course — let alone pushed from office  by money. At most, the Europeans could offer political support to Turkey, potentially making it more awkward for Russia to back an attack, though over time attention will fade and Idlib’s fate will likely be settled by force.

We have been living in a unipolar world since the end of the Cold War. The U.S. has been the sole major power. However, the structure of the international system has been evolving away from unipolarity due to the disproportional growth rates among states. Accordingly, there are states that speedily head to gain the status of major power. China in particular has increased its military and economic capacity in a short span of time, which is expected to reach the level of development that facilitates it to challenge the primacy of the U.S. So, a bipolar world is rising.

Besides, recently, new regional powers have emerged. Brazil, South Africa, and Turkey, are among those powers. The rise of regional powers, though it does not complicate things much at the global level, puts pressure on the U.S., which, as the only major power, engages in the politics of regions such as the Middle East as an off-shore balancer. Losing the control of a region may undoubtedly have political repercussions on the international level. That may give way to penetration of another extra-regional power or worse lead to the emergence of a regional hegemon, which may happen to rise as a global power in the long run.

Russia’s enhancement of its influence and Turkey’s tendency to act autonomously in the Middle East can be cited in this context. The relative decline of U.S. power in the Middle East has prompted Russia to fill the power vacuum and has urged Turkey to start the process of uplifting its status from a balancer to a hegemon in the region.

Current U.S. foreign policy faces the problem of accommodating China and regional powers like Turkey. So far under the Trump presidency, the U.S. has countered this problem by developing a unilateralist and isolationist foreign policy. This foreign policy basically seeks to contain and overturn the power shift that is now taking place. The Trump administration has taken policies that range from trade war to military tour de force for that purpose. This has been accompanied by the securitization of China and regional power like Turkey in the media.

Nevertheless, especially owing to the domestic political necessities like the upcoming elections for the Senate, the Trump administration has started to take contrary decisions towards these countries. The release of Pastor Andrew Brunson last week, who had been in prison for about two years in Turkey on accusations of aiding the PKK, was reciprocated by signaling to lift some of the economic sanctions that had been imposed on Turkey earlier this year.

Here we should note that Trump seems to plan to use the release of Brunson in his election campaign in order to mobilize the Evangelical and conservative voters to go to the polls and vote for the Republicans for the Senate. Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo, has recently expressed that some sanctions could be lifted. This marks that the period of tension, which was grown by mutual retaliatory political moves, seems to enter into a period of relative normalcy.

However, this should not increase the hopes for bilateral relations. As noted above, relations between Turkey and the U.S. will not be normalized unless the U.S. agrees to accommodate Turkey by admitting its new international status, which is an autonomous regional power. Indeed, in the past, relations between the two countries have witnessed several low points, including the Cyprus crisis in the 1970s. Yet, the reason behind these kinds of tensions was not structural. Turkey was merely expecting for its sovereign rights to be expected. It did not seek to change its status and position in international politics.

Today, Turkey seeks to adjust the international order according to recent changes in its domestic politics and the distribution of power in the region. Turkey does not want to keep playing its traditional role of the “outsider” balancer in its vicinity by following the U.S. leadership and national interests. Instead, it desires to establish itself as an autonomous powerhouse in the region. The U.S. has so far responded to Turkey’s new foreign policy attitude by supporting the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO (led by U.S.-based criminal cult leader Fetullah Gulen), which strives to curb the country’s potentials and capabilities.

In response to this attitude, Turkey has continuously given the message that it will not take a step back. For instance, last week President Erdogan signaled a new wave of military operations in the south of the country and stated that Turkey was adamant to cleanse the east of the Euphrates River from all terrorist (PKK) elements. This, no doubt, will be a new test on how “healthy” the relations between Turkey and the U.S. are.

In the first year of President Trump’s tenure, Turkish-American relations went through what we can call a period of “sizing up,” as hopes for a new beginning were somewhat moderated by strategic challenges. The Trump administration had inherited the Obama policy of supporting “local forces” (read YPG) against Daesh with no U.S. boots on the ground save for the “military advisors.” Turkey was patient in Trump’s first year to allow the administration some time to re-evaluate the mission and start working with Turkey instead of the PKK’s Syrian branch. When it became clear that the Trump administration would settle on the same policy, Turkey launched a military operation in Afrin to ensure the YPG forces would not go west of the Euphrates river.

The serious divergence on the ground in northern Syria has continued, but efforts to put the U.S.-Turkey relationship back on track also continued, as outstanding legal cases (Brunson and Zarrab cases) were compartmentalized away from broader policy questions. However, the pressure from the Evangelical base of the Trump administration led to an ill-timed ultimatum by President Trump and Vice President Pence, resulting in yet another bilateral crisis.

As a result of the pressure, the U.S. imposed sanctions against Turkish ministers and additional steel and aluminum tariffs, a first against a NATO ally. These measures appeared to be largely symbolic, but they had a serious impact on the Turkish Lira’s devaluation against the U.S. dollar. As Turkey refused to bow down to such economic pressures, the relationship came to the brink of total breakdown. Clearly, the Brunson case was a major catalyzer in this process, but the underlying strategic disagreements and the already existing mutual distrust has created a fertile ground for a major crisis.

With the Turkish courts deciding to release Pastor Brunson last week, however, an important new phase might just be starting in the bilateral relationship. Brunson’s return to the U.S. and President Trump’s hosting of the pastor in the oval office with high level administration officials sends a strong message to the Evangelical base ahead of the midterm elections in November.

Not that Trump risked losing the support of the Evangelicals, but Brunson’s return gives his standing with Evangelical supporters a big boost. Turkish leadership has maintained the legal process played itself out and both sides insisted there was no specific deal. We should note that there does not need to be a deal for this development to have a positive impact on the U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The fact that a legal case derailed the relationship between two NATO allies should give everyone a pause. It underscores the complexity of the strategic environment in Turkey’s immediate neighborhood and heightened security concerns Turkey feels as a result of U.S. policies in the region. President Trump’s positive remarks about Turkey reflect his concern over his standing with the Evangelical voters, but this will not be enough for a broader strategic conversation between the U.S. and Turkey.

The recent changes in the U.S. Syria policy have given at least a limited amount of reassurances to Turkey that its interests would be taken into consideration more carefully. The U.S. rhetorical support for Turkey against an imminent military operation against Idlib was a welcome development in this sense. Yet, without a more comprehensive policy coordination between two sides, the mutual skepticism will continue, especially as the U.S. continues to support the YPG.

The upside for the relationship is that the “sizing up” period may be over and both sides are much clearer about their positions. The ambiguities regarding northern Syria as well as the uncertain fate of the Brunson case are no longer excuses for the lack of an honest dialogue. The regional crises will almost certainly create new challenges and the U.S.-Turkey ties will be tried. The lesson from the Brunson case is that Turkey will not bow to threats and pressures, and that the U.S. will need to pursue diplomatic options instead. Going forward, a talk-first-shoot-later approach will have to win for a healthier U.S.-Turkey relationship.

The most striking feature of the Brunson case is that the U.S. has resisted to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy, and this led to a crisis between the two countries. Just to remind the reader, American Pastor Andrew C. Brunson has been kept under arrest for almost two years with the accusation of aiding terrorist groups such as the PKK. He was put on trial, found guilty and was condemned to a three year plus imprisonment by the Turkish courts.

U.S. President Donald Trump and Vice President Mike Pence claimed earlier that he had been innocent and expressed that he had to be released immediately. The language adopted in those statements bore a degree of threat and was disrespectful to the Turkish judicial system. That’s why Turkish officials have criticized President Trump and Vice President Pence for not showing patience and being disrespectful to the judicial process after the release of the pastor. They underlined that Turkey is a country where the rule of law is shown due respect. In fact, the issue was more than being about the rule of law, it is more of respecting Turkey’s sovereignty and recognizing its new international status.

The Washington Post columnist Jamal Khashoggi’s probable murder in the Saudi Arabia Consulate in Istanbul also points to the same problem. It is clear that the Saudi crown prince Mohammad Bin Salman ordered the killing of Mr. Khashoggi on account of his critical stance towards the Saudi regime. Regarding the very close and special relations between Prince Salman and President Trump’s son-in-law and senior envoy to the Middle East Jared Kushner, it is not hard to guess that the U.S. was closely following the issue and was informed that Mr. Khashoggi was ordered to be killed. Choosing Istanbul as the location for this outrageous act, which directly defies the norms of international politics, does not seem to be random. It has been rightly put forward by some analysts that the purpose of this unfortunate act of killing was not just to get rid of an opponent of the Saudi regime but to get Turkey involved into this unfortunate incident and to violate its sovereignty.

Combining these two recent incidents with the Trump administration’s supply of heavy weapons and diplomatic protection to the Syrian branch of PKK (YPG) and its unabashed and militant foreign policy towards Palestine and Jerusalem, one can conclude that the U.S. shows no respect to Turkey’s security concerns and sovereign rights. More to the point, the Trump administration fails to understand Turkey’s new foreign policy doctrine. Turkey has been following a revisionist foreign policy for a couple of years. It has been seeking adjustments in the existing distribution of power in its region and in the international system in general.

Turkey’s current Syrian policy and its call for reforming international institutions such as the UN Security Council on the basis of new international realities can be given as examples to this revisionist turn in Turkish foreign policy. Despite that these are defensive policies, since they were put into action after Turkey came under attack by terrorist groups and its long-term allies, they manifest the desire for change in international politics.

The U.S.’s uncompromising posture pushes Turkey towards more activism in its foreign policy. President Erdogan has just vowed to eliminate all the YPG militants in Manbij and cleanse off the region from the terrorist elements located in the east of the Euphrates river. This would be a punch in the face to the YPG (and also to the U.S.) who has already suffered a terrible loss in the Operation Oil Branch in Afrin. After that done Turkey would secure the control of all its southern border with Syria and become a more powerful actor in Syrian politics and in the region in general.

As long as the U.S. clings to its current policy of disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and supporting its enemies, this will get Turkey to feel more insecure and as a result it will accelerate its policy of defensive expansion in its vicinity. The Trump administration has to find a better policy to be able to contain Turkey. Supporting the YPG, giving unconditional support to Israel, disrespecting Turkey’s sovereignty and opening an economic war have so far backfired. Turkey has grown more powerful.

According to news reported from Anadolu Agency on Wednesday 10 October , U.S. forces in Syria’s Manbij have provided the PKK/YPG terror group with new construction equipment, allowing for terrorists to continue digging up trenches in the city center.

The U.S. support to the PKK/YPG in Syria has been a major point of difference between the policies of Washington and Ankara in Syria. While the U.S. believes that they can wipe out a terrorist organization by supporting another, Ankara has insisted that the U.S. regime ought to rule out support for any terrorist organization – regardless of their so-called ideological affiliation.

U.S. troops have continued to provide military and logistic transportation from northern Iraq to northwestern Syria, despite a deal between Ankara and Washington on the withdrawal of the terrorist organization from the city.

The Manbij deal that was reached in June this year was a reassurance to Ankara that the terrorist organization will withdraw from the city in order to stabilize the region.

According to the news produced by AA, local sources also told journalists that the U.S. also sends aid to the PKK/YPG in the region.

In the recent logistic support, trucks carrying four construction vehicles were transported to Manbij. U.S. soldiers escorted the transfer of these vehicles, which included 3 bulldozers and one excavator.

The PKK/YPG use this equipment in order to continue digging trenches and tunnels.

A report written by Sertac Timur Demir and published by the SETA Foundation indicates how terrorist organizations shape their communication strategies along with the technological developments.

Particularly focusing on the PKK terrorist organization, which is recognized as a terrorist organization by the U.S., European Union and Turkey, it can be stated that the report is divided into three sections.

The first section of the report examines the PKK within its own media organs. As a matter of fact, media aligned to the PKK, which has shifted from a traditional to a digital space, reveals the ideological codes and jargon the terrorist organization is based upon and wants to impose.

Following, the report assesses the way in which international media approaches the actions of the PKK, its discourse and its members.

Finally, Demir critically analyzes how parts of the center-left media affirms the PKK, while criticizing the Turkish state for its actions in its fight against terrorism. Demir highlights this topic by providing various examples of occasions where international, and even Turkish media, have failed to draw a distinction between reporting a terror attack conducted by the PKK and spreading the terrorist organization’s propaganda.

The report reveals the way in which the terrorist organization is legitimized, how its members are viewed as heroes and sacred, as well as how facts with regards to the group’s illegal activities are destroyed and how a rosy picture is drawn in order to depict the PKK as a harmless group.

Does the PKK use international media as a tool?

Report underlines the fact that certain influential international media outlets present the terrorist activities of the PKK in a soft tone. First of all, the group is labelled either as “rebel,” “Kurdish separatist group,” or “Kurdish militants.” According to the report, this labeling distorts the reality of the PKK’s existence as an officially listed terrorist organization in Europe and the U.S.

While Turkey’s war against terrorism has been continuing with the PKK for years, the PKK cannot be affiliated with a particular ethnic group. The reason for this is because not only does the PKK fail to obtain major support from Kurdish people living in Turkey, but also because over half of the Kurdish population in Turkey have been supportive of the government’s fight against the PKK.

Deliberately chosen images, twisted headlines and the use of passive voice are provided in order to give the impression that the PKK is not responsible for the illegal activities that they carry out. A couple of examples listed in the report are also listed below:

Thus, the reader gets the impression that the state is struggling with Kurds rather than terrorists. In one particular example, a PKK member was called a “legend.”In these, and many other headlines, there is no mention of what the PKK really is. In some cases the PKK is not mentioned at all – an indirect language tone is used.

In this photo used by the Economist on July 26, 2015, the PKK is reduced to Kurdish people who look helplessly in front of the armed Turkish soldiers.

Reasons why the international media reports from terrorist’s fronts

The PKK and its affiliated organizations – YPG/PYD/SDF – were considered as a major weapon in the fight against Daesh. As Daesh lost ground in the region, the PKK had the opportunity to represent itself to a large media coverage and naturally disseminate their own narratives, which concealed various illegal acts violating the rights of both Kurds and Turks. While there is a general tendency to portray the organization as “gender-equal” and “women empowering,” assuming that the female terrorists are some-what “glorified,” the report highlights the fact that this is a terrorist group – just like Daesh – that is left out. The claim that the PKK is a so-called “feminist” organization also oversees the fact that the group’s suicide bombers are in majority, women.

Turkey’s armed struggle with the PKK is also presented as the continuation of the ‘oppression’ of the opposition. Combined with the general stance towards Turkey and its President, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, one may wonder whether anything that Erdogan is against seems to attract the appreciation of Western media…?

In addition, over time, the updated and popular version of the phrase “Turkish state” or “Turkish army” has been transformed into a politically charged “AKP state.” One step further, it was observed that this narrative became more and more specific and that it was concentrated in President Erdogan in particular. Nevertheless, the international media’s bias towards one of Turkey’s major problems – namely terrorism – can be considered as a major concern for the future relationship between the West and Turkey.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan 

The outlawed PKK’s Syrian offshoot Democratic Union Party (PYD) has been forcibly recruiting children similar to the PKK, which has been systematically using children in armed conflicts since 1994. It is not possible to learn the exact number of children recruited by the group. However, after the death of Latife Kaya in 2016, who was notorious for recruiting girls traveling alone around the checkpoints in Qamishli region by either convincing them or forcibly bringing them to the PYD’s training camps, it was revealed that Kaya and her friends recruited more than 500 girls through this way. Meanwhile, it has been observed that the situation caused by the group’s recruitment policy particularly in the regions they capture is even graver.

The group’s recruitment of children is known from a variety of sources including the victim testimonials covered by the media, videos of the group militants uploaded on YouTube, U.S. CENTCOM’s tweets informing that the PYD and its child soldiers were ready for war, and fashion magazine Marie Claire’s article titled “These Remarkable Women Are Fighting ISIS. It’s Time You Know Who They Are.” Some of these publications represent the children fighting in the deployments of the PYD as the subjects of a liberation war when child recruitment is in fact a serious war crime that cannot be justified with any excuse.

A number of verdicts issued by the International Criminal Court (ICC), which was established with the Rome Statute, led to the conviction of the leaders of two terror organizations on the grounds of forcibly conscripting child soldiers. An arrest warrant was issued for Bosco Ntaganda while the Union of Congolese Patriots (UPC) leader Thomas Lubanga Dylio was sentenced to 14 years imprisonment. Furthermore, the regulations ban the involvement of children in any act linked to terror organizations along with the deployment of children in armed conflicts, which entails the risk of death or injury.

The 2007 Paris Principles, which is the most comprehensive regulation on the subject, defines “a child associated with an armed force or armed group” as any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes.

In the framework of the ban, there is no difference between the voluntary and involuntary recruitment of children in an armed group. In both cases, the will of children cannot be regarded as consent in legal terms. The protection of the child requires annulling the child’s will to his/her own detriment. Also, the consent given to an unlawful activity is already invalid.

Aside from the legal aspect of the subject, assuming the voluntary participation of children into an armed group implies that they can also voluntarily depart the group, which is hardly the case for terror groups. In an interview published in the website of Kurd Watch, Nurman Ibrahim Khalifa, who was abducted and conscripted by the PYD in 2014 as he was 13 years old, stated that a great number of children kept at the Iraqi Kurdistan camps were severely punished due to their attempts to escape, adding that a woman who was recruited as a child was killed before the eyes of people and her body was thrown into a lake after she was caught in her eighth attempt to escape when she was 18.

A great number of children kept at the Iraqi Kurdistan camps were severely punished due to their attempts to escape, adding that a woman who was recruited as a child was killed before the eyes of people

In 2013, when the organization’s child recruitment stirred reaction from the international public, the PYD signed the “Deed of Commitment for the Protection of Children from the Effects of Armed Conflict” in Qandil with an NGO named Geneva Call, guaranteeing that they would not conscript child soldiers under the age of 18. However, it was unraveled that the organization still continued using children after signing this contract except from a small-scale demobilization following the signing, and broke into houses and abducted children by clashing with their families when they needed more militants. Although the organization ran propaganda to the international public that this situation was an exception, the statements of the victims, the propaganda and actions of the group, and the fact that the group has members in charge of recruiting and training children demonstrate that using children in armed conflicts is a systematic practice for the organization.

As the recruitment cases are examined, it is seen that the organization increases its forcible recruitment activities when they have growing need for militants and goes beyond the limits of their self-proclaimed commitments during such times. For instance, the organization ruled that they would recruit people aged between 18 and 30 in Jazira, but in their practices in Manbij during 2016, a conscription was ruled for persons aged between 16 and 35. Also, in their actions in Afrin shaped through Turkey’s operation in the region, the group increased its forcible recruitment of children out of panic.

A Syrian man who took refuge in Turkey said that after the capture of Raqqa by the PYD, the group forcibly recruited girls from houses with no men, demanded $20.000 from the families not allowing that, and they silently had to watch their daughter taken from them

At this point, the accounts of the children who escaped from the group and the people who left their hometowns are of utmost significance as they portray first-hand experiences and testimonials. In an interview he gave to the press, a Syrian man who took refuge in Turkey said that after the capture of Raqqa by the PYD, the group forcibly recruited girls from houses with no men, demanded $20.000 from the families not allowing that, and they silently had to watch their daughter taken from them since they were unable to pay the money demanded. The Syrian refugee also relayed that his 65-year-old uncle who tried to prevent the abduction of his two daughters was wounded by the group militants with a gun stroke. Upon this, the two families met in the midnight of the same day and took refuge in Turkey.

In another news report published on February 11, 2018, a boy aged around 12-14 stated that the PYD’s armed wing People’s Protection Units (YPG) forcibly gave military training to a group of children including him, and he fled after 12 days, adding that everyone he saw in the camp was forcibly recruited. Another boy around the same age also said that the YPG militants raided into their house to take him. His father fought the militants but could not stop them. According to the account of another boy, he was abducted and brought to a conflict zone by the group militants when he refused to join them.

Besides, the propaganda videos uploaded on the organization’s YouTube channels, such as YPG Press Office, feature a great deal of footage displaying child warriors. These videos try to create the impression that the children joined the PYD with motivations like fighting against Daesh, the liberation of the Kurdish people and freedom of women. In doing so, the organization strives to whitewash its policy based on systematic child rights abuse by making use of generally-accepted notions. The Western supporters of this policy also release material contributing to the group propaganda. In a video titled “Her War: Women vs. ISIS,” which was uploaded on RT America’s YouTube channel, a 16-year-old girl expresses that her participation in the group’s armed units is an honor to her family, adding that she does not go to school since women’s liberation is more important than going to school.

The organization also has members responsible for conscripting and training children. Beritan Sela, who is featured in the videos titled “Women Against Daesh” on the YouTube channel of BBC News, states that they are training the youth aged between 17 and 18. The videos shared on RT America’s YouTube channel also features a member of the Women’s Protection Units (YPJ), whose code name is Tolheldan, while engaging in the training of girls in the Sehit Berivan training camp. Some militants also endeavor to gather children by going from house to house. In another incident reported by the NSO’s website, a man named Natheer Mostafa was arrested by the YPG as he tried to protect his children from the organization. NSO also reported that a YPG member called Qaraso used to visit Mostafa’s house when Natheer Mostafa and his wife were outside and tried to convince their daughters to join the YPJ, the female equivalent of the YPG.

All the sources and data on the subject indicate that the PYD, which endeavors to idealize its armed conflict in the guise of fighting a liberation war, systematically engages in child recruitment, which is mainly due to the obstacles the organization faces in mobilizing militants while proving that the PYD’s ideology does not address the masses in the region. The organization’s discourse is purportedly based on generally-accepted values, but this does not mean that they embrace these values as they claim to do and does not render the conflicts involving children ethical. Aside from the PYD, states and media outlets giving overt or covert support to child recruitment are also responsible for the risks children will undergo in conflicts and the challenges they will encounter in their education and rehabilitation processes following the conflicts.

The roadmap on Syria’s Manbij is expected to be announced after a final negotiation between Turkey and the U.S., which will be handled between Mike Pompeo and Mevlut Cavusoglu on June 4 in Washington. According to Turkish sources, the two countries have agreed on a three-step principle roadmap. In the first step, the PKK affiliated YPG forces will withdraw from the Manbij pocket complying with the date that will be determined by the Washington meeting. The second step, according to the sources, will start 45 days after the meeting between Pompeo and Cavusoglu. During this phase, the U.S. and Turkish military and intelligence authorities will launch a joint inspection in Manbij regarding the deployment of the Turkish and Turkish-backed troops there. The third step, according to the agreement, will be taken by both sides to form a local administration in Manbij within 60 days after June 4. This is the most critical part of the agreement, as it will implement a commonly accepted model. According to Cavusoglu, it would also be applied to the rest of PKK/YPG held territory in Northern Syria.

There is two integral parts of the model: providing security and establishing local governance to be responsible for the municipal services that will be formed in line with the ethnic distribution of the population in consideration. Even though it was not mentioned in the agreement, Turkey highlighted the return of Syrians to their homes, which should be interpreted as a significant part of Turkey’s strategy in Syria that is likely to reduce Turkey’s refugee costs in the short term.

Even though it seems that the Manbij agreement can work on paper, realizing the agreement goals might be difficult. There are many ambiguities concerning the U.S.’s strategy over the PKK/YPG in the eastern part of the Euphrates River. The current disagreements over the issues of S-400 aerial missile defense systems and F-35 fighter jets expected to be delivered in 2019 complicates the agreement outcomes for both Ankara and Washington.

The U.S. also wants to overcome the Pastor Brunson issue while negotiating the Manbij model. More importantly, the possible reactions by certain American security establishments such as the Pentagon, particularly the CENTCOM, constitute the most crucial part in implementing the agreement on the ground. The Turkish side, in this regard, has many concerns regarding the U.S. administration’s approval of the agreement in Washington and its implementation by the CENTCOM towards the other specific regions under PKK/YPG control in northeastern Syria. However, Turkey sees the agreement as a starting point to de-escalate the political rift between the two countries.

Under these circumstances, one might wonder how the agreement will be accomplished. The first phase is relatively easy to implement the model. The PKK announced that its forces have already left Manbij. However, the PKK’s close ally and ideologically integral part in the region – the Arab forces – want to stay in Manbij to take responsibility in the process of forming local security and municipal services. Turkey will be opposing this option. For Turkey, this is another way to create a pro-PKK force without the PKK. If such a claim is realized, the U.S. can maintain its support to the YPG. The best deal for Turkey in this stage is to remove all PKK-affiliated persons or groups from Manbij and form local forces, which have no direct or indirect connection to the PKK.

The removal of all PKK-affiliated persons and groups is quite crucial to implement the second phase of the agreement. However, how the agreement will specifically take Turkey’s will into consideration is still an open question. For instance, whether the Burkan al-Furat (the Euphrates Volcano), consisting of Arab military fractions mostly, will leave Manbij or not is of crucial importance for Turkey. The PKK/YPG has been allied with the group, creating room for the Euphrates Volcano Operation when Kobane was attacked by Daesh in 2014. At this stage, American troops will continue to remain in Manbij while Turkey will be establishing observation stations along with the forces that will be mainly composed of anti-PKK/YPG Arabs. According to Turkish sources, there is also a possibility to establish a new observation point on the Turkish border along with a limited number of American soldiers to observe the agreement in Manbij and to facilitate the development of the model for other regions. It should not be expected for Manbij to undergo complete Turkish military control, as the Turkish military will be operating in other regions where the Operation Olive Branch and the Operation Euphrates Shield took place.

The implementation of the military aspect of the agreement brings the third phase into question, in which the U.S. and Turkey will establish a local governance model composed of local security forces and effectively local municipal services. Turkey has a valuable experience regarding the formation of an effective local governance model, including police forces and delivering basic services to local people. However, Manbij will be different, since the U.S., and perhaps France will be the partners in implementing the local governance model in Manbij.

The uniqueness of Turkey’s experience is emanating from its decision-making process without taking any third party’s interference into consideration. The local training forces in Turkey, delivering humanitarian aid to liberated regions in Syria and forming local governance processes are in full control of the Turkish authorities. However, the Manbij model will be implemented under the joint control and protection of the U.S. and Turkey after the withdrawal of YPG forces from the region within a specific period.

Turkey has many concerns regarding the formation of a security structure and local governance, in which any PKK-affiliated persons or groups might be part of the process. For instance, how the municipal structure will be determined by the ethnic distribution of the population since the PKK has changed the very nature of the demographic balance in Manbij is a vital issue. Therefore, implementing the third phase of the agreement will take time while both sides will be implementing the first two steps.

The most important aspect of the Manbij agreement depends on how the two countries will overcome disagreements between the two capitals. Both the U.S. and Turkey will not decide about the future of their relationship via the Manbij agreement. However, the agreement will open a new page for the future.

The Middle East has undergone a massive transformation since the Arab uprising erupted in 2011. The Arab uprising initially rooted from people’s search for democracy, equality, and justice, noting that none of them have ever been at the core of politics since the Western intervention in the region took place. However, the nature of the Arab uprising dramatically transformed itself towards pervasive insecurities and chaos in the Middle East, especially after the spread of radicalization — particularly in the case of Daesh, the conflict-spillover effects of the Syrian Civil War, and the fall of democracy in the Arab world.

Today, from Libya to Yemen, the main characteristic of the new disorder in the Middle East is the proliferation of violent non-state armed groups, the deterioration of state structure, the rise of radical extremism, and the deepening geopolitical antagonism among states, ethnic, and religious groups. This new phenomenon resulted in state insecurity, regime insecurity, societal insecurity, and most importantly, in human insecurity across the region. Each of these outcomes indicate that the very nature of the Middle East order has been undermined by internal, regional and international actors. The new stage highlights that we are at a point where the Middle East is gradually falling into a new wave of crisis, especially after Trump’s accession to power in the U.S.

Trump and his so-called comrades in the Middle East are destroying the region that we know. This is the rise of a new geopolitical era in the Middle East political landscape that has been undergoing a transitional period of a new regional order without principles, rules, and norms. The new order in the Middle East is a product of reckless diplomacy of the Trumpian narrative of international politics. At the very heart of this Trumpian diplomacy lies diplomacy working without diplomats and law functioning without the international norms assembled around the United Nations after World War II.

The Palestinian case is an excellent textbook example to see how Trumpian diplomacy works without diplomats and law without paying respect to international norms in the Middle East. Trump’s decision to relocate the U.S. embassy from Tel Aviv to Al-Quds and the recognition of Jerusalem as the eternal capital of the so-called Jewish State signifies the very nature of Trumpian diplomacy. Additionally, the presence of Trump’s daughter, Ivanka Kushner, and her husband, Jared Kushner, at the opening ceremony of the U.S. embassy manifested how U.S. diplomacy is withdrawing itself from the scene and giving its place to Trumpian diplomacy without diplomats.

As it is mostly believed, Trump’s Israel policy is not a construction of the U.S.’s realpolitik interests in the Middle East; it is a product of the global civilizational conflict perception in which the Christian right, evangelical/fundamentalist Christians and the Orthodox Jewish community in the U.S. are at the center of. The evangelical pastor Robert Jeffress’s invocation at the opening ceremony showed how the judgment above portrays the very nature of this perception. Many people can easily recall Jeffress addressing Muslims as “heretics” in several of his speeches. At this stage, it is not necessary to examine how Trump disregards international law and norms, since Trumpian diplomacy does not consult international norms.

The way in which Trumpian diplomacy destroys the Middle East is not limited to Trump’s messianic decision about Al-Quds. The U.S. secession from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), or the Iran Deal, sealed by the international community, in which the U.S. was an integral part, are other outrageous examples that demonstrate how Trumpian diplomacy undermine  international norms. The Iran deal was a diplomatic success in 2015. Now it invokes a diplomatic ignorance caused by U.S. policy in the Middle East. However, this time round, diplomatic ignorance is not only caused by Trump himself – it is also the consequence of an intra-regional antagonism implemented by Israel to undermine the existing intra-regional balance against itself. For sure, Iran is not the champion of regional stability, but the termination of the Iran Deal is not the best realistic way to contain Iran’s destabilizing role in the Middle East. Calling off the Iran nuclear deal also attempts to undermine Iranian people. It accelerates Iranian politics towards a more radical line.

Another example to see how Trumpian diplomacy destroys the Middle East is the commitment to protect the PKK-YPG’s (which is listed as a terrorist organization by the U.S. itself) interests in northeastern Syria. This commitment indicates the Trump administration’s way of doing diplomacy without diplomats, as well. While the role of military disagreements in Turkish-American relations, particularly the case of the U.S.-PKK connection, shows the decline of diplomacy, it also demonstrates how a tactical concern can become a guideline for overall diplomatic strategy. In addition to that, the increasing rapprochement between the U.S. and the PKK proves the cliché of international politics that one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.

These three examples clearly demonstrate that Trump is demolishing the Middle East that we know by undermining the nature of diplomacy firstly, and secondly, by triggering the regional antagonism among the countries in the region. While destroying the historical status of Al-Quds makes the region more conflictual, demonizing Iran generates more instability for Middle Eastern countries. On the other hand, undermining Turkey’s national security by supporting a terrorist organization endangers U.S. interests in Syria and Iraq. Trump’s diplomacy is the new reality for the Middle East, which has perhaps struck the region via a new wave of crisis. Trump and his team are against international law, norms and diplomacy. The people who serve Trumpian diplomacy are ultra-radical, neocon and pro-interventionists. This is very dangerous for the Middle East. When the other ultra-radical leaders in the region are taken into consideration, the region’s future does not appear to be bright.

As we get closer to the June 24 Presidential elections, the topic of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East fades away from daily politics in Turkey. However, a recent development, particularly the ongoing negotiations between Ankara and Washington, concerning the issue of Manbij, still remains pressing. Last week, Cavusoglu and the U.S. Secretary of State, Pompeo, held a bilateral meeting in Brussels to talk about current political rifts between Ankara and Washington, specifically to discuss how both sides can work towards overcoming the issue of PKK/YPG presence in Manbij. Undoubtedly, Manbij is not the only issue between Turkey and the U.S. Through this meeting, S-400s, Russia, and other regional topics were also put on the table.

When the negotiation between Ankara and Washington was taking place, French soldiers were photographed in Manbij while patrolling along with U.S. troops in military vehicles that carried French flags. France’s strategic rationality is understandable because of many reasons, and the increasing role of France in the region, especially in northern Syria, might pose new challenges for Ankara’s short-term strategic game plan. Therefore, Ankara is carefully following the developments in the region as the election atmosphere continues to spread across the country.

There are three components of the French approach towards northern Syria vis-à-vis the PYD-YPG presence. While the first one is to accomplish the fight against DAESH on the military front, the second one is to back local, political, and military forces (in this case, the SDF will probably be the main actor) to improve and consolidate local governance, including the security sectors. The last one will be part of the wider political transition period if international actors can reach a comprehensive peace plan for the future of Syria. It seems that France and the U.S. believe that the PYD, as the main component of the SDF structure, is vital in this transition process if they can console Turkey on the matter. However, the picture is completely different for Turkey.

Manbij is one of the critical issues that Turkey and the U.S. administrations have to overcome. France is trying to signal to Turkey that they are also a partner of the SDF-PYD in this region. Unfortunately, the latest conversation between Pompeo and Cavusoglu could not bring an end to the disagreement on the Manbij issue. The U.S. State Department released a statement after the meeting indicating that both sides are still testing each other about Manbij. While the U.S. reaffirmed their support for the established bilateral process to find a common way forward on Manbij, and underlined the U.S’s commitment to support Turkey’s national security concerns, Turkey recalled that the U.S. should take concentrate steps to end YPG presence in Manbij.

At this point, Turkey’s position is very clear. According to Ankara, Manbij city council should be run by groups in line with the past census results of the city, before the demographic change in the area imposed by the YPG and PKK took place. On the other hand, the U.S. initially wants to certain Turkey’s Afrin model whether the establishment of the city council properly works or not. However, Ankara does not seem to accept the U.S. proposal. According to the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Cavusoglu, if the U.S. complies with the preliminary agreement on a roadmap, then the PKK will withdraw from Manbij while U.S. military presence will be maintained along with Turkish military presence. However, it is not expected that the Manbij conundrum will remain unsolved before the upcoming elections.

The U.S.’s game plan, especially after Pompeo’s appointment as the new secretary of state, is not about U.S. support to the PKK in northern Syria. There are two main strategies that Pompeo aims to achieve as the new secretary of state in charge. The first one is about Turkey-Russia relations particularly on the issue of the S-400 delay. Manbij is perceived by the U.S. as leverage to undermine the Turkish-Russian deal on the air defense missile system, which will be delivered to Turkey by the end of 2019. The second one is about anti-Iran rhetoric in the region, in which Turkey is seen as one of the important players in deterring Iranian influence. From Ankara’s point of view, the upcoming election will be a determinant factor. If President Erdogan maintains his power, then the Turkish position will not change. However, the problem between the two sides will continue.

In the past two weeks, there have been many developments that gave us clues about how we should think about the future of the PKK in the region. Firstly, the Turkish Armed Forces and TAF-backed Free Syrian Army captured Afrin city center within 58 days of the launch of the operation. The PKK/YPG had vowed that Afrin would be Turkey’s Vietnam. Secondly, Turkey began to intensify its political and military pressure on the PKK/YPG presence in Tel Rifaat. Various Turkish and Arab media channels reported that the center of Tel Rifaat city was encircled after Russian military officers pulled out of the areas, allowing the TAF and TAF-backed FSA to enter. Although TAF has yet to confirm this new development, it would be appropriate to claim that the fall of Tel Rifaat is just a matter of time. The main irony that the PKK faced in Tel Rifaat was that the PKK/YPG had seized the area with Russian air support, and has now lost it with Russian political support for Turkey.

Thirdly, Turkey and the U.S. have been working on the Manbij issue since Ankara launched the Afrin operation. Following the Afrin military campaign, Ankara and Washington established working groups in order to discuss a number of issues, including the stabilization of Manbij and the prevention of possible undesirable clashes. The stabilization of Manbij is now one of the determining factors between the two capitals to de-escalate the current crisis that emanated from the PKK in Syria. The signals coming from the U.S. underline that Turkey and the U.S. may reach an agreement to remove the PKK/YPG forces from Syria’s Manbij. Fourthly, Turkey’s strong political decisiveness to carry out its counter-terrorism campaign against PKK presence in Iraq’s Sinjar destabilized the PKK’s project to consolidate its power in Northern Iraq. Turkey requested the Iraqi government to clean the PKK forces from Northern Iraq, and indicated that the TAF would carry out a cross-border operation there anytime if necessary. Following the pressure from Turkey, the Iraqi government announced that its national army would take control of Sinjar, and remove the HPG militants (PKK armed wing coming from the Qandil Mountain) from there. More importantly, the U.S. Defense Secretary James Mattis told reporters at the Pentagon that “there is a PKK threat in Sinjar, across the Northern Iraq border against Turkey,” adding that the U.S. also wants the group to pull out from the area.

All the aforementioned developments that took place in the last two weeks underline that while Turkish troops are making sweeping territorial gains in northern Syria and recalibrating Turkish military deterrence against the PKK in northern Iraq, the PKK is gradually losing its strategic positions that it gained since the rise of Daesh in Syria and Iraq. The strategic and territorial losses of the PKK enables one to question the future of the terrorist organization in both Syria and Iraq. While it may seem that the PKK is strategically positioned in order to expand its sphere of influence in the mentioned countries, the reality in the region following the success of Turkey’s military action is that the PKK is dramatically overstretched and faces a complicated future.

The PKK’s weakness

There are many driving factors behind the failure of the PKK’s ongoing political project. While the lack of geopolitical and demographic depth constitute the main weakness of the group in Syria and Iraq, the over-reliance on external support, particularly on U.S. air support, can be counted as its main vulnerability. These factors are most likely to shape the PKK’s complicated future.

After the simultaneous loss of Afrin, Tel Rifaat and Manbij in a very short period of time, the PKK/YPG will only be able to maintain its territorial control in the eastern part of the Euphrates through U.S. support. However, it will not be able to easily sustain the control of the region anymore. Due to the unpredicted future of the Syrian crisis and the Turkish political and military pressure, the PKK can no longer control its territory without external support. The increasing rapprochement between Turkey and the U.S. over the problem of the PKK shows that the two sides will reach an understanding as Turkey vows to continue its military campaign against the PKK. This situation prevents the PKK from acquiring a geopolitical depth in Syria. More importantly, except in Afrin, the Kurds do not represent the majority of the population in any territory controlled by the PKK in northern Syria. A recent example shows that there is an increasing revolt against the terrorist organization’s presence in Tel Rifat, Manbij and Raqqa. The local people do not tend to accept the PKK-based political ideology, for which Abdullah Ocalan is considered as the main producer. This demographic and political imbalance undermines the PKK’s presence in Syria. The same is also valid for Sinjar. The PKK’s construction of Yezidis as an integral part of the Kurdish ethnicity does not correspond to the reality of the history of the Sinjar region. Therefore, the lack of demographic and political depth will prevent the PKK from maintaining control in the region.

The fertile lands suitable for agriculture are just as important as the demographic map in Syria. The northern part of Syria is known to have very fertile lands. While the PKK/YPG controls 57%, the Syrian regime now only holds 27% of the fertile agricultural lands. In addition to agricultural lands, the PKK also holds a good percentage of oil-rich regions in eastern Syria. Therefore, the struggle over the control of fertile lands will also shape the complicated future of the PKK in Syria.

Lastly, and perhaps most importantly, the U.S.-backed political project of the PKK is incompatible with the geopolitical realities of the region. This structural element is one of the most important factors that make it harder for the PKK to sustain it territorial and political control in the region. The PKK will only be able to survive if it receives air support from the coalition. In the near future, especially in the absence of Daesh, the PKK is expected to face another difficulty on the international arena. The propaganda machine for the PKK has also lost its functionality after Turkey’s Afrin operation. This will certainly affect the image of being an effective ground force in the fight against Daesh. As a result, it can be safely argued that the PKK faces a very complicated future in both Syria and Iraq.

Some local security sources spoke to Anadolu Agency on condition of anonymity that the YPG/PKK terrorists force civilians to dig two-meter deep, two-meter wide and kilometers-long ditches in order to block the entrance of Turkish military forces into Afrin.

Turkey has been watching the YPG by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), which show how the terrorist organization prevent residents to leave the city. Another video footage captured by Turkish UAVs show how a mine planted by the YPG killed civilians as they tried to leave the city.

As part of their defense strategy, the YPG/PKK had started digging ditches, building tunnels, making barricades, and planting bombs much earlier. It is commented that the ditches and tunnels in Afrin seem professional and this evokes the question if the YPG received a foreign support or training to build them.

Since the first day of the operation, both Turkish military and political authorities have repeatedly pointed out that the operation is targeting only YPG/PKK terrorists in order to establish security and maintain stability along Turkey’s borders as much as to protect civilians from the YPG cruelty, already known to thousands of locals who were forced to leave their houses by force of arms.

Evidence of the terrorist YPG/PKK using young children uncovered in the Turkish-led operation in Syria’s Afrin region confirms what many international rights watchdogs already reported: the terrorist recruitment of minors.

The memory cards of cameras seized during the ongoing Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s Afrin region, launched on Jan. 20 against YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists, show children — age 13-17 — bearing arms, training with weapons, and living in poor conditions in the mountains.

In a December 2016 report Iraq: Armed Groups Using Child Soldiers, Human Rights Watch documented 29 cases in northern Iraq of children recruited by armed groups affiliated to the terrorist PKK.

According to the report, children under age 15 took part in fighting, staffed checkpoints, and cleaned and prepared weapons.

The same PKK activity was also documented in a November 2013 United Nations report called Children and Armed Conflict.

The report said Kurdish armed groups recruited boys and girls age 14-17 in Syria’s Hasakah region.

The 2014 U.S. State Department Human Rights Report also said the terrorist PKK — the YPG/PKK’s parent group — regularly recruited children in the past, though the number of child soldiers recruited by the PKK that year was unknown.

The report also said PKK had kept up abducting and conscribing young people, adding that it was not generally clear whether they joined by force or volunteered.

Families of allegedly abducted children staged several protests during the year demanding the terror group free their children, it added.

Kidnapping children

In 2015, the U.S. Trafficking in Persons Report said Kurdish children were sometimes kidnapped and forced to participate in PKK forces, according to uncorroborated reports.

In the 2016 report, the U.S. said the YPG/PKK continued to recruit and use boys and girls, including children younger than 15.

According to the report, the YPG/PKK reportedly took the children to indoctrination and training camps.

In April 2015, a 16-year-old girl in Aleppo was allegedly recruited by YPJ/PKK female terrorists against the wishes of her family, said the report.

The forced recruitment of children by the YPG/PKK was also documented in reports of German-based Kurdwatch.

In a May 2015 report, Kurdwatch said the PYD/YPG/PKK kidnapped 12-year-old Fatimah S.A.

Quoting a family member, the report said: “The girl simply disappeared. Her parents are PYD supporters. However they weren’t asked if they wanted to send the girl to the military.

“The YPG claims that the girl decided by her own free will. Her parents were not even allowed to accompany their daughter. They were promised that after two weeks training, Fatimah would be allowed to return if she wants.”

According to the International Criminal Court, the enlistment and conscription of child soldiers under age 15, as well as using them to participate actively in hostilities, is a war crime.

According to the Turkish General Staff, Operation Olive Branch aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from terrorist oppression and cruelty.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

The U.S. must end its military and political support to the YPG not only to repair ties with Turkey but also to bring long lasting stability to Syria. If the U.S. is interested in a semblance of stability in Syria, it is a no brainer that it needs to work with Turkey and not with the PKK’s Syrian branch. The YPG is a direct threat to Turkey’s national security and it is not a reliable insurer of stability in any meaningful sense of the word. It only makes sense for the U.S. the U.S. to work with its state allies like Turkey, not a terror group’s extension.

The PKK’s Syrian branch, the YPG, has sought to carve out an autonomous zone in northern Syria by securing U.S. support under the pretext of fighting Daesh and by kicking Arab populations out of their lands. The PKK utilized the rise of Daesh and secured this as an opportunity by promising the U.S. that it will fight the terrorist organization in return for military and political support. The Obama administration played along starting with the Kobani fight and bought into PKK’s game plan despite Turkey’s multiple warnings. However, starting with Operation Euphrates Shield, Turkey displayed its determination in terms that it will not tolerate the PKK’s efforts to create a statelet for itself with U.S. support.

While rebranding the PKK’s Syrian forces and integrating them into the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) may have looked like a clever move, it was simply a gimmick to evade Turkey’s reaction and avoid legal complications, as U.S. law does not permit providing support to terror organizations. By investing in a partnership with the YPG, the U.S. created a center of gravity around it, driving many smaller groups to be part of the SDF. The SDF might include many non-YPG fighters but the YPG has remained the dominant group accomplishing its military and political goals.

The already existing command structure owed to the PKK made it easier for U.S. planners to invest in the YPG and to promote them as the most “effective fighters.” In reality, though, their “success” against Daesh always entailed U.S. air cover and military support including heavy weaponry. If one of the central goals of U.S. policy is stability, a group that depends on U.S. support so much cannot deliver it.

The YPG systematically pushed Arab populations out from their lands in northern Syria, rendering them refugees in Turkey. The YPG was able to justify this demographic engineering under the pretext that many of these Sunni Arabs might have ties to Daesh. With the blessing and support of the U.S. forces, they are now the dominant force controlling Arab majority cities like Raqqa. U.S. policymakers must recognize the reality that the YPG they have invested in is a destabilizing factor itself. Turkey’s Afrin operation has shown that the YPG has its own political agenda and it is not only interested in fighting Daesh. Moreover, it is ready to make deals with all actors, including the Assad regime.

Turkey is out of patience. Multiple promises by the Obama and Trump administrations have proven to be empty rhetoric. Recent visits by Trump administration officials have resulted in the creation of a strategic conversation mechanism but it is not clear how much progress can be made. After all, administration officials have not signaled a serious rethinking of the U.S. support for the YPG. If the U.S. treats the discussions in this new mechanism as brainstorming sessions with no concrete action on the ground, they may prove to be futile. “Working through” Turkey’s concerns may not cut it this time around; a real strategic conversation needs to start addressing Turkey’s national security requirements.

Speaking about Operation Olive Branch during a live television broadcast in Syria’s northern city of Afrin, presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin stated that the military campaign was launched in order to secure Turkey’s borders and its citizens from terror threats.

“When it becomes an issue of national security Turkey fulfills the responsibilities [through] its own capabilities. It is our responsibility to save Turkish citizens and Turkey’s borders. For this, we don’t need permission from anyone.”

“The PKK, or another terrorist organization, can never come to a position to determine the destiny of Kurdish people in this area. Neither the Kurds nor the Turks nor the knowledge, history and conscience of these Anatolian lands permits this.”

Reiterating Turkey’s call to the U.S. administration to stop supporting the PKK/PYD in Syria, Ibrahim Kalin stated, “Who can oppose the argument that the Syrian territory should be cleared of all terrorist elements? If someone opposes this, that means they have some other plan. In such a case, we will sit down and make a new assessment over that plan.”

“Our expectation [of the U.S.] is actually very basic, simple, clear and concrete: to end [its] support of the YPG and PYD. When this is accomplished, then we will say this is [the guarantee] from the U.S. for us. Then let’s talk about the current situation and future of Syria as well as the interests of the Syrian people.”

“Our expectation from the U.S. administration is to completely cut their support to the YPG and PYD. This is a solid guarantee. This is also a necessary step [to be] taken on the ground.”

While Turkey has consistently called for the U.S. regime to stop sponsoring the YPG terror, the Trump administration justified its support in terms of its fight against Daesh. However, reminding that the Daesh threat in Syria had been eliminated, Ibrahim Kalin emphasized that there was no need for the U.S. to continue to support the terrorist group.

On Wednesday 20 January, head of the Union of European Turkish Democrats (UETD) and former European Parliament member Zafer Sarikaya stated how Turkey’s military activity in Afrin is important for the security of Europe.

According to Ceyhun, “Europe’s safety, NATO’s prestige and border, and protection of EU values begins on Turkey’s border.”

More, similar to President Erdogan and presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin, Sarikaya criticized claims that Turkey’s operation in Afrin was against the Kurdish population.

In regards to this, he stated: “Turkey is a country which embraced around 200,000 Kurdish-origin brothers from Ayn al-Arab [Kobani] in a day.”

The operation in Afrin has been held in high regard due to the fear of another migrant crisis. Already there are approximately 3.5 million Syrian refugees in Turkey – had Turkey not intervened in Afrin, where the YPG terrorist group have been in control since 2012 – a new wave of migration could have occurred in Europe.

The YPG militants in Afrin have deserted the population in Afrin and have forcefully removed people (especially from Arab origin) from their homes.

Echoing this, Sarikaya underlined that “if terrorism in Syria is not cleared, a new wave of migration will occur.”

In addition to Sarikaya, another prominent European politician – former member of the European Parliament Ozan Ceyhun – emphasized how Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens that live in Afrin have suffered from the YPG’s terror.

“If Turkey had not intervened in Afrin, most of the civilians in Afrin would have to escape. This would cause a new wave of refugees.”

Ceyhun dismissed the criticisms made towards the Turkish government in regards to its activities in Afrin, calling the western portrayal of the situation as a “disgrace.”

Highlighting the importance of the Afrin operation for the security of Europe, Ceyhun stated that “If Europe and the EU want to protect their own values, then they should support Turkey’s operation.”

Operation Olive Branch, which began on 20 January, has remained on the political agenda of not only Turkey but the wider Middle East, Russia, the U.S. and NATO.

The operation conducted by the Turkish Armed Forces and the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army in Afrin aims to clear the region of the estimated 7,000 terrorist militants. The Afrin region has remained a safe hideout for the PKK/YPG after the Assad regime handed it over in 2012.

While several announcements have been made on many fronts within the Turkish administration, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan underlined on Wednesday that the aim of the operation is to secure justice.

Addressing local officials at the presidential complex, President Erdogan stated that Turkey’s concern is the “establishment of justice, not land.”

The President added that with the success of the Afrin operation, Turkey will not only destroy the terrorists but will also enable 3.5 million refugees in Turkey to return to their homes safely.

During his speech, President Erdogan noted that in total 268 terrorists had been neutralized, while the Turkish army and Free Syrian Army forces had suffered the loss of 8 martyrs over the last four days.

Mis-portrayal in the media

During the first days of the operation, presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin warned that the Olive Branch Operation is not designed against the Kurdish population in Afrin.

Since the beginning of the operation, many YPG-affiliated media sources and journalists that sympathize with the terrorist organization have made it out to seem that Turkey is attacking Kurds in the region.

Speaking out against these claims, President Erdogan informed that the PKK/YPG/PYD terrorist group had released all Daesh prisoners under the condition that they would fight against the Turkish army and the FSA in Afrin.

“These terrorist organizations are all the same […] These are terrorist groups serving the same purpose in the same scenario with different roles.”

The President slammed those who mis-portrayed the operation and stated that “it is clear that this operation targets several terrorist organizations,” reminding that similar accusations were made against Turkey during the Operation Euphrates Shield. Turkey had neutralized “more than 3,000 Daesh and hundreds of PYD/YPG terrorists in Operation Euphrates Shield,” and President added that this enabled the conditions for thousands of Syrians to return to their homes.

“I wonder if those who attack Syria don’t notice these?”

Asserting Turkey’s determination to clear the region from all terrorists, the President also stated that the operation would last until the death of the last terrorist.

The significance of the Afrin operation for Turkey must be evaluated through two main aspects: The place of the operation in Turkey’s counter-terror efforts and Ankara’s role in the regional geopolitical equation. In this scope, the most feasible alternative to carry the counter-terrorism fight across the border and prevent the PKK from becoming a regional actor in post-Daesh Syria seems to create a strategic state in Afrin. As the operation is viewed through the current situation and risks, it presents a generic scenario. However, it can be estimated that the situation may change at any moment depending on momentary factors and influence the progress of the overall process.

The operation will take place in winter conditions and in a relatively rugged terrain that occupies approximately 2,000 km² of area. The offensive will take place based on a joint military operation concept against the hybrid terror elements comprising around 6,000-8,000 operatives deployed in fortified lines of defense in rural and residential areas. It can be said that the maneuvers of the operation unit will be provided with land forces having mobile firepower in addition to local paramilitary elements whereas fire support will be provided both from land and air.

Air offensives on the PKK/YPG positions with fire support elements from land are expected, at the initial stage, to concentrate on the Dikmetas village, Minagh Air Base and Tel Rifat town located in the east of Afrin, Sheikh al-Hadid village, Jandaris town and Burj Abdullah village in the south of Afrin, where the main defense lines of the PKK and the YPG are located. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) are expected to segregate Afrin by getting through the PKK/YPG defense lines from eastern and southern sectors, and controlling the east and south of Afrin.

The risks entailed

In the subsequent phase, PKK/YPG elements may withdraw to the center of Afrin with forward operating TSK units from the northern and western sectors of Afrin. Following this phase, the PKK/YPG may enter clashes, particularly in Afrin’s city center, and force the TSK and FSA forces to collateral damage. Meanwhile, various terror assaults against the TSK and FSA forces may be organized in Afrin, such as attacks with improvised explosives, tactical weapons or assassination attempts.

As the operation kicks off, it is highly possible that the PKK/YPG units might organize attacks in the region where Operation Euphrates Shield was launched by advancing from Manbij, and the border security units on the Turkey-Syria border by advancing from Malikiye-Kamisli-Tel Abyad-Ayn al-Arab line. Syrian regime units may cooperate with the PKK/YPG on the Tel Rifat-Zahraa line and attempt manipulative military actions in order to clog the progress of the TSK and the FSA.

The extension of the operation may lead the Russian and Syrian regime to bring forward speculations regarding the use of Syrian air space. In such a case, Turkey could be forced to enter a direct armed engagement with Hayat Tahrer al-Sham in Idlib. Apart from the ordinary Kurdish people, groups who were radicalized by the PKK in Afrin may raise difficulties in enabling stability and security in the region after the completion of the operation, and might try to problematize Turkey’s presence in Afrin in the international sphere.

The main factors that will determine the success of the operation include speed, coordination, the ability to cooperate with local units and the sensitivity in survival measures. Considering the current situation and risks, the military targets of the operation are the PKK/YPG units for the time being. However, engagement with different threats is also possible during the later stages of the operation.

The Afrin operation is a strategic move in terms of supporting Turkey’s counter-terrorism efforts, geopolitical position and eliminating national security threats. More importantly, the success that is achieved through the operation in Afrin may be employed to intervene in other areas controlled by the PKK/YPG.

Turkey has been in a long on-going preparation process for an extensive military operation against the PYD/YPG, which the country deems as a threat to both its own national security and to the territorial integrity of Syria. Ankara has been in constant dialogue with countries across the region along with prominent actors in Syria in order to establish political and military premises.

Turkey has launched an operation targeting Afrin, the western end of the terror belt. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) had deployed military forces to the region near Afrin, it has also established a base in Idlib, south of Afrin, effectively surrounding the city. In addition to this, thousands of Syrian opposition soldiers, who were trained through the “train-and-equip” program, were deployed against the PYD/YPG. Turkey is pursuing an initiative similar to the Operation Euphrates Shield (OES), which was launched right after the July 15 coup attempt, and which simultaneously cleansed the defined areas from both Daesh and the PYD/YPG. Operation Olive Branch (OOB) was launched a short time after President Erdogan’s announcement on 20 January, 2018, at 17:00. While the TSK announced the name of the operation as “Olive Branch,” references were made to decisions made by the United Nations Security Council and Article 51 of the U.N. Charter.

What are the geopolitical and demographic features of Afrin?

Located in northwest Syria, Afrin is a district in the Aleppo Province. The district consists of seven towns: Central, Bulbul, Jandairis, Rajo, Sharran, Shayk al Hadid and M’abatli. Its border with Turkey renders the district important in terms of geopolitics. Its surface area is 1850 km², corresponding to 2% of the total surface area of Syria. Afrin is located in a mountainous region and its elevation is between 700-1269 meters. The distance between its easternmost and westernmost points is 55 kilometers, while the distance between its northernmost and southernmost points is 75 kilometers.

According to the 2004 census in Syria, 64,758 people live in the town center and the total population of the district is 172,095. The city is mostly populated by Kurds. However, Arab and Turkmen and a small population of Yazidis also reside in the region. The city experienced a population increase after the 2011 revolution, as the Syrian regime did not target the city. Yet, figures provided regarding the population of Afrin are contradictory – especially numbers released by pro-PKK/PYD sources are exaggerated. It is estimated that around 300,000 people live in the Afrin District.

Why is Afrin important for the PYD/YPG?

Following the 2011 revolution, the PYD/YPG terrorist organization made an agreement with the Assad regime handed Afrin to PYD, which declared it as its canton in 2013. Since October 29, 2014, the region has been managed by an administration appointed by the PYD. The terrorist organization has eliminated all Kurdish opposition in the region, especially the Kurdish National Council, and has established its hegemony over the region.

After the downing of the Russian aircraft, the terrorist organization captured territories between Tell Rifat and Menagh to the east of Afrin from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) with the support of Russian aircrafts. With this, the terrorist organization forced the Arab population in the region to immigrate. The group then attacked the town of Azez but failed to capture it. Since October 2016, the PYD/YPG has attempted to march on Al-Bab with the occasional air support from coalition forces. However, this march was stopped with the OES.

The YPG claims that it manages Afrin through 47 councils and 898 communes (communities) that organize the people. Even though the region is isolated from the PYD/YPG located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates, it is managed by prominent figures of the PKK such as Halil Tefdem, Ahmed Hudro, Mahmud Berhudan, Behcet Abdo and Nocin, who all receive their orders from Qandil under the chain of command of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK).

This region acts like a springboard for the organization, which will allow it to access the Mediterranean Sea. Moreover, the terrorist organization attempts to establish a line of supply through the Amanos Mountains in Turkey in order to mobilize militants with weapons. The TSK and security forces have killed over 40 terrorists trying to cross the border from Afrin. The terrorist organization sees Afrin as an important source of recruitment. They are forcibly recruiting girls and boys aged between 16-18 for their “Self-Defense Force.” There are several boot camps established by the group where these teenagers are trained.

What are some of the alternative scenarios to the Afrin offensive?

Operation Olive Branch was launched at 17:00 on 20 January with military aircraft belonging to the Turkish Air Forces, which entered Syrian air space and began targeting terrorist targets in Afrin. The TSK announced that 108 different locations used as shelter and arsenal by the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG in Afrin and its surrounding towns were destroyed by 72 aircrafts. In addition, the TSK informed that lines of defense, command centers and border outposts of the terrorist organization were targeted by the Turkish forces from land and air.

During the pre-operation assessments, there were various scenarios about the Afrin offensive. Initially, re-capturing towns like Tell Rifat and Menagh in order to completely surround YPG militants in the region was being discussed. However, the first stage of the offensive indicates that an extensive military operation against the PKK in Afrin will take place.

The extent of the military operation will depend on negotiations made with Russia, as due to the result of an agreement made with the Syrian regime, Russia continues to control Syrian air space. It is known that Moscow is trying to persuade the Turkish regime to pursue a small-scale operation. However, it is definite that Turkey needs an extensive military operation in order to permanently remove the terrorist threat from Afrin.

The operation was launched with intense air raids and support vehicles. After the lines of defense are softened, ground war could be expected to be intensified around the Menagh Air Base-Tell Rifat to the east of Afrin and Shayk al Hadid-Jandairis-Burj Abd Allah to the south of Afrin.

It could be expected that land forces of the TSK and FSA will simultaneously penetrate the defense lines of the PKK/YPG on the southern and eastern sectors, effectively isolating Afrin. In the following stage, the TSK may force PKK/YPG militants to retreat to Afrin by pushing from northern and western sectors. These terrorist elements may attempt to use civilians in Afrin as human shields in order to draw the Turkish armed forces into urban warfare.

The PYD/YPG had been preparing for a probable military operation by Turkey. The PKK controls over 1500 km² of territory including Afrin and its surrounding cities, where Russia has also begun to establish checkpoints.

It could be assessed that PKK/PYD militants, whose numbers are around 5000-6000, along with Jaysh al-Thuwar elements consisting of approximately a couple of hundred of militants, may attempt to halt the TSK and FSA through asymmetric warfare and hybrid methods. It is known that the terrorist organization has been digging trenches, forming tunnels, placing Improvised Explosive Devices (IED) and mines to certain locations. Moreover, with the courtesy of the U.S., the YPG may attempt to transport anti-tank weaponry that is currently located on the eastern bank of the Euphrates to Afrin. Considering the topography of the region, terrorist elements may attempt to use mountainous parts that are located towards the midwest and northwest of Afrin.

Nevertheless, the terrorist organization does not stand much chance against the TSK and FSA on the plains towards Afrin as well as around Tell Rifat and Menagh regions. It should not be forgotten that Turkey has learned valuable lessons from OES, especially in terms of fighting against anti-tank weaponry and asymmetric warfare methods, and has new inventory such as Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs), which could counter such attempts. All in all, Turkey is much better equipped for the Afrin offensive.

What has Turkey learned from Operation Euphrates Shield?

When drawing comparisons between the OES and OOB, there are both similarities and differences. Even though Turkish forces encountered PKK/YPG elements on the bank of the Sanjur River after capturing Jarabulus, it was essentially an operation against Daesh.

OES cleared a territory of 2200 km² from terrorist elements. While the conflict was mostly on the plains, it was concluded with urban warfare in Al-Bab and surrounding towns. Regime forces along with the PKK constantly harassed the TSK and TSK-backed Syrian opposition forces. As Daesh adopted hybrid and asymmetric strategies along with using civilians as human shields, the TSK had to exact the operation meticulously and steadily. Daesh had carried out asymmetric attacks throughout the OES, attempting to halt the march of the TSK and Syrian opposition forces through bombed car and suicide bomber attacks. The fact that Daesh was effectively using anti-tank weaponry was one of the greatest challenges of the operation. As Turkey engaged in urban warfare for the first time on a cross-border operation, there were certain handicaps regarding military equipment and experienced personnel. Moreover, Syrian opposition forces were not very effective during the initial train-and-equip program.

The majority of these handicaps were addressed with the experience gained from OES. While increasing the number of UCAVs improved close air support and precision strike capacities, protection systems against anti-tank weaponry that is implemented within Turkish tanks made the TSK a force to be reckoned with. There are more personnel in the force who are experienced in asymmetric hybrid conflicts. Meanwhile, Syrian opposition forces are trained and equipped better than before. There is a significant improvement in their battle-readiness. In this respect therefore, when compared to the OES, Turkey is more advantageous in the current operation.

Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim speaks at a meeting with media representatives at Vahdettin Mansion in Istanbul, Turkey on January 21, 2018.

Operation Olive Branch aims to create 30-kilometer-deep (approx. 19 miles) safe zone in northwestern Afrin region of Syria, Turkish prime minister said Sunday.

“First goal [of the operation] is to create a safe area there and then we can take concrete steps to eliminate terrorist elements,” Binali Yildirim told media representatives in Istanbul.

He said there are 8,000-10,000 terrorists in Afrin and Turkey would clear all the terrorists on its borders.

Yildirim said Russia, the U.S. and Iran were informed about Turkish plan ahead of the operation.

“There is confusion in U.S. [regarding the operation]. Everyone speaks different things,” he said, adding that they also did not voice a firm opposition to the operation.

Source: AA

Turkey has legitimate security concerns over insurgency inside its borders, U.S. Secretary of Defense Jim Mattis said Sunday, according to U.S. media reports.

“Turkey is a NATO ally. It’s the only NATO country with an active insurgency inside its borders. And Turkey has legitimate security concerns,” Mattis told reporters in a plane headed for Asia.

His remarks came amid Turkey’s ongoing military operation against terror groups in the Afrin region.

Noting that the overall success against Daesh “does not remove many of Turkey’s concerns,” Mattis said it is “easy to understand” why Ankara is worried that the conflict will extend beyond the Syrian border.

”Turkey was candid,“ Mattis told reporters. “They warned us before they launched the aircraft that they were going to do it. We are very alert to it. Our top levels are engaged and we’re working through it.”

Turkey’s operation was carried out against the PKK/KCK/PYD-YPG and Daesh terrorist groups under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, the UN Security Council’s decisions and self-defense rights under the UN charter.

Many foreigners have joined the ranks of the PKK/YPG in order to fight against DAESH. While some in the West advocate these people, the reality is that they have joined a terrorist organization to fight against another terrorist organization. Especially in regards to the terroristic methods of suicide attacks employed by the PKK and the radical leftist ideology of the PKK/YPG, these foreign fighters could pose a major threat towards the West. Although the majority of foreigners in 2014 joined the YPG to primarily fight against DAESH, after 2015 the trend changed in favor of radical leftists who joined the group for its radical leftist ideology. Today, the United States is supporting the YPG, like they supported the Afghan Mujahedeen in the past. Later on, however, foreign veterans of the Afghanistan war, such as Osama bin Laden, formed Al-Qaeda and conducted terrorist attacks against the so-called “real enemy” – the United States of America. Afghanistan as a successful model and training ground improved radical terrorism all over the world. The same may happen in the case of radical leftists and the successful PKK/YPG model in Syria as some may consider that for radical leftists, the US is the “real enemy” too.

Foreign fighters

On an international level, the PYD/YPG has conducted a very demanding campaign on media presence and brand control, ranging from political offices across Europe to Russia and Saudi Arabia, mobilizing both traditional and social media to push the issue forward. The PYD has highlighted two key issues in its Western reach: the group’s antagonism to DAESH – indeed, its opposition to all Islamists and even to non-political religious conservatives – and its outward promotion of universalist liberal ideas such as women’s rights, democracy, pluralism, diversity, economic justice and even environmental sustainability.

Due to its sophisticated media outreach, many foreigners joined the YPG. While the vast majority of foreigners within the YPG are Turkish, Iraqi or Iranian citizens of Kurdish origin, Kurds living in the West have also joined the militia. Although solid figures in regards to the number of non-Kurdish foreign fighters is not available, admitting that it is hard to give a solid number, Kyle Orton from the Henry Jackson Society told the author that he estimates the number of foreigners from the West to be as high as 1,200. He also stated that the number of foreigners joining the YPG rapidly increased after 2016. Among the notable demographic facts is that there is a strong trend towards younger recruits. Over 60% of YPG foreign volunteers are under 30 and 80% under 40 years of age.

Following the wall being built on the Turkey-Syria border, foreigners have pursued two different routes when joining the YPG. The first is landing in Sulaymaniyah in northern Iraq, transferring to the Qandil Mountains and from there entering into Syria, or smuggling themselves into areas near Fishhabur and Sinjar in the eastern region of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – sometimes under the guise of a journalistic company – and entering Syria from there.

While the international coalition led by the U.S. has heavily supported the YPG in its supposed fight against DAESH, the terrorist group is currently investing in state-building according to the radical leftist thesis of Abdullah Ocalan called “Democratic Confederalism.” With the aim to create this state, the Syrian branch of the PKK, the YPG, is propagating its radical leftist ideology which advocates suicide attacks. Just like how the case of Afghanistan was for radical Islamists, the example of so-called “Rojava” is an important example that illustrates how radical leftists achieve their goals with military and terroristic methods. Thus, when eventually trained radical leftists within the YPG return to their home countries, they can propagate their ideology and their experience(s). It is only a matter of time for the radical left to remember who their “real enemy” is – namely, the capitalist system. Therefore, one cannot rule out terrorist attacks from this group in the West for the future.

Danger of suicide attacks

Suicide attacks may be the most dangerous and radical form of terrorist attacks. From giant terror attacks like 9/11 or lone wolf attacks in France, suicide was a premise for terrorists. More, the psychological effect upon relatives of victims and society as a whole is more intense if the terror comes in the form of a suicide attack. Foreign fighters within the YPG are ideologized within a structure that actively endorses the idea of suicide attacks and promotes suicide bombers as heroes. While groups such as DAESH propagate suicide attacks with pseudo religious arguments, the PKK approaches them in a way which has the potential to reach more people in the West. The reason for this is because the general structure of society in the West makes it more vulnerable to non-religious extremism – as Muslims in the West only form a minority of society in comparison to other secular groups, while Daesh may have to convert an individual firstly from their origins in order to advertise its belief, radical leftists can directly work on ideological indoctrination. Hence, the PKK as a terrorist organization that has successfully gathered international support, may become a role-model for many Western radical leftists, especially when foreign fighters in the ranks of the YPG return home.

YPG as the Syrian branch of the PKK is commanded by senior PKK veterans who have fought against Turkey and who have ordered multiple terrorist attacks.[1] The PKK’s history of suicide bombings began in June 1996, and it was Ocalan’s decision to release suicide bombers, especially women. Of the 15 suicide bombers between 1996 and 1999, 11 were young women. Only 1 volunteered, and the others were chosen by Ocalan himself. The age of the perpetrators range between 17 and 27 years. None of them had professional skills and some of them were early school leavers who usually came from overcrowded and poor families. Young female PKK members were recruited at the age of 10, where they were trained as guerrilla fighters and separated from their parents. This shows the “importance” of women’s rights and gender equality for the PKK – a characteristic many commentators falsely boast about.

The use of suicide attacks by the PKK still continues. For instance, TAK, as an offshoot of the PKK, carried out a deadly terrorist attack in the Turkish capital Ankara on March 13, 2016, which killed 37 people. Turkey named one of the suicide bombers as Seher Cagla Demir who had been trained by the YPG in Syria. More, on 9 October, the PKK carried out a suicide attack on a checkpoint in eastern Turkey killing 10 soldiers and 8 civilians, wounding 10 soldiers and 16 civilians.

The suicide attack tactic utilized by the PKK is symbolic of the radical ideology of the terrorist group, in which foreign fighters have joined. Some analysts and experts have tried to explain the use of suicide-attacks by DAESH by referencing to the belief of the hereafter, stating that the promise of 72 virgins in paradise was enough for DAESH members to carry out such attacks. This is the difference between DAESH and the PKK/YPG, as while the former rests its belief in a religious conviction, an ideological belief is enough for motivating the latter. Thus, the PKK/YPG as a Marxist-Leninist group is an important example illustrating the results of a radical political ideology.

Although their general strategy and abilities were limited, as seen during the G-20 summit in Hamburg, radical leftists are violent. They burned cars, demolished shops and fought against police forces. Within the security forces in Germany, it is well known that radical leftists train recruits how to fight against police forces, how to build molotov cocktails and demolish shops. They even trained and prepared before the G-20 summit at a German university. While radical leftists pose such danger for Europe at the time being, one can only think of results when these trainings are given by former foreign fighters within the ranks of the YPG. As a veteran trained with weapons, knowledge in combat fighting, militia structures, bomb-building and suicide attacks, their abilities will improve the threat opposed by radical leftists in the West and therefore the radical left in the West may increase their quality in violence.

Syria to become the Afghanistan of radical leftists?

As stated earlier, the Afghanistan experience and training camps of Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan massively increased the abilities and strategies of radical Islamists in terms of violence. Afghanistan was a successful model for them all over the globe. Thanks to crisis and wars, they found an environment to promote their ideology, to recruit and train new members. Veterans who fought the Russians trained new recruits against their real enemy – “the West.”

Just like the Afghanistan experience, Syria has a grave potential to become a hub for radical leftists – even today, radical leftists have organized themselves in YPG-controlled areas and have established camps to train their members. Battle-hardened veterans who have fought within the ranks of the YPG may wait for a crisis or for a war to promote their ideology, recruit and train new members against their real enemy – “the capitalists.”

[1] Nurettin Halef al- Muhammed (Nurettin Sofi), Fehman Husayn, Ferhat Abdi Sahin (Sahin Cilo), Sabri Ok, Nasr Abdallah, Lewend Rojava; Nuri Mahmud, Lewend Rojava, Nuri Mahmud, Serdar Derek, Taulim, Ahmad Abdulqadir Abdi (Polat Can), Mahmud Muhammad (Xebat Derik), Ilham Ahmed (Ronahi Efrin), Walid Fahim Khalil (Aldar Khalil), Hediya Yousef, Rojin Ramo, Bahoz Erdal, Shahin Cilo Kobani, Fuat, Halide, Nureddin al-Muhammed, Dilan Rihan Muhammed, Ferhat Derik, Çiya Kobani, Ahmet Şeker are only some of the PKK veterans in YPG cadres.

Russia’s RIA news agency reported on Monday that the Syrian National Dialogue Congress in Russia’s coastal city of Sochi has been postponed until February. The Congress was expected to come together in December.

The news agency RIA Novosti cited a diplomatic source who spoke on the condition of anonymity due to restrictions on talking to the media.

“Preparations for the congress are currently underway. It will not be held until January, most likely in February,” the agency said.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Russian President Putin and Iran’s President Hassan Rouhani agreed on gathering a congress of Syrian groups to advance a political solution for Syria during a meeting held in Russia’s Sochi on last Wednesday, November 22.

The congress would bring together the warring factions in Syria for peace talks. It was also planned to start negotiations for a new constitution.

However, Erdogan warned that Turkey cannot share a platform with any terrorist organization which poses a threat to its national security, referring especially to YPG, which is the Syrian affiliate of the PKK terrorist organization.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan.