In his address to the United Nations on Tuesday, September 25, President Erdogan called on world leaders to take measures against the Gulenist criminal cult network. Two days later, this time during his trip to Germany, the Turkish President repeated his call and asked Germany to designate the Gulenist organization as a terrorist organization. Despite Turkey’s call for over two years now, the Gulenist cult members are still active in Western countries, from the United States to Germany and many others.

The organization operates in the disguise of charter schools in the U.S., think-tanks all over the Western world, and some online media networks such as news portals, and so on. While the Turkish public opinion is united against FETO, not everybody is well informed on the organization, and this is why they have difficulty in understanding Turkey’s insistence on this matter.

The very first question towards Turkish demands on the Gulenist network is on the terrorism charges. Many academics and journalists with some interest on this matter in the West question the terrorism charges. These questions are now being repeated after Erdogan’s recent remarks in the U.S. and Germany. They simply ask how an organization led by a “cleric” and which runs charter schools can engage in terrorism. Despite the amount of evidence delivered by the Turkish authorities, this evidence does not reach the ears that need to hear them.

Here is a brief story of the Gulenist network’s gradual and complex journey into terrorism:

It was quite uncommon to call the Gulenist organization – also known as FETO – a terrorist organization a few years ago. After all, terrorism is a form of political violence, and the group was not violent – until they became violent. With its school system to recruit and train young minds, the organization’s structure worked quite effectively in Turkey and abroad.

Gradually, the picture became clear as the recruits began to infiltrate state institutions – first in small numbers, then in masses. It became increasingly clear to the Turkish decision makers that the organization was stealing classified information, sometimes distorting it, and servicing it to foreign services or the media depending on the purpose.

By the end of 2013, there was no doubt about the fact that the members of the Gulenist criminal cult in various state institutions were well connected to each other and were well guided by a central authority in a clear command chain. This is essentially why they were called the “parallel state” by Erdogan – who was the organization’s primary target.

While it took the AK Party government some time to clarify the real purpose and structure of the Gulenists, once they did, there was no way back other than stopping them. As the government began to clean the Gulenists from state institutions, and as it became clear that the elected government will win this battle, Turkey witnessed the July 15 coup attempt in 2016.

The Gulenists in the military carried out a coup attempt, sent a squad to assassinate Erdogan, and killed 248 civilians and state security personnel in multiple spots. And this was the day that the Gulenists were no longer just a secret society infiltrating the state apparatus and being used by foreign services. The July 15 coup attempt also showed that the organization was capable of using violence on a massive scale.

We do not tend to call coup plotters as terrorists, neither in Turkey’s earlier coups nor on the global scale. However, this time, it is different. It was not the military that orchestrated the coup attempt but an organization whose leader is not a soldier and whose members were mostly civilians. This is how we saw a Gulenist ex-cop in military camouflage in a tank in Istanbul on that night. This is how we saw civilian engineers taking part in the coup attempt. This is how we saw civilian professors in the Akinci military base, the headquarters of the coup attempt on that night.

Gulenist academics and journalists also spent quite an effort to spread fake news that night about a manufactured story claiming that Erdogan was fleeing the country and so on. July 15 showed the entire Gulenist criminal network in its entirety on the mission. It was not a conventional coup attempt of soldiers unlike the coups that we know, but it was a joint coup attempt of Gulenist professors, police officers, engineers, and also soldiers. If terror is the use of violence by non-state actors targeting civilians in order to achieve their political objectives, Gulenists did this on the night of July 15 and, hence, they are a textbook example of terrorist organizations – a very innovative one.

Once, the Prussian King Frederic II chose a place in the southwest of Berlin for the construction of a palace for himself. But there was a massive mill in the land. So, if he were to have a palace in this place, the mill would both spoil the panorama and make noise. Upon that, the King went to the owner of the mill named sans-souci (carefree) and told him that he decided to buy the mill at that very moment, asking him to estimate a price for it. Sans souci refused to sell his mill and answered the King’s threats and objections as follows: “Of course, your majesty, your majesty could easily do that, if – begging your pardon – it were not for the Supreme Court in Berlin.” The King gave permission for the construction of the palace, whereas the mill remained within the complex. Eventually, the palace was named after the miller. Since then, those words of the miller are employed in such contexts related to justice in Germany and various other countries including Turkey.

As looked through the present-day perspective of Turkey, we see military coup plotters alongside the PKK militants in Berlin. Of course, there is a Supreme Court in Berlin, but the present justice system does not interdict their presence. One can contend that it is customary for the states regarded as democratic to protect several terror groups, which is true. However, the definitions, regulations and penalties with regard to terrorism, terrorists and terror crimes vary from country to country across the world. The approaches similar to Germany’s have also been displayed in the policies adopted by other European countries in the case of the PKK. Consequently, although it is unacceptable for Turkey, this approach of Germany can be evaluated within the norms of the European Union. But no matter what justification is employed, there is a fact that Germany can never explain today. How could Germany, one of the two founding states of the EU, harbor and protect the people who attempted to stage a coup in Turkey, who is an EU candidate? Being the leading state of the EU, Germany has to make it clear that on which EU criteria they protect the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO) militants.

The FETO operatives who attempted to stage a military coup in Turkey on July 15, 2016, which killed 248 people and wounded more than 2.000, fled to Germany shortly after the attempted coup. According to the data released by the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees (Bundesamt für Migration und Flüchtlinge, BAMF), a total of 1.059 people, including 288 with diplomatic passports and 771 with green (bureaucratic) passports, requested asylum between the time of the attempted coup and March 2018; and almost half of them were granted with asylum.

Also, Germany was not informed about the organizational structure of FETO solely through the channel of Turkey. On July 25, 2014, the intelligence service of Baden-Württemberg state released a comprehensive report about FETO on its website. But it turned out that the report was removed from the website following the coup attempt. As of August 2016, it became apparent thanks to the statements of the suspects and the witnesses and intelligence data that FETO members chose Germany as a harbor. Among the Turkish public, no one has doubts regarding FETO’s role in the failed coup. Hundreds of statements and analysis on the subject issued by many politicians of all political parties, including the Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP), can be found with a simple Google search. Despite that, the German Federal Intelligence Chief Bruno Kahl gave an interview to Der Spiegel on March 18, 2017, in which he claimed that FETO is a non-governmental organization engaging in religious and secular education activities and they were not convinced that FETO leader Fetullah Gulen was behind the coup attempt. These remarks stirred a great deal of reaction not only from Turkey, but from the German media and the Left Party of Germany.

In an article entitled “Wo Erdoğan Recht Hat?” (The Points Where Erdogan is Right About), which was published by TAZ on September 11, 2017, Jürgen Gottschlich covered the allegations on the criminal records of prominent FETO members and touched upon the possibility that Kahl either is not familiar with the issue at all or does deliberately protect the organization. Another article published by FAZ a few days later warned that in case it is found that the FETO operatives whose part in the coup attempt were proven were hiding in Germany, Berlin would not overcome the burden of harboring a criminal organization in its territory without taking legal proceedings.

The Left Party also issued a number of parliamentary questions on the subject. The replies given to these questions by the German government clarified Germany’s stance on FETO. One of the questions demanded to know that on which intelligence data Kahl’s remarks are based and whether Berlin was informed about the identity of the forces involved in the failed coup. The answer given to this question underscored that the organization was not monitored by the Office for the Protection of the Constitution (Bundesamt für Verfassungsschutz or BfV). Of course, Germany could not have announced the contacts it had with FETO members it protects. But with the answer given to the second parliamentary question, the German government avowedly displayed its position. The government suggested that answering such a question is not possible for the vital interests of the German state.

Surely there is a Supreme Court in Berlin today. But it is alarming that a state of law who is the founding member of the EU is currently guarding coup plotters, which is not even kept as a secret. The German public will hopefully bring them to account one day.

If a student of civil-military relations in Turkey were to write a paper on the evolution of the civil-military relations before the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, s/he would have questioned, “What happened to the military in Turkish politics?” The conclusion drawn from this paper would probably be that the military was pushed out of politics through many structural changes undertaken by the AK Party government and a judgment made within the public sphere that the military should not play a prominent political role in society. A final finding could be that the contributions of the EU had played an external role in consolidating Turkish civil-military relations in favor of civilian supremacy.

Regardless of how the central question is stated and what the answers are, civil-military relations in Turkey and the place of the military in the socio-political domains throughout the history of modern Turkey have been a controversial subject. Since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, the country has experienced four military coups. While the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) were able to perform a full-scale overthrow of the civilian governments and took over temporary rule during the 1960 and 1980 coup, it relied on more indirect means to bring about the forced resignation and replacement of the governments during the 1971 and 1997 coups. Due to the success of these four coups, it is not a surprise that Turkish politics has historically been dominated by the preferences of the military, and thus the nature of civil-military relations has been problematic in terms of improving democratic civilian supremacy over the military.

As a result of the ideological conflict between the military and AK Party, which has grown since the party rose to power in 2002, as well as a series of significant events since the beginning of the Ergenekon and Balyoz trials in 2008, there has been a substantial shift in the balance of civil-military relations in Turkey. Nevertheless, the question of how this rapid transformation of Turkish civil-military relations was achieved needs to be analyzed by looking at the external and internal dynamics of the AK Party era.

The AK Party government has made significant structural and political transformations in terms of civil-military relations and the military’s institutional and socio-political role, which have decreased the involvement of the military in politics since 2007. However, civil-military relations had not yet been fully civilianized before the July 15 military coup attempt. Following the suppression of the July 15 coup attempt, the unfinished democratization project of civil-military relations entered a new phase.

The June 24 presidential elections and the establishment of the new government model brought radical changes in civil-military relations as well. Initially, President Erdogan appointed his Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulisi Akar as Minister of National Defense. Following that, by presidential decree, the Chief of General Staff was positioned to operate under the Ministry of National Defense. Thirdly, by decree, the structure of the Supreme Military Council was re-designed in terms of the president’s autonomy over the final decision to determine promotions and assignments of colonels and generals and the number of ministers who can participate in Council meetings. Now, the decision regarding the promotion of the colonels and generals will be determined according to the absolute majority within the structure of the Supreme Military Council. The number of ministers who attend the Council meeting has also increased. The Vice-President and Ministry of Economy will be part of the Council meetings. But the question of whether Turkey reached a balance in civil-military relation remains due to the exceptional nature of civil-military relations in the country.

Ankara’s Four-Dimensional Strategy to Reconstruct Civil-Military Relations

To, ultimately, end the civil-military imbalance in post-July 15 Turkish politics, Ankara has attempted to restructure its entire state apparatus, in which security agents including the TAF will be positioned at the center. At the same time, the government has been trying to develop a comprehensive and long-term strategy for the newly emerging threats stemming from the regional insecurities in the Middle East. After the July 15 military coup attempt, the new period has entailed three crucial phases: lustration (de-Gulenization of the state) period, rehabilitation, democratic reconstruction of civil-military relations and modernization of the Turkish military. Ankara followed four-dimensional strategies in the post-July 15 coup attempt:

• Civilianization dimension is focused on democratic consolidation of the civil-military relations and requires that the TAF undergoes a full-fledged civilian control.
• Control-balance dimension sought to create a balance between the security forces in order to prevent a monopoly by the Chief of General Staff’s over the decision-making process within the army; and aimed to separate the security forces (Gendarmerie and Coast Guard Corps) from the chain of command to the Chief of General Staff to obtain a counter-balance.
• Ideological dimension sought to build ideational diversity within the officer core, but within the limits of their loyalty to the Constitution.
• Strategic dimension sought to redefine the national, regional, and international strategic mission of the TAF.

It is now that President Erdogan accomplished his first task by cleaning almost all the members of FETO within the TAF and other critical security institutions. The perception of TAF among the Turkish people has gained a very positive stance due to the increasing role of TAF in providing internal and regional security against threats emanating from the PKK and other terrorist organizations. TAF is more active militarily in Syria and Iraq to prevent terrorist activities against Turkey.

The second part of the post-July 15 civil-military relations is redesigned by civilian supremacy. But it does not necessarily mean that Turkey solved all its problems regarding civil-military relations. Under the presidency of Erdogan, the Ministry of National Defense will probably play a vital role in shaping Turkey’s military strategy and normalizing civil-military relations. The National Defense Ministry was in full control of the Chief of General Staff and responsible for daily military activities of TAF due to the exceptional status of Turkish military above its politics. Currently, the new minister has an important influence over the military institutions, and he has been closely working with the civilian authority in the post-July 15 Turkish atmosphere. Especially, TAF played an essential role in terms of recalibrating Turkey’s political strategy in Syria and Iraq and Turkey began to recalibrate its overall influence over the Syrian crisis.

President Erdogan’s central plan in the mid-term is to transform the Turkish military in accordance to the new regional and global geopolitical realities. TAF also wants to consolidate its adaptation capacity in order make the Turkish military more effective, deterrent, and professional. Therefore, the new minister Gen. Akar is seen as the most acceptable figure for TAF to make this transformation possible. However, since each of the aforementioned processes will take a long time to accomplish, there is a need for a comprehensive strategic roadmap for Turkey’s civil-military relations and for the strategic transformation of the military in order to increase the credibility of the TAF and minimize the security risks for Turkey in national, regional, and international security environments.

The Turkish Republic has faced several coups and coup attempts since its establishment in 1923 and even throughout the late 19^th and early 20^th centuries. This trend, unfortunately, did not change in subsequent times as it –once again– came into appearance in 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997 and even on 27 April 2007, when a so-called “e-memorandum” was issued by the ultra-secularist then-General Staff of the Turkish Armed Forces in order to prevent the AK Party’s presidential candidate from being elected.

It’s ill-advised to acknowledge some un-informed Turkish academics who insisted on the thesis that the Turkish military had always respected Turkish democracy and that the only intent of the putschists was to restore the allegedly repeatedly failing Turkish democracy. Similar narratives do not merit consideration as they overlook or intentionally disregard significant factors. Proposing that the Turkish military thus far was able to intervene in politics without the support of foreign allies is imprudent. Thus, it’s quite logical to expect that subsequent to an alleged “restoration” process following coup regimes, even those supporting the tutelage military regimes may put pressure to put an end to this period. That’s it. Furthermore, without the pressure of external factors, neither Turkey would have given up its one-party CHP-regime in 1946, nor would it lend the power to civilians after each coup attempt. But these issues go beyond the borders of this column.

Turks are generally aware of the historical anti-democratic mechanisms and tutelage intending institutions in Turkey, which have been largely attenuated in the recent 15 years. Despite these democratic changes, which prioritized the civil actors in the Turkish political system, today, the question arises about how a military coup on July 15, 2016, could been attempted? Moreover and more importantly, how was the coup attempt prevented on this instance?

The main and striking factor in the prevention of the recent coup attempt was the people’s active will, who were able to directly thwart the execution of the coup. For the first time in Turkish history, people stood against the country’s own military and blocked an infiltrated faction of the military geared to take over the country’s leadership–as a result of this heroic resistance of unarmed civilians, 250 Turks were martyred by the armed forces.

On this instance in contrast with previous coups, the driving force behind the coup was not a Kemalist or ultra-secularist group, but rather the supporters of Fetullah Gulen, whose disciples infiltrated key state institutions over the last 40 years. The Gulenist cult members are widely acknowledged and designated today by all Turkish political parties and societal groups as a terrorist organization, called FETO. All left-wing, right-wing and conservative circles have no doubt regarding the perpetrators of the 15 July coup attempt.

This consensus is also a reason why during the night of the coup attempt, not only conservatives and nationalists took to the streets to prevent the coup –subsequent to President Erdogan’s call– but also some leftists and even some Kemalists deemed the coup attempt illegitimate and illegal. To understand the people’s actual motivations and their standpoints in a broader perspective, our book-publication, ‘Democracy Watch: Social Perception of 15 July Coup Attempt’ from 2016 may be a good reference to contextualize Turkish people and their perception of the 15th July coup attempt.

In the 1990s, when the armed forces still controlled Turkish politics by indirect mechanisms –such as the media etc. – this kind of collective civil mobilization against an anti-democratic armed actor would be unimaginable. Thus, both the partly successful de-militarization process of Turkey’s politics in the recent years via rise of civil-democratic politics and the fact that the coup was attempted by a prevalently hated group, the FETO, were important in thwarting the coup. This is also a fundamental reason why the state of emergency, which will end in the coming days, was not opposed by the majority of Turks since its main target was the FETO.

Furthermore, it should be stressed that the presidential leadership was a crucial factor in the failure of the attempt. By calling the citizens to go on streets and protect democratic rights, Turkish President Erdogan differentiated himself from previous Turkish political leaders and thus mobilized the country against an anti-democratic attempt. The result was ultimately a success, reaching yet another successful milestone paving the way to Turkey’s progressive democracy path.

Nowadays, questions also arise as to the plausibility of potential future coup attempts. Undoubtedly, steps such as the strengthening of people’s democratic sensitivities, sustaining the democratic transformation of Turkey’s political institutions, continuing the fight against illegal groups within the army such as FETO, and the establishment of a further professional-democratic understanding of the armed forces by stressing civilian control will be the main factors in minimizing the likelihood of future coup attempts – regardless of their affiliations. Of course, the importance and meaning of the Turkish armed forces for Turks is not to be disregarded or diminished and it’s true that this perception is based on a rather emotional, religious and historical backdrop. Nevertheless, this fact does not hinder the need to further develop a sincere democratic understanding of civil-military relations in Turkish politics.

In this sense, it’s important to stress the recent institutional step, according to which the chief of General Staff and force commanders will henceforth fall under the new Defense Minister – a civil person. As already known, the previous Chief of General Staff, General Hulusi Akar, quit his job as military official right after he was appointed as the new Defense Minister in Turkey’s first presidential cabinet last week. Thus, it seems that an interesting transition model was formulated in order to establish an effective increase in civil politics. Moreover, similar progressive steps to develop the civilian control of the military –by taking into account the needs of a strong and democratic military– will most likely provide beneficial in reducing the notion of coups in the minds of anti-democrats, let alone the likelihood of potential future coup attempts by factions of the army.

Within two years since the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey has overcome several monumental challenges. The first and foremost challenge was the coup attempt which was thwarted in its tracks by civilian initiative thus setting the path for future challenges. The coup attempt was undertaken by an illegal organization, FETO, which tried to usurp power from within the state bureaucracy. Members of this organization had systematically infiltrated state institutions for decades while keeping up a façade of merely being a civil society organization.

Turkish people took to streets upon President Erdogan’s call to confront the putschists and protect their democracy. Countless stories from that night have been recounted all illustrating that Turkish people will no longer tolerate anti-democratic forces to dictate their will. It was clear from the onset of the night of the July 15 coup attempt that the era of coups in Turkey was drawing to an end. Unlike previous military interventions, Turkish people’s resistance that night signaled a major turning point in the history of Turkish democracy.

The second challenge was to tackle an unequaled terror organization which had taken over many strategic institutions, subsequently permeating its grip on power through anti-democratic means. Turkey was already dealing with domestic and regional terror organizations like the PKK and DAESH. Confronting FETO, however, demanded a unique approach as this organization existed within the state itself. Turkey had to comb through the state bureaucracy to find out members of a highly secretive organization who received orders from outside rather than from their legitimate superiors in the bureaucratic hierarchy. Especially in the weeks and months immediately following the coup attempt, there was imminent fear of the potential of another coup attempt transpiring any moment. The recent trauma of the night of July 15 was compounded with the urgent need to find out the perpetrators and prevent yet another attempt.

The third challenge was to establish a multi-pronged approach to combat domestic and regional terrorism. Both DAESH and the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK, were posing immediate security threats especially along the Syrian border. Towns bordering Turkey were often subjected to rocket attacks and occasional destabilizing activities such as smuggling. Lack of stability on the Syrian side of the border created opportunities for the YPG, which was increasingly legitimized and encouraged by western support. Only a month after the coup attempt, Turkey decided to take the fight across the border into Syria both to demonstrate its resolve and to ensure that it would not simply sit by and watch the PKK gain ground. To this end, Turkey conducted the Euphrates Shield and Afrin operations in addition to maintaining a military presence in Idlib. Through its military intervention in northern Syria, Turkey’s fight against terrorism evolved from a defensive state to a new proactive approach after the coup attempt by fighting terror organizations across the border when necessary.

The fourth challenge was a political one: to rebuild the political system that suffered from decades of military and civilian tutelage system. The traditional tutelary system prevented the popular will from being fully reflected in the political arena and various state institutions had the ultimate say in state affairs. The AK Party years have challenged this system in a significant way and yet a comprehensive change to the system, which was demanded by people of all segments of the society, had still to be realized. The 2017 referendum on the transition to a presidential system represented the most significant overhaul of the governance system in Turkey. With the June 24 elections, Turkey has now transitioned to a full presidential system whereby the state institutions originally set up to oversee the civilian governments are now going to serve under the elected leaders. It will take time for the new system to be fully functional and there may even be hurdles along the way. Nevertheless, an elected president and an elected parliament are now at the center of the political system with the unelected and appointed civil and military bureaucratic institutions serving under them.

We will certainly continue to debate the reverberations of the July 15 coup attempt and its legacy for the country. But one overarching message is clear: Turkish people will no longer tolerate their democratic rights and popular will to be undermined and hijacked by cliques and terror groups from within and outside the state. This will most likely constitute the cornerstone of the country’s democratic maturity in the years ahead.

Two years ago, Turkey witnessed the coup attempt by the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO), which had been infiltrating critical state institutions for a long time. The putschists killed 241 people and 2195 others were injured. During the two-year period after the coup attempt, there have been serious investigations towards FETO-linked people in public institutions and the judiciary. These investigations aimed to purify state institutions from FETO domination.

After two years, understanding the attitudes and perceptions of people towards FETO is important. There have been some studies analyzing the psychological aspects of the coup attempt and its perpetrator. All these studies show that FETO is still perceived as the most dangerous terrorist organization by people and it differs from other organizations by choosing extraordinary methods. For instance, while it pretends to be “a peaceful religious community working for the sake of humanity” in the international arena, the members of this terrorist organization still manipulate investigations to commit more crimes. The complication of their methods in communication and giving orders still make them one of the most abnormal terrorist organizations in history.

All of these factors keep the hatred towards FETO among Turkish people alive. The second commemoration of the coup attempt took place with the participation of millions of people throughout the country. In cities, people prayed for the souls of the martyrs and the sake of Turkey. They also showed their anger and hatred towards FETO. This shows that there is a consensus among people, no matter their ideology or political view, that FETO is a dangerous terrorist organization, which does not hesitate to act against human dignity.

The hatred towards FETO makes July 15 one of the most critical junctures in Turkey’s history. After the coup attempt, millions of people gathered for democracy watches in order to show their respect to Turkish democracy. These events created a new atmosphere uniting people all around the country. The participation to commemoration ceremonies in masses shows that this spirit is still alive after two years. Thus, it is obvious that July 15 created a founding spirit for the future of the country.

Even if there is a consensus on July 15 and its meaning in Turkey’s history among Turkish people, there is a concern among people that foreign countries failed to understand FETO danger. The two-year lasting process after the coup attempt shows that foreign countries are not aware of the dangers of this terrorist organization. Obviously, one of the reasons of this misperception arises from the widespread belief among these countries indicating that this organization is not as dangerous as Turkey claims.

Since FETO is a multi-faced terrorist organization showing its “soft” and “peaceful” face to foreign countries, most of these countries are blind to see connections between this group and the July 15 coup attempt. This makes it difficult to fight against FETO in the international arena. Additionally, some groups in Turkey also try to soften perceptions against this group under the influence of the discourse of FETO. Nonetheless, it should be reminded that some Western countries – in comparison to their attitudes two years ago – have begun to take into account the role of FETO in the coup attempt. This reflects some success in Turkey’s fight against the terrorist organization.

Consequently, Turkey proceeds to convince other countries about its two-year lasting fight. The unquestionable consensus among Turkish people on FETO’s role as the perpetrator of the coup attempt also started to re-shape the approaches of foreign countries. It is obvious that, with the support of the people, Turkey will continue to progress in its fight against FETO in the domestic and international arena.

One of the most important actors on the night of July 15, 2016, was the personnel of the Directorate of Religious Affairs. Calling mosque staff in all cities to duty, the directorate consolidated the people’s resistance against the coup taking place in Istanbul and Ankara. In this respect, in an unprecedented way, mosques broadcasted messages calling people to go out on the streets and thwart the coup attempt. This process, during which the Directorate of Religious Affairs personnel faced dangers such as going through a conflict zone or being attacked by some Turkish citizens verbally and physically, was initiated with former President of Religious Affairs Mehmet Gormez’s verbal instruction on Ulke TV when he reached the TV channel through phone around 11:40 PM:

“I ask all of my devoted brothers out there, please each and every one of you run to the minarets. First recite salawats to Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), then invite all people of Turkey to protect their rights and will.”

In addition to this verbal instruction on TV, the directorate personnel received a text written by Mehmet Gormez around 01:00 AM:

“My fellow devoted brother, doing whatever we can to protect the rights of our people is our duty. We can never allow this country and its people to be divided, deprived of peace and prosperity along with the will of people being infringed through coercion and violence. As the spiritual guides of our nation, we will stand with the people against all illegal initiatives. I call all of you to resist this heinous treachery [the coup attempt] in a nonviolent way by going up the minarets, the symbol of our freedom. Tonight, lights of minaret should remain on and the people of Turkey should be invited to protect their rights via reciting salawats.

Mehmet Gormez”

After this instruction of Mehmet Gormez, sounds of salawats, call to prayers, prayers and announcements rose from the minarets. Gormez had given the general framework to muezzins and let them do whatever they can within this framework. This situation revealed a rich potential of materials; while some muezzins recited salawats unceasingly, others were inviting people to resistance after salawats, praying in Turkish/Arabic, reciting “salat-ı ümmiye,” Turkey’s national anthem and poems.

Shaped through improvisation in terms of content, this rich material gave insight to the relations between the July 15-religion in particular and religion-state/politics/democracy/military in general along with how these relations were perceived by Turkish society. In addition, it also revealed how the directorate personnel viewed this sinister event and how they conveyed their views to the public along with uncovering how one of the most effective motivators functioned. In this respect, this material is crucial and for this reason it would be beneficial to look at what happened on the night of July 15 from this perspective through the common points that could be found among limited sources:

Looking at the mood of these calls and prayers, it is clear that there is an apparent and dominant “war of independence” or invasion psychology. This wasn’t a coup aiming to overthrow the government, but the state, call to prayer, the flag and independence – all of which are seen as synonymous. “Europe,” “the U.S.” “Zionists,” “Christians,” “heretics,” “hypocrites” and co-conspiring traitors are behind this coup attempt. This psychology had an impact on the frequent recitation of the Turkish national anthem written along with Arif Nihat Asya’s poem “Biz Kısık Sesleriz” [“We are the husky voices”]. Meanwhile, referred historical figures also reflect this psychology: Ulubatli Hasan, Mehmed the Conquerer, Abdulhamid II, Sütçü İmam…

National unity and solidarity are among the most underscored arguments during the calls made from minarets. Undoubtedly, this was the case because it wasn’t a solely military coup; it was perpetrated by a religious order which had a social correspondence. In this respect, with the addition of indiscriminate usage of heavy weaponry against the people, the coup was seen more of a threat than just a struggle for power between two parties or an attempt to shift power. This perception was due to the damage caused by violent political and social conflicts in Syria and Egypt in the near past being still fresh in the memory of people.

Protecting democracy and the national will were two points that were frequently expressed by religious officials when calling people to resist. People were invited to take the streets not only for the love of God or country, but also for the love of democracy, while it was highlighted that the national will, elected government, president or the Parliament could be altered with arms and coups, that was a clear threat.

Exactly two years has passed since the July 15, 2016, coup attempt in Turkey, but the fight against the terrorist organization led by the U.S.-based former imam Fetullah Gulen, officially known as FETO, remains at the top of the country’s agenda. The sustained importance of this issue stems from the discovery of new evidence about the organization as well as the opposition’s approach to Turkey’s crackdown on the FETO network.

In the wake of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey launched a proactive campaign against FETO terrorism. It is necessary to note, however, that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s commitment to this struggle predated the failed coup. As a matter of fact, he described the group as a ‘parallel state’ in the immediate aftermath of the judicial coup attempt on December 17-25, 2013. A designated terrorist organization that the National Security Council (MGK) officially identified as a threat against Turkey’s national security, FETO suffered major setbacks since the July 15 coup attempt, as its operational capabilities within the country were completely eliminated – at least for the time being. The declaration of a state of emergency, coupled with a number of decreed issues within that legal framework, facilitated the dismissal of FETO members, affiliates and contacts from the public service. Others, who actively participated in the organization’s illegal activities, were brought to justice. Over the following months, Turkish courts handed down various sentences to defendants over their links to FETO and their complicity in the July 15 coup attempt.

The question today is whether Turkey’s struggle against this 50-year-old organization, which is half as old as the Republic itself, has reached its conclusion. In order to answer this question, we must provide the following analysis and support the claims mentioned in it.

First of all, FETO has never been a religious organization. Since its formation, the group operated as a terrorist organization. Provided that it successfully disguised itself as a faith community, however, resulted in an overall failure to understand the movement’s true nature until the July 15 coup attempt.

Fundamental qualities of the organization

In order to fully appreciate the challenges that Turkish authorities face in their fight against FETO, it is necessary to understand what kind of organization it really is. At the same time, it is crucial to raise awareness about the threat posed by FETO members, whom certain foreign governments continue to harbor, to host FETO members around the world.

According to many counterterrorism experts who describe FETO as a terrorist organization, the group does not share the organization structure and operational processes with others. Developing a deeper understanding of the organization, whose members are radicalized by Fetullah Gulen’s cult of personality, is also key to the success of ongoing efforts to defeat it. To be clear, it is not possible to argue that FETO is known or has been explained sufficiently.

The first defining feature of cult movements is that their authoritarian leaders are considered sacred by their followers. Since the organization’s establishment, Gulen’s most significant accomplishment was to identify himself as a holy person. As a self-proclaimed chosen person, Gulen repeatedly compared himself to the Prophet Muhammad over the years. At other times, he presented himself as the executioner of His wishes. In doing so, Gulen took necessary precautions to ensure his total control over the organization. As a paranoid individual, he single-handedly decided which of his followers would marry and how they would name their children. Gülen also monitored the communications of his closest associates in an effort to concentrate all powers in his own hands.

FETO is also quite capable of indoctrination, which is the second most important quality of cult movements. As a matter of fact, the entire organization is a reflection of Gülen himself. A closer look at the group would reveal that it shares the personality traits of its leader. As such, the organization shares Gülen’s sinister nature, desire for becoming a legend, fear of death, tendency to alienate others, eagerness to hide his true motives and lack of confidence. Gulen was able to accomplish this goal with the help of a powerful network of indoctrination. Over the years, recordings, preparation schools and educational institutions have been the most significant carriers of Gulen’s messages. It was thereby that the organization’s leader came to control the minds of recruits from their childhood onwards. Those individuals, whose minds came to be controlled, became main players within the ‘parallel state’ in later years. With a sense of absolute devotion, they swallowed all discourse and actions of Gulen and his organization without reservation. Despite the overwhelming evidence against Gulen, for example, many members of the organization continue to turn a blind eye to the criminal nature of its activities out of absolute devotion and the hope of a better future.

To be clear, the nature of FETO was unmistakably shaped by the objectives of its sponsors. For example, many people view the organization’s current state as a deviation from religious principles over time. Quite the contrary, FETO has never been a religious movement. Instead, it has always been a terrorist organization. Instead of undermining state authority through armed struggle like traditional terrorist organizations, it aimed to infiltrate various public institutions to create a ‘parallel state’ which would take over the country’s government when the time came. Almost all sources on FETO, however, lack a coherent analysis of its emergence – – even though Gulen has always been open about his ultimate goal. A careful analysis would reveal that only a handful studies delve into the organization’s relationship with the Peace Volunteers Movement, a product of Washington’s anti-communist campaign that started its activities in Turkey in the early 1960s (just as Gulen was starting out), or how much time Gulen used to spend at the American locale in Edirne and his links to intelligence officers during his military service.

At all stages of its evolution, FETO remained capable of easily adapting to changing political circumstances in Turkey and around the world.  In other words, it assumed the shape of its container. It used religion to conceal its true identity and seized the opportunities it entailed.

At which level is Turkey in its fight against FETO?

The first step taken in order to fight with FETO was to initiate investigations against kumpas davaları (trials that FETO promoted with manipulations and fake evidences) which were used by FETO for the purpose of providing a “legal” dimension to its illegal activities. By these illegal activities, FETO aimed to speed up its organizational structuration in public institutions such as the Turkish Armed Forces.

OHAL (state of emergency) was put into action following the July 15 failed coup attempt. Then, with the help of decree laws issued in this state of emergency, the elimination of FETO members in public officials and breaking their power in various fields mainly including the spheres of education, media and economy, were at the top of the agenda. Dismissal of persons, who take orders from their “brothers” and “sisters” in the organization instead of their chiefs in the public offices, can be understood in this context. In this way, public personnel who have connections with FETO were dismissed and legal proceedings against them were initiated for the reason of abusing the possibilities offered by the state.

In order to block activities of FETO in the field of education, nearly 2.000 schools, student dormitories and various courses in connection with the organization have been closed by the Ministry of National Education.

Also, precautions were taken against the economic power of FETO by dealing with companies such as Bank Asya and Group of Koza Ipek, who act as intermediaries for money laundering. Trustees were appointed to these companies and suspicious past activities of them were examined by ministries, institutions and organizations.

The process of removing the effects of FETO from the state, as the most important part of the fight against FETO, is not an individual-centered approach but rather it aims to remove groups whose activities were infected with terrorism/crime. Up to now, 287 lawsuits were filed against the coup attempt and 171 cases reached at decisions. In these cases, 2.140 people were sentenced.

Turkey continues to struggle with FETO even in the international arena. Various information and documents have been forwarded to interlocuters in order to struggle with the manipulations initiated by the terrorist organization. In this context, authority in FETO schools in many places, especially in the Balkans and African countries, were delivered to the Republic of Turkey.

FETO isn’t just a threat against Turkey

Starting with the judiciary and law enforcement, the officials conducting Turkey’s fight against FETO, along with the political leadership behind the agenda, cracked down on the organization’s network at unprecedented levels. Keeping in mind Gulen’s character traits, it is important to highlight that the organization cannot be completely incapacitated in a short period of time. After all, FETO isn’t limited to its public profile. Since April 2017, the Turkish National Police has identified the organization’s undercover cells within the state apparatus and security operations concentrated on those specific targets. In light of newly available evidence, the Turkish authorities concluded that FETO was an extremely potent covert organization. It is possible to argue that each visible component of the organization has a ‘parallel’ or hidden counterpart. For example, it became clear that all FETO members within the Turkish Armed Forces reported to other, ghost-like members (known as hidden imams within the group). Regardless of their ranks, those operatives received orders and instructions from individuals other than their superiors within the military hierarchy. This specific arrangement meant that FETO became a ‘parallel state’ par excellence and was indeed a terrorist organization seeking to seize control of the state apparatus.

In addition to generating revenue for the group, FETO schools across the world served as a source of new recruits who would be trained to become part of the ‘parallel state.’ For the sake of presenting itself as a peaceful movement, FETO used its educational institutions as a front. Although Turkey ended the group’s activities in the area of education, it is important to note that Gulen’s school network became the organization’s backbone in recent years. Gulen-affiliated schools in the United States, Europe, Central Asia and Africa carry on supporting the survival of the organization. According to information obtained from individuals, who were captured in Ukrain, Sudan, Kosovo, Azerbaijan and Gabon in recent months by the Turkish intelligence servcices, they served as principals or teachers at FETO schools.

FETO schools outside Turkey must be considered serious national security threats in host countries. After all, those institutions formed the backbone of the group’s presence in other countries. First and foremost, countries harboring identified FETO members are now the new centers of the organization. These countries violate international law and diplomatic norms by supporting a terrorist organization, which attempted to overthrow Turkey’s democratically elected government in 2016, to seem unreliable. At the same time, they render themselves defenseless against potential attacks by FETO members. It is no secret that the children of local elites in many countries, where the group operates, are enrolled in schools affiliated with Gulen. As a matter of fact, it is possible to argue that political elites in countries, where FETO launched educational institutions relatively early, are graduates of those schools. In this regard, the group forms ‘parallel states’ in those countries as well.

On July 15, 2016, Turkey encountered the single greatest act of rebellion in the history of the Republic – which it overcame thanks to the sacrifice of the ordinary people. In the wake of the coup attempt, the country launched an all-out offensive against FETO. Although significant progress has been made within the country, members of the organization, who fled Turkey ahead of the failed coup, continue a smear campaign against the country. In this regard, many countries, including Turkey’s self-proclaimed allies in the West, do not pay the due attention to the steps taken by Turks in the international arena. Although there is irrefutable evidence linking Gulen to the coup attempt in Turkey, those countries are unwilling to extradite senior leaders of the organization to Turkey. We must not forget that FETO is the product of an ‘intelligence thinking’ and the group’s structure and activities were shaped by the same line of thinking. As such, the organization poses a security threat not just to Turkey but also other countries where it remains operational. Let us hope that those who ignore the FETO threat today can see the group for what it really is before it is too late.

Two years ago, on July 15, Turkey experienced a vicious coup attempt in its rather substantial history of coups. This coup attempt was more similar to the May 27, 1960 coup when compared to September 12, 1980, as the latter was realized within the chain of command. The July 15 coup attempt was perpetrated by a seemingly religious group, a criminal cult with civilian affiliates that had infiltrated not only the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) but all state institutions makes it unique. During that night, unarmed public and the Parliament were attacked for the first time in Turkish history of coups. This coup, however, was thwarted with the courage of the Turkish people and the determination of the political will. Nevertheless, a challenging process of cleansing state institutions from FETO members and mending the wounds left by the coup attempt had followed.

Re-establishing the public order and incapacitating the putschists were prioritized; without delay, the government began to remove FETO members from state institutions. Following the TAF’s cleansing, FETO-affiliated civil servants in all institutions, especially in the judiciary and the security forces, were removed according to the law, and administrative and legal processes were initiated. However, this was only the beginning. To be able to eliminate this threat efficiently, the Council of Ministers gathered under President Erdogan’s lead announced a three-month state of emergency in all cities of Turkey on July 20.

The state of emergency’s proclamation was preferred because of the extent of the threat and the counter-measures needed to be implemented against it. This coup attempt wasn’t realized only by a limited military junta organized under the TAF – it was perpetrated by a secretive and insidious organization that infiltrated public institutions. Infiltrating the TAF over numerous decades and operating in a clandestine way, the extent and capability of this organization was unclear. Investigations on and operations against this organization show that FETO is yet to be deciphered completely.

During the coup attempt, along with previous events, we have seen the existence of judges, prosecutors, security force members and high-ranking state officials, which unquestioningly obey every whim of FETO leader, Fetullah Gulen. Captured at the “command center” of the coup attempt and later identified as FETO’s TAF imam, Adil Oksuz, was released by judges despite the legal consequences. Similarly, two military prosecutors went to the Akinci Airbase on the day after the coup, destroyed the evidence there and escaped from Turkey.

Along with these, a police officer assassinating Russia’s Ambassador to Turkey, Karlov, indicated the threat FETO posed. It was clear that this organization, which could hurt Turkey’s security and peace with sabotages, assassinations or suicide bombings should be eliminated with a long-term plan. Moreover, the PKK and Daesh were increasing their pressure on the region, terrorist threats were emerging from Syria and Iraq and cross-border operations were taking place during this period. All of these made the state of emergency a necessity.

Turkey’s state of emergency and terror groups

The state of emergency is a mechanism employed when a state faces an adversary or a threat that cannot be eliminated through common and conventional legal measures. The main characteristic of this mechanism is that it increases state authority which, in turn, allows the state to eliminate the threat more easily. State of emergency is implemented and maintained by constitutional institutions in accordance with the respective laws in the constitution. Therefore, it doesn’t mean undemocratic, unlawful and arbitrary usage of power. Constitutional rights, the rule of law and legal supervision of all state institutions are maintained. In addition, state of emergency is a procedure that is included in the constitutions of all democratic states with the rule of law and no state hesitates to implement it when necessary.

According to the 1982 Constitution, Turkey had two emergency administrative procedures: state of emergency and martial law. Martial law was abolished with the constitutional amendment approved in the April 16 referendum. Therefore, the state of emergency is the only emergency administrative procedure. The constitution foresees that the Council of Ministers gathered under the lead of the president may proclaim a state of emergency with the condition of being limited to 6 months at a time. This decision is published in the official gazette and immediately submitted to the Parliament for ratification. The Parliament can alter the length of the state of emergency – upon request of the Council of Ministers, the Parliament could prolong the state of emergency up until four months at a time or could remove it. In this respect, the Parliament has the final say over the state of emergency. In fact, the Parliament prolonged the state of emergency by three months seven times upon requests of the Council of Ministers in the past two years.

Regarding matters of the state of emergency, the Council of Ministers under the leadership of the president may proclaim executive orders without requiring an empowering law ratified by Parliament. Even though it’s claimed that the executive orders proclaimed during the state of emergency bypass the Parliament, executive orders are submitted to the Parliament and it has the authority to alter, decline or approve them. Indeed, the Parliament has approved all state of emergency executive orders after discussions, rendering them eligible for the supervision of the Constitutional Court. Therefore, both the legislative and the judiciary is able to audit these executive orders. Meanwhile, there are three or four decades old executive orders, which are yet to be audited by the Parliament.

The state of emergency targeting  state or society?

It has been expressed that the most prominent characteristic of the state of emergency is the increasing authority on the part of the state. The extent of this authority and how it should be exercised is regulated by the State of Emergency Law No.2935. Despite the authority endowed to the state by the law, it was exercised in a way to not interfere with the everyday life of the people and to facilitate the fight against FETO. After the events during which police officers and the military clashed, the necessary and efficient precautions to have healthy investigations on thousands of suspected military and police officers, civil servants and civilians, to reestablish public order and to reinvigorate the economic life were implemented with the state of emergency.

It should be underscored that the exercise of authority during the state of emergency is supervised by the judiciary. Only the state of emergency executive orders were exempted from legal supervision of the Constitutional Court. However, as this caused apparent issues, the State of Emergency Commission was established and this commission paved the way for legal supervision.

In a region that is mired with civil wars and various terrorist threats, Turkey faced a military coup attempt and thwarted the short-term threat with sacrifices made by the state and its people. However, the past two years have shown that this is actually a long-term threat that needs to be fought with determination. Despite being occasionally criticized, the state of emergency was received rather well by the public. Nevertheless, prior to the June 24 elections, President Erdogan expressed that they would discuss the annulment of the state of emergency after the elections. Following the elections, former Deputy Prime Minister Bekir Bozdag stated that there was a will to remove the state of emergency and that its schedule would be discussed. If the state of emergency which is to end on July 18 isn’t extended again or the Parliament votes against its extension, it will be annulled. Thus, the state of emergency will be possibly annulled on July 18, if there isn’t any drastic change. It could be expressed that the state will continue to fight against terrorism with determination regardless of the statement of emergency.

“Once innocence is lost, it’s not possible to find it again,” says Bauman. When people start to taint their God-given nature with or without intent, being aware of it or not, nothing will be like it used to before. In this respect, infer the following inspired by the verses “Are those who know equal to those who do not know?” (Az-Zumar 9) and “The darkness and the light are not equal” (Fatir 20): Are those who protect their candor, innocence and humanity equal to those who do not? Holy texts are full of examples who betray themselves, their society, nature and ultimately God himself by failing to protect their innocence. I believe it’s enough to remind Lucifer’s disobedience and Cain’s murder of his brother Able.

To comprehend the loss of innocence is the issue. Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) defines feeling guilty as “remorse” (Ibn Majah, Zuhd, 30). To feel remorse, one should be aware of its crime; moreover, one should reprimand himself/herself. We see that Prophet Jonah submits to the God Almighty by saying “Indeed, I have been of the wrongdoers” (Al-Anbya 87) despite being a prophet himself, while Lucifer constantly avoids facing his crime and loss of innocence through arrogance (Al-Baqarah 34) and trying to justify itself (Al-A’raf 12). This is where the soul and mind become devilish.

FETO’s dogmatism

2 years has passed since the heinous July 15 coup attempt perpetrated by FETO. Turkey was in intensive care for a year, trying to come back to life. Our state, its government (Justice and Development Party, or AK Party for short) and those who backed them both (Nationalist Movement Party, or MHP for short) have implemented meticulous policies throughout this process. We have experienced the individual and societal trauma caused by the attempted attack on the state organization and democratic system. It’s without doubt that some were victimized by false accusations and denouncements motivated by the purple brain or personal ambitions. We see that these wrongs are being corrected incrementally.

The discrepancy between FETO’s apparent facet and hidden agenda, thus it’s extreme form of dissimulation (taqiyya), have inflicted wounds to the minds of all Muslims, especially Islamists, the pious and nationalist-conservatives. Firstly, the treatment of this wound isn’t as easy as it seems. An indomitable will by a resolute political administration is required.

Let’s go back to where it all started. FETO, which was deemed innocent by the public prior to 2012, lost its innocence through the December 17-25 events and the July 15 coup attempt. We are facing a structure characterized by Hoffer’s “true believers” and Rokeach’s “closed [dogmatic] mind.” A mental and emotional rigidity with the potential of fanaticism… Caused by unshakeable belief and utmost devotion, this condition was defined as “being a hashhashin,” referring to Hasan as-Sabbah’s original assassins.

Why? Because with the mind-numbing opium, people transform into mindless drones. It’s possible to talk about Marx’s remark that “religion is the opium of the people.” In FETO’s hand, religion turns into an opiate. For this reason, its members don’t feel remorse about attempting to suspend democracy and infringe the constitution along with killing hundreds of people. According to their belief, remorse is only possible if they disobey FETO leader Gulen, their acclaimed “messiah.”

Considering Fromm described such structures as “authoritarian,” it’s easy to understand how the leaders of fascist organizations are idolized. In this respect, loyalty and trust is only reserved for the leader in FETO. The belief that only the leader represents the truth has invaded every cell of their being. They evaluate every knowledge and information only according to their narrow ideology and purpose. If the provided knowledge and information is compatible with the organization’s teachings, it is accepted easily; otherwise, they will deny. “They have hearts with which they do not understand, they have eyes with which they do not see, and they have ears with which they do not hear” (Al-A’raf 179) describes the type of dogmatic and fanatical people in such authoritarian organizations perfectly.

Fanaticism takes only one step from dogmatism. Fanatics possess all the traits of dogmatic thought process and personality. However, they’re more prone to employing violence. Regardless of religious exploitation, rigid authoritarian structures all possess psychosocial issues like seeing the world in black and white, failing to see the grey zones, monopolizing the truth, perceiving the future with a pessimistic outlook, feeling insecure and accepting only other members as their brothers and sisters. All of these could be observed in FETO; yet, there is more: fanaticism. Individual or organizational, fanaticism is characterized by violence and aggression caused by contracting consciousness. In this regard, FETO isn’t only a dogmatic organization, but also a fanatical one.

The December 17-25 events and the heinous July 15 coup attempt has shown that Gulenism believes the ends justify the means and that it is a terrorist organization using violence unfetteredly. Similar to FETO, the PKK with its Marxist and leftist discourse is also a dogmatic and fanatical organization. So, it’s not hard to understand how these two terrorist organizations have found common ground in inflicting harm to the Turkish people and the state. We see that once innocence is lost everything is permitted.

In psychology, such personalities are deemed as morbose and it’s contagious. Brainwashing, inculcation and persuasion  strategies uniform the members, rendering them into one dimensional personalities. Members of FETO and similar organizations always have strong reaction mechanisms; what I mean by this mechanism is that there is a discrepancy between how they appear and what they actually are. Then, lets ask the question again: did the FETO leader and his followers lose their innocence after December 17-25 and July 15? It’s apparent that this organization that employs and encourages dissimulation has used a different language while they speak with pious people, Kemalists, and with a fellow member. This means innocence never existed.

The July 15 resistance is a milestone

There is another question to ask: why does Turkey suffer a coup or a coup attempt, which is backed by external powers, every 10-15 years? The answer should be sought in terms such as trauma, instability and discontinuity. The 1960 military coup traumatized our grandfathers, 1980 coup traumatized our fathers, February 28, 1997, coup traumatized ourselves and the July 15 coup attempt traumatized our children. Could these traumatized generations attempt to develop the country, build a civilization or challenge imperialism and capitalism? They can hardly do it anymore. Due to political instability, development is interrupted. In turn, his interruption creates transitional periods, wasting generations in a decade or so. What needs to be done is clear; we need to be politically stable and achieve continuity in development.

In his book “The Foundations of Civilization,” Will Durant insistently underscores the importance of a resolute state structure, political stability and economic order. Durant also expresses that religion and morality along with advanced scientific researches, literature and arts are indispensable elements of a civilization. It’s high time that we leave our traumas behind, achieve development and stability, and rebuild our civilization. The heinous July 15 coup attempt taught us that coups are history in this country. Nevertheless, the state should be equally distanced from either secular or religious organizations and should try to pull them towards legitimate grounds. Why? “Too much trust is too much indeed,” says Shakespeare.

Egypt has left behind one of the most anti-democratic electoral processes seen on a global level in recent years. Abdalfettah Al-Sisi, who led the military coup in 2013, won the elections held by the junta regime in 2014 and established a far repressive regime in the country than the Mubarak period. By employing all kinds of anti-democratic practices, Sisi’s regime has been at war with democracy. During Sisi’s presidency, the civil opposition came under heavy pressure by the regime, media was taken under government control and civil society has been restricted extensively.

During the past five years, thousands of civilians who were opposing the regime were arrested and tried in military courts. The regime did not (and continues not to) tolerate any opposition against those who are perceived as a threat to the security of the regime. This situation was particularly observed in the period before the 2018 presidential elections. Numerous individuals who announced their intention to run in the elections were either forced to withdraw their candidacy or imprisoned. While the 2018 presidential elections were held in such an environment, the leader of Ghad Party Moussa Mostafa Moussa, who defined himself as a “strong supporter of Sisi,” was the only candidate who could participate in the elections “against” Sisi.

For many, this election has not gone beyond a democratic ritual. This is reflected in the low level of participation. The official figures suggest that voter turnout was 41%. However, many observers claim that turnout was much lower than figures published. On the first day of the voting process, only %7 of Egyptians participated in the elections, displaying a strong message of discomfort against the Sisi regime. In an effort to encourage voters, the Egyptian regime announced that voting is obligatory and individuals that fail to vote, would face a fine.

With this concern in place, many Egyptians went to the polls and cast their votes. The government also arranged free transportation for public and private workers in large cities. There were even reports that the police checked IDs of people at cafes and forced them to go and vote. It was also claimed that in some regions, people who went to vote were paid money or given food aid. Following the vote, it was announced that Sisi, unsurprisingly, won the elections with % 97 of the votes.

These undemocratic course of events in Egypt were not surprising for many in the region. Neither were the reactions of Western states. While Egypt witnessed a guideline example of an undemocratic election process, the Western “democracies” such as the U.S. and the U.K. rushed to celebrate Sisi’s victory. Immediately after the election results were announced, U.S. President Donald Trump and British Prime Minister Theresa May called Sisi to express their support for the “democratization” process in the country. The Portuguese President Marcelo Rebelo de Souza even visited the country to congratulate Sisi in person.

The British Prime Minister’s words for the Sisi regime were of particular interest. During her phone call, Theresa May told that the election was an important step for Egypt’s transformation into a functioning democracy. She further suggested that the result of the election was proof of the Egyptian public’s confidence in their president, Abdalfattah Al-Sisi. May’s comments, which do not have any touch on reality were harshly criticized by many international observers. Critics argued that given the scale of human rights abuses, unlawful practices and oppressive policies conducted by the Sisi regime, Theresa May’s attitude would be considered as disregard to the Egyptians who suffer from this autocratic regime the most.

There are four basic motivations behind the support of U.S. and U.K. governments for the Sisi regime. The first is the fact that Egypt is a crucial partner for the regional interests of these countries. Secondly, Egypt constitutes a major ally with regards to the security of Israel. Third is the fact that Egypt is an irreplaceable actor in the emerging regional alliance between Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Israel and the U.S. Finally, another important motivation for the Western support of Egypt is to prevent the increasing interaction between Cairo and Moscow. It has recently been observed that Russia has increasingly been exerting its influence in the region by deepening relations with Egypt.

The support of Western countries for such an autocratic regime in Egypt would bring costs for them. By neglecting Egypt’s serious problems and not urging the Sisi regime to pursue democratic reforms, these countries contribute to the continuation of political and economic problems in the country. They have been losing the confidence of millions of Arabs in the Islamic world by supporting a regime that ignores democratic values. This attitude will deepen the distrust between the people of the region and the Western governments in the long-run, as opposed to the repressive regimes of these countries.

The trial for the February 28, 1997, coup, heard by the Ankara 5^th High Penal Court, is about to be finalized. A total of 103 defendants are being tried as part of the case, including Gen. Ismail Hakki Karadayi, the Chief of General Staff during the coup, and his deputy retired Gen. Cevik Bir, former Land Forces Commander retired Gen. Erdal Ceylanoglu, who was responsible for the symbolic release of tanks through the Sincan district in Ankara, Teoman Koman and Cetin Dogan as well as a number of civilians such as Kemal Guruz, former head of the Higher Education Board (YOK). On November 23, 2011, the Ankara Prosecutor’s Office announced that an investigation had began on the 1997 coup as part of Article 312 of the Turkish Penal Code, which reads: “Any person attempting, by the use of force and violence, to overthrow the government of the Republic of Turkey, or to prevent it, in part or in full, from fulfilling its duties, shall be sentenced to a penalty of aggravated life imprisonment.” The indictment was submitted to the court on May 22, 2013. Following the hearings that lasted for over four years, the trial was concluded on December 21, 2017, and the prosecutor asked for aggravated life sentences for the 60 defendants who were within the chain of command at the time of the coup. The defendants posted their final pleas in response to the prosecutor’s opinion between January 8 and 10, 2018 whereas the hearings had been postponed to February 12. By this time, the court is expected to give a final verdict after all the final pleas are presented. Thus, recent developments over the past couple of months brought the forgotten trial back onto the agenda.

Prior to the July 15, 2016, coup attempt, the judiciary in Turkey sided with previous putschists and tutelage regimes. It was only until recently that the country’s judiciary stood with and supported the national will and legitimate government for the first time. As a matter of fact, this change in the judicial system began with the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) elections held in 2014 and presented significant possibilities for the fight against the Gulenist Terror Group (FETO). The judiciary has been the leading institution running an effective and determined fight against FETO during the December 17-25, 2013, judicial coup attempts and before and after the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. Despite some problems stemming from FETO-linked members of the judiciary during the early stages of the investigation, the 1997 trial constitutes a considerable phase of the fight against putschist conventions and tutelage regimes.

The  “postmodern” character of February 28 and the trial process

Some groups assert that the actions leading to the Feb. 28 process cannot be regarded as a coup attempt and do not constitute an offense in terms of penal responsibility since the military did not virtually seize power. We have also witnessed defendants presenting their pleas within this scope. The pleas of defendants within the 1997 coup trial stressed that former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan resigned from office voluntarily, that politics in the country underwent a transformation in its own right, the military did not intervene virtually, all actions were in accordance with the duties and authorities vested by the Constitution and law, and that laws were not breached.

While the Turkish Armed Forces did not virtually seize power on February 28, 1997, it exercised a tremendous control over politics, state and society with all means. In doing so, the military utilized instruments of the bureaucratic tutelage system that was established with the 1961 Constitution and consolidated with the 1982 Constitution, whereas the National Security Council turned into a shadow government. Although the MGK, according to the Constitution, is only an “advisory body,” it gave instructions to the government and followed these instructions in all the state institutions by means of the MGK’s Secretary-General’s Office. A separate control mechanism named West Working Group (BCG) was also established unlawfully outside of the constitutional state organization. With the briefings given, the judiciary was prompted and hundreds of investigations and lawsuits were filed mostly on political grounds. The opposition parties sided with the military instead of protecting the domain of politics whereas the media became the leading actor of the process. Media outlets went to any length in order to spread fear in society and to legitimize the military intervention. As a result of this, the legitimate government that came to power with free and democratic elections was overthrown, the Welfare Party was closed, political bans were introduced, the True Path Party was dissolved and hundreds of thousands of people suffered from unjust treatment as an outcome of the implementations of the MGK decisions. As opposed to the arguments brought forward in the pleas of the 1997 coup trial defendants, an exceptional period was experienced before the eyes of the public at the time.

In a statement made, Erol Ozkasnak – Secretary General at the office of the Chief of General Staff during the 1997 coup and for whom the prosecution asked for an aggravated life sentence – openly admitted that they “staged a postmodern coup on February 28.” He explained the “postmodern” character of the coup as follows:

“It was a successful process that did not resemble previous coups. There was no bloodshed and nobody was upset. It was through democratic means and with the assistance of nongovernmental organizations.”

FETO and its shadow on the 28 February trial

February 28 was a process that occurred before the eyes of the Turkish people and which was greatly condemned by a majority in their hearts. This is why the February 28, 1997, coup trial provides a good opportunity for Turkey to face with its history of coups. However, the trials planned and conducted by FETO, for example, Ergenekon, Sledgehammer and the military spying trial, and the injustices that occurred during these trials make it harder for the 1997 coup trial to be conducted fairly and competently in the public eye.

We can see that the perpetrators of the 1997 coup are trying to hide behind the image of a mistreated and falsely accused Turkish soldier generated by these trials. In fact, this strategy can also be observed in the 2016 coup attempt trial. These conspiracies of FETO are now being used to shelter and excuse the real perpetrators of military coups.

When the 1997 trial process first started, it was actively sabotaged by FETO-linked elements active in the judiciary at the time, especially among specially authorized prosecutors and courts. The prosecutor who prepared the indictment of this trial and an important number of judges that presided over it have been expelled from office due to being members of FETO. We can now see that the defendants are using this point as the foundation of their legal defenses. FETO must have considered this trial unimportant and useless for its own interests as the organization did not exert as much effort on this trial as it did on trials regarding coup plans such as the Sledgehammer case. A reason for this is that while the 1997 coup greatly impacted the religious masses, it opened new doors for FETO members.

Despite the attempts of FETO to sabotage the case, the 1997 coup trial process is near to an end. However, this alone is not enough to address the injustices and crimes that occurred within the February 28, 1997, process. A significant number of people involved in this process were left outside of the trial. For example, no steps have been taken against the media, which was the most important and effective element during the process. Obviously, it is not possible to try all media workers involved in court. Legal accusations in the context of punishment law may not be applicable to some people involved. However, it is neither tolerable nor understandable that some media members, despite all their involvement in the 1997 process, are still using various platforms to accuse others of infringing democracy and human rights.

Another issue along with punishing the perpetrators of the 1997 coup is addressing the injustices that happened during the process. With this idea in mind, some measures have already been taken. Public workers who were forced out of their positions due to wearing headscarves were allowed to return to their jobs. People who had no choice but to leave their schools during the February 28 period were given the right to return. However, no solid measures have been taken in regards to the people convicted by the military in trials held during the coup process. It is difficult to make blanket statements regarding legal matters and a case-by-case examination is required to assess the validity of these trials and the sentences dealt. Yet it is noted that around 600 people received heavy sentences during trials in 1997 and some of them are still in prison. Some also put forward that these sentences were generally based on a series of abstract accusations rather than any solid evidence of offenses. The re-evaluation of these cases and consideration of other injustices that may have occurred due to February 28 would be an important step in facing the history of the 1997 coup.

The room for maneuver created by the strong reaction to the 2016 coup attempt by the Turkish public and politicians must be well employed. The required actions in this context are that the 1997 coup trial must be concluded, other participants must face the consequences of their actions and all effects of the process must be negated.

Exceptional for being a “post-modern coup” in Turkey’s history of coups and triggering one of the largest devastations of the political system in contemporary history, February 28 differs from other coups for being a process rather than a one-off intiative. Unlike conventional military coups that occurred during the multiparty system era, the coup was realized in coordination with actors from the judiciary, mass-media, academia, finance and the business worlds while the material and psychological damage it caused is still observable in various institutions and segments of society. The said damage is a result of the immense socio-psychological traumas triggered by the implementation of the headscarf ban, discriminatory quotients and national security pressure over pious segments of society with the pretense of a so-called “Sharia threat.” While there are ongoing February 28 trials today, the disappointments, tragedies and wasted years of thousands of people who were barred from employment and education are still fresh. On the other hand, it is obvious that the coup caused political and economic devastation due to banned politicians, parties that were closed down, siphoned banks and ransacked public finances. Having multidimensional societal and institutional devastations similar to all other military coups, analyzing the economic and financial damage caused by the February 28, 1997 coup is crucial.

Turkey’s first liberalization experience

Remembering the issues and systemic malfunctions of Turkey’s post-1980 liberalization experience is important in terms of better understanding the economic dimensions of the February 28 process. Turgut Özal led Turkey’s first wave of liberalization and implemented it according to the “Washington Consensus,” which limits state interference and enforces deregulation. During this era, the overlapping visions of the Motherland Party and foreign institutions led by the IMF and World Bank accelerated the process towards an open economy. However, even though a free market economy was advocated, failing to amend regulations and establish control mechanisms necessary for the institutional infrastructure rendered the country’s economy prone to crisis. Meanwhile, the era of fragile coalitions which began in 1991, triggered a ten-year long period of instability as political uncertainties and financial crises aggravated each other. High inflation, burden of uncontrolled public debt and the need for international loans condemned the economy to a vicious cycle in which debts were paid off with new loans. With the 1994 financial crisis, Turkey suffered its first systemic shock after the decision of financial liberalization in 1989.

The divided political structure and vulnerabilities in the management of the economy in the mid-1990s consolidated the spoils system. Public finance deteriorated due to paying high interest to the financial sector over aggravating internal debt. Systemically making losses under the pretense of “duty losses,” state economic enterprises (KITs) were being covered by high interest loans taken from private banks, making it a lucrative business for individuals with immense capital. By loaning the credits taken abroad to public institutions with high interest rates and exploiting the internal debt spiral, a superficial bourgeoisie that had the political power to form and destroy political coalitions was shaped. Along with banks, large-scale industrial enterprises in and around the Association of Turkish Industrialists and Businessmen (TÜSIAD) amassed a huge capital through internal debt incomes, which were shown as non-operating income. The terms such as industry, investment and production became obsolete in the country.

The Welfare Party’s ‘pool system’ in the Treasury

Winning the elections in 1994 through the discourse of clean politics and crowning this victory by coming first in the 1995 parliamentary elections, the Welfare Party led by Necmettin Erbakan formed a coalition with the True Path Party and was determined to implement a “pool system” that would overhaul the management of macroeconomics. Implemented in 1996, this system created a resource pool among state enterprises and allowed those showing relatively better financial performance to loan with low interest rates. Rather innovative for its time, the pool system limited the vulnerabilities of public finance that was caused by state enterprises and the total public debt started to decline. However, as has been the case throughout Turkey’s political history, the large-scale bourgeoisie objected to this innovation in order to protect their interests, resorting to anti-democratic tactics. The new public finance order caused a great loss to those who were loaning funds to the state institutions with high interest rates. Rejecting to lose their source of easy income, this financial bourgeoisie initiated its plan to either persuade the coalition to give up the pool system or to depose the coalition. A consensus was formed between the military-civilian bureaucracy and large business groups along with their media affiliates who were all ideologically opposed to the Welfare Party’s Islamic discourses. A psychological war was launched during which the economic concerns and calculations were kept hidden as a part of the strategy and some careless statements made by certain members of the Welfare Party were provocatively used to indicate a so-called “Sharia threat.”

Financial operations hidden behind the regression discourse

What happened next is history. Using the expression “readjusting democracy”, February 28 process created a new type of post-modern coup aiming to change the government through the discourse “secularism is being abolished” rather than just seizing the control of the state through armed forces. Assumed to “last for a thousand years,” this process was expected to shift the economic and social balance along with the political, to obstruct political movements that emphasize Islamic identity and to constrain the conservative representatives of the business world like Independent Industrialists and Businessmen’s Association (MUSIAD) and Anatolian Tigers Business Association (ASKON).

While injecting the paranoia of regression into the subconsciousness of society with marginalized figures and images, the coup perpetrators were attempting to cover up the substantial economic and financial operation. Indeed, during the 4-year time period between February 28, 1997, and the 2001 financial crisis, Turkey lost its public finance discipline and experienced the most intense subsequent crises of the country’s political economy. Coming to power in June 1997, the coalition formed between the Motherland Party, Democratic Left Party and True Path Party, also known as the AnaSol-D coalition, removed the pool system and opened the way to the internal debt exploitation cycle. This caused the interest expenditure to national dividend ratio to increase from 5% to 17% within four years. Allowing the financial bourgeoisie to exploit internal debt, this system crashed with the twin crises of 2000 and 2001 – all tax revenue of the state was being used for paying interest and it was not enough.

The financial cost of February 28 process: over $50 billion

Along with having a detrimental effect on public finance, the February 28, 1997 coup also damaged financial supervision and regulation systems. Undermining the financial supervision system, weak coalition governments issued multiple banking licenses together with their allies including the military-civilian bureaucracy and financial bourgeoisie. Transferring public banks to private enterprises without any supervision, issuing banking permits easily, siphoning banks the high volume of international loans taken to be given to public institutions with high interest rates and the fragility of supervisory institutions triggered a banking crisis. During the process, 20 private banks announced bankruptcy and were transferred to the Savings Deposit Insurance Fund of Turkey (TMSF). Considering the burden of seized banks, their interests and the burden of public banks, which were at a duty loss, the February 28 process cost over $50 billion to Turkey.

One of the most tragic features of the era in terms of the relationship between politics and economics was that retired generals were being made members of many private companies and the executive boards of various holdings. Under military tutelage, these large-scale enterprises did not shy away from protecting themselves with senior military officers and using their influences for commercial purposes. As the Chief of General Staff Hilmi Özkök objected to this practice on ethical grounds, this tradition, which only exists in third world countries, came to an end. However, the mysterious relationship between military actors and the financial bourgeoisie is among the main dimensions of February 28, which we are yet to shed light upon. Meanwhile, it should be remembered that the TUSIAD administration – which tries to boast on being pro-democracy and pro-modernization – while reaping the economic benefits of this hefty crime period, was silent to injustices committed against conservative political movements, conservative segments of society and entrepreneurs.

Despite all institutional and democratic gains, as the July 15 coup attempt reminds us that the threat of military coups in Turkey is still alive. For this reason, democratic consolidation, social solidarity and economic institutionalization which render such coup attempts unsuccessful, shall be achieved swiftly and the anti-coup spirit should be kept alive at all times.

The claim that the process started by the 1997 Turkish military memorandum will “last a thousand years” was founded on a wrong answer to the question as to why military coups occur. According to this view, coups are the result of a clash between a state with immense powers or a “progressive” bureaucratic elite and public elements with “reactionary” beliefs. Historically, the coups in Turkey happened due to political and public actors that were unable to internalize the republican regime and Ataturk’s reforms crossed the red lines of the state. Thus, military coups would only end after the entire public internalized reforms through a radical political and cultural shift. The sociological extinction of “reactionary” views and the decreasing number of people subscribing to those views led to the end of coups.

Those who sought alternative answers to this question were also similarly mistaken. For example, people evaluating the issue from the point of political culture reasoned that coups happen due to a statist mindset with authoritarian and patriarchal inclinations. Such mental constructs, present since the Ottoman era, were the real reason for coups. The prevention of new coups required a radical shift in public mentality, which would subsequently lead to a dominance of democratic beliefs in politics. In order to accomplish this, it was necessary for the perpetrators of the coups, namely the state, the military or the bureaucratic elite, to gradually lose its importance and control in politics to a civil society with liberal beliefs.

Another opinion was that coups in Turkey occur as a result of the interference of international powers. This was especially for the cause of the U.S. due to its global influence and self-interest in Turkish politics. According to this belief, any government that adopted internal or foreign policies against the interests of the U.S. would inevitably face a military coup. Therefore, in order to prevent coups, it was necessary to stop toeing the line of the west and end their influence in Turkey.

These three views all disregard the sociological structural factors of the Turkish public. The changes in the balance of power between political and public actors in the country were not being accounted for. Coups could possibly be triggered by an authoritarian and patriarchal mindset endemic in the state, resistance of the public to internalize Kemalist reforms and bureaucracy or international forces seeking to shape Turkish politics according to their own interests. However, none of these factors explain why coups are actively being used as a tool in political power relations. The reason for this is because only the perpetrators of the coup, whether the military, bureaucratic elite or the west were being focused on. The political and sociological forces subject to the coup were being objectified and not being viewed as political agents. The reason why coups were being actively used as a tool in political power relations and succeeding in their intentions was due to the fact that the public subject to such military interventions were weak.

Changing balances of power

To give a substantial answer to the question regarding why coups occur, one must examine and account for the historical developments in political and social balances of power in Turkey. The main power struggles in Turkish politics between the 1840s and the 1920s happened between the Ottoman Sultan and the westernized bureaucratic elite, combined with inner conflicts of the bureaucratic elite itself. During this period, popular democratic forces were not even perceived as actors in politics. Since the 1950s, political power struggles have occurred between the military and the bureaucratic elite, around which gathered the capital-owning class, organic intellectuals, artists, politicians and small portions of the public in line with these elements either due to ideological or financial benefits, versus popular domestic forces of the public. We can identify two main structural breaking points within this period that deeply affected public power balances.

The first is the partial dismantling of state power and its division among democratic forces according to the principles of democratic politics. This turned the long-standing hierarchical structure of political power in the country into an anarchical one (as in power did not belong to anyone). State power that was solely wielded by the Sultan for a long time prior to the 19^th century was being shared among bureaucratic oligarchic powers and the Sultan until 1919. Following the abolition of the Sultanate in 1922, political power transferred entirely to the bureaucratic oligarchy. In both cases, government power was not open to the public and had absolute owners.

The opening of political power to the public with a multi-party parliamentary system was introduced and its subsequent adoption by certain political actors in the 1950s caused a radical change in the situation; it opened the political stage for large masses in search of a democratic regime. Likewise, democracy is a system of government where segments of the population that hold a majority are the principal actors in the government of the state. From this point onwards, political power was being shared between the bureaucracy and large public masses – in other words, between the appointed and the elected. After the 1950s, the struggle for power was the main driver of Turkish politics. The 1960, 1980 and 1997 coups are critical moments in Turkish history where oligarchic powers, along with their bureaucratic and civil counterparts, acted together to keep their hold on political power and to banish the representatives of the people from the power domain via accusations of being “reactionary” and “separatist.” These sudden coups were always followed by periods where via the introduction of new regulatory agencies, power was restored to the bureaucratic oligarchy and further denied to the general public.

The second structural breaking point was the continuous strengthening of democratic public actors against the oligarchy. This is a situation that must happen in practice if a democratic regime’s ideal of transitioning political power to the public is to be realized. The conservative strata of the public, composed chiefly of people with low socio-economic status from the Turkish countryside, became urbanized and improved their economic and cultural class over the course of a half a century period. The result of this sociological shift is the gradual change of material and moral power balances between the minority oligarchic powers and majority democratic powers in the country. If a small analogy is to be made between this situation and international relations, we can say that the unipolar structure that enabled the hegemony of oligarchy powers and backed coups slowly evolved into a bipolar structure via the strengthening of democratic forces. This bipolar structure enabled the AK Party to assume power in 2002 and allowed it to become even more established and stable in the following periods between 2002 and 2010.

The period from 2010 onwards was defined by the gradual shift of power towards the pole represented by the AK Party and a transition back to a unipolar power structure. Two indicators representative of this are first, the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) – a party that traditionally associated itself with a different segment of society – decision to closely follow the AK Party’s line after the November 1, 2015, elections. The second indicator is the fact that the opposition led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) had to plan its policies defensively, with the focus of preventing AK Party’s influence and power from increasing rather than offensively, with the focus of reclaiming the government and political power.

Are new coups possible?

Changing power balances explain why the coups of 1960, 1971, 1980 and February 28, 1997, were successful while the memorandum of 27 April 2007, the attempted judiciary coup of December 2013 and the failed military coup of July 15, 2016, were unsuccessful. As pro-democratic political and public actors change power balances in their favor, coup attempts become unable to achieve desired results. Furthermore, as democratic forces accumulate their share of power in the political system, coups will ultimately stop being an effective tool in power struggles. Thus, as coups fail to succeed, the heavy costs of participating in a failed coup attempt, namely the legal punishments of participating in anti-democratic acts, deter future coup attempts.

The court decision of June 2014 that sentenced the participants of the 1980 coup to life imprisonment, the current point arrived in the trial process concerning the 1997 coup and the fast-moving trial process of the 2016 coup attempt signify that Turkey has reached an important milestone with respect to domestic democratization. Coup trials can neither be reduced to, as some say, attempts of revenge, nor can they be reduced to purely apolitical processes where injustices are addressed and justice is served. Attempts to define this process through apolitical points of views disregard the historical structural breaking point that Turkey has gone through. Since the 1950s, large public masses have become political actors and the power balances in Turkey continue to shift in favor of pro-democratic forces. This historical and on-going structural process renders future coups impossible.

February 28 was a coup. There was nothing post-modern about it. In a clear and direct way, it was a military coup d’état. The government was deposed through threats, blackmails and various other methods. Illegitimate means were used. It was anti-democratic.

While the army led the way, academics supported them, the business world preferred this overthrow and the media announced the whole thing. A legitimately elected government was deposed due to its number of deputies in Parliament. Politicians were threatened at the National Security Council. They were forced to sign various decisions. Tanks paraded on the streets. People were arrested. Discrimination occurred in all spheres, on all levels. Methods of political engineering were applied. Psychological warfare became part of everyday life. If this is not a coup, then what was it?

Those who claim that February 28 was not a coup are only trying to cover up their own crimes. I’m not sure who coined the term “post-modern coup,” but it is being used frequently. What does this mean? Nothing essentially. Are coups modern? Did they not exist before modernity? What does post-modernism, a phenomenon of the social sciences, have to do with February 28? The whole thing is farcical.

Turkey’s conservatives barred from accessing education

The coup’s most prominent aspect was education. With discriminatory policies and double standards, the religious segment of society was barred from accessing education. The headscarf ban was implemented and wasted away a generation. The 28 February coup was not only framed against politicians, but against society.

Looking back, we may assume that this mentality has been defeated. However, the estimates of the damage made are yet to be calculated: How many girls were barred from education due to wearing a headscarf? How many people were barred from education through the implemented quotient to imam-hatip and vocational high schools? How many dreams were shattered?

In the upcoming years, all these estimates may become clear. For instance, it might be easier to calculate how many people were denied the right to an education due to their headscarves. Yet, we may not know how many girls had to remove their headscarves in order to access education. Moreover, we may never know the cost of the trauma the coup had on the psychology of these girls.

Think about it. How many girls had to give up on registering to university because of the headscarf ban? You may have seen such examples around you. It is possible to understand what a prominent tragedy this was by listening to personal experiences. We may assume that it has a higher cost when we think about society as a whole. Despite these events, if some are still claiming that February 28 was not a coup, this means that the arrays of events have not been explained well enough.

Another aspect of this hostility and design was the quotient issue of imam-hatip high school graduates. Through the implementation of a quotient, the coup plotters wanted to bar a generation from accessing education. Those who remember will note that in the summer of that year, regulations involving university entrance had changed. High school seniors learned that entering a university was almost impossible in the autumn. More, they were told that they could not transfer to other high schools as it was also banned. Some transferred to open high schools, where they would complete their education from outside the system. There were a few who entered foundation universities. Some had to go abroad, as if they were exile. They suffered a lot. Yet, these people were the only ones that could have saved themselves as a minority. Most of them were doomed and were forced to apply to open education. While their scores were enough to enter prestigious universities in Istanbul or Ankara, they were forced to register to associate degree programs.

We didn’t forget, we won’t forget

Who could possibly calculate the estimates of this cost? Who is to be held accountable for the people deprived of an education? There is a vile figure left from those times. He was only recently defending all these discriminatory practices on TV. In the eyes of God, everything is forgivable, with the exception of injustice towards a fellow human being. Thousands of people were barred from establishing a good career and helping their children and grandchildren establish a good career. Is this a forgivable crime?

I came across a friend of mine who could have entered the most prestigious universities in Turkey had these unjust practices not been implemented. He told me that he had worked in various villages and towns of Anatolia for many years as a high school graduate. After many years he re-entered the university exam. He said he would be graduating soon. “After 18 years, I barely got everything back on track,” he said. Who is going to answer for all these years wasted? Who can claim that February 28 was not a coup? It was a vile coup that stole the future of people.

There is never a “good” coup, as all of them in all forms are detrimental. However, February 28 was different than previous coups as it tried to achieve more. The government deposed with the May 27, 1960, coup and which was replaced with state bureaucracy had an impact on the state, but not directly on society itself. The right to education was not barred. The March 12, 1971, coup was realized among various fractions of the state and was mostly dis-regarded by the people. The September 12, 1980, coup hurt a lot of people. However, it had a limited design towards the people as it aimed to perpetuate the tutelage system. It did not care about left or right wing politics – its focus was the state. Meanwhile however, the February 28, 1997, coup did not only push the largest ideological group in Turkey away from politics, but also attempted to destroy them. In this respect, the February 28 coup is on par with the July 15, 2016, coup attempt. The July 15 coup attempted to have a larger impact than February 28. It tried to control all of society, not just a particular segment. If the July 15 coup attempt had been successful, the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) would have had control of both the state and society. As they failed with this aim, they attempted to push the country into a civil war. Considering these factors, only July 15 could be compared with February 28 in terms of vileness.

There is never a “good” coup. Military overthrows are vile. However, some are trying to whitewash February 28 today. Excuse me, but we have not forgotten, and will never forget the tragedies lived.

Much research has been produced related to the 28 February, 1997 coup, on what happened, what caused it, and the economic and political results. The decisions of the National Security Council forced Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan to resign despite the national will, and the government was suspended and put under the custody of the army, and the judiciary, bureaucracy, and business world put in the hands of politicians supporting the coup. Despite all these unfair actions, the symbol of 28 February came to be the head-scarf ban and the prosecutions undertaken to enforce it.

In particular, the head-scarf ban is an issue which has been mentioned and discussed by all categories of society. After countless panel discussions, demonstrations, and legal cases, the ban was finally completely lifted in October, 2013. That is to say, this ban remained in force from 1997 to 2013, or a total of 16 years. With compulsory education being 12 years long, and undergraduate education being 4 years long, that 16 year period encompassed a whole generation’s basic and undergraduate education, and impacted their prospects for employment as well. Furthermore, new age groups have entered in this system during the 16 years. In other words, because of the 1997 coup, women who sought to wear the headscarf were excluded from an education entirely.

There is no comprehensive qualitative and quantitative data about women who suffered under the head-scarf ban, on how many left their education, or completed education by obeying the ban, only to go on and not be able to find a job because they wanted to don the headscarf. We do not have any idea how the head-scarf ban has affected the participation of women in democracy, especially women with a weak socio-economic status. So when the participation of women in education, employment, and managerial positions is examined, we tend to automatically overlook the impact of the 28 February coup.

The Role of February 28 on Social Gender Equality 

Women’s appearance in education, training and working life became more pronounced in the years since 1990. The main cause of this was families in low and middle income groups supporting girls to put them through school. When taking into consideration the statistics of higher education, we can see the substantial difference between the number of schooled girls between 1980 and 1990, and 1990-2000.

 

The dramatic increase in women’s enrollment in higher education has, however, not been mirrored when it comes to employment in Turkey. The latest Human Development Index Report published by the United Nations Development Program includes a social gender inequality index, determined by the dimensions of women’s reproductive health, women’s recruitment, and economic activities. The dimension of women’s recruitment is measured by the numbers of women in general assembly and continuation of women to secondary school and higher education. In 2014, Turkey was ranked as 71st among 155 countries, with a 0.359 grade. On the other hand, the ratio of women who at least have secondary education is 39%, while the same ratio among men is 60%. Additionally, the number of women parliament members was 80 in 2017, so the ratio of female members in parliament was only 14%.

When we analyze the causes of this situation, generally we can see the situation to be derived from religious sensibilities and traditional practices, which are believed to encourage the exclusion of women from economic and social life. But that is not the only explanation. The preference long given to “modern women” in Turkey, meaning those who do not, for example, wear a headscarf, has also built up a powerful barrier which prevents the participation of religiously observant women in education, employment and management. But, this fact is ignored.

So, on this year’s International Women’s Day, we face the situation, as in previous years, where the image of “modern women” is brought forward and as before, the religious principles or traditional life might be blamed as the main cause of women being treated as second class citizens. Yet, this behavior causes unfair approaches for women, so Turkey’s women find themselves in a vicious cycle of resentment and unequal treatment. In spite of the fact that many women were treated unfairly between 1997 and 2013, the discriminatory attitudes of women towards other women is not discussed. Furthermore, their attitudes have continued to intensify.

According to November 2016 data of Turkish Statistical Institute on Labor Force, it seems that the labor force participation of women in Turkey is only 32.7%; and the overall employment rate is 27.5%. Women’s participation in business life as well as education are among the foundations for a country’s economic and social development. However, in the criticism of the low employment rates for women in Turkey, the effect of the 1997 coup is completely ignored. There are neither qualitative nor quantitative data on women who were forced to leave school after 1997.

Studies on how many women are prevented from studying, whether they entered into business life, or ended their careers very limited. We do not know what kind of impact the ban had on the economic and social participation of women who were already weak in terms of socio-economic status. This must be compared with the situation for women with a strong socio-economic background, many of whom were able to continue studying by going abroad, or establishing their own businesses, after the 1997 headscarf ban. Even now, in criticism of the education and employment rates of women in Turkey, the loss of human capital caused by the February 28th coup is not mentioned. Although, the February 28th ban imposed systematic discrimination against women, this coup’s sin and its sinners are ignored in analysis of social gender inequality.

Therefore, in order for women to overcome inequality in social life and to guarantee justice among the sexes, practices should be encouraged to ensure equality between women and men, not just among men only. Lessons must be taken from the mistakes of the past, and from the impact of the headscarf ban, which resulted in the ‘othering’ of a large segment of Turkey’s women. Moreover, it should not be forgotten that the greatest discriminatory practice on February 28th was the legitimizing of a “modern” understanding of women in Turkey, which was in fact, entirely illiberal.

Turkish politics has flared up after the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill. The reform bill seeks to move Turkey’s government system towards presidentialism. It introduces a severe system of checks and balances, or separation of powers by splitting the elections and operation of the executive and the legislative. The rationale behind this political move, as in many occasions allegedly voiced by the AK Party, is to avoid coalition governments and promote democratic politics as opposed to a bureaucracy. The AK Party asserts that coalition governments carry the danger of political instability and jeopardize democratic politics by opening up room for extra-political forces such as the bureaucracy.

Turkey’s main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), takes the lead against the reform bill. The CHP focuses on the end results of the system change and criticizes the amendment by arguing that it will turn Turkish politics into an authoritarian regime. Its main thesis is that it is likely to abolish the parliament and put an end to the republican regime. Yet, a closer look at the content of the reform bill reveals that the parliament will be intact. Nevertheless, it will lose its centrality after the center of gravity in the government system slides towards the executive. So this change does not pose a transgression on the republican order; on the contrary, it may reinforce the republican regime by boosting equality among citizens and giving a central role to the society in politics.

A closer look at the content of the reform bill reveals that the parliament will be intact.

Turkey’s Odyssey to the “Total” State

The Turkish state’s transformation from being a neutral state to a total state took place in a gradual manner. In the long nineteenth century (1808-1923), the monarchy was enervated by the bureaucracy and finally left its place to the republic in 1923. Although Turkey was established as a republic, at least in theory, it was an oligarchy in practice. So the state remained a neutral state for a long time. The bureaucratic oligarchy in Turkey might be divided into two periods. The one-party regime until 1950 and a multi-party parliamentary regime under the bureaucratic tutelage from the 1950s to the 2000s.

The general elections in 1950 were the first open and free elections of the republic. After the elections, the state opened up its doors to the society by allowing a multi-party parliament. The parliament, which used to be populated by merely the CHP, started to host the Democrat Party (DP). The DP attracted the support of the voters in the periphery and held the parliamentary majority with its successive electoral victories until the 1960 military coup.

http://thenewturkey.org/parties-politicians-and-dispositions-towards-the-july-15-coup-attempt/

The 1961 Constitution drafted after the coup redesigned the state-society relationship. It created a parliamentary system under the supervision of the bureaucratic elites. The parliamentary system under the tutelage of the bureaucracy limited the intrusions of society into the state. This was facilitated mainly by dividing the parliament into two chambers. The upper house was populated by the appointed members of the bureaucracy and served to control the lower house which hosted the representatives of the people. This was endorsed by installing more bureaucratic institutions to contain the political sphere.

The 1982 Constitution, on the other hand, redesigned the state-society relationship in a new format. It was drafted after the 1980 military coup, which came after the Kemalist state lost control of the society and that led to bloody clashes between the far-right and the far-left societal groups in the streets. The 1982 Constitution, therefore, gave emphasis to the executive branch in order to strengthen the state vis-à-vis the society. It divided executive power between the president and the cabinet of ministers. The president’s main role was to keep the cabinet and the parliament in line with the state.

After 2002, the AK Party started to dismantle the bureaucratic tutelage. The 2007 constitutional reforms introduced direct election of the president by the people. It thus transformed the presidential office from being the gate keeper of the bureaucracy to being the representative of the society. The president used to be elected by the parliament with the bureaucracy’s tacit permission. This was followed by the 2010 constitutional reforms that further curbed the bureaucratic tutelage by reforming the judiciary, especially limiting the powers of the military courts. The current reform bill seeks to continue this process of democratization by opening up the state to societal forces by moving the regime towards presidentialism.

The Crisis of the “New CHP”

The post-2002 period figures as the acceleration of Turkey’s evolution into a total state. This fundamental transformation in state-society relations has urged political parties to reconsider their political positions and discourses. The most radical change has taken place with the CHP.

Despite the fact that it has never won an open election to form a single-party government, the CHP’s secular-nationalist Kemalist ideology has always been in power. Hence, the CHP has always sided with the state in critical times against the society. It single-handedly ruled the state under a one-party regime during the period of 1923-1950. After 1950, it acted to protect the state from the intrusion of societal forces based in the periphery. Thus, it has strived to contain the parliament and placate democratic politics in order to maintain the “Kemalist” state.

The CHP’s struggle to protect the Kemalist state was carried out on the basis of its secular-nationalist ideology until around 2010.

The CHP’s struggle to protect the Kemalist state was carried out on the basis of its secular-nationalist ideology until around 2010. In 2010, the CHP not only changed its secretary general, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu replaced Deniz Baykal, but also it started to shape its politics around liberal-democratic ideology. With the liberal turn, the so-called New CHP has moved its politics from the protection of the state to the limitation of the state. More specifically, the CHP started to utilize liberal-democratic discourse in order to interrupt Turkey’s evolution to be a total state.

It has sought to form a political bloc with the anti-AK Party societal elements. The sole success of this liberal-democratic politics might be cited as the general elections held on 7 June 2015. For the first time the AK Party could not gain a parliamentary majority to form a single-party government. However, the other three political parties in the parliament also failed to carve out a coalition government. This led to a replaying of elections on 1 November 2015. The elections resulted in a landslide victory for the AK Party. This was the starting point of the crisis of the New CHP.

With the liberal turn, the so-called New CHP has moved its politics from the protection of the state to the limitation of the state.

However, this was followed by the gradual increase of terrorist attacks on Turkish soil. The PKK, the FETO, and Daesh have targeted the country. The most important breaking point was the failed coup attempt perpetrated by the Gülen terror group on 15 June 2016. After 15 June, Turkish society united against terrorism, which was dubbed as “Yenikapı Ruhu,” or the Spirit of Yenikapi, referring to a historic rally against the coup. Yet, this climate of societal unity soon ended and political parties divided into two opposing blocs. The AK Party and the MHP joined forces on the basis of a conservative-nationalist ideology, or so-called “authentic and national” politics (“yerli ve milli” siyaset). The CHP and the pro-Kurdish People’s Democratic Party (HDP), on the other hand, formed a tacit political bloc on the basis of a secular-leftist ideology. This has deepened the crisis of the New CHP.

The CHP-HDP bloc struggles to contain the AK Party-MHP’s joint project of reforming the state through empowering the executive by moving the government system towards presidentialism. The former constitutes the “NO” bloc whereas the latter the “YES” bloc on the current constitutional reform. If the “NO” camp loses in the coming referendum (which will probably be held in early April) and the presidential system is institutionalized, Turkey’s gradual evolution to a two-party political system around the division between conservative-nationalist and secular-leftist ideologies, which is currently underway, will continue and consolidate.

The CHP-HDP bloc struggles to contain the AK Party-MHP’s joint project of reforming the state through empowering the executive.

In this picture the CHP may stop swinging between liberal-democracy and secular-left ideologies by downgrading its emphasis on a liberal-democratic discourse, which mainly serves to limit the state and locks the CHP into being merely an opposition party. Thus, it may move secular-left ideology more into the center of its party politics. If that happens, then, it marks the end of the New CHP and perhaps causes a rift in the party’s leadership. Nevertheless, the CHP will have to take a more centrist and positive political discourse by moderating its emphasis on secular-left identity to become an alternative under Turkey’s new political conditions.

The 1982 Constitution and the Limits of Politics 

As the determinants of the legal norms forming a state a constitution provide the main references to regulate state agencies and draw a general frame for the fundamental rights and duties of all. This aspect of a constitution defines its legal character. Thus the entire legal structure of a state is basically defined by its constitution, written or unwritten, which theoretically laid down the superior ground norm for its functioning. Moreover, a constitution, as a part of its technical function, transfers the values, that would dominate the political organization of the state, to a normative platform. At this point a constitution outstrips its legal nature and gains an extrajudicial identity.

These being the basic functions of a constitution, the Turkish Constitution of 1982 brought forth, since it came into force, a rather precarious situation for the Turkish legal and political systems. For this reason, the 1982 Constitution could be named as an “anti-constitution” for its objective is ‘to guard’ the state against society. The result, as far as more than thirty years of experience has shown, is that this constitution makes a preference for the side of the state in the individual-state balance when applied by a narrow literal approach. This constitution makes the individuals’ rights and freedoms vulnerable against the state authority by the means of sacralisation. Its preamble and unchangeable provisions attest to the uncompromising nature of the 1982 Constitution.

As a product of the coup d’état which took place in September 1980, the 1982 Constitution served, in line with the mind-set of the interventionist high-ranking officers, to ensure military tutelage over the political and the public spheres. The authorized bodies of judiciary, executive and legislation were regulated in accordance with the framework drawn by the founding ideology. Furthermore, steps were also taken to inhibit the actors who would use these bodies in future to overstep the “red lines” which had been determined during the constitution making- process. The very natural consequence of this situation was to prevent possible leakages of opposition which are realizable through democratic elections.

http://thenewturkey.org/turkey-erdogan-and-the-wisdom-of-the-presidential-system/

The Institutional Structure of the Bureaucratic Tutelage

The 1982 constitution carries an ideological view of social life and determines its borders. Secularism and nationalism laid down the main components of this view. The unchangeable first three provisions provide the textual basis of this mechanism. The constitution highlighted two main factors in the bureaucratic tutelage system, one being the judiciary while the second is the president office. Both of these institutions enjoy broad authorities but they are mainly politically unaccountable.

The judiciary ensured the politics to become judicialized by the means of transforming “independence of judiciary” into a myth. This way, not only the power domain of political authority was restricted but also those political parties which were considered dangerous have been closed down and pushed out of the system by the Constitutional Court.

It is a fact that the negative scene in question has lost ground by the democratization attempts of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) within the scope of harmonization process to EU. These resulted in strengthening the civil politics.

The presidency could be considered as the other institution undertaking the carrier role of tutelage of the 1982 constitution. This continued to be the case until the constitutional amendment made in 2007. The mission attributed to this institution could be seen clearly by considering the constitutional powers and duties given to the president. The president, who has been elected by the parliament until 2007, exercised executive powers other than being only a figurehead as it is in the parliamentary regimes and was subject to slightest pressure to accountability. Thus, the president office turned out to become a vital instrument of tutelage. There are two dimensions of the constitutional nature of this office. First is the rather familiar and proclaimed role of the President of the Republic and the second is its capacity to strengthen the bureaucratic tutelage mechanisms. Moreover, the interventions made on the presidentially determined political domain of the Constitutional Court by both the president and the court members could be indicated as the clear evidence to this situation.

Obviously, the military and bureaucratic tutelage functioned with the contributions of the actors apart from two institutions. For example, the National Security Council (Milli Güvenlik Konseyi-MGK) which remained under the control of the military until 2000s or the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors (Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu-HSYK) as being the protectors of a specific ideology in judiciary were the effective institutions of this order.

It is a fact that the negative scene in question has lost ground by the democratization attempts of the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) within the scope of harmonization process to EU. These resulted in strengthening the civil politics. Two vital steps were taken to downgrade the tutelage by the constitutional amendments made in 2007 and 2010. By these amendments, presidency and judiciary, as the two vital institutions of tutelage, have become more accountable from a democratic viewpoint.

According a major amendment made in 2007, the president was to be elected by a popular election, which was practiced for the first time in 2013. Also, in 2010 the Constitutional Court and the High Council of Judges and Prosecutors were restructured to obtain a more democratic judiciary. Nonetheless these amendments remark to an unfinished ideal. The failures of the current state system and the revision of the position of bureaucracy toward democratic institutions still call for further steps.

The empowerment of the politics against bureaucracy has not been implemented only in constitutional dimension. Several steps have been taken in order to overcome centrist state administration by essential regulations and to strengthen the local administrations. Thus, efforts were made to create a transparent, politically elected and accountable administration mentality.

New Constitution and Legitimacy Gap of Politics

Recent public surveys show that approximately 70% of public demands a new constitution. The incapability of the Turkish Parliament to secure a new constitution bears the potential of undermining its credibility in the eyes of the populace.

The constitutional reconciliation commission which following the November 2015 elections resumed its activities offers an historic opportunity for drafting a new constitution. The political parties in the parliament need to take advantage of the connective and participatory power of the commission in order to increase the credibility of politics in the eyes of public and keep their promise for “new constitution”. However, that CHP has left the commission lately has a risk to miss this opportunity.

The constitution of 1982, which has been amended quite a few times since the day it was put into operation, failed not only to meet the popular demands but also to come up with a coherent and stable political mechanism. The gap left by legal politics has in time been filled by a bureaucratic tutelage which further complicated the functioning of Turkish politics. Despite many democratic steps taken by various AK Party governments the rationalization of Turkish politics and furthering the powers of legal political actors cannot be duly secured without a new constitution. On the other hand it should not be forgotten that the success of the new constitution making process is not only a structural imperative but it is also strongly demanded by the public. For this reason, elimination of the “presidentialism-centered” approach toward the new constitution issue of Turkey would provide a sound basis for the discussions.

From a societal perspective, a constitution is a multidimensional phenomenon. According to Kenneth Wheare, a distinguished authority on constitutions, there are two main attitudes about constitutions. According to the first a constitution is primarily and almost exclusively a legal document in which there is only place for legal rules and practically for nothing else. Yet, for those who favour the second attitude a constitution is a sort of manifesto, a confession of faith, a statement of ideals, a “charter of the land”. Essentially, a constitution is the basis for the organization of a state. And in turn state institutions provide for the society the necessary mechanism to exercise political, administrative, and judicial powers in order to ensure law and order. Also, it is through this mechanism that individual rights and duties are established and the economic activities are regulated and promoted.

Although currently the Turkish case is, quite understandably, at the centre of the debates in Turkey, this country is not alone in its quest for a new constitution. Writing a constitution is an important part of many peace-making and democratic transition processes. Newly founded independent states new regimes and countries in transition to democracy that seek democratic credentials put constitution-making at the top of their list of priorities. With its long-standing democracy Turkey is still ruled by the 1982 Constitution which has been designed by military forces instead of democratic processes. The constitution was a by-product of 1980 coup d’etat and lacks the civilian and democratic spirit. The 1982 Constitution aimed to deepen the military tutelage system that has been originally established by the 1960 Constitution which was put into effect after the 1960 military coup det’at. Several amendments has been made by on the 1982 Constitution by civilian governments since it came in effect to eliminate  not only the undemocratic but also anti-democratic features of the constitution. Yet, the undemocratic spirit is so deeply ingrained in this constitution that amendments fall short of finding a definitive solution. Shortly after the time it came into force, there have always been hot debates around this constitution and demands have been voiced by diverse social groups to produce a new and civilian one carrying the spirit.

Beyond the Text: the Question of Agency 

Notwithstanding the significance of debates around the content and the wording of a constitution the question of who has the right to make a constitution is usually insufficiently addressed. Thomas Jefferson, the principle author of the American declaration of Independence, wrote in a sent letter to James Madison and dated 6 September 1789 that “no society can make a perpetual constitution, or even a perpetual law. The earth belongs always to the living generation. They may manage it then, and what proceeds from it, as they please, during their usufruct.” Jefferson basically refers to the fact that not only each generation should be able to choose the laws under which it is governed, but also the power of repeal is in no way equal to the power to choose a new one. The principle of popular sovereignty and the unalienable right of the people to participate in public affairs require the promotion of popular participation in constitution-making. That is to say in democratic systems the ultimate right to participate in the making of a constitution rests with popular classes of the society.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-rise-and-fall-of-feto-in-turkish-politics/

Political elites inevitably play a major role in making decisions about how to structure a new constitution. However, there is now an established trend to build into the process broad participatory mechanisms in order to avoid a constitution that simply divides the spoils among competing factions, and to improve the chances of the new constitution enjoying a high degree of popular legitimacy. In the ever-changing world, therefore, the forms of public participation now go beyond just voting for constitutional representatives or in a referendum. Instead, they include civic education and media campaigns, public consultation (on how to manage the process as well as on the substance of the constitution), national dialogue, and other creative means. Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, President of Turkey, expressed in a speech in last January that the constitution making process should include public participation via workshops and search conferences.

Notwithstanding the significance of debates around the content and the wording of a constitution the question of who has the right to make a constitution is usually insufficiently addressed.

Public participation is often taken to mean voting—for example, electing a constitutional convention or ratifying a constitutional text by referendum. Especially in developing nations in Africa and elsewhere, however, there are experimental attempts to place the initiative in the hands of citizens and to create an open constitutional conversation in which the public partakes in agenda-setting, content writing and ratification processes.

The methods of constitution-making have changed over time. In absolute monarchies the monarch alone enjoys the monopoly to decide for a constitution. or else, many constitutions were imposed on a vanquished or colonized people (for example, in Western imperial systems—the MacArthur constitution in Japan after World War II, and to a lesser extent in Post-War Germany and in colonies once they gained their independence). From mid- twentieth century onwards democratic processes of constitution-making became the norm in which the principal responsibility has been assigned to a parliament or to a constituent assembly. Since the last quarter of that century, the emphasis has shifted to the active and qualified popular participation—whether as individuals, social organizations, or communities.

In order to successfully repeal the 1982 Constitution and to make a new civilian and democratic one in Turkey, all democratic actors must, as a prerequisite, acknowledge  popular right to make a constitution and to partake in the entire process. Especially the political parties represented in the parliament should spend the greatest effort to ensure the popular participation in the constitution-making process and to produce a constitution that reflects the popular will and meet popular demands.