T

he developments in North Africa have had a decisive impact on the current climate of instability in Mali. In this context, Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) emerged during the Algerian civil war in the 1990s and continues to operate in the Sahel. A group of Tuareg fighters received military training under Gaddafi’s ‘Islamic Legion’ project in Libya and came to northern Mali following NATO’s 2011 operation in Libya. These fighters established the Azavad Liberation Movement (MNLA) organisation and rebelled against the Malian state. These are the most fundamental examples of this claim.

The Tuaregs, constituting around 10 per cent of Mali’s population, organised under the MNLA and demanded an autonomous state. In order to repel state forces in the north, they formed alliances with various radical organisations, including AQIM, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and Ansar Dine. In March 2012, Amadou Toumani Touré, Mali’s president at the time, was overthrown in a coup by the army, who claimed that the government was unable to quell the rebellion.

The collapse of state institutions in the north enabled the MNLA to seize strategic centres such as Gao, Kidal and Timbuktu. However, a dominant group within the MNLA that embraced a secular-nationalist ideology caused a deep split within the organisation. The MNLA subsequently withdrew from the alliance because its secular-nationalist ideology was incompatible with that of the other radical groups, and the MNLA entered into armed conflict with them. Following clashes that began in Gao, the radical groups eliminated the MNLA.

Initially pursuing a secular goal of independence, the insurgency turned into a terrorist threat dominated by jihadist Salafi ideology when radical groups advanced southwards to capture cities in central Mali. Amid increasing instability, the Malian government accepted Algeria’s comprehensive peace plan and signed a peace agreement with a coalition of independence movements in the Azawad region, including the MNLA. However, excluding radical groups from this coalition has allowed them to expand their influence and spread their control towards central Mali and neighbouring countries, such as Burkina Faso and Niger.

In 2017, the Sahel branch of AQIM, Ansar Dine, the Katiba Macina Front and al-Mourabitoun merged to form Jemaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (JNIM). Led by the Tuareg leader Iyad Ag Ghali, JNIM pledged allegiance to the al-Qaeda leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and the Taliban leader Haibatullah Akhundzada following its formation. Since 2017, the organisation has increased its activities in the Sahel region, centred in Mali.

JNIM’s new strategy: Economic warfare

In landlocked Mali, which has a population of around 25 million, terrorist and violent acts that have been ongoing for over a decade reached a critical threshold in 2025. In recent months, the country has faced an intensifying siege as JNIM has cut off vital supply routes to the capital, Bamako. Moving beyond classic guerrilla tactics, JNIM has begun to target transport convoys and logistical routes, exploiting the state’s economic vulnerabilities.

In September 2025, JNIM announced a ban on fuel imports into Mali from Senegal, Mauritania, the Ivory Coast and Guinea, effectively aiming to isolate Bamako from the outside world. This embargo has led to one of the most serious crises in Mali’s history. JNIM militants have targeted fuel tankers and transport companies in the Kayes-Nioro corridor in the west of the country, destroying hundreds of tankers and cutting off the main roads connecting Mali to Mauritania and Senegal. This has effectively besieged the capital, Bamako. As a result of this economic blockade, fuel supplies to Bamako came to a standstill.

Additionally, JNIM has targeted gold and lithium mines operated by foreign investors, kidnapping foreign engineers and demanding high ransoms in exchange. The fuel blockade is part of JNIM’s evolving operational strategy, which now encompasses economic warfare. Rather than seizing the capital Bamako directly, JNIM aims to weaken the government in the eyes of the people by tightening the circle around the regime using economic tools. As a result of these attacks, the country has experienced fuel shortages, price increases, power cuts, and supply chain disruptions. These issues are having a paralyzing effect on daily life, creating both psychological and political pressure on the regime.

The governance gaps within the Malian state, coupled with the socio-economic and cultural divisions in the north and centre, have played a decisive role in JNIM’s rapid rise. The central authority’s inability to respond to the demands of rural areas in particular, coupled with the economic and social neglect of the population, has facilitated the establishment of shadow governance structures by JNIM. These structures have fuelled JNIM’s growing support and influence by forging local agreements with different sub-communities in Mali. Mali’s political turmoil in recent years has also deepened the security vacuum. Military coups in August 2020 and May 2021 brought Colonel Assimi Goita to power. Although the Goita regime promised to address security issues in the north of the country, it has not yet achieved this.

The role of international actors and failed security models

Since 2012, security measures, military operations and regional and international cooperation have played an important role in countering ongoing terrorist and violent acts by radical groups in Mali. In 2013, Mali requested assistance from France to counter the terrorist threat spreading southwards. France responded with Operation Serval in 2013. This operation later evolved into Operation Barkhane, which is centred in Chad and targets radical groups in Burkina Faso, Mali and Niger. It involves 3,000 personnel. This operation helped the Malian forces to recapture key cities.

However, large areas of the countryside remained outside state control, enabling armed groups to proliferate. Not only did the presence of French forces on the ground fail to end terrorism, it also led to growing resentment among the local population. Anti-French sentiment, stemming from the colonial past, fuelled a series of military coups in the region, particularly in Mali. The Goita regime expelled French and UN troops from Mali, claiming that France was violating the country’s sovereignty.

Following France’s failed military missions in Mali and its subsequent withdrawal from the region, this has presented both an opportunity and a challenge for Russia. Since 2021, the Wagner Group, a private military company with links to the Kremlin, has been operating in Mali, supporting counter-terrorism operations and internal security missions. The recapture of the symbolically important city of Kidal was initially regarded as a triumph for the Mali-Russia alliance. However, in July 2024, around 80 Russian mercenaries and 50 Malian soldiers were killed in an ambush by Tuareg rebels and JNIM near the Algerian border.

These developments demonstrate that the Malian army is facing serious challenges on the ground, despite receiving external support. Furthermore, reports that Ukraine may have shared intelligence with Tuareg forces against the Wagner Group highlight the increasingly complex and internationalised nature of the conflict in Mali. Following the death of Wagner leader Yevgeniy Prigozhin in mid-2023, the Russian presence in Mali was reorganised as the ‘African Corps’. However, Russian forces have largely withdrawn to their bases and have not succeeded in stopping radical groups from advancing across the country.

The regional security environment has deteriorated further following the 2023 coup in Niger. This has led to fragmentation within the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the formation of the Alliance of Sahel States (AES): a military and political alliance between Niger, Mali, and Burkina Faso. The AES was formed on 16 September 2023 through the Liptako-Gourma Charter. It was designed as a response to the West’s withdrawal from the region and the sanctions imposed by ECOWAS against military regimes. The AES aims to establish an alternative security architecture that is independent of Western influence and asserts ‘regional strategic autonomy’.

Since 2012, the collapse of state authority in northern Mali and the rise of radical movements have created an environment of insecurity that threatens the entire country. The Russian mercenary model, introduced as a replacement for France’s failed counter-terrorism strategy, has resulted in greater instability and increased civilian casualties, with terrorism now reaching the capital. This situation demonstrates that security crises cannot be resolved solely by military means or by relying on external actors. In the short and medium term, the most serious threat to Mali is the erosion of the state’s legitimacy and the strengthening of JNIM as an alternative authority. Mali’s return to lasting stability will only be possible through local solutions centred on inclusive governance, socio-economic development and regional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

I

n East Africa, radicalization has targeted specific societal groups that experience real or perceived threats that are easy for terrorist organizations to exploit. The terrorist groups recruit members willingly into the ranks of their organizations to gain support for their acts of violence against groups they perceive as enemies.

It continues to be an issue of debate whether radicalization actually leads to violence. One side argues that there is no causal link between radicalization and violence, and that radicalization does not necessarily lead to violence. They contend that individuals should be allowed to hold radical views and that this should be recognized as part of social freedoms, including freedom of thought and expression.

The argument goes that there should be a limit to the extent to which security services should intervene when people believed to be radicalized are involved in violent acts. People believe that there are other factors that contribute to involvement in violence and radicalization, the surrounding environment being one of them.

A second group places more emphasis on the root causes of radicalization. They argue that individual factors, including psychological factors, are the main cause, and that certain types of people are more prone to being radicalized than others. Of course, in addition to these two groups, there are also those who argue in favor of social factors causing radicalization.

However, this argument raises the question of whether every individual is equally susceptible to radical views and beliefs. The social primacy thesis is gaining momentum because it tends to link radicalization to social interactions and factors in the individual’s social environment which include exposure to poverty, education, environmental challenges, technological equipment, and access to technology.

The nature of radicalization and the means it uses have led to new debates including the question of whether individuals can become radicalized on their own, without the help or radical views of a third party. Even with little exposure to radical content, individuals have gained enormous potential for self-radicalization with the help of the internet whose impact on the field of radicalization has led to further differences of opinion.

For example, why when the internet provides easy access to radical content, some segments of society and individuals are potentially radicalized simply by accessing and consuming radical content, while others are not? Radical content is being accessed and processed differently by an increasing number of different internet users, but mass radicalization is not occurring. Online communication technologies have increased the likelihood that individuals who do not engage in violent acts will become radicalized.

How and why are they radicalized?

How do these actors conduct their radicalization and terror campaigns in East Africa? Who are their main targets and why? Violent actors have proven to be highly adaptable, particularly in response to counterterrorism measures implemented by legitimate authorities in the region. Initially, groups such as al-Shabaab used public spaces, including mosques and schools, to disseminate radical ideologies, particularly to young people. In Kenya, for example, where counterinsurgency operations can claim to be the most discreet, a number of iconic public mosques in Nairobi and Mombasa were infiltrated by pro-al-Shabaab clerics who conducted radicalization campaigns targeting young people.

Some of the clerics were high-profile Islamic figures who commanded respect among their followers, likely increasing the impact of their message and popularizing calls for violence in the name of jihad.

In addition to illiterate segments of the population, al-Shabaab also benefits from large numbers of educated and highly skilled but unemployed youth. The organization places great emphasis on using ethnic diversity, regional circumstances, and even family connections for radicalization and recruitment. Individuals targeted for radicalization are approached by people who are familiar and close to them, such as wives tasked with radicalizing their husbands. The increased reconnaissance and surveillance of open areas suitable for radicalization has limited the group’s activities to rural areas, where it targets young people.

Closer surveillance of open areas has also forced these groups to turn to online communication technologies, where they can target wider audiences with tailored messages, including translation into local languages. However, better regulation and control of online content by the authorities is preventing prolonged online radicalization. A fierce competition has emerged between the authorities and terrorist groups to open and close social media accounts, which, in turn, has led to almost instantaneous censorship of many online channels.

Measures against extremism and terrorism

It is important to focus on the counter-radicalization measures taken by the authorities in East Africa. In terms of the effectiveness of these measures, the authorities have initiated three main approaches in partnership with civil society organizations and other groups within society, while developing key measures to increase society’s overall awareness and resilience to terrorist recruitment and radicalization. In the case of Kenya, key interventions have been decentralized to the county and grassroots levels for maximum impact.

Through public awareness programs such as “Epuka Ugaidi” (Shunning Terrorism), community members in Kenya were sensitized and equipped with the necessary skills to prevent radicalization at onset. Other measures include the use of intercommunity forums and even sensitizing critical sectors of society to increase the effectiveness of their role in countering radicalization. Somalia has prioritized the sensitization of academics, religious figures, and community leaders to maximize their influence in eradicating al-Shabaab narratives.

The second category of measures are more specific interventions targeting groups considered high risk and vulnerable to radicalization. However, such classifications are essentially meaningless and can undermine the effectiveness of counter-radicalization programs. Such profiling potentially fuels resistance and increases the likelihood of mass community radicalization.

Secondary measures to counter this are, therefore, more comprehensive and more likely to be community-led violence prevention initiatives. Reputable civil society organizations and faith-based groups have been involved in supporting community-led processes. The implementation of targeted secondary measures prioritizes the highest levels of transparency, respect, and honesty to achieve better results.

The final category of measures, called tertiary, targets those who have already been radicalized and joined violent groups. Rather than actively preventing violent groups from recruiting new members, tertiary programs aim to disadvantage violent groups by creating discord and discontent among new members, potentially leading to defections. Interventions have included disarmament, demobilization, deradicalization, and reintegration programs, particularly for those who have defected, been rescued, or returned from al-Shabaab.

For counter-radicalization purposes, the Kenyan and Somali authorities have granted amnesty to defectors and returnees in return for them sharing their views on their horrific experiences within the organization. The employment of defectors and returnees sends a strong anti-radicalization message to the general population. The exploitation and victimization of these individuals for the purposes of radicalization and recruitment to terrorist violence using religious texts to justify or explain acts of violence and terrorism.

T

he rise of terrorism in the Sahel has created an atmosphere of instability that has led to military interventions in Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, and, most recently, Niger. The states of the Sahel and the Horn of Africa share certain characteristics that make the emergence of terrorism possible: the states in these two regions are weak, non-institutionalized, while the lack of transparency and accountability continues to hamper effective governance processes.

The rise of terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa is a major concern, not only for the well-being of citizens in these regions, but also because of the impact of instability on neighboring countries and regions. The Sahel region typically includes Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. The Horn of Africa includes Ethiopia, Somalia, Eritrea, and Djibouti. Frequent intrastate and interstate conflicts in these regions create an environment conducive to terrorist activity, and the 2011 crisis and overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in Libya made the Sahel a center of terrorism in Africa.

After participating in the conflict in Libya, Tuareg fighters returned to Mali in 2012 and joined the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) as part of its efforts to create a breakaway state. Violent extremist groups have also taken advantage of the political instability in Mali to expand their operations into Burkina Faso, Niger, and Chad. This has been achieved with the help of DAESH and al-Qaeda. In the Horn of Africa, al-Shabaab also received support from DAESH to expand its operations from Somalia into Kenya.

Terrorist threats in the Sahel

The countries of the Sahel are struggling with bad governance, economic decline, and complex processes of state development. Various efforts to achieve growth and development have been hampered by the rise of violent extremism perpetrated by terrorist groups. The main terrorist groups supporting violent extremism in the Sahel include Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Boko Haram, the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM).

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) was formed in 2006. It was led by Abdelmalek Droukdel until 2020, when he was killed. AQIM was mainly made up of dissidents who had participated in the Algerian civil war in the 1990s. In the 1990s, the group was called the “Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat.” In the 2000s, the GSPC pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda and aligned its operations with it. As a result, it adopted the name “Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb” in 2007. Between 2007 and 2010, AQIM operated almost exclusively in Algeria, with some limited operations in Mauritania in late 2007 and Niger in 2008. AQIM was involved in alliances with the Tuareg. In 2012, it led the MNLA against Malian forces.

Al-Qaeda’s activities have far-reaching implications for regional and global politics. As a transnational terrorist organization, al-Qaeda benefits from the use of violence to advance its religious-political agenda. The ever-expanding characteristics of this non-state armed group and its ability to adapt and mutate in different geographical locations make it increasingly difficult to combat. Between 2008 and 2014, AQIM is estimated to have generated $125 million from kidnappings. The ambiguous nature of AQIM’s operations makes it increasingly difficult to track the exact amount of money generated from arms, human trafficking, and kidnapping. Whatever the case, the funding from these illegal activities has allowed the groups to strengthen their fighting capabilities by purchasing modern weapons and attracting young followers.

Violent extremism in the Horn of Africa

Almost all countries in the Horn of Africa have experienced terrorist activity with al-Shabaab standing out as the region’s most significant terrorist group. Al-Shabaab emerged in Somalia in 2004, and in addition to its terrorist activities there, it has also carried out attacks in the neighboring countries of Uganda, Kenya, and Ethiopia. The aim of al-Shabaab is to overthrow the government and establish an Islamic state governed by Sharia law. The group has exploited the weakness of the Somali government to establish bases which it uses to prepare and launch attacks against civilians and the military.

In 2013, al-Shabaab attacked a shopping mall in Kenya, killing 67 people. In 2015, another 148 people were killed in an attack by the group on a university in Kenya. The group organized 14 hotel attacks in Nairobi in 2019. Al-Shabaab’s terrorist activities remain a major concern in Somalia as well. In 2019, the group carried out truck bombings that killed 80 people, while car bombings in Mogadishu killed more than 100 people in 2022.

What is more, both Ethiopia and Eritrea face internal ethnic and political tensions, further complicating regional security dynamics. Yemen may not be part of the region but its proximity means that the Sahel is also vulnerable to the spillover effects of the conflict there.

Counterterrorism efforts

Various efforts are being made to counter the threat of terrorism in the Sahel and the Horn of Africa. Operation Serval was one of the first counterterrorism operations launched by the French army in Mali in 2013. It succeeded in preventing AQIM, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MOJWA), and Ansar Dine from taking over the Malian capital, Bamako. The operation included numerous air strikes against jihadist groups.

Operation Barkhane, which followed Operation Serval in August 2014, is now responsible for counterterrorism operations in Mali, Niger, Chad, Mauritania, and Burkina Faso. These countries cooperate on security along the G5 Sahel coast. France deployed around 5,100 troops at the height of Operation Barkhane. In Operation Sabre, France deployed special forces and also led the multinational Takuba Task Force, which included special forces from Sweden, Estonia, and the Czech Republic.

The joint multinational task force was established in 2014 to counter the threat of Boko Haram, banditry, and organized crime. The Takuba Task Force was composed of Benin, Niger, Chad, Cameroon, and Nigeria. In 2017, the Sahel states of Mali, Burkina Faso, Chad, Mauritania, and Niger came together to form the G5 Sahel Force mentioned above. This regional counterterrorism force has gathered more than 5,000 troops to neutralize militant groups in the Sahel. In the case of the Horn of Africa, the United States launched a special operation against al-Shabaab.

U.S. forces conducted air strikes, provided military intelligence, and built the capacity of local partner forces to conduct ground operations. This counterinsurgency operation significantly reduced al-Shabaab’s influence. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also played an important role: AMISOM’s operations created the security conditions that allowed humanitarian organizations to operate outside Mogadishu. Between 2011 and 2012, AMISOM was able to reduce the areas under al-Shabaab control.

L

eadership decapitation is defined as operations that target neutralizing or capturing leaders, and high-raking political or military figures of terrorist organizations. The underlying reason of leadership decapitation is the idea that the leadership cadre of terrorist organizations is the most fundamental element of the organizations’ ideological, discursive, tactical, and operational structure.

Leadership decapitation aims at diminishing the organizational and operational capabilities of terrorist organizations, and thus preventing their ability to carry out any action. These operations also seek to weaken the leadership structures of terrorist organizations and disunite their communication networks.

Intelligence services’ field personnel identify the leadership cadre, including their overall positions and areas of operational responsibility. When the leadership cadre is captured or their command ranks are broken, their operational capabilities are significantly affected; when hierarchy is lost, communication and coordination problems emerge, and distrust ensues.

However, there are critical approaches to leadership decapitation. Some argue that a new leadership can quickly be formed within the organization, allowing its activities to continue. Here, the internal structure of the organization matters as ideologically motivated organizations may resist leadership decapitation more than religiously motivated ones.

The MİT and leadership decapitation

A general assessment of the operations by Turkey’s National Intelligence Service (MİT) in Iraq and Syria reveals a focus on targeting mid- to high-ranking organizational leaders. This intelligence work is based on data collected by field personnel deployed over a wide area of Iraq and Syria. In addition, information passed to the Command Centre is used to conduct UAV/UCAV operations against the leadership cadre of the organization. The main strategy is to disrupt the command ranks, i.e., the hierarchical order of the organization, in order to cause significant losses of qualified personnel and thus maintain a psychological advantage, leading the PKK into a process of dissolution.

In particular, the frequency and nature of operations in the first seven months of 2023 indicate that they are targeting high-level operatives and officials who have been active in the organization for many years. Between January and July 2023, at least 25 mid- to high-level operatives, including members of the PKK’s executive council, intelligence officers, regional special forces, and finance, communications, aviation, logistics, sabotage, and training officers, whose names have been disclosed, were neutralized.

For example, Celal Kaya, codenamed “Hasan,” PKK’s intelligence officer and the mastermind behind the assassination of the diplomat Osman Köse, who was martyred in Iraq, was rendered ineffective by an operation carried out by the MİT in July. Kaya is said to have gathered intelligence and planned actions for attacks on Turkish forces in Iraq and for the kidnapping of Turkish officials.

Impact of the MİT operations

The neutralization of leaders leads to a shortage of experienced personnel and gradually weakens the memory of a terrorist organization. Militants without operational capabilities are promoted to higher ranks, which leads to a decrease in the quality of a terrorist organization’s actions and a blunting of its decision-making capabilities.

Leaders of terrorist organizations hide in locations far from the theatre of operations and attempt to maintain communication with other members of the organization by radio, letters, or videos. Gaps in communication lead to disruptions in the chain of command and undermine the authority of senior members. Disrupted communication accelerates the rate of desertion and leads to the surrender of terrorists. The fear of disclosure of their location prevents terrorists from leaving their hideouts, leading to increased autonomy among lower-level members and an erosion of the authority of senior members.

The statements by sources from within the PKK terrorist organization regarding the operations carried out by the MİT and the Turkish Armed Forces in Iraq and Syria in May and June expose the organization’s weakness. The co-presidency of the PKK’s executive council announced the suspension of the unilateral ceasefire it had declared on February 6, 2023, and the decision to carry out terrorist acts.

Similarly, terrorist leader Duran Kalkan highlighted the election results and the operations of the Turkish security forces in the region and declared the YPG’s intention to carry out more radical actions. Salih Müslim, co-chairman of the Democratic Union Party (PYD), said that they had moved to a defensive position due to the increased operations and were waiting for the results of the Astana talks on June 21, which focused on Syria.

The leaders of the terrorist organization continue to threaten Turkey rhetorically, but these statements are nothing more than an attempt to react quickly against the Turkish security forces. In the organization’s internal discourse, these statements have no practical foundation. The common point between the statements by the PKK, Duran Kalkan, and Salih Müslim is their call for the support of the international community and the world powers against Turkey. This is a clear indication of their tactical and operational shortcomings which stem from their defensive position in Syria, their retreat to the south in Iraq, and their demoralized mindset.

The fact that more than 70 terrorists have been neutralized by the operations carried out by the MİT and the Turkish Armed Forces in the region since the second week of June paired with the fact that the PKK/YPG has ordered its members to wear civilian clothes instead of military uniforms prove that the organization does not currently have the capacity to respond.

B

etween June 2 and 4, the 20^th session of the Shangri-La Security Dialogue was held in Singapore, amid an escalation of tensions in the South China Sea. On the sidelines of the dialogue, China refused to hold a meeting between its Minister of Defense Li Shangfu and the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd J. Austin. The Singapore-based dialogue showed how Asian leaders are concerned about the deterioration of security in their region, where global interests compete.

What is the Shangri-La Security Dialogue?

The Shangri-La Security Dialogue is an annual conference organized by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in Singapore, where delegates from different parts of the world, including ministers, discuss security. It is named after the Shangri-La Hotel where the conference is held. It is the largest security meeting in Asia, bringing together defense ministers, military officials, policymakers, and experts from around the world to discuss and exchange views on security in the Asia-Pacific region.

The Shangri-La Security Dialogue serves as a platform for cooperation on regional security challenges, such as geopolitical tensions, military modernization, maritime disputes, terrorism, and other emerging threats. The conference includes keynote speeches by defense ministers or senior officials, in addition to panel discussions and interactive sessions. It serves as an opportunity for countries to express their security concerns, highlight their policy priorities, and engage in bilateral or multilateral discussions on regional security issues.

Six hundred delegates from 49 countries across the globe take part in the Shangri-La Security Dialogue each year, where security officials discuss issues which they can’t talk about due to diplomatic considerations. The importance of the dialogue lies in the number of bilateral and multilateral military meetings held on its sidelines, as well as dialogue sessions and speeches given by defense ministers.

U.S. Secretary of Defense Austin’s demands from China

In the same vein, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin spoke to Reuters about the priorities of the relationship between Washington and Beijing, stressing the importance of following some measures to prevent the outbreak of conflict between the two parties.

Austin added that Washington is concerned that China is not willing to engage in better crisis management mechanisms on the military level.

On Friday, June 2, during the Shangri-La Security Dialogue, U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin shook hands with the Chinese Minister of Defense Li Shangfu.

General Patrick Ryder, a spokesperson for the U.S. Department of Defense, said the handshake between the two ministers took place without exchanging any substantive conversation.

He noted that Washington stresses the need to maintain open lines of communication between the armies of the two countries, and that it will continue to seek meaningful talks between the United States and China.

Intelligence chiefs meet

According to Reuters, senior officials from twenty of the world’s top intelligence agencies held a secret meeting on the sidelines of the Shangri-La Security Dialogue.

People with knowledge of these meetings report that they are organized by the Singaporean government and are held secretly.

According to Reuters, U.S. Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines participated in the secret meeting, representing the U.S., with the presence of China and India and other countries, despite tensions between Beijing and Washington.

Samant Goel, the chief of the Research and Analysis Wing of India’s intelligence service, also attended the meeting.

A spokesman for Singapore’s Ministry of Defense said that while attending the Shangri-La Security Dialogue, “participants, including senior officials from intelligence agencies, take the opportunity to meet with their counterparts.”

He added that Singapore “may facilitate some of these bilateral or multilateral meetings,” noting that such meetings are useful.

W

ave theory in international relations refers to four waves to explain modern terrorism and how the concept of terrorism and political violence has developed over time from being an anarchist concept (associated with political activism) to being associated with religion (such as suicide bombings that harm civilians). The theory attempts to provide an understanding of terrorist groups based on studying the history of terrorism over four 40-year-long phases and the use of tactics, theology, shared characteristics, and the future vision of terrorist groups. Introduced by David C. Rapoport at the University of California in 2004, wave theory has gained much weight since its first appearance.

Four Waves of Terrorism

Rapoport argues that the first wave of modern terrorism emerged in Russia. Known as the Anarchist Wave, it started on January 24, 1878, when Vera Zasulich, an anarchist, wounded General Trepov, the governor of St. Petersburg, over his role in flogging political prisoners. The Anarchist Wave extended to 1919. Zasulich was not convicted following her trial, where she claimed, “I am a terrorist, not a killer.” Zasulich’s memorable words suggest that the concept has gone through structural changes from being “almost acceptable” and open to debate, to being extremely negative today.

The fact that Zasulich was not convicted speaks of this change. The Anarchist Wave spread to countries such as China and the United States, and was known for its use of assassinations of political figures, police officers, and state officials such as U.S. President William McKinley who was assassinated in 1901. The globalization of the Anarchist Wave left its marked on this period as Russian anarchists were able to spread their propaganda to other countries and change the characteristics of traditional terrorism as it existed before.

World War I marked the end of the Anarchist Wave and the rise of nation-states, which translated into a gradual disappearance of anarchism from public spaces. At the same time, many nations, especially in the Balkans, hoped to rid themselves of the rule of traditional colonialism – a hope that vanished with the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. At the same time, groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA), which adopted a liberation discourse against British colonialism in Ireland emerged. At the same time, towards the end of the 1940s, the Zionist paramilitary group Irgun appeared in British Mandate Palestine, carrying out terrorist attacks including targeting the King David Hotel in 1946, killing hundreds of British and Palestinians.

In the 1940s, the term “terrorism” gained more negativity over targeting civilians and using excessive violence unlike the Anarchist Wave that was centered around targeted assassinations. The second wave, the Anti-Colonial Wave, was centered on a discourse based on national histories and cultures, focusing on the local rather than the global. The mid-1960s saw the end of the Anti-Colonial Wave, with most non-state actors gaining their independence, such as the National Liberation Front (FLN in French) in Algeria in 1962.

The Third Wave, also known as the New Left Wave, began in the mid-1960s, kicking off in the midst of the Cold War between the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc, led by the United States. The Vietnam War saw the mobilization of the global left against the war. The Cold War allowed the Soviet Union to support anti-West forces and allowed the West to support anti-Soviet forces, which was translated into giving weapons, and political and financial support to different non-state actors, thus making the sponsorship of non-state actors involved in terrorism a state policy.

The Third Wave of terrorism was more about propaganda rather than harming people and it saw the rise of plane hijacking to send political messages or to release prisoners held by specific state actors through swaps. Tools such as radio and television were important elements in spreading the message of terrorism and political violence at the time, and terrorism was still able to maintain its global, but not globalized aspect. Assassinations, inspired by the First Wave of terrorism, were also revised during the Third Wave.

The Fourth Wave of terrorism, known as the Religious Wave, was largely inspired by the Iranian Revolution. The targeting of U.S. marines by Hezbollah in Lebanon in 1982 and the American hostage crisis in Iran which ended in 1981 following an Algerian mediation are two important examples from this wave. Although the Fourth Wave is largely associated with the Muslim world, it has also taken place in other parts or targeted Muslims such as the use of nerve gas by Aum Shinrikyo in Japan, the Ibrahimi Mosque massacre in Palestine, and the Tamil Tiger violence in Sri Lanka.

Unlike the three previous waves which were led by intellectuals, the Fourth Wave includes people of all backgrounds. This wave is ongoing and includes groups such as Al-Qaeda and Daesh, which has almost disappeared after its defeat in Iraq and Syria.

The Cold War and the Arab Spring 

The Cold War has played a major role in providing a political, military, and financial cover for non-state actors classified as terrorist by certain state actors such as the FLN in Algeria. Thanks to the politics of the Cold War, the FLN was more accepting of terms such as “revolutionary terrorism.” In the words of an FLN leader, “Urban terrorism like guerrilla warfare is the only method of expression of a crushed people.”

Yet, with the end of the Cold War, the excessive use of violence against civilians, the rise of the United States as the only superpower, the impact of 9/11 and the momentousness of harming so many civilians at once, and the politics of labeling, terrorism has become an all-negative concept. Non-state actors became preoccupied with removing themselves from terror lists by offering concessions or adopting a discourse that is more acceptable to state actors that deem them terrorist.

The Arab Spring and the sectarian politics it brought along has only emphasized the role of labeling in the terrorism debate, where regional politics, in addition to global politics, became effective in identifying a group as terrorist or not. The politics of the Cold War and the Arab Spring have contributed to making terrorism an exclusively negative concept, especially following 9/11 and the shock waves it sent across the world.

Looking at the concept of terrorism, over the span of 125 years, we see that it has emerged from being “almost acceptable” to being rejected as purely and extremely negative. Today, terrorism is a negative label and with the end of most anti-colonial struggles, it will become harder for non-state actors using violence as a tool of political expression to market their agenda to the rest of the world, especially in light of regional and global politics.

C

hainalysis, a Singapore-based blockchain data platform, published a report, which claims that cryptocurrencies are used to finance terrorism. According to the research, in 2021, terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and Daesh (ISIS) attempted to finance their operations by using cryptocurrencies. Experts consider providing funding to non-state actors and similar actions as “terrorism financing.”

According to the 2022 Crypto Crime Report, Al-Qaeda bought cryptocurrency in 2019 and 2020 via Facebook groups and Telegram channels. According to the report, the money services businesses (MSBs) which enabled some of these transactions were detected by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), Homeland Security Investigations (HSI), and Internal Revenue Service, Criminal Investigation (IRS-CI).

The al-Qassam Brigades, the military arm of Hamas, as a non-state actor collected more than $100,000 in donations in early 2021, the report claims. Additionally, the Israeli government confiscated a large portion of it from related MSBs in July.

How Non-state Actors Use Cryptocurrencies

The National Bureau for Counter Terror Financing (NBCTF) announced on June 30, 2021 that it confiscated cryptocurrencies from numerous wallets linked to Hamas-funding operations. This action comes after a long investigation into these activities. According to many media accounts, the operation followed a significant surge in bitcoin donations to the al-Qassam Brigades in May 2021 as a result of heightened fighting between Hamas and Israeli forces.

In recent years, Hamas has suffered financial woes due to the lack of cooperation between banks and the organization. To overcome its financial difficulties, in 2019, Hamas asked its supporters to donate in Bitcoin.

The NBCTF seized assets including Bitcoin, Ether, Tether, and XRP. According to the Chainalysis report, the seizure was made possible through a review of blockchain data and open-source intelligence (OSINT). This is the first cryptocurrency confiscation specifically targeting a non-state actor, containing a variety of digital currencies. 

The G20 Bali Summit, which took place on November 15-16, was expected to place a strong emphasis on the regulation of cryptocurrencies due to the rise in their use and in money laundering. The final declaration of the 17th meeting of the G20 gained a lot of attention as it called on the OECD to improve its commitment and monitoring of the widespread implementation of the Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes. The declaration also welcomed the MSB’s approach to establishing a comprehensive international framework for the regulation of crypto assets and their activities based on the principle of “same activity, same risk, same regulation.”

Experts argue that governments and NGOs must provide quick answers when demanded and abide by regulations.

Daesh (ISIS) and Cryptocurrencies

Daesh’s use of cryptocurrency has constantly increased as the terrorist organization cannot use conventional financial transaction methods. Many MSB systems, such as PayPal and MoneyBeam, can be accessed globally, are used to transfer funds quickly, and, most importantly, it is difficult to identify the actual end-user.

Hence, terrorist groups are able to use shell companies and fast money transfer to move financial assets into their accounts. On the other hand, while there is a customer identification rule in traditional banking activities, MSBs offer legal loopholes as well. Terrorist groups can benefit from these loopholes to conduct transactions with anonymous accounts. Daesh realized this and started using PayPal and Bitcoin.

In 2017, U.S. citizen Zoobia Shanaz was charged with money laundering. Shanaz used cryptocurrencies, including Bitcoin, through stolen cards to support Daesh in Iraq and Syria, raising as much as $85,000. A review of the U.S. official sources on the investigation does not provide detailed information on how the fraud was perpetrated.

The report “Bitcoin and the Dark Web: The New Terrorist Threat” published in 2018 by Antonia Ward, a RAND Europe analyst, notes that Daesh raised funds using cryptocurrencies in 2014. The clearest evidence is that the list of weapons such as rockets, rifles, grenades, and other equipment were given with prices in cryptocurrency. A campaign called “Jahezona” was launched and Bitcoin QR codes were added.

On another occasion, Daesh launched advertisement campaigns by sharing Bitcoin addresses. The transactions that ensued took place on the dark web.

Similar to Daesh, Al-Qaeda has used cryptocurrencies. The year 2019 saw the solicitation of Bitcoin donations using a Telegram account called “Tawheed” and Jihad Media, which purportedly had ties to Al-Qaeda groups in Syria back then.

Al-Qaeda requested donations using the slogan “Fundraising Campaign – Finance Bullets and Rockets for the Mujahideen,” and supplied a Telegram account to contact for more information. Donations were requested via a variety of channels, including Bitcoin, Western Union, and PayPal.

As terrorist organizations quickly adapt to technological innovation for survival, eradicating them is becoming harder.

T

he international community experienced yet another terror shock on November 13, 2022; this time, the target was Istanbul’s most popular and crowded pedestrian avenue, Istiklal Street. Six people died and 81 others were wounded. Turkey is a country, which has been struggling to eliminate terror of all kinds for five decades. Contrary to the arguments by some analysts who repeat the old customary narratives about most terror attacks, this attack has unique differences compared to preceding ones.

The Istiklal Street terror attack directly and indiscriminately targeted civilians, proving the Western perception of the “moderate” PYD utterly false. To combat ISIS (Daesh), the United States and its European allies promoted the PYD by supplying weapons and nurturing the positive image of a group dedicated to legitimate ideals.

James Jeffrey, (former) the United States Special Representative for Syria Engagement and Special Envoy to the Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS, had ‘once’ tried hard to legitimize the PYD and persuade Turkey to tolerate its presence in Northern Syria. Brett McGurk, the former Special Presidential Envoy for the Global Coalition to Counter ISIS at the U.S. Department of State, keenly protected and rebranded the PYD.

The “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) was the new name given to the PYD after the inclusion of several Arab tribes to show its alleged plural structure. The U.S. officials, mainly CENTCOM staff and McGurk, currently the U.S. National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa, promoted the SDF as a secular organization to counter ISIS, denying their link to the PKK, which the U.S. recognizes as a terrorist organization.

The Istiklal Street terror attack both proved the PYD’s use of terror and revealed its organic affiliation to the PKK. The apprehended terrorists, primarily Ahlam Al-Bashir, confessed that the PYD trained her as a “special intelligence agent” in Manbij, where it planned this terror attack under the directives of the PYD leadership, and she then moved to Idlib before infiltrating into Turkey through the Regime-held areas. In other words, the huge network of a terror group is mobilized in Northern Syria’s PYD-controlled areas and its extensions in Turkey.

Al-Bashir’s confession of her relationship with the PYD is significant for understanding how the U.S. government is providing operational, intelligence, logistical, and ideational support to the terrorist group through American taxpayers’ money. The “18 U.S. Code Chapter 113B: TERRORISM” defines terrorism as follows:

(1) The term “international terrorism” means activities that—

(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or of any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State;

(B) appear to be intended—

(i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population;

(ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or

(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by mass destruction, assassination, or kidnapping; and

(C) occur primarily outside the territorial jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend national boundaries in terms of the means by which they are accomplished, the persons they appear intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum…

Without a sliver of doubt, the Istiklal Street terror attack fits into this definition and is a clear violation of the U.S. code. It seems that the U.S. government will soon have to come to a decision: maintaining its solidarity with Turkey to defeat global terrorism or continuing to ally with a terror group and facing the responsibility of breaking its own legal code. There is also the interesting aspect of the American threat perception which on the one hand, perceives Iran and Russia as hostile and, on the other, tolerates the partnership of the PKK/PYD with Russia and Iran.

A further debate would be about the strategy of the PYD/PKK—the group appears under different names such as SDF, YPG, KCK, and others. This terror attack had subliminal objectives that could expose the terror network’s agenda. Let’s have a closer look.

The perpetrator of the Istiklal Street terror attack, Al-Bashir, seems to have been selected deliberately for this activity. For years, the PYD has been promoting its female members as “freedom fighters” with the male-dominated leadership urging female members to commit suicide bombings. If the Turkish security forces had neutralized Al-Bashir, the PYD would have circulated her image as yet another figure killed in a “heroic act.”

More importantly, Al-Bashir is of Afro-Arab Syrian origin, and her involvement in a terror attack was intended to provoke the Turkish public, already alerted by the huge number of Syrian refugees in Turkey. A Syrian committing a terror attack has a potential to sharpen people’s ethno-nationalist sentiments ahead of the June 2023 general elections. Thus, the AK Party government could be seen to be entrapped between its open-door policy to Syrians and sustaining the safety of Turkish citizens. Meanwhile, the opposition would have escalated the anti-Syrian rhetoric to gain votes, and the PYD would have ignited social unrest in Turkey by playing Turks off against Syrians, leading to the break of ties between the Syrian National Army and Ankara.

The Netherlands listed a Dutch pacifist activist on a terrorism list and shared his data with Europol, the European police agency, and Interpol, the international police agency. Here are the risks the activist is now facing.

Surveillance society 

The threat of terrorism and organized crime has led countries around the world to develop surveillance systems meant to prevent attacks and crimes. Large scale databases have been set up to inform law enforcement authorities about the activities, movements, and statements of suspected persons.

Because of the movement of suspects across borders, police authorities cooperate and exchange information about their identity and whereabouts.

Interpol and Europol store information on persons in the form of alerts sent by national police authorities. Those alerts request for a particular action to be taken such as the surveillance, arrest, detention or the deportation of the person.

A Dutch pacifist activist on a terrorism list

For years, Frank van der Linde has been advocating for social justice. He has demonstrated and publicly defended anti-racism causes and the rights of the Palestinians.

In 2014, the Dutch police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) started surveying van der Linde, including by recording his statements on Twitter. From 2017 to 2019, they added his personal data to a terror list alongside terrorist suspects and shared this information with Europol and Interpol. Since then, the police referred to Frank activities with a CTER-code (Counter Terrorism Extremism and Radicalization).

In October 2018, for the first time, van der Linde requested the police provide him with the information they stored about him, and he learned about being surveilled. In February 2019, police agencies including the NCTV recognized Frank’s activism as non-violent and removed him from the terrorism list.

Black Boxes of Information 

Interpol’s constitution, adopted in 1956 after the police agency had briefly fallen into Nazi hands, states neutrality as one of the main principles guiding its actions. The organization is strictly forbidden to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character (Article 3, Interpol Constitution).

Interpol’s red notices have been used by states to track and imprison political opponents who have fled their home countries.

Similarly, Europol as a European agency adheres to the key principles of good governance promoted by the Ombudsman’s European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, including impartiality.

Interpol’s red notices have been used by states to track and imprison political opponents who have fled their home countries. Recognized refugees fleeing persecution have been targeted with alerts asking for their detention and return.

Vivid criticism from members of civil society led to the reform of Interpol and to the creation of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF) that reviews whether alerts are in line with Interpol’s rules. In practice, however, plenty needs to be done, and the vetting system remains inconsistent and secretive.

The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the supervisory authority for Europol, admonished the European police agency last year for collecting information outside of its mandate. Large scale databases were sent by member states to Europol’s big data case for analysis. Due to the number and complexity of the information, the police agency stored them all before reviewing them.

Vivid criticism from members of civil society led to the reform of Interpol and to the creation of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF) that reviews whether alerts are in line with Interpol’s rules

The decision to transfer personal data to a police agency should not be taken lightly. To protect the principle of impartiality and individual rights, police agencies should review all data shared by states before making them available in their system.

Who polices the police?

Van der Linde’s information has been removed from the Dutch terror list.

However, there is no automatic deletion from Interpol and Europol systems after the data has been deleted from the national database.

Europol has decided in this case to keep the data in its database. The EDPS is currently reviewing Europol’s decision to refuse van der Linde’s request for information. The supervisory authority has nonetheless no enforcing power on Europol. Indeed, Europol’s big data case has not been followed by corrective measures from the police agency. On the contrary, the recent reform proposal by the commission regarding Europol regulation will legalize the unlawful practices of the police agency.

In May, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on the case of a German citizen who after suspicion of fraud had his personal information recorded in a red notice by Interpol. After settling the case in Germany with the payment of a fine, he complained that his data continued to be stored by Interpol due to an alert based on the same fraud in the United States.

Sources reported that Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar was badly wounded in gunfire in Kabul over a disagreement among the Taliban leaders on how to resolve the Panjshir situation and government structure. The Taliban later denied that Baradar was wounded. Nevertheless, a source asserted that the Deputy Afghan PM Mullah Baradar is upset with the current face of the Taliban government.

The Taliban formed the government and appointed ministers after 20 years of fighting the U.S. and the Afghan government. Last month, the Taliban swiftly reached the capital and took over 33 of the 34 provinces in the country without major impediment. However, despite a massive aerial and ground encroachment on Panjshir, the resistance against the Taliban is still alive.

The Taliban are going through a transition from guerilla fighting to governance, bringing order to a multiethnic nation, and adjusting within the contemporary world. War and governance are two distinct issues. Now that the Taliban must govern, they face numerous challenges.

Governance: No single institution is functional

The Taliban had vowed that the group would form an inclusive government where all political parties, ethnicities, and classes see themselves in the government. Nevertheless, last week, they announced their first cabinet where only their leaders and commanders are appointed. The announcement faced massive criticism since it did not include a single woman or any Hazara ethnics, whereas Afghanistan is home to millions of Hazaras.

The appointed ministers lack governmental experience, and no minister has a PhD, master’s, or undergraduate degree, while all the cabinet members, including its chief minister, are religious scholars. In addition, many of the skillful, well-educated, and experienced Afghans have already left Afghanistan and those who remain are striving to get out.

Human rights and the Taliban

The Taliban’s fastidious form of Islam has been met with deep concerns by human rights organizations and movements across the globe. In a democratic and liberal society, the Taliban apply an interpretation of Sharia law where music is banned, and women’s rights to education and work are limited or completely halted. This decision has brought the group face-to-face with criticism by the international community.

For the past 20 years, women enjoyed access to education and work – rights that they are now denied to them by the Taliban. Concurrently, Afghans have been posting on social media videos of Taliban flogging women on the streets and searching houses for affiliates of the previous government.

Such actions have led to women’s demonstrations in Kabul and a massive protest in Kandahar against the Taliban. The social media campaigns and attacks on them have discomforted the Taliban to the extent that the group couldn’t fully comprehend and mark its victory. Afghans and their sympathizers across the globe have been actively engaged in publicizing the Taliban’s actions. Relying on social media, the global media formulate news and update policy-makers across the world about the Taliban. The Taliban are monitored by ordinary Afghans’ cell phones, who record their moves and in one click inform the entire world.

The Taliban and the economy

The United Nations Secretary-General António Guterres warned that Afghanistan faces a dramatic humanitarian crisis. The warning comes after international aid to Afghanistan has dried up, businesses are closed, investments have fled, unemployment has reached an all-time high, and poverty is rife. The protracted conflict and drought have exacerbated the humanitarian catastrophe. The UN reports that in 2021 alone, over half a million people have been internally displaced in Afghanistan.

The Taliban now manage revenue sources such as customs; however, in the absence of trades, investments, and businesses, the customs do not generate enough revenue. In fact, they do not even cover the daily expenses of the Taliban’s sustenance and fuel expenses. The Taliban also do not have access to the $9.5 billion in assets belonging to Afghanistan’s central bank, which have been frozen by the United States. The country’s economic situation and the humanitarian catastrophe are causing genuine hardship to the Taliban.

Security challenges: National Resistance Front and ISIS-K  

In Afghanistan, Taliban fighters were not the only security threat to the country. Among others, the fighters of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) have conducted numerous attacks and have fought hard against the Taliban. After the fall of Kabul, ISIS-K published a commentary where the group accused the Taliban of betraying Jihadists with the peace agreement with the U.S., and the group vowed to continue fighting the Taliban. Since the Taliban took over the capital, ISIS-K has carried out deadly attacks.

Among others, the fighters of the Islamic State in Khorasan (ISIS-K) have conducted numerous attacks and have fought hard against the Taliban.

Last month, ISIS-K fired rockets in Kabul followed by a statement which read, “By the grace of God Almighty, the soldiers of the Caliphate targeted Kabul International Airport with six Katyusha rockets.” In another incident, the group carried out twin suicide attacks against a crowd outside of the Kabul airport killing 85 people, including 13 Americans. It is estimated that the group has 4,000 to 5,000 fighters in Afghanistan. In an interview with CNN, Abdul Munir, a commander of the so-called Islamic State stated that he leads 600 fighters, including Indians, Pakistanis, and Central Asians. He added, “When the foreigners and the people of the world leave Afghanistan, we can resume our operations.”

Apart from the so-called Islamic State, the National Resistance Front of Afghanistan (NRF) is another headache for the Taliban. Even though the Taliban fighters have seized the center of Panjshir, the NRF fights from the mountains of Panjshir. The majority of the commanders of the Northern Alliance (officially the United Islamic National Front for the Salvation of Afghanistan), including Marshal Abdul Rashid Dostum, Atta Mohammad Noor, and Hazara leaders have fought heavily against the Taliban.

Ismail Khan, another prominent commander in the  Panjshir resistance, asserted that the Taliban’s rule will not last and that Panjshir resistance is expanding. These commanders have opposed the Taliban in Afghanistan. Should they begin a resistance, they would put the Taliban’s government in hardship.

International isolation and the Taliban

The previous Afghan government was recognized worldwide; however, despite the Taliban having appointed their cabinet and chief minister, no country is amenable to recognizing their government – even the countries that have supported them in fighting the U.S. Despite Pakistan’s support for the Taliban, the country has not recognized their government. Iran and Russia, once amicable to the Taliban, now move in a different direction. Tehran slammed attacks on Panjshir Valley and urged the Taliban to honor commitments. It also slammed Pakistan’s aerial attacks on Panjshir and said it will probe into the attacks.

On the other side, Moscow has sent its military to Tajikistan to block potential threats from Afghanistan. The Taliban also face international isolation. The European Union had already threatened the Taliban with isolation if they seize power. In addition, Germany’s foreign minister stated, “A transitional government that does not include other groups is not the signal for more international cooperation and stability in the country.”

The E.U.’s top diplomat, Josep Borrell, said in a statement that the Taliban would face international isolation. NATO, the UN, and Britain warned that the Taliban will be isolated should they continue to take power by force, and that the international community will not recognize the group. Importantly, the president of the United Nations Security Council for September warned that the Taliban must sever ties with all international terrorist organizations or continue to face sanctions and isolation.

Should the Taliban not dramatically change their ideas and actions, the group might face extinction as it cannot govern a complicated country in a complicated region. To govern, the Taliban need legitimacy from the people, international recognition, and monetary resources. Meanwhile, they halted political dialogue and encroached on the National Resistance Front in Panjshir. Yet, a good lesson to be learned in Afghanistan today is that when the Taliban were toppled in 2001, they soon resurfaced in Bahramcha in the Helmand Province.

Should the Taliban not genuinely engage with the world and Afghan parties on the issues of concern, there are risks of facing international sanctions and of the emergence of national confrontations.

Prior to the terror attacks outside Kabul Airport that took the lives of 170 people and at least 200 wounded which included Afghan civilians and American military personnel. Western countries were warned of an impending strike. The attack on August 26, 2021, did not surprise the Pentagon, and neither did their perpetrators. The Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) was ready to inflict devastation by taking advantage of the chaos at Kabul Airport.

The U.K, New Zealand and the U.S. were warned; as stated by a senior U.K. defense official James Heappey, who told the media prior to the bombing of an ‘imminent, lethal attack’. The U.S. embassy in Kabul sent a warning on August 28th warning US citizens in Afghanistan at many airport gates to “leave immediately” due to security risks. President Joe Biden has highlighted the possibility of an assault many times during the last week, using it as justification for not delaying the August 31 deadline for military withdrawals.

In response, President Joe Biden vowed to track down the perpetrators and instructed his military chiefs to devise counter-plans against the terror group and later on stated “And to ISIS-K: We are not done with you yet”.

ISIS-K and their objectives

The Islamic State Khorasan Province, also known as Daesh Khorasan, ISIS-K, ISKP, is an official affiliate of the so-called Islamic State in Afghanistan, as acknowledged by its central leadership in Iraq and Syria. ISIS-K was established in January of 2015. It was able to establish territorial authority in numerous rural areas in north and northeast Afghanistan in a short period of time, and it started a deadly campaign across Afghanistan and Pakistan.

ISIS-K perpetrated assaults against minority groups, public spaces and institutions, and government offices in major cities in Afghanistan and Pakistan in its first three years. Emboldened by America’s withdrawal, ISIS-K initially appeared in 2015, a year after ISIS — originally a branch of Al-Qaeda that developed into a competitor — captured tracts of territory across Iraq and Syria and declared a caliphate.

Both ISIS-K and the Taliban are religious fundamentalist groups who aim to govern via an authoritarian system based on their radical interpretation of the Sharia law.

Both ISIS-K and the Taliban are religious fundamentalist groups who aim to govern via an authoritarian system based on their radical interpretation of the Sharia law. Though both employ violence to maintain their regimes, the distinctions between the extreme organizations – as well as others like Al-Qaeda – basically boil down to significant strategic disparities, ISIS-K’s goal is to establish a caliphate in Central and South Asia; outside the borders of Afghanistan whereas the Taliban’s focus is establishing an Islamic governing state within Afghanistan.

The ideological interpretation and enforcement of the Sharia law is one of the vital differences between the most important Daesh and the Taliban. One element is how women are treated in their interpretation of Islamic law. Reuters Institute of Journalism published a lengthy paper on this topic stating that “ISIS heavily sexualizes females as an object… whereas Taliban portray women in one consistent role.”

What happens next?

International experts are afraid that the humanitarian situation will worsen in the coming weeks and months, despite the fact that comprehensive evaluations will take time and require much enhanced humanitarian access. In the first half of 2021, civilian deaths and injuries in Afghanistan hit new highs, with a particularly significant spike in killings and injuries since May 2021, when international military forces began to depart, and combat increased following the Taliban onslaught.

On July 26th, UNAMA (United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan), released a new study, in which it predicts that unless violence is significantly reduced, Afghanistan will see the greatest number of documented civilian fatalities in a single year since UNAMA records began in 2021.

The research warns that if the rising violence is not stopped, an unprecedented number of Afghan civilians will die or be wounded this year. According to the head of UNAMA, Deborah Lyons, “The data shows a very disturbing trend, particularly since early May, of ever-increasing numbers of Afghan civilians being killed and injured due to the expanding conflict”.

This will most certainly continue to spread terror and confusion, delay the withdrawal process, and demonstrate that the Taliban are unable to provide security to the populace in the short term. If the organization can reestablish some kind of territorial control in the long run and recruit additional fighters, it is likely to make a resurgence and represent a danger on a national, regional, and worldwide scale and the attack on Kabul Airport would be small in comparison to what they’re capable of doing, and will further exacerbate a Central Asian refugee crisis.

U.S. President Joe Biden announced last week that the U.S. military mission in Afghanistan will end by August 31. He called on the leaders of Afghanistan to come together to prevent a possible civil war after the U.S. withdrawal. The U.S. president asserted that “after 20 years of American valor and sacrifice, it’s time to bring those troops home.” In April, during testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Zalmay Khalilzad, U.S. special representative for Afghanistan, made a similar statement, stating, “The choice that the Afghans face is between a negotiated political settlement or a long war.”

After 9/11, the U.S. and its allies invaded Afghanistan to oust the Taliban’s regime and annihilate Al-Qaeda. With the current withdrawal of U.S. troops, have these objectives been achieved?

To examine the first objective, it is widely believed that Al-Qaeda is still present in Afghanistan. The UN Security Council report dated February 3, 2021 states that Al-Qaeda has 200 to 500 fighters in about 11 provinces of Afghanistan. According to the report, Al-Qaeda media chief Abu Muhsin al-Masri was killed in Ghazni province on October 20, 2020, and a deputy of Al-Qaeda, Mohammad Hanif, was killed in Farah province on November 10, 2020.

The Taliban commanders have also acknowledged the presence of Al-Qaeda in the country. Two Taliban commanders told NBC News that the Taliban have asked foreign militants and Al-Qaeda not to execute any terrorist attack against the United States. The U.S. and NATO forces achieved a splinter of their objective when they killed Osama bin Laden, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Pakistan. However, the ideology, legacy, and adherents of Al-Qaeda are still present in Afghanistan.

As far as the Taliban are concerned, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan did not lead to their defeat.

In his speech, Biden stated that Al-Qaeda has been downgraded, which is true. Nonetheless, the Taliban were also severely downgraded after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. However, the group soon remerged and now governs more than half of the country. Should Al-Qaeda expand its presence in Afghanistan, the group might consider vengeance for the killing of their leader and his immediate circle. Hence, without a proper political settlement, the withdrawal of U.S. troops will imperil the country as Al-Qaeda will be strengthened and other militant groups will possibly emerge.

As far as the Taliban are concerned, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan did not lead to their defeat. Despite the fact that the Taliban were downgraded at first, at a later stage, they made a triumphant comeback. After the September 11 terrorist attack, an international coalition force was able to topple the Taliban regime and entrench the Afghan government.

Attempts in the West to combat terrorism allegedly related to Islam suffer from three serious flaws: terrorism is attributed to Islam in general; governments believe that they can handle it all by themselves; and they rely almost exclusively on criminal law.

Terrorism is supported only by a few and rejected by many

First of all, among political and media circles, terrorism is often portrayed as the inevitable outcome of a “clash of civilizations.” In this view, Islam is regarded as being incompatible with Western values. This position is exemplified by the statement made by French President Emmanuel Macron last year that Islam needs to come to terms with Enlightenment. In so doing, the French president lost sight of the fact that Enlightenment has actually incorporated key elements of Islam, such as tolerance, which was a hallmark of the Ottoman Empire, and human reason, which was introduced by Ibn Rushd.

The “clash of civilizations” discourse denies that Islam has contributed significantly to Western civilization. The West owes much of its knowledge in the area of the natural sciences and medicine to Muslim scholars. Although the Renaissance is often seen as the result of Europeans rediscovering classic Greek and Latin texts, it actually relied heavily on the work of Muslim scholars. Not only had they saved the texts for posterity by translating them into Arabic, they had also further refined and developed the ideas contained therein.

This “clash of civilizations” position also fails to recognize that according to Islam, Muslims who live as minorities in non-Muslim countries are supposed to respect the government, obey the laws, and fit into society. As soon as Muslims apply for a visa, a residence permit, or citizenship, they enter into an agreement, under which they are supposed to discharge their duties loyally towards the state.

The large majority of Muslims relate such a jihadist view to a biased and distorted interpretation of religion.

In return, the government is supposed to ensure their freedom of religion. Therefore, instead of trying to domesticate Islam by replacing it by a state-sanctioned, watered-down version of this religion, governments should respect Muslims’ freedom of religion and allow Islam to do its remedial work.

The truth is that only an extremely small number of Muslims take part in terrorist activities with the conviction that the governments in many Muslim-majority countries are corrupt because they fail to rule in accordance with Islamic law. They believe that these regimes are being supported by Western states. By stretching the theological notion of jihad beyond its limits, these militant extremists feel justified in fighting Western governments as well as the regimes and governments in Muslim countries.

The large majority of Muslims relate such a jihadist view to a biased and distorted interpretation of religion. Therefore, to marginalize these militant views, the Muslim community, rather than secular outsiders, should be relied upon to challenge and correct them.

To bypass these theological and constitutional obstacles, governments instead rely on a psychosocial approach which assumes that Muslims can gradually develop from moderation to militancy. In their view, this transition becomes visible by increasing piety and observable changes in dress. These two function as indicators of radicalization, which must be undone through “de-radicalization,” i.e., by deprogramming “radicalized” Muslims through psychological treatment to turn them into model citizens.

The concepts of “radicalization” and “de-radicalization” were developed as quick fixes after 9/11, to make terrorism manageable to law enforcement in the U.S.

The concepts of “radicalization” and “de-radicalization” were developed as quick fixes after 9/11, to make terrorism manageable to law enforcement in the U.S. Consequently, their academic credentials are weak and no conclusive evidence exists to show that they actually work.

On the other hand, this approach has huge drawbacks. It creates suspicion: why to trust your nice Muslim neighbors if they could one day turn into violent radicals? In addition, it puts an onus on pious, orthodox Muslims who are actually allies in combating militant jihadism because they condemn and reject it on theological grounds.

Moreover, Western governments’ unilateral tackling of this religious extremism feeds into the propaganda of the militant jihadists, who claim that these governmental measures aim at destroying Islam. Last but not least, policymakers are trying to fit a secular square peg into a round theological hole, which is bound to fail.

Relying on criminal law is counterproductive

Thirdly, Western governments believe that relying on criminal law is the best way to tackle terrorism, and many anti-terrorism laws have been enacted for this purpose. These are not, like ordinary criminal law, aimed at the rehabilitation of those who have gone astray, but at incapacitating them, so that they can no longer pose a threat. This is what Günther Jakobs has called “enemy criminal law.”

The power to revoke the nationality of terror suspects in order to keep them abroad – and consequently turn those suspects into the concern of other countries – is an example of such incapacitation. Anti-terror laws violate the same principles of the rule of law which they are supposed to uphold.

These laws select suspects on the basis of group characteristics; construe the intentions of the perpetrators instead of judging them on their acts; and intervene at a very early stage when the suspects have not even begun to put their plans into practice. This legal approach also stigmatizes Muslims as a “suspect community.”

An alternative approach is both necessary and available

In view of these three shortcomings, an alternative approach needs to be developed which acknowledges first and foremost that only a small number of militants with a religious affiliation engage in terrorist acts. This approach should also take Islam and the Muslim community as allies in fighting against terrorism. And lastly, the new approach should set aside criminal law and seek different means to tackle the issue at hand.

To this end, the Cross Cultural Human Rights Centre at the Free University of Amsterdam, in cooperation with the Dutch Muslim community, has developed such an approach which has been translated into a project proposal. As part of this project, young Muslims will be made more familiar with the opportunities offered by democracy and the rule of law to channel grievances and realize ambitions. They will be given the chance to brush up their knowledge of Islam to enhance their ability to see through the propaganda of recruiters.