L

ove him or loathe him, there’s no denying that Donald Trump brought a whole new level of spectacle to the world of international relations through his unique approach. In the age of social media, Trump wielded his Twitter account like a magician’s wand, conjuring up tweets that sent shockwaves through the global stage. From the moment he stepped into the political arena, he turned traditional diplomacy on its head, replacing dignified speeches with 280-character proclamations.

It was a rollercoaster ride of mixed messaging, unexpected U-turns, and moments that left even the most seasoned diplomats scratching their heads. One moment he’d be locking horns with world leaders, engaging in diplomatic smackdowns with the best of them. The next, he’d be cozying up to erstwhile adversaries like long-lost buddies.

In his book, Donald Trump’s Digital Diplomacy and Its Impact on US Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East, Ahmed Y. Zohny skillfully delves into the intricate relationship between history, political science, and the digital age. With a meticulous blend of content analysis and critical discourse analysis, Zohny examines the profound implications of Trump’s statements and tweets, that explain the often puzzling nature of his foreign policy decisions. At the same time, Zohny’s analysis unveils the intricacies of this unique form of diplomacy, shedding light on its influence on global politics.

While the American public remained primarily engrossed in the domestic implications of Trump’s presidency, people around the world were deeply curious about how his foreign policy choices would reshape the geopolitical landscape. What emerged from Zohny’s research was a deeper understanding of Trump’s communication style, marked by mixed messaging and impulsive decision-making.

One of the most significant areas of focus in the book is the United States’ withdrawal from the Iran Accord. Zohny compellingly argues that this decision not only guaranteed the collapse of the agreement but also added to the volatility in the already turbulent Middle East. Through detailed analysis, he highlights how this move significantly impacted regional dynamics and strained diplomatic relations.

During a visit to Europe while young, the former emir of Qatar Hamad bin Khalifa was asked by an immigration officer at a European airport where the state of Qatar was located. Today, there is an airport in Qatar named after him, the Hamad International Airport, and Qatar has become a well-known Middle Eastern country, especially after its political role in the Arab Spring and its remarkable successes in the fields of media, energy, and diplomacy. As a strategy, Qatar makes use of soft power tools, including sports. The country’s emir and his close advisors realize the importance of sports diplomacy in achieving the country’s goals of becoming a regional sports hub.

Qatar has invested time and effort, showing a massive capacity in order to gain the rights to organize the FIFA 2022 World Cup, one of the world’s most important global sports events. Qatar will become the first country in the region to host this major sports event.

Prior to hosting the 2022 World Cup and the 2030 AFC Asian Cup, Qatar has hosted nearly 500 international sports events since 2005, covering all types of sports and age groups. For example, Qatar hosted the 2006 Asian Games, the 2015 World Men’s Handball Championship, the 2015 World Boxing Championship, the 48th World Artistic Gymnastics Championship, the World Handball Championship for Intercontinental Champions Clubs, the 2019 ANOC World Beach Games, the 2019 Club World Cup, and the Club World Cup 2020. Finally, it hosted the 2021 FIFA Arab Cup in December, and the Turkish Super Cup final in January 2022. In 2021 alone, Qatar hosted 63 sport events, including six world championships.

Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA 2021 Arab Cup was a turning point for a number of reasons. After a long interval of almost two decades, the Arab Cup was finally organized in December 2021 and took place in Doha. For the first time, all Arab countries participated in the event, which was professionally organized. The Arab Cup was first launched in Lebanon in 1963, but due to regional instabilities could only be held 10 times.

Technically, Qatar wanted to test its ability to run the FIFA 2022 World Cup with the Arab Cup, which was a mini-test for the World Cup scheduled to kick off on December 2, 2022. Naturally, beyond the sports, these international organizations are linked to Qatar’s national interests. Qatar proved itself very successful at winning over the hearts and minds of the Arab peoples who follow this tournament.

Qatar’s hosting of the FIFA 2021 Arab Cup was a turning point for a number of reasons.

At sports events, Middle Easterners a savor moments of joy and foster the feelings of brotherhood and unity, putting aside conflicts and regional disagreements. In April 2021, at the draw ceremony of the FIFA Arab Cup at the Katara Opera House, FIFA President Gianni Infantino said that the Arab Cup, which took place for the first time under the FIFA umbrella, will unify the Arab world. He added, “The FIFA Arab Cup 2021… will be a great opportunity to unite the Arab world through football besides testing Qatar’s operational readiness for the prestigious FIFA World Cup in 2022.”

Meanwhile, the match that was scheduled to take place between Arab and world football legends under the auspices of the Arab Cup was cancelled as Arab players withdrew in protest of the presence of an Israeli coach. All the above contributed to highlighting the true pulse of the Arab peoples, and Qatar benefitted from allowing such freedom of expression.

Qatar does not limit itself to hosting Arab sports events and practices sports diplomacy in wider regions. The country recently hosted the Turkish Super Cup between Beşiktaş and Antalyaspor. On January 5, 2021, Qatar also hosted the African Super Cup.

Qatar advertises itself in a discreet manner through sports, especially since sports has a magic that can sometimes transcend politics and even contribute to finding solutions to political problems.

It is important to remember that one of the motives for the Gulf reconciliation was the desire of Qatar’s neighbors to benefit from the 2022 World Cup, whereby Emirati and Saudi airlines would see the benefits of transferring sports fans from all over the world to Qatar. Qatar has organized world sports events in a professional manner that is unprecedented in the region and has built cutting-edge infrastructure like stadiums equipped with the highest-level equipment and modern technology.

One such example is hologram technology, which was used for the first time in the Arab world in opening ceremonies, and in which a group of late artists sent messages calling for unity, brotherhood, and tolerance. These efforts have drawn praise from across the world, and continue to bolster Qatar’s image and reputation in both the international and regional public opinion.

Tunisia is in a cascading political crisis which continues to to deteriorate rapidly. The latest sign of this is the huge security operation that was deployed against the January 14 demonstration in the center of the capital, Tunis, and which prevented the demonstrators from entering Avenue Habib Bourguiba, or “Revolution Street” as it is called by the regime opponents.

The Tunisian political scene seems open to various scenarios. Where before the coup, previous governments had failed abysmally to deliver on the aspirations of the Tunisian people, especially the youth and the poor, it has become abundantly clear since Saied’s coup that his administration and government advisers have only managed to exacerbate and worsen the rapidly deteriorating economic and social conditions across the country – in addition to overthrowing the democratic process.

In the past few weeks, Saied shocked the public opinion by engineering a four-year prison sentence against former president Moncef Marzouki for allegedly lobbying against Tunisia and the Francophone summit that was scheduled to be held in Djerba last year.

Ironically, and to the bewilderment of public opinion, Saied denied he had played any role in the sentencing of Marzouki, despite ordering the justice minister in front of live cameras on live television on October 30, 2021 to open a judicial investigation into Marzouki on the charge of high treason, adding that Marzouki “had joined the ranks of the enemies of the state.”

Then came the spectacularly public scandal of the kidnapping of the former minister of justice and vice-president of the Ennahda Movement, the largest party in parliament, Noureddine Bhiri. Having failed to persuade the judiciary to issue an arrest warrant for Bhiri on the charge of violating the laws of the land, Kais Saied decided to resort to illegal methods reminiscent of the behavior of armed militias in failed states.

Large sections of ordinary, apolitical citizens in Tunisia have not been especially bothered or concerned with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saied regime.

Bhiri was violently kidnapped a few yards from his home and transferred to a secret detention center. The move drew widespread political anger and condemnation, not only in the ranks of the Ennahda party, but also from across the political spectrum, from human rights activists and international organizations.

It should be stressed however that large sections of ordinary, apolitical citizens in Tunisia have not been especially bothered or concerned with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saied regime. The primary reason for this is the overwhelming preoccupation with the dire economic conditions that continue to deteriorate.

Despite these difficulties and challenges, Saied has decided to begin implementing his plans to change the constitution and the political system unilaterally in Tunisia. He has established an electronic consultation platform that he insists will engage the population in his plans for reforms. He has also announced that a constitutional referendum will be held on July 25, 2022, and then legislative elections on December 17, 2022 on the basis of the new constitution. Saied has hinted that the elections will not be supervised by the Independent Election Commission for which he has openly expressed disdain.

Saied has decided to begin implementing his plans to change the constitution and the political system unilaterally in Tunisia.

However, most political parties in Tunisia have called on the people to boycott this electronic consultation. Moreover, many people in Tunisia do not have the ability or access to participate in such a consultation, or the technical skills necessary even if they wanted to. This means that in reality, Saied is effectively using the electronic platform as a cover to make changes according to his own whims and desires, while knowing full well that such a process will not be recognized by the country’s political class. In other words, Saied’s “process” will only serve to deepen the constitutional and legal crises in the country.

Tunisia is at a crossroads. On the one hand, there is Saied’s individual and totalitarian project that threatens a return to the days of tyranny. On the other, there are the forces of political and civil society seeking to restore democracy, constitutional legitimacy, and the rule of law.

Support for Saied is decreasing day by day as the reality becomes clear to the people. There are no longer any prominent political groups that support the coup except for a pan-Arab nationalist-oriented political trend that only serves to remind people of the bitter experiences of tyranny that Arab populations have endured under regimes that touted nationalist slogans.

Meanwhile, the camp of the civilian democratic forces is growing in number, and there are increasing efforts to unite its components on a common political program that will enhance the chances of defeating the political coup and rescuing Tunisia from its clutches.

There is no doubt that the situation in Tunisia was bad before Kais Saied’s coup; however, it is even clearer that it is has become worse since the coup. Autocracy, combining all the powers in the hands of one person, is not the solution to the difficulties facing the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia.

Tunisians now find themselves facing a historical political battle to decide their fate, and to regain their freedom and dignity. There must be no doubt that to remain silent on what Saied is doing to democracy, the constitution, the rule of law, and the state institutions, will sooner or later bring the roof tumbling down on everyone’s heads.

When Arabs arrived in Central and South America, they had nothing but the clothes they wore. They were called “Turcos” as they carried Ottoman passports. Today, they are wealthy and occupy important positions. Are they “sons who lost their mothers,” as a poet once put it? Do they maintain their ties to Palestine, Syria, Lebanon, and Jordan, the lands of their ancestors? Yousef M. Aljamal of Politics Today spoke with Simán Khoury, a Palestinian-Salvadorian, who serves as the president of the Palestinian Federations in Latin America, about the ethnically Arab populations in Latin America today.

Q. When people of the Levant arrived in Latin America in the late nineteenth century, they were called “Turcos.” Can you tell us about this? What does it mean and how do South Americans perceived the term?

The Arab immigration, especially from the Levant or Greater Syria, to Latin America was mostly in the late nineteenth century during the period of the Ottoman Empire. All those immigrants held Ottoman passports. So basically, people there did not distinguish between Arabs and Turks, and they called us all “Turcos” (Turks).

Q. What is the reason for this contempt of “Turcos”?

The majority of those who immigrated at that time were poor and ordinary people, mostly peasants. Ordinary Latin Americans, who lived and thought in feudal structures, considered them as inferior, lower-class people.

When our grandparents and our great-grandparents arrived there, four, five, or six generations back, they did it barefoot, which means that they were in a dire economic situation.

Q. What was the stereotype in the minds of immigrants about Latin America? I mean economically.

They were men of modest substance. Everyone wanted to go to America, meaning North America, and had no idea about possible differences between North, Central, and South America. They thought that they were going to North America. However, they arrived at Puerto Colombia, in Colombia, or in Cuba, where they split up. Some went to Chile, some went to El Salvador, and from there to other places, especially the places where they had relatives, if any.

Q. Why are Levant immigrants mainly concentrated in Chile, El Salvador, and Honduras?

There are about a million Palestinian immigrants in Latin America. The majority almost are from Palestine, especially from Bethlehem. In addition, the majority of those immigrants were Palestinian Christians from the city of Bethlehem. Chile has about half a million Palestinians, and there are maybe some 200,000 in Honduras, and 120,000 in El Salvador. Although there are people who say that these numbers are exaggerated, I am sure that they exist and we have statistics supporting that.

Chile has about half a million Palestinians, and there are maybe some 200,000 in Honduras, and 120,000 in El Salvador.

Q. There is a saying, which goes “In every town in Chile, there is a priest, a policeman, and a Palestinian.” Can you tell us more about Palestinians’ impact in Latin America today? What are their positions, their economic status, their cultural, political, and societal status?

When immigrants arrived, they were in a miserable economic situation and suffered from extreme poverty, but they managed to integrate. First, they worked as street vendors and this contributed to their marginalization by the feudal and wealthy classes. But they managed to set up shops and work in textile factories. Gradually, their financial situation improved, which led to an improvement in their social situation. These immigrants struggled for their children to live a better life. They sent their children to schools and universities, and were able to obtain a better social status.

Q. You have spoken about the relations that still link the Latin American Levantines with the Middle East. How do you see the new generation, especially with the Internet and easy access to information? Do they try to restore this relationship and the link between them and their countries of origin? If yes, how do they express this?

Although these migrations took place a long time ago, 80, 100, or 120 years ago – for example, I immigrated 41 years ago – the link between Palestinians and their homeland, despite the fact that they belong in the countries they are currently in, is excellent. They visit their homelands, whether Palestine, Syria or Lebanon – especially the Lebanese, who live in large numbers in Brazil, reaching 7 million.

They still send money and other kinds of aid, whether from Chile, Brazil, or El Salvador to their families there and continue to visit them. As an expression of our cultural identity, we participate in pro-Palestine political and cultural events on every possible occasion and follow the latest news. We have activities, including political ones, to support the Palestinian cause. We have many people in El Salvador who are politically active and support the cause.

Q. Historically, the relationship between South and Central America and the Middle East is strong, but recently, there has been a rise of the right wing in South and Central America. This, of course, also applies to the whole world. Do you observe any impact of this trend on South American interest in Middle Eastern affairs?

This has a great impact on our relationship. In 2017, with the presence of a left-wing government and the activism of the Palestinian community, we were able to close the Israeli embassy in El Salvador. However, the current situation is different due to the economic power of the Jewish lobby in South America.

In 2017, with the presence of a left-wing government and the activism of the Palestinian community, we were able to close the Israeli embassy in El Salvador.

At present, Palestinian embassies are not showing enough effort to influence these countries diplomatically and win their support. This is surprising because this cause is fundamental, it is about displaced people who are being expelled from their lands by brutal force. I personally blame Palestinian diplomacy because there are many countries, even when Chile was ruled by the right, which are still supportive of Palestine. For example, the President of the Republic of El Salvador Elías Antonio Saca González visited Palestine and he was a right-wing politician. He visited his family, the city of Bethlehem and Palestine, while currently, there are leftist countries that try to destroy these relations.

Two months ago, we published an article on the controversial issue of using models with the Palestinian keffiyeh in the training of the Panamanian police by the Israeli police. What are the reflections on this in local society?

Even though we have a large group of Palestinians in Panama, who have the upper hand in the country economically, the incident shows that the Israeli lobby is strong. I have personally been to the city of Cologne, where the greatest merchants in the Colon Free Zone are Palestinians. The community is doing what it can and we cannot blame them. What’s sad is that the Palestinian community has not had enough support from the Palestinian government or the PLO during the last three or four decades.

Is it possible to form a lobby that supports the rights and demands of the Arab Middle Eastern communities in Central and South America, similar to, for example, the Jewish lobby in the U.S. so that it presses, for example, for the recognition of the Palestinian state? In entire South America, Mexico and Panama are the two states, which haven’t yet recognized Palestine.

There is a lobby in Chile. For example, we have around 12 parliamentarians of Palestinian origin, and there is a league of these parliamentarians to support the Palestinian cause.

There is a lobby in Chile. For example, we have around 12 parliamentarians of Palestinian origin, and there is a league of these parliamentarians to support the Palestinian cause. Similarly, although this lobby is currently less effective in El Salvador, they nurture considerable support in Latin America in general.

Let me be clear from the beginning: what happened in Tunisia on July 25, 2021 is a coup against the constitution. There is no doubt about it and no argument.

As for the decision of the coup, it was not taken in haste on the Sunday before last nor was it a reaction to the widespread protests taking place that day. There is no doubt that Kais Saied has been planning this coup from at least the beginning of this year, which means that he had already consulted with the army leadership and secured the necessary support before taking these drastic measures.

There is no direct material evidence that there is any foreign involvement in Saied’s decision to embark on this coup. However, there is an important question to be asked: Kais Saied is over sixty years of age, a university lecturer, and was able to win the presidential elections. Is it reasonable to believe that he would suspend the parliament and move to monopolize all of the state’s power in his hands without having coordinated in advance with foreign powers such as the French president to secure international support, and then with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure the necessary financial support to cement his coup?

Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the international response to the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first public words on the coup were, “I had a good call with President Kais Saied.”

These words indicate that the U.S. administration will not seriously obstruct Saied’s plans to change the political course in Tunisia. The Americans are not interested much in competing with France for influence in Tunisia, and have far more important issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, and COVID-19.

The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is significant popular support for Saied’s decisions. The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011. Over the course of the past two years, the newly elected parliament, and the two governments which were bestowed with its vote of confidence, have resoundingly failed to improve the lives of ordinary citizens – just as the previous governments before it. The situation has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic that has ripped through the country with devastating impact.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has, of course, significant effects at home, as well as in Tunisia’s regional surroundings, particularly with regards to neighboring Libya. Among the countries that supported Saied’s measures immediately after they were announced, are two countries that have great interests in Libya, which outweigh their interests in Tunisia – namely, Egypt and the UAE.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has significant effects at home as well as in Libya.

The leaders of both countries fully understand that Tunisia is a lifeline for the Tripoli government, and that if a regime closer to them is established in Tunis, and they have a tangible influence on it, it will be possible to tighten the noose around the Tripoli government in coordination with their ally Haftar who is ever-present in the east.

Two years ago, Khalifa Haftar was about to enter Tripoli victorious, after he had besieged it with the support of Egypt and the UAE. But, Turkish support and an open border with Tunisia, where the Ennahda movement has enjoyed an advanced political position, saved Tripoli and its rulers from defeat.

But now that Ennahda has been removed from power with the coup of Saied, Egypt and the UAE may hope that what they failed to accomplish in 2019 can now be achieved in coordination with a friendly regime in Tunisia, and with more support for their ambitious Libyan ally, General Hafter.

Of course, the governments of Egypt and the UAE also have a strong alliance with France, with whom they share mutual interests and cooperation on regional issues, and in particular Libya: oil for France; the employment of Egyptian workers and the granting of construction contracts to Egyptian companies for the el-Sisi regime; and uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and ending its presence in Libya for the UAE (which Egypt and France also want to see).

It is very clear, then, that the Tunisian coup has a strong relationship with the Libyan issue. This naturally leads us to consider Algeria, Tunisia’s most important neighbor, and how it will react to the Tunisian coup and its repercussions in the region.

There are no official Algerian statements that can be relied on to know the actual mood among Algerian policymakers. However, there was a call between the Tunisian and Algerian presidents on July 26 and a visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Tunisia the next day, during which he met with Saied.

Algerian comments on social media and press leaks indicate that Algeria will not accept the control of Tunisian foreign policy by Egypt and the UAE – a control that would seek to facilitate Haftar’s bid to gain control of all of Libya’s regions. Algeria views Haftar as an opponent, and he, in turn, reciprocates this stance. Algeria also sees the UAE as an antagonist in the region. Abu Dhabi has established a consulate in the disputed Western Sahara, much to the chagrin of Algiers. Coupled with the normalization of ties with Israel, the intention of the UAE to flex against Algeria by drawing on international support in favor of Morocco is clear.

On this basis, Algeria may put pressure on Saied not to dissolve parliament and not to overextend the period afforded to him to wield emergency powers in order to preserve the position of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, and thereby to ensure there is a check on the governments of Egypt and the UAE that prevents them from exercising influence on the foreign policy of Tunisia.

Many scholars and pundits of the MENA region are wondering why the Islamists did not take over during the massive protests known as the “Arab Spring.” This question is relevant to the extent that political Islam for many decades has been a popular movement that has threatened regimes marked by a deficit of legitimacy.

To address this issue, we need to bear in mind that the ideological references of Islamism pertain to a sort of utopia which prevented the movement from being politically efficient. Many Islamists became aware of this ideological handicap, seeking another path in order to play a role in the state institutions.

What is Islamism?

Islamism can be defined as a resistance to the inescapable secularization, or at least, an attempt to bargain the place of religion in the public sphere. Facing the social and cultural transformations of past colonization and current globalization, religious consciousness is worried about the future of Islam.

Hence the demand for the implementation of Islamic law, sharia. But this demand is not limited to the judiciary; it encompasses a worldview that dictates how the state and society should be.

In this regard, Islamism is a utopia expressing the desire for a perfect society and a fair state. The utopia is about building a social world where selfishness does not exist. For instance, in the Islamist literature of the 1980s in Algeria, including the weekly publication Al Munqid, the issue of underdevelopment was explained by mismanagement and bad economic policy.

The idea is that despite the fact that God created enough wealth, poverty is widespread and it is the result of the rulers’ corruption and selfishness. To reach this utopian goal, the state needs to be run by righteous people who fear God and who are not prone to corruption. Islamists are in search of the ideal government and the ideal leaders in a society marked by fairness.

The excessive violence in Egypt and Algeria led to a split of the movement: a mainstream approach to take over the state peacefully through the electoral process, and a minority trend supporting Al-Qaida and Daesh. It is worth noting that the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt accepted to create a party (Justice and Liberty Party), meaning that by implication they saw themselves as a political party among others, while in the past they claimed to be the party of all the Egyptians.

Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan.

By foregoing violence to take over the state and by accepting other parties as legitimate competitors, Islamism evolved towards what is called “post-Islamism,” inspired by the Turkish experience as embodied by Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. Islamists took part in elections, and in some countries, they won. They won in Tunisia in 2011, and in Egypt and Morocco in 2012 following the nationwide protests.

The internet factor

The internet factor, as a societal phenomenon, reduced the influence of the Islamist discourse among young people. Multiple debates in many virtual forums gave the opportunity to oppose the Islamist views on society, women, culture, etc. There was a sort of deconsecration of the Islamist discourse with the idea that the verses of the Koran could have many different interpretations. This deconsecration was made possible by the free speech that was encouraged by anonymity on social media.

Some young people went as far as to claim to be atheists, and others questioned Muslim theology. At the university, professors and students engaged in debates questioning the religious authority of thinkers such as Al Ghazali and Ibn Taymiyyah.

There is a climate never seen before where people are demanding a reform of the theology inherited from the past. Students have started to read Mohamed Shahrour, Mohamed Taha, Mohammed Arkoun, among others.

Undermined by its ideological and political contradictions, Islamism failed to emerge as the dominant force to take over the state following the Arab Spring. The Islamists do not see themselves any more as the party of the nation; they have accepted to be one party among others.

In Tunisia, they backed down on issues of women and freedom of consciousness. In Morocco, they aligned with the king who kept the army and the foreign affairs under his control, despite having gained more seats in the National Assembly than any other party.

In Egypt and Algeria, certain Islamists are seeking the blessing of the military to take part in the state institutions. In Iraq, Sunni Islamism has been weakened by the excesses of violence perpetrated by Daesh. It leaves a space to Shiite groups to be more active, whether they align themselves with Tehran or not.

In book four of Plato’s The Republic, the notion of dignity, what Socrates called thymos, (literally spiritedness), is deemed central to a harmonious political and social life in the polis. Thymos denotes that every subject of the polis is entitled to unalienable dignity and liberties by virtue of being a member of the polis.

This is reflected in politics as the general sentiments of the masses in the quest for better governance of sociopolitical affairs and personal liberties in the polis. When the spirit of thymos is disrupted or imbalanced, chaos and revolution looms in the horizon.

This year marks the 10th anniversary of the Arab Spring. Back then, millions of citizens had taken to the streets demanding an overhaul of politics and governance in their home countries. The Arab Spring was contagious and inspired protest from Wall Street to South America.

Indeed, when the Arab Spring started or ended is up for debate: the protests in Sudan and Algeria in 2019 that toppled dictatorial regimes underlined the intricate complexity of politics in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab Spring.

Moreover, while the Arab Spring occasioned unprecedented revolutionary moments in the Arab world, in global media discourses it was framed in implicitly Orientalist tropes such as narratives and assumptions of its failure or success; the impossibility of democracy in the “strong man”-craving attitudes of the Arab Muslim masses; or the incapability of the Muslim world to give birth to foster a revolution of the magnitude of the French Revolution.

These discourses refuse to acknowledge the unique context of the Arab Spring and its diverse outcomes.

Similarly, the Arab Spring was analyzed with Orientalist approaches in academia. Lorella Ventura observes how the Arab Spring laid bare the Orientalist stereotypes of the global media and academia. However, reduction of historical moments in the Muslim world to stereotypical cultural determinisms has a long history.

Just remember how the French radical philosopher Michel Foucault refused to assign the Iranian Revolution “the status of a revolution.” For him, history had stopped in the Muslim world and revolutions are impossible – except for a few involuntary and irrational uprising of the masses.

Nevertheless, the Arab Spring was a unique historical moment in the Arab world and it manifested differently in different countries based on factors ranging from sociological to historical and geopolitical. Stereotyping the Arab world as a homogeneous entity when it comes to politics and society will only lead to misunderstanding the spirit of the Arab Spring and of the whole region.

When the house of cards collapsed

When Mohamed Bouazizi, a humble street vendor set himself on fire on December 17, 2010, no one anticipated that his action would change the course of history in the Arab world, going as far as to topple long-term dictators in the region.

However, his act of self-immolation which was a protest against his dire economic condition and the confiscation of his vending wheelbarrow resonated on a deeper level with his fellow Tunisians and the whole region over the next few years.

Remember that most of these dictatorships drew their legitimacy not from their people, but from centers of power in the Western world. Militarily equipped, funded, and absolved from any accountability by Western powers, Arab dictators were deemed friendly by their backers and ruled with impunity.

The Arab Spring was a complex historical moment that produced diverse outcomes.

However, with the financial crisis of 2007/08 and its aftermath shocks, youth unemployment, inflation, and the cost of living skyrocketed in many Middle East and North African (MENA) countries – as they did across the globe. This exposed the leaders beyond redemption to the  masses.

The slogan “Aish, Karama, Hurriya” (Bread, Dignity, Freedom) heralded the end of dictatorial regimes in Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, and Yemen, and, most recently, in Sudan and Algeria.

Beyond Orientalist discourses of “success” and “failure”

The Arab Spring was a complex historical moment that produced diverse outcomes. Viewing it as a single homogeneous event is tantamount to disregarding the historical and political diversity of the region and the role of geopolitics. The idea of the failure or the success of the Arab Spring has dominated Western global media discourses for the last decade. Most recently, the magazine Foreign Policy published an op-ed titled “Arab Dignity Is Real, So Is Arab Failure.”

The Economist added, “Why Democracy Failed in the Middle East.” The Guardian wrote, “Tunisians Curse Man Who Sparked Arab Spring”, and the Associated Press concluded with “A Decade of Upheaval and Lost Hopes.” Implicit in all these narratives are Orientalist tropes that spew essentialist ideas about the MENA region and its diverse societies.

The evaluation of the Arab Spring as a failure or success is not helpful as it serves ideological score points. The Arab Spring was a spontaneous historical event brought about by the masses with the help of technology and unprecedented diagonal civil society mobilization. The message was clear and loud: change is inevitable in the MENA region.

Orientalist discourses spread the idea that the Arab world, and the whole Muslim world, is devoid of a quest for change. Modern-day Orientalists tacitly argue that in this part of the world, revolutions occur only when the masses are irrational or hysterical.

For them, history here is a mechanical top-down engineering, and the masses are idle with no substantial political agency, real intention, or any grass-root organizing potential. History is dead in these lands; hence there is no progress.

The Arab Spring showed a different aspect of the Arab world, one that was considered lacking or stunted by culture or by religion. Diverse MENA societies flocked to the streets and squares irrespective of ethnicity, class, sect, or gender and demanded dignity, liberty, and change.

“It is hard enough to start a revolution, even harder to sustain it, and hardest of all to win it.” 

Larbi Ben Mhidi, FLN Founding Member as portrayed in The Battle of Algiers (1966)

In February 2019, the bid for a fifth term was announced on behalf of Algeria’s former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was debilitated after suffering a stroke in 2013. Frustrated and exasperated, the Algerian people flooded the streets in protests demanding the withdrawal of Bouteflika’s candidacy.

Far away from home, I watched the weekly Hirak (activism) as it grew from protests to a full-fledged revolution. Millions of Algerians gathered for a peaceful and creative protest to say “enough.” I could not help but compare it to the 2014 protests against Bouteflika’s fourth mandate which were smaller and weaker for one reason: fear of chaos and violence.

Clearly, the Revolution of Smiles (Thawrat Al Ibtisama) was the result of an anger that accumulated over several years, the president’s absence had become too embarrassing to be tolerated. The Hirak movement succeeded in ousting Abdelaziz Bouteflika, but is yet to succeed in toppling the entire military regime, which has been governing the country since its independence in 1962.

President Abdelmajid Tebboune was elected in the December 12, 2019 elections amidst a very low turnout of around 39.8%. The controversy continued after the election as people openly contested having another president brought in by the military.

Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the protests had to be suspended; however, the movement’s activism continued online on social media. Although there have been a few protests during the summer of 2020, they remain small in number compared to the massive protests of the Hirak. The Revolution of Smiles is not over yet.

Unfulfilled Promises

One of the Hirak’s most famous slogans was “You thieves, you ate the country,” as the people lamented the large amounts of money claimed to be stolen by government officials while the nation sank into dire poverty. During his campaign, President Tebboune repeatedly promised Algerians that he has a plan to recover some of the money stolen by the previous government.

The president refused to reveal his plan to the media and even openly admitted that he would not divulge it in case he loses the election. A year after his inauguration, the Algerian nation has not heard anything about the plan yet. Even worse, the president himself disappeared after allegedly contracting the COVID-19 virus. The question, therefore, changed from “Where is the money?” to “Where is the president?”

The president spoke to the Algerian people from a German hospital on December 13, 2020. His sickly appearance and obvious weight loss only fanned the flames of concern regarding who is running the country during the president’s absence. Reminiscent of Bouteflika’s era, the concern about having the state institutions paralyzed once again is on a constant rise. These concerns were not calmed by the president’s return to Algeria on December 29, 2020.

The Witch Hunt

One of the main reasons why the Hirak movement managed effectively and peacefully to make change in Algeria was the fact that it does not have any leaders or representatives. It is a national movement of people from different ideologies who all agree that Algeria deserves a better government. The absence of leaders simply means that the corrupt government cannot arrest or blackmail an entire nation.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the Hirak movement deeply. After national consensus that the weekly protests pose a risk to public health, the Hirak hiatus gave the government more room for attacking symbols of the Hirak.

Another example of the state-led persecution is the arrest of the 25-year-old Algerian social media content creator Walid Kechida whose satirical memes seemed to upset the government.   Kechida was charged with “insulting the president of the republic.” Contrary to the case of Drareni, Kechida’s trial clarified the true intentions of this witch hunt: to tie all tongues of dissent. The witch hunt eventually left no room of negotiations between the movement and the government.

Back to Square One

On December 11, 2020, the former defence minister General Khaled Nezzar returned to Algeria on a private jet after spending months between Spain and France. This was a major disappointment for the people who were anticipating the return of President Tebboune from Germany. The general had been convicted of plotting against the army leadership and posing a threat to state institutions.

After over nine months of Hirak protestors shouting “Throw the army generals in the bin, and Algeria will get its independence,” this turn of events is kindling a national suspicion regarding what is happening backstage at El-Mouradia.

Most importantly, Nezzar is a contested figure in Algeria because he remains a symbol of the state violence committed against civilians during the Black Decade. This return during the president’s absence has sparked a heated debate on whether the former minister has secured an agreement with the government in order to be exonerated, which would undoubtedly ignite a massive wave of anger from the people.

The symbolic value of this return, which coincides with General Toufik leaving prison for convalescence, is also raising a lot of questions about a fight for power between different army generals. After over nine months of Hirak protestors shouting “Throw the army generals in the bin, and Algeria will get its independence,” this turn of events is kindling a national suspicion regarding what is happening backstage at El-Mouradia.

On January 2, 2021, the military court acquitted four top officials whose imprisonment seemed like a temporary success of the Hirak. Said Bouteflika, the younger brother of ousted president Bouteflika, two former security chiefs Mohamed Mediene and Athmane Tartag, and the leader of the Workers’ Party Louisa Hanoune were convicted for plotting against the army and the state. All were acquitted while Bouteflika remains in custody to face other charges of corruption.

Will the Revolution of Smiles Continue in Algeria?

The same question that once urged millions to flood the streets of Algeria still awaits an answer: who is running the country? The temporary sedative of prosecuting a few corrupt government officials is fading away and it is becoming ever clearer that the demands of the Hirak are still the same. The slogan “Ytnahaw ga’” (Off with them all) targets, primarily, the military system. Instead, the Algerian people are surprised to see them all return.

The policies of President Tebboune’s government have not succeeded in giving answers to “their excellency, the people,” but have only engendered new questions regarding how profoundly difficult it is to get rid of the “gang” running Africa’s biggest country. Algerians turned dissent into a form of art: they patiently calculate every movement and adapt their demands according to the republic’s best interest.

It is, therefore, very unlikely that they will accept a change in the civil façade of the junta in power. It is important to emphasize that the Hirak in Algeria is not exclusive to the protests in the streets; every article, every meme, every tweet against the injustice of this system is part of the Hirak, and no system can ever keep all tongues tied. The Revolution of Smiles continues, until they all leave. As disheartening as the recent events have been for the nation, they serve as a reminder that there is only one hero: the people.