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recent report by Human Rights Watch (HRW) has brought to light the Chinese government’s expansion of its mosque crackdown operations into regions beyond Xinjiang, raising significant concerns about the perpetuation of policies that restrict religious freedom for Muslim minorities.

The HRW report, released on Wednesday, November 22, 2023, has revealed that authorities are shutting down mosques and removing their Islamic architectural features as part of an official process termed “consolidation.” This has been particularly noted in the northern Ningxia region and Gansu province, areas with considerable populations of Hui Muslims.

According to the report, which is based on public documents, satellite imagery, and witness accounts, local authorities in these regions have been actively modifying mosques to reflect more “Chinese” architectural styles. This move aligns with President Xi Jinping’s 2016 directive for the “Sinicization” of religions, an effort to integrate religious beliefs within the framework of Chinese socialism.

Systematic effort to curb Islamic practices within China

Human Rights Watch has criticized these actions as violations of religious freedom, emphasizing that the government’s claim of consolidating mosques is a facade for shutting them down. Maya Wang, the acting China director at HRW, stated that this is part of a systematic effort to curb Islamic practices within China.

These findings add to the growing international scrutiny over China’s treatment of Muslim minorities, including Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz. A report by the United Nations last year suggested that China might have committed crimes against humanity through actions such as the creation of a vast network of extrajudicial internment camps in Xinjiang, believed to have detained over a million individuals.

In specific instances cited by HRW, villages like Liaoqiao and Chuankou in Ningxia saw the dismantling of mosque domes and minarets, with some main buildings being completely demolished between 2019 and 2021. These accounts have been backed by visual evidence and satellite imagery analysis conducted by HRW researchers.

A report gains attention

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has not yet responded to inquiries seeking comments on the HRW report and Beijing’s official stance on its policies towards Muslim minorities.

This expansion of mosque closures indicates an extensive application of restrictive religious policies that had previously been most visible in Xinjiang. With local backlash against such actions already occurring, as evidenced by protests in southern Yunnan province earlier this year, the international community is likely to watch closely for China’s next steps in handling religious practices and minority rights.

As the report gains attention, the pressure may mount on China to address these concerns and demonstrate adherence to international standards of religious freedom and human rights.

Sources: AP and the Frontier Post

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hina’s traditional reluctance to get involved in international crises and conflicts, particularly beyond its regional sphere of influence, has now become obsolete as the rising power increasingly seeks to become a global player rivaling the United States. Conflict management and crisis diplomacy are now integral to China’s diplomatic involvement in the Middle East. China and its Middle Eastern partners are building a strategic multipolarity that would serve their national interests better than the current U.S.-led order giving rise to a new strategic multipolar order.

The Middle Eastern middle powers view China’s growing involvement in the region as steps towards a multipolar order, which would help them counterbalance the U.S. influence. In March 2021, Iran and China signed a 25-year strategic cooperation agreement entailing economic, military, and cybersecurity cooperation. Both states seek to undermine U.S. dominance in the Middle East: Iran needs China for tackling U.S.-led sanctions aimed at crippling its economy, while China imports cheap oil and gas from Iran.

A similar mutually beneficial relationship also exists between Saudi Arabia and China. The two countries are building a strategic partnership through a series of trade and investment deals. Chinese companies are set to build factories in Saudi Arabia and the kingdom is already China’s biggest supplier of crude oil. In June 2023, Saudi Minister of Investment Khalid Al-Falih told CNBC that he believes a multipolar world has emerged and that cooperation between the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), the Arab world, and China will be a significant part of the new order.

Is China replacing the U.S.?

The U.S. has been a key player in the Middle East since the end of World War II, while the regional order was mostly dominated by the U.S. and its allies. The U.S. brokered peace between Egypt and Israel; has formed alliances with Israel, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt and since the mid-1970s with Egypt; and used to be allies with Iran until the Islamic Revolution in 1979.

By the end of the Cold War, the U.S. appeared even more forceful (or hegemonic); however, more recently, it has lessened its involvement in the region as it seeks to shift its focus to Asia-Pacific. China, on the other hand, aims to militarily counter the U.S. in the Asia-Pacific region and has increased its diplomatic and economic engagement with the Middle East.

China has achieved some notable success in peacemaking in the Middle East. Chinese officials have successfully mediated between Saudi Arabia and Iran for normalization of the relations between the two states. China’s trade relations with both have been substantially progressing and it has also offered to mediate in the Israel-Palestine conflict, which used to be an exclusive domain of American diplomacy. In fact, China has established strategic partnerships across the Middle East, including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iran, the United Arab Emirates, Turkey, Jordan, Qatar, Iraq, Oman, Kuwait, Israel, and Palestine.

No other country, not even the U.S., has such a long list of partners in the region. Although the level of engagement with China substantially varies from one country to another, the length of the list is indicative of China’s ambitions. Given such developments, many Middle East analysts pose the same question: Is China going to replace the U.S. as the main external actor in the region?

Analysts agree that China is yet to establish itself as a global military power while the U.S. still enjoys certain advantages such as its long-established alliances and military bases across the Middle East. Some point out that China and the U.S. share the same crucial regional interests: access to energy resources and freedom of navigation. As the Chinese and American interests are compatible, the emerging multipolar order in the region is not necessarily detrimental for U.S. interests.

Would multipolarity prove stable in the Middle East?

A multipolar order, according to some IR scholars, would prove stable among competitors who have equal distribution of power. In the case of the emerging multipolarity in the Middle East, power appears dispersed but not equally distributed. The region’s key actors, Egypt, Iran, Turkey, and Saudi Arabia, have varying levels of economic and military capacities. Shifts in power balance may also complicate the regional order. For instance, Iran becoming a nuclear power would not be welcomed by the other regional actors, and would likely result in an unstable multipolarity.

The emerging multipolarity may not prove stable in the middle or long term, but it currently serves the interests of the Middle Eastern middle powers and China well. It also poses no threat to the vital U.S. interests. The Middle East actors cannot aspire to regional dominance given their current capabilities, but through their partnerships with China they can create a strategic multipolarity which serves their national interests. If in the future the actors perceive their interests differently based on the acquisition of more capabilities, the multipolarity might be undermined.

The Chinese-brokered Saudi-Iran diplomatic normalization deal is a case in point. The deal has a limited scope because neither Saudi Arabia nor Iran desires full-fledged collaboration in regional affairs. The Iranians and Saudis instead seek stronger ties with China which would help them strengthen their standing vis-à-vis the U.S. In other words, the Chinese quest for multipolarity in the Middle East corresponds to the strategic multipolarity sought by Middle Eastern middle powers.

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hina has been increasing its naval presence in the Middle East to secure its energy supplies and gain strategic advantage. Beijing claims that its naval operations focus on maintaining regional stability and combating piracy. However, China’s actions have drawn international attention and sparked discussions about its long-term goals in the Middle East.

A recent report revealed that the Chinese navy, the People’s Liberation Army Naval Forces (PLAN), has the largest number of naval ships in the world. The navy is composed of approximately 300,000 soldiers that are divided into three fleets: North, East, and South. The PLAN’s fleet comprises 777 vessels, including two aircraft carriers, 79 submarines, and 41 destroyers.

China’s Belt and Road Initiative: A strategic expansion of naval power

China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has become a critical tool for projecting naval power in the Middle East. The BRI aims to build infrastructure and increase connectivity across Asia, Europe, and Africa, passing through the Middle East.

The BRI has facilitated China’s naval expansion by allowing it to build and operate ports in Pakistan and Djibouti, providing Beijing with strategic footholds. Additionally, the BRI has enabled China to invest in regional infrastructure projects, such as railways and pipelines, further strengthening its influence and economic ties in the Middle East.

China’s joint naval drills with Iran and Russia

Beijing, Tehran, and Moscow conducted a joint military maritime exercise named “Security Belt-2023” in the Gulf of Oman. The naval drills were conducted on March 15-19 to promote security and peace. The military drills involved, among others, maritime shooting, joint search and rescue, communications, counterterrorism, and counter-piracy operations. The three countries conducted similar joint military drills in 2019 and 2022.

According to the Chinese Ministry of National Defense, the Chinese PLAN Navy’s guided missile destroyer Nanning joined the joint maritime exercise and returned to its naval escort mission after leaving Port Chabahar in Iran.

As reported by U.S. news channel Fox News, the U.S. sees this cooperation as China’s growing ambition to access hydrocarbon and energy in the Middle East.

John Kirby, spokesperson for the U.S. National Security Council, said that the White House was not worried about the joint exercise, and it was not the first instance that the Russians and Chinese conducted joint training.

China’s strategy in the Middle East

China’s increasing presence in the Middle East has significant implications for the region’s political landscape and global affairs, potentially impacting regional stability and security. China’s role in brokering a détente between Iran and Saudi Arabia is clear evidence of its growing diplomatic weight in the region.

On March 15, 2023, Wang Di, the director-general of the Department of West Asian and North African Affairs of China’s Foreign Ministry, discussed China’s strategy towards the Middle East. He highlighted China’s support of Middle Eastern nations’ strategic autonomy, solidarity, and cooperation. Wang Di also emphasized China’s “responsible and constructive role” in promoting peace and stability.

U.S. response to China’s growing naval power

The joint drills show that China is expanding its regional reach and seeking to establish a more significant military presence.

According to a report by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy, “China’s growing naval presence in the Middle East is part of a broader global strategy aimed at challenging U.S. dominance and expanding Chinese influence.” The report further notes that “China’s naval expansion in the region is likely to increase tensions and could even spark a conflict.”

Bejing’s naval power in the Middle East is becoming a topic of concern for regional powers. China’s BRI has provided it with the means to expand its naval power by building and operating ports in the region, and investing in infrastructure projects that further its economic ties and influence.

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he Chinese government has announced allocating 7.2% of its annual 2023 budget to the military in order to continue the process of modernization. This translates into 533 billion Chinese yuan or $224 billion. At the same time, China’s military budget is three times smaller than that of the United States. According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, China owns 350 nuclear heads; the U.S. has accused China of planning to increase its nuclear heads to 1,500 by 2035. Beijing has stressed that its nuclear power will not be used except in the case of self-defense and only in case of being attacked with nuclear weapons.

China has been facing increasing challenges such as the formation of AUKUS, the trilateral security pact between Australia, the U.S., and the United Kingdom, which aims to counterbalance China’s growing military presence in the South China Sea. The U.S. has recently signed a deal with the Philippines which allows it to build four more U.S. military bases in the country. The growing ties of the United States with Taiwan, which China views as an integral part of its territory, have also contributed to Beijing feeling threatened by the U.S. and thus increasing its military budget. Unlike the U.S., however, China has only one military base outside its territory in Djibouti, which it says aims to protect ships passing through the Red Sea from piracy.

The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) of China claims that it is a defense army and that it has no plans to attack other countries. China, which has been modernizing its military since the 1980s as a result of its economic growth, maintains its army is being trained to protect the country’s ambitions and to be ready for a possible invasion of Taiwan. In this process, China has reduced the number of its military personnel, focusing more on quality and performance.

The Chinese Army: History and Numbers

Although the U.S. has the largest military budget in the world, China has the largest army. The Chinese military traces its past to the Red Army, which was formed in 1927 when communists revolted against nationalists. In 1933, the size of the Chinese military jumped from 5,000 in 1929 to 200,000. Many of these military forces were killed during infighting with the nationalists while some fought the Japanese alongside nationalists in the north of China.

Following World War II, in 1949, the Red Army, which was renamed the “People’s Liberation Army,” was officially established with the foundation of the Republic of China.

The Chinese constitution states that the military commission of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) should lead the republic and military. This means that the Chinese military should be under the command of the CCP, and is loyal to the party rather than the republic or the constitution.

In addition to the 2,035,000 soldiers actively recruited by the Chinese military, there are 510,000 reserves. In 2022, the Chinese military budget accounted for 7.1% of the country’s budget.

People’s Liberation Army Ground Forces: The Chinese ground forces are estimated to include approximately 975,000 soldiers. During times of crisis, reserves and paramilitary forces join the army, adding 510,000 more personnel to its capacity.

People’s Liberation Army Naval Forces: The Chinese navy has undergone rapid modernization. Some 300,000 soldiers are organized into three main fleets: the North Sea Fleet, the East Sea Fleet, and the South Sea Fleet. Each fleet consists of several surface ships, submarines, and naval air forces, coastal defense, and naval units. The Chinese navy is considered the largest in the world when it comes to number of naval ships, with a total of 777 different vessels, including, among others, two aircraft carriers and a helicopter carrier, 79 submarines, and 41 destroyers.

People’s Liberation Army Air Force: The number of recruited personnel in the air force of the People’s Liberation Army is 395,000, and they are divided into five commands and 24 divisions with three airborne divisions. The Chinese Air Force is the third largest in the world with 3,285 aircraft, 1,200 of which are warplanes.

People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force: The People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force is the main strategic missile force of the People’s Liberation Army with at least 120,000 personnel, divided into six divisions. Its primary mission is to control China’s conventional and nuclear strategic missiles.

People’s Liberation Army Strategic Support Force: Established at the end of 2015 as part of reforms by the People’s Liberation Army, the Strategic Support Force operates with a personnel count of 175,000. A Chinese official has stated said that it is a mix of all current combat units, including but not limited to space, electronic, and intelligence warfare.

China’s growing military power reflects its mounting economic and political weight in world affairs, and the increasing threats surrounding its borders. Although China stresses its army is a defense one, it is not certain that China will not turn offensive in light of growing threats in the South China Sea and Taiwan.

Only time will reveal when and how China will project its military power, especially with Western powers being busy with Russia in Ukraine. This is especially true considering the growing military ties between China and Russia which always leave the U.S. and its allies at unease.

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In late December 2022, the Japanese government announced a new security policy, abandoning the fiction that the country’s military (euphemistically called the “Self Defense Forces”) would not possess offensive weaponry. Perhaps more significantly, the government also announced it would increase military spending dramatically, almost doubling the budget over the next five years.

This has been reported on internationally (and domestically) as an inevitable reaction to increasing Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea and elsewhere. Such reporting, however, misses the broader political context.

The two percent figure: Pleasing the Americans

The Japanese government’s stated aim is to have military spending at two percent of GDP: a startling departure from the longstanding policy commitment to keep the budget at or around one percent. This would make Japan the third-largest military spender in the world, after the United States and China—an uncomfortable fact rarely mentioned in the Japanese media.

The two percent figure is an arbitrary one, not based on any kind of serious assessment of defense needs. Indeed, some commentators have argued that the military does not have the capacity to absorb the large sums: the all-volunteer forces have consistently not been able to meet their recruiting goals. Nevertheless, successive governments of the conservative Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), backed by big business, have long pushed for the increase—a push that became stronger under the overtly nationalistic cabinets of Shinzo Abe.

Rather, the reasoning is political. NATO countries, the closest allies of the United States, commit to a two percent GDP target (though not many of them fulfill this pledge, inviting American criticism). Though obviously not a NATO member, Japan increasing its military budget to two percent, would, in the minds of the political elite, endear the country to the eyes of the all-important Americans.

For Japan to be recognized as a good student and invited to the front of the classroom to sit amongst the big boys, so the political elite believe, Japan must prove its worth to the United States as a trusty military sidekick, ready to jump to action at a moment’s notice. The notion that American interests may differ from Japan’s, or that Japan may be dragged into a catastrophic war, seems simply inconceivable; for better or for worse, Japan wants to be all in.

China as Japan’s eternal boogeyman

The Russian invasion of Ukraine has, of course, provided a bandwagon for the LDP to obtain support for a larger military, and has been relentlessly exploited. However, the true adversary has always been China, labelled in the new policy as “a matter of serious concern” for Japan and the “greatest strategic challenge” the country faces.

This mantra of the Chinese threat has been repeated ad naseum in Japan for the better part of twenty years, in particular since China overtook Japan as the world’s second-largest economy in 2010. The Japanese have essentially been spoon-fed a sustained, almost hysterical barrage of how they must fear the Chinese menace.

China is a security threat, an economic threat, a political threat, a cultural threat— the list goes on and on, and is repeated over and over in official statements and in the media. Yet few can point to any plausible, concrete threat that China poses to Japan, and certainly none that would be solved by aggressive military posturing. That China poses a challenge to unipolar American hegemony in the Asia Pacific (and elsewhere) is clear, but that is a problem for Japan only because of the slavish attitude of the political elite towards the United States.

The context: Continuing Japanese decline

The background of this is, of course, ongoing Japanese decline. Since the bubble economy imploded in 1990, economic growth has been anemic at best. Wages have remained stagnant for the better part of thirty years, and the country is now in the lower third of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). A recent global survey showed that salaries for information technology (IT) engineers in Japan came in at a dismal twentieth place. With the weakening yen, more and more young people are moving abroad for higher wages—a situation that would have been inconceivable a generation ago.

The low wages are particularly galling given the brutally long hours most Japanese still work: karoshi, death from overwork, remains a major social issue in the country, with people regularly working over the officially recognized “karoshi line” of 80 hours of monthly overtime. An international survey of young people in 2018 showed that Japan was dead last in terms of hope for the future: only 12 percent of Japanese respondents said they had any hope. The second lowest, France, had twice that. Forty percent of Japanese, double the percentage of 1989, are currently in precarious, contract-based employment.

Within this general context of anxiety, people often want a scapegoat, and China has served as the all-menacing boogeyman. Of course, the Japanese do not believe that China is the direct cause of the country’s economic and social decay: rather, it is the vague sense of impending doom, of being stalked, overtaken, and left in the cold by some dark, powerful force that has, over time, gripped the popular consciousness. More and more, the “Chinese threat” is being used to simply shut down any debate—something that can be observed with the military expansion.

No one can say the world is ignoring Xinjiang.

Testimonies of the Turkic Uyghurs who managed to escape the province have reverberated, provoking reactions ranging from disbelief to outrage.

The danger, however, is that we might narrow down the issue to a narrative of authoritarian China abusing the rights of minorities and therefore needing to be confronted.

We should not forget that this particular repression of Muslims in Xinjiang harnesses all the tools of the globalized modern age: capitalism and progress which often mean the policing, exploitation, and dehumanization of the recipients of the so-called help.

For this purpose, it is important to position Chinese state violence at the crossroads of the post-socialist neoliberal development and the surge in Islamophobia since the West’s “war on terror” was launched. Is this not a part of the centuries-long global imperial history?

Although the People’s Republic of China was born from the resistance to imperialism, it has reproduced the tenets of imperialism to create the infrastructure for political violence.

Following the footsteps of European colonialists, the communist state-builders also look down on indigenous people in their frontier territories, treating them as incapable of self-rule, and, at the same time, extracting their resources.

Is there anything new in China’s behavior?

Some would argue that for the first time in history mass surveillance is being used on such a scale, and that this could give China an award for inventions on suppressing its own people.

Because authorities labeled Uyghurs as threatening the order, a long list of beneficiaries in the guise of technology companies are allowed to pitch their solutions, advance the dehumanizing project, and thrive.

In Xinjiang, most non-Han people live outside of the detention facilities, but their lives resemble one huge open-air prison

Anything more seductive than making money from mass surveillance and incarceration? The capitalist accumulation process never stops – it continues to be reinvented! That is why the pre-criminal offences of thought and action were added to the long list of “extremist but not serious terrorist crimes.”

This accompanied by capital-driven development dispossessed Uyghurs, producing a neo-colonial system at a frontier of global capitalism.

In Xinjiang, most non-Han people live outside of the detention facilities, but their lives resemble one huge open-air prison. With their movements being tracked, passports taken away, and phones monitored all the time, Uyghur people are far from free – even in comparison to other places in China.

The Chinese visionaries of state violence in the right context

The Soviet model reeducated citizens through forced labor and collective training. On the other hand, Western imperial powers targeted certain ethnic groups who had independence aspirations by deploying some sort of eugenics.

It seems that China borrows from both streams of imperialism which combine the use of propaganda and justify mass detentions of a segment of the population. Therefore, it becomes inevitable that special measures against the target group will be accepted by the rest of Chinese society, which view them as the necessary steps to provide safety, and not aimed at an erasure of identity. All the while the government abuses segments of the population to display its ability to protect the others.

This landscape of terror could have looked different if things in the West had played out differently.

It is the West’s response to 9/11 that allowed China to embrace anti-Muslim rhetoric. Places such as Guantanamo Bay continue to inspire others to justify torture and preemptive punishments. Now, the U.S. and European institutions face accusations of hypocrisy when denouncing China’s policies.

In these moments, many ask about the rationale behind Trump’s ban on Muslims, the criminalization of asylum-seekers, or the efforts to influence the country’s minority demographics.

Is the Chinese government working alone to achieve similar goals?

Looking back, forced labor has prevailed in China for centuries, with the Chinese Civil War itself constituting a show-off of nationalists and communists making use of reeducation for the broad population.

Then, after the communists won the war, millions were pushed into a penitentiary state mechanism – this later evolved along with Chinese society and brutal labor camps persisted in a wide range of settings.

One of the Chinese’s colonial endeavors was transforming the region for their own purposes, exploiting its natural resources, and dispossessing its people.

Uyghurs are stripped of the most lucrative job opportunities, and are kept under the strict eye of the watchtower in which a relationship of superiority and inferiority is duplicated.

China’s colonial project includes the subjugation of the indigenous population and social engineering. Han people, who have settled or been settled by a decree, in Xinjiang, disrupt the social structure of the region. As a result, the proportion of Han Chinese has risen from 6% to roughly more than 40%, forming a counterweight to Muslim Uyghurs.

Should we place all the guilt on the leadership of China?

Xinjiang has been rebooted to deploy tactics that are already on the rise around the globe, particularly in the borderlands, where the colonial settings have been replaced.

Reinforcing these mechanisms once again normalizes the century-long process of the spread of concentration camps.

The struggle against the terror campaign in Xinjiang should be considered alongside labor camps and mass incarceration in other parts of the world. If anti-imperialism means standing with the colonized, the fight should go beyond China and be linked to other places where it is globally connected.

Amid escalating tensions between Moscow and the West over Ukraine, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to China to finalize the negotiations over a new $80 billion natural gas agreement. On February 4, Gazprom signed an agreement with China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to supply Russian gas to China via the Far Eastern route for the next 25 years, which will boost Russian gas volumes to China by an extra 10 billion cubic meters (bcm) a year.

Unlike the previous Russia-China gas agreement on the Power of Siberia pipeline, which is being built for the last five years, the new agreement does not entail the construction of an additional pipeline network. Although the Western media dubbed this agreement unexpected, the negotiations over the agreement lasted six years and resulted in the signing of memoranda of understanding in 2015 and 2017, respectively.

Russia has long aimed to capitalize on its vast hydrocarbon resources to cater to China’s increasing liquefied natural gas (LNG) demand. The agreement was signed at a time of an uneasy geopolitical situation between the U.S. and Russia over Ukraine, which prepares for the full-scale war with Russia. In this vein, it is significant that the new gas agreement was settled in euros in an effort by both Moscow and Beijing to diversify away from trade in U.S. dollars.

The de-dollarization process is a relatively new phenomenon in Russia-China trade relations, and can be seen as a move by both countries to enhance security of bilateral trade against potential U.S. sanctions. This process is more visible in the energy field with Gazprom and the CNPC mainly using national local currencies – ruble and yuan – and sometimes euros due to the current trade volumes between the EU and Moscow-Beijing. This move can also be explained by Russia’s and China’s desire to push for a greater role of their local currencies in the global financial market.

In addition to natural gas export, the new deal would boost the development of Russia’s Far East, which has remained economically underdeveloped for many years; help create more jobs; fully gasify the region; and attract additional investments.

Europe remains the top destination for Russian gas and oil as the volumes of exported energy are much higher than those exported to China.

Although the agreed extra gas volumes are moderate for China, the biggest natural gas consumer globally, Moscow seeks a deeper alliance with Beijing and to gain its political support aimed at neutralizing the Western pressure and possible new economic sanctions. The new gas deal raised concerns in Europe that Moscow would sharply divert its LNG exports to China; however, the LNG export to China will not flow through Russia’s European pipeline network. In other words, Europe remains the top destination for Russian gas and oil as the volumes of exported energy are much higher than those exported to China, and hence Moscow is unlikely to decrease the volumes of LNG to Europe anytime soon.

Moreover, China deliberately avoids any possible military confrontation with the U.S. or NATO, and relies on its rising economic power as a tool. Therefore, a possible invasion of Ukraine by Russia may result in global economic disruptions and negatively affect China’s economic stability during the post-pandemic recovery period, as well as the running of Chinese companies. However, both China and Russia have an interest in deepening their political and economic ties in an uneasy period when both are cautious of Washington’s bellicose rhetoric.

Whereas recent events, such as the Russia-China-Iran joint naval exercises, intensifying incursions of Chinese jets into Taiwan’s airspace, and the harsh Chinese statements towards Taiwan, stir concerns in Europe of Moscow and Beijing creating a simultaneous crisis in both Europe and the Indo-Pacific region so as to undermine Western influence and earn additional concessions, this scenario is unlikely under the current conditions.

In contrast to Russia, which is a declining power with a one-man rule and a stagnating economy, China has long been revising the international order through its soft power methods and existing global institutions, thus preserving its global reputation. Given this fact, it is safe to note that the Chinese army will unlikely commit a blatant violation of international law to seize Taiwan, though it definitely possesses the capacity of destabilizing regional security.

What is more, unlike Ukraine, Taiwan enjoys the paramount support of the U.S. militarily, politically, and economically, and a possible invasion of Taiwan would bring an unprecedented reaction by Washington causing severe economic, political, and security damage to Beijing. In this case, even the close alignment with Russia will not yield significant results.

China may look as a reliable partner but always remains tightfisted when it comes to taking high risks, and expresses carefully worded support for Russia. It is most likely that the Chinese will attempt to dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine, but, at the same time, the country feels comfortable with an economically weak and internationally isolated Russia. The current standoff will likely help China secure.

Economic relations between China and Israel are witnessing remarkable developments in recent years. A number of concluded commercial deals and signed contracts are clear evidence of the increasing imports and exports. The scope and diversity of the bilateral relations can be witnessed by a free trade agreement, China’s restoration of a number of Israeli ports, the construction of transportation tunnels in the Carmel region, the mobile phone sector, Israeli food and technology companies, and China’s bid for developing the world’s largest desalination plant in Israel – which was unsuccessful due to an American refusal.

China launched its diplomatic relations with Israel in 1992, but the economic relations were only gradually strengthened after the 2000s in the investment, tourism, and trade sectors. Israel rightly views China as an economic giant since it is the second-largest global economy while the Chinese markets attract Israeli industrialists and businesspeople, despite some difficulties such as the long geographical distance and being located in different time zones.

Out of 42 Israeli economic attachés around the world, six are in China to support Israeli businesspeople. Meanwhile, the visit of Benjamin Netanyahu, the former prime minister of Israel, to Beijing in 2017 resulted in the signing of 25 contracts worth $2 billion.

Chinese expansion into Israel comes within the framework of Chinese President Xi Jinping’s Belt and Road Initiative, under which China could invest billions of U.S. dollars in commercial and economic projects such as expanding the Israeli ports of Haifa and Ashdod, digging tunnels in the Carmel Mountains in Haifa, constructing the Tel Aviv light rail line, and building housing and civil towers.

China is the third-largest destination for Israeli exports after the United States and Britain, with a value of $4.7 billion.

Since the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1992, trade volume between China and Israel has grown every year. China is the third-largest destination for Israeli exports after the United States and Britain, with a value of $4.7 billion. The most important commodities exported are cars, electronics, and chemical and medical products as well as optical equipment. Israel’s imports from China are second only to those from the United States, with imports of $11.4 billion in a variety of industries including electronics, textiles, toys, furniture, metals, chemicals, and a variety of consumer goods.

The Israeli Innovation Conference in 2017 broadened the scope of economic and technological cooperation between Tel Aviv and Beijing, which extended to universities, unions, and private companies, and tens of thousands of participants can now annually visit Israel to learn about new innovations. Israel’s technological capabilities are of interest to China, which invests a large amount of its resources in adopting technologies from around the world. Israel’s technological developments in software, agriculture, health, automobiles, water resource management, and manufacturing have become the focus of many Chinese companies.

High-level Chinese delegations have been visiting Israel in recent years, considering this a new breakthrough in the country’s international relations. Israel is interested in the Chinese sectors of agriculture, medicine, and technology, and has already learnt from China in the field of facial recognition, and in many other fields for bilateral cooperation.

China is Israel’s second-largest trading partner.

In terms of internal trade, Israeli data reveals that 463 investment deals were signed between Israeli and Chinese companies between 2001 and 2020, and China became Israel’s second-largest trading partner after the United States. In 2001, the volume of trade between China and Israel amounted to $1.07 billion; in 2018, this reached $11.6 billion; and in 2019, the figure decreased slightly to $11.2 billion.

At the industrial level, China is Israel’s second-largest trading partner. In the field of infrastructure, the Chinese company SIPG won a bid to expand the port of Haifa in northern Israel in 2018, and another bid to establish a new port in Ashdod in the south, in the next 25 years. The Ashdod port is expected to improve maritime transport and supply lines from and to Israel, and reduce the waiting time compared to the old ports in the region. All in all, this will provide Israel with more economic gains.

Although Chinese investments have not yet exceeded 10% of the total foreign capital in Israel, the country has won large bids for its transportation infrastructure, has started bidding for water and electricity infrastructure projects, and has submitted a bid to build the new light rail lines in Tel Aviv worth billions of U.S. dollars. Since 2010, Hutchison Whampoa Limited has worked on the light rail line in Tel Aviv with an estimated budget of $500 million.

Chinese delegations visit Israel to learn more about its water desalination technologies as Israel is considered one of the world’s most advanced countries in desalination.

In water desalination, the Chinese company Hutchison has entered into a tender to build the SWRO II facility, planned to be the world’s largest desalination plant on the Mediterranean coast in southern Israel. The plant produces 200 million cubic meters of drinking water annually, which raises the total water treated by Israeli desalination plants to 786 million cubic meters annually – or 85% of its total annual domestic consumption. The value of the bid is $1.5 billion, and the winning company will manage the facility for 25 years.

China has been following the Israeli water market for the last decade. Chinese delegations visit Israel to learn more about its water desalination technologies as Israel is considered one of the world’s most advanced countries in desalination. The Chinse-run plant treats 200 million cubic meters of water annually, which increases Israel’s desalination capacity of water to 35%. The plant is the sixth one to be operated by China in the country.

When talking about technology and innovation, the joint ventures of China and Israel are based on the notion of supply and demand. The Israeli government sent a delegation to visit Beijing in March 2017 to learn about Chinese technologies. The relationship between Israel and China continues at various levels of government, universities, unions, and private companies that send tens of thousands of participants annually to learn about Israeli innovation.

Apart from agricultural research, China is the third-biggest investor in Israeli high-tech companies. China has advanced expertise worldwide, and can feed the global food supply chain through the use of contemporary technology.

The main Israeli export to China (51%) is electronic components, while Intel is responsible for 80% of exports, including chips made in Israel and sent to China for inspection and assembly. There are three other major and growing industries: industrial measurement, control equipment, and chemical and medical equipment.

China now considers Israel an attractive investment destination, whether in technology or infrastructure, and its investment in infrastructure in Israel is due to its knowledge, techniques, expertise and capital required to compete successfully in winning bids.

Israeli startups raised $325 million from Chinese investors in 2018, compared to $76 million in 2013, and Chinese investments aim to benefit from Israeli knowledge in the areas of artificial intelligence, advanced computing, autonomous vehicles, robotics, and data science. With regard to the increase in Chinese tourism in Israel, Israeli companies have recently focused on attracting more Chinese tourists, and the Israeli Ministry of Tourism has even opened a second office in Shanghai, following the one in Beijing. The ministry is working to market Israeli tourist sites to the Chinese, as tens of thousands of Chinese arrive in Israel to participate in sales and fairs.

An article by Gideon Rachman in the Financial Times last July is a prime example of western intelligentsia’s limited understanding of China’s unhindered rise as a superpower. “Becoming a superpower is a complicated business. It poses a series of connected questions about capabilities, intentions and will,” Rachman wrote.

To help us understand what this claim precisely means, the FT writer uses an analogy. “To use a sporting analogy, you can be an extremely gifted tennis player and genuinely want to be world champion, but still be unwilling to make the sacrifices to turn the dream into reality.”

At least, in Rachman’s thinking, China is capable of being a political actor, though it remains incapable of vying for the superpower status, as it supposedly lacks ‘the will’ to make the required ‘sacrifices’.

Although I visited Beijing only once, a few years ago, I, or even any casual visitor to the Chinese capital, could attest to the powerful collective economic engine that fuels not only China but much of the world economy. While Chinese officials do not outright profess that their ultimate aim is to make their country a superpower – for, frankly, rarely are superpowers aware of the mechanisms that lead to such status – the Chinese leadership fully fathoms the nature of the challenge at hand.

Take Chinese President Xi Jinping’s speech in October 2019, on the occasion of the 70th anniversary of the founding of the Republic of China. “Over the past 70 years, under the strong leadership of the Communist Party of China (CPC), the Chinese people, with great courage and relentless exploration, have successfully opened the path of socialism with Chinese characteristics.

Along this path, we have ushered in a new era,” he said. Note Xi’s constant references to ideology, nationalism, forward-thinking and insistence on China’s central position in this ‘new era’. Xi was elevated to the status of Mao Zedong – as a ‘core leader’ in 2019 and ‘helmsman’ in 2021 – precisely due to his role in transitioning China in terms of power, politics and global prestige.

The sooner we acknowledge that China is an influential political entity that operates according to a clear and decisive political strategy, the more meaningful our understanding of the geopolitical transformation in Asia, and the rest of the world, will be.

Indeed, the sooner we acknowledge that China is an influential political entity that operates according to a clear and decisive political strategy, the more meaningful our understanding of the geopolitical transformation in Asia, and the rest of the world, will be.

Since the rise of Britain as a colonial power, thus the advent of a new world order, determined almost exclusively by western powers, the global center of power, starting in the 18th century, had shifted away from Asia and the Middle East.

Later on, starting in the mid-twentieth century, the main competition that colonial western powers had been forced to contend with came from the Soviet Union, its Warsaw Pact, and their international allies, mainly Europe’s former colonies in the Southern hemisphere.

The U.S. involvement in long wars with undefined objectives opened up unprecedented geopolitical spaces that Washington and its western allies have dominated over the course of decades. For example, the U.S. had near-total geopolitical control over much of South America starting with the introduction of the Monroe Doctrine, in 1823. The same assertion can be made about Africa which, despite the formal end of colonialism in the long-exploited continent, continued to revolve around the same western colonial powers of yesteryears. However, a noticeable shift in the West’s geostrategic influence in these regions began taking place in the last three decades.

Russia has speedily offered itself as a military and strategic ally and alternative to the U.S. in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and South America.

While the West was fighting essentially futile wars in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of the intentionally ill-defined ‘war on terror’, regional and international political actors moved in to fill the gaps created by American and western absence from their various regions of influence. Russia has speedily offered itself as a military and strategic ally and alternative to the U.S. in parts of the Middle East, Africa, and South America – in Syria, Libya and Venezuela respectively – as China moved in to fulfill a much larger economic role, branding itself as a fair partner, especially if compared to western powers.

It was not until the gradual U.S. retreat from Iraq in 2011 that Washington announced its ‘Pivot to Asia’, a new military and political stratagem aimed at offsetting the Chinese influence in the Asian Pacific region. Much of former U.S. President Barack Obama’s first term in office was dedicated to America’s political strategic realignments in the Asia Pacific.

“The United States is a Pacific power, and we are here to stay,” Obama declared in a speech to the Australian parliament in November 2011. “As we end today’s wars, I have directed my national security team to make our presence and missions in the Asia-Pacific a top priority.”

However, the American geopolitical shift may have arrived belatedly. For one, the repercussions of America’s military undertakings in Central Asia and the Middle East – as time has clearly demonstrated – were far too severe and costly to be simply canceled out by a declaration of a new strategy. Two, China had, by then, built a complex network of alliances in Asia and around the world, allowing it to cement real bonds with many nations, especially those concerned or fed up with the West’s obsession with military superiority and interventions.

According to a report published in October by the International Institute for Sustainable Development, over the last twelve years, China has been Africa’s largest trading partner. “China has created 25 economic and trade cooperation zones in 16 African countries,” the report reads, “and has continued to invest heavily across the continent throughout the COVID19 pandemic,” according to a government report about Chinese–African economic and trade ties.

In contrast, according to data published by Statista Research Department in August 2021, “after a peak in 2014, foreign direct investment (FDI) in Africa from the United States dropped to 47.5 billion U.S. dollars (from 69.03) in 2020.”

Here is precisely where many analysts go wrong, arguing, as Rachman did, that “China’s economic weight, as the world’s largest trading power and manufacturer, gives it significant political leverage internationally. […] But Beijing’s economic power is not always politically decisive”.

This limited thinking is based on the assumption that, to be ‘political’ is to follow the same blueprint used by the U.S. and its western partners in their approach to foreign policy, diplomacy and occasional wars. China’s take on politics, however, has always been quite different. According to Beijing’s thinking, China does not need to invade countries to earn the designation of a political actor.

Instead, China is simply tapping into its own historical trajectory of utilizing economic influence in its quest for greatness, and arguably, empire. The fact that the Road and Belt Initiative – a long-term strategy aimed at connecting Asia with Africa and Europe via land and maritime networks – is a modern interpretation of the Silk Road, which was a network of ancient trade routes which linked China to the Mediterranean region, is enough to tell us about the nature of the Chinese model.

Recent months have seen the People’s Republic of China (PRC) adopting an increasingly belligerent posture towards Taiwan, as evident in undertaking aerial incursions into the latter’s Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) in unprecedented numbers and repeated statements denouncing any move by the island toward seeking formal independence.

Concurrent to this, the U.S. has taken an increasingly assertive posture against the PRC. The preceding Trump Administration saw a unprecedented surge in U.S. warships undertaking Freedom of Navigation Operations (FONOPS) through the Taiwan Strait; a more recent leak by the Taiwanese authorities has revealed that the Trump Administration authorized the deployment of a training detachment of US troops to Taiwan.

More recently, President Joe Biden affirmed the U.S. commitment to defend the island. In offering a less-than-veiled indication of the likelihood of a U.S. military intervention, Biden’s statement has aroused debate over whether his Administration is abandoning the U.S. policy of ‘Strategic Ambiguity’ toward Taiwan.

‘Strategic Ambiguity’, adopted following Washington’s establishment of diplomatic ties with Beijing in 1979, was drafted with a twofold aim in mind. First, it enabled Washington to hint at Beijing the possibility of U.S. military intervention, if the mainland were to attempt an unprovoked invasion.

Second, strategic ambiguity enabled the U.S. to simultaneously hint to the Taiwanese authorities that unnecessarily provoking the mainland would void the contingent scenario of U.S. military intervention. Such a proviso thus sought to induce caution in Taipei.

We should not be too surprised about Biden’s assertiveness over Taiwan.

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party has reason to be furious over Biden’s statement, we should not be too surprised about Biden’s assertiveness over Taiwan. The ambiguity underpinning the possibility of U.S. intervention to support Taiwan is conditioned on the nature of mainland behavior; in light of the escalatory moves that Beijing has adopted towards Taiwan in recent months, a statement highlighting the Biden Administration’s willingness to defend Taiwan is consistent within the bounds of the policy of Strategic Ambiguity, and a necessary one at that, given the need to warn China against further escalation.

Second, recent developments in Taiwan have elevated the island’s status as a poke in the eye of the CCP’s ego. Whilst the PRC floundered in responding to the spread of COVID19 and was only able to bring the virus under control due to harsh lockdown measures and manipulation of its domestic media, Taiwan was able to suppress the virus through its ‘whole-of-society’ response that underscored the efficiency of the island’s model of governance.

In so providing a high-profile instance of good governance in a democratically-elected polity, Taiwan has earned widespread international praise; combined with the mainland’s repeated attempts to sideline and bully Taiwan over the last several years, the result has been a growing sense of international solidarity with the island, with a growing number of EU delegations to Taiwan.

This was exemplified in September 2020, when President of the Czech Senate Miloš Vystrčil visited Taiwan and, on the floor of the Legislative Yuan, declared in Mandarin Chinese that ‘I am a Taiwanese’, alluding to John F. Kennedy’s ‘Ich Bin Ein Berliner’ speech in 1963.

The combined effects of these developments has been to arouse CCP fears of an increase in pro-independence sentiment in the island that has already been increasing in recent years due to a younger Taiwanese demographic that has little emotional connection to the mainland, as well as growing international scrutiny of the mainland’s human rights abuses, and Beijing’s reneging on its promises to respect Hong Kong’s autonomy as part of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model.

The convergent impact of these developments has been to arouse the CCP’s fear that the Taiwanese populace may become further emboldened into seeking formal independence for the island, under which circumstance the CCP’s failure to bring about unification with the mainland would stand as a high-profile policy failure that will undermine the CCP’s domestic credibility.

The CCP’s current sabre-rattling is thus likely intended to coerce the Taiwanese populace against any further actions that would otherwise force CCP’s hand to avoid a domestic crisis of legitimacy.

With no end in sight to the mainland’s pattern of provocations against Taiwan and the Biden Administration affirming the U.S. commitment to Taiwan, the next question concerns the possibility of a Sino-U.S. clash over Taiwan. I do not see such a scenario occurring in the immediate future. As noted above, China is attempting to rely on threats of force to dissuade the Taiwanese populace from seeking formal independence.

The CCP is aware that a clash of arms with the U.S., at a time of clear U.S. military superiority over the PRC, is the kind of gamble that would likely lead to a Chinese defeat, the kind of high-profile failure that the CCP cannot deflect domestic public opinion from.

The next question is about a possible Sino-American clash over Taiwan.

Over the medium-to-long term, however, the picture is less clear, for two convergent reasons. The first concerns the rapid pace of modernization in the PRC’s air and naval power capabilities. In conjunction with Beijing’s investment in cyber-warfare, cruise missile and space warfare technology, U.S. policymakers have expressed increasing concerns that the PRC may close the military gap sufficiently, to the extent that the CCP believes that it might emerge triumphant from a short, armed takeover of Taiwan that would enable Beijing to present Washington with the fait accompli of Chinese control.

Many of the old Western imperialist powers are taking part in a new scramble: this time not for Africa, but for hegemony and influence in the South China Sea. In a surprise announcement on September 15, 2021, the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom formed a new strategic partnership for the sharing of weaponry (in particular nuclear submarine and cruise missiles) and security-related cyber technology, with the main recipient of new weapons expected to be Australia. Dubbed AUKUS, this new alliance will purportedly “protect shared values and promote security and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region.”

Like the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, commonly known as the Quad, an alliance bringing together the U.S., Australia, Japan, and India, none of the official statements of the AUKUS alliance mention China by name. And yet, like the Quad, the intentions of AUKUS are transparent: to maintain military and economic hegemony over the South China Sea, and over China in general. In other words, to keep China in its place, through brute force if necessary. Though how AUKUS and the Quad will co-ordinate remains unclear, there is little question that the provocative joint military exercises taking place under the rubric of the Quad will be expanded to include the AUKUS framework as well.

The inclusion of the UK in AUKUS has raised some eyebrows, since the country has hardly been a Pacific power since World War Two. However, the entire Brexit narrative has been based largely on imperialist fantasies of Britain returning to its “rightful” place as a global powerhouse, perhaps cajoling pesky natives into lucrative – for Britain – trade deals through gunboat diplomacy. There have been calls by influential UK politicians (backed by the former Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe) for the UK to be a “major democratic counterweight” to China in the region, and a major review of foreign and defense policy in March 2021 centered on a shift to focus resources – diplomatic and military – on the Indo-Pacific.

Britain also sent an aircraft carrier to the South China Sea, essentially to join the game of intimidating China. Of course, the glory days of Queen Victoria are long over, and the notion that the current UK could accomplish much of anything on its own is somewhat fanciful, so a military alliance with the U.S. and Australia makes sense from that perspective. It should also be noted that the three AUKUS countries, together with Canada and New Zealand, are part of the Five Eyes alliance for intelligence sharing, which includes unsavory activities such as spying on each other’s citizens through monitoring of internet communications.

Even Germany has thrown its hat into the South China Sea ring, sending a frigate to the region.

France has also been flexing its muscles. In 2021, the country participated in joint military exercises in the region with Japan, the U.S., and Australia, dispatching warships to – where else? – the South China Sea. Indeed, the very birth of AUKUS was part and parcel of an imperialist game between Britain and France, with Australia abruptly cancelling a large French contract for submarines and switching to a British manufacturer. A diplomatic row ensued, with the French accusing the AUKUS countries of “betrayal” and even recalling their ambassadors to the U.S. and Australia (Britain was deemed not worth the trouble).

However, while all of that made for entertaining news, at the end of the day it was a sideshow compared to the much more important goal of beating the war drums. Even Germany has thrown its hat into the South China Sea ring, sending a frigate to the region. However, the Germans were easily snubbed by China, which refused the warship entry into a Chinese port.

Defenders of the “rules-based” order

Certainly, the most insulting idea advanced by the countries attempting to contain China is the notion they are defending the “rules-based order” in the South China Sea. In this narrative, China is the “rule breaker,” flouting the accepted laws and customs of international society. China is portrayed as a rogue state, going against international norms and the rule of law itself. The white knights of the West have arisen, not to protect their own selfish interests, but to defend those laws and rules, and champion the “fair and open” international order.

Even the openly provocative passages of Western warships in the area are euphemistically called “freedom of navigation” missions – one can imagine how the U.S. would react to Chinese warships conducting military maneuvers close to its shorelines. These blatantly biased narratives are repeated ad nauseam, not only by the governments themselves, but also by a compliant press. Unable to point to any specific violation, the media uses vague terms such as “increasing assertiveness” to describe Chinese behavior, as if that were a crime. In Japan, the right-of-center press has even resurrected the Cold War term “Free World” to juxtapose itself and the West against China.

The international system is indeed a “rules-based order,” based on laws and norms. In particular, the Charter of the United Nations proclaims the equality and sovereignty of all nations, and prohibits the use of force outside of situations of self-defense. It should be stressed that even then it is only until the Security Council decides on a course of action.

It is hardly controversial to note that the U.S. (and its allies) have openly broken these norms on a huge number of occasions, with catastrophic results for the people on the receiving end. The invasion of Iraq, the destruction of Libya, and ongoing military intervention in Syria are just some of the more egregious examples of U.S. violations of international law in recent years.

The ostensibly liberal government of President Biden thinks nothing of announcing that, even after the 20-year U.S. occupation of Afghanistan came to an unceremonious end, the country will continue the “war on terror” using “over the horizon” means, i.e., illegal bombing with drones and other air-based weapons. The so-called liberal U.S. press practically mounted a concerted campaign to stop the U.S. from pulling out its troops from Afghanistan, claiming the war on terror could not be effected without “boots on the ground.”

The U.S. thumbing its nose at international law is hardly a new phenomenon, and is not confined to the “war on terror” framework.

The U.S. thumbing its nose at international law is hardly a new phenomenon, and is not confined to the “war on terror” framework. The U.S. has intervened openly or covertly in many countries in Latin America, including Cuba, and imposes crippling sanctions on Venezuela. And continuing lavish support for countries that truly do deserve the “rogue state” label, such as the apartheid state of Israel, make a mockery of U.S. claims to be upholding international law.

Of course, the U.S. is hardly the only country that violates international law, and the notion that international law is observed more in breach than in observance is far oversold. Nevertheless, that does not detract from the main point: it is the U.S. and its allies that are being aggressive in the South China Sea, and China is completely justified in being apprehensive of the encirclement of the country by seemingly hostile navies.

A new Cold War – or even a hot one?

Though the current tensions between the West and China are often called a “new Cold War,” there are of course important differences with the past Cold War with the Soviet bloc. Probably the most important one is the extensive economic interdependence between China and the West (and the rest of the world). Even as they rattle their sabers, Western countries are mindful that they rely economically on China, as a manufacturing base and increasingly as a market.

Indeed, China is the main trading partner for the U.S., Japan, and the EU as a whole. A real shooting war would be an unmitigated disaster for the global economy: a fact well understood by business interests that wield great influence over Western governments. That may not make a real shooting war inconceivable, but it definitely does make it difficult. Much of the current rhetoric, in particular in Japan, is a result of pandering to nationalistic constituencies, and of attempts at justifying bloated military budgets and arms sales.

The problem is that, once nationalistic furor is inflamed to this extent, it can very easily get out of control. Right now, there are many opposing militaries in a small space, and merely one mistake could lead to disaster. The West will have only itself to blame if it does.

In Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting,” Professor Kerry K. Gershaneck, who has studied and written on the China-U.S. relationship for the past decades, focuses on China’s political warfare which he understands a threat to the United States. The author belongs to a circle that considers China an essential enemy of American freedoms and values. The book is Gershaneck’s explanation of how “‘contemporary totalitarian Sino-fascism’ threatens democracies insensitive to the danger.”

Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting” is a comprehensive analysis of the complexities of China’s challenge, including its tactics, ideologies, and organizational procedures. It entails comprehensive case studies of China’s political warfare operations against regional allies of the United States such as Thailand and Taiwan.

Gershaneck believes that China is at war with the world, and especially with the United States and its allies. He tries to explain the most important concepts and themes needed to appreciate China’s political warfare and offers a historical outline of the development of Chinese political warfare abilities and skills.

The book’s main idea is “political warfare,” a term that the author owes to the American statesman George F. Kennan (1904–2005). In April 1948, Kennan published The Inauguration of Organized Political Warfare to prepare the “Free World” for the use of the political warfare needed to defeat the Soviet Union and win the Cold War. Gershaneck introduces China’s political warfare, and explains the most important terms and definitions of the concept. The book continues with China’s political warfare goals, ways, means, and wartime support, and elaborates on the country’s political warfare against Thailand and Taiwan.

Gershaneck believes there is an urgent need to establish an Asian political warfare center of excellence, to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute China’s political warfare activities.

Given that for Gershaneck China presents a substantial threat to the United States and its allies, he offers some conclusions and recommendations to empower the USA in this challenge. He discusses the need to develop a national strategy to counter China’s political warfare, and to rebuild national institutions and establish programs in this direction.

Gershaneck believes there is an urgent need to establish an Asian political warfare center of excellence, to investigate, disrupt, and prosecute China’s political warfare activities and to screen, track, and expose them. He also recommends that U.S. policymakers take legal action against China’s officials and affiliates engaged in civil rights offenses, encourage academic study that focuses on combating China’s political warfare, and finally, pass legislation to diminish the offensive power of China’s news and social media.

Kerry K. Gershaneck, Political Warfare: Strategies for Combating China’s Plan to “Win without Fighting” (Marine Corps University Press, 2020) ISBN 979-8569771318, 215 pages

As China’s leaders steer their country to the center of world affairs, they are becoming increasingly frightened. They fear encirclement by hostile neighbors and distant enemies. They fear disloyalty from their own citizenry, especially the talented youth who are intrigued by foreign cultures. Above all, China’s political elites fear one another. Treachery at the very top—where raw power carries the gravest dangers—that is the constant terror of party and military factions who see every crack in their facade of unity as an omen of sudden collapse, a long-dreaded Chinese sequel to the fall of the Soviet Union.

When China’s rulers feel that control is slipping through their fingers, they focus on two nemeses that seem to generate the deepest troubles—the United States and the Islamic world. After decades of ambiguity, Sino-American relations have fallen into a downward spiral with no end in sight. Their disputes are far-reaching and mutually reinforcing. Even if compromise emerges on a single issue—trade or climate change—it can’t forestall confrontation in countless other areas, especially military deployments and human rights.

Long-term antagonism with the United States shapes Beijing’s thinking at every level, leading to the securitization of all politics—foreign and domestic. Issues that could once be seen as primarily economic or religious are now viewed through the lenses of police and military headquarters. This shift in perspective has profoundly altered China’s attitudes to Islam and to Muslim societies. Inside of China, the regime has reimagined Islam as a menace instead of a national resource. At the same time, across Asia and Africa, Chinese leaders have chosen to back repressive governments that portray political dissent as the work of “Islamic” terrorists.

These alliances are a sharp break from China’s previous efforts to avoid deep involvement in Muslims’ regional and national quarrels. A long decade of revolutions and civil wars made those disputes more tumultuous precisely as Beijing launched its Belt and Road Initiative, popularly known as the New Silk Road.

In response, China’s rulers turned their view of the Muslim world upside down. At first, the lands of Islam were supposed to create a bridge spreading Chinese power into Europe, the Indian Ocean, and Africa. Instead, warring Muslim societies seemed to morph into a set of spears aimed at China’s heartland through its ever vulnerable western and northern frontiers.

The specter of dual encroachments—American from the sea and Islamic from the land—is animating a growing belligerence in China’s behavior in world affairs and toward its own people.

The specter of dual encroachments—American from the sea and Islamic from the land—is animating a growing belligerence in China’s behavior in world affairs and toward its own people. After Mao, Chinese diplomacy followed a patient opportunism, assuming that international peace would encourage domestic development, eventually creating a stronger nation that could assert itself more confidently in contests for global leadership. Today that patience has disappeared—replaced by a sense that time is running out because China’s enemies are determined to halt its rise while they still have the power to prevail.

This is the misguided logic that seems to justify—indeed, compel—massive assaults on domestic freedoms that prudent defenders of the status quo would normally regard as self-defeating. Sure enough, Beijing’s campaigns of repression have already provoked backlashes from several directions at once. Western and Islamic governments, global human rights advocates, and United Nations bodies are censoring Chinese officials with greater boldness by the day.

Chinese people who once looked forward to wider freedom—like Hong Kong they often said—now see their future foreshadowed in the surveillance state of Xinjiang. The persecution of religion extends beyond Uighurs to Muslims in general and to all worshipers outside of state-control. And religion is just one of many basic liberties vanishing across the mainland.

Freedoms of speech, association, and legal representation are non-existent for most of the population. Even party members are prohibited from gathering in groups of three of more without prior permission—a sure sign that the supreme leaders trust no one, including their professed allies.

Most damaging of all is the growing hostility against ordinary Chinese citizens who travel abroad to study, work, and shop.

Most damaging of all, however, is the growing hostility against ordinary Chinese citizens who travel abroad to study, work, and shop. More and more, they discover that their nation is further than ever from enjoying the international respect they have craved for generations and hoped was finally in their reach. The sting is particularly painful in the Islamic world. Chinese people in all walks of life are feeling the disdain of Muslims in one country after another—lands where they until a few years ago they were unknown or welcome curiosities.

The revulsion is sharpest in the vernacular press and online media across Asia and Africa. In Indonesian, Malay, Urdu, Turkish, Arabic, and Persian, audiences gasp at a flood of films, photos, interviews, police records, and data sets—all testifying to cruelties too shocking to ignore.

Time after time, citizens learn that the inhumane treatment of Chinese Muslims is enabled by open collaboration of their own governments, the very politicians who try to outdo one another in claiming world leadership of Islam as a political and ethical force for creating a more just society.

These shifts in public opinion are perilous for rulers in the Islamic world as well as China. Silk Road dreams for hemispheric integration are dimming as great powers scramble for spheres of influence. China and Russia continue to pry Europe away from the Atlantic alliance, but they increase the risk of entrapment in new proxy wars across Asia and Africa.

In a quest for geopolitical advantage, China is casting its lot with the most despised reactionaries of Islamdom—the predatory generals of Egypt and Syria, the feuding tyrants of the Persian Gulf, and the fossilized police states of Central Asia. The overt persecution of political and religious dissent demolishes any pretense that Beijing will nourish the universalistic values of Chinese civilization to fashion a more ethical global order.

Having chosen such a calamitous course, China’s rulers will find it difficult to reverse direction. Limits on candid debate greatly reduce the possibilities of auto-correction or anything resembling political learning. The result is a drastic impoverishment of Chinese statecraft precisely when it most needs to help manage global crises instead of aggravating them.