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he Strait of Hormuz has long been the lifeline for the energy production of the GCC states, enabling these oil-rich nations to export huge quantities of oil to consumers, particularly those in East Asian countries such as China, Japan, and South Korea. This allowed the GCC states to prosper, build their economies, foster population growth, and cultivate international relations, using energy as a tool of influence. However, the geopolitical shifts in the region, represented by the war between the United States and Iran in late February 2026, and the associated regional security dilemma, led to the closure of the Strait of Hormuz by Iran on March 4, 2026.

This has cast a shadow over the economies of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states, which rely heavily on energy exports, and has also affected consumer economies, the industrial production cycle, supply chains, and global trade in general. Approximately 20% of global trade passes through the Strait of Hormuz daily, including roughly 16 million barrels of crude oil, representing more than 15% of global oil demand, estimated at 104 million barrels per day, according to 2025 figures.

In addition, about 10 billion cubic feet of liquefied natural gas (LNG) passes through the Strait, mostly from Qatar, which accounts for nearly 20% of global LNG trade. Therefore, a complete halt to shipping traffic in the Strait of Hormuz has severely disrupted energy exports and crippled the economies of the GCC countries, recovery from which is likely to take a considerable time. The disruption of energy exports through the Strait led to a supply gap estimated at around 10 million barrels per day.

Alternative options to bypass Hormuz

Countries with alternative export routes, such as the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah crude oil pipeline, and Saudi Arabia’s 1,200 km. pipeline from Abqaiq in the Eastern Province to Yanbu on the Red Sea, were unable to fill the gap due to the limited capacity of these alternative routes. The limitation of the alternative oil export pipeline was compounded for Saudi Arabia when the Houthis closed the Strait of Bab el-Mandeb in July 2026, effectively choking off Saudi oil exports. Saudi Arabia alone exports between six and seven million barrels of crude oil per day, and the crisis in the Strait of Hormuz reduced this production to less than half.

Overall, the pumping capacity of both alternative routes — the UAE’s Habshan-Fujairah pipeline and the Saudi pipeline from the Eastern Province to the port of Yanbu on the Red Sea — remained capped at only 3.5–5.5 million barrels per day. The war with Iran and its major repercussions, such as the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, posed a genuine threat, primarily to the GCC with their economies that are significantly reliant on revenues from the export of hydrocarbons. The dilemma also disclosed gaps in the GCC’s security arrangements and revealed a clear absence of long-term plans, to ensure the sustainability of energy exports without total dependence on passage through the Strait of Hormuz.

Despite the multiple official statements of condemnation and calls for the indispensability of allowing free navigation through the Strait, future considerations can be viewed through two main perspectives. First, the lack of cooperation on energy export strategies. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz severely impacted some GCC members, such as Qatar, Bahrain, and Kuwait, due to the lack of alternative shipping routes. Second, the absence of a collective approach to security, particularly maritime security, within the GCC. This was manifested in the lack of a unified stance on the conflict, and the absence of a manifest collective security framework.

Collective energy export strategy

With regard to energy export strategies and economic security, the GCC countries need a joint strategy, to ensure the continuity of oil and gas exports during times of regional crisis that cause disruption to maritime shipping, such as when transit through the Strait of Hormuz becomes impossible. First, this requires the building of trust, as transboundary pipelines will traverse the territories of neighboring countries, with coastal states serving as the final export hub. If these final export hubs are to be the Omani ports on the Arab Sea, while avoiding the use of ports on the Sea of ​​Oman due to their proximity to Iran, this will pose a challenge for countries like Kuwait, as export routes will be long, and will pass through several GCC states’ territories.

Furthermore, a single export hub implies greater vulnerability, as it will represent a center of gravity for energy resources, making it susceptible to targeting or sabotage. Second, Saudi Arabia and the UAE may consider expanding their alternative pipeline capacity to accommodate their daily oil production. However, for the UAE, the alternative export terminal at the port of Fujairah on the Sea of ​​Oman remains vulnerable, due to its proximity to Iran. Likewise, for Saudi Arabia, the alternative oil pipeline in Yanbu on the Red Sea remains dependent on the status of the other maritime corridor, the Bab Al-Mandeb Strait.

Third, it is possible to invest in LNG and storage facilities in areas that do not require passage through any of the straits. This move could be linked to increasing storage capacity to accommodate mass LNG production, which would ensure the safe flow of LNG away from conflict zones, as it passes through the straits. However, the GCC states must reach a consensus on managing unified export hubs, and again, a common export hub would remain vulnerable to attacks and sabotage. Reaching a consensus on future security arrangements and energy export strategies is crucial for the GCC states, as divergent and unilateral approaches to security and energy issues have proven strategically costly.

Collective regional security approach is a must

When viewing the issue of their inability to secure energy exports, the GCC states appear to be constrained by divergent energy transportation strategies, each of which entails numerous challenges and risks. Therefore, the GCC states may need a comprehensive review of their security cooperation, to ensure a unified stance on regional crises and support mediation efforts, so as to reach solutions satisfactory to all members and regional actors alike.

The February 2026 outbreak of war serves as a wake-up call for GCC decision-makers to enhance coordination on security issues, ensuring the continuity of energy exports and regional security. Particular attention must be paid to maritime security through a collective approach, which is currently lacking. By ensuring a unified maritime security policy, the GCC states can strengthen their naval capabilities, guarantee the interoperability of systems, improve coastal patrols, and reduce defense spending through the concept of burden-sharing.

However, collective maritime security will only bear fruit by fostering a degree of coexistence with other actors, thus bringing relative calm to the region. This would allow the GCC states to address security issues in partnership with other regional actors, such as Iran, Iraq, and potentially Yemen, without foreign interference, and through joint investments, incentives, and shared interests, to build trust and counter geopolitical volatility.

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he 36th NATO Summit, held in Ankara on July 7-8, 2026, addressed critical agenda items not only concerning key themes such as the Russia-Ukraine War, defense spending or European security, but also within the context of NATO’s policies towards neighboring regions. In this context, the Summit can also be seen as a platform for redefining relations with the Middle East, North Africa and Gulf countries, which form the Alliance’s southern flank. NATO’s relations with the Gulf countries, which have been caught in a spiral of strategic uncertainty due to the US-Iran conflict, were specifically addressed at this Summit.

The summit held in Ankara demonstrates that the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI), launched with the Gulf states at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, has regained strategic importance 22 years later. As will be recalled, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, launched at the 2004 Istanbul Summit, marked the starting point of NATO’s institutional engagement with the Gulf states. However, over the span of 22 years, this initiative has failed to deliver the transformative impact that was anticipated. The potential of the Ankara Summit to revitalise this framework deserves to be assessed from both a symbolic and a strategic perspective.

The primary aim behind the establishment of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative was for NATO to contribute to the security architecture in the Middle East and the Gulf region in an inclusive and collaborative manner. In particular, the Gulf states’ reliance on external sources for security and their fragile structure were the underlying reasons for this initiative. However, in 2004, only four out of the six Gulf states joined the initiative, meaning full inclusivity could not be achieved. Nevertheless, NATO continued to invest in the initiative, hoping that other Gulf states might eventually join Qatar, Bahrain, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, which had already joined the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.

At this stage, the fact that membership of this initiative remains limited to four countries, with Saudi Arabia and Oman continuing to remain outside it, can be regarded as both a symbolic shortcoming and a structural weakness. The fact that Saudi Arabia and Oman, two of the most critical countries when it comes to the geopolitics of the Persian Gulf and the security of the Strait of Hormuz, are not part of the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative can be cited as the main reason why this initiative has remained a ‘limited-impact’ framework to date. Indeed, this situation also highlights the limitations that the Gulf states’ divergent security perceptions and foreign engagements may impose on cooperation with NATO. Consequently, the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s failure to demonstrate the expected trajectory of development can be explained not only by fluctuations in NATO’s regional priorities but also by the divergent approaches of the Gulf states.

NATO-Gulf cooperation in the shadow of crisis

From the perspective of Gulf geopolitics, it can be argued that the key factor distinguishing the 2026 Ankara Summit from the 2004 Istanbul Summit was the context in which the meetings took place. The Istanbul Summit was held in the wake of the largest wave of expansion in NATO’s history and against a relatively optimistic global backdrop. The Ankara Summit, however, took place in an uncertain geopolitical environment in which a conflict between the US and Iran, which had started on February 28, was directly affecting the Gulf states and posing a serious threat to their security. This situation has distinctly set this year’s IIG session apart from the routine diplomatic contacts of previous years.

In this context, NATO foreign ministers and representatives from the Gulf states came together at a meeting held on the margins of the summit. At the meeting, a consensus was reached on strengthening cooperation in the face of the security challenges posed by the conflict in the Gulf region. This approach can be interpreted as a sign that the initiative may be evolving beyond a purely rhetorical framework of cooperation towards a crisis-management-centered function. A notable aspect here is the shift in the rhetoric of European allies. The fact that the stability of the Gulf is now framed not merely as a regional issue but as an integral part of European security and energy supply security can be interpreted as a shift in rhetoric that enhances the strategic significance of the IIG. This shift also points to the concretization, specifically in the context of the Gulf, of the ‘360-degree security’ approach that has long been debated within the Alliance.

On the other hand, from the perspective of representation, it is noteworthy that whilst the foreign ministers of NATO countries attended the meeting, only Kuwait, among the Gulf states, was represented at the level of foreign minister. The attendance of State Minister for Foreign Affairs Mohammed bin Abdulaziz al-Khulaifi from Qatar, State Minister for Defense Mohammed bin Mubarak Fadil al-Mazrui from the UAE, and Director-General for Bilateral Relations at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Sheikh Abdullah al-Khalifa, from Bahrain, highlights that, despite strong diplomatic messages and rhetoric on cooperation, the Gulf states had limited expectations of the summit.

In terms of positive outcomes, however, it was observed that discussions took place at the summit regarding the possibility of taking some concrete steps between NATO and the Gulf states within the framework of the GCC. In this context, the agreement reached between Qatar and NATO on a partnership program to frame civil and military cooperation between the two sides, and the fact that the establishment process for a regional centre for peace support operations planned to be set up in Qatar is approaching its final stage, can be regarded as concrete steps in the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative’s transition beyond being merely a consultative platform.

State Minister al-Khulaifi, who attended the summit on behalf of Qatar, emphasized in his statement that his country attaches great importance to the IIG and is ready to implement concrete outcomes. Kuwait, another country taking concrete steps in cooperation with NATO and hosting the GIG-NATO regional centre, launched the Kuwait-NATO Political and Security Dialogue Mechanism in January 2026. Sheikh Jarrah Jabir al-Ahmed al-Sabah, Kuwait’s Minister of Foreign Affairs, who attended the Ankara summit, also proposed in his statement that the GCC Ministerial Summit be held in Kuwait in 2027.

The future of NATO-Gulf cooperation

At this stage, it remains unclear whether NATO’s renewed engagement with the Gulf states is the result of a temporary momentum generated by current crises, or the outcome of a process aimed at implementing lasting structural measures. Given the Gulf states’ quest for security, having recognized the ineffectiveness of a security mechanism entirely dependent on the US during the Iran conflict, it is reasonable to suggest that they may wish to consider NATO as a new alternative security provider. Indeed, the Gulf states, which already maintain strong partnerships with NATO member states such as the US and Turkey, may also aim to formalize institutional cooperation with NATO.

Turkey’s role in this process, as the host of the Ankara Summit, is also noteworthy. Having hosted the 2004 Istanbul Summit during the enlargement process, Turkey has, by 2026, become a more central actor on the Alliance’s southern flank, owing both to its geographical location and its growing defense industry capacity. Efforts to position the reconstruction process in Syria as a bridge between NATO’s sphere of influence and Gulf capital can also be cited as one of the concrete manifestations of this central role. The progress Turkey has made in the defense industry sector and its transformation into a significant actor in terms of military deterrence have made Ankara an important security partner for the Gulf states.

Consequently, the Ankara Summit has had limited yet positive implications for the future from the perspective of the Gulf states. The interactions revealed by the Summit, particularly regarding the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, demonstrate that an initiative which had seen relatively limited progress over the past 22 years has been able to regain significance in the wake of the crisis. At this stage, the most significant question mark concerns whether this momentum will translate into a permanent institutional framework.

Whether the NATO–ICI dialogue will remain a temporary reaction to the geopolitical uncertainty created by the US–Iran conflict will become clear through the concrete steps the parties take in the future. Key factors in this regard will include whether key actors such as Saudi Arabia and Oman will join the initiative, and to what extent the emerging cooperation programm will be reflected in practice. Consequently, the most tangible dynamic in NATO’s future in the Gulf can be identified as the success of the transition from rhetorical solidarity to sustained institutional cooperation.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ulf Arab states are reassessing their long-standing security relationship with the United States following Washington’s emerging agreement with Iran, amid concerns that the proposed deal could reshape the regional balance of power and leave key security issues unresolved.

The framework agreement between the United States and Iran, announced after months of conflict and negotiations, has been welcomed across the Gulf as a step away from a wider regional war. However, analysts and diplomats say many governments in the region remain deeply uneasy about its long-term implications, particularly regarding Iran’s military capabilities and growing regional influence.

The agreement seeks to end hostilities between Washington and Tehran, reopen the Strait of Hormuz to international shipping and establish a process for broader negotiations on Iran’s nuclear program, sanctions relief and economic reconstruction. While Gulf capitals support efforts to prevent another devastating conflict, many officials are questioning whether the arrangement adequately addresses their security concerns.

Trust in US erodes

For decades, Gulf monarchies have relied heavily on the United States as their principal security guarantor. American military bases, naval deployments and defence partnerships have formed the backbone of regional deterrence against external threats, particularly from Iran.

Yet confidence in those guarantees has gradually weakened over the past several years.

Regional observers point to a series of developments that have fuelled doubts, including the limited U.S. response to attacks on Saudi oil facilities in 2019 and Washington’s broader shift toward reducing its military footprint in the Middle East.

Those concerns have resurfaced following the latest U.S.-Iran agreement, which many Gulf officials view as another indication that Washington is increasingly prioritising diplomacy and strategic disengagement over long-term military commitments in the region.

The agreement also introduces new arrangements affecting navigation through the Strait of Hormuz, one of the world’s most strategically important maritime corridors. Under the framework, Iran is expected to play a role in future discussions on managing commercial shipping alongside Oman and other regional stakeholders.

Possible Iranian influence on maritime security

For Gulf countries whose economies depend heavily on energy exports passing through the waterway, the prospect of expanded Iranian influence over maritime security has generated considerable debate.

Analysts argue that while reopening shipping lanes would benefit global energy markets, Gulf governments remain cautious about any arrangement that could strengthen Tehran’s leverage over regional trade.

The deal also leaves several contentious issues unresolved.

Although negotiations on Iran’s nuclear activities are expected to continue during a 60-day transition period, the current framework does not directly address Tehran’s ballistic missile programme or its relationships with armed groups across the Middle East.

Many Gulf governments have long regarded those issues as posing a more immediate security challenge than Iran’s nuclear ambitions alone.

During a regional tour following the announcement of the agreement, U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio sought to reassure Gulf allies that Washington would continue consulting closely with them throughout negotiations and would not pursue policies that undermine their security.

Rubio emphasised that future discussions concerning Iran’s missile program would be coordinated with regional partners and reaffirmed America’s commitment to longstanding alliances in the Gulf.

Despite those assurances, regional analysts say trust has been weakened by years of uncertainty surrounding U.S. policy in the Middle East.

Diversifying military partnerships

Several experts argue that Gulf states increasingly believe they must prepare for a future in which they shoulder greater responsibility for their own defense.

As a result, some governments have accelerated efforts to diversify their military partnerships and defence procurement beyond traditional suppliers.

Turkey has emerged as one potential alternative source of military equipment and defense cooperation, reflecting a broader strategy of reducing dependence on any single security partner.

At the same time, Gulf countries continue to strengthen economic ties with the United States. Major investment commitments announced in recent years demonstrate that while questions persist over security arrangements, economic cooperation remains a central pillar of bilateral relations.

The proposed agreement with Iran also includes plans for a multibillion-dollar reconstruction and investment fund intended to support Iran’s economic recovery after the conflict.

Although Washington has indicated that Gulf participation would be important, several regional governments have said they have not yet committed funding and are awaiting further details before making any decisions.

For many Gulf leaders, preventing another regional war remains the immediate priority.

The recent conflict exposed the vulnerability of Gulf states to missile and drone attacks and highlighted the economic consequences of disruptions to energy exports and international shipping.

I

n the context of the effects of the war launched by the U.S. and Israel against Iran on February 28 on the Gulf region, the saying “Geography is destiny” is a particularly apt description. The Gulf states, which were not direct parties to the war, have been affected almost as negatively as the warring parties by this process. From the war’s very first days, the Gulf states, known as the “oasis of prosperity” in the Middle East, began to emerge as the biggest losers of this process, following Iran’s retaliations. While not all have been affected equally, the myth of the “Gulf’s inviolability” has ended, opening the door to a bleak future for the region’s monarchies.

In this context, the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia, which could be considered the actors closest to the US politically, have borne the brunt of the blow. Their cautious statements in the early days of the war gave the impression that they were avoiding taking sides. However, the use of US military bases on their territory during the conflict was viewed by Iran as an unacceptable pretext.

They attempted to maintain security ties with Washington while keeping tensions with Tehran under control, but the rapidly rising tension and chaos soon made it impossible for these countries to avoid becoming targets. Bahrain and Kuwait, which pursue low-intensity foreign policies, were similarly affected. In both countries, critical infrastructure, including US military bases, ports, and water treatment facilities, was targeted by Iran at various times.

Position towards Iran

The differing reactions of the Gulf countries during the war resulted in varying impacts of the conflict. From this perspective, Oman and Qatar’s positions during the war set them apart from other Gulf states. Although Qatar sustained heavy damage and expelled Iranian diplomats, the Doha administration’s decision to maintain dialogue with Tehran was notable. Oman, on the other hand, stood apart from all other Gulf states. It became one of the few Gulf countries not targeted by ballistic missiles from Tehran and emerged as one of the most important mediators between Iran and the US.

Throughout this process, both countries adopted a measured approach. However, Oman engaged in intensive mediation efforts to prevent the outbreak of war in the pre-conflict period. It can be argued that the common ground underpinning these countries’ approaches lies in their distanced stance toward the U.S. and Israel, coupled with a relatively closer position regarding their relations with Iran.

A common factor among the Gulf states, which have been affected by the war to varying degrees, is growing security concerns. The deployment of air defense systems in the Gulf following drone and missile attacks on critical infrastructure, particularly energy facilities, marked a turning point in terms of defense for the Gulf states. Iran’s unexpectedly aggressive stance, coupled with the Gulf states’ realization that they were facing this aggression alone, constituted a significant turning point.

The Gulf states were disappointed by the failure of the security architecture, which had been based on the assumption that the US would protect them, to withstand this severe test. This disappointment has driven the Gulf states to develop alternative security mechanisms. Consequently, while the Gulf states realized during this war that the U.S. would not directly protect them, they also recognized the need to form alliances with other actors to ensure their security and prepare for a potential Iranian threat after the war. It has become evident that countries such as Saudi Arabia and Qatar are trying to strengthen security cooperation by working with important regional actors, including Türkiye, Pakistan, and Egypt.

Economic impact

The economy is another area where the concrete effects of the war have been particularly felt in the region. The Gulf region, one of the most important hubs for the global energy supply, found itself in the midst of the conflict. The initial impact was felt in the form of rising oil prices. While some shipments were diverted to alternative routes due to the war, this has increased costs and extended delivery times.

Although rising oil prices above $100 per barrel might appear favorable for the Gulf states, which are exporters, the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint for hydrocarbon products reaching global markets, remained at the center of military activity. Coupled with rising insurance costs and the complete halt of transit, the Gulf states were deprived of one of their main sources of income.

In this context, Oman is the only country that stands apart from the other Gulf states. Due to its geographical location, Oman is not dependent on the Strait of Hormuz. Consequently, its oil revenues have risen in line with the increase in prices during this period. Oman continued to export oil, particularly to Asian countries, from its LNG facility in Kalhat, even during the war. Shipments also continued from Mina al Fahal, the country’s most important oil export hub. Omani crude oil traded at $120 per barrel when global oil prices were at $100. This played a critical role in the country’s economy.

Beyond hydrocarbon trade, the economic impacts of the war on Gulf countries have also been highly destructive. In the United Arab Emirates, a key tourism hub in the region, tourist activities came to a complete standstill. Hundreds of hotels in Dubai were left entirely empty within a short period, and thousands of future bookings were canceled. Following the damage to the region’s “safe haven” image, there was a capital outflow amounting to billions of dollars, particularly from Dubai, a recognized global financial center. While the Abu Dhabi and Dubai stock exchanges suffered significant losses, the property market declined by up to 30 percent.

Another sector severely affected by the war is the aviation industry. Major Gulf airports, such as those in Dubai, Doha, and Abu Dhabi, which serve as key hubs for global air transport, became completely non-operational in the early days of the war. They were subsequently forced to operate at minimum capacity. As a result, tens of thousands of foreign workers, who form the backbone of the Gulf labor market, have left the region, negatively impacting consumption and the labor market. Due to these factors, many Gulf countries, including the UAE, are expected to experience severe economic contraction by 2026.

Social impact and expectations of peace

On the other hand, the war has undoubtedly impacted societies in the Gulf. While the effects were limited to daily life and the food supply chain during the war, the erosion of the region’s sense of security has had a traumatic effect on Gulf societies accustomed to nothing but prosperity and development for decades. Consequently, some Gulf citizens have reportedly temporarily relocated with their families to safe havens such as London, Zurich, Singapore, and Istanbul. Uncertainty has also rapidly increased for the millions of foreign workers who play a key role in daily life and the labor market across the Gulf states. The fact that some of the migrant workforce, particularly in the energy and construction sectors, is considering returning to their home countries risks disrupting the already fragile labor market balance. Meanwhile, rising energy and logistics costs are reflected in daily living expenses, and price increases have been observed in food and essential consumer goods.

Although the effects of the war are gradually subsiding following a temporary ceasefire, the Gulf states are prioritizing lasting peace. The Gulf states’ key priorities in the post-war period include the cessation of cross-border threats, particularly from Iran; the guarantee of regime security; and the permanent removal of barriers to energy exports. The Gulf states also expect Iran to struggle for regional influence through proxy forces and to limit Tehran’s nuclear capabilities. Finally, establishing a new security architecture and implementing defense mechanisms to ensure regional security are of critical importance to the Gulf states.

Conversely, one could argue that the collapse of the Iranian regime or the country’s descent into deep instability in the post-war era would also pose a risk to the Gulf states. A resulting power vacuum could lead to uncontrollable consequences that go beyond the current threats. The emergence of a more radical Iranian regime would also pose risks to the Gulf states. A Tehran administration capable of holding the Gulf regimes accountable for events during the war could threaten the Gulf states for decades to come. From this perspective, the Gulf states would prefer Iran to remain an actor whose capacity to generate security concerns is limited and with whom limited dialogue can be maintained rather than being perceived as a threat. Consequently, the Gulf states greatly value entering the post-war period in an environment free of threats from Iran.

The war initiated on February 28 by the U.S. and Israel targeting Iran has had its most intense regional impact on the Gulf states at this stage. The Persian Gulf’s role as the logistical hub and economic heart of the war is the primary reason for this. Consequently, although a temporary ceasefire has been established, the Gulf states now face a vortex of uncertainty within their own borders, as this war has transformed from a crisis unfolding elsewhere. This serves as a reminder that crises seemingly far removed from the Gulf states are much closer than they appear. As the most vulnerable actors in the climate of uncertainty created by the war, the Gulf states are calling for an immediate end to the conflict while attempting to prepare for the new political, military, and economic order set to emerge.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ensions in the Middle East escalated sharply after Iran warned it would target energy and water infrastructure across the Gulf if the United States attacks its power grid, following a deadline set by U.S. President Donald Trump.

Trump issued a 48-hour ultimatum demanding that Iran fully reopen the Strait of Hormuz, a vital global shipping route. He warned that failure to comply would result in U.S. strikes on Iranian power plants. The deadline is set for Monday evening.

Iranian officials responded with strong warnings, stating that any attack on their energy facilities would trigger retaliation against U.S. and allied infrastructure in the region. Military spokesperson Ebrahim Zolfaqari said energy systems, water desalination plants, and even information technology networks could be targeted.

The threat raises serious concerns for Gulf countries, which rely heavily on desalination to meet water needs. Nations such as Bahrain and Qatar depend almost entirely on desalinated water, while the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia also rely on it for a significant portion of their supply.

Iran’s parliament speaker, Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, warned that regional infrastructure could face “irreversible destruction” if Iranian facilities are attacked.

Oil markets: Military escalation continues

The warning comes amid ongoing military exchanges. Israel launched a new wave of strikes targeting infrastructure in Tehran, while air raid sirens sounded across Tel Aviv and parts of the occupied West Bank due to incoming Iranian missiles.

Reports from Iran indicated civilian casualties following strikes in cities including Khorramabad and Urmia. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia said it intercepted ballistic missiles aimed at its capital, Riyadh.

The broader conflict, involving the United States and Israel against Iran and its allies, has already resulted in over 2,000 deaths since late February.

The crisis has severely disrupted global energy markets. The near-closure of the Strait of Hormuz — through which roughly one-fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes — has triggered the worst oil shock since the 1970s.

Market analysts warn of growing instability. “A ticking time bomb of uncertainty” now hangs over global markets, with expectations of falling stock prices and rising fuel costs.

Iran has stated that while the strait remains open to some shipping, vessels linked to its “enemies” will be restricted. Some ships have reportedly managed to pass through under coordinated arrangements with Tehran.

The conflict is also expanding beyond Iran and Israel. Fighting involving the Iran-backed Hezbollah has intensified along Israel’s northern border, with continued rocket fire and Israeli military operations in southern Lebanon.

Israeli officials have indicated that the fighting could continue for weeks, raising fears of a prolonged regional war with global economic consequences.

(Source: Reuters)

R

ussia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) reveal a multifaceted and increasingly strategic nature as recently witnessed by the visits of Russian President Vladimir Putin. Discussions on issues such as the Russia-Ukraine war, Israeli attacks on Gaza, and OPEC+ point to a deepening engagement beyond traditional energy cooperation.

President Putin visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia on December 6. The visits were notable as they were among the rare visits made by the Russian president after the International Criminal Court issued an arrest warrant for him. As a result of the arrest warrant, for example, Putin did not attend the recent BRICS summit in South Africa or the G20 summit in India.

While Putin’s visit to the Gulf is critical in many respects, it is also fundamentally related to the structure of Russia-Gulf relations after the Russia-Ukraine war that began in February 2022. The visits to the UAE and Saudi Arabia focused on the Russia-Ukraine war, Israel’s attacks on Gaza, OPEC+ energy issues, and the Yemen issue.

Analysis of conjunctional developments on the Russia-Gulf line

With the onset of the Russia-Ukraine war, the Gulf countries, especially Saudi Arabia and the UAE, showed a neutral foreign policy tendency. In essence, the Gulf countries’ refusal to participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries—led by the United States—was similar to the foreign policy trends before the Russia-Ukraine war.

The Gulf states were already having problems in their relations with the U.S. because of its rhetoric and actions about withdrawing from the region; however, after the Taliban took power in Afghanistan, relations entered a crisis of confidence. In addition, the U.S., which has problems with Saudi Arabia over, among others, the Biden-Muhammad bin Salman tension and oil production policy, has also experienced tensions in its relations with the UAE over issues such as Russia-UAE relations and the UAE’s relations with the Assad government in Syria.

In fact, the Gulf countries, which have intensified their search for both regional and international partnerships, did not participate in the sanctions against Russia imposed by Western countries. At the same time, within the framework of this search for partnership, normalization processes with Israel, Iran, and Turkey have been carried out since 2020, albeit at different levels. The depth of the Gulf states’ positions on the Russia-Ukraine war, in fact, can be attributed to signs of a multipolar world order prevailing among them.

The Gulf views Russia as an alternative power in a multipolar world order and a critical actor in terms of energy policy, strategic partnerships, and regional security concerns. The decline in global demand for oil and natural gas derivatives from 2019 onwards, in the context of pandemic measures and the transition to renewable energy projects, was the point at which Russia and the Gulf countries sought a common solution. At a time when the discourse on reducing the use of fossil fuels was one of the most important dimensions of the fight against global climate change, the loss of global oil and gas supplies made Russia and the Gulf countries strategic energy actors once again.

The sanctions imposed by Western countries on Russia’s oil and gas exports as of February 2022 enabled Russia and the Gulf countries to effectively use the OPEC+ platform in global international relations. Despite serious criticism and sometimes veiled threats from the U.S., since 2019, the largest producers, Russia and Saudi Arabia, have taken decisions to reduce oil production within OPEC+ several times, and price stability in the oil market has been achieved.

At the same time, Russian oligarchs are protecting their financial resources mainly in Middle Eastern countries and, in particular, in places like the Emirate of Dubai, and  do not want to lose them due to the pursuit of sanctions by Western regimes. According to 2022 data, Russian citizens came first in the purchase of houses in Dubai, leaving behind British and Indian citizens—a sign that explains Russia’s strategic relations with the Gulf countries.

Background of the strategic security and defense partnerships

Russia’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates date back beyond recent years, when signs of a multipolar world order were seen, and the Russia-Ukraine war. It should be remembered that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have been developing military, defense, and security cooperation with Russia since the 2010s. Saudi Arabia’s purchase of the S-400 air defense system, Kornet-EM anti-tank guided missile (ATGM) systems, and other specific military equipment from Russia was on the agenda. The two countries also signed a military cooperation agreement in August 2021. At the time, the move by Saudi Arabia was interpreted as a strategy to build relationships with influential international actors and achieve relative autonomy through partnerships, rather than relying solely on the United States in security and defense policy.

Like Saudi Arabia, the UAE has long been engaged in military, defense, and security partnership cooperation with Russia. So much so that Russia is known to be negotiating with the UAE and India on the joint production of the fifth-generation SU-57 fighter jet. At the same time, defense and security cooperation between Russia and the UAE has manifested itself in Russia’s interventions in Syria and Libya since 2015, while the UAE has sought to harmonize its strategy and power with Russia’s strategy in both regions. In addition, the two countries seem to be pursuing a joint strategy in South Yemen. Also, between 2009 and 2013, Russia supplied the UAE with Pantsir-S air defense systems, which were subsequently reformed.

For many years, Russian companies have been able to present their current products at international exhibitions held in Abu Dhabi, the capital of the UAE. Such platforms can be used to broker contracts for the supply of military equipment. All in all, it should be noted that the UAE’s defense/security partnership with Russia is a strategic diversification choice rather than a conjunctional necessity.

Rekindling Bonds: A Momentous Journey of Diplomacy

The recent visit of the Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan to three prominent Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries has captivated attention, illuminating the Turkey-Gulf relations and pointing towards a rekindling of the pre-Arab Uprising era in bilateral ties. On July 17, President Erdoğan embarked on a Gulf tour, encompassing Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), with an economy-oriented agenda to foster and fortify trade and investment relations with these influential Gulf nations.

Following the significance of President Erdoğan’s re-election on May 28, his visits hold special importance, with Gulf monarchies poised to form a cornerstone in Turkey’s foreign policy for the next five years. The Turkish elections garnered profound attention in the Gulf region, leading to swift and warm congratulations from Gulf leaders, underscoring their desire for continuity and stronger ties with Turkey. The GCC nations, in an unequivocal display of commitment, expressed their steadfast determination to bolster relations with Ankara throughout President Erdoğan’s forthcoming term, setting the stage for an era of promising collaboration and mutual growth.

The timing and significance of Erdoğan’s visit were of utmost importance, given Turkey’s ongoing efforts to revitalize its struggling economy, which has been grappling with currency devaluation, soaring inflation, and depleting reserves. The expectations back in Turkey regarding a potential trade and investment deal with Gulf monarchies were set high. Notably, Turkey’s new economy managers, Finance Minister Mehmet Şimşek and Central Bank Governor Hafize Gaye Erkan, preceded President Erdoğan’s visit with their arrival in Saudi Arabia on July 11. Their purpose was to lay the groundwork for the high-ranking Turkish delegation’s visit, further underscoring the importance of the occasion. Minister Şimşek, along with Turkish Vice President Cevdet Yilmaz, also embarked on visits to Qatar and the UAE to strengthen economic ties with these nations earlier in July.

Enhancing Bonds: Agreements, Gestures, and Gifts

Accompanied by 200 businesspeople, the Turkish President embarked on his first visit to Saudi Arabia, where he held a significant meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman. The Saudi Arabia-Türkiye Business Forum took place in Jeddah on July 18, resulting in the signing of five key agreements between the two countries, covering investment, energy, communication, and defense industry cooperation.

Of notable importance among these agreements is the cooperation deal with Baykar Technology, which demands considerable attention. The partnership with the Saudi Ministry of Defense represents Turkey’s most substantial defense and aviation export agreement ever, as confirmed by Haluk Bayraktar, the CEO of Baykar Technologies. Beyond the scope of mere trade relations, these deals also encompass joint production and technology transfer. Baykar Technologies highlighted that the primary objective of this collaboration is to bolster the high-tech development capabilities of both nations in the foreseeable future.

Emphasizing the depth and significance of the collaboration, Baykar Technologies stated, “With this comprehensive agreement, there will be a focus on technology transfer and joint production to propel the high technology development capabilities of both countries.”

Following the business and diplomatic contacts in Saudi Arabia, President Erdoğan arrived in Qatar on the second leg of his Gulf tour. During an official ceremony at Lusail Palace, President Erdoğan met with his counterpart Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad al-Thani. During the visit, the two countries inked an MoU on the occasion of the 50^thanniversary of diplomatic relations.

Throughout the last decade, Turkey has proven to be a reliable and unwavering partner for Qatar, a bond that became even more evident during the 2017 Gulf Crisis. Ankara swiftly and consistently extended its political, economic, and military backing to Qatar, solidifying their relationship as vital regional allies. Both nations hold significance for each other, serving as trusted and strategic foreign policy allies in the region.

In a joint statement both countries noted, “Türkiye-Qatar relations reflect deep-rooted historical ties built on political and social foundations, as evidenced by the fact that the two countries have consistently supported each other in the spirit of brotherhood and solidarity throughout many pivotal periods in their history, and the two countries continue to mutually support each other in various fields.” The two leaders are expected to meet again later this year at the 9th Qatari-Turkish Supreme Strategic Committee meeting slated to take place in Qatar.

The third and last stop of President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour was the UAE. In a two-day official visit, Turkey and the UAE signed 13 agreements in fields such as energy, transportation, infrastructure, logistics, e-commerce, finance, health, food, tourism, real estate, construction, defense industry, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies. The total worth of agreements announced stands at $50.7 billion. The two countries also agreed on establishing a “High Level Strategic Council” to elevate the bilateral relations to the level of strategic partnership.

Apart from business deals, personal gestures and significant gifts have become remarkable features of President Erdoğan’s recent Gulf tour: President Erdoğan gifted a Togg, Turkey’s first domestically manufactured electric car, to each of the leaders of Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE. Media attention was high as President Erdoğan and Gulf leaders personally examined the car together. Apart from its importance domestically, it appears that the Togg might be a diplomatically significant tool in Erdoğan’s foreign policy over the upcoming five years.

During his official visit to the UAE, President Erdoğan was honored with the prestigious Order of Zayed by Emirates President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan (MBZ). The Order of Zayed, named after the UAE’s founding father, is the highest civilian honor bestowed upon world leaders and heads of state, symbolizing humanitarianism, international cooperation, and the pursuit of peace worldwide. The award of the Order of Zayed is as a goodwill gesture in strengthening bilateral relations between the UAE and Turkey.

Beyond the Horizon: Key Reflections and Future Trajectories

The primary dimension that will define the trajectory of Turkey-Gulf relations in the upcoming five years is undeniably its profoundly business-oriented nature. This strategic focus on bolstering economic ties has been eloquently emphasized by Nail Olpak, the president of the Foreign Economic Relations Board (DEİK). During this recent Gulf tour, which he aptly dubbed #businessdiplomacy, the profound developments and engagements with the Gulf monarchies have been unambiguously centered around forging robust business alliances and sealing consequential deals. It becomes evident that business collaborations are not merely a means to an end but, rather, they represent the very essence of the diplomatic engagements with these Gulf nations, underscoring the critical role they play in shaping the future of Turkey-Gulf relations.

Defense and energy cooperation stand out as the primary pillars of collaboration between Turkey and the Gulf. The agreements forged in these critical sectors hold the potential to pave the way for enduring and steadfast cooperation, owing to the remarkable synergy in supply and demand between Turkey and the GCC monarchies.

Within the energy domain, Turkey’s position as a net energy importer harmoniously corresponds to the pivotal role played by Gulf states as prominent energy exporters. The surging prominence of liquefied natural gas (LNG) in Turkey’s natural gas imports serves as a poignant testament to the indispensability of energy relations, particularly with Qatar. Moreover, Turkey’s allure as an attractive investment destination for renewable energy projects mirrors the ambitions of Gulf monarchies seeking to transition their economies beyond oil and achieve net-zero emissions. These converging factors underscore the mutual benefits and profound significance of fostering robust energy cooperation between Turkey and the Gulf countries.

In the realm of defense, the Gulf nations are actively pursuing the diversification of their military partnerships and reinforcing their drone capabilities to counter unconventional attacks on oil facilities. At the same time, Turkey is keen on leveraging its advanced and cost-effective drone industry to reap both economic and strategic advantages. With these parallel objectives and shared interests, defense cooperation emerges as an immensely advantageous endeavor for both parties, promising mutual gains and strengthened security measures.

From a strategic perspective, defense sector productions and technologies serve as critical commodities that establish enduring dependencies between sellers and buyers. By forging defense ties, especially with technology transfer and joint production, with the Gulf monarchies, Turkey can effectively strengthen its presence and strategic importance in the Gulf region in a sustained and integrated manner. This proves particularly advantageous for the Gulf monarchies, as procuring Turkish defense productions and technologies, as a NATO member, is less likely to trigger significant backlash from the United States and Western partners, unlike military cooperation with China and Russia, which often raises concerns among these powers. Given the close alliance between the Gulf monarchies and the U.S., this advantage holds substantial weight.

Economically, the numbers speak for themselves: Turkey’s defense exports witnessed a remarkable 42% increase between 2020 and 2021, with the total export value reaching an impressive $4.4 billion in 2022. Notably, for prominent firm Baykar, foreign contracts constitute more than 90% of its revenue in this sector. Additionally, Turkey has set ambitious goals to achieve $6 billion worth of arms exports by 2023. Consequently, the Gulf states are ideally positioned to fill the trade and investment gap, thus providing crucial support to Turkey in reaching its economic objectives in this domain.

The strategic alignment of interests in these areas not only ensures mutual benefits, but also sets the stage for sustained, long-term partnerships, further solidifying the bond between Turkey and the Gulf nations providing that the political will and trust-building measures between both sides continues.

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ccording to the Qatar-based Al-Araby Al-Jadeed, discussions have taken place regarding the establishment of a joint naval force involving Iran, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Oman. The primary objective of this coalition is to ensure the safety of navigation in the strategically significant Persian Gulf. China has actively participated in mediating the talks between Tehran, Riyadh, and Abu Dhabi. On June 3, following this news, Rear Admiral Shahram Irani, Commander of the Iranian Navy, stated that several regional countries, including Iran and Saudi Arabia, will form a new naval coalition in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean.

During a television program, the Iranian Navy Commander stated that almost all littoral countries in the northern parts of the Indian Ocean are willing to support Iran and collaborate collectively to ensure security. He went on to say that while Iran and Oman have conducted numerous joint naval exercises in the past, other countries such as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, Pakistan, and India are also keen on engaging in joint naval cooperation. Irani claimed that the “unjust” presence of foreign powers in the region would soon come to an end, and that the countries of the region would take responsibility for safeguarding it. Irani did not provide specific details about this development, and there have been no statements from the countries allegedly involved in the formation of this alliance.

On June 6, Chinese Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Wang Wenbin announced that Beijing is in favor of the concept of a joint naval force consisting of Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and other regional countries. During a press conference, Wenbin stated that the preservation of peace and stability in the Middle East’s Persian Gulf region is crucial for the prosperity of the countries and people in the area, and plays a vital role in global peace, the advancement of global economic growth, and ensuring a sustainable energy supply. Wenbin highlighted China’s commitment to playing a positive and constructive role in promoting peace and stability in the region.

Response to Middle East NATO?

According to Iran’s state broadcaster, Press TV, the proposal to establish a regional naval alliance is seen as a response to U.S. and Israeli suggestions made last year to create a Middle East NATO. Commander Tim Hawkins, the spokesman for the U.S. 5th Fleet and Combined Maritime Forces, criticized Iran’s claim of forming a maritime security alliance, stating that Iran is the primary cause of regional instability and cannot claim to protect the waters it threatens. Hawkins mentioned that Iran has attacked or seized 15 international-flagged merchant ships in the past two years, and stated that the U.S. is reinforcing defenses around the Strait of Hormuz with its partners.

In contrast, the UAE government announced its withdrawal from the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) on May 31, expressing disappointment with the U.S. military’s perceived lack of response to Iran’s seizure of commercial tankers in April and May. Although UAE officials denied that their withdrawal from the CMF was a direct result of U.S. inaction against Iran’s maritime activities, a phone call on June 2 between UAE National Security Advisor Sheikh Tahnoun bin Zayed Al Nahyan and his American counterpart Jake Sullivan suggests uncertainty and tension regarding the course of action in the absence of U.S. security guarantees.

Abu Dhabi’s disappointment with the perceived weaker U.S. commitments has led to a shift in the UAE’s foreign policy, emphasizing diplomacy and partnerships with China and Russia to address regional threats from Iran. This approach may reflect both the recognition of declining U.S. influence in a multipolar geopolitical environment and a strategy to secure stronger American commitments.

GCC Challenges

The Cooperation Council for the Arab States of the Gulf (GCC) member states have faced challenges in establishing effective joint military structures and agreeing on a common vision regarding threats and challenges. Factors contributing to this include a lack of appropriate strategic culture and military power, significant divisions and rivalries within the GCC, concerns about Saudi Arabia’s dominance, and the presence of private interests.

Despite making joint declarations, the GCC states are not a unified entity, and a joint military operation in the event of a conflict would likely have a limited value. Decision-makers within the GCC primarily focus on the quantity and technological advancement of their military equipment, rather than their ability to use it effectively. As a result, the security of these countries is seen as fragile. The issue of the GCC states’ actual combat value, effectiveness, and ability to cooperate in warfare remains unresolved.

Despite significant military expenditures, the GCC states have heavily relied on Western countries for military protection and security. However, the perception of the United States as an unreliable security guarantor has led the Gulf states to seek closer ties with major powers like China and Russia. They have also increased diplomatic efforts to counter the perceived threat from Iran. Consequently, the possibility of security cooperation between Iran and the Gulf states is not entirely out of question. Nour News, a news website close to Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, suggested on Tuesday that Iran’s nuclear technology could even be potentially transferred to Saudi Arabia under the supervision of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in accordance with international law.

Given that the countries involved have not denied the plan to establish a joint naval force, it can be inferred that discussions on this matter have taken place. However, it is important to note that the focus might be more on joint action or planning rather than forming a formal naval alliance. The Iranian Navy Commander’s statement regarding previous joint naval exercises by Iran and Oman, as well as the interest shown by Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain, Iraq, and other countries in naval cooperation with Iran, could indicate Iran’s plans for joint exercises in the Gulf or Sea of Oman, similar to their annual exercises with China and Russia in the Indian Ocean.

Change in the course of relations

While the joint Iranian-Arab naval exercises will not be more than messaging, they will be an indication that Iran and the Gulf countries are making efforts to change the course of their relations. Although the details of this project have yet to be disclosed, it nonetheless is indicative of an important geopolitical shift that is taking place in the Middle East.

Both Riyadh and Tehran are looking for new options to manage regional equations, and Washington is no longer seen by the Gulf states as a security guarantor and a regional problem-solver. This includes China’s economic partnership plans in the region. Moreover, Washington’s pledge to build an alliance of democracies against autocracies in the aftermath of the war in Ukraine has also irritated some Gulf Arab countries.

The timing of an incident involving alleged “harassment” in the Strait of Hormuz amidst these ongoing developments is significant. On June 5, the U.S. Navy announced that its sailors, along with the UK Navy, had come to the aid of a ship reportedly harassed by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) in the strategically important Strait of Hormuz.

In response to these allegations, on Monday, June 5, IRGC Navy Commander Abbas Gholamshahi stated that a distress call had been made by a Marshall Islands-flagged ship through the international channel, and Iranian forces had responded accordingly. Gholamshahi emphasized that certain hostile media outlets in violation of media ethics were attempting to spread misinformation, incite unrest, and legitimize the “illegitimate and unjustified presence of non-regional countries in the Persian Gulf.”

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hinese President Xi Jinping’s visit to Riyadh last week marked the opening of a new period of bolstering Sino-Gulf relations that have already been on the rise. In his keynote speech, Jinping underlined five key areas of cooperation: energy, finance and investment, science and technology, aerospace, and culture. Solidarity, collaboration, and common prosperity have become the main characteristics of Beijing’s official discourse in explaining the prospects for this visit to the region.

For the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, which host their biggest international commercial partner, Xi’s official visit will bolster areas of cooperation while mitigating any areas of contention. Traditionally, Sino-Gulf relations remained primarily confined to economic cooperation. However, this partnership could well develop beyond that even if Beijing has a long way to go to counter the entrenched American presence in the region.

Economic cooperation as a gateway

Beijing has long been accustomed to relying on economic cooperation to achieve a larger influence in its investment landscape. For instance, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) created lucrative business opportunities for China while functioning as a soft power instrument. Bolstering economic cooperation to reach common prosperity is the most commonly used theme by Chinese policymakers. Predictably, President Xi Jinping used the same rhetoric to woo the Gulf region.

China and GCC are inevitable partners in commerce. The bilateral trade volume reached $232.1 billion in 2021. The joint statement underlined that both sides would further develop ties in finance, investment, energy, and technology. During the first days of the visit, approximately $29.3 billion worth of trade deals and a memorandum of understanding for BRI investments were signed.

It seems that China-Gulf relations will gain momentum in the economic field, and China will diversify its engagement in multiple areas. Another sign that economic cooperation paves the way for more Chinese influence is that Xi Jinping highlighted the priority of Yuan settlement for gas and oil transactions. These could be the first steps into lessening petrodollar hegemony in the Gulf and a major sign of defiance towards Washington.

A delicate equilibrium

Although China views the Gulf primarily from the prism of economic cooperation, this complex relationship will need more than money to develop into a strategic alliance. In this context, there are two delicate balances to be maintained. First, China needs to calibrate its relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran. The former is its largest trading partner within the GCC, and the latter has long-standing economic and military ties with Beijing. Incidentally, Tehran and its proxies continue to represent a major security menace for the Saudis.

Already Tehran expressed resentment towards Beijing’s charm offensive in the Gulf, depicting it as a “betrayal”. The islands of Greater Tunb, Lesser Tunb, and Abu Musa, which Iran occupies, were mentioned in the joint statement in the context of seeking a peaceful resolution. These islands remain the subject of heated disagreements between Iran and the UAE. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian official news agency did not translate this part of the statement in its report about the GCC meeting, and Tehran summoned the Chinese envoy, revealing Tehran’s uneasiness vis-à-vis the Chinese rapprochement with the Gulf countries.

The second is the GCC’s own balancing act between China and the U.S. The Saudis aspired to use the recent summit as a bandwagon to get the GCC behind its policies. By doing so, Riyadh presented a facade of Gulf harmony while sending key foreign policy messages. However, beyond the veneer of unity, existing disagreements in the Gulf continue to hinder Riyadh’s aspirations.

The UAE, for example, was underrepresented during the recent GCC-China summit held in Riyadh. This is not a good omen and could indicate the existence of major divergences in foreign policy approaches between Abu Dhabi and Riyadh. Therefore, a common Gulf foreign policy position towards China is not as straightforward as it seems.

China’s pivot to the Gulf

Apart from these delicate balances, the political dimension of China’s pivot to the Gulf will be decisive. Exchanging energy supplies for security has been the lynchpin of the region’s relationship with the U.S. Washington, as the traditional security guarantor of the Gulf in the second part of the 20th century, has played a vital part in entrenching this relationship. Although there is a perception that the U.S. has gradually begun to withdraw from the region, it would not be judicious to say that this withdrawal will produce a geopolitical vacuum that Beijing can fill.

There are a few impediments to such a potential posture. China has to first address its strategic doctrine which is based on the “non-interference” principle, which is normally part of the main themes governing China’s foreign policy, also known as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence. Second, the U.S. has already a network of air, army, and naval bases in the region.

How could China assume a similar protective role does not seem conceivable in the near to medium term. Last, China is currently not interested to conduct such a role. In the joint statement, China stated it seeks to mutually preserve its non-interference policy in conducting diplomatic relations and prefers to avoid criticizing the internal affairs of another sovereign nation.

On December 3 and 4, 2021, French President Emmanuel Macron traveled to the Gulf for a short visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Qatar, and Saudi Arabia. This is likely to be his last foreign trip outside of Europe, as France has entered election season. The presidential election will take place on April 10 and 24, 2022, and

Macron is preparing to run for re-election.

Macron’s trip highlights the importance of the Gulf countries on at least two levels. First, at a time of the United States’ disengagement from the region, France is trying to occupy its place economically, militarily, and politically.

Second, at a time when the issue of Islam and Muslims is at the center of the presidential campaign, Macron wants to seek support for the French position against “radicalism,” and especially so after the adoption of the “Law against Separatism,” renamed the “Law Reinforcing the Principles of the Republic,” which came into force in August 2021 and which has caused much misunderstanding in the Muslim world (and elsewhere) as it appears to be (and is in fact) a law against Islam and Muslims.

The most successful stopover was in Abu Dhabi, where President Macron has a close personal relationship with the Emirates’ strongman, Mohamed bin Zayed (MBZ). The signing of a record contract for the sale of 80 Rafale aircraft was accompanied by the sale of twelve Eurocopter EC725 Caracal helicopters, and the singing of various economic partnership agreements. “This is the biggest military contract with a French component in our history – worth some 17 billion euros,”  Macron said.

For Macron, this is proof of the close ties between Paris and Abu Dhabi. “I think that the Emirates and the Crown Prince saw that France was a solid partner in the fight against terrorism (…), that is to say that we kept our commitments in the region and that we were attached to its balance.” For it is not only a question of arms sales, but of a community of views and coordination between Abu Dhabi and Paris in the “war against terrorism” (notably in Libya), and in the fight against “political Islam,” as shown by the presence on the trip of Laurent Nuñez, the national coordinator of intelligence and the fight against terrorism. MBZ’s support for French laws against “separatism” is particularly appreciated.

We should notice that the French president said nothing about the authoritarian nature of the Abu Dhabi regime, which imprisons and tortures its opponents, about its involvement in the deadly war in Yemen, or about its use of Pegasus spy software. Yet, a few days later, a report by the International Federation for Human Rights (FIDH) highlighted the dark side of the regime and Paris’s complicity in it.

The last and most controversial stop of Macron’s trip to the Gulf, in France at least, was his visit to Saudi Arabia. For the first time since the horrific murder of journalist Jamal Khashoggi in October 2018, a major head of state of the Western world agreed to meet Mohammed bin Salman (MBS), the Saudi crown prince, widely considered the mastermind of this crime.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018, when he was reportedly kidnapped in Saudi Arabia by MBS and forced to announce his resignation from Riyadh.

Relations between MBS and Macron had not been rosy since the French president “rescued” Lebanese Prime Minister Saad Hariri in 2018.

While the aim of the meeting was also to give a boost to bilateral relations – and to take advantage of the rift between Washington and Riyadh, with President Joe Biden refusing any contact with MBS – one of the objectives was a new mediation with Lebanon, which the Saudis are subjecting to a trade embargo that is aggravating the economic crisis in the country. The result was modest: a conversation between Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati and MBS on Macron’s phone. Nothing more came of the visit – no return of ambassadors and no lifting of the embargo.

During the trip, the question of the nuclear agreement with Iran was not at the center of the discussions. Macron made only one declaration asking the Gulf states and Israel to be associated, a non-starter for Iran and even for the U.S. It is also noteworthy that the question of Palestine was not addressed, as France has supported the Abraham Accords and largely abandoned its traditional position on a solution to the Palestinian question.

There are three obvious conclusions to Macron’s visit to the Gulf. First, the trip was notable for the absence of any reference by France to human rights in the region. It is true that since the reception of Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi in France in December 2020 and his decoration as “Grand Officier de la Légion d’honneur,” President Macron has not seemed to attach much importance to democracy in the Middle East.

Secondly, Macron’s visit made clear the importance of the “Islam” dimension in French foreign policy, a ball and chain that is all heavier since Paris is the only major Western capital to show such an obsession with Islam and Muslims. Finally, Macron’s visit shows that France can still be an actor in the Gulf and the Middle East, and can defend its interests there; however, its weight is limited, especially in the regional conflicts (Iran, Syria, Palestine, Yemen), not only when compared with the United States, but also with regional powers such as Turkey, Iran, or Russia.

On February 14, 2021, Turkey announced that the PKK (Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan, Kurdistan Workers’ Party) had executed 13 Turkish citizens, who had been kidnapped some years ago and kept in a hideout in northern Iraq. The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization not only by Turkey but also by the United States and the European Union. In fact, the terror group has earned this designation for committing innumerable deadly attacks across Turkey since the early 1980s.

The cold-blooded execution of 13 people in the hands of their captors created an uproar in Turkey. Many felt the same fury as Suleyman Soylu, Turkey’s Minister of Interior, who clearly put this rage into words: “Let this nation and our martyrs spit on our faces if we do not catch Murat Karayilan [the military leader of the PKK] and cut him into a thousand pieces.”

Despite the emotions running high in Turkey, no country in the Gulf condemned the PKK nor did they send condolences to the Turkish people or expressed solidarity, except for Qatar. In a statement issued by its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar strongly condemned and denounced “the killing of 13 Turkish citizens” and sent its condolences to the families and the Turkish government and people. Thus, Qatar proved once again to be Turkey’s closest ally in the region.

Yet, upon closer inspection even Qatar’s statement appears far from satisfactory from a Turkish perspective. This is so for two reasons. First, the statement does not name the PKK as the perpetrator of this atrocity. Second, the statement reiterates Qatar’s policy position that rejects “violence and terrorism” and thus implicitly describes the act as an act of terrorism. But, then, the statement adds, “whatever motives and causes” were behind it. The statement, therefore, implicitly suggests that at least “some” motives or reasons might be behind the act.

Overall, the Gulf states are apathetic towards Turkey’s PKK problem. This apathy has two sources. One is historical. There is a general negative view shared by many Arabs, if not all, of either the Ottoman past or the modern Republic of Turkey, or both. As academic research documents, one line of argument suggests that the Ottoman rule was simply exploitative and repressive, and hence the root cause of the contemporary backwardness of the Arab world.

In another line of argument, contemporary Wahhabi-Salafism has accused the Ottomans of straying away from religion or even corrupting it with many religious innovations. The only societal group that held a more positive view of the Ottoman past was the Muslim Brotherhood. But the group was harshly critical of the modern Republic of Turkey for abolishing the Caliphate in 1924 and for other secularizing reforms.

These broad arguments have been shared and propagated by different influential groups in the Arab world, and seem to have deeply shaped the public discourse about the Ottoman past and the Republic of Turkey. The overall negative view of both has created an almost unquestioned sympathy especially among the Arab ruling classes and intelligentsia towards all ethnic groups who had once been or are still under Turkish rule, in general, and the Armenians and Kurds, in particular.

There is no systematic survey of these classes’ views on the PKK. But it is not difficult to imagine that the general antipathy towards the Ottoman past and the Republic of Turkey can turn into a sympathy towards the separatist Kurds and the PKK.

This is visible in the media coverage of PKK-related incidents. Even the coverage of the PKK by Al-Jazeera, the Qatar-based news outlet, is disappointing for Ankara. In fact, TRT World, Turkey’s state-owned international news outlet, once critically noted the similarity between Al-Arabiya (Saudi Arabia-owned) and Al-Jazeera in their coverage of Turkey’s operation against the PKK in Syria.

Al Jazeera’s coverage of the most recent PKK execution was in fact no different, describing, for example, the PKK militants as “Kurdish fighters.” Given that the media is heavily state-owned in the Arab world, the media’s coverage of the PKK illustrates the general sympathy of, at least, the Arab ruling classes towards the PKK.

The other source of the Gulf states’ apathy towards Turkey’s PKK problem is political. Turkey had great relations with all Gulf states in the 2000s to the extent that the Gulf Cooperation Council declared Turkey as a strategic partner in 2008. But, this changed with the Arab Spring. Turkey embraced the Arab Spring and developed cordial relations with the democratizing post-revolution governments in Egypt, Tunisia, and Libya. Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain became, on the other hand, status quo powers and distanced themselves from Turkey.

The same fate befell on Qatar, which also embraced the Arab Spring like Turkey. In the aftermath of the military coup in Egypt in 2013, Turkey and Qatar faced a severe regional isolation and in order to break out of this isolation, they developed a strong bilateral relationship. Showing the strength of these bilateral relations, Turkey resolutely stood by Qatar when Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt cut their diplomatic relations with the country and imposed a total blockade on the emirate in June 2017.

The blockade lasted for three-and-a-half years and in the succeeding years Turkey’s relations with Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain reached historically low ebbs. Turkey taking a clear side in a specifically Gulf crisis added further strength to the already existing apathy Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain felt towards the PKK problem.

In some governmental circles that apathy might even have turned into a sympathy towards the PKK. In fact, soon after the Gulf crisis broke out, according to a pro-government newspaper in Turkey, namely Yeni Şafak, officials from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Egypt, met with the YPG, which Turkey considers the PKK’s Syrian branch. Yeni Şafak even published a photo of the meeting where a portrait of Abdullah Ocalan, the PKK’s founder, was hanging on the wall. A few months later, a Saudi minister, Thamer al-Sabhan, visited Raqqa, which was then under YPG control. Then, in August 2018, Saudi Arabia pledged $100 million for stabilization projects in the territories under YPG control and announced that it made the payment in October 2018.

Of course, the appeal of the YPG for Saudi Arabia and the UAE lies in the organization’s strong relations with the U.S. We should not forget that the YPG emerged as the U.S. partner in the fight against DAESH (ISIS) in Syria and as such received generous financial and military support from the U.S. The rise of the YPG alarmed Turkey so much so that it has so far undertaken three major military operations in northern Syria.

The good relations between former U.S. President Donald Trump and Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan helped Turkey’s efforts. But it is still unclear how the new president, Joe Biden, will address Turkey’s concerns with regard to the YPG’s continued presence in northern Syria. It seems logical to expect that the Biden administration will increase U.S. support for the YPG given the strong pro-YPG and pro-Kurdish sentiments in Washington D.C., alongside the anti-Erdogan and anti-Turkey sentiments that are also running high.

In this context, the Gulf states, which heavily rely on the continued military and diplomatic protection of the U.S., took the least risky path and have turned a total blind eye to the most recent atrocity committed by the PKK – the execution of 13 Turkish citizens. Qatar proved to be the exception in the Gulf by virtue of its strong relations with Turkey. Yet, Qatar’s cautious statement reflects not only the general apathy of the Gulf states towards Turkey’s PKK problem, but also the highly cordial relations between the U.S. and the YPG.

Pakistan’s relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) have become complicated in recent years as a result of changing regional geopolitics. To manage the difficulties in relations with Saudi Arabia, in January of this year, Pakistan appointed a retired military commander as its ambassador to Riyadh. Lieutenant General Bilal Akbar replaces Ambassador Raja Ali Ejaz, a career diplomat who was appointed to Riyadh in January 2019.

The appointment of an experienced military man is a calculated move to better handle the challenges facing the bilateral ties and their likely effect on economic relations between Pakistan, on one hand, and Saudi Arabia and the UAE, on the other. It is worth noting that the Saudi ambassador to Islamabad, Nawaf bin Said Al-Malki, is also a former military man who has been in his current post since September 2017.

General Manoj Mukund Naravane, the chief of the Indian army, visited the UAE and Saudi Arabia recently for the first time. The visit was seen as a clear sign of India’s growing military ties with the two Gulf states.

Though India has close economic relations with the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) as it imports a significant portion of its oil and gas needs from the region and exports some $60 billion worth of goods to the six GCC states, New Delhi is keen to advance its military interests in the Arab region.

India’s ambition is supported by the large presence of Indian expatriates in the GCC, with their numbers in the UAE and Saudi Arabia reaching six million in total. Indian interest in expanding military ties with Saudi Arabia and the UAE presents a tricky situation for Pakistan, which has been a major security partner to both Riyadh and Abu Dhabi for a long time.

A number of factors are contributing to the changing security environment in the Gulf region as key countries keep a close watch on Abu Dhabi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and his Saudi counterpart Mohammed bin Salman’s (MBS) uncontrolled ambitions. Countries like Pakistan, India, Iran, and Turkey as well as France, Britain, and the U.S. realize that power equations in the Middle East are changing. Israel’s embrace by Arab princes adds a new dimension to regional politics.

Military ties between Pakistan and the GCC

Pakistan can take credit for having developed a military ecosystem in the Gulf, especially in Saudi Arabia and the UAE, as the GCC has a history of deep-rooted military ties with Pakistan. India already enjoys a vast trade and business engagement with Arab monarchies. Since 1967, Pakistan has routinely provided military and air force training to the Saudi Kingdom. The comprehensive defense pact between the two countries in 1982 institutionalized Pakistan’s role in Saudi Arabia’s security.

Islamabad has also supplied troops in times of regional conflicts, especially during the Iran-Iraq War and the 1991 Gulf War. Officially, some 1,600 Pakistani military personnel are now deployed in the Saudi Kingdom, but it is believed that a much larger number of Pakistani retired military personnel are serving in Saudi Arabia.

Similar engagements exist with the UAE. The fact that the first five chiefs of the UAE Air Force were Pakistan Air Force (PAF) officers speaks volumes about this military relationship. PAF officers continue to serve in the UAE as of today. The Pakistani army has also established an armor training school in the UAE  and has provided training to UAE commando battalions, as well as to all armed and artillery corps officers.

Pakistan’s economic dependency on the Gulf

Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the two biggest sources of remittances to Pakistan’s economy. Around 2.7 million Pakistanis live in Saudi Arabia and 1.5 million live in the UAE. Pakistan received $14.2 billion in remittances during the first half of the financial year 2020-21 compared to $11.37 billion in the same period of the previous year. The GCC contributed 60.14% of the total cash inflow to Pakistan during the July-December 2020 period.

The rulers of Saudi Arabia and the UAE are experts in displaying their petulant money power towards Asian and Arab countries by using threats of not issuing work visas, trade boycotts, and withdrawing investments. Such a state of affairs requires high levels of diplomatic and political skills. Therefore, Pakistan’s new ambassador to Riyadh has a delicate task in managing relations on multiple fronts.

Saudi Arabia asked Pakistan to return the second tranche of $1 billion of a total of $3 billion that it had borrowed from Riyadh in 2018 shortly after Imran Khan became prime minister of Pakistan. The UAE only deposited $2 billion out of the $3 billion it had committed to Pakistan, halting a $1 billion tranche when Pakistan’s foreign minister refused to participate in the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) foreign ministers’ meeting in the UAE after Abu Dhabi extended an invitation to India to be the guest of honor in the plenary session on March 1, 2019.

Bin Salman put pressure on Pakistan to stay away from the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019 which was attended by Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Indonesia.

In November of last year, the UAE temporarily suspended the issuance of new visit visas for 12 countries, including Pakistani passport holders.

Saudi fragility

The criticism of the Saudi-based OIC by Pakistan Foreign Minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi in August 2020 for not organizing a meeting of foreign ministers on the Kashmir issue did not go down well with Saudi Arabia. Qureshi’s statement that Pakistan would explore the possibility of convening a meeting of foreign ministers of Muslim countries outside the OIC angered the Saudis. Bin Salman put pressure on Pakistan to stay away from the Kuala Lumpur Summit in December 2019 which was attended by Malaysia, Turkey, Qatar, Iran, and Indonesia.

Western power brokers have exploited Saudi control and influence over the OIC, making the 57-member organization ineffective on major global issues. Saudi interventions on behalf of Western interests have been a source of frustration and anger among Muslims but not many countries have come forward to challenge Saudi Arabia’s fragile leadership in this matter. Though the Kuala Lumpur Summit was not directed at the Saudi leadership, the Saudi government was panic-stricken when it saw important Muslim leaders gathering for a summit without its approval.

Pakistan feels that Saudi Arabia and the UAE have betrayed Islamabad on the Kashmir issue by not being vocal enough to support its position against India. Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE have long supported Pakistan’s stand on Kashmir. Now, their growing ties with India have become strategically and economically important, and the Saudi and UAE leaderships have distanced themselves from Pakistan’s interests.

It is true that Pakistan has limited economic options. It is equally true, however, that Saudi Arabia is left with limited military options in the case a major crisis hits Riyadh. Many in Pakistan believe that the Saudis and Emiratis do not provide them the kind of economic support they have been providing to Egypt, especially after bankrolling the coup against the democratically elected government of Mohamed Morsi.

The friction in relations with Saudi Arabia is also because of Pakistan’s own change of foreign policy orientation. Prime Minister Imran Khan is keen on charting a more independent foreign policy after decades of reliance on the U.S. and the Gulf states. Islamabad’s reduced reliance on the U.S. is replicated in less reliance on the Saudi-UAE axis. It started in 2015 when Pakistan’s parliament unanimously refused to send troops to participate in the Saudi-UAE-led war in Yemen, shattering the Saudi impression of using Pakistan as a hired gun.

Sheikh Yamani, Saudi Arabia’s former oil minister (1962-86) once quipped that that the Age of Oil, like the Age of Stone, would come to an end long before the world ran out of oil. Reminiscent of history’s flow of game-changing trends implied in China’s ancient philosophy – the “I Ching” (易經) or “Book of Changes”, global paradigm shifts are afoot seemingly to help bring about Yamani’s “prophecy”.

Following Deng Xiaoping’s “Open Door Policy”, China has grown to be the “factory of the world”. The nation became a net importer of oil mostly from the Middle East. Fossil fuels have since driven China’s economy and turned it into the world’s largest oil and gas customer, representing 30% of China’s total energy demand and 25% of the world total.

China’s crude oil imports surpassed 10 million barrels per day in 2019, 55% from Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) with greatly increased imports from Saudi Arabia (16% of total).

Dependence on energy supplies from the Middle East, however, has national security concerns for China. Such supplies transit through the narrow “choke points” of Iran’s Strait of Hormuz, open to U.S. hostility, and the Malacca Strait near Singapore which hosts America’s 7^th Fleet.

China has been pushing hard to reduce energy intensity of its GDP growth, in pursuit of a green revolution to build a low-carbon energy system towards 2035 and 2050, part of the “China Dream” of national rejuvenation. China now formally pledges peak carbon emission by 2030 and carbon neutrality by 2060, targets likely to be incorporated in the coming Five Year Plan (2021-25).

With Climate Change rallying the world to embrace a greener future, including green-energy vehicles, these imperatives are bound to drastically reduce global demand for oil.

China has launched an ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the world, including GCC countries and the rest of the Middle East.

In May 2017, China succeeded in extracting scalable quantities of methane hydrates (“inflammable ice”) in the South China Sea. Compared to coal, oil, and natural gas, methane hydrates are a lot less polluting but 10 times more energy- rich per unit. One cubic meter of methane hydrates is equivalent to 160 cubic meters of natural gas.

Global reserve of methane hydrates is estimated at twice as much as all other known fossil fuels combined, enough for 1,000 years’ human consumption. China’s gas hydrates reserve is estimated at 100 billion-ton oil-equivalents, 80 percent of such reserve is in the South China Sea.  The nation is expected to kick start commercial production by 2030.

China has launched an ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) to connect the world, including GCC countries and the rest of the Middle East. This includes a “Digital Silk Road” for internet transactions and an “Arctic Silk Road” encompassing increasingly-navigable maritime routes through the Arctic.

China has launched a sovereign digital currency and a joint venture between the People’s Bank of China, the country’s central bank, and SWIFT (Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunication), the world’s premier network for international transactions. This would turbo-charge RMB internationalization.

China is the largest importer of Saudi oil. However, China doesn’t share Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards Iran.

The BRI also provides alternative overland energy transit routes with pipelines through China-friendly territories including Central Asia and Pakistan’s port of Gwadar, bypassing Hormuz and the Malacca “choke points”.

China is the largest importer of Saudi oil. However, China doesn’t share Saudi Arabia’s hostility towards Iran. Despite some earlier Chinese arms sales and recent supply of Chinese COVID-19 vaccines, China doesn’t seem to have broader synergy with Saudi Arabia other than economic and energy interests. Saudi-China relations are deemed largely “functional, not strategic”, according to the Brookings Institution.

However, Brookings’ classification misses a more granular and subtle approach. According to Degang Sun,Professor of Political Science at the Institute of International Studies, Fudan University, China is establishing a non-aligned network of Middle East partnerships, a kind of ‘marriage without licence’, seeking common ground while preserving differences.

There are four categories –

• ‘Pivot states’ – regional powers with comprehensive strength which function as pivots or hubs in China’s global partnership network;
• ‘Node states’ – partners serving as bridges to facilitate cooperation between China and other great powers;
• ‘Key states’ – medium-sized powers with development potential which can exert influence on neighboring countries;
• ‘Stronghold states’ – smaller countries but exhibiting a strong desire for cooperation to function as China’s strongholds in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the United States’ strategic interest in the Gulf has substantially changed as America has become energy self-sufficient or energy-surplus following extensive exploitation of homeland shale energies. Uncle Sam’s current interest shifts to boosting the security and economic interests of Israel, its immutable ally thanks to the bipartisan, politically and financially powerful Jewish constituency.

Hence, the recent rapprochement with Israel of the UAE and Bahrain under the so-called Abraham Accords brokered by Jared Kushner, ex-President Trump’s son-in-law.

China has no ambition of dislodging the United States from the Arab Peninsula. A cordial relationship with all Members of the GCC is in its best interest. The same applies to Iran, Israel, and Turkey. Nor does China want to be dragged in the proxy war in Syria involving Sunni-Shiite rivalry and self-interests of the United States, Russia, Israel, amongst others.

For China, one strategic interest in the Middle East and Central Asia is maintaining good relations with Islamic countries (including Turkey) with a Uyghur population. Some Uyghurs are suspected to be connected with the East Turkestan (Xinjiang) independence movement, which China brands a terrorist organization. International condemnation of Uyghur camps in Xinjiang is keeping Beijing on its toes.

In the wake of the Arab Awakening in 2011, ties between Turkey and the Gulf duo, namely Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), began to deteriorate. This is particularly true after the counterrevolution led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE in Egypt where they bankrolled the bloody coup against the democratically elected government of the late president Mohamed Morsi and installed their henchman Abdel Fattah el-Sisi.

The failed coup in Turkey in 2016, the unjust blockade of Qatar in 2017, the Arab duo’s constant support of counterrevolutionary forces in Syria, Libya, and Sudan, and their anti-Turkey stance in the Eastern Mediterranean, have vitiated any chance to recuperate the fraught ties between Saudi Arabia and Turkey.

The rise of Mohamed bin Salman in Saudi Arabia and his alliance with UAE’s Mohammed bin Zayed made a deadly anti-revolutionary combination in the Middle East. This convergence of counterrevolutionary states ultimately resulted in putting Turkey and Saudi Arabia on the opposite sides of the conflicts in Syria, Libya, and Iraq.

Turkish-Saudi rapprochement is more likely

In the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia is a “real” country with a huge land mass, significant native population, natural resources and, of course, the custodian of Mecca and Medina. All these aspects make Saudi Arabia an important player in the region and beyond.

Therefore, in the long run, Turkey would naturally want to avoid a direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia. On the other hand, there is no such direct competition between Turkey and the UAE. In fact, the UAE is the pawn of major powers that are opposed to Turkey’s growing profile in many important regions of the world.

There is no match between the national power of Turkey and that of the UAE. That’s perhaps one of the reasons why we see direct criticism of the UAE by Turkish authorities.

Conversely, one could argue with great confidence that Saudi Arabia’s capacity to withstand Mohamed bin Salman’s perturbations and the kingdom’s chances to remain a major regional player are high, unlike the Emirati “sand castle” that is open to vulnerabilities of all sorts and is even open to collapse as a result of Mohammed bin Zayed’s erratic foreign policy decisions.

In the last few years, due to its reckless foreign policy, Saudi Arabia has squandered a lot of good will and this seems to have been realized in Riyadh, which used to be a considerable soft power and, for good reason, held the status of an arbiter among its fellow Muslim countries.

The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

Turkey does not pose any kind of threat to Saudi Arabia and its internal political consensus. What Turkey expects from Saudis, though, is to disassociate itself from UAE policies in the region, which Turkey feels are designed in Western capitals for the purpose of destabilizing the region.

Turkey has made sure to avoid direct confrontation with Saudi Arabia, while the Saudis are cognizant of the fact that they stand to lose a lot in any direct conflict with Turkey. All these factors make the rapprochement between Turkey and Saudi Arabia more likely. The Saudi reconciliation with Qatar after the three-year embargo which was later followed by the UAE, Bahrain, and Egypt may pave the way for a possibility of Saudi-Turkish rapprochement.

The demands included closing Al-Jazeera TV, shutting the Turkish military base, and downgrading ties with Iran. Qatar rejected all demands. Besides Qatar, two other GCC member countries, Kuwait and Oman, have long been developing their ties with Turkey. In this regard, Turkey’s increased profile in the GCC and in the Middle East may prompt Saudis toward a reconciliation.

A substantial number of Saudi Arabia’s power brokers have always viewed the embargo on Qatar as a bad policy and have known that a direct confrontation with Ankara would be harmful for Riyadh. Saudis also know that the ghost of journalist Jamal Khashoggi’s brutal murder in the Saudi consulate in Istanbul will not disappear easily.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan.

Though there have always been uncertainties in Saudi policies and abrupt changes can be expected, Saudis usually do not go beyond a certain point when it comes to confronting or criticizing the major Muslim countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, Indonesia, and Egypt.

The Saudis and Emiratis mostly rely on the United States for their security, and regionally they rely on Egypt and Pakistan. Since Pakistan signed the bilateral security agreement with Saudi Arabia in 1982, it has been assisting the Saudis in areas like military training and defense production.

It is extraordinary that the Pakistan government allowed General Raheel Sharif, who retired as army chief in November 2016, to move to Saudi Arabia as a top military advisor. It’s not talked about in a pretentious way, but there is a Pakistani commitment to intervene in a decisive manner if Islam’s holiest cities come under threat and Saudi Arabia seeks help.

T

he first priority of Saudi Arabia and the UAE has always been the preservation of their regimes. They are now anxious as their chief security guarantor, the United States, is going through a tumultuous period in its domestic politics. The Biden administration appointees are not giving clear indications as to what sort of foreign policy goals they will pursue in the Middle East.

The multibillion-dollar investment in Egypt is also not sustainable since el-Sisi himself is engulfed in many crises and won’t be able to rescue the Saudis and Emiratis even if he wants to do so. On the other hand, Pakistan, which has long played a role in guaranteeing Saudi Arabia’s territorial integrity and the regime’s security, holds significance for Saudi Arabia beyond a desire to cultivate religious ties and assert its soft power.

As the world’s fifth most-populous country and a nuclear power, Pakistan’s market and security dimensions have been attractive to the Saudis. However, Pakistan is wary of joining Saudi regional power games and its feckless rivalries with other countries in the region as was evident in its unwillingness to support the kingdom in the imprudent Yemen war. Therefore, the monarchies of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain feel very anxious in the fast-changing regional and global scenarios.

A Beleaguered UAE?

Saudis in particular would not want to annoy Turkey. Even after putting maximum pressure, the Saudis and Emiratis could not discourage their close ally Pakistan from deepening political and military ties with Turkey. It seems that Saudi Arabia has now realized that it can’t do much to stop the new realignments in its neighborhood, and any new realignment -with or without Iran- in the region will definitely not toe the line of abrasive Saudi policies.

Over a month ago, Kuwait concluded its parliamentary elections for the 16th legislative term. The governing structure in Kuwait differs from its Gulf neighbors as here the legislative branch, which is also known as the National Assembly, has significant influence not only in passing legislation but also by virtue of its oversight of the executive branch.

Although the outcome of the parliamentary elections might not have a direct effect on the region, this particular legislative term in Kuwait will be interesting to monitor for various reasons from its being the first parliament to be formed under the reign of the newly elected Emir, Sheikh Nawaf al-Ahmad al-Jaber al-Sabah, to the increasing pressure from the Kuwaiti people to reject normalization relations with Israel.

The outcome of the elections 

On December 5, 2020, despite the COVID-19 pandemic restrictions and the bad weather, Kuwaitis showed up in high numbers; the election turnout was around 70 percent. Out of the 342 candidates running across five electoral districts, only 50 were elected to the parliament, ten from each district. The outcome of the elections yielded significant results, with more than a 60 percent turnover; only 19 of the 44 incumbents were re-elected to an all-male parliament.

Although Adel Al-Asoumi, the chairman of the Arab Parliament, congratulated Kuwait for holding a “transparent and successful election,” there were no official reactions from the five other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries following the election in Kuwait.

Role of Kuwaiti parliament in foreign affairs 

While the parliament does not usually delve into matters of foreign affairs, it has the jurisdiction to propose and vote on laws that concern Kuwait in relation to other countries.

“There is no clear constitutional text that prevents the National Assembly from discussing foreign policy matters, but it is understood from the spirit of the constitution that the Emir handles the signing of international treaties and the relationships with other countries. However, the National Assembly theoretically can disapprove any treaty signed by the state,” Nabeel Nowairah, an independent analyst, told Politics Today.

“As an institution, the parliament does not have a huge role to play in Kuwait’s foreign policy but “individual MPs sometimes voice their opinion on certain matters happening in the region and take their own stance, occasionally coming off as provocative,” Daniel Tavana, postdoctoral fellow at the Council on Middle East Studies at Yale University, told Politics Today.

During the election cycle, the Palestinian cause was brought up multiple times, thus signaling that the topic is one of utmost priority for most Kuwaitis.

This was evident two weeks ago when a UK-based Emirati media outlet, Al Arab, published an article following the AlUla summit which was perceived as an insult towards the Kuwaiti Emir, as it took away from his role in resolving the Gulf dispute.

This prompted Kuwait’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs to contact its Emirati counterpart to express their concern. While the issue was resolved on a state level, MP Ahmed Al Hamad spoke out on the incident and pointed out that the newspaper has a “limited opinion and is ignorant regarding Kuwait’s role in mediating the Gulf crisis.”

Kuwaiti “House of the People”

As the branch of government that represents the voice of the Kuwaiti people, the parliament discusses matters related to the region when they are of national importance.

During the election cycle, the Palestinian cause was brought up multiple times, thus signaling that the topic is one of utmost priority for most Kuwaitis.

Indicating the importance of rejecting ties with Israel and although the parliament had been in session for about a month, normalization with Israel was regarded as a priority by the foreign affairs committee, with one of its members, MP Abdullah Al Mudhaf, stating that they aim to solidify the boycott of the Zionist state.

In terms of legislation, on December 26, Kuwaiti MP Dr. Abdulaziz Al Saqobi, submitted a proposal to amend Law 21 of 1964, related to the boycott of Israeli goods, to include that Israel should be boycotted politically, electronically, and in terms of tourism.

The parliament’s role as the “House of the People” was clearly visible during the previous legislative term when 38 MPs released a statement demanding that the Kuwaiti government acknowledge its commitment to rejecting ties with Israel, after news broke that the United Arab Emirates had agreed to normalize ties with Israel.

The move came after the Kuwaiti people loudly voiced their support for the Palestinian people and 40 civil society organizations urged the parliament to “urgently pass a law that criminalizes normalizing relations with the Zionist Enemy.”

The parliament’s role as the “House of the People” was clearly visible during the previous legislative term when 38 MPs released a statement demanding that the Kuwaiti government acknowledge its commitment to rejecting ties with Israel.

In Kuwaiti politics, going against the Palestinian cause is a red line, and MPs and politically active persons are expected to have a firm stance against Israel. Such figures are favored by the public. Marzouq Al-Ghanim, the speaker of parliament, gained notable attention during the Arab Parliament in Amman when he threw the “deal of the century” document in the trash, claiming that it “belongs in the dustbin of history.”

Given that Article 70 of the Kuwaiti constitution stipulates treaties must be approved by a law to be enforced, when Kuwait and Saudi Arabia reached an agreement on December 24, 2019 over the Neutral Zone, a 5,770-square meter oil production zone shared by both countries, the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) was not deemed final without the approval of the parliament.

While the law passed as the majority of the members approved the MoU, six MPs rejected it. One of the MPs who voted against the bill, Mubarak Al Hajraf, during the session asked, “Did this agreement bring about equal sovereignty between both countries?”

Several influential political figures and former MPs Obaid Al-Wasmi and Saleh Al-Mulla, spoke on the matter pointing to the fact that reaching an agreement is vital as long as it does not infringe on Kuwait’s sovereignty and wealth.

The Neutral Zone has been a topic of national interest since 2015 when both countries halted oil production in Kuwait’s Wafra and Saudi Arabia’s Khafji oil fields, after growing tension following the Saudis’ approval to grant Chevron a 30-year concession without consulting Kuwait. The move was not welcomed by Kuwait as the Kuwaiti constitution states that no foreign country is permitted ownership of any of its oil resources.

Siding with allies, yet maintaining diplomacy 

Kuwait refrains from engaging in offensive military operations and tries to reduce regional tensions if they arise. Although this has been the governmental stance for decades, the parliament has played a role in reflecting public opinion regarding regional affairs.

One notable instance was back in 2016, when nine Shi’a MPs boycotted a parliamentary meeting which was scheduled to take place a day after 25 Kuwaitis were charged for allegedly having ties with Iran and Hezbollah. The incident caused polarization in Kuwait with some MPs calling for harsh measures on Iran, while others stating that the ruling was an indication of the increasing Saudi influence on Kuwaiti domestic issues.

Earlier in 2011, during the Bahraini uprising, there was internal pressure, including from the parliament, that Kuwait should refrain from establishing a military presence on the ground. Sticking to its diplomatic stance, the Kuwaiti government ended up sending naval forces and medical personnel.

Setting an example 

Since Kuwaiti citizens have the right to vote for the members of the legislative branch (except the 16 ministers who are appointed by the government), the Gulf country’s semi-democratic process is argued to be one of the freest governing structures in the region.

“Although there is no regional standard, given that every Gulf country has its own electoral and legislative institutions, the Kuwaiti parliament is the only one that has some autonomy and real law-making power,” stated Tavana.

Kuwait’s democratic process sets an example for the region, not only as a body that enacts laws but also in terms of its ability to hold the government accountable.