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he overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi’s 42-year-long regime in 2011, following public uprisings, plunged Libya into a political, social, and military crisis. Even after 13 years, the country has yet to achieve unity and integrity. The uprising, ignited on February 17, 2011, is considered by some as the root cause of today’s conflict environment, while others view it as a justified and legitimate quest for a new order.

Revolution dilemma

Although the February 17 revolution emerged as a popular movement, the post-revolution phase, particularly two years later with the enactment of the “political isolation law’” that marginalized former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats from the political scene, followed by the military polarization of 2014, indicated that the revolution had been co-opted by certain political and military cliques into a struggle for power.

This scenario and the historical flow extending to the present day reveal that the masses, aspiring for better living conditions and a fairer governance model, have relinquished control of the revolution to the country’s political elites. The fragile and fragmented security atmosphere, perceived as a window of opportunity by tribal and militia groups active in the east and west, led to deep divisions and polarizations across various sectors, constructed through narratives and policies securitized within the narrow agendas and interests of the relevant actors.

Over time, this division evolved into armed conflict, leading to the deaths of tens of thousands of Libyans in the civil wars of 2014 and 2019, and further laying the groundwork for the emergence of regional animosity and seeking of revenge. Despite being ethnically more homogeneous compared to many countries in the Middle East and Africa, the North African nation witnessed its initial revolutionary vs. anti-revolutionary divide deepen into Islamist vs. secular, east vs. west, and even city vs. town polarizations, all of which have hindered the processes of reconciliation and state reconstruction.

For instance, the city of Misrata stood out as both a stronghold of the revolution and in favor of the influential Islamist Muslim Brotherhood movement, while the city of Benghazi transformed into a hub for revolution opponents and former Gaddafi-era soldiers and bureaucrats, especially following the rise of militia leader Khalifa Haftar in the east. Additionally, the capital, Tripoli, along with influential western cities like Misrata, Zawiya, and Zintan, became strategic points where armed groups are engaged in a power struggle, specifically aiming to expand their spheres of influence and augment their control over official institutions in the post-revolutionary era.

Disruptive interventions by external actors

Parallel to these internal balances, Western countries within NATO, which planned and executed air strikes against Gaddafi in 2011, have continued to intervene in the process. The United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL), established under the auspices of the UN, has remained inadequate in terms of providing a foundation for permanent and sustainable solutions, instead supporting interim governments and similar power-sharing agreements formed in 2015 and 2021.

More importantly, NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya, the first peacekeeping operation implemented under the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine, neglected the responsibility to rebuild, a crucial component of the R2P approach. The post-Gaddafi reconstruction process was left to Libya’s incomplete institutions and a society lacking a developed sense of citizenship. Subsequent international conferences, such as those in Palermo and Berlin, witnessed meetings that veered into a dominance struggle, far from solving issues, and were marked by disagreements stemming from conflicting interests among Western nations.

On the other hand, the authority vacuum and weak borders have transformed Libya into a hub for mercenaries, on the brink of regional crises, where fighters are gathered and dispatched. The period during which Gulf countries and the Russian private military company (PMC) Wagner Group financed numerous Syrian, Chadian, and Sudanese foreign fighters within Haftar’s ranks was documented in several open sources. From this perspective, it can be stated that external interventions have been as detrimental to Libya’s unity and integrity as internal factors.

The Libyan Political Dialogue Forum (LPDF), convened under the auspices of the UN in Switzerland on February 5, 2021, designated the Government of National Unity (GNU), led by the businessman from Misrata Abdul Hamid Dbeibeh, as the new transitional administration to guide the country towards the elections planned for December 2021. Gaining relative support from rival figures in a short period, the GNU prioritized economic and political reforms. However, the postponement of the planned elections due to controversies over candidate criteria and constitutional debates led to a broader division, culminating in the establishment of a new parallel government in February 2022. The developments following this date can be identified as primary causes for the conflicts erupting in and around Tripoli, closures of oil facilities, and the resultant economic and political crises.

Militias and Libyan politics

The current situation has enabled militia groups in the country to evolve into political entities over time, leveraging the privileges and powers they have accumulated. This transformation is elucidated by the concept of “militia diplomacy,” which denotes the distribution of shares in military and political institutions. According to this approach, militias affiliated with tribes or community-based in the east, west, and south aim to position actors sympathetic to them in government during transitional processes.

The deviation from this scenario not only questions the legitimacy of the new structure in the eyes of these groups but also leads to potentially destabilizing endeavors. Many analysts focusing on Libya argue that militia groups, which have been integrated into the Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Defense, and Presidential Council since 2011, have become “statized,” positing this as a significant impediment to democratic processes.

Currently, it is possible to discuss some initiatives regarding the reorganization of the December 2021 elections that were canceled. Alongside mechanisms involving local and international actors led by the UNSMIL, priority should be given to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs. A united Libya requires unified institutions and, more importantly, a unified military. At this point, both the so-called Libyan National Army (LNA), comprised of Haftar’s forces in the east, and the fragmented security bureaucracy in the west of the country indicate chronic problems for the future.

Georgia Meloni’s accession to power in Italy is seen as a remarkable turning point that has redefined Euro-Mediterranean relations in general and Euro-Tunisian relations in particular. Meloni was sworn in as president of the Council of Ministers on October 22, 2022. Her inauguration caused an uproar and raised questions about the future of the region, particularly in relation to the Italian state’s migration policy. In fact, an important factor to consider is that Meloni is the leader of Brothers of Italy, a direct descendant of Benito Mussolini’s fascist legacy, but she is also one of the iconic figures of the new right in Europe, propagating a strong sense of xenophobia and advancing a sterile populist discourse.

Why Italy? Demystifying the fundamental factors behind the unusual dispute

Geographical proximity

It is no secret that geopolitics is the fundamental parameter defining Italian efforts in the European-Tunisian equation. Separated by only 140 kilometers, Italy’s geographical proximity to Tunisia has a significant impact on the bilateral dynamics between the two strategically important countries. In fact, the implications go beyond the borders of Italy, as they directly affect the European continent. The answer to the question “Why Italy?” is therefore multifaceted and fraught with complications and interpretations. From a strategic point of view, the shared Mediterranean Sea serves as an important route not only for the promotion of trade but also for the movement of people, making migration a key issue in the Italian (and European) approach to Tunisia. It is important to stress that Tunisia has a significant position both as a home for illegal migrants and as a transit country for migrants from beyond the Sahara.

The main reasons for intercountry migration are often human capital-related, but also include asylum seekers fleeing the intense political instability in North African countries. Statistics confirm that more than 5.3% of the total population of the EU comprise migrants of non-European origin, amounting to 23.7 million people from Third World countries. In this context, Tunisia’s influence on the European Union depends more on the uncontrollable influx of immigrants than on trade and economic dynamics.

The number of Tunisian citizens arriving by sea on the island of Lampedusa in southern Italy has fluctuated over the years. In 2019, the number stood at 2,654 and in 2018 at 5,181. In 2021, it peaked with 15,671 arrivals, followed by 2020 with 12,883 arrivals. The statistics prove that the problems caused by the sea are a major incentive for the Italian authorities to work with Tunisia to find a solution.

Tunisia: A route for an alternative energy source for Europe

In conjunction with the previous section, we can conclude that the geographical factor has implications for energy reasons, namely, the dependency between Europe and the southern Mediterranean. It is worth noting that Italy is one of Europe’s largest energy consumers and its proximity to Tunisia, a potential producer of renewable energy (especially solar energy), could be beneficial for the country and for Europe at large.

It is useful for reasons of perspective to compare this approach with the trends in the global power struggle that have taken place since 2021. In this context, the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian military confrontation is seen as the origin of a number of flaws in the concept of the “balance of power” between the continents.

The European Union is currently facing the direct consequences of its transcontinental policies. Many observers believe that the fighting between the two parties has led to a reshaping of the traditional relationship between the EU and its southern Mediterranean neighbors. In particular, the military hostilities has to some extent broken the archaic “asymmetry of interdependence” that the EU has maintained at a steady pace since the signing of the Barcelona Process with Tunisia in 1995. The Russia-Ukraine war has created logistical difficulties for Europe, and given that Tunisia is a strategic partner, facilitating the transit of gas to Europe across the maritime border with Italy, the “Meloni factor” can be justified in the ongoing unrest over the past month.

The Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline and economic cooperation

Known colloquially as “TransMed,” the Trans-Mediterranean Pipeline is a 2,475 km natural gas pipeline “allowing the transport of large quantities of high-quality energy” through Tunisia and Sicily. Although Tunisia’s share is comparatively small, it is nevertheless considered to occupy an important position that can solve the energy problem in terms of the European Union’s external interests, as well as securing potential containment solutions to prevent Tunisia’s economic decline. It is crucial to highlight that the European Union is still considered the country’s first economic partner, accounting for 73.8% of total exports, while maintaining rates of 45.5% of Tunisia’s total imports. Moreover, Italy’s role in Tunisia’s foreign policy has increased in economic terms in the post-Jasmine Revolution era. With the introduction of democratic elements, Italy became Tunisia’s leading supplier in 2017, ahead of France.

Italian-Tunisian relations are often seen as a projection of Euro-Tunisian relations, due to the sum of all the factors mentioned above. Put simply, the inter(in)dependence between Tunisia and Italy and/or the European Union is governed by multiple parameters, of which the economy and migration work together to define this web of complexities.

Migration at the heart of European diplomacy: the role of “Meloni” Italy

The strategy of bilateral cooperation is underpinned by a series of diplomatic all-round dialogues and coordination, mediated mainly by Italy, and has witnessed an urgent upsurge that comes to fulfil the legacy of the “shared history, geographical proximity and strong relationship” (Directorate-General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations, 2023) between the European Union and Tunisia. From a European perspective, the problem of migratory flows is seen as a predator lurking behind the bushes and imposes a multitude of complexities on the Euro-Tunisian platform, exemplified by economic, political, and ethnographic difficulties.

The Italian perception of the situation has been translated on two different occasions by Meloni’s courageous efforts. Georgia Meloni first landed on Tunisian soil on June 6 and returned on June 11 to reaffirm the positive European perception of Tunisia, accompanied by European Union President Ursula von der Leyen and Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte. The two parties worked out “a memorandum of understanding on the comprehensive partnership package to be approved by Tunisia and the European Union before the end of June 2023” in order to integrate the country into the European efforts to regulate migration. On the other side of the of the coin, President von der Leyen insisted that “against the backdrop of global uncertainties, it is in our common interest to strengthen our relations and invest in stability and prosperity.”

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hen Kais Saied won the landslide elections in Tunisia in 2019, he began to pressure parliament into ceding executive powers that the 2014 constitution had stripped the Presidency of. The constitution made parliament supreme in the country as opposed to the Presidency. Yet, Saied was adamant that he should be the one to appoint his own prime minister and government and should be allowed to rule directly. The elected parliament, in which Rachid Ghannouchi’s Ennahda party were the largest bloc, refused to cede these executive powers and proceeded to try to establish a working majority coalition in parliament that would back a coalition government.

However, Ennahda struggled to form a government and was met with resistance from other parties in parliament such as Tayyar al-Dimoqrati who sought to capitalize on the tension between Saied and Ennahda to demand the interior ministry post. Ennahda’s proposed candidate Habib al-Jimli failed to form a government. As the month designated by the constitution to form a government was approaching its end, Saied and his allies began to threaten to use the constitutional power of calling early elections that would be afforded to Saied after the designated month to form a government had come to an end.

The parties within parliament panicked at the prospect of facing a hostile electorate again and abandoned their polarized positions to come together to form a compromise government. Saied’s preferred candidate for Prime Minister would be accepted, however, the government would be divided between the parties in parliament. Ilyas al-Fakh Fakh was appointed prime minister.

Al-Fakh Fakh, however, did not last long, and was soon accused of corruption. His position became untenable and Ghannouchi moved to reassert the primacy of parliament by mobilizing a vote of no confidence which was read out by a member of Tunisia’s Parliament Issam Bargougui from the Popular Will party. Saied summoned al-Fakh Fakh to the palace on the same day the no confidence motion was read out, and it was announced at the end of the meeting that al-Fakh Fakh had tendered his resignation.

A constitutional debate

This triggered a constitutional debate. If al-Fakh Fakh was removed by a vote of no confidence, then the constitution stipulated that parliament had to present the next candidate. If al-Fakh Fakh resigned, however, the constitution stipulated that the president would appoint the next prime minister. A debate ensued as to whether the no-confidence motion had been submitted first, or the resignation.

In the end, Ennahda ceded to Saied again in order not to fuel further antagonism towards parliament from a hostile population, and Saied appointed his own prime minister Hichem al-Mishishi over which Saied was able to exert much more control.

However, Mishishi soon switched allegiances and began to work more closely with Ghannouchi and Parliament. Mishishi then sacked some of Saied’s loyalists, including the interior minister, and assumed the latter’s position himself alongside his role as Prime Minister. Saied raged at this ‘betrayal’, and it is within this context that he subsequently moved to seize all power, suspended parliament, and suspended the constitution.

Low turnout

However, the turnout for both his referendum and his subsequent ‘elections’ later in the year were abysmally low. The elections in particular saw less than 12% turn out to vote, and almost set a record for the worst-attended election in the history of global democracy. Neither the referendum nor the elections could credibly reinforce the ‘legitimacy’ of his coup internationally and domestically.

The humiliation was not lost on Saied’s supporters, who once again insisted that Saied’s failure to convict the democratically elected Speaker of Parliament Rached Ghannouchi and Saied’s failure to dissolve the most successful democratically elected party in the country would continue to undermine his coup. In other words, the continued freedom of the democratically elected leadership of the largest democratically elected bloc would continue to present a stumbling bloc towards any bid by the coup to establish ‘credible legitimacy’.

The turning point, however, was the notable shift in the stance of Washington which welcomed Saied’s ‘elections’ as a “essential initial step toward restoring the country’s democratic trajectory”. A jubilant Saied immediately moved to arrest former Prime Minister Ali Laareydh (who remains in prison to this day). Noureddine Bheiri, a former justice minister, was detained. The democratically elected member of parliament for the city of Kairouan Sayyed Ferjani was imprisoned.

The sudden surge in arrests and detentions reflected the growing confidence from Kais Saied that his ‘legitimacy’ was being recognized internationally. Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni publicly insisted on the need to help Tunisia secure funding, while Qatar sent a delegation to Kais Saied to discuss investments. The sudden turn in fortunes for Saied internationally resulted in a ramping up of his crackdown, to the extent that Saied openly declared that “any judge who finds [his opponents] innocent will be considered a co-conspirator”.

Why Saied arrested Ghannouchi

It is in this context that Saied moved to arrest Ghannouchi at the first opportunity. A video emerged of Ghannouchi addressing other opposition activists and asserting that “attempts to eradicate any political trend, whether Islamist, or leftist, or socialist, would threaten to plunge the country into civil war”. Media outlets, that have increasingly aligned with the new power dynamics in Tunisia, gave the video relentless coverage with pundits accusing Ghannouchi of ‘inciting civil war’. Ghannouchi’s house was reportedly stormed, and he was taken away. This time, instead of ordering his release, the judge ordered his detention and imprisonment.

International reactions have been rather muted. The White House took 48 hours to release a statement in which the contents suggested it was more protocol than any suggestion of anger at Saied or support for the democratically elected Speaker of Parliament. Moreover, Saied has received a boost in his resistance to the terms of the IMF loan being negotiated as the powerful trade unions, with whom Saied has been wrestling, announced their firm support for Saied’s rejection of the proposed conditions. The U.S. has also indicated it is prepared to revise the terms of the IMF loan deal.

In other words, the arrest and detention of the democratically elected Speaker of parliament, and leader of the most successful democratically elected party, has been met by the international community with relative silence, and instead, greater cooperation with the coup that has toppled the democratic transition. Even as reports emerge of security forces breaking down the doors of Ghannouchi’s family, and embarking on practices reminiscent of the dictatorships of the Ben Ali and Bourguiba regimes, the suggestion is that the international community remains undeterred in its current course of working with the coup.

Saied hopes that now he will finally be able to secure the verdict he has long sought against Ghannouchi. The exact charge of conviction is irrelevant. Saied simply hopes to assert to the Tunisian population and the world that the parliament he suspended and then dissolved was ‘illegitimate’ because the democratically elected Speaker was a ‘criminal’ who should never have been elected. Saied will hope that the conviction of Ghannouchi will finally secure international ‘legitimacy’ and ‘recognition’ for his coup against Tunisia’s democratic transition.

Tunisia is in a cascading political crisis which continues to to deteriorate rapidly. The latest sign of this is the huge security operation that was deployed against the January 14 demonstration in the center of the capital, Tunis, and which prevented the demonstrators from entering Avenue Habib Bourguiba, or “Revolution Street” as it is called by the regime opponents.

The Tunisian political scene seems open to various scenarios. Where before the coup, previous governments had failed abysmally to deliver on the aspirations of the Tunisian people, especially the youth and the poor, it has become abundantly clear since Saied’s coup that his administration and government advisers have only managed to exacerbate and worsen the rapidly deteriorating economic and social conditions across the country – in addition to overthrowing the democratic process.

In the past few weeks, Saied shocked the public opinion by engineering a four-year prison sentence against former president Moncef Marzouki for allegedly lobbying against Tunisia and the Francophone summit that was scheduled to be held in Djerba last year.

Ironically, and to the bewilderment of public opinion, Saied denied he had played any role in the sentencing of Marzouki, despite ordering the justice minister in front of live cameras on live television on October 30, 2021 to open a judicial investigation into Marzouki on the charge of high treason, adding that Marzouki “had joined the ranks of the enemies of the state.”

Then came the spectacularly public scandal of the kidnapping of the former minister of justice and vice-president of the Ennahda Movement, the largest party in parliament, Noureddine Bhiri. Having failed to persuade the judiciary to issue an arrest warrant for Bhiri on the charge of violating the laws of the land, Kais Saied decided to resort to illegal methods reminiscent of the behavior of armed militias in failed states.

Large sections of ordinary, apolitical citizens in Tunisia have not been especially bothered or concerned with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saied regime.

Bhiri was violently kidnapped a few yards from his home and transferred to a secret detention center. The move drew widespread political anger and condemnation, not only in the ranks of the Ennahda party, but also from across the political spectrum, from human rights activists and international organizations.

It should be stressed however that large sections of ordinary, apolitical citizens in Tunisia have not been especially bothered or concerned with the human rights violations perpetrated by the Saied regime. The primary reason for this is the overwhelming preoccupation with the dire economic conditions that continue to deteriorate.

Despite these difficulties and challenges, Saied has decided to begin implementing his plans to change the constitution and the political system unilaterally in Tunisia. He has established an electronic consultation platform that he insists will engage the population in his plans for reforms. He has also announced that a constitutional referendum will be held on July 25, 2022, and then legislative elections on December 17, 2022 on the basis of the new constitution. Saied has hinted that the elections will not be supervised by the Independent Election Commission for which he has openly expressed disdain.

Saied has decided to begin implementing his plans to change the constitution and the political system unilaterally in Tunisia.

However, most political parties in Tunisia have called on the people to boycott this electronic consultation. Moreover, many people in Tunisia do not have the ability or access to participate in such a consultation, or the technical skills necessary even if they wanted to. This means that in reality, Saied is effectively using the electronic platform as a cover to make changes according to his own whims and desires, while knowing full well that such a process will not be recognized by the country’s political class. In other words, Saied’s “process” will only serve to deepen the constitutional and legal crises in the country.

Tunisia is at a crossroads. On the one hand, there is Saied’s individual and totalitarian project that threatens a return to the days of tyranny. On the other, there are the forces of political and civil society seeking to restore democracy, constitutional legitimacy, and the rule of law.

Support for Saied is decreasing day by day as the reality becomes clear to the people. There are no longer any prominent political groups that support the coup except for a pan-Arab nationalist-oriented political trend that only serves to remind people of the bitter experiences of tyranny that Arab populations have endured under regimes that touted nationalist slogans.

Meanwhile, the camp of the civilian democratic forces is growing in number, and there are increasing efforts to unite its components on a common political program that will enhance the chances of defeating the political coup and rescuing Tunisia from its clutches.

There is no doubt that the situation in Tunisia was bad before Kais Saied’s coup; however, it is even clearer that it is has become worse since the coup. Autocracy, combining all the powers in the hands of one person, is not the solution to the difficulties facing the consolidation of democracy in Tunisia.

Tunisians now find themselves facing a historical political battle to decide their fate, and to regain their freedom and dignity. There must be no doubt that to remain silent on what Saied is doing to democracy, the constitution, the rule of law, and the state institutions, will sooner or later bring the roof tumbling down on everyone’s heads.

What had to happen, happened. Algeria and Morocco have broken off their diplomatic relations. Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra made the announcement on Tuesday, August 24, 2021, during a press briefing. Before announcing this fatal outcome, Lamamra made a long presentation in which he listed all his country’s grievances towards Morocco since Algeria’s independence in 1962.

Lamamra began by recalling the Sands War, which pitted the two Maghreb armies against each other between the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964. He went on to describe all the misunderstandings between the two states over the past 60 years, recalling, of course, the eternal dispute over Western Sahara between the Sahrawi independence fighters of the Polisario Front, supported by Algiers, and the Kingdom of Morocco since 1975. He then moved on to recent history, touching on the recent tensions, which have been shaking the two countries and are not minor.

Here are the reasons that pushed Algiers to break its relations with Rabat. Algeria considers that the normalization of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel in December 2020 means the installation of a “Zionist vanguard” in the Maghreb. And this, it has claimed since December, constitutes a threat to its security. The recent official visit to Morocco of the minister of foreign affairs and future prime minister of Israel, Yair Lapid, has only added fuel to fire.

Although it is still not known if he did so with the approval of the Moroccan authorities, from Raba, Lapid criticized the “rapprochement [of Algeria] with Iran” thus expressing the opposition of the Rabat-Tel Aviv axis to the supposed Algiers-Tehran axis. By doing so, he exported to the Maghreb the geostrategic rivalry between Israel and Iran. This move was viewed as a mistake in the eyes of many Moroccans who, despite a bitter Saudi campaign that led to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran, do not consider Iran an enemy.

For several years, Rabat has been trying to give credence to the idea that Tehran, through the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, supports the Polisario Front militarily, with the acquiescence of Algeria.

For several years, Rabat has been trying to give credence to the idea that Tehran, through the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, supports the Polisario Front militarily, with the acquiescence of Algeria. But for the moment, despite a few rare opinion articles in the Moroccan and foreign media linked to the Moroccan regime, no serious investigation has been able to confirm this scenario. Even the Americans, although vigilant towards Iran and Hezbollah, have not detected anything.

The other Moroccan blunder that set off the fire was the quasi-recognition of MAK, the Movement for self-determination of Kabylie, supported by Rabat and considered a “terrorist organization” by the Algerian government.

The Algerian state announced its decision to “review” its relations with Rabat and to intensify security control on the western borders due to “the incessant hostile acts” by Morocco.

A few days later, Algeria declared that the forest fires that ravaged the north of the country were caused by MAK militants. To further increase its pressure on Morocco, Algiers accused Morocco of training MAK activists in military camps.

The rupture of diplomatic relations was a matter of days. To show that there was no return back and to signify that the bridges between the two countries had been definitively cut, on August 26, Algiers announced that it would no longer use the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline that connects the Algerian oil fields with Europe via Morocco. Mohamed Arkab, the Algerian energy minister, explained to the Spaniards that from now on, the Algerian gas would only go through Medgaz, another pipeline that links Algeria directly to Spain, without passing through Morocco.

This Algerian decision constitutes an economic loss for Morocco, which used to pump 900 million cubic meters of natural gas every year, let alone the financial losses that Rabat will suffer as it will no longer collect money from Spain for using its territory.

What will happen now? It is unlikely that the escalation between Algeria and Morocco will end with the severing of diplomatic ties.

What will happen now? It is unlikely that the escalation between Algeria and Morocco will end with the severing of diplomatic ties. The fear that Moroccans and Algerians residing in both countries will be expelled from their homes as was the case in 1976 at the height of Algiers’s recognition of the Polisario Front is palpable, yet unlikely, unless the situation escalates.

Today, there are only skirmishes between the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and the Saharawi independence fighters who broke the ceasefire with Morocco last year after the events of the border post of Guerguerat that separates the disputed territory of Western Sahara from Mauritania.

But we are still in a pre-war situation which has the potential to continue. It can also tip over into an all-out conflict if Algeria allows and supports the Polisario Front in going beyond today’s military commitments.

Morocco and Algeria have engaged in a dangerous arms race in recent decades. In 2015, Algeria’s military budget was $11 billion, while Morocco’s was only $3 billion. Morocco caught up with Algeria after launching a $22 billion five-year rearmament plan in 2017 and then reintroducing mandatory military service in 2018. The two countries have arguably reached a dangerous military equilibrium that experts say will often end in conflagration.

A war, even limited and short, would considerably weaken the two economies, which are already in bad shape, provoke sentiments, and make the much-needed reconciliation far away. Above all, it would destabilize the entire Maghreb region. This does not suit the European Union, which needs Algeria and Morocco to fight illegal immigration.

Morocco and Algeria share a common history, religions, and vernacular languages. Even if the two people might not identify with the diplomatic squabbles and bellicose desires of their rulers, a conflict with death and destruction would break this fraternal bond, which today, despite assurances from both sides, hangs by a thread.

Let me be clear from the beginning: what happened in Tunisia on July 25, 2021 is a coup against the constitution. There is no doubt about it and no argument.

As for the decision of the coup, it was not taken in haste on the Sunday before last nor was it a reaction to the widespread protests taking place that day. There is no doubt that Kais Saied has been planning this coup from at least the beginning of this year, which means that he had already consulted with the army leadership and secured the necessary support before taking these drastic measures.

There is no direct material evidence that there is any foreign involvement in Saied’s decision to embark on this coup. However, there is an important question to be asked: Kais Saied is over sixty years of age, a university lecturer, and was able to win the presidential elections. Is it reasonable to believe that he would suspend the parliament and move to monopolize all of the state’s power in his hands without having coordinated in advance with foreign powers such as the French president to secure international support, and then with Saudi Arabia and the UAE to secure the necessary financial support to cement his coup?

Moreover, there is much to be gleaned from the international response to the coup. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s first public words on the coup were, “I had a good call with President Kais Saied.”

These words indicate that the U.S. administration will not seriously obstruct Saied’s plans to change the political course in Tunisia. The Americans are not interested much in competing with France for influence in Tunisia, and have far more important issues such as Afghanistan, Iraq, China, Russia, and COVID-19.

The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011.

Yet it cannot be denied that there is significant popular support for Saied’s decisions. The social and economic situation in Tunisia has deteriorated significantly since 2011. Over the course of the past two years, the newly elected parliament, and the two governments which were bestowed with its vote of confidence, have resoundingly failed to improve the lives of ordinary citizens – just as the previous governments before it. The situation has been compounded by the COVID-19 pandemic that has ripped through the country with devastating impact.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has, of course, significant effects at home, as well as in Tunisia’s regional surroundings, particularly with regards to neighboring Libya. Among the countries that supported Saied’s measures immediately after they were announced, are two countries that have great interests in Libya, which outweigh their interests in Tunisia – namely, Egypt and the UAE.

President Kais Saied’s coup against the constitution has significant effects at home as well as in Libya.

The leaders of both countries fully understand that Tunisia is a lifeline for the Tripoli government, and that if a regime closer to them is established in Tunis, and they have a tangible influence on it, it will be possible to tighten the noose around the Tripoli government in coordination with their ally Haftar who is ever-present in the east.

Two years ago, Khalifa Haftar was about to enter Tripoli victorious, after he had besieged it with the support of Egypt and the UAE. But, Turkish support and an open border with Tunisia, where the Ennahda movement has enjoyed an advanced political position, saved Tripoli and its rulers from defeat.

But now that Ennahda has been removed from power with the coup of Saied, Egypt and the UAE may hope that what they failed to accomplish in 2019 can now be achieved in coordination with a friendly regime in Tunisia, and with more support for their ambitious Libyan ally, General Hafter.

Of course, the governments of Egypt and the UAE also have a strong alliance with France, with whom they share mutual interests and cooperation on regional issues, and in particular Libya: oil for France; the employment of Egyptian workers and the granting of construction contracts to Egyptian companies for the el-Sisi regime; and uprooting the Muslim Brotherhood movement and ending its presence in Libya for the UAE (which Egypt and France also want to see).

It is very clear, then, that the Tunisian coup has a strong relationship with the Libyan issue. This naturally leads us to consider Algeria, Tunisia’s most important neighbor, and how it will react to the Tunisian coup and its repercussions in the region.

There are no official Algerian statements that can be relied on to know the actual mood among Algerian policymakers. However, there was a call between the Tunisian and Algerian presidents on July 26 and a visit by the Algerian foreign minister to Tunisia the next day, during which he met with Saied.

Algerian comments on social media and press leaks indicate that Algeria will not accept the control of Tunisian foreign policy by Egypt and the UAE – a control that would seek to facilitate Haftar’s bid to gain control of all of Libya’s regions. Algeria views Haftar as an opponent, and he, in turn, reciprocates this stance. Algeria also sees the UAE as an antagonist in the region. Abu Dhabi has established a consulate in the disputed Western Sahara, much to the chagrin of Algiers. Coupled with the normalization of ties with Israel, the intention of the UAE to flex against Algeria by drawing on international support in favor of Morocco is clear.

On this basis, Algeria may put pressure on Saied not to dissolve parliament and not to overextend the period afforded to him to wield emergency powers in order to preserve the position of the Ennahda movement in the Tunisian political scene, and thereby to ensure there is a check on the governments of Egypt and the UAE that prevents them from exercising influence on the foreign policy of Tunisia.

The Amazighs, usually referred to as Berbers, are native inhabitants of North Africa. Their presence stretches from the Canary Islands of Spain to Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Today, they also make up a considerable percentage of immigrants in many countries outside North Africa.

The Amazighs trace their origins to the Libyan tribes that formed strong political entities such as the Garamantes the Gaetulians, and the Meshwesh. The Meshwesh, in fact, annexed Egypt and even installed Shoshenq I as a pharaoh. His lineage carried on for centuries through the 22nd and 23rd Egyptian dynasties (945–720 BC). Apart from this, the Amazighs’ cultural influence on ancient civilizations was extensive as detailed in Greek and Egyptian mythology.

Throughout time, two great powers emerged in the territories where the Amazigh lived: the Phoenicians and the Romans. The Amazighs’ relationships with these two powerful states changed drastically ranging between war, alliances, and cooperation. Yet, throughout the various kingdoms they established, the Amazighs – mainly the Massylii and the Masaesyli – maintained an independent and free will.

The Amazighs, colonialism, and postcolonialism

Due to migration and the unfolding of political events, many Amazighs forgot their language and became Arabized Amazighs. Amazighs speak Darja, the local North African dialect as their primary and mother tongue. North African Darja is highly influenced by the Amazigh language, which is very difficult to understand for native Arabs of the Middle East.

Starting from the colonial era in North Africa, the Amazighs like their African neighbors, lost territory and power to the Europeans, mainly to Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain.

Many other Amazigh groups have kept their native tongue. Such groups include the Chaoui people of eastern Algeria; the Chenouas in western Algeria; the Amazighs of Tripolitania in Libya; the Kabyle people, who are the inhabitants of the historical autonomous region of northern Algeria; and the Chleuh in High Atlas and the Souss Valley of Morocco. Other groups include the Riffians of northern Morocco, the Mozabites of southern Algeria, the Zenata of western and southwestern Algeria, and the Tuaregs of the Sahara.

Starting from the colonial era in North Africa, the Amazighs like their African neighbors, lost territory and power to the Europeans, mainly to Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain. They had to fight long and bloody wars of independence to gain their freedom from colonial powers that created new territorial changes, including the creation of modern Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, and Libya.

Today, in Algeria, Tamazight, along with French and Arabic, is one of the three main languages used in media. In 1996, Tamazight began to be taught as an optional subject in regions where it is spoken. On December 27, 2017, Algeria’s former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika recognized Yennayer, the first month of the Amazigh year, as a public holiday to be celebrated on its first day (January 12) every year.

Amazighs are gaining greater political presence in Algeria and Morocco. Many Amazigh figures reached high positions in the social and political hierarchies. Examples include the former president of Algeria, Liamine Zéroual, and its current president Abdelmadjid Tebboune, and the current prime minister of Morocco, Saadeddine Othmani.

In 2019, the Amazighs contributed greatly to the Algerian protests, also known as the Hirak Movement, which resulted in the deposal of the regime of President Bouteflika.

In Algeria today, political parties and popular movements are pushing for granting the Amazighs more rights such as including the Amazigh language as a mandatory language in schools and promoting the restoration of the Amazigh cultural heritage sites. The last two decades have seen an improvement in the political, cultural, and social status of the Amazighs in North Africa, but the road ahead to a full recognition of their rights in still long.

The unification of the Amazigh language and education

To this day, there’s no unified Amazigh language – at least, this is the case in Algeria, where each region claims the use of its local language as the de facto learning language. Academics concerned about the issue are divided between three examples and groups.

The example of the German language where all Amazigh languages become one. The Italian example where one Amazigh language is taught in all regions, and thus the other languages fade away and in time merge with the new de facto official language. And the federal example, where each region keeps its local language.

The main issue, however, in introducing the Berber language to the school system is the alphabet as there are three suggested systems to write Berber texts. The first is Tifinagh, the Amazigh alphabet system, which is still widely used in the Tuareg region. This very old alphabet is found throughout North Africa’s old inscriptions and ruins.

Today, it has been developed and made official by local authorities. It is widely used at facilities such as schools, post offices, and banks, yet some scholars argue that it is not practical and that is hard for new learners, who, instead of learning a new language, have to go through learning a new system instead.

Let it be clear to the public: there is no doubt that Tunisian democracy has been in a serious crisis for some time, although this article focuses on the events of the first weeks of 2021.

On Tuesday, February 2, 2021, Tunisian President Kais Saied visited the Interior Ministry, then toured the capital’s main street and heard people chanting for him to dissolve parliament.

Two weeks prior, the president addressed a number of citizens at a café in a popular neighborhood on the outskirts of the capital, and posted a video of his meeting with them on the official page of the Presidency. In it, people can be heard calling for him to dissolve parliament and all political parties.

Prior to this, Mohammad Abbou a former minister who met with the Tunisian president had publicly called for the army to be deployed in the cities, claiming these extraordinary measures are needed to combat what he considers the corruption of the political class.

There is now a serious constitutional crisis in Tunisia. On January 26, 2021, the Tunisian Parliament approved the inclusion of a number of ministers in the government of Hisham al-Meshichi with a large majority of nearly two-thirds.

However, President Kais Saied refused to swear them into office by allowing them to take the oath, a constitutional prerequisite for ministers to be able to carry out their duties officially.

This is an unprecedented dilemma, especially since the constitution has not anticipated that the president might refuse to confirm and deal with ministers approved by the constitutionally more powerful parliament.

Parliament Speaker and Ennahda President Rachid Ghannouchi said that in the future Tunisia should move towards a fully parliamentary system in which the president is a symbol of the state without any executive powers. His statement poured oil on the flames of the ongoing dispute between him and President Kais Saied and his supporters.

Behind this conflict lies President Kais Saied’s hostile attitude towards the political system in general and the way in which powers are divided in Tunisia’s 2014 constitution. Even before he was elected president, Kais Saied declared his aversion to partisan political representation, and refused to form any political party.

Throughout this political and constitutional crisis in Tunisia, Kais Saied has spoken with an undeniable self-confidence, and does not hide his negative and unfriendly view of the presidents of parliament and the government.

He constantly reiterates that he is ready to make “the right decision at the right time.” The majority of people understand the term “right decision” as dissolving parliament and preparing for new elections later in a new electoral system.

Public anger has turned to parliament because it is the one that gives legitimacy to Tunisian governments under the new constitution.

One might ask: why are people in Tunisia talking about dissolving parliament as if it were normal and acceptable? Isn’t the elected parliament the symbol of Tunisia’s democratic experience and the cornerstone of its political system in accordance with the country’s constitution, which was agreed upon after the revolution?

Unfortunately, the answer is that the failure of successive Tunisian governments since the December 17 revolution to achieve the social aspirations of the people, primarily employment and the fight against poverty, has made large segments of the population no longer care about the survival or demise of democracy. Public anger has turned to parliament because it is the one that gives legitimacy to Tunisian governments under the new constitution.

That second important reason is the growing anger towards the Ennahda party, the largest political force in the country and in successive governments over the past decade. Ennahda is a party with a sizeable backing, that came out on top at the 2019 legislative elections, winning 52 of the 217 seats. But for many of those who did not vote for it, their common denominator today is their desire to remove Ennahda from power.

Since Ennahda is the number one force in parliament today, and is seen as supporting the government of Hisham al-Meshishi with two other parties allied to it, the anti-Ennahda camp does not mind dissolving parliament as it means removing Ennahda from power.

For them, the democracy that put Ennahda in control of the country’s destiny and did not succeed in solving the country’s economic and social problems is not worth defending or shedding any tears over. Among them, of course, are the ideological enemies of Ennahda who cannot beat it in the polls, and believe that any other political order is better than one led by Ennahda.

Kais Saied knows all this and knows that he enjoys a broad popular support in Tunisia, more than Ennahda and any other politician in the country. He has also been able to find allies from within parliament, particularly through the Democratic Current party and the People’s Movement. He knows that if he dissolves parliament, the people will not shed any tears over it and he will not be attacked by influential media inside Tunisia.

Kais Saied also knows that although Democrats have regained power in Washington, governments such as France, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE will stand by him firmly if he makes such a move. His main problem, however, is that Tunisia’s current constitution does not allow him to dissolve parliament.

According to the constitution of Tunisia, if the prime minister in charge after the elections fails to win the confidence of parliament, the president assigns someone else to form the government. Only if this person does not have the confidence of parliament, does the president then have the right to dissolve parliament and call early elections.

This scenario is not currently available to President Kais Saied, as the government of Hisham al-Meshishi has the support of nearly two-thirds of the members of the People’s Assembly.

Morocco has always had two “sacred” causes. The first and the oldest cause is Palestine, which had been there since the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, eight years before the Sherifian Empire regained its independence from France and Spain. The second “sacred” cause dates to 1975, when, Spain handed over the keys of Western Sahara to Morocco and Mauritania following the Green March and the Madrid tripartite agreements.

This was a poisoned gift by Spain that triggered a war between Morocco and the Saharawi independence fighters of the Polisario Front. The withdrawal of Mauritania from its zone, that is the southern half of Western Sahara, in 1979, pushed King Hassan II to occupy the zone militarily in order to prevent the Polisario from using it for their own benefit.

The Moroccans have always held the causes of Palestine and the Western Sahara close to their hearts. With the exception of a few small Berber groups, all Moroccan political parties have continuously declared themselves pro-Palestinian.

For the Western Sahara conflict, only one political formation of Marxist affiliation, Annahj Addimocrati (The Democratic Way), is neutral and calls for the holding of a referendum on self-determination as accepted by Hassan II and adopted by the eighteenth summit of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the forerunner of the African Union (AU), in 1981.

The position of the Democratic Way is rare in a country where the concept of “national consensus” has been imposed, according to which all Moroccans are obligatorily in favor of the Moroccanness of the Sahara, and those who deviate from considering Western Sahara as Moroccan, as well as those who call for the holding of a referendum, although granted by Hassan II, are considered “traitors.”

Until President Trump announced the U.S. recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara in exchange for the restoration of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel, these two issues were never discussed together. Neither of these two causes was more important or more sacred than the other.

And it was unthinkable that one could ever be bartered for the other. However, this is precisely what just happened. By agreeing to re-engage with the Israeli state, the King of Morocco Mohamed VI has broken, even if he defends himself against it, this consensus on Palestine by making a major geostrategic deal.

Hence, a large portion of the Moroccan population didn’t understand the Israel move. While Moroccans are satisfied that the current U.S. administration’s recognition of their country’s sovereignty over Western Sahara, they are mortified by the king’s decision to restore diplomatic relations with Israel, which is considered a colonial state.

In a country like Morocco, which has an allegedly constitutional monarchy, the elected representatives in the House of Representatives (the lower house), despite knowing the feelings of their electorate base, didn’t express their voice, at least symbolically, revealing their dissatisfaction with the move.

However, nothing happened in the country, where public opinion does not count and where virtually all political parties have long been tamed. Only three parties have declared opinions contrary to the royal decision.

Nothing happened in the country, where public opinion does not count and where virtually all political parties have long been tamed.

The Federation of the Democratic Left (FGD), with two deputies in the House of Representatives that protested, but softly; and two other movements without parliamentary representation, who are still considered as the real opposition parties in Morocco: the Marxists of the Democratic Way, and the Islamists of the powerful association Al Adl Wal Ihsane (Justice and Spirituality). The latter used the same word to say no – “treason.”

The fact that El Otmani was forced by the Royal Palace to sign, in front of television cameras on Tuesday December 22, 2020, the tripartite agreements with Jared Kushner and a high representative of the “Zionist entity,” Meir Ben-Shabbat, a close adviser to the Israeli prime minister, was felt by him and his electoral base as a strong slap in the face.

On Wednesday, December 23, 2020, Abdelillah Benkiran, the predecessor of El Otmani as the head of the PJD and the government, stated that “the PJD could not oppose the decisions taken by the king” because it is part of the state. This disturbed the party’s base even more.

The public humiliation inflicted on El Otmani was, however, the price that had to be paid for accepting the meagre power granted by the Royal Palace. What is even more dramatic is that PJD ministers cannot even resign to escape the general opprobrium. In Morocco, the ministers, let alone the prime minister, do not resign. They are dismissed or resign at the request of the king.

Morocco, as recognized in the West, is a “moderate” Arab and Muslim country. However, if it is really moderate, it is only so in its relations with the European Union and the United States of America.

As for everything else, the Moroccan monarchy is a genuine autocracy. The King of Morocco reigns, governs, is the supreme chief, and the chief of staff of the Royal Armed Forces (FAR), and has the country’s greatest fortune. To support the legitimacy of his dynasty, he also proclaims himself as the “commander of the believers” and claims to be directly descended from the Prophet Muhammad.

If we add to these powers, both temporal and religious, the fact that the sovereign directly controls several “ministries of sovereignty,” such as the foreign affairs and the interior, and that all the secret services are under his control, it is easy to understand why Moroccans and their representatives in parliament and government, are unlikely to do much to reverse the royal decision on normalization with Israel.

In the end, the “sacred” causes in Morocco are neither Palestine nor the Western Sahara. The first sacred cause is the survival of the Alawite dynasty. By abandoning Palestine, the King of Morocco, who is also the chairman of the Al-Quds Committee, consolidates the Moroccan presence in Western Sahara.

A Morocco without the Sahara, following billions of dollars in investment for the development of this arid region, serving as a manna, could simply mean a Morocco without a monarchy, some believe.

This is true and false at the same time. If one day, for one reason or another, the survival of the monarchy is to depend on the abandonment of Western Sahara, the king would not hesitate a single second to get rid of it, probably using similar fabricated arguments as those used today. Given the king’s stronghold on the state’s repressive apparatus, Moroccans will not object. They will let go of Western Sahara, as they are doing today of Palestine.