Former French president Jacques Chirac passed away last week at the age of 86. As a well-known personality with a political career spanning more than 40 years in France, Europe and internationally, several articles on his life have been published in the past days. Most of those briefly summarized his life, focusing on the most interesting incidents of his career both domestically and internationally. I do not aim to repeat these details, though some significant points should be addressed.

As a representative of the so-called Neo-Gaullist stance, Chirac started his political career by entering the French Assemblée Nationale. In the following years, he was promoted by former Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing. However, disagreements with d’Estaing became more and more obvious. Consequently, Chirac quit his job as a high ranked member of his cabinet.

Chirac led his RPR party (Rassemblement pour la République / Rally for the Republic) between 1976 and 1994, which he had established after he quit his membership at Giscard’s UDR in 1976, both officially and later during his presidency in a de facto way.

In 1977, Chirac was elected as the first elected mayor of Paris, which contributed to his increasing popularity. When the Socialists under President François Mitterrand achieved power at the presidential level, by lost the majority at the legislative level, Chirac was appointed as prime minister by Mitterrand.

Under this so-called “cohabitation” period, and after serving two times as prime minister, Chirac finally won the French presidency in 1995. Following this first tenure which lasted seven years, he once again became President in 2002, receving 82 percent of the votes in the second round against far-right Jean-Marie Le Pen.

By this, Chirac became France’s second longest serving post-1945 president after his predecessor, socialist President Mitterrand. Although Chirac was given a suspended jail sentence in 2011, for corruption during his period as mayor of Paris (1977-1995), today, he is still considered the most popular French president (33 percent), according to polls, even more popular than François Mitterrand (21 percent) and Charles de Gaulle (17 percent).

Despite his position in the international context, in my opinion, Chirac has had a fundamental impact on the trajectory of the French system of government and its consolidation over the years. He played important roles in his stance against the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003, his positions regarding Turkey in the EU context, and his very controversial decision of ordering tests of French nuclear weapons in the South Pacific subsequent to being elected as President in 1995.

Despite these issues, Chirac has been a main figure who shaped and consolidated the country’s “presidentialized” framework and, particularly, its current president-party relationship. President Chirac, who had one of the longest continuous political careers in France and Europe, is seen as a successor of previous leaders such as Charles de Gaulle and Georges Pompidou. Described mostly as a so-called “Neo-Gaullist”, referring to the “founding figure” and first president of the Fifth Republic since 1958, Chirac is also considered a nationalist in the specific French context and among French republicans.

Like all French presidents, who became influential political figures in the country since the adoption of the 1958 Constitution, Chirac, too, dominated the political scene, particularly in his first tenure from 1995 to 2002. He supported constitutional reforms which reduced the tenure of the president from seven to five years, while changing the election periods. This meant that since 2002, parliamentary (legislative) and presidential (executive) elections are held quasi-simultaneously, that is to say, legislative elections are held only some weeks after the presidential elections. Consequently, due to the so-called “coattail effects” which are also seen in the U.S. presidential context, no “cohabitation” cases occurred again. And due to this, the president is able to work in harmony with a parliamentary majority.

In order to understand the specific path of France and the trajectory of its system of government, it is useful to explore Chirac’s political path, the manoeuvres of his political party and its relations between the executive and the legislative arms of government. Chirac’s successor President Sarkozy also continued with similar president-party relations by broadening the informal relations to a more formal one.

Today, the French semi-presidential system is based on a leader focused presidency that mostly operates through the president’s party or supporting parties. Most likely, the same counts for President Emmanuel Macron, who is the informal but actual leader of his so-called En Marche! party.

Turkey has recently gone through a highly competitive local election process and the campaigns, alliances and results tell us many things about the newly established presidential system and new electoral behaviors and political culture in the country. The Turkish governmental system shifted to a presidential system from a parliamentary system with the 2017 referendum and two elections after this shift – the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections and the 2019 local elections – mark significant shifts in political competition and the nature of Turkish politics.

Turkey’s political culture and competition emerged within the era of the parliamentary system. During this system, besides long eras of coalition governments, the country witnessed single-party governments of the leading parties that received very low rates – such as when the AK Party obtained 33% of the general vote in 2002 and formed government. However, the presidential system changed the system radically and the threshold to winning an election has become at least 50% of the votes. With this shift to a presidential system, it means a harder target to reach and thus encourages and even forces political parties to form alliances with each other in order to pass the threshold.  

The presidential system in Turkey has changed the game of politics radically and the threshold to winning an election has become at least 50% of the votes.

In both the presidential and local elections in 2018 and 2019, two alliances were formed. The first was the People’s Alliance, made up of the AK Party, the MHP and BBP (Great Union Party). The second alliance was the Nation’s Alliance, which consisted of the CHP, Iyi Party and the SP (Virtue Party). In addition, the HDP – the political wing of the PKK terrorist organization – supported the Nation’s Alliance in certain regions. The People’s Alliance presents more inner integrity than does the Nation’s Alliance due to conservatism and nationalism going well hand-in-hand in Turkey, both historically and socially. These two political movements formed two coalition governments in the 1970s (Nationalist Front Governments) and made an electoral alliance in the 1991 general elections. However, this is not the case for the Nation’s Alliance.

CHP, a leftist and Kemalist party came together with SP, an Islamist party. Moreover, the Iyi Party, which claims to be a Turkish nationalist party, did not reject support from the HDP, which is a separatist and pro-PKK political party. Although vast inner contradictions among the parties of the Nation’s Alliance, these parties met in the same electoral alliance. These need to be analyzed in the context of the political blocs that emerged after the new presidential system.

The right and left-wing electoral balance among Turkish voters has been around 65% to 35%. But the politics of alliance blocs has changed this.

The common assumption about the right and left-wing electoral balance among Turkish voters has been around 65% to 35%. This balance seems to transform into a new form within this new politics of alliance blocs. Although the Iyi Party and SP are relatively small right-wing parties, considering their total votes in the last general election, they achieved in motivating their voters to vote for the CHP candidates, which, it is fair to state, is a hard job. Considering its highest rate of votes in the last 30 years was 25%, the electoral bloc pioneered by the CHP managed to reach the rates of 47% with the external support of the HDP.

New centralizing and de-centralizing dynamics in Turkish politics

This new wave of electoral alliances is an important dynamic to change the traditional balance of right and left among Turkish voters. This alliance might increase the chance of the CHP for winning the government, while there was a much lower chance. However, this also enforces the CHP to meet the demands of other parties for determining a more right-wing candidate to convince non-left opposition voters. For instance, in two metropolitan cities, Ankara and Antalya, which the CHP won from the AK Party, CHP candidates were politicians that came from a different political tradition. Mansur Yavas had been the MHP mayor of Beypazari and Muhittin Bocek started his political career after being elected as the mayor of Konyaalti, from the Homeland Party (ANAP) – a former center-right political party.

Moreover, Ekrem Imamoglu, CHP’s Istanbul candidate, was also a previous member of ANAP and coming from a conservative, non-leftist background helped him to obtain the support of conservative, right-wing voters in Istanbul. The CHP administration even tried to pursue former AK Party member and former President Abdullah Gul as their presidential candidate. However, Iyi Party opposed this idea since its leader did not accept withdrawing from candidacy.

Considering its highest rate of votes in the last 30 years was 25%, the electoral bloc pioneered by the CHP managed to reach the rates of 47% with the external support of the HDP.

The fact that the necessity for winning an election is gaining at least 50% of the votes enforces political parties to compromise and reach common candidates with other parties and receive their support. This triggers a new dynamic in Turkish politics: centralization. The candidates, their discourse, campaigns and teams, regardless of political membership, are selected among moderate and central figures. The co-existence of different ideological and political movements in the same alliances also causes the decrease in ideological identities and the replacement of ideologies that were constructed in the Cold war era with non-ideological figures. This trend is also a case in some European countries, such as France, where Emmanuel Macron became a common political figure to counter the “threat” of far-right governance as a non-ideological figure. This centralizing dynamic of electoral politics is the first important dynamic in the context of bloc politics.

Second, because of the 10% threshold to gain seats in the parliament in the old parliamentary system, smaller parties were not counted as significant and tended to be ignored. However, as we can see in the examples of SP and BBP, even if their votes remain at around 1%, they have become key figures in Turkish political life. These parties emerge as “negotiator parties” in order to change the game where the voters of two blocs are close and electoral volatility among alliances is very low. We can also consider the HDP in this context. Even if its support to the Nation’s Alliance is considered as external support, receiving the HDP’s support was of crucial importance for the CHP and allowed it to gain major votes in big cities. This second dynamic rises as the ‘de-centralizing dynamic,’ which can open the gates for acceptance of relatively small, marginal groups that used to remain outside the political periphery in Turkey.

New game of politics 

These both centralizing and de-centralizing dynamics existing side-by-side create a complex situation for the present and future of Turkish politics. This complex situation is also valid for Turkish voters. As we witness among the strategy of formation of alliances and their tactics of selecting candidates, the Turkish electorate have also pursued tactical voting. The behavior of the Turkish voters has become to oppose something rather than to support it. It can be argued that the majority of voters within the Nation’s Alliance display attitudes of anti-Erdoganism, rather than supporting a CHP government and vice-versa for the People’s Alliance. This arises from the political polarization of the country.

The centralizing figures that lead the candidacy of right-wing figures from the CHP aims to break the opposing pole and gain votes from the conservative-nationalist bloc. This strategy could be regarded as successful in the cases of Ankara and Antalya. Moreover, in the future, we might see both the AK Party and MHP attempting to change their discourse in order to break the other bloc and to gain votes from it. The recent ‘Turkey’s Alliance’ discourse displayed by President Erdogan could be considered in this context. President Erdogan expressed his new concept of ‘Turkey’s Alliance’ after the recent local elections as an umbrella for all different political groups to unite the nation against the threat to Turkey’s security and independence. This could be an example of the centralizing dynamic that leads political leaders, from both sides, to influence and attract the public in the political center.

The presidential system has led to a de-centralizing dynamic, which can open the gates for acceptance of relatively small, marginal groups that used to remain outside the political periphery in Turkey.

The emergence of new blocs also pushes both sides to position in the political center and gain small political figures at the same time. Positioning in the political center is also about satisfying the demands of the social center. For instance, the necessity of gaining votes from the conservative majority of society enforces the CHP to sway away from its orthodox Kemalist discourses and practices, which could be perceived as anti-religious. Similarly, this new bloc politics pushes the AK Party and MHP to persuade young voters, who are mostly middle-class, educated and live in major cities. This is the demographic in which the People’s Alliance gains the least votes. These dynamics mean point to a change in political figures, discourses and campaigns. Since the political atmosphere and criteria of winning has totally changed in this new bloc politics after the establishment of the presidential system in Turkey, the rules and tactics of the game have also changed.

A report published by the SETA Foundation draws a roadmap towards a new economy under the new presidential system in Turkey.

The report, “New System New Economy: A Detailed Roadmap” concentrates on the fields of industrial, agricultural, fiscal, and monetary policies and on institutional systems and the bureaucracy in accelerating the developments in Turkey’s economy. While the key points emphasized in the report are nativity and the efficient collaboration between various institutions, the authors also encourage long-term development and progress.

Although there has been concrete development in the Turkish economy, the report suggests that if the new system is established in the right way, Turkey is likely to reach its true potential – and even surpass it – in a short period of time. Effective and inclusive economic reforms are required in order to achieve this success.

The suggestions made in the report, covering the five different areas, are listed below.

Industrial policy

The report suggests for there to be set performance goals in the industry sector and for incentives to be given to companies in this field. The amount of incentives that companies will receive should be determined according to some specific performance criteria, such as the nativity rate of production, the amount of exports, and the number of patents applied.

If the performance targets cannot be met, the precautions that can be taken within the lines of the market economy must be predetermined and feasible. In addition, public procurement should be used more effectively, contributing to the development of domestic technology.

One further suggestion in this field is to put in place patient capital-style financial models, ready to take risks and avoid high financial returns if necessary, in order to enable companies to introduce breakthrough technologies and/or create new markets where they will be able to provide long-term funding on the terms appropriate to them.

Agricultural policy

Despite the fact that the proportion of support and incentives in the agricultural sector have increased during the AK Party governments, there are still significant structural problems in the sector.

Suggestions are made as to how to develop policies that aim to balance the import-export equation in the agricultural sector. Among these are the establishment of more functional agricultural banks, the utilization of technological developments, follow up of R&D and innovation activities in order to increase agricultural efficiency.

The report states that these efforts ought to be supported in an integrated manner with social infrastructure and rural development projects. In a country where the average age of farmers is increasing, young entrepreneurs should be encouraged and motivated so to keep them in this sector.

Fiscal policy

According to the report, Turkey’s budgetary discipline since 2002 has contributed to the national economy in various dimensions. Within IMF listings, Turkey is among the countries with the least public debt in the world.

Reducing the indirect tax burden on energy will seriously benefit Turkey, since energy prices on economic development issues are of great importance.

The report also states how Turkey’s expenditure on social protection has been increasing since 2002. It is emphasized that this increase should be maintained in order to increase social protection expenditures and to expand welfare state implementations in accordance with state facilities.

Money politics

According to the report, monetary policy should be removed from being a topic only within the context of the Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT). All institutions and organizations on financial markets (Banking Regulation and Supervision Agency, Saving Deposit Insurance Fund, Capital Market Boards…) should have a more active and constructive role in supporting monetary policy.

Public banks should aim for “value-added maximization,” and not for “profit maximization,” and should also support Turkey’s development in this field.

More, the CBRT should abandon its understanding that it has no other role to play other than stabilizing prices in the course of economic development. Rather, it should take into consideration the fact that the strict monetary policy applied has long-term damage to the real economy and economic development.

Institutions and bureaucracy

For more efficient ministries and committees, Turkey needs to direct experienced individuals to work in the field of bureaucracy.

The line management of newly established boards should not only consist of those from the field of bureaucracy and academia but also with individuals who have experience in the private sector.

In order to facilitate the daily life of citizens and companies, the report suggests to remove all unnecessary bureaucratic stationery operations as soon as possible, and suggests to develop a balanced reward-punishment mechanism in order to increase the job motivation and satisfaction of bureaucrats.

*Written by Suna Nur Sarihan.

With the June 24 elections, Turkey switched to the presidential system, which was approved in a referendum last year. The last two months after the election were important in terms of the implementation of the presidential system and the transformation of the state structure in accordance with the requirements of the new system. As is, and has been experienced, in other examples throughout the world, transition periods are always a puzzle and it is difficult to control all aspects that occur within this period. In Turkey’s case, busy domestic and foreign policy agendas caused a lack of interest in the public about the transition to the presidential system. Therefore, an evaluation of the last two months and analyzing what really happened during this period is crucial.

Turkey has been experiencing an accelerated transition period due to the early elections and the switch to the presidential system. Since all legal and administrative preparations were planned according to the elections that were designed to take place in 2019, the re-scheduled agenda had to be implemented after the decision to call early elections was made. Thus, all this process was re-planned according to the snap elections on June 24.

One of the most difficult parts of the transition process was the preparation of the legal infrastructure for the new system. There have been five detailed and well-prepared decree laws regulating the transformation of state institutions under the new system. These laws were designed in order to formulate and frame the fundamentals of state institutions under the new structure. Thus, they did not foresee so much to the policy implementation process. At this point, bureaucratic capabilities and rationality were needed in order to get success in the implementation phase. It can be observed that Turkey’s bureaucratic culture, which depends on a strong state tradition, has enabled for bureaucracy to be successful during this transformation process.

Nevertheless, when taking into account the requirements of the new system in the long-term, it is seen that the transformation period will need more dedication and well-equipped professionals and experts to serve during this critical time. The contributions of politicians and bureaucrats are not enough to achieve the intended success, and the contributions of academics and professionals should also be welcomed in the next phases. In accordance with this reality, nine presidential boards were established under the Presidency, so to serve in developing strategies in critical areas such as local government, energy, social policy, education, economy, health, culture, technology, and innovation. The formation of these boards and the lists of experts expected to serve under them have not yet been announced. These academics and experts, who will be from outside the bureaucracy, will take on major responsibilities in these boards.

Above all, in order for better collaboration and communication to be achieved under the new system, public engagement is a must. The concept of collaborative governance enables the active involvement of citizens in government decision-making and has become quite popular in presidential systems in the last decade. This is because it creates collaborative and multi-level problem-solving mechanisms in public institutions, and a collaborative governance approach enables for countries to increase their quality of participatory democracy. Turkey’s state structure under the new presidential system also pays attention to the improvement of communication between the public and the state. Nonetheless, there is need for new mechanisms in each public institution in order to provide more sufficient tools for dialogue, which will serve diverse interests.

Overall, Turkey has witnessed an enormous change in its state structure in the last two months and has been achieving success in its management of the process until now. As was stated above, it will take some time for Turkey to be able to transform its state structure under the new system. Additionally, Turkey’s bureaucratic and political culture will also be re-shaped in accordance with the new rules. Therefore, it can be stated that the transition period will preserve its place on the top of the political agenda for quite a while.

It has been a rapid period of change for Turkey since the June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections. While the routine of daily politics has been reshaped according to the rules of the new presidential system for a month, state structures have been transformed in line with it. Until now, there have been five decree laws regulating the transformation of public institutions under the new system.

Here it is important to clarify the main characteristics of bureaucratic transformation. There are a couple of factors that should be taken into consideration in the ongoing process. Firstly, as transformation of the governmental system requires cumulative change, all regulations were realized step by step and extended over a period of time. It is impossible to regulate the transformation of all public institutions instantly. Until now, all decree laws are regulating mostly major changes in institutions. Nevertheless, in time, all state structure will be accommodated within main parameters of the presidential system.

Secondly, change of the bureaucratic mindset needs time to achieve along with the transformation of public institutions. There is no single change that people can smoothly adapt to. Since 1876, the Ottoman-Turkish state tradition has been shaped according to the rules of the parliamentary system. Even if there had been ruptures in this tradition, the parliamentary system also determined mindsets of Turkish bureaucrats. From Menderes to Ozal and Erdogan, one of the difficulties that leaders faced while trying to change the system had been reactions of the ideological-oriented robust bureaucracy. Indeed, President Erdogan is a political figure who got success in breaking the predominance of bureaucracy in Turkey. Nonetheless, in the new term, there is a need to settle rationality in bureaucracy in order to change bureaucratically formed mindset. Thus, the transformation of the legacy of the parliamentary system and its effects on mindsets of bureaucrats will also change in time.

As a third characteristic of bureaucratic transformation, changes in the juncture of bureaucracy and politics will be effective. It is not enough to solely change the bureaucratic mindset under the new system; the rules of politics should also adapt to it. The lack in adaptation of politics creates ambiguity and misperceptions towards the presidential system. For instance, most of the opposition parties react to changes with the practices of the parliamentary system because they fail to understand the requirements of the new system. One of the failures of these parties is confusing the political system and the regime. As a result, they reject to understand single changes under the presidential system. Nonetheless, the political culture of Turkey will internalize the rules of the presidential system and it will also transform in accordance with it. For all these reasons, it is not an exaggeration to state that parties and politicians who adapt quicker will be more successful in learning the rules of the game.

As mentioned, all the main characteristics of bureaucratic transformation will take some time to be active. Actors, institutions, structures, and all other elements are supposed to gain momentum in accordance with the new system. However, it seems that politics will be more robust to change than bureaucracy in Turkey. Except the AK Party and MHP, all other parties deny accepting transformation to the presidential system. They do not even accept its legitimacy via perceiving it as a “new regime” rather than a system. Thus, it seems that the problem of robustness in politics will be another issue that should get attention as well as the bureaucracy.

Turkey’s new cabinet was formed on Monday. After President Erdogan’s inauguration ceremony in the Parliament and Presidential Complex, Turkey’s new cabinet was announced by the President himself. President Erdogan also proclaimed the first vice president of Turkey, Fuat Oktay – coming from the bureaucracy. This cabinet was formed in accordance with the requirements of the presidential system, which began to be implemented after the elections. As part of the new state structure, some ministries were combined and the total number of ministries decreased to 16. Indeed, the ministries were combined to increase the efficiency of the state structure and bureaucracy under the new presidential system.

When names in the new cabinet are examined, it is seen that the main trigger behind its formation is expertise with bureaucratic and technical knowledge. Almost all names in the cabinet have significant experience in working areas of their ministries. It is also striking to see that President Erdogan paid attention to make a balance among the business world, bureaucracy, politics, and NGOs. Some names such as Ruhsar Pekcan (Minister of Commerce), Fahrettin Koca (Minister of Health), and Mehmet Ersoy (Minister of Culture and Tourism) have successful business careers in their area of expertise. Additionally, some ministers such as Mehmet Cahit Turan (Minister of Transport and Infrastructure) and Fatih Donmez (Minister of Energy and Natural Resources) are from the bureaucracy. The most surprising name in the cabinet is Hulusi Akar, who has been appointed to the Ministry of National Defense while serving as the Chief of General Staff of Turkey.

As well as the names, the function of the cabinet and ministries in the new term is crucial to understand the dynamics of the Turkish presidential system and state institutions. Above all, the place of the cabinet in the new system is quite different than the previously implemented parliamentary system. While the cabinet was holding executive power in the old system, this power belongs to the president in the new system.

The withdrawal of the prime ministry and the transformation of the cabinet are expected to bring new issues to the forefront such as efficiency, accelerated decision-making, transparency, and bureaucratic rationality in administrative bodies. Additionally, the function of presidential boards will increase the importance of advisorship and expertise in administration.

The previous system was lacking in providing efficiency and accelerated decision making processes among state institutions. It was even quite difficult to see the flow of information and interaction between state agencies. One of the reasons of this problem is ambiguity between policy formation and implementation in state bodies. Nonetheless, the new system foresees a clear-cut differentiation between them.

Newly-established nine presidential boards will develop strategies in crucial areas such as local government, energy, social policy, education, economy, health, culture, technology, and innovation. Thus, policy formulation will be the responsibility of these boards while ministries will charge in policy implementation much more than before.

Another striking innovation in state bodies under the new system is related to bureaucratic rationality, which is one of the indispensable requirements for development. Bureaucratic rationality distributes power among state agencies appropriately. The previous parliamentary system in Turkey lacked in providing bureaucratic rationality and clash of authority and lack of communication were common among ministries and other state institutions.

Nevertheless, the relationship between state agencies matters in the new system. It was designed to form efficient communication dependent on bureaucratic rationality. It should be reminded that one of the reasons of the development in Korea was the existence of bureaucratic rationality provided by planning boards in the system after the 1960s. Centralized policy-making under these boards also accelerated policy implementation.

The transformation of bureaucracy under the new system is anticipated also to bring cohesiveness between ministries. Ministries will be in more interaction and resilience of the bureaucracy will be lessened due to increasing demand in expertise.

Sunday’s elections in Turkey have finalized the transition to the presidential system with the victory of President Erdogan and his party. Erdogan has advocated and campaigned for this system change since his years as the Prime Minister, arguing that Turkey needed a political system based on the people’s will not on the will of the civilian and military bureaucratic elites. Having handled serious domestic and foreign policy crises over the years, including party closure cases and a failed coup attempt, Erdogan’s campaign for the presidential system has been accepted by the Turkish electorate. Sunday’s elections results are a proof of this reality.

The AK Party has passed legislation in the past year to prepare and adjust to the new system but there will be more work to be done in order to restructure the executive branch. The AK Party’s seats in parliament is short of a parliamentary majority, which means that it will need to recruit the support of other parties, starting with the MHP, to implement the party program and election promises. The MHP has worked with the AK Party and entered into an alliance in the elections, which provides a ground for further cooperation. As I wrote before the elections, the parliamentary distribution will not hamper the creation of the cabinet and functioning of the executive branch.

As the presidential system requires the restructuring of the political system and fine-tuning of the relationship between the executive and the legislative branches, many details have yet to be worked out. But, President Erdogan has created the necessary groundwork to implement his agenda effectively by striking an alliance with the MHP, which has achieved better than expected results in the election. For major legislative action as well as budget negotiations, Erdogan will likely seek support from the MHP. The MHP will continue to be a key role in the legislative process as it has in the past.

One of the most serious consequences of the elections might be the leadership question in the CHP. The CHP’s presidential candidate Ince has openly challenged the current party leader Kilicdaroglu in the past for electoral failures. Sunday’s results show a large gap between Ince’s votes (%30.64) and the CHP’s electoral showing (%22.64). Ince’s relative success and the party’s perceived failure can pave the road for Ince to challenge Kilicdaroglu once again. However, if there is an understanding between the two leaders that the party voters would vote strategically to ensure that the HDP passed the electoral threshold, such a inter-party rift may not be imminent. However, the 8% discrepancy will most likely force yet another debate around the CHP’s leadership.

While the adjustments to the new system are implemented, the March 2019 local elections will be just around the corner. Political parties will enter the new year in campaign mode and the local elections results can serve as an indicator of party performances. Local elections in Turkey always have a different dynamic than general elections, as they can depend much more on local politics. The March elections will not be different but it will have less impact on the executive branch. It will serve more as an indicator of satisfaction with party performances in parliament. Political parties will focus on agenda items that will help them in local elections. This could mean that parties would have more incentive to strike a compromise with President Erdogan to show the electorate that they are in the business of delivering their election promises instead of obstructing.

The June 24 elections are historic not only for sealing the deal on the adoption of the presidential system but also providing political stability for the next five years. There will always be crises and spoilers that will test the new system. However, in this last election, the Turkish public has spoken definitively.

The June 24 parliamentary and presidential elections resulted in a great victory for President Erdogan and the leading AK Party. While the party got 42.5 percent of the votes, President Erdogan has been selected to become the first president of Turkey under the presidential system by winning 52.5 percent of votes.

The MHP, the alliance partner of the AK Party, got 11.2 percent of the votes and passed the 10 percent threshold contrary to the claims of opinion polls. As a result, the People’s Alliance got the majority of seats in parliament. On the contrary, the Nation Alliance consisting of the CHP, the Iyi Party, and the Felicity Party faced with a disappointment because of the results.

The alliance could not get the majority in the parliament and none of the presidential candidates of this alliance succeeded in the elections. While the members of this alliance were aiming to push President Erdogan into a second-round runoff against Muharrem Ince, the presidential candidate of the CHP, the elections ended in the first round with the victory of Erdogan. Above all, the turnout in the elections was higher than 85 percent, which proves the health of Turkish democracy compared to other democracies in the world.

While the results of the elections are analyzed, it is seen that despite the sixteen years of experience in office, the AK Party is still the only party who can manage to get votes from various circles of society. Except from Igdir, Tunceli, and Hakkari, the party got MPs from all provinces, which show that the AK Party is the only party successful in bringing different groups together. Additionally, the party increased its votes in 17 provinces most of which are in Eastern and Southeastern regions of the country. Thus, contrary to some claims, the party still gets the great majority of votes from these two regions and Kurdish people support the AK Party governments in majority.

Nonetheless, the party experienced some decrease in its votes in the parliament especially in Istanbul, Ankara, Konya, Bursa, and Kayseri. During his balcony speech, President Erdogan stated that they had received the message of voters and would evaluate the results in order to understand the reasons lying behind this fall. In any case, the party obtained a significant victory in its 13th election in the last 16 years.

Another striking result of the election was the success of the MHP in parliamentary elections. While pre-election surveys were claiming that the party would get around 5-8 percent of the votes, the party got 11.2 percent and showed that it was still representing the center for nationalist voters. As its splinter party, the Iyi Party got 10 percent of the votes and fell behind the MHP. These results prove that despite all the manipulations and maneuvers of the Nation Alliance, the MHP can consolidate its voters in elections.

Last but not least, it is obvious that the CHP is the most unsuccessful party in the elections. The party faced with a sharp decline and lost approximately 4 percent of its votes. Because of the ongoing campaign among CHP voters, a significant amount of CHP supporters voted for the HDP in the parliamentary elections. The HDP substituted losses from Kurdish voters with the supports of the CHP and passed the threshold. Nonetheless, the results of the elections show that the CHP is in a crisis now and the gap between the party’s and Ince’s votes creates ambiguity in the future of the party. Thus, the results of the elections show that the leader of the CHP, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, is going to face challenges in holding the party’s chairmanship and controlling party organs in the next days.

On 24 June, Turkey’s presidential and parliamentary elections will be held. Subsequent to the declaration of the date of the snap elections, on 18 April, political parties in Turkey started their campaigns and published their election programs. The upcoming elections represent a final switch to Turkey’s new system of government which was accepted by a referendum on 16 April last year. The elections to take place in the next four days are also the first elections in Turkish history according to which both elections are executed simultaneously.

To get a clear perception of the recent election period, I’ll try to point out some crucial issues.

First of all, even though Western media outlets do not address this issue, the presidential elections are conducted in a diversified political atmosphere. There are six presidential candidates representing different political and societal expectations striving for the country’s highest political position. This is actually a diversity covering most of Turkey’s dominant political camps. In addition, ten political parties are participating in the parliamentary elections. The very interesting issue during this election period is the fact that at least six parties will definitely be in the parliament subsequent to the elections due to the new law on election alliances. According to this law, which was approved by a majority vote led by the ruling AK Party and the MHP in March 2018, the country’s 10 percent electoral threshold will still be in place but it will apply to the sum of the votes of the parties in the alliance. Thus, the number of MPs will be determined according to the sum of the votes of the election alliance. Interestingly, this issue which gives the possibility also to small political parties to join the parliament, is not addressed by foreign media due to the fact that this step has been initiated by the AK Party and MHP.

Furthermore, apart from President Erdogan and his party’s campaign, one has noticed that among the opposition only the CHP’s presidential candidate, Muharrem Ince, was able to make some striking statements. President Erdogan, for instance, while conducting his campaign, stressed the need for a strong executive and legislative organ in the upcoming period. Thus, he asked the people to vote for him as well as his AK Party in parliament. On the other hand, Ince insisted on an election campaign which differentiated itself from previous CHP discourses and biases. By this, Ince tried to portray himself within a rather conservative Muslim circles-friendly and pro-HDP image, which, however, totally contradicts the CHP’s traditional positions. It’s also fascinating that while Ince has been appointed as the party’s presidential candidate, CHP Chairman Kemal Kilicdaroglu excluded all MP candidates, who are known to be close to Mr. Ince, with regard to the upcoming parliamentary elections. This image actually displayed who has the control of the party and who has concrete and real expectations from the election results.

By focusing on the other parties presidential candidates and their campaigns, its seems that no candidate was able to neither determine nor influence the political discourse during the recent two months. For instance, the MHP-split Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener, who runs as the Iyi Party’s presidential candidate, had no concrete proposal for Turkey’s future despite rather populist statements. For Mrs. Aksener, it’s also very frustrating due to the fact that President Erdogan did not address her once during the entire election campaign. To be honest, it cannot be said that there is public support regarding the Iyi Party even though Western politicians supported her as well.

The Kurdish left ethno-nationalist HDP’s presidential candidate Selahattin Demirtas and his party HDP, though, are extraordinarily supported by foreign media and even foreign political circles. By taking the HDP’s propaganda into consideration, the misleading conclusion above all in Western circles occurs, such as the false portrayal of the party as a quite liberal-leftist party that allegedly prioritizes human rights etc. By this, the party’s actual closeness and even links to the PKK terrorist organization is disregarded by foreign media and HDP supporters. For instance, it’s even ironical that the HDP’s presidential candidate, Selahattin Demirtas, was publicly supported by his brother Nurettin Demirtas, who lives as a PKK-terrorist in Iraq’s Qandil mountains. Of course, besides various statements and positions which do support the PKK, this fact has also been disregarded by HDP supporters and Western media.

Other performances of presidential candidates, such as the Felicity Party’s Chairman Temel Karamollaoglu and the Patriotic Party’s Chairman Dogu Perincek, have been also very low. Neither certain statements of these leaders were seriously taken into account by other leaders nor their election programs seem to persuade and do excite the electorate.

Thus, it’s quite obvious that the AK Party dominates the election campaign while the CHP seems to be divided into two parts. On the one hand, Muharrem Ince is trying to win the presidential election while Kilicdaroglu sets a focus on the parliamentary election and a potential inner-party rivalry subsequent to the elections. On the other hand, it’s striking that Ince makes use of populism by not explaining several promises in depth. For instance, Ince declares that he has no problem with women who wear headscarves while he does not explain his previous and well-known anti-positions just some years ago. The same counts for his populist statements with regard to HDP voters.

The AK Party stresses the new Turkish presidential system in the upcoming period while the CHP –and all other opposition parties except the MHP– do not explain how they schedule to switch back to a parliamentary system. This issue gets even more complex when Ince states that he wants to lead the country as an executive president while Mrs. Aksener calls for a rapid future plan. Finally, it’s also very bizarre that the dominant opposition parties do not address Turkey’s fight against terrorist organizations such as the PKK, FETO  in depth – neither in the candidates’ nor the parties’ program.

Turkey is going to the polls this weekend to decide the presidential and parliamentary elections on the same day – a first in the country’s history. The elections will complete the transition into the presidential system that was decided by last year’s referendum in April 2017. Over the course of the past year, some aspects of the referendum have already been implemented and adaptation legislation has passed. The stakes are high as the president and the parliament will be decided by the Turkish public for the next five years and the presidential system will be fully implemented during that time. 

The very rationale for the change in the system was to never go back to the weak and unstable coalition governments the parliamentary systems tend to produce. The 1990s produced many weak coalition governments often under the shadow of the tutelary system maintained by the military and civilian bureaucracy. The AK Party governments brought stability in the 2000s but were continuously challenged by these forces. The 2007 presidential elections and the 2008 closure case against the AK Party are examples of this.

The AK Party’s electoral victories ensured the primacy of the elected governments against the appointed but the system continued to be a holdover from a foregone era. Once the various initiatives for a comprehensive constitutional change failed because of political reasons, the partial amendments to the constitution were made. The latest yet the most critical one of these amendments is the transition to the presidential system, approved in last year’s referendum.  

In addition to the domestic drivers of the change to the presidential system, Turkey’s foreign policy challenges and its immediate neighborhood contributed to the country’s search for more stability. The Arab Spring produced the most challenging humanitarian catastrophe in Syria, resulting in more than 3,5 million refugees for Turkey. Turkey’s border security was challenged in addition to the increased threats posed by Daesh and the PKK as a result of the Syrian Civil War. Instability in Iraq and the confrontation between the U.S. and Iran over the nuclear issue are only some of the examples of an increasingly unstable environment.

The liberal international order has been challenged by the rise of China, the resurgence of Russia in the Middle East and in Europe, and the Brexit, a product of the populist movements throughout the West, including the U.S. Turkey has had to face security, foreign policy, and economic challenges in its immediate neighborhood as well as those emanating from the unpredictability of the international system. Moreover, in an era when the U.S. has refused or been unable to provide leadership, the Western alliance has found itself increasingly fractured, unable to forge comprehensive policy solutions to a variety of challenges.

Committing to and aligning itself with an international bloc to resolve its international and domestic challenges were no longer an option for Turkey. Diversifying its relationships and compartmentalizing issues with various powers became a necessary practice to navigate an uncertain international environment. At home, the political system continued to be rife with challenges emanating from the lack of a truly civilian constitution and a system that is based on the will of the people. The need for a civilian constitution and a truly democratic system devoid of the institutional tutelage has been the central political debate of the past several decades. The official transition to the presidential system this weekend signifies a critical turning point in that effort.

Any system change would need time to be implemented and to mature over time through challenges and political crises and Turkey is no exception. It is easy to get caught up about who is going to win and what the parliamentary seat distribution is going to look like. However, it needs to be remembered that the June 24 elections are part of Turkey’s quest for domestic stability in an increasingly uncertain international environment. 

Since the onset of the global economic crisis political, economic and technological competition among the global and emerging powers acquired increased pace and tenacity. While the U.S., Russia and China experience geo-political tensions with increasing frequency and face the possibility of direct confrontation beyond proxy-wars; liberal economics and free trade approaches rapidly lose their proponents in the world economy.

The political backing behind the liberal international trading system represented by institutions such as the World Trade Organization is fading, while neo-protectionism gains ground along with rising economic nationalism. Triggered by the Trump administration in the U.S. and the rising tide of nationalist/neo-populist parties in Europe and elsewhere, trade wars, currency wars, cyber-space wars, economic sanctions and accusations of technological theft are also increasing.

A fierce conflict for sustained global economic hegemony, or to use Organski’s words, to prevent a “power transition,” openly takes place between the U.S. and China. All these developments constitute crucial challenges for the political and economic authorities of emerging powers and developing countries. There is an ever-increasing pressure on decision-making communities in these countries to monitor global developments closely and formulate effective and timely responses.

Managing the Turkish economy under presidential system

Turkey is heading for a systemic transformation towards the “Presidential Government System” under such difficult global conditions. But it is exactly these difficult conditions that make Turkey’s systemic transition more important and inevitable. As such, the systemic reform that will take place in Turkey following the June 24 elections shall be conceptualized not only as a legal and political reform that will restructure the separation of powers among the executive, judiciary and the legislative branches of the government. On the contrary, it should be construed as a structural reform that would transform the macroeconomic governance architecture and socio-economic development strategy with comprehensive institutional changes.

While embarking on major institutional reform in macroeconomic governance, there are several common features that need to be taken into account from the successful development experiences across the globe:

1. Strong political leadership that supports politico-economic stability and the autonomy of key institutions formulating long-term development policies with a clear division of labor.
2. A highly qualified, professional, meritocratic, practical, fast-acting, problem-solving bureaucracy controlled by “pilot organizations” with strong channels of communication with political and economic actors.
3. A dynamic, open-minded and innovative private sector that shares common interest with the politico-bureaucratic elite as to the long-term development goals of the country and focuses on vibrant sectorial competition strategies with a global view.
4. A dynamic social structure that allows vertical mobilization through a high-quality education system, participatory institutions and structured collaboration among political, bureaucratic and market actors.

Therefore, Turkey’s initiative for institutional reform shall proceed in a way to enable smooth progress on all these accounts. When we look at the historical record of previous AK Party governments for institutional reform, it is clear that significant reforms were made to institutionalize a “regulatory state” in the first decade of the 2000s. Consequently, fiscal discipline was permanently established and the financial structure became resilient against severe international shocks.

Several institutional reforms in line with the “Post-Washington Consensus” style of prudent financial and macroeconomic regulation were successfully accomplished. Instrumental independence of the Central Bank to conduct monetary policy and autonomy of key regulatory agencies responsible for the supervision of regulation of finance, capital markets and other services were secured. This robust regulatory framework was extremely effective in constraining the negative repercussions of the global economic crisis on Turkey.

But there was one major structural problem with the overall macroeconomic management approach in that it favored the inflow of international funds to sponsor the booming construction, finance and service industries; rather than industrial production and technological know-how.

Over the course of the years following the global economic crisis Turkey tried to realize a paradigmatic transition to a more production and real economy oriented growth model with no avail. In order to precipitate a transition to a more industry-technology and export oriented growth strategy various inventories and reports were prepared, sectorial goals were determined and subsidies were released. Yet the path dependency, which remained from Turkey’s stabilization program during the early 2000s with an emphasis on fiscal discipline and the service sector, could not be broken.

Social and political volatilities from the Gezi Park protests in 2013 to the failed coup on 15 July 2016 also exerted a negative impact on the projected strategic transition. As did the hesitant attitude of the AK Party leadership on taking a leading role for industrial-technological upgrading through public-private partnership schemes since these were seen contrary to the principles of economic liberalism.

When we came to 2018, the global atmosphere concerning strategic public involvement in key industries and neo-protectionism are globally accepted practices and there is a relative sea change in terms of the public-private balances in macroeconomic management. Therefore, the political leadership in Turkey has more leeway to exert strategic activism when it comes to achieving prioritized sectorial growth objectives.

Restructuring macroeconomic management

In order to follow global developments leading to the so-called Fourth Industrial Revolution, Turkey needs to radically restructure both the philosophy and institutional manifestations of macroeconomic management in order to keep up with the pace of ever-fastening global competition among global and emerging powers.

Concretely speaking, the following institutional changes could be made in the existing macroeconomic governance architecture:

1. The basic law of the Central Bank could be altered to establish a dual role for the Bank focusing on price stability (inflation control) and employment (growth) as in the case American FED and several other major central banks. This will transform the current standing of the Central Bank from a purely financial management organ to a pilot institution trying to balance price and financial stability with growth and employment objectives in the real economy.
2. The current ministerial portfolio responsible for the management of macroeconomic areas is excessively dispersed. Several ministries could be merged and some of them could be made leaner in order to increase their efficiency.
3. In this context, the current Economy Ministry, Science-Industry and Technology Ministry, and Development Ministry could be merged together to form an “Industry, Trade and Development Ministry.” This ministry could play the role of a coordinating ministry such as Japan’s METI holding the pulse of the real economy and productive sectors.
4. The fiscal and financial branches of the ministerial-bureaucratic network such as the Ministry of Finance and Treasury could be brought under the roof of a “Ministry of Finance and Treasury” so that financing development and budget management could be properly coordinated.
5. A new “Ministry for Science, Higher Education and Information” could be formed to better manage science policy in close coordination with universities and institutions responsible for high-tech infrastructure.
6. An autonomous agency that brings together academics, experts, bureaucrats and key stakeholders from civil society could be formed to monitor the institutional reform process and conduct objective impact analysis such as India’s NITI or Malaysia’s PEMANDU.
7. Sector-specific incentive schemes could be prepared to boost research and development for scientific agriculture, nanotechnology, biotechnology, optics, lasers, rocket science, high-tech materials such as carbon-fiber and renewable energy technologies. Autonomous sectorial monitoring commissions could be formed within the Office of the Presidency to follow up the efficiency of these schemes.
8. Advisory positions within the Office of the Presidency could be organized into more institutionalized offices in order to allow sectorial offices for modernization of agriculture, manufacturing industry, R&D financing, entrepreneurship, export promotion and so on.
9. These presidential offices could follow up both policy formulation and implementation processes in order to solve jurisdiction problems among different ministries and assess the efficiency of devised policies, allowing policy adaptation.

In two weeks time Turkey will hold one of its historical elections. They are historical because they are the first elections after the Turkish constituent decided to switch to a presidential system in April 2017. The AK Party-MHP alliance’s victory will consolidate a presidential system whereas the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance’s election success will put it under question and make way to switch back to the old parliamentary regime. Thus, the June 24 elections are more about structural matters that design the rules of the game for political actors rather than a competition between political parties over good governance.

The AK Party-MHP alliance campaigns to uplift the country with a presidential system to an upper league in international politics where only democratic and powerful countries reside. The CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance, in contrast, criticizes Turkey’s presidential system of being one-man rule and promises to restore the old parliamentary system. The AK Party-MHP alliance’s presidential candidate Recep Tayyip Erdogan, during his public meetings insists that other candidates, especially CHP’s candidate Muharrem Ince, are not competent for the post. Erdogan deliberately targets Ince and strikes him of not even having been elected to the post of CHP’s general secretary. His incompetency, for Erdogan, stems from his lack of experience in governing the state and unbridgeable gap with the public due to Kemalist CHP’s authoritarian and elitist past.

In response to Erdogan’s verbal charges, other candidates especially CHP’s Ince, who seems to outshine the other candidates in the opposition camp with Erdogan’s help, takes pains to show he is as competent as Erdogan and has a strong touch with the people. He does not hesitate to deride Erdogan and target pro-Erdogan media to show that he is strong. He also puts a showcase image that he’s a man of the people by riding a bike before the crowd in his public meetings and distributes photos in which he drives a tractor or praying in a mosque with the villagers.

Alongside his populistic gestures, Muharrem Ince often seems to forget his party’s basic campaign message, which is restoring the old parliamentary system. He seems to embrace the presidential system.

Alongside these rather populistic gestures, Ince often seems to forget his party’s basic campaign message, which is restoring the old parliamentary system. He seems to embrace the presidential system and poses himself as the most important rival of Erdogan for the presidential post. Yet Ince’s unamenable attitudes have seemed to cause a serious discomfort for the other candidates in the opposition bloc. Last week, Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener called the leaders of her alliance partners to an urgent meeting to discuss the preparation of a road-map that responds to the question of how to restore the old parliamentary system in the aftermath of the elections. After the meeting, CHP’s leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu and Iyi Party leader Meral Aksener gave a joint press conference where they declared that both leaders were in agreement and committed to the plan of switching back to the parliamentary system.

It is obvious that Ince’s move to the front and to be the primary rival of Erdogan has worried Aksener. If Aksener does not show a considerable success in the elections, her leadership within her newly founded party will be questioned. There are some figures, such as Umit Ozdag, in the party waiting for the right moment to take over the party leadership.

If Aksener does not show a considerable success in the elections, her leadership will be questioned. There are figures, such as Umit Ozdag, waiting for the right moment to take over the party leadership.

Not to mention Kilicdaroglu’s fear of losing his seat as the CHP’s leader in the event of Ince’s confrontation with Erdogan ends up with the CHP’s increase of its votes. This may trigger a process of soul searching within the party and cause a leadership change. That’s why Kilicdaroglu discharged many of Ince’s men from the party in the run-up to the preparation of the party’s list of parliamentary candidates. Kilicdaroglu undercut the support for Ince within the party cadres.

All in all, a roust may hit the opposition parties, especially after the elections. The main reason for this will be the lack of a comprehensive and well-defined political project shared by all opposition parties, which can produce a united front. The absence of such a political project not only makes the division within and the parties visible but also curtails its chance of winning the elections.

Turkey will hold one of the most critical elections in its history on June 24. They are critical because they are not an exchange of seats between political parties or transfer of power from one political party to another in a democratic country. On June 24, the people will rather decide whether the country should revert the old oligarchic regime in which the bureaucracy used to hold power and sovereignty or whether it should consolidate its burgeoning democratic regime in which power and sovereignty lay with the people. Besides, on June 24 the people will also decide whether the country should gain more autonomy in international politics or continue its age-old foreign policy of disengagement and dependency.

The AK Party-MHP alliance proposes to render the people’s will as the ultimate authority in the country’s political life and make Turkey great again in international politics. The CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance, on the other hand, claims to restore the republican ideals of “Old Turkey,” which are characterized by modernist authoritarianism and bring the country back in line with the civilization, namely the West. Thus, the elections on June 24 will rather portray a moment of historical decision on the country’s regime type and national independence.

Indeed, the themes of democracy and independence will put their seal on the elections. Around these themes we have three scenarios for the post-election Turkey. In the first scenario, President Erdogan wins the presidential elections and the AK Party-MHP alliance gains the majority in parliament. This will mean that the people still hold on to their decision to switch to the presidential system on April 16, 2017. If this happens, the presidential system will be consolidated and democracy will be recognized as the only game in town.

For this will put pressure on the opposition to recognize the rule of the people’s will as the supreme will in politics and therefore the search for bringing the country back to an oligarchic regime will get shelved for good. This might also be accompanied by the democratization of the opposition’s view of international politics through its recognition of the country’s political authenticity and autonomous political will. More, terrorist organizations such as the PKK will face contraction of room for maneuver and FETO will give up hope for a comeback.

In the second scenario, President Erdogan wins the presidential election and the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance obtains the majority in parliament. This will display that the people still support the decision to switch to a presidential system and the consolidation of the democratic regime, yet they find the political actor –the AK Party-MHP alliance– unsuitable for this task. Encouraged with these results, the opposition will follow a politics of destabilization by blocking the presidential decrees in parliament and attempt to convince the people that the presidential system is not that good for the country. This will open up the door for changing the country’s direction back to oligarchy, emboldening the terrorist organizations such as the PKK and FETO and increasing the chances for foreign powers to influence the country’s domestic and foreign policies.

In the third scenario, President Erdogan loses the presidential election and the CHP-Iyi Party-SP alliance gains the majority in parliament. This will show that the people have changed their decision to switch to a presidential system and do not believe that President Erdogan or the AK Party-MHP alliance are suited for the task of democratizing the country’s domestic and international politics. In this situation, the opposition parties and their partners in the state apparatus will immediately attempt to take control of the country and embark on stifling the people’s demand for democratization. The people will doubtlessly show a considerable resistance to the restoration of the status quo ante at the outset, yet the lack of leadership and organization on the part of the popular front will in time give the upper hand to the oligarchic forces. In that political vacuum, the PKK will at once start a war of attrition in Northern Syria and Eastern Turkey whereas FETO will pick itself up and become a significant actor in the state apparatus once again.

Depending on the results of the election and whether the presidential election goes to the second round, one thing is certain: a new domestic makeup is waiting for Turkey.

Turkey is a dynamic country, which often proved being able to overcome unexpected challenges. It does not seem to be a real challenge that the upcoming early elections, which were initially planned for November 2019, will now be held on 24 June of this year. President Erdogan announced this following his meeting with Devlet Bahceli, the leader of the MHP, whose offer was to hold the elections earlier than they had been planned.

To get a clear notion of what’s happening in Turkey, the following main points can be taken into consideration: First, what do the snap elections mean for the Turkish political system and the people’s attitude in general? Second, what about the main parties regarding the elections? And lastly, what do we expect during the two months until the election day?

First of all, the elections have a constitutional importance. These will be the first elections subsequent to the referendum on April 16, 2017, according to which Turkey’s old system of government has been transformed into a presidential system. Currently, Turkey is still leaded under a certain kind of semi-presidential system where a dual-executive exists. This will end with the elections on 24 June and Turkey will completely switch to the Turkish presidential system – abolishing, for instance, the office of the prime minister. On the day citizens go to the polls, both the election of the president and legislature will be held simultaneously. Consequently, the parties – or probable alliances – have to select their presidential candidate and MP candidates. Due to the fact that Turkish citizens have already experienced electing a president by popular vote, which occurred for the first time in August 2014, although the country’s political system is going to change, it can be stated that there are no complications expected during the election campaigns. Furthermore, until the Election Day, the current parliament will pass laws in order to bring harmony with the new system of government. Turkey has also been in the mood for elections for 22 months, since the AK Party and MHP started a collaboration. This created an expectation for holding elections both among the public and state apparatus.

Second, apart the marginal and Kurdish left-nationalist HDP, main parties welcomed the decision to hold elections earlier. Even the MHP-dissident Iyi Party’s leader Meral Aksener argued that her party is “the most prepared” one – even though the electoral board only confirmed that her party could participate in the elections on Sunday. CHP, the main opposition party, though, has neither announced a presidential candidate yet nor has a serious strategy regarding the elections. Officially, as a supporter of the parliamentary system, CHP’s main ambition was previously to win the elections and abolish the presidential system while bringing back the old one. However, due to the obvious lack of needed support, the CHP has to build alliances. However, as extensively explained, this will not be easy. Another interesting question is whether there will be any other potential candidates for the presidency. Most obviously, these uncertainty and speculations will continue for a short time.

On the other hand, due to an established alliance since the July 15 coup attempt in 2016 and formalizing the alliance a couple of months ago, the AK Party and MHP’s presidential candidate will be Recep Tayyip Erdogan. As it rightly stressed by Nebi Mis, it seems that during the one year subsequent to the referendum, the AK Party has made its local congresses across Turkey, which caused the party’s base and network being uninterrupted ready for elections, renewed the cadres under the leadership of Mr. Erdogan and concluded its process of building an alliance for the upcoming elections. The main opposition party, though, which has a total vote of approximately 25%, neither has found a presidential candidate yet nor could it even agree on its “alliance of principles” principles. Honestly, it’s not reasonable to think that a party and its incumbent leader, who lost 8 elections in 8 years, is going to prepare his party much better this time. No serious mind would require believing this and no political science theory would argue that this time it promises success.

Finally, domestically, the election campaigns will most probably resemble the 16 April referendum, while this time the concrete changing steps of the new system will be addressed more in depth. Opposition parties, on the other hand, have to decide what they want to achieve. Thus, either ambitions such as winning the elections in order to abolish the presidential system or pursuing to lead the country in accordance with the newly adopted system. Nevertheless, it seems that there will be an election period without many turbulences in contrast to previous ones. But it’s quite likely that externally, once again, particularly both foreign media outlets and political elites, will be biased to support a well-known anti-Erdogan and anti-AK Party discourse and discredit the elections generally. All in all, this election will be a step that will ultimately concretize Turkey’s upcoming five years.

Turkey has already entered the trajectory for the upcoming snap elections of June 24. Since the date was settled just a week ago, what is clear so far is the presidential candidacy of the incumbent Erdogan in the midst of many unknowns. We are still yet to know whether the opposition will run as a bloc with one agreed-on candidate or whether there will be a multitude of candidates to challenge President Erdogan. Despite no clear declaration so far from any portion of the anti-Erdogan camp, the latter scenario seems to be more likely. Given the opposition bloc that the CHP tried to form in 2014 did not work out well and Erdogan won the majority in the first round, the opposition parties now might try to push the race to the second round. And the most plausible strategy for it to multiply the number of candidates so that every segment of society will find its best match on the ballot. Hence, we can see President Erdogan on the ballot alongside challengers from a wide array of ideologies from ultra-nationalists to liberals, from conservatives to Islamists, from social democrats to socialists, from the sympathizers of the Kurdish question to hardcore Kurdish separatists, and so on. In such a scenario, Erdogan may or may not win the race in the first round. If he wins in the first round, it is the same film that we saw in 2014: a clear electoral victory that gives Erdogan to complete Turkey’s change toward a full-fledged presidential system. But what if the elections, in the midst of multiple candidates, postpone the victory to the second round?

Well, the route might be little bit longer in this case but there seems be to be no surprise at the end of the tunnel. The reason is clear. Erdogan is the Condorcet winner of Turkey, which means he will probably defeat any other candidate in the second round, in a head-to-head election. He will probably defeat a candidate who is more nationalist than himself but he will also defeat a candidate who is less nationalist. The same goes for the more or less conservative candidates, more or less liberal candidates, and so on. And this is how we connect the Condorcet method to another well-known electoral concept, the median voter.

If we can align the preferences of Turkish voters along a horizontal line from right to left, the median voter stands where Erdogan is. In other words, Erdogan is right on the spot. And this is the case for any given issue area. The median voter is as nationalist as Erdogan, no more, no less. The median voter is as conservative as Erdogan, no more no less. For any issue area from the Kurdish question to the proper role of the state in the economy, Erdogan has reserved the median spot. This is so partly because of Turkey’s political legacy. The Turkish median voter is not in the exact center but in the center-right of the ideological spectrum, where Erdogan is positioned. This is the reason why single party governments of Turkey’s democratic era have been formed by Menderes, Demirel, Ozal, and Erdogan but not by Inonu, Ecevit or Kilicdaroglu. Nevertheless, in Erdogan’s case, there is more to the story.

President Erdogan does not only match with the median voter on a few issue areas but in almost all areas. The median voter in Turkey is sympathetic to the Kurdish question but with a blend of religious brothership discourse that Erdogan shares. The median voter hates the socialist economic regulations but is also not easy with wild capitalism. The median voter is troubled with Turkey’s strict laicism in the past but also does not want a fundamentalist future. The median voter is proud of the Ottoman past but has no intention to give up the gains of the republic. You can list more of the issue areas, but you will see Erdogan just by the median voter in each. Hence, in some part, Erdogan represents the median voter in any given issue area.

Erdogan matches with the expectations of the median voter, but even further, he also has the capability to carry a great chunk of the electorate together with him along the spectrum in any issue area. In other words, he can change the center of gravity in our imaginary horizontal line. His skill to move the center of gravity on top of his representation of the median point are the two reasons why he is the Condorcet winner of Turkey.

As the Condorcet winner, Erdogan has managed to win elections regardless of the voting system, which varied in the parliamentary elections of the past, in the presidential election of 2014, in a number of referenda, and so on. It was so because Erdogan and the median voter have not fallen apart. This is why he kept winning one election after another and there seems to be no reason why he should not again. And he knows it. Erdogan knows that he will win in any pairwise election and that is the reason why he presents the elections in dichotomies as in the case of “me versus him.” In a nutshell, if politics is a game, Erdogan knows how to play it.

In presidential systems, electoral alliances are held in both presidential and parliamentary elections. The presidential authority, which holds executive power, has vital importance for political parties. For this reason, parties – whose primary aim is to obtain this position – tend to form an alliance if they cannot get a majority of the votes. Thus, the concept of majority rule in presidential elections make alliances an obligation for countries governed by a presidential system.

The presence of an organic link between presidential elections and parliamentary elections in presidential systems ensures that alliances formed at one election are carried out at the other. For this reason, the general tendency in countries governed by presidential systems is providing alliance both in the presidential and parliamentary elections. In other words, the scope of alliances in presidential and parliamentary elections is interdependent, and the success achieved in one election seems to influence the results of the other.

Since the main actor in the presidential system is the president, the success of this candidate in elections also determines the success of its party in parliament. Called the coattail effect in political science literature, this implies that the presidential candidate’s popularity and electoral success contributes to the success of their party in parliamentary and local elections. This is the case especially when presidential and legislative elections are held at the same time.If there is a significant time difference between the presidency and legislative elections, this effect decreases. The period between the two elections is also another important determinant in the success of alliances.

Another consequence of the coattail effect in terms of electoral alliances concerns minor parties and their election strategies. If the presidential and legislative elections areheld synchronically, the chances of the presidential candidates of minor parties to win the election are reduced. This is because their candidates cannot create a massive effect on society due to their limited popularity. Therefore, these minor parties have a tendency to form alliances with larger parties in order to obtain significant success in elections.

Another element determinant on pre-electoral alliances in presidential systems is the intrinsic political culture of countries. As an extension of this culture, electoral alliances have changing characteristics. For example, in Mexico, alliances have been more common in the last twenty years due to rising political instability following the end of dominant party rule. In related to the effects of instability of the political system, Brazil has very well framed pre-electoral alliance rules in its Election and Political Party Laws. In South Korea, the effects of long-lasting military regimes and strong leadership factors brought about leadership-based pre-electoral alliances formed with the initiation and mutual confidence of the leaders of the parties. As a semi-presidential system, France has witnessed a clear-cut division among political parties on both sides of the spectrum. Parties on the left and right have formed alliances within themselves.

Last but not least, the balance of power among parties forming a pre-electoral alliance is a crucial element. This balance is shaped by their power as a unique actor. Each party in the alliance can contribute to the election success in accordance with its popularity among the general public. At this point, if a party fails to convince its voters that it has achieved necessary gains from an alliance, the party may be negatively affected. For this reason, political parties pay close attention to their achievements and contributions when forming an alliance and observe whether there is any deviance is the balance of power between the two parties.

One of the most important consequences of a consensus-based climate formed between the AK Party and the MHP after the July 15 coup attempt was the legal amendment allowing the formation of formal pre-electoral alliances in Turkey. The legal amendment consisting of 26 articles was first approved by a majority vote in the Assembly and then finalized by the approval of President Erdogan on March 15. The approval of the amendment results in striking changes in electoral and political party laws that will be implemented firstly in the 2019 parliamentary elections. These new regulations also show that pre-electoral alliances will be one of the hot topics of Turkish politics both in the short and long term. Thus, it is crucial to evaluate the effects of new regulations on the future of political parties and election systems.

Pre-electoral alliances and voting behavior

It is possible to say that one of the clear-cut effects of the new regulations will be on voting behavior in Turkey. Surveys show that pre-electoral alliances seem to increase voter participation by reducing the uncertainty about the formation of government after the elections. For instance, a survey on 223 parliamentary elections in 19 countries between 1970 and 2002 reveals that pre-election alliances have increased voting turnouts in elections by an average of 1,5 %. Thus, new regulations will maximize voting turnout especially in the long term.

Another striking effect of pre-electoral alliances is reducing a representation problem in elections. By increasing voter turnout, the pre-electoral alliances invalidate the principle of “If you don’t vote, you don’t count.” This is due to the fact that, especially in countries implementing proportional representation systems such as Turkey, pre-electoral alliances increase voter motivation to go to the polls by enabling a fairer political climate for minor parties. Voters of minor parties who would usually refrain from going to the polls by assuming that the party could not pass the electoral threshold will also participate in elections if their party forms an alliance. The possible outcomes of this phenomenon are increases in government effectiveness, the creation of a more responsive and accountable government, and the provision of a more equality-based social representation in the parliament.

The ideological cohesion of parliamentary parties and its implications

Another possible outcome of the new regulations may be ideological cohesiveness between the parties. As was revealed in a survey on pre-electoral coalitions from 1946 to 1998 in 20 countries, pre-electoral alliances are more likely to occur among ideologically coherent parties. The formation of alliances among ideologically coherent parties also contributes to the consolidation of democracy by facilitating the formation of a consistent party system. Indeed, it should be remembered that ideological cohesiveness was the main criterion of forming an informal alliance among parties in Turkey in the past. Political parties with consistent ideological baggage preferred to form an informal alliance in order to pass the 10% threshold.

In this context, it should be noted that the incompatibility between party ideologies and voter bases will make it difficult to form an alliance, and it is unsustainable for the ideologically non-coherent parties to keep their voters when they form an alliance. This fact will be one of the main aspects of alliance negotiations held among parties.

Consequently, it is crucial to evaluate the short and long-term effects of pre-electoral alliances on Turkish politics. While evaluating this new phenomenon in Turkish politics, it will be useful to consider the election system, especially the size of the electorate and its possible effects on the formation of alliances. This direction will be more useful to understand long-term effects of pre-electoral alliances and possible further regulations in election and party systems.

During his press statement on January 8, 2018, Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) leader Devlet Bahceli clarified certain ambiguities surrounding the 2019 elections that were the main items on the political agenda. In this statement, Bahceli announced that MHP would not nominate any candidate, but support President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in the 2019 presidential elections. More, MHP leader highlighted that his party is open to alliance with Erdogan’s AK Party for the parliamentary elections as well. This alliance, it was suggested, should be implemented into a legal framework, allowing parties to maintain their corporate identity and to identify the percentage of votes each party receives. President Erdogan responded to MHP’s call positively, which then led to the two parties establishing their own alliance commissions.

With this, Devlet Bahceli carried out the AK Party-MHP alliance, which was formed after the July 15 coup attempt and which aimed to ensure the survival of the state, on to a next level. This was a requirement necessitated by the presidential system, as political parties have to seek alliances in order to secure the election. Therefore, after party-member presidency, the political reflections of the presidential system began to be apparent on the road to 2019.

The content and political implications of the presidential system were not discussed during the referendum campaign due to the manipulations of the opposition, refusing to allow people to understand the importance of this political transformation in terms of democratization. For instance, the “no” bloc distorted the truth about certain amendments, such as decreasing the age to be eligible for parliamentary candidacy to 18 or increasing the number of deputies to 600. Moreover, opposition leader Kilicdaroglu claimed that the 4 million Syrians who are seeking refuge in Turkey would be naturalized if the referendum succeeded. These kinds of manipulations obstructed the essence of this new system and the political implications it would bring from being understood.

Not polarization, reconciliation

Analyzing the developments in Turkish domestic politics, it becomes obvious that political parties are experiencing changes brought by the presidential system. As it is known, a simple majority is sought in the presidential elections and this condition will shape Turkey’s political landscape.

First of all, the simple majority factor renders political and social reconciliation inevitable. In the new era, political parties will be inclined to be more inclusive, agreeable and appealing to voters. In this respect, “bloc politics” foreseen by the new system enforces political reconciliation instead of polarization. Thanks to these political blocs, the public will observe which parties are working with each other and will decide accordingly. Therefore, the success of the alliance political parties will form in the presidential system is to be determined by their appeal to the public.

In terms of seeking reconciliation and alliance that is brought by the new system, the AK Party and MHP have agreed on national stance and an alliance that appeals to the majority of the public. Considering this alliance, it could be asserted that the MHP is pursuing a realistic political stance. The party sought to transform its existing cooperation with the AK Party into an alliance since the July 15 coup attempt. Bahceli’s statement about being true to the “Yenikapi spirit” and desiring to incorporate the new system is the most important indicator of this. MHP is aware of the necessity of adopting a national unity discourse amid global and regional conflicts and that this discourse appeals to the public.

What caused MHP to depart from its previous bloc was the failure of this bloc to maintain a national stance, which inevitably discomforted the public. In other words, unlike the other bloc consisting of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and Peoples’ Democratic Party (HDP) along with several smaller parties, which prefer to cooperate behind closed scenes, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently thanks to its public consent.

No coalition but pre-election alliance

The alliance-forming process between the AK Party and the MHP also revealed another tangible outcome of the presidential system: reconciliation between political parties in a different form other than a coalition in the parliamentary system. During the discussions on transitioning to the presidential system, it was expressed that the new system would eliminate coalition governments and provide opportunities for new forms of reconciliation and cooperation. There is significant difference between presidential and parliamentary systems in terms of reconciliation. Unlike in the parliamentary system, the presidential system also seeks reconciliation among the public instead of only party leaders and political elites.

While the public only observes coalition negotiations in the parliamentary system after casting votes, the presidential system allows the public to shape alliance discussions between political parties. This is due to the fact that alliances have to be formed prior to the elections. If the agreement is only among political elites, the public may punish their political parties by not voting for them. Therefore, the AK Party and MHP are conducting their alliance negotiations transparently and prior to the election, accepting to face any repercussions in the case of public dissatisfaction.

Coalitions formed under the parliamentary system do not necessarily allow the public to know which party will have executive power. However, in the case of the AK Party-MHP alliance, the public is aware that Erdogan will maintain executive power if he is elected. In addition, even if MHP withdraws its support from the AK Party after the elections, it will not create a political crisis, as it would do in a parliamentary system.

For all these reasons, the presidential system does not have coalitions, but pre-election alliances. The process between the AK Party and MHP is a reflection of this. Therefore, criticisms about not being able to eliminate coalitions despite transitioning into the presidential system are just not true.

The process between the AK Party and MHP reveals only a part of the reconciliatory aspect of the presidential system. If the president’s party fails to secure a majority in Parliament, the President will be inclined to reconcile with other parties that possess seats. If the AK Party fails to secure a majority of seats in the 2019 elections, its alliance with MHP will most probably permeate the Parliament as well. Indeed, Bahceli clearly stated that his party will do all that is required to render the new system permanent in 2019-2024 period.

In this sense, the presidential system enforces pre-election alliances, not government coalitions. These alliances will reveal the political blocs indicating social reconciliation rather than social polarizations. Considering its voter base, it had been inevitable for MHP to become party to a different bloc. Meanwhile, the discourse on national unity, which has gathered support by the general public and which is shared by the AK Party has allowed MHP to leave the “no” bloc and join powers with the government.

On Sunday April 16, fifty-five million Turkish citizens will cast a historic vote on the possibility of transforming the Turkish republic from a parliamentary to a presidential system. This change has been a long time coming. President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling AK Party have been advocating the transformation for over a decade. Former prime minister and Erdoğan’s mentor, the late Necmettin Erbakan, had advocated the presidential system since at least the 1990s because of the instability of the current parliamentary system. In its ninety-three year history, there have been 65 different governments in the Turkish republic for an average of 16 months for each government. If the stable AK governments of the last 15 years were not taken into account, the average length of each government would be much less.

Ever since the current parliament approved the 18 constitutional amendments for this transformation last January, there has been much tension in the debate but little clarity. The nation has been polarized by the yes “Evet” and no “Hayır” campaigns. Instead of focusing on the merits of the constitutional amendments and the presidential system, most of the criticism has focused on the fears that the new presidential system could serve as a platform for authoritarianism, or worse dictatorship, by the overwhelming personality traits of the strong president.

But to be fair, an objective analysis should focus on the merits of the amendments and the proposed presidential system aside from the character of the sitting president. Once such analysis is conducted, one must assess the proposed changes to evaluate the checks and balance mechanism in the amendments to guard against the possibility of authoritarian rule.

The key argument for a presidential system is in providing political stability for the government, headed by a president elected popularly for a fixed five-year period. In such a system, the government will not be vulnerable to threats of needless vote of confidence in parliament or partisan political maneuvers designed to extract concessions from the largest party in coalition-type governments, which have been the hallmark of much of Turkey’s modern history. The main reason a government in a presidential system is strong is because it would be formed by a popularly elected president, with cabinet members who mostly represent his political ideology and programs, and thus govern in a more harmonious and effective manner.

Even though they have to adhere to the political programs of the president, many cabinet members and senior government officials would often times be non-partisan experts or technocrats, appointed on their merits because of their management skills and qualifications. In contrast, parliamentary governments tend to represent conflicting ideologies, programs, strategies and tactics. Because different ministers in such coalition governments belong to different political parties, or worse, are subject to sectarian or ethnic quotas, it’s not uncommon for one ministry or government agency to be the main obstacle to the implementation of the programs of another ministry or agency, thus leading to confusion, economic stagnation or political paralysis in the country.

Moreover, when a partisan cabinet member takes over a particular ministry, especially a service type, such as transportation, health, or energy, rather than calling on civil servants or career officials, the minister would often appoint his partisan officials in the most important positions within the ministry as rewards to his supporters regardless of the national interest. With the high turnover of coalition governments, this practice becomes endemic, which potentially leads to the spread of government inefficiency and corruption. On the other hand, with its strong grip on the executive branch, a presidential system generates strong bureaucracy resulting in political stability, government efficiency, and potentially sustained economic development and growth.

Furthermore, a presidential system by definition strengthens the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches of government since members of parliament cannot simultaneously hold legislative and executive positions. This strengthens the role of parliament as a watchdog over the executive branch. On the other hand, the parliamentary system’s weakest point is the blurring of the separation of powers where the government (with most ministers and their deputies being members of parliament) controls both the legislative and executive branches making it almost impossible to hold government officials accountable to the representatives of the people. In short, in a presidential system the accountability function of the parliament is not only restored but also strengthened as potential cover-ups and corruption (as a result of the failure of the government to investigate itself) would be largely curtailed and under check.

Furthermore, the presidential system not only reinforces the separation of powers between the different branches of government but also establishes the appropriate balance between them. For example in the American presidential system, while Congress makes laws and passes budgets, the President could veto any of its bills. But Congress could also override the presidential veto with a two-third majority vote, as each branch can then check the other.

In addition, the interpretation of laws is the domain of the Supreme Court, where both Congress and the executive branch are subject to the orders of the judiciary, while neither Congress nor the President could dismiss a judge. Nor the President could dissolve Congress, or Congress dismisses the President without elaborate impeachment proceedings, followed by a trial in the Senate. In short, a good “checks and balances” system distributes power to the three branches of government in order to limit any potential abuse of power.

Perhaps the area where the presidential system is most effective is in implementing foreign policy. It provides a unified and consistent national security policy making it very difficult for foreign powers to exploit domestic disputes and differences or playing rivals against each other within a coalition government for partisan advantages. On the other hand, because of different policy positions on many fronts such as military interventions, security policy, trade, or foreign relations, coalition governments tend to invoke weak responses or even paralysis, especially on the most contentious issues.

Since the emergence of its fifth republic in the late 1950s, France functioned as a semi-presidential system, with a president largely in charge of foreign policy, and a prime minister, largely in charge of domestic policy. But the system has demonstrated its inherent weakness as both powerful positions clashed repeatedly especially when they represented different political parties. The Islamic Republic of Iran adopted this model in 1979, but abandoned it ten years later when the inevitable rivalry led to confusion, economic instability, political paralysis, and lack of accountability.

However, the underlining assumption of the presidential system is having independent judiciary, government transparency, strong and vibrant civil society institutions, and robust and independent media, not only representing the interests of the citizenry, especially the most vulnerable among them, but also holding all government branches accountable to the people.

On the other hand, the strength of the parliamentary system is in fragmenting political power so that no party or individual could accumulate so much power, especially within a tribal or primitive society, and turn it into an authoritarian regime or repressive dictatorship with little or no oversight. But this genuine concern is dealt with through strong civil society institutions and constitutional safeguards of personal freedoms, civil and political rights, bill of rights including freedoms of expression, assembly, and beliefs, and protections for vulnerable minority communities and political oppositions.

In addition, one way to limit any potential executive presidential abuse of power is to distribute this power to the provinces and local authorities allowing for its exercise over several jurisdictions. Fortunately, Turkey has a long history of having strong local governments with considerable power and effective administration that are subject to periodic, free, and fair democratic elections. For example, Turkey has 81 cities, 30 of these are metropolitan municipalities and others have municipalities and also provinces, while Istanbul has 39 district municipalities, with each elected periodically by their constituencies.

So how do the proposed amendments to the constitution fare with such a transformation? Could the new proposed constitution allow for a one-man rule or a potential dictatorship as the critics contend?

Clearly, there is no doubt that after spending fifteen years as the central figure in Turkish politics, the character and presence of President Erdoğan is dominating and overwhelming. But the proper assessment requires that one evaluate the text of the amendments for the potential abuse of power aside from personal or political calculations or fear of the unknown.

Much of the proposed executive powers transferred from the prime minister to the president are standard and routine: heading the government, appointing ministers, or holding executive power (Article 104). But the new constitution also strengthens the separation of powers in many areas. Any member of parliament must resign if appointed to the executive branch (Article 106).

Parliament can hold any member of the executive branch accountable, including the initiation of preliminary investigations (by simple majority), the launch of official investigations (by three-fifths majority) and dismissal (by two-third majority), which is quite similar to the American system of impeachment (Article 105). While the President could issue executive orders (same as the American system), parliament could annul these decrees by a simple majority (Article 104).

However, the most disturbing aspect of the new amendments is the ability of the President to dissolve parliament (already in the current constitution.) But even this authority carries with it a huge political risk. Because the new constitution calls for simultaneous presidential and parliamentary elections (Article 77), if the president dissolves parliament, he would also shorten his term and would have to stand for elections himself, in addition to have the concurrence of three-fifths of the members of parliament (Article 116), a requirement that is much more that any party has ever assembled in Turkish political history.

Moreover, unlike the American constitutional system that requires a two-third majority for a veto override, the proposed Turkish constitution allows the parliament to override a presidential veto with a simple majority (Article 89). But perhaps the most sweeping reforms enacted with the new amendments include the total abolishment of military courts (Article 142), which has a long and ugly history of abuse against civilians. In addition, the president’s ability to declare a state of emergency would be subject to parliamentary approval, while the parliament could extend, remove or shorten it.

While states of emergency could be extended for up to four months at a time, every presidential decree issued during a state of emergency would still need parliamentary approval (Article 119). While the U.S. president nominates all federal judges and Supreme Court justices, the new Turkish constitution allows the president to nominate 12 out of 15 for the Constitutional Court (Article 146) and 6 out of 13 members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (Article 159), while parliament appoints the remaining members.

Polls in Turkey vary widely and internal polling of major political parties show a slight edge for the “yes” campaign with about 10 percent as undecided. Hence, the vote for the referendum could go either way. Even though the proposed constitutional amendments would solve many of Turkey’s endemic political problems, there are still concerns and fears of the critics for a potential authoritarian rule, but they have been blown out of proportion. As the response to last summer’s coup has aptly demonstrated, the Turkish public is keen on preserving its democracy, strengthening its political institutions, holding power to account, and is not prepared to cede its sovereignty or future.

Turkey is rushing towards the April 16 Referendum, which is potentially one of the most important events in the history of its democracy. No matter what the results will be, this referendum will always be remembered as a case and cited as a milestone in Turkish political history.

What makes the April 16 Referendum important is that Turkish people for the first time are going to vote for such a large-scale constitutional reform. Turkey has experienced several constitutional amendments before, but most of them were related to fundamental rights and freedoms. They had little or no significant effect on the state structure. This referendum, however, aims to change the state structure directly. It is, therefore, unique and unprecedented.

The constitutional referendum is also vital since it is, independent of its results, a significant democratization step on its own. During the period of democracy, Turkish constitutions were either completely built by military bureaucrats or changed under their pressure and threats. Thus, the real powers who made or revised the constitutions were the army and its official and civilian allies. During the AK Party governments, this situation began to change and reached its peak with the introduction of the April 16 Referendum package. For the first time in the modern history of Turkey, civilian forces have pioneered such a large-scale constitutional amendment aimed at subordinating constituent power in the real sense.

The third feature of the amendment package is that it is more comprehensive, broader, and deeper than several columnists -including myself- and experts anticipated at the first glance. Although the change in the government system lies at its center, this step will affect the entire state structure. Although the “no” wing claims the opposite, the regime will not change, i.e., the republic and democracy will not disappear, but many things will either be renewed immediately or will enter a phase of renewal. Both the principal and relative positions of the prevailing forces will change. It is due to the fact that there is a network of relations and equilibrium between the forces in the current system and the change in the system will predictably affect the position of others. This change will inevitably affect bureaucracy, the culture of government or governance, and the modes of operation of the existing forces over time.

What Happens if Turkey Votes “No”

A “No” vote, despite being a weak possibility, is still a possibility and it became even weaker because of the impudent and anti-democratic attitudes of several European countries. If the referendum results with a “No” vote, then, it still might lead to some “good” consequences. The current political situation in the country made it clear to everyone that the country needs a governmental system that is, we must overcome the situation we are now in. No one can deny this and cannot avoid responsibility – as the main opposition party did. If the proposal does not get approval from the people, it does not mean that the necessity of change in the government system will disappear. On the contrary, the need to establish a governmental system will appear even more urgent. Starting from the morning of April 17, the search for a new system will begin.

Once the way is paved for the referendum, the public will make it easier to carry out subsequent similar undertakings. Thus, Turkey’s democracy will have surpassed an important threshold. Those of circles who have long ignored the basic purpose and duty of politics, that is to lead, will find themselves encircled with this all-encompassing trend.

What Happens if Turkey Votes “Yes”

If “Yes” wins the referendum, it will lead to several consequences that will spread to various phases. It will radically affect and change our political system and political culture.

Center-right parties constitute standard democratically elected political governments in Turkey. Left governments are not a standard, but a deviation in Turkish politics. So far, all center-right governments have complained about the governmental system in the country. Pointing out to the fact that the area of democratic power is arbitrarily limited, they wanted to change it. As a center-right political movement, the AK Party did not go beyond this line. (Let me answer the objections that may arise in the assertion that the AK Party is the center-right wing party. The best evidence to prove the AK Party is in the center-right is that both the Gülenist Terror Organization, which is a totalitarian religious movement, and radical religious trends aiming at the Islamization of the Turkish society, which is overwhelmingly a Muslim society, according to their understanding of Islam, complain about and even hate the AK Party.)

In Turkey, the bureaucratic guardianship system has established its sovereignty by encompassing the executive power of the democratically elected governments. Now the situation is changing. The process of change that began decades ago accelerated during the AK Party governments with the influence of various factors. If the outcome of the April 16 referendum turns out to be “yes,” the two-headed executive power will end. Thus, the bureaucratic guardianship system will lose an important base.

This will also reinforce the democratic character of the executive power. The government will not have indirect legitimacy as in the parliamentary system, but will have direct democratic legitimacy since it will directly be elected by the people. This will facilitate its struggle with the bureaucratic guardianship. This scenario is predictable since none of the elected governments wants to share its powers with bureaucratic foci and to get under their yoke.

The amendment will also bring stability. The parliamentary system leads to executive instability, especially in countries where politics is overly divided. When elections do not produce a government, parliamentary games and negotiations start. Ineffective coalition governments emerge and the executive power can be blocked by tempting the smaller partners in the coalitions. The government may fall at any moment if it cannot obtain a vote of confidence. This also makes the governmental responsibility unclear.

The proposed system, however, offers an effective government power. Just after midnight on Election Day, it will be apparent who will be the executive organ. Executive power will complete its normal duration period since it will be independent of the judiciary. Politics, to a certain extent, will have a new outlook far away from being an area of ugly bargains. So, the governments foresee and make long-term plans accordingly. This will also allow citizens to recognize the success and failure of the governments easily.

The new system will encourage parliament to move far from executive to legislative affairs. The number of deputies who specialize in legislative activities will increase. The parliament thus will spare more time on legislation.

The separation of legislative and executive powers will also reduce and alter lobbying activities for the members of the legislature, voters, and interest groups. Deputies will not be considered as people whose main and only job is to do business follow-up.

The presidential system also leads to significant changes in the political culture. The new system encourages democratic reconciliation. Since the presidential election will have two rounds at almost every time, voters will participate in the main wings in the second round. To express it in as an analogy, creeks will join rivers. Thus, democratic politics become stable over time and political traditions and customs will start to have a form and shape.

An important problem of Turkish politics is that the speed of renewal of political staff is rather slow. This is not only valid for the victorious leaders and their teams, but for leaders and their staff who constantly lost the elections. The current parliamentary system is one of the most important reasons for this phenomenon. Names such as Bülent Ecevit, Alparslan Türkeş, Süleyman Demirel, and Necmettin Erbakan became the leaders of political movements for 40 to 50 years. They left their seats only after health problems and death. However, a successful leader in the new system will have a maximum duration of ten years. Let us look at this issue through Erdoğan to better explain it: Erdoğan has been governing the country for fourteen years first as the prime minister and then as the president.

If the proposed system was the current system, Erdoğan would have already left the political scene. If the proposed system does not pass and the old system continues, Erdoğan may return to the AK Party in 2024 and, if God gives him a prolonged life, he can continue to govern the country as the prime minister for another twenty years. The contribution of the new system to the renewal of Turkish political life is also apparent for the oppositional party. In the new system, it will be difficult for the leaders who lose the elections to keep their seats. Their parties will seek new ways and methods to win the next election and thus the defeated leaders find themselves in the position to leave their seat. Both the government and opposition parties will therefore enter a phase of renewal.

The April 16 Referendum means, to some extent, setting the spirit free. The spirit cannot be forced to enter the bottle again. Whatever the result is, there is no turning back from change. That is the reason why April 16 will be a turning point in Turkey’s political history.

As we countdown the days towards the referendum, the process of changes that may come from the Presidency system have been discussed with various perspectives in a variety of different circles. What then will the presidential system, which will alter the politics of the country significantly, bring to the Turkish economy? A system of governance, which the social and cultural codes of a country make it successful in terms of providing political stability, serving predictable and inclusive policies, and activating a well-functioning bureaucracy, is certainly of benefit for the economic development of this country.

When we look at the history of the Republic of Turkey, it can be seen that stability was not achieved during the various coalition governments, politics were far from predictable or even being inclusive, and the cumbersome bureaucratic structure deadlocked the political system. The bottlenecks of the 1970s, the 1994 crisis and the 2000-2001 crises all took place during the periods when a coalition government was in place. In the single-party government periods however, the Turkish economy had made significant gains.

It would be unrealistic to expect any level of success from coalition governments in a socio-cultural environment where, due to conflicts and disagreements, even siblings have played havoc with family businesses and sustainable partnerships are rare. In Scandinavian countries where coalition governments are relatively successful in economic terms, success points at factors such as a small and homogeneous population, high social trust and their geographical position. Nevertheless, the countries where the coalition governments successfully worked have had a solid and successful economic infrastructure built over the last fifty years and consequently quick decision making has become a secondary priority. An economy like Turkey, which has lagged behind in the race of economic development, does not have the luxury to move with such a slow pace.

Despite the fact that Turkey has been governed by one-party governments for the last 15 years, the current system does not guarantee this indefinitely. The closest example of this was in the June 7, 2015 elections. The AK Party – which received 41 percent of the vote, and 15 percentage points ahead of its closest rival – failed to establish itself as a single-party government. Thus, the presidential system offers an important opportunity for the Turkish economy to avoid the friction that comes with coalition governments.

In terms of the economy, another weakness of the current system is that both the president and the prime minister go through an election process, which means that both these positions of authority also come with the potential that may arise from holding important forces in their hand. The respectable relationship between the presidents and the prime minister for the last decade has been based on strong human relations. It is not realistic to expect that the relationship between the two forces will have the same consistency and amiability in every period. If these authorities equipped with high power implement contradictory populist economic policies based their electoral agenda, these contradictory policies will increase uncertainty. Needless to say, an increase in this kind of uncertainty can cause serious damage to the economy. However, as is the case with the incident where a former president threw a constitution booklet to a former prime minister, nonsensical agitation between the president and the prime minister can also spark an economic crisis.

The current system also makes it difficult for decisions to be made quickly and for the bureaucracy to function properly. This country had experienced periods whereby the head of the execution, the prime minister, could not even choose his own bureaucrat. In 2006, despite the fact that important candidates such as the late Adnan Buyukdeniz and Deputy Prime Minister Mehmet Simsek were available to be appointed to the central bank, they were appointed due to the ideological defenses of the then president. Likewise, many projects put forward for the development of the country were deliberately postponed for unacceptably long times due to the cumbersome bureaucracy, taking advantage of the poor president-prime ministerial relations as well as duality of administration as an opportunity to delay these major projects. In a governance system in which bureaucrats cannot reach the speed of the politicians, it is impossible to make economic development move quickly.

The presidential system is critical in terms of Turkey’s role in the global economy. At the beginning of the 2000’s, Turkey was in a position of clinging onto the IMF. Thanks to the political stability and a decisively implemented economic policy, Turkey paid off all debts to the IMF. In addition to that, recent reforms in the IMF, along with Turkey and some other important emerging economies, has successfully seen them having a more important say, to a certain extent, in the governance of the IMF. As the share of developing countries in the global economy increases, this will also come with a power shift in the governance of international institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank. Nevertheless, the inadequacy and inefficiency of the Bretton Woods’ institutions, to fully address the problems of the ever-changing global economic structure also pushes developing countries to find different alternatives. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, which was founded under the leadership of China, and of which Turkey is a founding partner, is a good example of this situation. Consequently, it is no surprise that the foreseeable future will see a substantial increase in the number of institutions that are all encompassing and focused on solutions in the international arena.

It is also very likely that there will be major changes in the international trade system in the coming years. The Brexit, the election of Donald Trump as President of the United States and the growing anti-liberal discourse in the EU will significantly alter the current international trade agreements as well as the future of the World Trade Organization. In addition, after such a long period of time, negotiations on the future of the international trade system will most certainly stiffen. In order for Turkey to gain a better position in international economic institutions and to be in a better position within the global trade system, Turkey must not have to deal with the struggle of political instability and must shake off any weak political will.

Energy is another area where Turkey has achieved an important position within the global economy in recent years. At a time when global economic growth is weak and concerns for the future of traditional energy sources are rising, the transfer of energy resources from the East to the West is crucial. Turkey is an important actor playing a critical role in securing and supplying energy because of its geographical position and has the advantage of being a rare country that can sit on the bargaining table with almost all the big energy producing countries such as Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan and Qatar. The fact that such energy projects are very long-term projects necessitates a political will that will follow through these projects outside of the daily political banter. This follow-up will be very difficult to take place within a coalition government or in a setting where this contention between the president and the prime minister.

Another important aspect of securing political stability, predictable policies and strong political will, from a global economic perspective, is that it will contribute to the creation of an environment in which Turkey can extend its assistance and support to a wider geographical area. Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has been one of the world foremost important foreign aid donors for the past ten years even though until ten years ago no one had even had heard of their name. Turkey is one of the few countries making an effort to offer a “humanitarian” solution without prioritizing their own national interests against human tragedies. The fact that Turkey can continue to expand this work corresponds with its strong system of governance.

Turkey is a country that aims not only to increase its own economic power by accelerating the economic development process, but also to make it more inclusive for the underdeveloped and developing countries in order for them to have more say in the global economic arena. For this reason, Turkey needs a new system of governance in order to achieve this goal. The Presidential system, which will be voted on in the constitutional referendum on April 16th, is a valuable alternative that can respond to and meet these needs.

Since the adoption of the 1982 Constitution, the text has been subject to debate and several amendments. Following the elections in 2011, there was hope for a new Constitution, but it disappeared after the failure of an agreement in the Constitutional Reconciliation Commission on the revision of the text. Immediately after the failed July 15 coup attempt, Turkish political parties agreed on a brief Constitutional package. However, the subsequent political tension prevented the carrying out of the project. Surprisingly, the leader of the MHP Devlet Bahceli, initiated a new process by throwing his support behind an amendment in the Constitution that would be put forward by the AK Party. The AK Party prepared the Constitutional amendment proposal that included a “Presidential System” and proposed this amendment to the Turkish Parliament after negotiations with the MHP. The core objective of the proposal is to abandon the 1982 Constitutional model, which was drafted following a military regime. Since the 1982 Constitution does not provide a conventional parliamentary system, it facilitated the transition to the Presidential system.

Neutrality of the Judiciary

Article 1 of the proposal and Article 9 on the jurisdiction of the Constitution provide an “impartiality” clause which emphasizes the neutrality as well as the independence of the judiciary. The 1982 Constitution too called for judicial independence and emphasized the necessity of the independence and the legal jurisdiction of judges in a number of matters. However, the independence of the judiciary and its connection to the concept of impartiality does not appear explicitly in the Constitution and thus its absence is the motivation for this new proposal.

It is impossible to separate neutrality from an independent judiciary. An independent judiciary – without the influence of any individual or institution, whether inside or outside of the judiciary – upholding the law with impartiality to avoid any bias or without any prejudice whatsoever is essential. In other words, a judge must decide independently and irrespective of any personal benefit, ideology, belief and world view.

Themis, the ancient Greek symbol of the principle of justice, in her blindfold demonstrates this need for neutrality and impartiality in judging a case. The principle of impartiality is of critical importance in the protection of fundamental rights and freedoms. For this reason, the impartiality provided in international human rights documents finds its place side by side with the principle of independence. Article 10 of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 14 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights all emphasize the principle of neutrality.

These examples show that the incorporation of the principle of neutrality in the proposal into the 1982 Constitution is compatible with human rights conventions and will address the deficiencies in the present system.

Another reason for this addition is related to the longevity of the bureaucratic tutelage in Turkey. The army was one of the basic elements of the judicial tutelage that was established by the 1961 Constitution, with the judiciary using it as a mean to maintain its control. During this period, the judicial tutelage preferred the protection of the guardianship of the state power against the political power along with the defense of its privileges, rather than protecting basic rights or establishing the rule of law.  The activities of the judiciary have always been defended with an emphasis of the independence of institutions, however those in power have often turned a blind eye to the principle of impartiality. In other words, the emphasis on neutrality in the current proposed Constitutional change is a result of the reaction to the bureaucratic tutelage, which is trying to take the power of the democratic governance of political power under its jurisdiction.

Supreme board of judges and prosecutors of Turkey (HSYK)

The new Constitutional proposal reduces the number of members of the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors (HSYK) of Turkey from 22 to 13, and ends the practice of direct election of judges from other judges in the HSYK. According to the proposal, the Minister of Justice and the undersecretary of the Minister will be members of the HSYK. Four members will be appointed by the President, and the remaining seven will be elected by the Parliament. The Parliament will select three of these members from the Supreme Court of Appeals, with two of these being a teaching fellow and the third being a barrister, and one elected from among the members of the Council of State.

The first point is an important departure from the old system and it abandons the method of selection of a number of members of the HSYK by judges and prosecutors. This process was first introduced as a democratic method by the AK Party in 2010. However, the practice of this method for seven years and two electoral terms has shown that it can have negative consequences posing a danger to the Turkish democracy.  Under the previous system, the HSYK members were elected by the judges and prosecutors of this country, but this election process became politicized, with blocks of voters following various political movements. The most powerful political movement was composed of the members of the Fetullah Gülen Terrorist Organization (FETO).  This caused great damage to the judiciary. The electoral procedure essentially insulated the courts from oversight, deterred judges and prosecutors from completing their primary duties, politicized the judiciary and encouraged the emergence of political or ideological camps among the judges and prosecutors. During the course of the HSYK election, the candidates were favored for their political views, beliefs, ethnic and sectarian identities rather than on their merit or professional experience. This should not be accepted under any circumstances for an institution such as the judiciary. This politicization of the judges was seen in the press releases of the HSYK, both before and after the two most recent elections in 2010 and 2014.

Additionally, all of the camps and political parties that were parts of the judiciary were opposed to the procedure of the election of the members. The main opposition party CHP proposed that only the highest courts be allowed to elect a member of the Constitutional Court. The election procedure was totally abolished in the proposal of the MHP.

The second important point is that a simple majority was insufficient for HSYK members to be elected by the Parliament. According to the proposal, the Justice and Constitutional Commissions of the Parliament appoint three out of five candidates to the HSYK. If candidates are not supported by a majority in the Commissions, three candidates must be elected through choosing by lot. In the General Assembly of the Parliament, there shall be two votes for each of the three candidates, with three out of five candidates presented for each open seat on the HSYK. In the event of no majority being secured, a lot will be drawn for the two candidates with the most votes.

It can be seen that the election of seven members by the Parliament by way of a qualified majority, was meant to prevent a simple majority and to force parties into a compromise. In response to these positive arrangements, we can say that the lack of recognition of the authority of the HSYK members to select a part of the Supreme Court and the Council of State is a deficiency of the proposal.

Removal of Military Courts

The proposal also provides a complete abolition of military prosecution. Article 13 of the proposal reads: “Military courts outside disciplinary courts cannot be established. In the event of a war, however, military courts may be set up to take charge of the crimes committed by soldiers in relation to their duties.”

The military jurisdiction is one of the most effective elements of the tutelage system that was later reformed with the establishment of the 1961 Constitution. After the 1960 military coup, the Military High Court of Appeals was established in the Constitution, and the Supreme Military Administrative Court was also added following the 1970 military memorandum.

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the power of the military jurisdiction was increased by enforcing its autonomy. With the 1960 coup d’état and the subsequent intervention of the army in the government, each Constitutional change has strengthened the so-called “guardianship function” of the military judiciary.

The present Constitution broadly defined the scope of the military courts to the point that was unacceptable in a democratic state of law, and in 2010 a Constitutional amendment partially addressed these issues. In spite of the steps taken to bring military tribunals under democratic rule of law standards, military courts were preserved as a separate judicial branch in addition to the civilian judicial jurisdiction. It is rare to find an independent military judiciary and a high court for military judiciary in Western democracies.

This is the case for the Supreme Military Administrative Court. It appears that military prosecution is an important tool for the military and for the system of judicial tutelage. In this system, the army develops “a two-headed structure in the judiciary” as a result of a desire to create its own autonomous domain independent of the civilian administration.

Finally, it is important to emphasize that one of the most important institutions in which FETO is organized is the military judiciary. This presence allowed a group to gain maximum leverage in the tutelary structure. Those who closely followed FETO pointed out that they were very powerful in the military judiciary, and included high level military judges. They were even almost completely controlled by them, and they had members in many important positions, such as the General Staff’s legal adviser. Additionally, the Ankara Chief Public Prosecutor’s Office made a clear statement regarding the activities of the FETO in an indictment presented prior to the July 15 coup attempt. It should be noted, however, that the question of military jurisdiction cannot be explained solely within the scope of the FETO probe, and cannot be resolved with the expulsion of judges and prosecutors tied with FETO. For this reason, a complete removal of the military judiciary was long overdue.

With the absence of a military judiciary and a removal of two high military courts, the number of members of the Constitutional Court will decrease from 17 to 15. Additionally, because of the change in the government system, the provision that excludes the judicial review of the activities of the President is removed from the Constitution. Finally, judicial review is strengthened by removing the provision that excludes judicial review of the decisions of the Supreme Military Councils concerning the members of the military.

Turkish politics is currently polarized by the debate over a constitutional reform bill. The ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) have jointly proposed a constitutional reform bill to shift Turkey’s parliamentary system towards a presidential system. These two political parties defend the bill by arguing that it will boost Turkey’s democracy. Yet the opposition, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the People’s Democratic Party (HDP), strongly oppose the bill by claiming that it will lead Turkey into an authoritarian one-man rule.

The opposition contends that the new constitution weakens the parliament to the extent that the presidency amasses all the powers in its hands. This will leave the government without a system of checks and balances and end the rule of law. So it sets forth a regime change, namely the end of Turkey’s republican order. The AK Party and the MHP, in response, propound that the new constitution provides better conditions for reflecting the popular will in the government. So it does not end Turkey’s republican order; on the contrary, it improves the republican order by empowering the society over extra-political forces such as the military and civil bureaucracy.

Indeed, this debate reveals the main fault line in Turkish politics. Turkish politics is primarily determined by the conflict of two historical blocs, the secular middle class and the masses in the periphery. The secular middle class, which constitutes the minority in society, figures that its interests will be best served as long as the parliament holds the central place in politics. The peripheral societal forces, which constitute the majority in society, seek to push the executive to the center in politics. The former believes that the minority will have more say in politics as long as the parliament holds a focal point. The latter thinks that the majority will get its due share in power as long as the executive occupies the central place in the political system.

So we have two competing views of democracy at hand. From a liberal perspective, democracy simply refers to the limitation of power. From a conservative perspective, democracy refers to the rule of the people, namely the concentration of power in people’s hands. While the opposition holds on to the former, namely the negative view of democracy; the AK Party and the MHP sticks to the latter, namely the positive view of democracy.

Parliamentary System under Bureaucratic Oligarchy

To put the matter in a historical perspective, the majority’s choice of positive view of democracy is tenable. The secular middle class organized around the bureaucracy ended the Ottoman monarchic regime in 1922 and established the republic in 1923. This regime change brought about another significant change, it ended the “neutral” state and replaced it with a “total” state. With this transformation of the state, the absolute separation of the state from society came to an end. The state and society, therefore, became enmeshed through political parties. The political parties became the most significant political actors.

Yet, the newly established republic was unable to deal with the disrupting effects of pluralism in society. The state found the solution in strictly separating itself from the society. It kept the parliament at the center of politics but the parliament was restricted to a political party, namely the CHP. The two attempts, one in 1925 and the other in 1930, to install multi-party systems failed.

Hence, the state under the control of the bureaucratic elite formed an oligarchic rule. It single-handedly decided on who should rule and be ruled. The nationalist-secular middle class values drove the line that divided the ruler and the ruled. The political actors with “secular” values were granted the right to rule, whereas the others with “conservative-religious” values were reduced to be ruled. Thus, the state evolved back to a neutral state. The state is off limits to society.

The period of 1950-2002 witnessed a process of controlled opening of the state to society. The bureaucratic oligarchy allowed a multi-party system. The political parties such as the Democrat Party in the 1950s and the Motherland Party (ANAP) in the 1980s dominated the parliament and challenged the hegemony of the bureaucratic elite. The former broke down after the military coup in 1960, whereas the latter collapsed within itself and lost its parliamentary majority after the leadership change.

Besides, from the mid-1960s to the 1980 military coup, the state lost control of the society. The parliament fell short of absorbing pluralism, and this unrestricted ideological polarization unleashed bloody clashes on the street, especially from the mid-1970s till the coup. In the 1990s, with the decline of ANAP, the number of parties in the parliament rose. The parliament absorbed pluralism to an extent, yet it failed to provide a working coalition government to sustain political stability. This weakness of parliament eventually pushed the state to a deep legitimacy crisis in the late 1990s.

Democratization of Parliamentary System

However, after the AK Party came to power in 2002, power has gradually shifted from the secular middle class to the masses in the periphery. This power shift led to two important constitutional reform bills in 2007 and 2010. They were designed to curb the power of the bureaucracy. The constitutional reform in 2007 brought the popular election of the president. The presidential office, which was granted broad powers by the 1982 constitution, used to be elected by the parliament and served as a gate keeper for the bureaucratic oligarchy. The 2010 constitutional reform, on the other hand, reformed the judiciary system by limiting the powers of military courts.

These institutional changes were accompanied by the process of sociological equalization within the society. This change in the distribution of power in society and the loss of power urged the opposition to launch a new political discourse which targeted the AK Party with a negative view of democracy. It constantly criticized the government for establishing an authoritarian rule. In the meantime, the power vacuum in the bureaucracy was filled up by the Gülenists. Starting from 2012, the opposition and the Gülenists began to team up against the AK Party. The Gülenists attempted a coup twice. One through the Judiciary on 17 and 25 December in 2014. The other was through the military on 15 July 2016.

Upon these onslaughts against the government, the AK Party and the MHP agreed to embark on a new constitutional reform on 1 December 2016. The 2016 reform aspires to empower the political infrastructure of the country by shifting the government system towards presidentialism. It mainly seeks to shift the center of gravity towards the executive branch within the political system and strengthen democratic politics versus extra-political forces, namely the bureaucracy.

Presidentialism and the Republic

With presidentialism, the government seeks to strike a delicate balance between two opposing forces in society, pluralism and stability. Thus, on the one hand, it seeks to sustain pluralism in society by keeping the state open to the whole society. On the other hand, it struggles to maintain political stability by steering political parties to the center.

Indeed, this has been the basic motivation of the 1982 Constitution. It installed a multi-party parliament while introducing a 10 percent election threshold. More, it split the executive between the president and the council of ministers. The president, who was planned to be elected from the cadres of bureaucracy, was granted more powers and was supposed to keep the government in line with the bureaucracy.

The current constitutional reform shares the same motivation, emphasizing stability at the face of centrifugal societal forces, but with a caveat. First of all, it unites the executive by abolishing the office of prime minister. Second, it separates the presidential election from the parliamentary elections. Third, it deprives the parliament of its power of a vote of confidence. The parliament keeps its other powers that enable it to check and balance the executive, such as calling for new elections, debating and approving the budget, etc.

Thus, the constitutional reform that seeks to shift the government system towards presidentialism abides by the basic democratic norms. Moreover, it may serve to further the democratization of the country and create a better republic. Indeed, a republican order requires two conditions. First of all, it underlines the fact that rule is supposed to be a political rule, namely there should be no categorical difference between the ruler and the ruled. It is the rule by the people for the people. Secondly, the rule is supposed to be based not on power but rational discussion. Having equality and cultural and economic homogeneity among the members of the political community is a sine qua non of a republican order. These measures constitute its genuine and actual basis.

Furthermore, the current constitutional reform may endorse the process of sociological equalization and promotes cultural and economic homogeneity among the citizens without forsaking societal differences and pluralism. This is because it puts a premium on democratic politics in the face of extra-political forces and pushes political parties to address the whole society in order to get elected. In other words, it rules out coalition governments and shifts the center of gravity in the state towards democratic politics. In short, it gives priority to society’s will.

The draft currently being debated in parliament focuses on the essence of the relationship between the legislative, executive and judicial branches and the primary features of a presidential government system. Called the Presidential System indigenous to Turkey, the draft aims to discuss the design of checks and balances between state branches. In this context, there are two points vital for ensuring majority support in the parliament for the president: the timing of constituency and presidential elections, and the formula for presidential elections. After that, other checks and balances instruments, the decree power of the president, the power to repeat elections for both parliament and president, and the procedure for budget preparation can be discussed.

Concurrent Constituency and Presidential Elections

There are two attitudes towards how the timing of elections effect the majority support of the president in parliament. The first one argues that concurrent constituency and presidential elections could create a problem in terms of checks and balances, and such an election could mean both a majority of parliament and the president could be elected from the same political party.

The other argument is that the possibility of differentiation between the president and parliament would increase if elections were held at different periods. Especially, this possibility could become evident with runoff elections. The consequence of this difference would be a parliament that reflects the political mood at one point, but not at the point when the president is elected, leaving the two bodies out of step with public will.

A considerable part of criticism against the current amendments argues that they leave the legislator with little power against the executive. The supporters of this argument state that concurrent elections for the legislator and executive would lead to a political majority in both branches from the same political side. However, while empirical research based on comparative examples supports this argument, some research also shows that there are experiences which prove this argument wrong.

Even more, as the system is presented in the current amendment, runoff elections in the presidential system could reduce the occurrence of a political or ideological divide in state organs, thanks to coalitions based on popular political figures, especially in the second round of elections. So, the argument that such a system would lead to a single party dominating both the executive and legislative branches, should not be accepted as an absolute given.

Moreover, there is a reasonable argument for justifying the amendment: getting rid of instability created by the current parliamentary system. There are some executives working with a political majority in the legislatures that are from an opposing party. This situation is called a divided government, and leads to a deadlock in the system, especially for tasks that require cooperation between the legislature and the executive. So, concurrent elections should be evaluated in terms of solving this problem.

Mutual Power to Call for New Elections

Another issue of synchronism between the legislature and executive is having the same expiration date for these state organs. If this was the case, it would be possible to prevent the occurrence of an asymmetric balance of power between them, a situation which draws attention to another issue in the proposed amendment: a mutual power to call new elections for the presidency and the legislature.

One of the weaknesses of the presidential system is the possibility of a deadlock because of a strict separation of powers and related with that, a situation where both organs cannot cease the existence of each other. Apparently the amendment aims for the avoidance of the threat of deadlock in the system by granting the power to call new elections to both the president and the parliament.

Clearly, the proposed solution is not a common mechanism in current global examples, where presidents generally have the right to unilaterally call for a new parliament, called a rescission of parliament. Presidential systems in which presidents have the right to unilateral rescission, especially in Latin America states, experience regime crisis frequently, and when presidents are elected from non-political figures, meaning presidents who are not popular, the risk of a crisis increases. In practice, different political ideologies in the branches of power could ease dissolution, and in such systems, there are no constitutional mechanisms to safeguard against this problem. There are not many examples of this power for the president or legislator in presidential systems. Today, the constitutions of some countries in Latin America, such as Peru (article 134), Ecuador (article 148) and Venezuela (article 236) give this power to presidents.

For example, article 12 of the proposed amendment envisions a mutual renewal of elections. According to the draft, the Turkish Parliament (TBMM) can decide on new elections with a 3/5 ratio of total members, and in this case, the election of both branches is done together, and this concurrency is also valid if the decision to hold new elections is made by the president.

On the other hand, if parliament decides to repeat elections in the second term of office, the president can become a candidate one more time. The parliament and the president which will be reelected will be in power until elections occur. Also both the parliament members and the president will be elected for 5 years.

With this proposed amendment, the parliament and president would have the right to call for fresh elections. Thus, presidents do not solely have the power of dissolution of government, but either the legislator or the executive could decide for new elections, and as the amendment proposes, such elections would be for both branches, preventing this decision being made in an arbitrary manner. In effect, whoever decides to call for fresh elections must themselves be confident they will win power again.

Runoff Elections for the President

Part of the amendment, which is not so different from the current system, suggests runoff elections for president. In the first polling, if any candidate cannot win an absolute majority, there will be a second poll in which the two candidates who have the highest votes in the first poll would compete. In this poll, the candidate who has the plurality of votes will be elected as president. This ensures that there will be reconciliation (no matter the vote ratio in the first poll) on the winning candidate. So this situation would strengthen the democratic legitimacy of the president.

Presidential Enactments

According to a survey of current global systems, presidents as the head of the executive have the power to publish regulatory administrative acts to carry out or develop policies. In the United States, for example, the constitution does not give power to decree law directly to the president, but they use this power based on Article 2 of the constitution. These enactments, called “executive orders,” are administrative acts and also very important instruments for building various institutions, organizing or changing bureaucratic processes and executing laws which have already been approved by the legislature.

In the Turkish amendment being currently considered, there is a proposal to give the president power to enact such orders. According to Article 9 of the amendment, which aims to change article 104 of the current constitution, the “president can publish an enactment on executive issues.” In the same article, there are restrictions and rules on this power that preclude any such enactments from effecting:

• Fundamental rights, individual rights and duties stated in the first and second parts and political rights and duties in the fourth part in the second section of constitution.
• Issues which should be regulated exclusively by laws according to constitution.
• Issues which are regulated by laws clearly.
• If the enactments conflict with laws, the provisions of the law are valid.
• If parliament passed a law about an issue which is regulated by enactments, laws replace the enactments.

These restrictions and rules circumscribe the limits of executive orders, and will not violate legislative power, a major criticism of enactments being they could act as a de facto legislative power. Certainly, the same criticisms can be made of the power to publish statutory decrees by the government in the present system, and governments could publish these statutory decrees under empowering laws which are passed by parliament. So, according to the amendment, the president could have this power without empowering law.

However, it should be considered that current presidential systems are based on a strict separation of powers. Even more, the requirement of taking permission from parliament by the presidency as an executive position cannot be compatible with the spirit of a presidential system. At this point, it could be said that the limits of presidential enactments are not clear in the amendment. For instance, in article number 9 in the draft, there is a regulation with the issue. These regulations aim to prevent any damage to fundamental rights and freedoms that could be done by enactments. In the amendment, fundamental and individual rights and duties, as already enumerated in other parts of the constitution, are preserved clearly. On the other hand, presidential enactments could be published dealing with social and economic rights as enumerated in the second part of the third section of the constitution.

Enactments are under the monitor of the Constitutional Court, and that institution is also significant for the checks and balances mechanism. For example, in the possible situation of a conflict between enactments and laws, the Constitutional Court will be the authority for a solution.

Budget Preparation

Finally, the state budget is a way of interaction between the legislative and executive branches in many governmental systems. In presidential systems, this interaction becomes more powerful and important because the strict separation of powers creates a relationship based on mutual checks and balances through the budget.

The proposed Turkish amendment gives the authority to prepare budgets to the president, and this prepared budget needs the approval of parliament, as is the case in many presidential systems in the world today. Thanks to that, the legislator has the right to reject a budget prepared by the president when it deems it necessary. In this situation, the president could prepare a new and temporary budget according to the revaluation rate.

There are major mechanisms for ensuring checks and balances in the new system which are: 1) Concurrent constituency and presidential elections, 2) Concurrent renewal of elections, 3) A time limit for terms of office, 4) Runoff elections for presidents, 5) The power to publish enactments by the president on limited issues and under the supervision of the Constitutional Court to develop and execute policies, 6) And budget preparation as a power of the president but at the same time needing the approval of parliament.

In short, the Turkish Presidential System, which is the center of the proposed amendment, creates differentiations from the current system, not only institutionally but also in terms of the construction of checks and balances. This feature puts limits on the powers of the president and parliament, especially in terms of their relation with each other, and also aims to preserve their spheres of power from intervention by the other.

Turkey has achieved, to an extent, the former criterion. Indeed, the 13-years AK Party rule has lifted the semi-official barriers that had produced inequalities among Turkish citizens. Some citizens, especially those of Islamic and Kurdish identity, used to be less equal than others before the law. Their elevation to full citizenship has been accompanied by a wave of sociological equalization; as part of this wave, the large bulk of the lower classes has been upgraded to the middle class. Nevertheless, the second criterion, that of freedom, is yet to be carried out since a well-formed political system with a sound legal system, which is expected to constrain power, does not exist. The AK Party and its supporters highlight the fulfillment of the first criterion, the equalization of Turkish citizens. The opposition, on the other hand, insists that full democracy requires more. That is, the rule of law should be institutionalized in order to protect the rights of all citizens from the excesses of power.

Democracy is a contested concept. It is susceptible to many different articulations. Yet all these articulations share one basic idea: democracy is a form of political rule.

Indeed, the ongoing debate in Turkey’s public sphere over drafting a new constitution and shifting to a presidential system hovers around this democracy problematique. The AK Party asserts that the presidential system will further democracy by securing the equality of Turkish citizens, and best reflecting their will to the administration. The opposition, in contrast, contends that the presidential system will endanger democracy by serving the concentration of power and the infringement of the rule of law.

The process of equalization

The AK Party’s defense of the presidential system cannot be adequately grasped, and indeed, risks being seen as a step back from democracy, when one fails to take into consideration the importance of institutions in sustaining democracy. Ideally, the rationality of political institutions is measured by the quality of interaction that they provide in state-society relations. Hence, institutions are rational so long as they do not allow a gap or alienation between the state and society. Moreover, since society is a dynamic phenomenon, especially when it is a so-called transitional society, those institutions which objectify the power relations in society come under intermittent challenges. The emergent gap at such times reveals the contingent nature of political orders and requires a reorganizing of the political community’s institutional infrastructure.

Indeed, the AK Party itself is a product of such a historical break in Turkey. The Kemalist regime pursued a policy of alienation in state-society relations by closing the gates of the state to the majority of the society. These communities were relegated to the rank of second-class citizens and exposed to a series of procrustean assimilation policies. The institutional form of these socio-political relations was that of single-party rule, during the time period of 1923-1950. No political parties, other than the Kemalist CHP, were allowed in the parliament. After the 1950s, owing to international and societal pressures, the institutional form of rule evolved into a multi-party parliamentary regime under bureaucratic tutelage. However, the institutional instability and its growing legitimacy crisis triggered military intervention into Turkish politics four times in the second half of the twentieth century.

Some citizens, especially those of Islamic and Kurdish identity, used to be less equal than others before the law. Their elevation to full citizenship has been accompanied by a wave of sociological equalization.

The AK party came to power in 2002, when Turkey’s state institutions faced a total collapse. It was the ever-growing gap between the Kemalist regime and Turkish society that produced the AK Party. The AK Party, in return, has steadily enlarged its public support by promising to bridge the residual gap in state-society relations. This promise, in essence, involves reshaping Turkey’s institutional infrastructure in order to end the long-lasting alienation between the state and society. This has involved the dismantling of bureaucratic tutelage over the parliamentary system, and the democratization of civil-military relations. The 2007 reform bill, which brought about the election of a president directly by the people, was the apex of this endeavor. The president had formerly been elected by the parliament, under the direction of the bureaucracy, and, in essence, had served as the regime’s gate keeper in the executive branch of the government.

The rationalization process undertaken by the AK Party has transformed the government system towards presidentialism, the end result being that Turkey now has a directly elected president with considerable political powers. Today, the AK Party strives to finalize this rationalization process by legalizing the de facto situation with a new constitution based on a presidential system.

The warning against power 

Turkish politics is shaped by the clash between competing claims of political community. All of the political camps strategically employ the discourse of “rights” to dislocate the opposing hegemonic formations and open up room for themselves in the socio-political system. The political struggle, then, is not between the defender of “the right” (individual, freedom) and “the good” (society), but rather between contesting claims of the good. The warning that presidentialism will lead to a concentration of power should be thought through in this political context.

Presidentialism is a democratic government system; ideally, it will not allow for the violation of the rule of law. So arguing that presidentialism will inextricably lead to the encroachment of rights is baseless. Why, then, is this objection being raised by the opposition? This is occurring simply because presidentialism figures as a game-changer in Turkish politics. It will, first of all, produce a political context in which the political actor having the backing of the majority of society holds on to power. This means that populism will be the strongest weapon in the system. Secondly, presidentialism will enervate the bureaucracy vis-à-vis the elected politicians in decision-making. This means that society at last will dispense with the bureaucracy for good.

Clearly, the opposition is reluctant to shift to presidentialism since it has been proven that the AK Party is invincible when populism is the only game in town. Moreover, the basic strategy of the main opposition parties (the CHP and the MHP) is to keep the civil-military bureaucracy in politics. This requires crippling civil politics, thereby producing a power vacuum to justify the return of bureaucracy. This will inevitably end up diminishing the role of the elected representatives of the people in decision-making. The CHP’s defense of the parliamentary regime in the face of the presidential system, or, more concretely, the call for undoing the 2007 reform bill which enables the direct popular election of the president, is motivated by this strategy. The Turkish parliamentary system harbors more pitfalls to allow room for bureaucracy in politics.

Quo Vadis?

But should we stop defending rights against power? Turkey should continue to rationalize its political system as Germany did in 1949 with the Basic Law, France in 1958 with the Fifth Republic, and Britain under Tony Blair in the 1990s. These are all examples of attempts to empower the executive vis-à-vis the legislation and extra-political actors, without overstepping democratic politics. So the presidential system in Turkey should abide by the basic rules of developed democracies, namely the separation of powers and the rule of law.

Presidentialism is a democratic government system; ideally, it will not allow for the violation of the rule of law.

Beside this institutional step to protect rights against power, the second move should be to ease the tension between rights and “the good” in politics. Indeed, the primacy of rights exaggerates the subjectivity of individuals, whereas the primacy of the good does the same for the social whole. The slavish defense of rights carries the risk of political instability, which might unintentionally bring greater violation of citizens’ rights. The imprudent tendency to objectify the good leads to turning a blind eye to social injustices and disrespect, which might end up dissolving social ties and tearing down the social whole.

One way to break this deadlock of self-defeating politics may be to center inter-subjectivity in politics, which includes toning down political polarization and initiating a genuine and meaningful discussion of the common good. Unless all the political actors put this goal on their agenda, reason is doomed to fail against power. And then no complaint of power could be justified.