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he geopolitical upheavals experienced in the international security environment in recent years are fundamentally altering the position of defense spending within economic policy. Increasing strategic competition on a global scale – particularly deepening security risks in the Middle East, such as the Russia-Ukraine War and the US/Israel-Iran War– alongside energy supply security, supply chain continuity and the global race for critical technologies, is leading to a reshaping of defense spending. In particular, NATO’s decision to raise member states’ defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) in the long term signals the start of a new era, not only in security policies but also in global industrial production and technology investment. This has sparked a debate as to whether defense spending could become the new engine of economic growth.

For many years, defense spending has been assessed within the framework of the opportunity cost approach. This approach argues that public resources allocated to defense have a restrictive effect—albeit to a relative degree—on economic growth, as they are diverted from productive sectors such as education, healthcare or infrastructure investment. However, the technological transformation and changes in the security architecture over the past twenty years have necessitated a reassessment of this approach. Today, defense expenditure is viewed not merely as current expenditure-focused public spending aimed at building military capability, but as multifaceted investments that support high-tech production, research and development (R&D) activities, and export capacity.

How do defense expenditures affect economic equilibrium?

The economic effects of defense expenditures are now analyzed not only from the perspective of fiscal policy but also from the perspectives of industrial policy and technological transformation. The economic impact of defense expenditures is realized through a multi-stage transmission mechanism. In the first stage, public expenditure stimulates demand, thereby increasing aggregate demand, expanding production volumes, raising capacity utilization rates and supporting industrial production. Due to their high capital intensity, defense projects generate increased production across numerous sub-sectors, notably machinery manufacturing, electronics, metallurgy, composite materials, software and communications technologies. Thus, defense expenditure creates a powerful multiplier mechanism that mobilizes a broad supply chain.

In the second stage, R&D investments come into play. Defense projects involve significant R&D expenditure due to their high-technology nature. Technologies developed within the defense industry are transferred to other sectors over time, thereby creating long-term positive effects on productivity.

The third stage is the external balance channel. Owing to its high technology intensity, the defense industry is one of the sectors with the highest export value per kilogram. The export of defense products contributes to the current account balance and, at the same time, enables countries to move up the global technology value chain. For this reason, the defense industry is today recognized as one of the strategic determinants of high-value-added exports.

However, the effectiveness of this transfer mechanism depends largely on domestic production capacity. In countries that procure defense systems largely through imports, increasing defense budgets lead to significant outflows of foreign exchange, whereas in economies with domestic production capacity, the same expenditure is channeled back into the economy in the form of increased production, employment, technology development and exports. Consequently, the economic return on defense expenditure is linked not so much to the size of the budget as to the extent to which expenditure can be channeled into the domestic industry.

In this new global context, Türkiye’s production capacity constitutes a notable advantage. As a result of the localization policies implemented over the past twenty years, dependence on foreign sources in the defense industry has been significantly reduced. Within the defense industry, capabilities in design, system integration and high-technology production have been markedly enhanced. Consequently, defense expenditure has evolved from a structure heavily reliant on imports to a production model that generates domestic added value.

What is the contribution of Turkish defense industry companies to the economy?

One of the most significant indicators of this transformation is Türkiye’s rise in global defense exports. Over the past twenty years, Türkiye’s share of global defense exports has grown steadily and, as a result, Türkiye has become one of the key suppliers in the global defense market. This rise in export performance demonstrates that the defense industry has transformed into a strategic production ecosystem that competes in international markets, exports technology and generates foreign exchange.

Institutional transformation is equally noteworthy. Whilst in 2009 ASELSAN was the sole company representing Türkiye amongst the world’s top 100 defense industry firms, in recent years TUSAŞ, ROKETSAN, ASFAT and MKE have joined ASELSAN on the same list. The fact that companies such as STM, HAVELSAN, FNSS and BMC have entered the global top 100 defense industry companies in different years demonstrates that Türkiye’s defense industry has evolved from a single-company-centered structure into a multi-stakeholder, deepened and technologically diversified industrial ecosystem.

This rise in international company rankings is directly reflected in Türkiye’s industrial performance. An analysis of the Istanbul Chamber of Industry’s ISO 500 survey reveals that defense industry companies are steadily strengthening their positions among Türkiye’s largest industrial organizations in terms of sales from production. It is particularly noteworthy that, as of 2025, TUSAŞ has become Türkiye’s seventh-largest industrial organization, while ASELSAN has become the ninth-largest. Export performance at the company level also confirms this transformation. While ASELSAN’s export revenues have reached an all-time high in recent years, TUSAŞ has risen to the status of a key manufacturer within global aerospace and defense supply chains, with export volumes hovering at the billion-dollar level. This picture demonstrates that the Turkish defense industry has gained international competitiveness not only in platform production but also in areas such as electronic systems, avionics solutions, software, engineering services and systems integration.

How will defense expenditure take shape in the coming period?

In this regard, NATO’s plan to accelerate defense investments over the next decade is of considerable importance for Türkiye. This does not merely signify a larger export market for Türkiye. It also holds the potential to strengthen Türkiye’s strategic position within the supply chains of NATO countries, thanks to its production infrastructure with high local content, advanced engineering capabilities and defense companies capable of competing on a global scale. The growing demand from Alliance countries for defense industry products is creating long-term investment and export opportunities for the Turkish defense industry.

In conclusion, the global defense economy has entered a new phase of structural transformation. Defense expenditure is regarded not merely as public spending to meet security needs, but as strategic investments that support technology development, high-value-added production and export capacity. In the coming period, competition between countries will be shaped not so much by the size of defense budgets, but by the capacity of industrial ecosystems to convert these budgets into production, technology and exports.

The defense industry infrastructure that Türkiye has established over the past 20 years, and in particular its clusters, will provide a significant competitive advantage during this new period of expansion in global defense spending. For this reason, the defense industry will continue to be one of the key pillars of both national security and Türkiye’s development strategy, which is based on sustainable growth, high-tech production and exports.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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he Republic of Turkey hosted a NATO Summit once again after a gap of twenty-two years. Whilst the Ukraine–Russia War has triggered a shift in the perception of threats in Europe, the emergence of new security risks stemming from a potential US/Israel–Iran conflict has further heightened the importance of the Summit. Statements made by heads of state and government prior to the Summit indicated that it would be the most significant gathering in recent years in terms of ‘outcomes and decisions taken’.

In this context, the fact that NATO’s future vision was shaped in Ankara, given that NATO is itself a security organization, holds particular significance. Turkey’s central position within NATO, as well as its capabilities in the defense and aerospace sectors, are drawing attention in the context of the Alliance’s future. When the final communiqué is considered, it is evident that NATO is transitioning to a new security architecture referred to as the ‘3.0 era’.

Whilst Ankara hosted the 36th NATO Summit of Heads of State and Government, defense spending and the defense industry were at the heart of the strategic decisions taken by the Alliance in Ankara. Ensuring that Alliance partners adhere to the stated commitment regarding the targeted defense spending limits was a priority. In parallel, the development of defense and security cooperation and relations came to the fore. Discussions held throughout the Summit centered on the role of the capabilities achieved by the Turkish defense industry in the Alliance’s future, and how and to what extent these capabilities could be utilized.

In addition to the statements made, the Defence Industry Forum held as part of the Summit addressed potential areas for Alliance partners to work together and build a sustainable ecosystem. Hosted by the President of the Turkish Defence Industry, Prof. Dr Haluk Görgün, and organized at TUSAŞ as part of the NATO Summit Defence Industry Forum (NSDIF), a reception was held where the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area.

Burden-sharing among allies

As part of the Summit, the defense industry forum (NSDIF) – which marked a number of firsts – was held at the ATO Congresium. As announced by NATO, bilateral and multilateral military, security and cooperation agreements were signed for the first time under the NSDIF’26 framework. The agreements, estimated to have a total value exceeding 50 billion dollars, were primarily structured around the following key areas: defense investments and the Alliance partners’ ‘5 per cent’ commitment, capacity enhancement through multinational cooperation, the development of defense industry partnerships, and the improvement of processes from serial production to sustainment. Within the framework of NSDIF’26, emphasis was placed on the importance of developing high-tech and innovation-focused solutions tailored to the evolving battlefield.

NATO’s long-standing target of 2 per cent defense spending was accepted by Alliance partners as a radical increase to “5 per cent” in response to the growing and evolving threat perception. Recently, assessments have been carried out regarding the independent and collective activities undertaken to achieve this objective. Whilst the aim is to significantly increase burden-sharing within the Alliance, the objective is to enter a new era in which allies outside the US (Europe and Canada) directly assume their own security responsibilities. Whilst the concept of “strategic autonomy” is being defined within the Alliance, the initial objective is to establish the financial infrastructure.

The aim is for Alliance partners to increase their defense spending to 5 per cent of their gross domestic product (GDP), which represents a significant economic volume, whilst also developing production capabilities beyond mere procurement. However, the fact that multinational projects implemented, particularly in Europe, have failed to deliver the desired results, due both to their lengthy timelines and their structural nature, has opened the door to alternative approaches: the “Trusted Partner”. Although Turkey has been a NATO member for a quarter of a century, the fact that its capabilities in the defense industry have not been ‘effectively’ utilized within the Alliance has been a subject of debate, particularly over the last 10 years. Turkey, an Alliance member that has also been subject to both covert and overt embargoes, is now being highlighted as a central actor in NATO’s new era.

Mass production capacity and centralized production

The Ukraine–Russia War has highlighted the inadequacy of stockpiles and inventories amongst the world’s armed forces in the face of protracted conflict. Furthermore, a similar scenario has manifested itself in various forms within the US-Israel-Iran triangle. In the face of the reality of the ‘war of attrition’, which has been redefined in the present day, it is imperative that allies ensure their stocks of ammunition and military equipment are sustainable. The signing of supply agreements at the summit, totalling over 50 billion dollars, aims to transform the defence industry from a purely commercial sector into a direct deterrent. In this context, particular attention was drawn to items with high consumption rates, such as artillery ammunition, aircraft bombs and air defence missiles. In this regard, the allies’ efforts – for example, Canada’s increase in artillery ammunition production capacity and Turkey’s allocation of additional funding for the ‘Iron Dome’ air defence systems – were the first examples to be highlighted.

Attention was drawn to the negative effects of projects implemented in a multinational framework in European countries, both on the execution of the projects and on production capacity and capabilities. In assessments aimed at improving this situation, ‘project management’ and ‘autonomous/centralised’ approaches emerged as key priorities. The aim is for key actors in projects to be carried out on a multinational basis, as well as allied nations acting as subcontractors, to implement more effective process management. In this way, both the production capabilities and key areas such as sustainment and logistics of projects carried out on a multinational basis are being improved. Furthermore, Turkey’s long-standing vision of “lifting covert and overt embargoes between allies” aligns directly with this topic addressed at the Summit.

NATO is demonstrating increasing sensitivity regarding the management of interoperability amongst allies. Multinational collaborations are being implemented whilst taking into account the operational needs of the allies. The decision taken at the Ankara Summit to strengthen the transport aircraft fleet, in addition to the NATO-led tanker aircraft fleet, underscored this commitment. The fleet to be established with A400M transport aircraft will be operated to meet the operational needs of the allies. In addition to the transport fleet, in which the Turkish defence industry also holds a share, Turkey will take a leading role in establishing a space-based communications and early warning system through the IMECE project.

The allocation of an additional $24 billion budget for the Iron Dome is significant not only for Turkey but also for the Alliance’s air and missile defence capabilities. Roketsan’s demonstration of its missile systems in the field of precision-guided systems also attracted attention. Turkey’s capabilities in mass production and high technology are being utilised more actively than ever before to meet diverse requirements. In particular, Turkey has gained increasing importance in recent times with solutions such as cyber security and encrypted communications. As emphasised at the Summit, NATO aims to structure its capabilities not only around assets such as ships and aircraft, but also through integrative elements such as cyberspace, communications and intelligence.

Conclusion: An increasing role and key messages

As part of the NATO Defence Industry Forum, the capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to participating delegations at a reception held at TUSAŞ, through both flight displays and an exhibition in the static display area. The delegations were greeted by the modern instruments of the battlefield on display: the Altay tank, ARMA armored vehicles, MKE’s TOLGA air defense solution, ROKETSAN’s ballistic missiles, and Baykar and TUSAŞ’s manned and unmanned aerial platforms. In addition to all this, demonstrations were held to showcase the current state of the aviation sector: the GÖKBEY general-purpose helicopter, the T129 ATAK attack helicopter, the HÜRKUŞ basic trainer aircraft, the HÜRJET advanced jet trainer, the ANKA III strategic bomber, the ANKA-S, the Bayraktar AKINCI UAV and the Bayraktar TB3 unmanned aerial vehicle, all of which demonstrated their capabilities through flight displays.

The capabilities of the Turkish defense industry were demonstrated to delegates not merely through a ‘catalogue’, but directly at the production facilities and via live flight demonstrations. The presence of both executives and project engineers from the relevant companies on site enabled the evaluation of both the products and potential partnerships. In short, the reception provided a unique platform for increasing defense and aerospace exports and establishing new partnerships.

Turkey’s production of systems that are fully compliant with NATO standards (STANAG) and have proven themselves on the battlefield supports strategic interoperability within the Alliance. This, in turn, enables Turkey to export significant quantities of defense systems to its Alliance partners. According to 2025 figures, 56 per cent of Turkey’s exports, totaling 10.56 billion dollars, were made directly to the European Union, NATO member states and the United States. These figures are, in themselves, a testament to the quality and reliability of Turkish defence industry products, which meet Western standards. Furthermore, there is a growing interest in products that have proven themselves on the battlefield.

This reinforces the desire to implement ‘joint projects’, as seen during Belgium’s recent high-level visit to Turkey. The Belgian firm developing the turret proposed to Turkish land vehicle manufacturers: “Let’s integrate our turret into your armoured vehicle and sell them together.” In every discussion regarding Turkey, the door to cooperation is being opened with the message: “You have high-quality products, and we want to benefit from working with you.” Meanwhile, Spain’s supply of the HÜRJET fighter aircraft, Portugal’s warships, Italy’s unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and Poland’s electronic warfare systems are strengthening Turkey’s central position within the Alliance in this field.

In short, the Ankara Summit is more than just a platform for delivering political messages; it represents a critical turning point where the obstacles to defense industry cooperation among allies will be discussed. It was clearly emphasized at this summit that any form of export restriction or covert embargo imposed by allies against one another under the NATO umbrella ultimately weakens the Alliance’s own collective deterrence. It is abundantly clear that Turkey’s high-tech production capacity is not a competitive factor to be excluded or restricted amongst allies. Turkey’s position should be viewed as that of a ‘regional production hub’ which will optimize the Alliance’s overall capabilities whilst also reducing logistical costs.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

The Turkish aviation industry has gained significant momentum, which is reflected in both exports and Turkey’s strengthening position in foreign policy. This increases Turkey’s influence as a smart power, not only in the region where it is located but also on a global scale. For example, BAYKAR has set a new record by exporting $5.5 billion worth of defense industry equipment. Similarly, other prominent Turkish companies such as TUSAŞ and ASELSAN have made significant contributions to this sector.

In 2023, Turkey exported 230 different types of defense equipment to 185 countries, making Turkey one of the leading nations in air combat and defense technology. Advanced aircraft such as Kızıl Elma, Kemankeş, and TB3 will further enhance the country’s capabilities.

Turkey’s first indigenous fifth-generation fighter, the KAAN, successfully completed its maiden flight last month. With this achievement, Turkey joins an exclusive group of nations, along with the United States, the Russian Federation, and China, capable of developing fifth-generation fighter aircraft.

Very recently, ASELSAN announced that it has begun test flights with F-16s of an advanced high-tech pilot’s helmet called “Tulgar”, a Helmet-Mounted Display System, which is integrated with advanced technology and powered by software developed in Turkey. This helmet is specially designed for KAAN. The question now is what these developments mean for Turkey’s defense technology and their broader strategic implications.

Obviously, Turkey’s broader national technology initiative is driven by a concerted effort of various private and state-owned companies. It aims to promote the production of critical technologies that are vital to the country’s security and sovereignty. Achieving this capability is key not only to becoming a global player in critical and cutting-edge technologies but also to strengthening national independence in defense capabilities.

The importance of producing a national fighter such as the KAAN is obvious, but the abilty to produce key components, such as the Tulgar helmet, is  a breakthrough. This development underscores the importance of both comprehensive projects and specific innovations that enhance their operational effectiveness.

Technical Insights for Tulgar and How It Compares to the F-35 Helmet

According to the information document provided publicly by ASELSAN, the Tulgar helmet features a visor-projected color display with a 40-degree field of view and integrates digital night vision. It employs a hybrid (inertial and optical) head-tracking system to provide high-fidelity tracking in pilot’s head movements, critical in modern combat scenarios. The helmet is lightweight, weighing less than 2.1 kg, including the oxygen mask, and supports the ARINC-818-2 and Display Port video interfaces, essential for modern avionics. These specifications are designed to enhance the pilot’s situational awareness and mission effectiveness by merging high-resolution images and environmental awareness directly into the pilot’s line of sight.

The Tulgar’s capabilities parallel those developed for the F-35 helmet used on the U.S. advanced fighter jet. Like its U.S. counterpart, the Tulgar uses sophisticated helmet-mounted displays to provide pilots with immersive simulations that enhance training and mission readiness. These displays incorporate augmented reality, night vision, and data-link capabilities to provide pilots with real-time, 360-degree views of their surroundings. Notably, the F-35 helmet is an integral part of the aircraft’s system, significantly impacting its operational capabilities at a cost of approximately $400,000 each.

The helmet’s design incorporates lightweight materials and is customized to fit the individual pilot, improving comfort and reducing fatigue during long missions. Active noise reduction helps minimize cockpit noise, allowing the pilot to maintain focus and situational awareness. Furthermore, compatibility with 3D audio systems enhances auditory signals critical to spatial awareness and threat identification.

Overall, the development of the Tulgar helmet represents a significant step forward for Turkey’s defense technology and promises to increase its autonomy in the field of advanced military technologies. By equipping the KAAN fighter with such sophisticated components, Turkey not only enhances its operational capabilities but also positions itself as a formidable player in the global defense technology arena, capable of producing world-class military hardware in line with its strategic security interests.

Moreover, ASELSAN’S development of the Tulgar helmet represents a significant leap forward in high-tech equipment for KAAN fighter pilots. More than just a protective gear, the Tulgar is designed to be an integral part of the pilot’s sensory apparatus, dramatically enhancing situational awareness and combat readiness. This initiative underscores Turkey’s commitment to integrating cutting-edge technology into its defense systems and positions Tulgar as a critical component in modern air warfare.

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n a surprising turn of events, Germany has announced its decision not to oppose the sale of Eurofighter jets to Saudi Arabia. This unexpected move comes as a notable departure from Germany’s previous stance on arms sales to the Middle Eastern nation. Foreign Minister Annalena Baerbock conveyed this decision after a meeting with Israeli President Isaac Herzog and Foreign Minister Israel Katz in Jerusalem.

Historically, Germany has been reluctant to endorse arms sales to Saudi Arabia due to concerns about human rights violations and regional stability. However, the latest statement by Baerbock suggests a shift in perspective, highlighting Saudi Arabia’s contribution to Israel’s security.

Baerbock emphasized that Saudi Arabia plays a crucial role in enhancing Israel’s security by intercepting missiles launched by Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The Foreign Minister acknowledged Riyadh’s efforts to counter the threat posed by the Houthis and stated that Germany would not stand against the idea of Britain providing more Eurofighters to Saudi Arabia.

The decision underscores the intricate geopolitical dynamics of the region and how nations collaborate in response to shared security concerns. Baerbock noted, “Saudi Arabia is a key contributor to Israel’s security and is helping to stem the risk of a regional conflagration.”

Rationale Behind the Decision

The shift in Germany’s stance appears to be rooted in the recognition of Saudi Arabia’s strategic role in maintaining regional stability. Baerbock’s statement suggests that the German government sees Saudi Arabia as a valuable partner in addressing common security challenges, and this perception has influenced its decision on Eurofighter sales.

The Eurofighter is a joint project involving the United Kingdom, Italy, Germany, and Spain. As Germany’s approval is required for sales of these fighter jets, the decision not to oppose the sale to Saudi Arabia reflects a coordinated effort among the participating nations.

Houthi rebels have been a source of regional instability, targeting vessels in the Southern Red Sea and threatening Israel-bound ships. In response to these attacks, the United States recently announced the creation of a multinational mission named Operation Prosperity Guardian to counter Houthi aggression.

A significant shift in German foreign policy

The geopolitical landscape in the Middle East has been further complicated by the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hamas. The Israeli onslaught on Gaza has resulted in a humanitarian crisis, with significant international concern about potential war crimes or genocide. This complex situation adds layers of intricacy to diplomatic relations in the region.

Germany’s decision not to oppose Eurofighter sales to Saudi Arabia marks a significant shift in its foreign policy approach to arms deals in the Middle East. The acknowledgment of Saudi Arabia’s role in enhancing regional security and countering common threats demonstrates the evolving nature of diplomatic relationships in a dynamic geopolitical environment. The implications of this decision will likely reverberate across international relations, prompting further analysis of the evolving alliances in the Middle East.

Source: Anadolu Agency

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO and its close partners have increasingly provided military support to Ukraine. The  nature of the support has changed over time and some policies that were previously avoided in order not to cross Russia’s “red lines” have been chosen. For instance, after much controversy, Germany authorized the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Britain provided Challenger tanks. Poland and Slovakia gave Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft. This military support has had a significant impact on the course of the war. Thanks to the military aid given to Ukraine, countries have removed Soviet legacy weapons from their inventories. These were mostly replaced by American military equipment. With the intensive military support provided, the Ukrainian army has become considerably more modernized than it was before the war.

However, Ukraine does not believe that the current military support is sufficient, at least in the long term. On July 11, the first day of NATO’s Vilnius Summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO for its lack of a timeline for his country’s future NATO membership, calling it “unprecedented and absurd.” Ukraine’s main goal in the summit is to be presented with a road map for NATO membership. In this regard, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and senior Ukrainian officials have frequently made statements and succeeded in putting pressure on NATO. It was even stated that Zelensky’s participation in the summit would be meaningless if there was no signal from the Alliance in this direction. Thus, Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership and the security guarantees that could be provided until then became one of the main items on the agenda ahead of the Vilnius summit.

In September 2022, Zelensky announced that Ukraine was already a de facto NATO member and that it was applying for membership in order to formalize its status. Ukraine is currently awaiting an official invitation to become a member in response to this application. In Ukraine’s view, if accession to NATO is not assured at the end of the war, a new war with Russia will be inevitable. The only way to prevent this is to deter Russia by Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

While Ukraine’s NATO membership will only be possible after the end of the war, it will be difficult to draw a clear road map with concrete security guarantees in the interim period, as security guarantees are inherently ambiguous. In a climate of uncertainty, many countries are more likely to avoid such commitments and to show a desire to maintain military support for Ukraine. Only a clear commitment by the United States can resolve this dilemma.

On the other hand, NATO’s top priority since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has naturally been to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. In this scope, various measures have been taken, in particular to increase the Alliance’s level of combat readiness. New multinational battlegroups were established and deployed to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia; Turkish soldiers are serving in the groups deployed to Bulgaria and Hungary.

Of course, mobilizing such a large multinational force in a short period of time is a very demanding and costly endeavor which requires the member states to increase their military expenditures in many dimensions such as personnel, logistics, and equipment.

Lastly, by ratifying Finland’s accession in March 2023, Turkey had demonstrated its historic and principled support for NATO’s open-door policy and sent a message to Sweden, which was given the green light by Turkey on the first day of the Summit. Indeed, the trilateral memorandum had broken the deadlock in Madrid last year and shown that a diplomatic compromise could be reached quickly. This is because such major summits always offer the possibility of last-minute solutions, and this was the case with Turkey’s last-minute green light for Sweden’s NATO membership. Turkey will expect Sweden to continue to increase its efforts against the fight against terrorism in its all forms in the coming period.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the scope of support for Ukraine has been diverse and constantly expanding. Supporting Ukraine has now become a trend with weapons and platforms of strategic value being provided to the country. The support has been effective, especially in Ukraine’s newly launched operation. Yet, this effect is only visible in certain areas and the military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s withdrawal from all regions it occupied. The main reason for this is that such support could deepen the war or escalate the conflict by provoking unpredictable responses from Russia.

Military support in the absence of air superiority—as is currently the case of Ukraine against Russia—prevents Ukraine from achieving the capability to drive Russia completely out of the region and regain some of its territory. There may be different and more rapid developments once the F-16s are delivered and deployed to the battlefield after the training period. But for now, military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s defeat or to force Moscow to negotiate peace.

Can Ukraine become a NATO member? It seems unlikely that NATO will support this. Yes, at least 21 NATO members support Ukraine’s membership, but the continued occupation is one of the biggest obstacles to membership. NATO is unlikely to take such a risk.

Security guarantees could be considered in this context, but they are not very possible without agreement and foresight on how the future of the war will develop. Even now, security guarantees are unlikely within NATO. Even with the support of countries at the level of bilateral relations, it seems that member countries will not be able to provide Ukraine with a security guarantee that could end the conflict with Russia.

In the meantime, NATO’s strategy document, the new Strategic Concept, published last year, does not address the China issue in detail. However, this is the first time that China has been identified as a strategic challenge, given NATO’s post-Cold War history and transformation. At this stage, China poses more of a political and economic challenge than a military threat to NATO, the Alliance’s member countries, and the region they shape. It appears that NATO is not yet ready to portray China as a threat.

The U.S. perspective in the Sino-American rivalry is to transform NATO into a global organization, but not all NATO members share this view. For the time being, it does not seem possible for NATO as a whole to act against China. However, depending on how the dimensions of the Washington-Beijing rivalry evolve in the coming period, NATO may renew its position internally. That said, in the short term, it is not possible to define China as a threat.

Military assistance to Ukraine and its NATO membership are two separate matters. In fact, there is almost complete consensus among Alliance members to provide military assistance to Ukraine. Although some NATO members, such as Germany, were initially reluctant, they have come around to Washington’s line under pressure from their domestic public opinion, Europe, and the United States.

In the early stages of the Russia-Ukraine war, Berlin was only prepared to provide Ukraine with troops, but it has now supplied the country with Leopard 2 tanks and advanced air defence missiles. From this point of view, NATO, which has organized itself very quickly and decisively to support Ukraine militarily, will continue this support until it achieves its goals with regard to Russia.

There are already problems with the production of ammunition for certain weapons due to their intensive use on the Ukrainian front, yet, one of the most important factors determining the course of the struggle between NATO and Russia will be the production of weapons and ammunition, given that Russia is experiencing similar problems to a much greater extent.

The issue of Ukraine’s NATO membership, which is expected to be one of the main items on the agenda at the Vilnius summit, has caused serious disagreement between member states. Some, particularly the Baltic and several Eastern European countries, argue that Ukraine should become a member of NATO quickly, while others, such as the United States and Germany, where there is intense internal debate on the issue, oppose such a quick decision.

Those in favor of a more cautious approach suggest to wait until the end of the war to decide on the issue, fearing that Ukraine’s possible NATO membership during the war would draw them into direct armed conflict with Russia and would also complicate peace negotiations with Russia. They are considering postponing a decision in the hope that, at the end of the war, there will be a weakened Russia unable to oppose Ukraine’s NATO membership. Therefore, it seems unlikely that a decision on Ukraine’s NATO membership will be taken at the Vilnius summit.

However, given the establishment of a NATO-Ukraine Council and the strong likelihood that Ukraine will not be required to meet the preconditions of the Membership Action Plan for the accession of new members, such as the fight against corruption, which was previously included in the Membership Action Plan adopted at the Bucharest Summit, the door will be left open for Ukraine’s membership in the medium term. This issue will be closely linked to the development of NATO’s Russia policy and the outcome of the war. Moreover, Russia’s policy towards the West will be crucial to Ukraine’s NATO membership.

For NATO members, such as Italy and Spain, which have not yet resolved their economic problems caused by the Euro debt crisis, increasing their military spending from 1.5% to more than 2% would mean additional problems for their budget balances. In addition, the military spending of NATO members such as Canada, Belgium, the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, and Ireland remains well below the Alliance’s target. It should be recalled that NATO has set the 2% limit as a minimum target, and Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has persistently called for more than 2% military spending in the member states he has visited.

While Russia’s aggression in Ukraine has created a strong motivation for NATO to increase military spending, the disruptions it has caused to energy and food supplies, and prices, and the resulting economic challenges have left many members struggling to find the financial resources to increase their military spending. It is worth noting that NATO members, especially those with growing economic problems, will find it difficult to meet the Alliance’s targets for increasing military spending.

Meanwhile, the U.S. administration wants to see its NATO allies on its side in the fight against China, just as it has done with Russia. Yet, it is no secret that there are members who have reservations about this; Germany, France, and Turkey are among such countries, albeit for different reasons.

In the aftermath of the Trump era, European NATO members are struggling to trust the United States, making it difficult for them to follow Washington’s lead, especially when it comes to a policy towards China. The same reluctance was also present about a policy towards Russia; however, the Russia-Ukraine war helped to remove this reluctance and align countries behind the U.S. Now Washington wants to capitalize on this shock momentum and rally its European allies behind its line against China.

In addition to the shock effect of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, the U.S. has another advantage in rallying the Europeans behind it: “American friends” in Europe. These “American friends,” commonly known as Atlanticists, are everywhere in Europe. They are in power in countries like Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland, and are partners in coalition governments in countries like Germany.

Given that China has not made a mistake similar to Russia’s aggression against Ukraine, but instead is trying to create a sphere of influence for itself through economic cooperation, and given its close economic ties with some European countries, it will not be as easy for Washington to rally NATO members behind its fight against Beijing as it has been to rally them against Moscow.

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n Original Sin: Power, Technology and War in Outer Space, Dr. Bleddyn E. Bowen presents the sobering reality of space technology; its development to enhance the killing power of the state.

Bowen discusses the political, strategic, and social causes and consequences of the Global Space Age and sees it as an outgrowth of the international system actors within it. The book provides a global view of international politics of space and its increasingly multipolar environment, and masterfully links technopolitics to power politics.

Q. What is the original sin? How did nations first decide to pursue space power?

It’s tied up in the Thermonuclear Revolution, through the pursuit of military power. If it wasn’t for the perceived military benefits of being able to launch nuclear weapons, you would not have had the very large sums of money poured into these very temperamental, exotic new technologies in the 1940s and ’50s. The scenario would be similar for satellite technologies; they were very temperamental and unknown. The potential benefits were so huge that both superpowers’ military industrial complexes in the early Cold War put resources into it, and got the things working that then opened up access to space for all sorts of other applications as well.

The original sin refers to the military interest in developing those very first technologies that opened up the entire space. It started with the Sputnik shock. The launch of Sputnik in 1957 was the product of the Soviet missile arms and nuclear project. It wasn’t just to have a demonstration; Khrushchev did not plan that. It was very much Sergei Korolev saying, “Well, we might as well put a demonstration satellite up there.”

They were building those rockets to launch nuclear weapons. Korolev was told he could only work on the satellite in his spare time, so that the work did not interfere with developing them as missiles with nuclear weapons. So, Korolev and his teams worked on Sputnik in their own time, not on the main line of work. Even the very first satellite launch was just the tip of the iceberg of what was a massive military nuclear buildup.

Q. How has the use of space technology evolved from back then?

What we have today are just mature and advanced versions of the same basic technological system. They are often decades old. GPS is 50 years old. We just have a very advanced version of it today compared to 50 years ago. So, it’s about the spread and the increased availability of the services rather than a change in the technology as such.

It didn’t happen overnight, but by the 1990s most of the kinds of satellite service types that we use today had been developed in their earliest generations, or sometimes even the second or third generations.

Satellite TV, for example, came out of military command and control systems. The Tokyo Olympics were broadcast by satellite in 1964; it was the first major sports event to be broadcast by satellite. That’s an example where the actual service and technology have been there for a long time, but it’s far more ubiquitous now.

Satellite navigation is another one. Various parts of the military and civilian economy in the United States were already using the very first services of GPS in the late 1980s. Today, those services are just far more accessible to everyone rather than just specialized organizations.

Similarly, with satellite imagery; one of the applications was in 1960 when the first Corona spy satellite images came back. Those things have been around for a very, very long time; now, you have a lot more commercial companies doing that, which means the private sector, and even individuals who have the money can purchase those kinds of images now, and get them much more quickly as well.

However, I’m not optimistic about that future, because if anything of value is found that is economically feasible to develop or exploit, then selfish interests will probably prevail because the precedent is already there in Earth orbit. If you want to look at the actual competition for resources in space, it’s been happening for decades already in the geostationary satellite belt.

At geostationary orbit, 36,000 kilometers above the equator, there’s a finite space and finite radio frequency spectrum to use, and different countries have to file at the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) to get the right to use the particular radio communication frequency and the location to put their satellite. They are given a time limit to get their satellites up there and to start using it. Then, they must continuously use it and have a satellite there, or they lose the right to that slot and somebody else can bid for it. It’s pretty much on a first-come-first-serve basis.

The geostationary belt and Earth orbit are so valuable for military and economic purposes that there is no truly equitable method of governance there. It may occur in the future; politics is about possibilities. However, that’s the precedence we’ve set over the last 70 years, and it’s not encouraging. I don’t think we’re going to have profitable moon mining anytime soon. I think that might take another 100 years or more. But if the moon becomes economically very valuable, there aren’t many positive precedents to use sadly.

Q. Do actors hog up these strategic locations? Is there any regulation that prevents such an act?

In terms of geostationary satellite slots and frequency use, it is first come, first served, and if you don’t use it, you lose it. The filings on the ITU are constantly watched because if countries or companies file for a certain frequency, and if it was approved, they own that frequency. Some countries like to file for very large satellite constellations and people evaluate this as an attempt to hog the spectrum or a location.

It’s up to the countries within the ITU to resolve those disputes before final decisions are made. If the ITU fails to make enough decisions that people think are fair, then the organization itself risks becoming desolate. There has to be some level of coordination to avoid jammed and incompatible satellite usage. So, you could end up with a situation where nobody can use satellites in a certain area, because too many people are trying to use it at the same time.

Q. How does more countries or actors stepping into the space arena translate to international relations?

That is a difficult question. I won’t have a clear answer for you, because I’m observing it just like everyone else. The phrase the “democratization of space” is being thrown around a lot. I don’t like that phrase because I don’t think that having more countries doing things in space is necessarily democratic.

Space governance is usually more a reflection of power politics rather than any democratic process, and a lot of countries that are doing more things in space are not democratic countries themselves, and even within democratic countries there are questions over how involved the wider electorates are in space policy, or whether they are actually interested or informed about their countries’ space policies and activities. There’s a representation and engagement question there that we would ascribe to any system we would call democratic.

So, whilst there’s more population in space now, perhaps in terms of the number of different countries, and also large private companies doing things in space, I wouldn’t call it democratic. We don’t have a truly democratic governance structure for outer space. There are votes of the UN General Assembly, but it’s not really the same as the domestic democratic system.

On one hand, more countries are paying more attention to space now, because it affects everyone, so more engagement and more awareness is a good thing. On the other hand, it means that the ways that a lot of countries have been using the United Nations to try to govern space activities needs to be revisited in a way that recognizes that dozens more countries now have a stake in it. It’s not necessarily the West versus the rest, and it requires a shift in mentality for many of the older traditional space powers, including China, Japan, and India, just like Western Europe, the United States, and Russia.

The older, bigger traditional space powers are used to being able to do what they want to, without having to consider the rest of the world too much—that is less and less the case now. If they can’t change the ways they behave, or try to get agreements or consensus built in various forums, that may be an issue. Space is becoming more like governing the seas now, with a lot of smaller states much more involved and influential in any sort of UN-level agreement.

Q. Do different countries take similar or different paths in developing and utilizing space technology?

There are variations, especially in the way countries might want to present themselves. Yet, they share a lot of the same technological hurdles because it’s the same base technologies that you need to use. As I do in Original Sin, you can look at six or seven significant space powers and they all must get over the same technological hurdles to have their own access to space, their own launch vehicles, their own satellite industries, their own educated and trained workforce in space technology and sciences, etc.

Especially early on, when space knowledge and technology were not as widespread, there were many common challenges that had to be faced. But then, within that broad similarity, in terms of the technological challenges, you have the variations in the way certain countries go about doing things.

Japan, for example, didn’t really have that much of an explicit military connection to its satellite and launch vehicle deployment. The logic of autonomy and avoiding complete dependence on the United States was supported by the Japanese government, just in case Japan might need to develop its own nuclear weapons program in the upcoming years. Having a nuclear energy industry and a rocket launch industry, you got the fundamental infrastructure there to develop nuclear bombs and missiles, if you need to down the line. India’s major space efforts were presented in terms of social and economic development, much more so than the Soviet Union, China, and the United States.

Today, there are even more variations because there are already six established space powers: the United States, Europe, Russia, China, India, and Japan. Other countries can now cooperate or purchase services and pick and choose which aspect of space industries they want to develop or take part in. Take Nigeria, for example. It has dropped its old ambitions of having its own launch vehicle, its own rockets, and its own astronaut in space, and focused on satellites and using satellite data. That means, Nigeria has really important stakes in what goes on in space, but it can’t launch its own satellites and it still buys satellites. It still hasn’t gotten a full satellite manufacturing capability yet, but it operates and uses its own satellites.

Brazil has major Earth observation satellites in a joint program with China. It tried to have a launch program which failed, and they eventually gave up on it because it was just too expensive. Other countries, for a fee, would launch their satellites for them. Britain, for example, doesn’t have its own launch capability, but it does a lot in space science, engineering and research, integrated with the European Space Agency. It relies on the United States for security and intelligence applications in space and services, and is a world leader in small satellites manufacturing. It’s not comprehensive, but it’s got very targeted, niche strengths.

Finland has a commercial radar imagery satellite company, and is a big player in terms of the space economy and technology development in the particular area, but it doesn’t have its own rockets.

Just like any other aspect of military, technological, economic, or diplomatic power, space power has so many different applications. What matters is what kind of space technologies and industries each country actually needs because they will be different for each case.

Different countries today can tailor their space strategies and policies according to their economic and security needs, etc. The United Arab Emirates is particularly interesting. They are throwing money at space in lots of different areas; they are investing in defense security, economic infrastructure, and space exploration. They have sent a satellite to Mars and wanted to send a payload to the moon, but they still don’t want to build their own rockets.

Space is still so expensive and you need a lot of trained people and highly specialized skills. You need to have loads of people go into rocket science, which would take them out of other sectors of high-technology skills and training that they could otherwise be deployed at. Therefore, space power must be targeted in countries that are new to space or smaller countries.

Q. The Outer Space Treaty bans the placement of nuclear weapons in space but that’s not the case with conventional weapons. What measures can actors take to protect themselves?

This has been the case since 1967 based on Article 4 of the Outer Space Treaty. There’s not a lot you can do in terms of governance, because there’s no appetite for any more restrictions on other kinds of weapon bans in space. The Russians and the Chinese have tried to push a treaty on it, but it has not gotten anywhere. It is seen by many as a bad faith diplomatic exercise; it is not something that’s done with genuine intent to try to make space warfare less likely to happen.

There’s not a lot you can do other than to build more satellites, so that if something happens to one, there are more ready to take over, or to build terrestrial alternatives or backups. If the satellites go dark, there’s not a lot you can do because if a determined enemy wants to shoot down your satellite and they have technology capabilities, direct defense of satellites is very difficult.

Against electronic warfare or cyber warfare, there are more options for defense. However, it’s difficult for us on the outside to observe it. The forensics of that become very difficult. It’s hard to tell when something is a deliberate attack or just accidental.

They are highly proliferated and the cost to entry is lower, so smaller powers can do cyber operations. It’s difficult to stop a missile from blowing up your satellite but you have more options to respond to enemy jamming or a cyber attack, the effects of those can be reversed. So, in terms of governance, there’s not a lot you can do. On the other hand, militarily depending on the kind of attack, there are some things you can do in some areas.

T

here come times throughout history where military innovations or shifts in the character of warfare take great revolutionary leaps, allowing those able to reap their benefits first to position themselves at a substantive competitive advantage. Militaries that identify and exploit these periods of disruptive changes make major shifts in the balance of power, security, and prosperity for their nations. Those who fail to do so, or fail to adapt to change, risk exposing their country to danger. What will the next big thing in warfare be? And how can militaries successfully adapt to meet the challenge? The Origins of Victory: How Disruptive Military Innovation Determines the Fates of Great Powers provides an authoritative take and the necessary foundation for healthy speculation.

Military strategist Andrew F. Krepinevich Jr. discusses military revolutions—or shifts in the character of warfare—and specifically the most recent precision warfare revolution which is currently reaching its maturity.

According to Krepinevich, an even newer revolution is emerging. This is fueled by the advances of commercial and military-driven technology, such as AI 3D manufacturing, synthetic biology and quantum computing, and directed energy and hypersonic weapons, and is accelerated by the competition between the U.S., Russia, and China.

The precision warfare revolution was introduced by the U.S. military in the First Gulf War. It gave the U.S. a monopoly over this form of warfare for several decades, but now other powers such as China have these capabilities.

In this era of increased competition amongst great powers, The Origins of Victory, first gives a preliminary assessment of the disruptive changes occurring in general war to identify the existing characteristics of the precision warfare regime, and goes on to offer speculation of the overlapping successor revolution.

Second, The Origins of Victory examines the crucial factor of how military organizations have successfully anticipated and exploited disruptive changes in warfare faster than their rivals.

The book consists of two parts. In Part I, Krepinevich considers the characteristics of the emerging competitive environment through trends over the years and identifies the ones that may show yield in the future. He discusses the maturing precision warfare and the overlapping new revolution, as well as their implication for deterrence.

The world is in an era of permanent low-level conflict. Traditional conflict has largely left its place to grey-zone warfare and hybrid war. States have always used unconventional and non-military ways to acquire leverage or attain victory; however, the increasingly complex and interconnected current nature of the world has made interdependence the battleground.

From sanctions to competing for and buying influence abroad, warfare has taken a more subtle, sly, undeclared, unending, and, most importantly, unrestricted, form. Nowadays, this has blurred the line between war and peace.

While traditional war is very expensive, unpopular, and often too difficult to manage, this new way of war is groundbreaking and does not shy away from any tool available. War is all around us, in everyday life, culture, economics, law, and information. Even something as innocuous as cute cat pictures online can become a ploy.

Mark Galeotti takes us through the weaponization of everything, from disinformation, cyberattacks, and espionage to subversion and crime, in order to understand the changing landscape of war and what it might bring.

Gone are the days of “stable” warfare! The subtle components of martial and everyday civilian life are blending, leading to instability within countries and a legitimacy crisis across the globe. However, this development does not need to be a solely negative one. As Galeotti points out, conflict is democratized, meaning the people are not just bystanders and can take positive action to avoid zero-sum situations. The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War equips the reader with ways of surviving, adapting, and taking advantage of the opportunities presented by this new reality.

When everything is weaponizable, why would the distinction hold any meaning? Where do we begin to look? How can civilians be mindful of this development? Many of the weapons used are often abstract but their effects are very much tangible and jolting. As it turns out, some things are more weaponizable than others.

Luckily, The Weaponisation of Everything lays bare how this warfare takes form all around the world with examples and a future trajectory. While this form of conflict may be vague and confusing, Galeotti makes the topic apprehensible for all readers.

Even though technology advances in leaps and problems seem to be constantly evolving, Galeotti’s approach invites the reader not only to face the emerging reality, but also to learn to adapt to the new permanent, bloodless war. The Weaponisation of Everything, first released in February 15, 2022, is now available in paperback as of February 14, 2023.

Mark Galeotti, The Weaponisation of Everything: A Field Guide to the New Way of War (Yale University Press, 2022) ISBN 9780300253443, 256 Pages

World military spending rose to almost $2 trillion in 2020, according to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) report. The Russia-Ukraine war will prompt many countries to increase their annual defense spending. Against the backdrop of the ongoing war, it would be no surprise to expect an exponential rise in world defense payout in 2022.

Europe’s defense budget

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is compelling European countries to rethink their defense spending and security strategies. Many European Union countries including Germany, Sweden, Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, Denmark, France, Latvia, and the Netherlands, have declared their intention to increase their annual defense expenditures.

German Chancellor Olaf Scholz announced that this year, Germany’s budget will allocate €100 billion to defense spending—more than double Germany’s total defense spending in 2021 (€47 million).

During a special session of the Bundestag, Scholz further emphasized the importance of “more security to protect freedom and democracy in Germany.” However, it is interesting to note that for many years, Germany has resisted the pressure from the U.S. and other countries to raise its defense spending to 2% of the GDP, which is the guideline and expected target for all NATO members. The recent increase in defense spending manifests a major shift in Germany’s pacifist doctrine.

Sweden

In Sweden, the security threat created by Russia led the Swedish government to announce a significant boost in their military spending to 2% of the GDP. Sweden used to spend almost 4% of its GDP on its defense budget during the Cold War era. After the disintegration of the USSR and the subsequent end of the Cold War, Sweden’s defense budget was drastically reduced to about 1%.

The recent defense budgets enlargements in Europe are taken in response to the deteriorating security situation in Ukraine. Swedish Prime Minister, Magdalena Andersson, said in a news conference, “Today, we present a new initiative with a clear message to the Swedish people and to the world around us. Sweden’s defense capability must be greatly strengthened.”

Belgium

Eyebrows are raised in Brussels as well. Belgium’s defense minister, Ludivine Dedonder, has recently called for more funding of Belgium’s armed forces. This is said to be done in addition to the €10 billion that the federal government decided to invest in Belgium’s military forces in the coming years.

Like Sweden and Germany, Belgium also falls far short of NATO’s target. Considering the escalating conflict between Russia and Ukraine, in the coming days, Belgium is expected to announce an increase of its defense budget as well.

Poland

Poland, which has followed NATO’s 2% defense spending guideline, has also decided to raise the spending on its armed forces more than planned as the emerging security threat leads Poland to reconfigure its plans.

While addressing the lower house of the parliament, Jaroslaw Kaczyński, the leader of the Polish ruling nationalist Law and Justice party, stated, “There will be an amendment (to the defense plan): 3% of GDP on defense next year, then we will increase it.”

Lithuania

Seimas, the unicameral parliament of Lithuania, voted unanimously to increase the defense spending by €300 million. The country’s defense minister, Arvydas Anušauskas, said “Lithuania’s defense budget increase will allow us to get arms earlier than planned before, which are needed for strengthening Lithuanian’s army and, additionally, to host NATO troops coming to Lithuania.”

Denmark

In a similar vein, Denmark’s prime minister Mette Frederiksen has also announced an increase in the country’s defense budget. Under an agreement between parliamentary parties in Denmark, it was decided that defense spending will reach 2% of the GDP by 2033. This is equivalent to an increase of 18 billion Danish crowns ($2.65 billion).

Frederiksen called this move the “largest investment in Danish defense in recent times.”

Romania

After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, President Klaus Iohannis also raised the need to increase the defense spending to 2.5% of the GDP from the current mark of 2%.

Non-European countries defense expenditure

In addition, there are other countries that are contemplating an increase in their defense expenditure. Boris Johnson could increase the UK’s defense budget amid fears of the growing Ukraine crisis. The Canadian defense minister also said his country is considering “aggressive options to increase Canada’s military budget.”

The rising defense budget trend all over Europe has also become a source of inspiration for Japan. Japanese Prime Minister Fumio Kishida talked about the formulation of the National Security Strategy (NSS) to ensure the protection of Japanese people’s lives.

China also announced it plans to spend 7.1% more on defense in the year 2022. It is clear that Beijing is considering challenges that have emerged from several fronts ranging from U.S. naval and air missions in the South China sea, the issue of Taiwan, and a prolonged border dispute with India.

Increasing defense spending: what does it mean?

Since the advent of Russia’s military attack on Ukraine, countries from Germany to China are bluntly increasing their defense budgets. Meanwhile, many countries have experienced decades of underfunding, and political and systematic neglect of their defense portfolio.

The chief of the German army Lt. Gen. Alfons Mais criticized the German government over “long running neglect of military readiness in the country.” He further stated that “his forces are more less powerless.”

The critical question, therefore, seems to be the following: Would a sudden leap in countries’ defense budgets lead to sudden improvements in their defense capabilities.

Greece ordered a total of 18 Rafale combat aircraft from France in 2021. The country received the first six Dassault Rafale combat aircraft on January 19, 2022.  The Rafale is planned to replace the older models of the Mirage 2000 aircraft, also produced by France.

The year 2021 saw many developments regarding combat aircraft in the form of announcements of selection and procurement signatures. The Rafale by France and the F-35 by the United States were the two most prominent aircraft in the headlines throughout the year. The technical-military selection criteria and the political impact thereof are subject to debate. The evaluation of modern combat aircraft, similar to other sophisticated platforms such as air defense systems, requires a multi-disciplinary approach incorporating military, technological, and political assessments. The competition between the Rafale and the F-35 is emblematic of such a challenge.

The F-35 Lightning II

The F-35 Lightning II is the product of the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program to develop a next-generation combat aircraft for the U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps as well as the program’s partner nations and major U.S. allies. Developed by Lockheed Martin, the F-35 has three variants: the conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version F-35A; the short takeoff and vertical landing (STOVL) version F-35B; and carrier variant (CV) F-35C. All variants share the same basic design and mission systems whereas critical subsystems and performance parameters differ based on specific design requirements.

The development and manufacture of the F-35 are undertaken by the United States and seven partner nations, namely the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada, Italy, Norway, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Turkey was also a partner in the program, but was removed by the United States in 2020 due to Ankara’s purchase of S-400 air defense systems from the Russian Federation.

According to the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in 2021, the F-35 program costs a total of $1.7 trillion across its lifecycle.

The F-35A is a fifth-generation combat aircraft which incorporates next-generation flight and combat capabilities such as very low observability (VLO) against radars and other sensors, advanced electronic warfare, electronic intelligence and communication capabilities, various types of electromagnetic and electro-optical sensors, and a wide range of precision guided air-to-air and air-to-ground weapons. The F-35 was designed around the concept of interoperability, as a tactical combat platform able to seamlessly exchange data with various air, sea, land, and space assets of allied nations during complex multinational operations.

The JSF is the world’s most expensive and complicated weapon development project to date. Along with the project’s political aspect, JSF has resulted in controversy and criticism mainly because of its sizable budget and schedule overruns. According to an estimate by the Pentagon’s Cost Assessment and Program Evaluation in 2021, the F-35 program is expected to cost a total of $1.7 trillion across its lifecycle.

The Rafale has a maximum takeoff weight of 24.5 tons and can carry 9.5 tons of external fuel and armament. For strategic strike missions, the Rafale’s main weapon is the SCALP air-launched cruise missile and the ASMP standoff nuclear missile that is used for nuclear strike. The latest version of the Rafale is designated as “F3R.” This variant comes with improved avionics systems and the introduction of the RBE2-AA new-generation active electronically scanned array (AESA) radar, replacing the legacy RBE2 radar. A follow-on variant, the F4 is under development and all French air and naval forces Rafales will be upgraded to this standard.

F-35 partner orders and exports

More than 700 F-35s have been delivered to the United States, partner nations, and Foreign Military Sales (FMS) customers as of late 2021. So far, the U.S. has ordered 1,763 F-35As, 353 F-35Bs, and 353 F-35Cs. Partner nations, namely the UK, Italy, the Netherlands, Australia, Denmark, and Norway, have confirmed orders for 353 F-35A/Bs. Canada, a Level III partner, has so far not ordered any F-35s.

In addition to the United States and seven program partners, so far, the F-35 has been selected or ordered by eight nations. South Korea ordered 40 F-35As in 2014, with a follow-on acquisition of 20 F-35As and 20 F-35Bs announced in August 2020. Two other major U.S. allies in the Indo-Pacific region, namely Japan and Australia, have ordered F-35s. Japan signed an agreement for an initial batch of 42 F-35As and in 2018 declared plans for the procurement of 63 F-35As and 42 F-35Bs.

Two states, namely Israel and Singapore, are procuring the F-35 as Security Cooperative Participants (SCP) under agreements signed in 2003. In 2006, the Israeli Air Force officially announced its long-term plan to purchase more than 100 F-35As. The contract for the first 19 aircraft was signed in 2010, followed by an order for 14 more in 2015. A batch of 17 aircraft was ordered in 2016, and the first F-35A was delivered in December 2016. As of January 2022, the Israeli Air Force has 30 F-35As in service. The U.S. approved the sale of four F-35Bs to Singapore with an option for eight more in January 2020.

In September 2019, the U.S. approved the sale of F-35As to Poland with a cost of $6.5 billion. Another agreement for 32 jets was signed in January 2020. In the following year, another NATO ally, Belgium, selected the F-35A to replace its aging F-16A/B fleet. A contract for 34 F-35As was signed in April 2020.

The F-35A won two major competitions in 2021. First, Switzerland announced its selection of the aircraft in June 2021. The F-35A competed against the Dassault Rafale and the Swedish Saab Gripen E/F. The Swiss Air Force will receive 36 F-35As. The other feat was in Finland. After a much-publicized competition against the Dassault Rafale, the Eurofighter Typhoon, and the Saab Gripen, the F-35A was declared the winner in December 2021. Finland will purchase 64 F-35As along with a large package of precision-guided munitions.

The F-35 is currently on the agenda of several countries. One of the most controversial cases is the United Arab Emirates. A letter of request (LoR) for 50 F-35As and a large package worth $23 billion including MQ-9 Reaper armed drones was sent to Washington in September 2020. The request was approved on the last day of Donald Trump’s presidency and temporarily paused for review by his successor Joe Biden. The process was reportedly given a go-ahead by the Biden administration, but the UAE said it will withdraw the request in December 2021 because of a disagreement over operational limitations and logistics.

Greece is planning to induct the F-35 as well. Athens sent an LoR for 24 aircraft in November 2020. Other prospective customers include Spain, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Thailand.

France’s sales thrust for the Rafale

After entering service with the French air forces and navy, the Rafale was marketed to many countries, but did not achieve an export success until the mid-2010s mainly due to high acquisition costs. In February 2015, Egypt ordered 24 Rafales under a €5.2 billion agreement with France. The agreement also covered the purchase of a FREMM class frigate and various types of missiles. A follow-on order for 30 jets was made in 2021, bringing the total number of Egyptian Rafales to 54.