From the War on Terror to the far-right conspiracies, Islamophobia manifests in various forms. In today’s world, systemic Islamophobia continues to cast a long and dark shadow over the lives of Muslims across continents. Rooted in historical and contemporary contexts, this pervasive form of discrimination and prejudice has significant implications for individuals, communities, and societies at large.

Systemic Islamophobia operates within power structures, institutions, and cultural biases, perpetuating inequality, marginalization, and the violation of human rights. Implicitly and explicitly, Islamophobia is reinforced by various layers of society, including governments around the world.

While its manifestations may differ from one region to another, systemic Islamophobia shares commonalities across countries and societies. It operates as a product of historical legacies, geopolitical dynamics, cultural narratives, and power imbalances. It thrives in contexts where Muslims are viewed as the “Other,” perpetuating stereotypes, prejudices, and negative portrayals that undermine their rights, dignity, and societal inclusion.

The impact of systemic Islamophobia is far-reaching. Muslim individuals and communities face challenges in various domains of life, as the titles included in this Bundle will show. They experience heightened surveillance, racial profiling, and discriminatory legislation, hindering the realization of fundamental human rights and the pursuit of justice and equality. Furthermore, the interconnetedness of discrimination makes the issue even more pressing for all.

Recognizing and understanding systemic Islamophobia is essential for dismantling its deeply entrenched structures. It requires comprehensive analysis, dialogue, and collective action which this collection hopes to envoke.

The Rise of Global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, Race, and Islam delves into the complex and far-reaching consequences of the ‘War on Terror’ on global perceptions of Muslims. The book examines the intersection between Islamophobia, and various social, economic, and political factors that have shaped its prevalence.

The authors convincingly argue that the ‘War on Terror’ has not only intensified anti-Muslim racism but has also provided a framework that perpetuates a global Islamophobic narrative. By framing Muslims a perpetual enemy, this conflict has fostered a climate of fear and suspicion, fueling the growth of nativist and populist movements worldwide.

One of the book’s strengths lies in its comprehensive analysis of the different forms and manifestations of Islamophobia. Through an examination of localized histories, conflicts, and contemporary geopolitical realities, the authors map out the intricate ways in which Islamophobia has taken shape across the global North and South. This approach adds depth to the understanding of the diverse factors contributing to the rise of anti-Muslim sentiment.

The book offers a nuanced and comprehensive analysis of the connections between interpersonal and institutional racism. While highlighting the deeply rooted nature of Islamophobia, the book also sheds light on the activism and resistance that have emerged to confront this issue. By featuring narratives of individuals and groups challenging Islamophobia, the authors provide hope and inspiration for those seeking to combat this pervasive form of discrimination.

Naved Bakali and Farid Hafez, The rise of global Islamophobia in the War on Terror: Coloniality, race, and Islam (Manchester University Press 2022) ISBN: 978-1-5261-6175-8, 264 pages

Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” presents a groundbreaking examination of the multifaceted nature of Islamophobia in the country. Authored by Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, the book challenges the prevailing notion that Islamophobia arises solely from individual bias but rather that Islamophobia in France is deeply entrenched within existing structures of power and control.

The book sheds light on pivotal moments in French history that have contributed to the marginalization of Muslim communities. It highlights the 2004 ban on veils in schools, followed by the 2010 legislation that prohibited face-covering clothing in public spaces, primarily targeting women who wear burqas. President Emmanuel Macron’s public statements regarding the hijab’s compatibility with French ideals further illustrate the pervasive Islamophobia within the country. These cultural biases not only perpetuate discriminatory practices but also position the Muslim population as scapegoats for broader issues surrounding immigration in France.

Hajjat and Mohammed go beyond surface-level analysis to uncover the structural dimensions of Islamophobia in France. They argue that French elites strategically employ Islamophobia as a state technology to exert control and contest the presence of specific groups of postcolonial immigrants and their descendants. By exploring the data on Islamophobia and examining its functioning in contemporary French society, the authors paint a comprehensive portrait of the mechanisms through which Islamophobia operates.

Islamophobia in France is an English translation of Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed’s Islamophobie: Comment les e´lites franc¸aises fabriquent le “proble`me musulman.” and an essential contribution to the field, providing a nuanced and insightful examination of the systemic nature of Islamophobia and its consequences on Muslim communities in France.

Abdellali Hajjat and Marwan Mohammed, Islamophobia in France: The Construction of the “Muslim Problem” (University of Georgia Press, 2023) ISBN-10 0820363251, 306 pages

In The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims Khaled A. Beydoun presents an essential examination of Islamophobia from a legal and ground-up perspective. Drawing on his intellectual prowess and moral imperative, Beydoun presents a compelling analysis of the network of anti-Muslim campaigns unfolding worldwide and offers a comprehensive analysis of how Islamophobia is utilized by both democratic and authoritarian regimes to persecute Muslim populations.

The New Crusades does not shy away from challenging the established narratives. It delves into the role of the War on Terror in fueling and intensifying anti-Muslim campaigns around the world. Beydoun skillfully illustrates how Islamophobia operates as a unifying thread, perpetuating state and social bigotry and igniting hate-mongering from both liberal and right-wing factions. Through trenchant analysis and firsthand accounts from Muslims on the ground, the author brings to light the various manifestations of Islamophobia in Europe, Asia, the Middle East, and beyond.

The book’s global perspective sets it apart, as Beydoun incorporates on-site experiences, interviews, and a diverse range of contexts. This approach enhances the authority of the narrative and makes it accessible and engaging for scholars, students, and the general public.

The New Crusades unravels the distinct systems of demonization and oppression that have emerged across the post-9/11 geopolitical landscape. Whether it is the imposition of hijab bans in France, state-sponsored hate speech and violence in India, or the existence of concentration camps in China, Beydoun examines how Islamophobia operates as a global phenomenon, perpetuating discrimination on multiple fronts.

The book powerfully reveals the unsettling reality that Islamophobia remains one of the few acceptable forms of hate in the world today. By exposing this truth, Beydoun calls attention to the urgent need for collective action against Islamophobia and its far-reaching consequences. By weaving together social science, law, and captivating narratives, the author highlights the pervasive impact of Islamophobia on Muslims across the globe.

Khaled A. Beydoun, The New Crusades: Islamophobia and the Global War on Muslims (University of California Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780520356306, 390 pages

In Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order Arsalan Iftikhar, a renowned American Muslim human rights lawyer, offers a comprehensive exploration of global Islamophobia. The book refers to the chilling reminder of the Christchurch massacre, where a white supremacist perpetrated a horrific act of violence against Muslim worshippers in New Zealand. Iftikhar draws attention to the manifesto left by the attacker, titled “The Great Replacement,” which espoused the belief that Muslims posed a threat and sought to replace white people. This incident serves as a starting point for exploring the dangerous legacy of this theory and its influence on extremist acts.

Iftikhar goes on to emphasize that the victims of the “Great Replacement” theory extend beyond Muslims alone. The tragic attack on the Tree of Life synagogue in Pittsburgh, which targeted Jewish congregants, exemplifies the broader impact of this ideology including the infamous actions of Norwegian terrorist Anders Breivik.. The perpetrator’s anti-Semitic and Islamophobic motivations, fueled by anti-immigration sentiments, underline the interconnected nature of discrimination.

Throughout the book, Iftikhar critiques the presidency of Donald Trump, which he argues has contributed to the exacerbation of Islamophobia in America. He dissects Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric and policies, including his claim that “Islam hates us” and his call for a complete ban on Muslims entering the US. Iftikhar contends that Trump’s leadership has fueled the growth of Islamophobia.

The book goes beyond the United States and the Western world to shed light on global Islamophobia. Iftikhar highlights the genocidal levels of Islamophobia in countries like China and Myanmar, where Muslim communities face severe oppression. Additionally, he addresses the European focus on policing Muslim women’s hijab, exposing discriminatory policies that curtail religious freedom.

Arsalan Iftikhar, Fear of a Muslim Planet: Global Islamophobia in the New World Order (Skyhorse Publishing, 2021) ISBN-13 978-1510761872, 288 pages

The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State offers a captivating and deeply personal exploration of the impact that two decades of policing and counterterrorism have had on the state of mind of Muslims in Britain. Drawing from his own experiences, author Rizwaan Sabir takes readers on a compelling journey through British counterterrorism practices and the pervasive policing of Muslims.

Sabir’s narrative describes his wrongful arrest and detention on suspicion of terrorism. He recounts the distressing process of being unjustly made a target in the “war on terror.” With candor and vivid detail, he outlines the events leading up to his arrest, including being found in possession of the Al-Qaeda Training Manual, which he had downloaded for legitimate postgraduate research purposes. Sabir sheds light on the excruciating experience of being subjected to suspicion and surveillance solely based on his Muslim identity.

Throughout the book, Sabir recounts the harrowing aftermath of his arrest. He vividly describes the relentless monitoring and scrutiny he faced upon release from custody. This included frequent stop-and-search encounters, detentions at the border, surveillance by police and government departments, and an attempt by the UK military to recruit him into their psychological warfare unit. The author’s firsthand account provides a chilling insight into the intrusive and discriminatory practices endured by Muslims in the name of national security.

Sabir argues that the profound harm inflicted on individuals like him is not merely the result of government planning errors but rather a deliberate consequence of employing a counterinsurgency warfare approach to combat terrorism and police Muslim communities. Through his writing, Sabir advocates for and building networks of solidarity and support to challenge the injustices perpetuated by these policies and practices.

The Suspect serves as a powerful call to action, urging readers to recognize and resist the profound injustice faced by Muslims. By sharing his story, Sabir empowers readers to challenge the harmful narratives and practices that perpetuate the policing of Muslims.

Rizwaan Sabir, The Suspect: Counterterrorism, Islam, and the Security State (Pluto Press, 2022) ISBN: 9780745338484, 256 pages

In France, a founding member of the European Union, the far-right party has advanced to the threshold of the Élysée Palace, and its voice is now being heard not only at home, but around the world. Marine Le Pen has never been so close to winning the presidential election. What if she crosses the threshold?

Since the night of April 10, French politicians, academics, intellectuals, journalists, and especially President Emmanuel Macron, have been repeating both verbally and in writing: “This is a historical responsibility, it is time to unite against the extreme right!” In the Fifth Republic, when this call was first made 20 years ago, in 2002, Jean Marie Le Pen eliminated the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin, but President Jacques Chirac won the election with 82.21 percent in the second round.

In 2017, when Emmanuel Macron won 24.1 percent and Marine Le Pen 21.30 percent of the votes in the first round, the call was repeated: “This is a historical responsibility, unite your votes against the extreme right!” Although the difference was not as clear as last time, Macron came in at 66.10 percent and Marine Le Pen at 33.90 percent. Here it is, five years later, in the first round, Emmanuel Macron got 27.84 percent, Marine Le Pen got 23.15 percent, and the other two far-right candidates Eric Zemmour got 7.07 percent and Nicolas Dupont-Aignan 2.28 percent.

The far right thus received a total of 32.50 percent of the votes in the first round. This time, according to various polls that see Macron ahead, the gap between the two candidates is closing and is only between 2 and 7 points.

In the last elections, the country’s traditional left and right parties had weakened in favor of Macron’s “neither right nor left, both right and left” party; this time, they were buried. Anne Hidalgo, the candidate of the socialists and the mayor of Paris, received 1.75 percent of the votes. Valérie Pécresse, the candidate of the center-right party of the Gaullist tradition, Les Républicains, is crying foul because her 4.78 percent will not allow her to receive state aid, and has launched a campaign to cover election costs.

Parties that receive less than 5 percent of the votes in France are not eligible for state aid. While that is the scenery, Jean-Luc Mélenchon, the leader of the ultra-leftist La France Insoumise party, who is a presidential candidate for the third time, scored unpredictably high, receiving 21.95 percent of the votes. In other words, he almost scored high enough to qualify to run against Macron for the second round, the difference with Le Pen being only 1.2 percent.

Why did the far right and the far left get stronger?

So, what happened to make the far right and far left so strong in France? Why is everyone, especially Macron, screaming that “Republican values” are under threat? Why are the leaders of the Rassemblement national (National Rally) party (Le Pen), the Reconquête (Reconquest) (Zemmour), and Debout la France (Dupont-Aignan) called far-right? Who are their enemies, what makes the far right a far right?

The economic measures of Macron’s rival, Marine Le Pen, are similar to those of the far-left and even centrist parties. She wanted to take France out of the military wing of NATO, but De Gaulle also did so in 1966. She does not say, “France should leave the European Union,” but she makes promises that will inevitably create a de facto departure from the EU. “I will recognize the supremacy of constitutional law over European law by holding a referendum,” she says.

While Macron said in his 70-minute speech on “Fighting Separatism” that “in some schools, some students want meals in the canteens based on their religious beliefs” (i.e., they do not eat pork), according to Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, this was communitarianism and unacceptable. In October 2019, Macron’s former interior minister, Christophe Castaner, described having a beard or celebrating Ramadan as “conspicuous” and a sign of radicalism. These and similar absurd statements were well received by France’s elite, whose apparently influential majority is extremely Islamophobic, and became the cover story of weekly magazines.

The Imam Charter, for example, a unique state-level text on anti-Muslim hostility, was the official declaration that Muslims were a separate and dangerous entity under the French Constitution and laws, even in their very existence. Judging by the ideas and actions that the imams, and thus Muslims, were supposed to commit to never think or act, they were a community prone to committing all kinds of evils, including “discrimination against the sick and disabled.”

Indeed, Macron’s government this year even shut down the Collective Against Islamophobia in France, one of the leading anti-discrimination organizations documenting hate crimes against Muslims. Between 2018 and 2022, France rummaged nearly 25,000 mosques, schools, associations, and workplaces, and shut down 718 bodies, including more than 20 mosques. The state demonizes Muslims with its Imam Charter, Anti-separatism Law, its so-called French Islam with its fabrications and rhetoric, and portrays Islam as a dangerous religion that needs mass surveillance and oppression. Muslim French are presented as an existential threat to France’s “civilization,” “tradition,” and “values.”

With a president and government that patented Islamophobia for themselves, naturally, Marine Le Pen had to go from door to door in the election campaign in order not to get euchred out of her voters. What’s more, Zemmour emerged as another candidate in the elections. “Sow the wind and reap the whirlwind,” say the Turks.

In his brief 10-minute speech after the election results were announced, Macron hastily began embracing Muslims. In his refutation, he said excitedly and surreptitiously, “I do not want a France that prevents Muslims or Jews from eating as their religion dictates. No, we will not.” For the first time, Macron mentioned Muslims and Jews in the same sentence, but because of the strict laws and sanctions against anti-Semitism, no one cares about the kosher of the Jews. He could not stop himself and went on to give a message to Muslims before the second round on April 24: “Madame Le Pen says she will ban the headscarf. Then, she will not be president of all French people.”

Before that, however, Macron had said, “The headscarf contradicts our country’s civilizational understanding of the relationship between men and women, and therefore makes us feel insecure.” Each of his ministers made numerous statements on the same subject. Marlène Schiappa, Minister Delegate in charge of Citizenship attached to the Ministry of Interior stated, “The headscarf is a political act,” and Minister of National Education Jean-Michel Blanquer said, “The headscarf is undesirable in our society.”

The Minister of the Interior Darmanin, who opposes Le Pen today, said, “In no democratic country in the world, is there a ban on religious symbols and signs in public spaces,” the women wearing headscarf were taken hostages in accordance with traditions that are not compatible with the Republic.

While hostility to Muslims brought votes from the far right, respect for Muslims also brought votes from the far left to Jean-Luc Mélenchon. French Muslims, who had to choose between deliberate abstention and voting, gave their votes to the far-left candidate Mélenchon by 70 percent, according to polls. Many French Muslims posted the following message verbatim on their social media platforms: “I never look at the world ideologically from the same angle, but Mélenchon does not discriminate, does not point fingers, does not label us and even condemns Islamophobia.”

The legitimization of Islamophobia, which resurged in France after the colonial period, especially since the 2000s, has played a very important role in the growth of the far right. Today, it is no longer just a threat to Muslims, but it indirectly threatens the rule of law, the European Union, and even the country’s strategic choices and alliances.

In the first round of France’s presidential election on April 10, incumbent Emmanuel Macron and Marine Le Pen came out on top, securing their places in the second round of voting, which will be held on April 24.

Macron’s result was the best first-round performance for an incumbent president since 1988. He gained more votes than in the 2017 first round. There is no doubt that his warnings of the need to hold voters back from the far right and his role in the Ukraine-Russia war both played a big part in his success.

However, Le Pen also scored higher than in 2017, especially in the last few weeks of her campaign when, instead of putting Muslims on the agenda, she focused on the high costs of living and inflation, something that concerns most voters.

Now, with all the votes counted, Macron has over 27% and Le Pen has less than 23.1%. Far-left leader Jean-Luc Mélenchon came third, with close to 22% of the votes.

Although this year’s election did not exceed the 2002 record levels of abstentions, which stood at 28%, the percentage of voters who abstained this time remained high at 26% which corresponds to 12.8 million from around 49 million eligible voters. This time the abstention rate was higher than in the first round five years ago.

The abstention among the younger population was higher this year than in the previous elections. According to Ipsos-Sopra Steria estimates, the age group with most abstentions was voters between 25 and 34 (46%).

Yasser Louati, a French political analyst, believes that voters abstain from voting mainly because they don’t have faith in politicians.

“We have millions of people living under the poverty line, COVID19 killed more than 150,000 people. We have institutions that are being discredited, people don’t believe in institutions, politicians are not trusted, journalists are not trusted,” he told Politics Today.

“Instead of addressing these questions and how we can make our institutions more legitimate, how we can address poverty, we have debates over Muslims. Such as, do Muslims belong here? Are Muslims like us?” he noted.

Amal Benkerroum, a Muslim woman entrepreneur, who is thinking of leaving France, told us, “I don’t know if I will vote on Sunday. I don’t know who to vote for.” She added, “If Le Pen becomes the next president of France, I am going to leave France because that means the community that we are living in doesn’t want us and we are not welcome.”

With the second runoff only a week away, France is faced with two choices. However, most young people feel that neither Macron nor Le Pen can represent them. Four days after the first round, several hundred students took to the streets chanting “Neither Macron nor Le Pen!” Most of them voted for the hard-left leader Mélenchon, and they complain about not having a suitable candidate in the second round who represents them.

According to Ifop pollsters, Macron is expected to receive 51% of the votes and Le Pen 49% on April 24. However, abstentions may increase in the second round mostly due to the fact that the 2022 French election has been driven by fear rather than hope. Although Macron is calling on people to vote for him in order to block the far right, the gap is very narrow and it is the first time in French history that the far right is so close to winning.

France will choose its new president in April of this year. Current president Emmanuel Macron has not yet announced his candidacy, but he is expected to announce it officially soon. There are around 40 candidates who will run for the election.

The presidency is the strongest organ of the country’s two-headed executive branch. Thus, the French presidential election attracts a global interest as French presidents determine the country’s foreign policy and domestic politics.

While far-right politicians in France have been already mobilized, Macron, who was elected in 2017 with great expectations, wants to be re-elected. No prediction for a future election is easy, and neither is predicting whether Macron will be elected again. To this end, we need to have a brief look at Macron’s four-year term in office.

Macron’s failed tests

Emmanuel Macron faced many challenges in domestic politics after he was elected in 2017. The yellow vests protests and the COVID-19 pandemic were the most important tests. In November 2018, civil protests broke out against the rising fuel prices and living costs. The police response was violent and used disproportionate force against civilians participating in the protests, leading to severe criticism of the Macron administration.

The Macron government did not prevent the excessive violence by the security forces, but on the contrary, made legal arrangements for the use of violence. The General Security Law emerged as a reaction to the protests and was approved in France’s National Assembly, empowering security forces and justifying the use of excessive force to defend and protect themselves.

Macron failed another test in the fight against the COVID19 pandemic. His administration couldn’t efficiently overcome the socio-economic problems that emerged due to the pandemic, reducing confidence in Macron’s leadership. As a result, La République En Marche! (LREM) founded by Macron suffered a great defeat in the municipal and regional elections that took place in 2020 and 2021, respectively. LREM fell short of expectations and lost big cities such as Lyon, Marseille, and Paris to the Greens and Socialists, respectively.

Islamophobic aspects of the candidates

The Islamophobic views of prominent candidates such as Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour in the lead-up to the election point to a serious threat to Muslims in the country. In fact, the marginalization and securitization of Muslims in France since the September 11 terrorist attacks reveal that the French governments follow an institutionally Islamophobic stance.

The Islamophobic views of prominent candidates such as Macron, Le Pen, and Zemmour in the lead-up to the election point to a serious threat to Muslims in France.

More recently, Macron’s government has closed down 17 mosques with vague claims of violating security laws or not meeting the required safety standards, and has surveyed nearly 90 mosques. Moreover, the government pressured the French Council of the Muslim Faith (CFCM) to sign a charter of “Republican values” as a part of its so-called French Islam project.

With elections drawing near, the French government is looking for ways to appeal to far-right voters. For instance, on February 5, 2022, they officially introduced the Forum of Islam in France (FORIF) that took over from the CFCM. What’s controversial about this forum is that all its members will be handpicked by the government, evidently undermining the political representation of Muslims in the country.

As part of their far-right ideology Marine Le Pen and Eric Zemmour are quite notorious for holding both Islamophobic and anti-Semitic stances. Both oppose the presence of Islam and Muslims in France. More extreme than Le Pen, Zemmour calls for the assimilation of Muslims and demands that French Muslims renounce their faith.

Muslims in France are struggling to decide which candidate to vote for in the election. Whatever the outcome of the election is, difficult days lie ahead for French Muslims, which comprise around 10 percent of the population. The worst-case scenario is a far-right candidate coming to power. Then Muslims would face innumerable difficulties including facing more violent acts in the coming years.

How might the election results affect relations with Turkey?

It seems that two political/ideological factions stand out in the French presidential elections. The first is the relatively moderate line represented by Macron, and the other is the far-right line represented by Le Pen and Zemmour. If Macron is re-elected, as seems probable at the moment, the current tense atmosphere in Turkish-French relations may continue. More specifically the tensions in Libya, Syria, and the Eastern Mediterranean, where the concerned parties are in direct confrontation, are likely to remain.

The second scenario would be catastrophic. If the far right comes to power in France, then, there would be a paradigm shift in France’s relations with Turkey. Turkish-French relations cannot remain healthy under a Turkophobic and Islamophobic government. In such a scenario, ideological motives would dominate the relationship and the bilateral relations may come to a breaking point. Therefore, Macron’s victory in the presidential election seems the more preferable option for Turkey.

France was shocked when Jean Marie Le Pen, who was the leader of the far-right party and never invited to be on any television channel in France, went into the second round against Jacques Chirac with 16.86% of votes in the 2002 presidential elections. Expectedly, Chirac was elected president with 82.21% in the second round; meanwhile Le Pen could only increase his vote to 17.79%.

But, according to the newspaper headlines, this was a shameful event and a great disaster for France! This was because Le Pen, who was prosecuted for inciting xenophobia and for his statement that gas chambers were “a mere detail” in the history of World War II, achieved a great success considering he could only win 0.74% of votes in 1974 when he first ran.

That’s all water under the bridge now. Over the last 20 years, far-right ideas have flourished and bloomed. They have even ceased to be “far-right ideas” as they have become pretty common. An ambiguous xenophobia against Africans, Arabs, and sometimes people coming from countries in the European Union was replaced by an overt hatred of Islam and hostility towards Muslims. This new xenophobia moved to the center of politics and gained serious ground in both left-wing and right-wing politics.

French Minister of Higher Education Frédérique Vidal, who gave an interview to CNews channel after Blanquer, said, “Islamo-leftism causes social collapse and I think universities as a part of the society are not free of its grip.” Not only that, Vidal also called on the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) to conduct a study on the “Islamo-Gauchisme [French term of Islamo-leftism] effect and its impact on studies on the decolonization process” in universities.

There are many examples of the so-called valorous breakthroughs in the name of Islamophobia that started in the 2000s. An influential figure in left-wing politics, feminist intellectual and philosopher Élizabeth Badinter, in an interview to the newspaper Le Monde during socialist President Hollande’s incumbency stated, “Don’t be afraid of being accused of being Islamophobic; I’m not afraid, no one should be afraid.” She had also secured the support of Prime Minister Manuel Valls at the time.

Before that, one of the founders of the highly circulated right-wing magazine Le Point, Claude Imbert said in slightly more timid words, “To be honest, I’m a bit Islamophobic,” while Françoise Laborde, a former Radical Party of the Left senator who later joined Macron’s party, said, “Frankly, I like being called Islamophobic.” These are only a taste of what’s going on.

With his talent as a writer, Zemmour expresses in a vulgar but impactful way what others could only whisper or insinuate. He is a republican after all, albeit being “radical” or “overzealous” for some. In France, the definitions of secularism, republicanism, and “Civilization” – whether used together or separately – are extraordinarily useful euphemisms for anti-Islamic sentiment and hostility towards Muslims. When it comes to Muslims, Zemmour’s far-right ideological position of “Civilization and the Republic,” Marine Le Pen’s emphasis on “Secularism,” and a socialist or a right-wing politician’s discourse of “Republicanism, Secularism” or “Civilization” are not different at all.

As a matter of fact, Macron’s “Anti-Separatism Bill” was renamed “Principles Strengthening Respect for the Laws of the Republic” after receiving backlash across the world for being Islamophobic; however, it retained its content. In other words, the state does not openly say “give up your Islamic identity” like Zemmour, but does its best to make Muslims live their faith in their inner world and make their physical attachment to their religion invisible.

The French public is subject to constant manipulation; the French Institute of Public Opinion (IFOP), one of the leading research institutions in France, for instance, published a survey last month based on students’ responses to the question “Have you observed any behavioral patterns at school that show signs of religious belonging?” Zemmour, then, justified his thesis through this survey.

Horrendous cartoons of the Prophet Mohammed being projected on government buildings or Muslim children being forced to look at these cartoons as a part of their education, and two 10- or 11-year-old students who refused to look at these cartoons being taken from their homes with their families and being subjected to investigation is not dissimilar to what Zemmour promises.

Eric Zemmour announced and propagated this discourse and his racist comments by writing for mainstream media outlets like Le Quotidien de Paris and Le Figaro, along with appearing on prime-time shows on channels such as RTL and France 2. Although he faced trial and was convicted twice, it is not possible to claim that he has faced a hostile response to his person. In the last 20 years, he has become a celebrity in political and economic circles. For two years, he was working at CNews, the news channel controlled by the Catholic businessman Vincent Bolloré, who previously supported Macron.

Eric Zemmour announced and propagated this discourse and his racist comments by writing for mainstream media outlets like Le Quotidien de Paris and Le Figaro, along with appearing on prime-time shows on channels such as RTL and France 2.

Despite all this, there is something about Zemmour that renders him unique. Born in 1958 to an Algerian Jewish family, at his first official political rally on December 5, 2021 he boasted of his minority background, describing himself as a “little Berber Jew from the other side of the Mediterranean.” Zemmour, who was educated at a private Jewish school located in a Parisian suburb, says he practices his faith but does not consider himself Orthodox. However, this is not what makes him unique – he is accused of turning historical events on their head, while some describe him as an “anti-Semitic Jew.”

Indeed, Zemmour claimed that “Dreyfus may not be innocent,” [referring to the political scandal riddled with anti-Semitism known as “Dreyfus affair”] and Philippe Petain, who was president during the Nazi occupation between 1940 and 1944, was actually watching over the French Jews! Shocking at first glance, Zemmour’s connection to anti-Semitic history seems to be his far-right ideology, and the anti-Semitic vein at the base of the far-right may have tactically compelled him to make such comments. Indeed, 93-year-old former far-right party leader Le Pen also declared that he supports Zemmour instead of his daughter. “The only difference between Éric and me is that he is a Jew. It’s hard to call him a Nazi or a fascist. It gives him more freedom,” Le Pen said.

On the other hand, there may be another element to explain his shocking historical “revisionism.” In France, there is a publication called Causeur, which was first established as a website by the Sephardic Jewish journalist and writer Élisabeth Lévy. Causeur has been publishing as a monthly magazine for several years now and is deemed a right-wing and far right-wing publication. Alain Finkielkraut, another one of the magazine’s founders, is one of the country’s most influential and prominent philosophers and of Jewish origin, who is known for being “just like Lévy, but more of an Islamophobe.”

Lévy, in the article titled “Salomon, Will You Vote for Zemmour?” states that Zemmour is the talk after synagogue services. She relays that while part of the congregation says, “aren’t you be ashamed to support him, so you’re going to vote for a Petainist,” others say “Zemmour is our savior.” Due to France’s foreign policy discourse or despite the protection offered by legislation against anti-Semitism, the rise of Islamophobia causes tensions between Arab and Jewish children in the suburbs, especially in Paris. Lévy extracts that while many institutions and organizations of the Jewish community condemn Zemmour for his views and allegations, Jewish families residing in the suburbs see him as a “savior” or even as the “last exit before exile.”

According to polls, with 14-17% of the vote, Zemmour is unlikely to become president. However, in a country where far-right parties and ideas are indisputably on the rise, he will retain a significant voter base and will continue to inflame the debates along with consolidating the anti-Islamic and anti-Muslim rhetoric.

Emmanuel Macron’s statement on French colonial history and memory in Algeria and his sharp criticism of the Algerian regime sparked a political crisis between the two countries, which are linked with more than 130 years of colonial history. Macron’s statement is not new to the French political elite, which since Algeria’s independence in 1962 has been playing the colonial history card on every occasion for internal political consumption in France. Given the size of the Algerian community in France, Algeria has always occupied a significant place in the sociopolitical agenda.

More than four million Algerians are living in France and more than one million French Algerians are eligible to vote in French elections. During his visit to Algeria in 2007 on the eve of French elections, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy was the first French head of state to utter words of recognition and apology for the French colonial crimes.

However, later, he explicitly withdrew his statement during a presidential visit in December of the same year. What is new in President Macron’s statement is the criticism of the ruling elite in Algeria, his direct targeting of it, and the reference to the military structure of the regime despite the good relations that link these elites with France both publicly and behind the scenes.

This is the reason why Algerian authorities reacted strongly to Macron, especially when he referred to the slackness of the Algerian regime vis-à-vis the popular movement (the Hirak Movement) that erupted on February 22, 2019. Moreover, Macron questioned the existence before French colonialism of an Algerian nation in the first place. In a clear echo of the French orientalists of the nineteenth century, he ignored Algeria’s long history and its emergence as a state, the state of Numidia, a thousand years before the French state existed.

In fact, the French cultural and scientific machine worked hard to justify Algeria’s occupation and dissolving its political structure following its colonization in 1834, claiming it as French soil and its inhabitants as French Muslims. From then onward, France employed the Catholic Church’s religious machinery under the pretext of “civilizing” Algerians by educating them.

Behind Macron’s statement lies that fact that French presidential elections are approaching and according to opinion polls, far-right candidates such as Marine Le Pen, the head of the National Rally, and Éric Zemmour, independent far-right candidate of Algerian origin, have better chances in the elections.

Stora presented his report in January 2021 to Macron, including practical recommendations to bridge the gap between the two countries politically and culturally. Macron also handed over the skulls of 24 nineteenth-century leaders of the Algerian resistance against French colonialism – out of the 500 skulls France keeps – after 170 years of displaying them at the Musée de l’Homme (Museum of Mankind) in Paris. This was a first in the history of French-Algerian relations, and it occurred on the occasion of the 58th anniversary of Algeria’s independence in July 2020.

These steps by Macron were meant to show many Algerians that he is serious about facing the crimes committed during the French colonial rule. Macron’s recent statement, however, brought the matter back to square one and escalated the Algerian position, which insists on a full apology for the crimes of colonialism in the period from 1832 to 1962. The Algerian government demands three conditions to bridge the gap: (1) giving the archival documents presently kept in France back to Algeria; (2) opening the French nuclear explosions file in southern Algeria; and (3) paying compensation and the full recovery of the skulls of the Algerian resistance fighters held in Paris.

France views the bilateral relations through a colonialist memory and logic, which goes up and down in accordance with the strength of the Algerian regime. When the Algerian regime was strong in the 1970s, French politicians and intellectuals were reluctant to rise any serious issues against Algeria in reference to colonial memory. France sought to maintain a solid and calm relationship with Algeria in an effort to preserve its economic interests as stipulated in the Évian Accords of 1962 that granted independence to Algeria.

France, in fact, signed an accord with Algeria in 1968, with which it granted exceptional privileges to Algerians living in France. However, the weakness of the Algerian regime, starting with the military coup in 1992, left the door open for France to blackmail Algerians, who were in dire need of French support at international forums. France launched a campaign to nullify the 1968 accord of its content and made a unilateral amendment to it in 1994 with Decree No. 1103/94. France made another amendment in 2001, which reduced the privileges Algerians enjoy in France, restricting the freedom of movement of Algerians between France and Algeria.

France also started to discuss thorny issues between the two countries, such as the rights of the Pieds-Noirs, the French settlers in Algeria, who left Algeria after independence, and the right of return to their homeland of Algerian Harka, the Algerians who fought with France in the 1954-1962 war and who fled with the French army in 1962, including granting them a full pardon. France has practiced all forms of pressure on the Algerian ruling elite to reverse the policy of Arabization pursued by Algeria since 1972, which aimed at achieving cultural independence from France and strengthening the Algerian identity based on three main pillars: Islam, Arabism, and Amazigh identity.

It is strange that France succeeded, through its Francophone lobbies, in infiltrating the Algerian administration, in blocking the Arabization law of 1991 and the law of 1997, and in stopping all attempts to strengthen the role of the English language in the Algerian educational system. France also obstructed all efforts to pass a law criminalizing the colonial legacy of France by the Algerian parliament. The first draft was put up for discussion in 2009. But, with France’s strong influence on Algerian domestic decision-making, the Algerian regime failed to decolonize the colonial memory, which both the regime and the Algerian people consider one of the central issues in rearranging bilateral relations with France.

The successive French policies of obstructing the presence of Algerian Harkis, who fought alongside France during Algeria’s War of Independence, on French soil escalates during electoral campaigns, and has strengthened and consolidated the official and popular Algerian position. Perhaps the best evidence is Law No. 2005-158, which glorifies colonialism and was passed by the French General Assembly in February 2005 during the time of President Jacques Chirac.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride. The fourth article of the law includes a paragraph stipulating that school programs should praise the positive role played by the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa. As expected, this law caused a deep rift in Algerian-French relations.

Even though Macron’s recent statement was a strategic move for the upcoming presidential elections in order to win the support of the French far right and to break the popularity of the National Rally, it reflects a deep French conviction not to retreat from the French position on the issue of colonial memory in Algeria.

For Algerians, the best option is a full recognition of French colonialism and its brutality. However, the only way to change the French position and secure a full apology is closely linked to the establishment of a strong and coherent government in Algeria. Macron’s positive statements and promises made before September 2021 and his retreat reflect a state of confusion among the French political elites that began since Nicholas Sarkozy came to power in 2007, and became even worse after Emmanuel Macron became the president in 2017 – a development that shook the French political system.

Last year, President Emmanuel Macron launched a war against “Islamist separatism” in France after a terrorist attack that targeted a French schoolteacher. On February 16, the French National Assembly passed a bill to reinforce “Republican Principles,” officially aimed at fighting an ideology associated with extremism. However, the bill targets entire Muslim communities in the country by making it easier for the government to shut down mosques, associations, and schools that are found to be critical or not complying with the vaguely defined “Republican values.”

For the French sociologist Raphaël Liogier, professor at Sciences Po Aix and visiting scholar at Colombia University, Islam in France has gradually been constructed as a problem in the media and became the product of a long history of people perceived as refractory to civilization and progress. “Muslims have a peculiar definition in our minds: enemies of the Christian culture, and enemies of modernity and progress.” If Islam has been depicted like this for a long time, the new rhetoric of “Republican values” used by the French government gives another perspective as to how Islam is also “anti-Republican.”

In the name of “secularism”

The Macron law aims to bring about a radical and reactionary transformation of society and politics by imposing a strict state control over the Muslim religion and a principle of collective responsibility which allows political parties and the police to decide the fate of religious associations, organizations, and schools. The law of 1905 that supports neutrality of the state and freedom of religious exercise is a law of separation which implies that the state must renounce the regimentation of cults.

A secular state has nothing to say about what religious dogma should be. It does not have to intervene in the way believers live their faith as long as they respect the laws in force. “Before 2003, secularism meant the freedom of expression in the public space. However, from 2003 onwards, we changed its interpretation. It was not only the neutrality of the state, but also the neutrality of people, which is very different,” says Liogier.

Stigmatizing not only Islamism but Islam itself, is a symptom of this new unqualified rejection of the Muslim population, which is nevertheless largely integrated into the French society. The 2004 law banning religious symbols in schools has opened the floodgates to significant abuses, explains the sociologist. “In 2004, you can see the act of parliament to prevent the scarf, the simple scarf, in public schools in France.”

The recurring persuasion to ban veiled mothers from accompanying children on school outings even though they are not public officials; the attempt by political figures to constantly direct the debate towards Muslim community are in reality a form of Islamophobic propaganda in the name of French secularism.

In reality, this tactical election strategy shows first and foremost the contradictions of a government that is walking on eggshells. With the responsibility for the catastrophic balance sheet of the health crisis, and a historic economic crisis and its consequences on the working classes and youth, Emmanuel Macron aims to replay the card of the bulwark against the extreme far-right for the presidential elections of 2022.

A strategy that pushes him to carry out an offensive on the reactionary and Islamophobic ground of Marine Le Pen, while at the same time delimiting himself intermittently in order to embody the party against the populism of the National Rally and its leader. A vast program that has nothing to offer to the youth except for the accentuation of the authoritarian and racist offensive.

Emmanuel Macron aims to replay the card of the bulwark against the extreme far-right for the presidential elections of 2022.

This shift towards authoritarianism is linked to the homicidal policy of the ruling class in response to multiple crises within the country. To implement its homicidal policy, the international ruling class is cultivating fascist forces and turning to authoritarian forms of power. “Similar acts reflect the picture all over Europe; and there is something strange with the laïcité in France. It is becoming the object of our narcissistic anxiety,” recalls the sociologist.

Throughout Europe, similar processes are underway. In Spain, the army reacted to last year’s strikes that forced a policy of closure by plotting coups and rehabilitating the leader of the 1936 fascist coup and dictator Francisco Franco. In Italy, banker Mario Draghi is forming a government of “herd immunity,” including both the far-right Lega and the former Stalinist Democratic Party.

For Raphaël Liogier, this narrative shaped a collective paranoia, born out of a narcissistic wound which resulted in imposing an ideology at the expense of Muslim communities. “It is very important for everybody, but it is even more important for Western Europeans because they are used to the idea of being at the center of the world, and this created some kind of a complex. And, anti-Islamism, which exists in some parts of the world, is directly fed, even constructed, through this complex.”

Muslims are a problem for France today, as they were in the colonial period. In the words of General de Gaulle, “We are still primarily a European people of the white race, Greek and Latin culture, and the Christian religion. Don’t tell me stories! Muslims, have you gone to see them? Have you watched them with their turbans and jellabiyas? You can see that they are not French!” In 1959, when Algeria was still a French colony, de Gaulle used a metaphor to explain the difference between the French and Arabs when talking to MP Alain Peyrefitte: “No matter how much you mix vinegar and olive oil, after a while they separate.”

De Gaulle is, of course, much more than this and like de Gaulle, French President Emmanuel Macron too wants to leave his mark on history. As the party leader of Le Republique en Marche (LREM), Macron did not miss the historical remark, which was sometimes implied by some of his predecessors, that vinegar and olive oil don’t mix. On the contrary, he went further. De Gaulle expressed these views in a private conversation – Macron made his speech titled “Separatist Islamism” publicly in Les Mureaux.

Though recent polls show that Macron and opponent Marine Le Pen are neck and neck, it is highly possible that Macron will be re-elected in 2022 for a second term. Interior Minister Gérald Darmanin, who has become a leading figure in the political battle, has attacked Le Pen arguing, “To proclaim in every election, ‘Either the nationalist parties or the National Front!’ is not nice.

This is Marine Le Pen stigmatizing the voter base, and I am opposed to this kind of popular disdain.” His desire is to draw the far-right electorate into his camp. If one side of the coin is historical, this is the other side. Why not unite under Macron’s “En Marche” after you separate the olive oil and the vinegar?

President Macron, in his speech titled “Separatist Islamists,” explained what makes the Muslims who are not accepted as French by both the right and some of the socialists, especially the far right, different – even though this does not cover the entire political spectrum of his country. Macron used a very inclusive language for the Muslims in his country. So much so that even a Muslim who lives a secular life and, for example, is only sensitive about halal food among the orders of the Islamic religion, could be counted among these “separatists.”

As president of one of the six founding states of the European Union and, as he claims, “the five permanent members of the UN Security Council and the president of one of the G7 countries,” he was not going to let his words only be words.* Rather, he made a small change. His speech “The Fight against Separatist Islamism,” which he gave to announce a legal framework, was harshly criticized and even ridiculed not only by Muslims but also by the media across the Atlantic and the English Channel. He begins with the “Draft Law Strengthening Republican Principles” and the “Charter of Principles for French Islam” dictated by a group of imams in his pocket.

Aside from its funny, tragicomic, horrible, and unacceptable content, this draft is an unsolicited document for any religious community or ethnic group, and its very existence signifies the official announcement that Muslims are a separate entity under the French constitution and laws. France is not satisfied with this separatism. While this draft is introduced as the first official document of the invention of French Islam, it also clearly distinguishes Muslims from the Islamic ummah.

Judging by the course of politics in France, the ban on the Muslim Brotherhood is clear. It is forbidden to criticize the current Egyptian government that staged a military coup against the Muslim Brotherhood, which came to power through democratic elections for the first time in Egypt’s history. Although not demanded in the draft, Macron’s ideal is to bow to General Sisi (who overthrew Egyptian President Mohammed Morsi with a military coup) the way socialist Paris Mayor Anne Hidalgo did during an official visit of the general.

The draft points out that “mosques were not established to spread nationalist discourses that advocate foreign regimes that are hostile to France and French citizens and support their foreign policies.” Given that the draft appears to be stating the obvious in regard to a place of worship, there must be a different motive behind it; Regardless of the possible intentions behind this, it seems to have a current application and one that is not even related to foreign policy but surprisingly to the fight against the global COVID-19 pandemic.

In France, imam Farid Slim was sent to court on February 2 because he stated in social media that “Turkish President Erdoğan is managing the pandemic better than French President Macron.” Slim, whose home was raided by police at 6 a.m. on the orders of the Chambéry Governorate on charges of “humiliating France, trying to overthrow the French government, and propagating terrorist propaganda,” is on trial at the Paris Court of Appeal. While the public prosecutor expressed his opinion that the search warrant for the imam’s house was unlawful, the President of the Court decided to announce the result of the hearing on March 31.

The statement in Article Sixth of the draft that “none of our institutions and none of our rules aim at treating Muslims differently in France” is definitely funny and also obscure. However, it becomes clear when Article Nine titled “Fight against Anti-Muslim Hatred, Propaganda, and Misinformation” comes in. In the draft it states that “Muslims in France and symbols of their beliefs are often the target of hostile actions.

French president Emmanuel Macron gives a positive definition of laicism: “Laicism is the freedom to believe or not believe. The freedom to practice religion as long as it doesn’t disrupt public order, which is guaranteed by the state. And this is the cement of a united France.”

Macron stresses again and again, “The problem and the danger is separatist Islamism.” But when he says, “We cannot victimize Muslims with the stigmatization of polemicists and extremists,” he actually spills the beans! Since right-wing extremists are not the soldiers of laicism and what they practice is cultural racism, when we look at the discourse of the president we see that the problem is precisely “a matter of identity, conditions of being proper French.”

Whatever this being French is, in Algeria under French colonial rule those who took off their headscarves and became Catholic or fought against their own people in the French army in order to overcome half-citizenship status, never really became French. But the state still tries nevertheless. The first thing to do was to ban and impose sanctions on practices of Islam as much as possible. We will be able to see these in the bill of December 9, “115 years after the 1905 Act” as the president says. One article has already been revealed.

According to the bill of Minister of Interior Darmanin, if a man or a woman rejects being examined by a doctor of the opposite sex, they will be sentenced to imprisonment of up to five years and a fine of 75,000 euros. Yet, France recognizes Catholic doctors’ right to decline to perform abortions because of their religious beliefs. No matter how firm and strict a state is, like France’s authority today aimed at Muslims, how close can it get to reaching its goal by banning or punishing?

The French president is clearly serious when he talks about getting to the bottom of the issue. Whatever is deemed to be incompatible with the republic, regarding the beliefs and practices of Muslims must be eradicated. How can that be? A French Islam will be invented, everything suspected to be incompatible with the republic will be assumed foreign.

As a matter of fact, Macron means this when he says, “Islam will be freed from foreign influences, imams from other countries won’t come to France,” and “[i]mams fully compatible with the values of the republic will be trained in France.”

Just like François Hollande, Macron thinks there were no Muslims in France when the 1905 Act, which is considered to be the foundation of laicism, was enacted. However, Madagascar and Algeria were French colonies at the time. Ultimately, France did not need a protocol similar to the agreement with the Catholics to define its relationship with Muslims at the time for the addressees were not citizens!

Macron keeps saying that Muslims came “to our land” during the 1960s-70s. The expression “our land” reveals the fact that Muslims are not accepted as “real” French citizens.

Today, Macron once again echoes the fact that Muslims were not accepted as French citizens when he says Muslims came during the 1960s-70s and keeps using the expression “to our land.” It is debatable whether he is aware of it or not, but it seems he wants a hierarchical Islamic structure similar to Catholicism.

For this purpose, in 2003, when former President Sarkozy was still the Minister of Interior, the French Council of the Muslim Faith was founded. (It seems to make little difference if the government is rightist, socialist, Macron’s administration, or any other party. This is a long-term project that will allow Muslims no respite.) But the French Council of the Muslim Faith had a relatively pluralist structure and seemingly did not meet the government’s expectation.

Now the addressee is invented to a large extent. This addressee is the Foundation of Islam in France founded in 2016, the successor of the Foundation for Islamic Works in France founded during Villepin’s premiership in 2005. In any case, during his presidency, Sarkozy talked about a notion called “French Islam” and not the “French Council of the Muslim Faith.” On the other hand, Macron does not use the term “French Islam”; he prefers a more rhetorical term, “Enlightenment Islam”!

Tareq Oubrou: “The French culture does not want to see the headscarf. Then, Muslims should act like a chameleon wrapping itself in the colors of nature.”

Regarding the answer to the question “How and who will enlighten Islam for France?”, the president of the foundation Ghaleb Bencheikh seems to be the chosen one. He is a physician of Algerian descent but most importantly he is the ideal imam France is looking for. Last year, in an interview for the magazine Marianne, he said, “The headscarf attacks woman’s human dignity.” He also complained by saying, “Unfortunately homosexuality is convicted in the Qur’an,” and stated that women can be imams, and men and women can pray in the same row.

In his various interviews with the French media, a member of the same foundation, the imam of Bordeaux, Tareq Oubrou, defended the idea that Muslims need to be invisible. “The French culture does not want to see the headscarf. Then, Muslims should act like a chameleon wrapping itself in the colors of nature.”

Emphasizing the importance of modesty, Oubrou said, “The headscarf means you are Muslim, and it attracts attention. But Islam says not to attract attention. You cannot expect a Muslim to be a prophet. Just as Allah is not visible; the angels are not visible.” And in case anyone had any doubts, he added, “Also, if we are living in France, we have to accept whatever the society we’re living in accepts – even if it is against Islam. That is the real Islam.”

Another Muslim member of the foundation is Hakim El Karoui of Tunisian descent from the liberal Institute Montaigne. Last year, he published a 617-page report titled “The Islamist Factory” imitating a work titled “The Islamophobia Factory.” Macron’s colleague from his years at Rothschild, El Karoui wrote a study on how to create “French Islam” at the request of the president.

As for how Karoui views the issue, both his statements in various interviews and the primary questions of the field study published in his report answer the question. They are about “the headscarf, halal meat, the issues of virginity and submission to men, and how many times Muslims go to the mosque.”

In short, today’s France instead of creating a multi-religious and multicultural country, a model of integration that will accept Muslims’ differences, which could in turn reinforce their sense of belonging to the republic, it replicates the former attitude towards Jews this time against Muslims in the 21st century. This plan cannot be named as a plan to combat “Islamist Separatism.” It should be named as “Fight to Create More Separatists.”

At the beginning of his speech at Mureaux titled “Fight against Separatism” on October 2, 2020, French President Emmanuel Macron said that it is necessary to understand the current problems of France with a taboo-free approach.

During his speech, which lasted about 70 minutes, he identified the problem and this taboo-free approach: “There is an Islamic separatism that endangers our society, our capacity to live together, our Republic; it is first trying to establish a hostile society parallel to the Republic, and then take it over!”

The president did not mention terror, terrorists, or a terrorist organization, and even said he distinguished these Islamic separatists from the rest of Muslims in France. So, who are the perpetrators of this “separatism?” More importantly, what is the difference between an ordinary Muslim and a separatist Muslim in the eyes of the state? How can one tell a Muslim is not a perpetrator of “separatism”?

According to the French president, the separatist Muslims “propose ideas that turn the republic’s values upside-down, disregard gender equality, and even contradict human dignity.” In France, for almost 30 years, there have been many instances of explanations by high-level officials as to what Macron means by this and who this rhetoric affects.

François Hollande, compared to his successor Sarkozy, gave the impression of a politician with a more respectful and earnest approach towards Muslims. Sarkozy stated, “If a woman with the headscarf is given the opportunity to improve herself, she will be liberated from captivity, eventually throw away the headscarf, and become ‘French’.”

Laurence Rossignol, Hollande’s Minister of Family, Children, and Women’s Rights, explained how women’s dignity is disregarded. “Once there were black people who wanted slavery in the U.S., the women with headscarves are just like them.” Manuel Valls, the former mouthy prime minister of France under François Hollande, said that religious symbols besieged the streets and that this meant a rebellion against the republic. He also assumed the role of a religious authority as the prime minister and said, “The burkini is not in the Qur’an, so it is the symbol of radical Islam.”

Last year, when the sportswear brand Decathlon marketed a sports hijab, the top representatives of the political class became hysterical! Aurore Berge, Macron’s party spokesperson, called for a boycott of the brand.

“Now it is impossible for me to trust a brand that contradicts our values, neither as a woman nor as a citizen,” Berge said. While Marlène Schiappa, who served as Secretary of State for Gender Equality in the government of Prime Minister Édouard Philippe from 2017 to 2020, cried, “This sportswear is obviously a promotion of political Islam, a proof that religion controls everything.”

According to the spokesperson of the Republicans (Les Républicains), Lydia Guirous, the brand’s move was “nothing but chaperoning the submission of women.” And for some members of the French parliament, the brand was “obviously starting the sexual apartheid process.”

After a few days, the company announced, “We have been subjected to unprecedented threats and a wave of insults, our employees were insulted and physically threatened.” As a result, the company withdrew the product from the market.

The French president made other striking points such as “[i]n some municipalities, there are requests for men and women to swim at separate hours in the pools” and “some students in some schools ask for mealtimes at school cafeterias according to their religious beliefs!”

During a TV program, the Minister of the Interior Gérald Darmanin stated, “I am always shocked when I see food aisles applying religious beliefs at supermarkets!” While Macron emphasized in his lengthy speech at Les Mureaux that the government will get to the bottom of this issue, according to the Minister of Interior Darmanin “this is how communitarianism starts” and capitalism is the culprit.

While explaining the difference between “Muslims” and the “separatist Muslims”, Macron stressed that the separatists talk a lot about France’s colonialist era!

Somewhere in his speech, while explaining the difference between Muslims and the separatist Muslims, Macron stressed that the separatists talk a lot about France’s colonialist era. Clearly these separatists talk about the parallel society created by the first-class French citizens who gave a status of half citizenship to the Muslims who survived the torture and massacres in the former colonies of France.

Simple things like the beaches closed to Algerians in Algeria, or 25 Muslims staying in a barrack room whereas five French people staying in similar rooms, or not being able to get a passport! As written on the walls of the barracks, French people needed more oxygen – just like today.

Though French President Macron accepts that France has its “faults” and “responsibility” for the colonial past, he personally thinks the separatists have evil intentions, “otherwise why would they talk about this?” he wonders. “If,” he begins and explains, “their grandparents have been living in our land for many years now, children and their parents who never saw the colonialist era, these separatists entrap them.”

The formula of the French president is simple, and he expresses it whenever possible. He explained his formula last year in January in the old capital of the Republic of Cote d’Ivoire, Abidjan, by saying, “Colonialism was a big and serious mistake of the French Republic!” Implying that it is all in the past now, he made a call to all of Africa, “Let’s turn this page now. Besides, the population of the African continent is young. For example, three-fourths of the population of Cote d’Ivoire never lived in the colonial era. Likewise, I also am not from the generation of the colonial era.”

If the issue of halal food, which could be handled very simply in the school canteens, was considered an issue at the state level, then, the problem is directly the belief and religious practices of Muslims.

Therefore, it could be expected that France would confront Muslims with the strict laicism principle. And then, we could say France’s traumatic past with Catholicism does not legitimize the attack on the Muslim minority today, but that’s not the case.

The far-right in France has best understood contemporary national and international fluctuations, which lead to anti-Parliamentarism, anti-Semitism, or nationalism, and promotes hatred of Muslims and other minority groups in society. Since Vichy and the collaboration of French authorities with the Nazi regime, the far right has been oscillating between anti-Semitism, latent but never asserted as a political program, and anti-Arab racism, as clearly demonstrated by political scientists.

For nearly 40 years, the far-right occupied the French political scene, crystallizing under the name of the National Front. Created by Jean-Marie Le Pen, the National Front exploited the nostalgia of French Algeria, the petty bourgeoisie of the Poujadist movement, and the fears of a population hit by deindustrialization.

However, the attachment of the French youth to the far-right is no longer limited to the National Front, which turned into the Rassemblement National or the National Rally. Thanks to the communication networks and the use of social media, they can now form various small groups. Ideas of right-wing politics are becoming more mainstream and widely disseminated in the French public.

A new generation of far-right in France?

The political inclination towards the far right is traceable throughout Europe, and France is no exception. While European far-right parties present candidates aged between 20 and 30 years in order to attract young voters, in France the rising star of the National Rally is Jordan Bardella, a 24-year-old politician, a well-behaved and clean-cut young man, elected from Seine Saint Denis, one of the poorest and most ethnically mixed districts in France.

What is happening today in Europe with the rise of right-wing parties is a generational change that reflects a significant shift from the far-right of postwar Europe. At that time, the far-right was identified with the Nazi genocides.

This movement was marginalized and finally defeated by a unified Europe. Today, right-wing candidates who address young people use an anti-Muslim discourse, which is sometimes, not necessarily always, accompanied by a pro-Christian vision of Europe.

According to several studies, migration and asylum are described by young French people, who are closer to the far-right, as Europe’s most urgent problem. However, for young French people, who are closer to the left-wing movements, it is the environmental issues that worry them the most.

For the young French who support right-wing parties, the fear of the European population being culturally and ethnically replaced by minorities is at the heart of their concerns.

Although fanciful, the fear of the Great Replacement has successfully gained ground in France. Theorized by the extreme right-wing writer and theorist Renaud Camus, the Great Replacement is a racist and xenophobic conspiracy theory according to which there is a deliberate process of substitution of the French and European population by a non-European population, primarily from Black Africa and the Maghreb.

This replacement implies a change of civilization and the process is claimed to be supported by the European political, intellectual, and media elite for ideological or economic reasons.

For the young French who support right-wing parties, the fear of the European population being culturally and ethnically replaced by minorities is at the heart of their concerns.

Is this right-wing phenomenon in France reflected in the ballot boxes? During the European elections of 2014 and local elections of 2015, two thirds of young people under 35 abstained from the ballots. Among those who voted in 2015, the National Front won the highest percentage at 30%. The percentage was 25% in the European elections of 2014.

Looking at how the youth voted in the first round of the French presidential elections in 2017, Marine Le Pen won 21% of votes of people aged 18-24. She was clearly preceded by the far-left candidate Jean-Luc Mélenchon who won 30% of the votes, surpassing Macron who won 18% of the votes. In the 25-34 age group, Le Pen won 24% of the votes, like Mélenchon, but behind Macron with a percentage of 28%. In the second round, in the 18-24 age group, 66% voted for Emmanuel Macron and 34% voted for Marine le Pen, the candidate of En Marche!

However, the youth vote in favor of the National Front was less of a vote of protest than a vote of support. It is a generation – let’s not forget – that has always seen the National Front in the French political landscape. This is a generation less marked by history, by successive wars, be it the Second World War or the War of Algeria. Therefore, for them, voting for the National Front only means “expressing their dissatisfaction with the other parties.”

This is a generation less marked by history, by successive wars, be it the Second World War or the War of Algeria.

The youth vote for the National Front was a vote of support. The first reason for this support is that among the youth voting for the National Front almost 23% share the political perspective of Marine Le Pen’s.

The second reason is their support for “the ideas and solutions on immigration and integration that this party proposes.” The third reason is the impression that the “NF is the only party that cares about people’s problems. “This belief is held by +/- 17% of the general French population.

Outside the National Front

The takeover of the National Front by Marine Le Pen changed the party’s vision. She has never ceased to hold a narrow line and to hold on to a legacy while marking a distance with the sulfurous phrases and attitudes of her father Jean-Marie Le Pen. The party was renamed “Rassemblement National,” a way perhaps of betting on what unites the nation rather than what divides it.

A quest for respectability that has, in an almost mechanical way, shifted the lines. The ideological line of the National Rally officially is based on a Eurosceptic and anti-migration stance.

The National Rally, in spite of the young Bardella factor, has remained a party of the elderly. The white hair of its members and sympathizers strike any observer who watches the party’s meetings. In addition, some criticized the leadership of Marine le Pen for causing the party to lose its dynamics through institutionalization and also of expelling most of its far-rightist members.

A “gentrification” is taking place, a weakening of the marginal ideas, and turning the National Rally into a party positioned in the right of the right – but not any longer in the extreme right. A term that the heiress Le Pen vigorously recuses.

In France, however, the extreme right now exceeds the National Rally alone and is embodied in various small groups. Religious groups intervene in social debates (freedom of expression in the arts, gay marriage, etc.) Civitas, also known as France Jeunesse Civitas or Institut Civitas, is a French social and political movement that defines itself as a “traditionalist Catholic lobby,” a movement “committed to the establishment of the Social Royalty of Christ in nations and among peoples in general, in France and among the French in particular.”

The movement that attracts the most attention is undoubtedly the Identitarians (Génération identitaire). This movement is characterized by its mastery of social networks, its marketing capacity – activists wear blue jackets with distinct logos – and its symbolic acts. For example, when they rally against police violence and “anti-white racism” in the Republic Square of Paris, they opened a huge banner from the roofs of houses facing the square, or when they organize “deport to the border” protests against migrants who try to cross the Italian-French border, or when they interrupt distributions of hot meals to migrants with the motto, “Ours before the others” (Les nôtres avant les autres).

The Identitarians use social networks in an interesting but efficient way. They recruit followers via online games like Fortnite, or war games, which are filled with racist conversations and conspiracy theories such as the Great Replacement. According to this conspiracy theory, people of African origin will replace the original “French” population.

This fear is often expressed in cinema, which sometimes tells us more than sociological surveys. Zombie films, such as World War Z, describe the destruction of the civilized world by enslaved hordes.

Through “raids” and “astroturfing,” the Identitarians use social networks to “lynch” a person or a community, and adeptly utilize trendy Twitter hashtags. This new, far right-aligned generation is waging “a war of influence and culture.”

The new far-right movement also worries the intelligence services. In June 2018, the newspaper Mediapart published an article and shared the results of an investigation conducted between October 2017 and June 2018.