T

he five-month political deadlock in Iraq, which had persisted since the November 2025 elections, ended on 27 April 2026 with the announcement of a surprise candidate. The country’s largest parliamentary bloc, the Shiite Coordination Framework, nominated 41-year-old businessman Ali al-Zeydi as its candidate for prime minister, and Iraqi President Nizar Amedi officially tasked Zeydi with forming the new government. Zeydi, a figure with no political background who is seen as a ‘technocratic consensus figure’, has reignited both internal balances and the dynamics along the Washington–Tehran axis. The young prime ministerial candidate is expected to present his cabinet to parliament within 30 days.

The quota system in the shadow of crises

In Iraq, the process of forming a government has traditionally been fraught with difficulties due to the ethnic-sectarian quota system known as ‘Muhasasa’, which has been in place since the US invasion of 2003. Under this system, the presidency is allocated to the Kurds, the speakership of parliament to the Sunnis and the premiership to the Shia Arabs, despite this not being enshrined in the constitution. However, this power-sharing arrangement, particularly when combined with competition between factions within the Shia bloc and the interventions of external actors, can lead to governance vacuums lasting several months.

A similar scenario emerged during the latest crisis following the November 2025 elections. Rivalry between former prime minister Nuri al-Maliki and incumbent prime minister Mohammed Shia al-Sudani brought the process to a standstill. This deadlock was only resolved when both figures withdrew their candidacies in the national interest and reached a consensus on Ali al-Zeydi, a non-political figure. Zeydi’s candidacy was approved by the majority of leaders within the Coordination Framework, thereby becoming the will of parliament’s largest bloc.

Portrait of a young businessman: who is Ali al-Zeydi?

Born in Baghdad in 1986, Ali al-Zeydi is the youngest prime ministerial candidate in Iraqi history. He studied law and finance and completed a master’s degree in banking and finance. Notably, he has never previously held any political office or served in government.

Prior to entering politics, he was a wealthy businessman at the helm of major conglomerates such as the Al-Owais Group and National Holding, spanning 15 sectors including agriculture, property, energy, logistics, education, and healthcare. Furthermore, his management of major contracts supplying food to the Iraqi army, as well as his educational investments, including Al-Shaab University, demonstrate the extent of his economic influence. However, Zeydi’s profile is not without controversy. The South Islamic Bank, of which he is chairman of the board, was subjected to sanctions in 2024 at the request of the US Treasury Department due to suspicions of money laundering and dollar smuggling. The bank was also barred from conducting dollar transactions. Some analysts have criticised this situation as an attempt to normalise and sweep under the carpet the ongoing major corruption investigations in Iraq.

Zeydi’s candidacy is seen as an attempt to maintain balance between Nuri al-Maliki and Muhammad Shia al-Sudani within the Coordination Framework. Zeydi is known to have close ties with the incumbent Prime Minister, Sudani, and his cousin, Ziya al-Zeydi, is a parliamentarian from Sudani’s coalition. This raises the question of whether Zeydi is an extension of the current system.

Nevertheless, Zeydi’s name has also been well received by other key political figures. In addition to the leaders of the Kurdish KDP and KYB parties, the Sunni Azm, Siyada and Taqaddum alliances have also congratulated Zeydi and issued messages of support. Shortly after his appointment, Zeydi met with Sunni leaders and promised to establish a government that would represent all Iraqis.

The Approach of the US, Iran and other powers

One of the key figures involved in the process was US President Donald Trump. As is well known, Trump firmly vetoed Nuri al-Maliki, the Shiite bloc’s first choice and a figure known for his close ties to Iran, threatening to cut off all support for Iraq should Maliki become prime minister. This pressure from Washington forced the Coordination Framework to back down, prompting it to reconsider its options for prime ministerial candidates.

However, Trump openly supported Zeydi’s candidacy, posting a message on Truth Social reading “Congratulations, Ali!” and inviting him to Washington once he had formed the government. This apparent green light from the US appears to be conditional on Zeydi forming a government that maintains a ‘distance from Iran’. Meanwhile, the Tehran administration initially remained silent, but Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Arakchi later congratulated Zeydi, stating that they supported Iraq’s stability. Political circles are also discussing whether Zeydi’s appointment might be the result of a “mysterious” agreement between Washington and Tehran regarding Iraq, as has been the case in all prime ministerial selection processes since 2003, or whether it is a temporary step back by Iran to avoid sanctions.

One of the key figures involved in the process was US President Donald Trump. As is well known, Trump firmly vetoed Nuri al-Maliki, the Shiite bloc’s first choice and a figure known for his close ties to Iran, threatening to cut off all support for Iraq should Maliki become prime minister. This pressure from Washington forced the Coordination Framework to back down, prompting it to reconsider its options for prime ministerial candidates.

Ali al-Zeydi’s appointment to form a government has received widespread support, both within and beyond the US and Iran. In its congratulatory message, the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs emphasised the deep historical ties between the two countries and expressed a desire to develop strategic institutional cooperation further in the coming period. During a telephone conversation, Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari congratulated Zeydi and they discussed the development of bilateral relations and Pakistan’s role in reducing regional tensions. Arab League Secretary-General Ahmed Abu Ghait welcomed the appointment, expressing hope that the new government would fulfill the Iraqi people’s aspirations for security and prosperity.

Leaders of many Arab countries, including Syria, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, Jordan and Lebanon, also telephoned al-Zeydi to offer their personal congratulations. The European Union (EU) Delegation to Iraq and British Ambassador to Baghdad, Irfan Siddiq, stated that they viewed the appointment positively and emphasized that they would continue to support Iraq’s reform, peace and development process.

The challenging process ahead for Zeydi

Securing a vote of confidence from an absolute majority of the 329-seat parliament within the 30-day legal timeframe is Ali al-Zeydi’s greatest test on the path to becoming Prime Minister. Should Zeydi succeed in forming a government, the economic crisis will be the first of many challenges he will face. The closure of the Strait of Hormuz and the disruption of oil exports due to tensions between the US, Israel and Iran have already severely impacted Iraq’s struggling economy.

Corruption and security issues constitute another major crisis awaiting Zeydi. Combating deep-rooted corruption and addressing the future of Shia militia groups (Hashd al-Shaabi), which operate outside the army’s full control, are among the most sensitive issues facing the new government. Political stability is another area where it remains to be seen whether Zeydi will be able to succeed, given that Iraq has been unable to achieve it for years. After all, it is unclear how influential figures such as Muqtada al-Sadr will react to this process.

Some predict that, should Zeydi fail to form a government, the Coordination Framework could propose new candidates to buy time, while others suggest that the country could be drawn into a cycle of early elections. Ultimately, it will become clear in the coming weeks whether this ‘rejuvenation’ operation in Baghdad constitutes genuine reform or merely a tactical manoever, depending on the nature of the cabinet to be formed.

This article was originally published by Middle East Africa in Turkish.

Iran-backed proxies are involved in almost every major crisis in the Middle East. Recently, the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, of Yemen launched another missile attack on Abu Dhabi, called on foreign companies and investors to leave the UAE, and vowed to make the country unsafe. Also, the Fatah Alliance and other Iran-backed parties affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected Iraq’s recent parliamentary election held in October 2021 and tried to further destabilize the already chaotic Iraqi politics.

Moreover, elements within the PMF such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq with strong ties to Iran, have been trying to hinder Turkey’s fight against PKK terror in northern Iraq as they present it as “a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty,” a point which was also made by Iraj Masjedi, Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad last year in February.

Most recently, Kata’ib Hezbollah issued a statement which threatened Turkey and demanded the withdrawal of its forces “before it’s too late.” To these Iranian proxies, the presence of Iran’s militias in Syria must also be added. In short, alongside the Hezbollah of Lebanon, Iran’s proxy par excellence, Iran-backed Shiite militant groups are active all across the Middle East.

Why does Iran need proxies?

Iran is undoubtedly a major Middle Eastern power with its geostrategic position, abundant natural resources, and significant human capital. Nevertheless, Iran’s conventional military capacity has, for decades, either fallen behind its political aspirations or remained untested with the notable exception of the tragic and devastating defensive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1980-1988.

In the twentieth century, the country was not involved in any substantial and direct military conflict against any major enemy. For that, Iranian elites’ masterful political maneuvers and their use of the international balance of power to their advantage deserves a huge credit, but that’s a different story.

The country stayed neutral during the two World Wars, “solved” the oil nationalization crisis in the early 1950s without facing military aggression – unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt which was jointly attacked by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France upon President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 – and even got away with the Iran hostage crisis at the end of 1979 without an open military confrontation.

While doing this, Iran envisioned itself as the true leader of all the Shiites in the region and beyond. These proxies consolidated Iran’s defensive capabilities but gradually turned into a security risk for the region. Furthermore, although Iran’s short-term expectations from these proxies were mostly military, there was a strong political dimension from the beginning. In essence, Iran was reproducing, in different countries, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which were established by Ayatollah Khomeini following the revolution and in time turned into a military, economic, political, and even social power.

How do Iran’s proxies function?

From its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as an interventionist regime that interposed in the affairs of regional states through the rhetoric and practice of exporting the revolution. This was clearly reflected in Article 154 of Iran’s constitution which declared Iran’s support for the “just struggles of the mustada‘fun [the oppressed] against the mustakbirun [the oppressor] in every corner of the globe,” while “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations.”

As it turned out, Iran cared little about the non-intervention principle of the United Nations. The hostility between the Islamic Republic, the U.S., and Israel, along with the unfavorable attitude of certain Arab regimes in the region, with the notable exception of Hafez Assad’s Syria, towards the Islamic Republic’s policies certainly added to Iran’s desire to look for non-state allies to consolidate its security in the region. Nevertheless, paradoxically these proxies caused, for all intents and purposes, Iran’s further isolation in the region.

Although the “axis of resistance,” Iran’s preferred term for the large network of proxies under its control, is anti-American, anti-Zionist, and counter-hegemonic in rhetoric, it is characterized, in fact, by two main features: Iran’s proxies grew in weak and war-torn states, and they targeted Iran’s regional enemies – not only Israel – along with the U.S. as the first and foremost global hegemonic power. Yet, the real risk for Iran’s proxies has always been their political influence rather than their military capability.

Iran’s proxies after Qasem Soleimani

Iran’s Middle East proxies have for a long time been predominantly associated with Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. There is no question that Soleimani played an immensely decisive role in coordinating Iran’s network of Middle East proxies especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

But, although his assassination by the U.S. in January 2020 came as a shock for Iran, his weight in in laying out Iran’s Middle East foreign policies was already put under increasing question by those such as Javad Zarif, Iran’s former minister of foreign affairs, who sought to reintegrate Iran in the international community.

In the changing landscape of today’s Middle East and Iran’s normalization attempts with its Gulf neighbors, Iran’s proxies can no longer effectively function like they did in the past as sheer militant groups. Yet their political influence in their respective countries also poses challenges to the region.

Their sectarian approaches, reliance on arms, and their close ties with Iran further complicate the possibility of their integration into national politics. In a nutshell, at best, Iranian proxies can hope to replicate the Lebanese Hezbollah, which itself suffers from these defects and acts like a state within a state.

As nuclear negotiations continue in Vienna to find a common ground between Iran and the U.S., Iran’s proxies once again became a critical issue. It goes without saying that the U.S. regards these proxies as a security risk for itself and its Middle Eastern allies, but they are primarily a regional problem.

Thus, although reaching a renewed nuclear deal which would effectively limit Iran’s nuclear capacity and undermine the security risks of its proxies must be a shared priority for the region, there needs to be a regional initiative to secure stability in the greater area.

Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations and repair broken ties with a number of states in the region can be a good starting point to deescalate tensions in the Middle East. Also, the lifting of illegal sanctions on Iran can encourage it to take part constructively in the region’s normalization process.

In order to realize this, Iran must respect the principle of “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations” as stipulated in its constitution.

Eighteen years after the fall of Saddam Hussein in Iraq, Iraqi Shiites are divided on the relationship between political power, ethnicity, and religious legitimation. However, one thing that is clear is that the greater majority of high-ranking Shiite religious scholars in Iraq support democracy. Peyman Eshaghi of Politics Today interviewed Dr. Ali Taher Elmemmud, associate professor of sociology at the University of Baghdad, on his book titled The Embers of Governance: Iraqi Shiites and Nation-State Building Challenges in the Post-2003 Era, Beirut, Darelrafidayn, 2017 [in Arabic].

Q. What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book? What is the inspiration and motivation behind this book?

This book was my doctoral dissertation. It took two years to write, and a passionate defense that lasted six and a half hours was held for it. This was because it was the only dissertation defended in the Faculty of Humanities and the Department of Sociology of Baghdad University on Shiism and state-building in Iraq. After that, of course, it took a year to turn the dissertation into a book.

Of course, I removed some theoretical aspects from the book, and it became more suitable for non-academic readers and researchers. To write the dissertation, I conducted field research for more than a year. I succeeded in conducting interviews with twenty notable personalities. It was very challenging to meet Iraqi high-ranking Shiite clerics, known as “Sources of Emulation,” and top political figures due to Iraq’s situation and the sensitivities surrounding the issue. Among them are Al-Sayyid Ali Al-Sistani, Sayyid Muhammad Saeed Al-Hakim, Muhammad Is’haq al-Fayadh, and Bashir Al-Najafi.

Talking to intellectuals was much easier, but as I said, interviewing leading religious figures in Iraq was more difficult. For example, I spent six months trying to interview a Shiite high-ranking religious scholar known as “Marja” (literally Source of Emulation) in Najaf.

Q. How did you conduct research for this book?

While examining the state-building by Shiites in Iraq after 2003, I tried to study the fundamental theories of state-nation building. But I soon realized that many of the approaches cited about Iraq do not reflect the realities of the country. Perhaps this is because most of the researchers who have worked in this field have been non-Iraqis or have not done fieldwork. It must be borne in mind that Iraq is a country with an ancient history and deep-rooted culture. Therefore, it is challenging to bring together all the affairs of Iraq and understand the country in terms of the relationship that the government has had with its people.

For example, Francis Fukuyama has written about state-building in Iraq, and British author Liora Lukitz has written another book on state-building in Iraq. In this book, Lukitz applies Anthony Smith’s theory of national identity to the case of Iraq. However, when we scrutinize the issue, we find that neither of the two writers has been able to consider and understand Iraq’s realities. These two “Western ways” of thinking could not comprehend the local complexities.

Since 2003, Iraqi Shiite Islamists have ruled with the same secular tools and way of thinking. Thus, it must be said that this is a new phenomenon in the course of Shiite political thought. In practice, no Shiite Islamist has tried to pass Islamic law in parliament since 2003. Personal status laws were never transformed into the “Islamic” ones. The budget law, one of the clauses of which imposes a tax on alcoholic beverages, which practically guarantees their free sale in Iraq, has never been criticized by a parliament whose majority is Shiite Islamists. They never tried to establish an Islamic institution called the government. Such things show that their Islamism enjoys a civil approach.

Although this approach is not Islamist in the conventional sense, it is not necessarily secular in the anti-religious sense. Instead, it respects religion without allowing religion to rule directly. Iraqi Shiite Islamists are in favor of a civil society, and Islamism for these Islamists is a belief in Islam and a personal commitment to it. In other words, Islamism is defined by performing a series of private acts of worship, observing sincerity and trustworthiness, and the like. Islamists have no purpose other than themselves and individual issues, and do not intend to lead society towards Islam.

Most of the Iraqi Shiites are following Ayatollah Sistani. However, they are not the only ones. Some Shiites are also openly secular in three types: first, liberal seculars represented by people like Ahmad Chalabi, who passed away a few years ago. Second, the national seculars who are represented in the political arena by politicians such as Ayad Allawi. The third group is the Communist seculars, represented by the Iraqi Communist Party.

Islamist Shiites are also made up of several groups. Most of them follow Ayatollah Sistani. The second group, which is smaller than the first group, is Muqtada al-Sadr. Religiously, they were following Sayyid Muhammad-Sadiq al-Sadr, Muqtada al-Sadr’s father, who was assassinated by state forces in 1999, and now they follow Muqtada al-Sadr. Muqtada is a nationalist figure who has never called for the formation of an Islamic-Shiite state since 2003. He has promoted religious, denominational, and cultural pluralism in Iraq, especially in recent years.

The third group of Shiite Islamists is loyal to the theory of velayat-e faqih (Guardianship of the Islamic Jurist). They follow Ayatollah Khamenei, the supreme leader of Iran, who resides outside Iraq in the Iranian capital of Tehran. These people are mainly affiliated with Iraqi militia groups. They have never dared to say that they want an Islamic or Shiite state since the fall of Saddam, but their approach is vividly focused on the Shiite identity and creating a Shiite ummah. In their view, the Shiite ummah ranges from the Hazaras of Afghanistan to Hezbollah in Lebanon. According to them, the leadership of this Shiite nation will be in Tehran.

The last group of Iraqi Shiites is supporters of Ayatollah Sayyid Sadiq al-Shirazi. They are much fewer in number than others. They are more focused on ritual issues, and they do not have a specific political program.

Ebrahim Raisi, ex-judiciary chief of Iran, has been elected as the new president in Iran’s June 2021 presidential elections. The 2021 elections were low key; economic hardship and fading public trust in government alienated people from the ballot boxes. Iran’s election turnout was the lowest since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. Many experts interpreted the low turnout as a sign of a legitimacy crisis for the Iranian regime.

With Raisi’s victory, reformists and moderates were wiped off the political scene. Conservatives have complete control over the legislative, executive, and judicial bodies. Hence, the Iranian political scene will be dominated by conservative elements for at least four years. In domestic politics, strict media control (especially on social media), limited political freedoms, and a colorless political life can be expected. In foreign policy, Iran will have breaks and continuities because of regional and global developments, and Raisi’s political orientation.

Raisi’s Presidency and Foreign Policy-Making in Iran

Based on the constitution of Iran, the president must consult on foreign policy issues with other institutions, assemblies, and senior officials. The parliament has a say on every domestic and foreign political matter. Specifically, the Iranian parliament’s National Security and Foreign Policy Committee is very active in foreign policy discussions. Furthermore, the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC) is one of the highest authorities that decides on Iran’s foreign policy. The Iranian president is the council’s natural chairman, and the council’s secretary is appointed by the supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.

Members of the SNSC are comprised of heads of the three branches of the government; the interior, foreign, and intelligence ministers; the chief of staff for the Armed Forces; the heads of the Army and the Revolutionary Guards Corps; relevant ministers; and other members appointed by the supreme leader. Iran’s strong political and economic institutions called “bonyadha” (foundations) also have an impact on foreign policy decision-making. Consequently, the Iranian president has limited power in determining Iran’s foreign policy.

The new president of Iran, Raisi, is unlikely to display strong political leadership in his first years in power. Beside institutional and legal restraints, there will be two determinants contributing to Raisi’s limited political power: First, Raisi has spent most of his career in the judiciary, thus, lacks political and administrative experience apart from being the head of the famous religious charity organization Bonyad-e Astan Quds Razavi (Astan Quds Razavi Foundation) between 2016 and 2019.

Bonyads are highly powerful institutions in Iran and are constitutionally exempt from parliamentary or governmental examination – they are only accountable to the supreme leader. Second, Raisi owes almost all his career to Supreme Leader of Iran Ali Khamenei. This means, he cannot breach the line drawn by Khamenei.

An interesting point about the new Iranian cabinet is that it contains some figures, who worked under Ahmadinejad’s presidency. Interior Minister Ahmed Vahidi served as defense minister under Ahmadinejad; Javad Owji, who has been nominated as the new minister of oil, was Ahmedinejad’s oil minister; and Rostam Ghasemi, who was also Ahmadinejad’s oil minister, has been appointed as the roads and transportation minister. Considering the tension between Ahmadinejad and Khamenei, Raisi’s ministerial choices show that the above names are pursuing their agenda rather than participating in Ahmadinejad’s current political stream.

Many of the names Raisi appointed and he himself are on the U.S. or EU sanctions list. This situation severely limits the diplomatic capacity of the new Iranian government. Some are curious as to how Western countries will contact and negotiate with the Iranian president and his ministers given that some of them are on their sanctions lists.

Iran’s Current Foreign Policy

Both during the election campaign and after his election, President Raisi declared that he is not against nuclear negotiations. However, he also said that negotiations carried out in the previous period did not serve the interests of the Iranian people. For this reason, one can say that although the Iranian president is not against nuclear negotiations in theory, in practice, he will approach the issue in a tone and style that the P5+1 countries do not desire.

Both during the election campaign and after his election, President Raisi declared that he is not against nuclear negotiations.

Therefore, nuclear deal negotiations are likely to come to a deadlock. The latest round of negotiations were held two weeks before the Iranian presidential election. It was necessary to clarify how the newly elected president and his team would approach the issue of nuclear negotiations. However, although Raisi has been elected to office, the negotiations have not started yet. Hardline MP Mojtaba Zonnour said that Iran would not continue negotiations because the “Vienna format is a worse repetition of the JCPOA [Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action] and is jumping out of the frying pan into the fire.” Even though Raisi’s new cabinet and foreign policy team started their work, the future of the nuclear deal is not clear yet.

Raisi repeatedly emphasized prioritizing friendly relations with Iran’s neighbors in his foreign policy agenda. After his election, he clearly stated that Iran wants to normalize its relations with Saudi Arabia and the UAE. During Trump’s presidency, Tehran’s relations with these two countries deteriorated. With Biden coming to power, Gulf leaders calculated that they would not enjoy U.S. support against Iran as they did before.

The change in the U.S. administration is the main reason behind the two Arab Gulf states’ recent positive attitudes towards Iran. The main objectives on the Iranian side are maintaining the Gulf’s security and preventing conflicts with Gulf countries. Considering Iran has suffered from the U.S. sanctions seriously for almost ten years, avoiding costly conflicts with regional powers will benefit it.

Following his inauguration as Iran’s new president, Raisi has faced serious challenges from Afghanistan. As many experts and officers indicated, after the U.S. withdrawal from the war-torn country, the Taliban took over government. Land warfare expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies Ben Barry claimed, “If the U.S. ceases to use its airpower to directly support Afghan forces, the Taliban will gain a considerable military advantage.” Sadanand Dhume from the American Enterprise Institute, said, “The Taliban don’t care about human rights any more than they did in 2001 and likely will take power.”

With the Taliban takeover, regional balances have drastically changed. To orient itself with newly emerging dynamics in Afghanistan, Iran changed its rhetoric and attitudes towards the Taliban. The situation in Afghanistan poses many challenges to the Tehran administration. For this reason, Iran has been negotiating with the Taliban for the past two years. First, to maintain border security, Iran took preventative measures and increased its military presence at the border and closed some border gates with Afghanistan.

Thanks to the agreements between Iran and the Taliban, this time, the notorious military group did not systematically persecute the Shiite minority.

What is more, the Taliban are famous for atrocities against Shiites in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, thanks to the agreements between Iran and the Taliban, this time, the notorious military group did not systematically persecute the Shiite minority. Although there are reports about Taliban attacks towards Hazara Shiites, there is no credible evidence that shows it is an official Taliban anti-Shia policy.

On the contrary, according to some media outlets, Taliban members joined the Ashura ceremonies and gave assurances that the Shia minority will be protected. Furthermore, in terms of trade and preventing drug and human trafficking, Iran needs to negotiate with the Taliban.

The Raisi era began in Iran with a vibrant foreign policy agenda. The stalemate in nuclear talks, normalization of ties with the Gulf states, and the Afghanistan crisis will take over most of Raisi’s foreign policy agenda. However, there may be unexpected turns or advancements in the coming days. Raisi’s response to these developments will be shaped by the dynamics stated above.

Iraqi Premier al-Kadhimi and his mentor Iraqi President Barham Saleh are making a futile attempt against all odds at home to carve a new leadership role for the country by availing themselves of the chaotic internal conditions and the strained and fragile post-Arab Spring Middle East order.

A conference was held in Baghdad on August 28, 2021, which the two Iraqi leaders were originally hoping would be a summit. However, the list of attendees shows that it turned out to be a one-day ministerial-level conference.

Al-Kadhimi co-sponsored the conference in Baghdad with French President Emmanuel Macron to discuss the war in Yemen, Lebanon’s collapse, the regional water crisis, and the Saudi-Iranian rapprochement. The Iraqi and the Arab media paid special attention to the conference, raising the expectations.

The statement of the London-based Al-Quds Al-Arabi newspaper read, “The Saudi and Iranian presence, through their foreign ministers, Faisal bin Farhan and Hussein Amir Abdullahian, also indicated an increasing desire on both sides to find lines to meet.”

Iraqi Foreign Minister Fuad Hussein indicated that the Saudi-Iranian meetings are continuing and that they began in Baghdad with a meeting that took place between the ruler of Dubai and the Iranian foreign minister. Iraqi officials viewed the meetings between the emir of Qatar, Egyptian President Abdul Fattah al-Sisi, and Bin Rashid of Dubai as a major breakthrough.

Nevertheless, the rapprochement between Qatar and its Gulf neighbors had commenced before the Baghdad conference. The Saudi-Iranian dialogue was launched in April this year as the U.S. and Iran held negotiations on reviving the 2015 nuclear deal with Iran (JCPOA) – a development which alarmed the Saudis. The latter are afraid of a possible deal at their expense.

Tehran’s sensitive relationship with Baghdad and the issue of not using Iraq as a launching pad to launch attacks on neighboring countries were not addressed.

Al-Kadhimi and Macron are trying to seize the opportunity presented to them to assert leadership and enhance their dwindling power base at home as elections are approaching. It appears that President Joe Biden’s strategic shift in foreign policy orientation from the Middle East to Asia, his stated policy of making human rights the priority of his foreign policy abroad, and the recent debacle in Afghanistan have alarmed Arab regional leaders, Saudis, and the United Arab Emirates and convinced them to chart a new foreign policy in the region and regard Washington as unreliable.

Iran has its own reason to be receptive of regional dialogue as well. Being hard-pressed by the U.S.-led economic embargo initiated by the earlier U.S. administrations, and intensified by the Donald Trump administration to maximum pressure, and which the Biden administration so far has done nothing tangible to alleviate, Iran was not in a position to refuse negotiation. What is more, the hardline President Raisi stated during his inauguration speech that there will be serious openings internally and externally to better the conditions in the country.

Finally, being hard-pressed by COVID19, and the shadow war which is continuing with Israelis, Iran had no choice but to act on pragmatic considerations and accept peaceful engagements with its regional foes. However, this does not stop Iran from pursuing its war against the U.S. and its regional allies through regional proxies.

The Baghdad government’s initiative to hold a regional conference also had an Iranian blessing.

Thus, the Baghdad government’s initiative to hold a regional conference also had an Iranian blessing: it is an attempt to find a loophole in the siege wall and isolation imposed by the United States and its allies on Iran.

U.S. officials are fully aware of Iran’s foreign policy objectives but still seem to be committed to the success of the Vienna Talks. For this reason, Biden has empowered Macron, who aspires to a new leadership role abroad to stop his declining popularity at home, to be the channel for conveying messages to Iran. Due to Macron’s occasionally voiced opposition to Trump’s unilateralism, Iran seems to have accepted Macron’s mediating role.

President Saleh of Iraq, following the footsteps of his group leader Jalal Talabani, a former Iraqi president who tried to play a mediating role between Iranian and western leaders, especially the U.S., seems to have convinced al-Kadhimi to initiate this conference.

Saleh has recently been engaged in intensive shuttle diplomacy in Iraq with various influential groups, especially the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), and regional countries, while he also met President Reisi to ensure his second term as president of Iraq. The holding of the regional conference was an attempt to enhance his chance to be re-elected for a second term.

Although al-Kadhimi has made numerous statements to the effect that in the future he will not stand for any post, his recent political statements and the numerous measures he has taken recently indicate that he is hopeful that he will continue in his post most probably in an alliance which will be composed by the opponents of Iran’s dominant influence in Iraq: the Sadr followers of Sairun, the Nasr bloc, and the Kurdish groups. The success of this conference could enhance his role regionally and internally.

Iraq has often been likened to a mafia state and a kleptocracy. It has the semblance of democracy through fairly regular elections, and the trappings of a judiciary and security forces serving the interests of the nation by “fighting terrorism” and “ensuring justice is served”, as Iraqi politicians often like to pontificate in an attempt to polish their credentials as public servants.

In reality, however, Iraq has become the playground for Iran-sponsored Shia jihadist groups and militias who control every kind of industry imaginable, from a Shia clergy-backed illicit sex trade that sells girls as young as 9-years-old, to a drug trafficking cartel that controls Iraq’s porous borders with Iran and smuggles copious amounts of narcotics.

Regular Iraqis who have had their lives upended by the incessant criminality and who have had their hopes for a bright future dashed by these gangs and terrorist organizations know that Iran’s insidious influence is responsible. Although they have come out in protest several times, such open dissent is often extremely deadly, with activists facing assassination and worse.

A recent spate of political assassinations

This month alone, several well-known activists and political dissidents have been killed, with the state either complicit in the slayings or else powerless to prevent these powerful militias from murdering the Iraqi citizens it is supposed to protect.

In the first week of May, Ihab al-Wazni, a leader of the protest movements in Karbala, was gunned down outside his home. Surveillance footage showed several masked men on motorcycles close in on Wazni before strafing him in a hail of gunfire, killing him on the scene.

The militants had finally killed the prolific activist, himself a Shia Arab, after attempting to do so in December 2019 just after the most recent protest movement first began in earnest. Wazni narrowly escaped an attempt on his life which tragically led to the death of his friend and co-organiser Fahem al-Tai. Wazni was dropping Tai off at his home, also in Karbala, when again masked gunmen opened fire leading to Wazni barely escaping death while Tai was not so fortunate and was killed outside his home.

The assassination of Wazni was followed 24 hours later with the attempted murder of journalist Ahmad Hassan who was shot in the head as he arrived home in Diwaniyah. Hassan has undergone brain surgery and remains in critical condition at a Baghdad hospital with his family fearing further retaliation against him and them due to his criticism of the authorities and militia violence against unarmed demonstrators.

Over the weekend, a candidate in the upcoming elections was also assassinated, again by suspected Iran-backed militants. Hashem al-Mashhadani, a Sunni candidate in Baghdad for the Azm Coalition led by businessman Khamis al-Khanjar, was killed last Saturday less than five months before elections are due to take place. Khanjar described the assassination as “a dangerous message” designed to undermine the democratic process by putting candidates in fear of their lives.

These assassinations and murders have led Al-Beit Al-Watani, or the National House bloc, a political group which emerged out of the protest movement, to boycott the elections set to take place in October this year. The party has demanded that the killers responsible be brought to justice before the electoral process can be taken seriously. Obviously, this is not a controversial position for them to adopt, particularly considering the last election in 2018 attracted an embarrassing 44.5 percent turnout, placing enormous doubts on the credibility of Iraq’s democratic process.

Shia jihadism undermines democracy

It is no secret that Karbala, Diwaniyah, Baghdad, and all major Iraqi cities are crawling with pro-Iran Shia militants. While the protest movements in Iraq were primarily Sunni-led until the rise of the Daesh terror group in 2014 (itself a consequence of sectarian Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s violent suppression of protests), since Daesh’s defeat and the recapture of Mosul in 2017, most demonstrations have been led by the Shia.

The authorities in Baghdad blamed all of Iraq’s economic, security, and political woes on Sunni terrorist organizations, including Al-Qaeda, but after they declared victory in 2017, the common Iraqi Shia began to lose patience with the government for its total lack of services, corruption, and its subservience to Tehran’s interests and diktats. This ultimately led to a number of crises, including the total poisoning of Basra’s water supply due to systemic negligence, continued electricity shortages despite Iraq’s massive energy wealth, and rampant corruption that has drained Iraq of at least $150 billion since 2003, destroyed the economy, and the people’s hopes for a brighter future.

Realizing that the problems faced by the country could not solely be attributed to terrorist organisations, and having finally felt fed up of the government blaming everyone but the corrupt politicians who serve the national interests of Iran rather than Iraq, the Shia Arabs took to the streets in heretofore unheard of mass demonstrations in the Shia-dominant south.

These protesters knew who to blame. Aside from torching the offices of several Shia Islamist parties, the demonstrators have repeatedly set fire to diplomatic buildings including consulates belonging to the Islamic Republic of Iran. Anti-Iran sentiment is at the highest it has been likely since the Iran-Iraq War of the 1980s, a war in which many Shia Iraqis gave their lives to prevent Iraq from being occupied by Iranian forces after Ayatollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, ordered an invasion of their country in 1982.

What this demonstrates is that there is now a new kind of Iraqi nationalism forming, and it is a nationalism that is largely based on opposition to corruption engendered by malignant Iranian interference. By trampling over human rights, the rule of law, and the rights of Iraqi citizens to live with dignity and economic opportunity, Iran and its Shia proxies have inadvertently created perhaps their worst enemy yet. Rather than that enemy being a terrorist organization, it is instead the Iraqi people themselves and, as such, it is only a matter of time before they topple the corrupt state that has made their lives a living misery since 2003.

On April 18, news of Iran-Saudi Arabia talks to re-establish relations was reported in the media. Aside from the veracity of the news, recently there have been bilateral signs of softening. Both countries have their reasons that drive them to the negotiation table.

The Saudi-Iranian relations, although improved for a short period in the 1990s, cooled off with the geopolitical shift in the Middle East following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The rise of pro-Iranian politicians in “new” Iraq increased Iran’s role in the country’s turbulent politics, an influence that gradually expanded with the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011.

However, the Arab Spring has put Iran and Saudi Arabia in a paradoxical situation. While considering the protests in Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, and Libya as a phenomenon inspired by its Islamic Revolution of 1979, Iran regarded the mass protests in Syria and Iraq as a conspiracy initiated by its enemies: the Zionists, the West, and their regional allies like Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

On the other hand, Saudi Arabia tried to seize the opportunity and, in an obvious contradiction, perceived the Syrian revolution as the people’s democratic right while considered the protests and events in Yemen, Bahrain, and Lebanon a result of Iranian intervention. Thus, the fierce proxy war between the two sides became inevitable.

It is clear that the hostile policies between Iran and Saudi Arabia are due to their pragmatic thinking. The two countries have always tried to prevent each other from acquiring more power by giving money and weapons to their governmental and non-governmental allies. The war in Syria caused the two to enter into a fierce proxy war; however, as the war entered an erosive stage, military spending on both sides increased sharply.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen.

Iran tried to keep the Saudis busy by expanding the scope of the conflict to other areas like Yemen. There were even large-scale demonstrations and clashes in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, which Saudi officials perceived as a result of foreign intervention, implicitly accusing Iran. Eventually, the Saudi influence in the Syrian war gradually declined after 2015 as they became heavily involved in the war in Yemen against the Houthi group, which maintains close ties with Iran.

The continuation of hostilities between Iran and Saudi Arabia has led to unpleasant results. The humanitarian crisis in Yemen has tarnished Saudi Arabia’s prestige. After six years of intense conflict in Yemen, Saudi Arabia has faced severe international pressure in addition to not being able to achieve its desired results.

The heavy cost of the war in Yemen and the increase in military spending, along with falling oil prices and the COVID19 pandemic, have led to a downturn in the Saudi economy and a budget deficit. Additionally, the competition with Iran has caused the latter to make its influence in the Middle East persistent by forming proxy groups, while the main goal of Saudi Arabia was to eliminate Iran’s influence.

Although Iranians have gained a lot of experience in fighting regional rivals, the overall consequences haven’t been favorable for the country. Iran sees the wars in the region as a conspiracy to curb its influence in the Middle East, and as a result, believes that groups such as Daesh (ISIS) and Jabhat al-Nusra were formed by Saudi Arabia and its regional and international allies. Therefore, Iran has to defeat its enemies in erosive battles outside its borders.

However, the outcome of the bloody wars has shown that this policy isn’t sustainable for either country. Increasing Iranian influence has led neighboring Arab countries to seek refuge in Iran’s number one enemy, Israel. In addition, Saudi Arabia, due to its influence in the Arab world, has been able to seriously disrupt Iran’s relations with other Arab countries.

For example, after the attack on the Saudi embassy in Tehran in 2016, Saudi Arabia encouraged Arab countries to close down their embassies in Tehran. Coinciding with the former U.S. President Donald Trump taking office in the United States, international pressure and sanctions on Iran increased to a high level and Saudi Arabia encouraged the United States and other Western countries to intensify pressure on the country.

The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran.

Nevertheless, an even worse scenario materialized when Saudi Arabia’s close allies normalized their relations with Israel in 2020. The possibility of the formalization of Saudi Arabia’s relations with Israel poses a double threat to Iran. Since the UAE and Bahrain have already normalized their relations with Israel, it is possible that Israel will enter the region’s security mechanisms as a protector of these states.

Further efforts were made to re-establish relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia following an attack on a Saudi Aramco facility in September 2019. Even before this attack, the Iranian foreign minister had signaled that a “non-aggression pact” with Saudi Arabia and its allies was offered. The attack on Aramco showed the ability of Iran’s allies to reach the depths of Saudi territories.

However, after the attack, which put the two countries at risk of direct confrontation, Iran softened its approach towards Saudi Arabia. It is even said that General Soleimani, who was assassinated in Baghdad by the U.S. military, was carrying a message to Saudi officials during his visit to Iraq.

Saudi Arabia seems to have softened its stance as a result of the Houthis in Yemen targeting of its infrastructures almost daily. The purpose of these tactical attacks, which seem to have been somewhat successful, is to force Saudi Arabia to stop attacks on Yemen and to negotiate with Iran. Along with this, the pressure by the Biden administration on Saudi Arabia has made Saudi officials more flexible with Iran.

Today, with the resumption of Iran’s talks with the P5+1 group, there is a possibility that with the return of Iran and the U.S. to the nuclear deal, Iran will offer more support to the Houthis, who have been in control of Yemen’s northern governorates since 2014. Accordingly, the Houthis, in practice, have become an effective force vis-à-vis Saudi Arabia, and Iran can use them to pressure the Saudis.

Houthi missile and drone attacks have repeatedly closed Saudi Arabia’s airports, terminals, and other vital infrastructure. Therefore, it is not an exaggeration to claim that Yemen’s Houthis have become the second most powerful quasi-governmental force in the region after Lebanon’s Hezbollah, both of which are close to Iran. Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia does not have such a leverage.

Forty-two years have passed since the establishment of the Islamic Republic of Iran by a referendum landslide held on March 30 and 31, 1979, when 98.2% of the country’s eligible citizens approved the new regime. A series of dramatic developments which unfolded during the last years of the Pahlavi regime ultimately brought its downfall ushering the revolutionary triumph of Ayatollah Khomeini, whose arrival back to Iran on February 1, 1979 after fourteen years of exile marked the movement’s zenith.

Immediately after his return, he made a historic speech at Behesht-e Zahra, Tehran’s famous cemetery, where he said, “I will appoint the government! I will slap the present government on the mouth! With the support of the people, I will appoint the government!” Indeed, he “slapped” the shah’s last government and held the country’s reins in a matter of days, with Prime Minister Shapour Bakhtiar resigning from his post to flee Iran shortly afterwards. Nevertheless, the long-standing chaos was far from over.

Post-revolutionary Iran

Iran is, more often than not, a puzzling case especially when it comes to its recent past. The referendum was approved by an overwhelming majority, but it did not take long for the unrestrained revolutionary enthusiasm to start to fade and an increasing number of Iranians to experience a sense of anxiety and fear which had a lot to do with the chaos that erupted after the revolution.

The situation further deteriorated by the assassinations of senior revolutionary figures, including some high-ranking ayatollahs and politicians; the trials and executions of several figures who served under the deposed shah; and the bloody struggles between the erstwhile allies of the revolutionary movements who turned into its staunch enemies after its victory. But none of these could match the horrors of the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted eight years, and brought devastating humanitarian and economic costs to both sides.

In the early 1980s, during the heat of the revolutionary turmoil, many people, including politicians, ordinary citizens, and observers at home and abroad alike, wondered if this “unlikely” revolution was “inevitable” or whether things could have followed a different path had the shah and his regime behaved more consciously. Now, more than four decades later, the more valid question is whether the Iranian revolution fulfilled its promises or not.

Retrospectively speaking, in a country where the population more than doubled from approximately 39 million in 1979 to some 83 million currently, the economic and infrastructural records of the Islamic Republic cannot be said to be worse than the Pahlavis. The same holds true for its educational and health policies. Yet, the pressures on freedoms never stopped and in time, the “revolutionary ideals” turned into viable tools for subjugating not only “the traitors” (khain) or “the enemy” (doşmen) but also ordinary Iranians including some of those who originally supported the revolution.

This never-ending revolutionary discourse hinders Iran’s normalization. During the last decades, significant progress has been made in this regard but it has fallen far behind popular expectations, especially those of Iran’s younger generations. This is the most pressing domestic challenge awaiting Iranian political elites, both from the conservative and the reformist camps. As for the outside, there are other challenges.

Iran in the Middle East

Obviously, the attitudes of the new regime changed Iran’s position within the international community at large – and not necessarily for the worse in all cases. As a matter of fact, had the Hostage Crisis of November 1979 not occurred between Iran and the U.S., the Islamic Republic could have been more warmly welcomed by the Western world as the shah’s image as a reasonable leader was, at least to the end of his reign, badly hurt.

Islamic Republic’s Middle East policy was not a radical shift from the previous era, at least in terms of its objectives.

But even so, Iran’s capacity as a principal oil exporter, its geostrategic location, and the economic interests of many European states in the country, gave it enough room for maneuver in international politics. To this, Iran’s major role in Middle Eastern politics should also be added.

From a broader historical perspective, the Islamic Republic’s Middle East policy was not, from the beginning, a radical shift from the previous era, at least in terms of its objectives. Yet, the means and the discourse used for this policy were revolutionary. In the thick of the war against Iraq, Ayatollah Khomeini said that they were not after conquering the world and that they wanted to share pains with Muslims. “We do not want to go anywhere to capture it… We are defending Islam… Saddam is oppressing his own people. We are not attacking; at this we are in a defensive position.”

Evidently, although the war was originally started by Saddam Hussein, it could have stopped much earlier and at lower costs for both sides had Iran not shifted from a defensive position to an offensive one at some stage of the war. Equally significant was the lesson Iran’s leaders learnt from the war which, they thought, was “imposed” on them.

During the war, Iranian leaders felt that they were left to their fate by most of the Arab regimes which, they thought, strove for the Islamic Republic’s downfall with the notable exception of Hafez al-Assad’s Syria. He had his reasons to hate Saddam more than the Islamic Republic that was eager to align with him. Khomeini died in 1989, about a year after the war was over, and was replaced by President Ali Khamenei as Iran’s new supreme leader. Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, a relatively moderate figure, emerged victorious in the 1989 presidential elections to be Iran’s fourth president.

Now Iran seemed to follow a different path in its regional policies. Nonetheless, the growing presence of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the region, the emergence of Lebanese Hezbollah in the early 1980s with Iran’s full backing, and the unwillingness of some Arab regimes including, but not limited to, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, for a rapprochement with a “revolution-exporting Iran” undermined the prospects for normalization throughout the 1990s.

Moreover, faced by the threats posed by the U.S. and Israel, Iran adopted an extensive armament policy to the further concern of its neighbors. The 21st century opened an entirely different page for Iran’s presence in the Middle East.

The turn of the century unfolded two rather paradoxical developments. On the one hand, Iran’s nuclear program came to the attention of the U.S. and the rest of the international community at a time when Saddam was soon to be blamed for having weapons of mass destruction. On the other, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan (2001) and Iraq (2003) after 9/11, eliminated two of Iran’s archenemies: the Taliban and Saddam respectively.

It has been almost two decades since the United States led a coalition of Western powers to invade and occupy Iraq, on the promise to the world of ending former dictator Saddam Hussein’s purported Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMDs) program, and the pledge to the Iraqi people that only they would be the masters of their own fates.

In the ensuing years, Iraq has not emerged as a bastion of democracy in an almost uniformly undemocratic Arab world as was initially promised, but instead it has become a warning to others about the destructive potential of divisive politics, sectarianism, and allowing the politics of revenge to gain pre-eminence over the national interest.

Like many modern nation-states, Iraq’s population is composed of a pastiche of different peoples, cultures, and religions. This is as a natural result of centuries, even millennia, of population migrations, wars and conquests, and, increasingly in the modern day, globalization.

While this can in many ways be a blessing for a nation, it can also create some stark divides that are exploited by unscrupulous politicians and external powers who seek to sow discord and strife within a country to ensure that it is always under the boot.

It is unsurprising that a country as rich in resources, geostrategic importance, and as diverse as Iraq, which is ethnically, culturally, and religiously varied, would be the target for the divisive and bloody politics of sectarianism.

Iran’s self-proclaimed “Islamic Revolution” that began in 1979 was forcibly confined within Iran’s own borders and the dream of a Shia Islamic state fizzled away in the face of the Iraqi armed forces.

Iraq’s present political elite are largely those who heeded the call of the former administration of George W. Bush in 2002 and attended the London Hilton to form an official “Iraqi opposition” to support the invasion of their own country by a foreign interloper. These people were not only backed by the United States, but also by Iran, which may strike many as interesting considering the history of enmity between the two powers.

However, if there was one thing Washington and Tehran could agree on, it was that they needed a broken, weak, and shattered Iraq that was incapable of defending itself or pursuing its own interests. It was not simply the case that Saddam had to go, but the very concept of a sovereign Iraq had to be dismantled and destroyed, never to rise and stand on its own feet again.

In Iran’s case, this is simply because Iraq had, and after eight long years of war, forced the Islamic Republic’s founding father, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, to sign an embarrassing ceasefire in 1988. Iran’s self-proclaimed “Islamic Revolution” that began in 1979 was forcibly confined within Iran’s own borders and the dream of a Shia Islamic state fizzled away in the face of the Iraqi armed forces.

Iraq was thus seen as the bulwark against any Iranian plan to export their revolution and further destabilize a region that was still suffering from the effects of rampant misplaced nationalism born of European colonization in the aftermath of the defeat of the Ottoman Empire during the First World War.

Although the stated objective of the United States and its allies was to disarm Iraq, ensure Saddam Hussein could never develop WMDs, and as a punitive mission to stop Saddam’s support for terrorist organizations including Al-Qaeda, the perpetrators of the 9/11 terror attacks, the reality was far different.

In reality, and as became blindingly clear, all of the reasons for invading Iraq turned out to be false and based on lies. In Britain, this scandal became known as former Prime Minister Tony Blair’s “Dodgy Dossier”, a file packed to the gills with lies, mistruths, and red herrings designed to mislead the British public. Not only was Iraq effectively contained since the Gulf War concluded in 1991, but it had no WMDs and certainly did not support Al-Qaeda.

Even worse, it has engendered brutal sectarian violence and produced such politicians as former Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki who has gained infamy as one of Iraq’s most sectarian Shia Islamist politicians and ruled the country between 2006 and 2014.

According to international rights monitor Amnesty International, Maliki frequently abused counterterrorism laws to target Sunnis, imprisoned and tortured many, and his administration used rape and sexual violence against female relatives of inmates as a way of forcing false confessions leading to their executions. Alongside his open support for violent, unofficial Shia armed groups and death squads, Maliki’s actions directly led to the rise of the ISIS (DAESH) terror group in 2014.

However, even after ISIS’s defeat in 2017 and Maliki’s departure from the most powerful office in the land, there appear to be no signs of the Shia and pro-Iran dominated government’s let up against the Sunni population.

Sunni cities are still a mess of rubble and destruction that have not been rebuilt since ISIS was defeated, and the closure of refugee camps for internally displaced people have forced children to live amongst bombs and corpses.

Further, and just last month, the United Nations expressed concern over how Sunni prisoners faced “imminent executions” on the basis of hasty convictions on terror charges in trials marred by irregularities and no access to fair hearings.

There can be no doubt that the primary purpose of such executions, discrimination, and disenfranchisement is to ensure that Iraq’s Sunni population can never again be an organized political force. A succession of Shia Islamist prime ministers has consistently backed policies that seek to keep the Sunnis down, blaming an entire segment of the population for the actions of Saddam.

However, as Maliki’s foolish policymaking proved, the politics of revenge does nothing to alleviate any threat to the nation-state but in fact exacerbates it and could easily lead to a resurgence of violent groups such as ISIS coming to the fore again.

Such an outcome will prove that the Iraqi elite has learned nothing since 2003 and certainly not since ISIS was defeated in 2017, and they will only have themselves to blame when they radicalize yet another generation of the downtrodden against them.