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hen Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan says he does not want to see “a new conflict in the Horn of Africa,” he is not making a throwaway remark about a distant region. He is speaking after high-level talks in Addis Ababa and phone calls that range from Abu Dhabi to Mogadishu, at a moment when Red Sea tensions, Ethiopia’s search for sea access and Somalia’s first offshore drilling project are all converging. I don’t read this as a routine diplomatic line. To me, it is a sign that, for Ankara, stability from Ethiopia to Somalia has become a strategic test of its broader foreign policy narrative.

Over the last few years, Türkiye has steadily expanded its footprint along the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden corridor. Somalia hosts Turkish trainers, engineers and aid workers. Ethiopia has become one of Ankara’s largest investment destinations on the continent. Sudan, Djibouti and even Eritrea now enter Turkish debates about sea lanes, energy routes and security risks. Erdoğan’s latest message simply makes explicit what policy choices have already been saying quietly: the Horn of Africa is no longer a side file.

That matters because the region sits at the intersection of several fires at once. Civil war in Sudan, unresolved tensions inside Ethiopia, maritime insecurity in the Red Sea and the persistent threat of al-Shabaab in Somalia all blur into one another. For a country that sees itself as both a regional stabilizer and a rising middle power, ignoring this arc of instability is not really an option.

From a “Somalia file” to a regional vision

Türkiye’s entry point into the Horn of Africa was Somalia. What began as humanitarian aid during the 2011 famine turned into a long-term relationship that combines military training, infrastructure projects, and political support. Ankara built roads, hospitals and schools in Mogadishu, opened an embassy when many others stayed away and later established a major military training base to support Somali forces fighting al-Shabaab.

Over time, this “Somalia file” stopped being just about one fragile state. Turkish diplomats and security officials increasingly framed it as part of a wider picture that stretches from the Suez Canal to the Indian Ocean. Turkish Airlines routes, port projects and naval deployments all reflect the same logic: what happens around the Bab el-Mandeb strait and the Gulf of Aden directly affect Türkiye’s trade, energy security and diaspora connections.

As Ethiopia’s leadership began to talk more openly about its need for sea access, and as Sudan’s war threatened to fragment another coastal state, Ankara’s calculus shifted again. It was no longer enough to work only with Mogadishu. Relations with Addis Ababa deepened around investment, defense cooperation and discussions on how Ethiopia could secure access to ports without triggering a wider conflict. The message coming out of Erdoğan’s meetings has been consistent: any solution on sea access should be based on regional consensus, not unilateral moves that risk pulling everyone into a crisis.

This is happening in a crowded field. The United States, Gulf countries, Egypt, the European Union and China all have their own military bases, port concessions and political projects in and around the Horn. Türkiye is not the biggest player in terms of money or firepower. Its difference lies in what it is not: it has no colonial history in the region; it presents itself as a partner from the Global South and it speaks the language of both security and development at the same time.

Security that tries to reduce, not export, risk

Erdoğan’s Horn of Africa message is rooted in very concrete security concerns. Ethiopia is still managing the aftershocks of internal conflicts. Sudan’s civil war threatens to spill over into Chad, South Sudan, and the Red Sea. Eritrea remains a closed but influential actor. In Somalia, al-Shabaab has not disappeared, even as security forces have made gains. Across the water, Yemen’s conflict and Houthi attacks on shipping lanes have turned the Red Sea into a zone of permanent alert.

In such an environment, escalation rarely stays local. A border clash between Ethiopia and a coastal neighbor, a miscalculation in Sudan or a major attack on shipping could quickly draw in Gulf states, Western navies and regional rivals. Trade routes, energy flows and migration patterns would all feel the shock.

Türkiye’s answer has been to invest in local capacity rather than posture as a front-line power. In Somalia, Turkish officers train army and police units, while naval forces contribute to anti-piracy and maritime security missions. The aim is to help local institutions stand on their feet, not to replace them. The same logic applies to Ethiopia and Sudan, where Ankara stresses respect for territorial integrity and advocates political dialogue even as it supplies equipment and technical support.

From Ankara’s perspective, stability in the Horn is tied directly to its own security. New refugee flows, disrupted shipping in the Red Sea, or the spread of extremist networks would quickly reach the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. At the same time, a more stable Horn offers opportunities: safer trade corridors, energy cooperation with Somalia, and a friendlier environment for Turkish investment in Ethiopia and Sudan.

Ports, planes and people-to-people ties

Security is only part of the equation. The Horn of Africa has also become an economic and diplomatic laboratory for Türkiye. Turkish companies are active in ports, construction and logistics projects, seeking a role in upgrading infrastructure that links landlocked states to global markets. Every port concession, every logistics hub has a dual meaning: commercial opportunity and geopolitical leverage.

For a middle power with limited resources, every naval mission, every training base and every trade deal has to serve more than one purpose. A presence in Mogadishu is not only about counterterrorism; it is also about giving Turkish firms a foothold in a market that others have long ignored. Investment in Ethiopian manufacturing is not only about cheap labor; it supports a political partnership that Ankara hopes will last through leadership changes on both sides.

Soft power runs alongside these hard interests. Scholarship programs bring Ethiopian and Somali students to Turkish universities. Development agencies support health, education and agriculture projects in remote areas. Turkish NGOs operate clinics and schools that often outlast news cycles. In quiet times, these efforts build goodwill. In moments of crisis, they provide channels to actors who do not always sit at official tables.

In recent years, the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin have become strategically important regions, both regionally and globally. One of the main reasons for this is its location at the intersection of global energy and trade routes. This characteristic places the region at the centre of the struggle for influence among regional and global actors, while it simultaneously experiences a high level of political uncertainty and an unstable security environment due to instability and external interventions. While some of these actors exacerbate instability through destructive actions, others contribute to stability and development goals through constructive policies.

Türkiye, a pioneer in constructive policies towards the region, has recently intensified its stabilizing efforts and prioritized cooperation with other regional actors. In this context, Ankara appears to favor a foreign policy that prioritizes coordination over competition, particularly with Cairo and Riyadh, with regard to the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea. This approach suggests that Türkiye is attempting to utilize its cooperation-oriented bilateral relations to contribute to resolving crises in third countries.

While this strategy has the potential to evolve into an inclusive alliance among the involved parties, it also demonstrates the possibility of cooperation in specific areas and the potential for these partnerships to yield tangible results. Indeed, it reveals that, in a global political landscape where complete alignment of interests is challenging, it is possible to achieve common interests through the coordination of foreign policies. In this context, it can be said that Türkiye aims to significantly impact the political landscape of these countries by coordinating its policies more closely with Egypt regarding Somalia and with Saudi Arabia regarding Sudan. It should also be noted that the gradual normalization process with Cairo, and the strengthening of the alliance with Riyadh following the establishment of trust, played a significant role in reaching this point.

Coordinated engagement in Somalia

In this context, Somalia is one of the countries in which foreign policy partnerships are most commonly observed. The country has long struggled with issues such as state-building, establishing security, creating a national army, and achieving political unity and integrity. These difficulties have been exacerbated by the privileged relationships established by certain external actors with local factions, which have undermined the central authority. Somaliland and Puntland, two federated regions of Somalia, are treated as independent actors by regional and global powers, separate from Mogadishu. This is considered a serious threat to Somalia’s national sovereignty.

Therefore, for many years, Türkiye has been working closely with the Mogadishu government to take the necessary steps to protect Somalia’s national integrity and achieve stability. In this regard, Türkiye’s military training support, infrastructure investments and humanitarian aid activities have been of great importance in strengthening Somalia’s institutional capacity. Recognizing that Somalia’s stability is vital for security and political stability in the Horn of Africa, Ankara has maintained a clear stance against any threats directed at the Mogadishu government.

A similar approach can be seen in Egypt’s recent policy towards Somalia. Indeed, Egypt views policies such as Ethiopia’s disregard for Somalia’s national legitimacy and Israel’s recognition of Somaliland as threats to regional stability. In this context, Cairo has begun to pursue a foreign policy aligned with Ankara’s on Somalia. Egypt’s prioritisation of Somalia’s territorial integrity and stability in the context of Red Sea security provides a rational basis for Ankara and Cairo’s converging policies on Somalia.

This approach has undoubtedly been made possible by the recent steps taken by Egypt and Türkiye to align their foreign policies in various areas and enhance coordination. These steps have revealed areas in which they can cooperate on foreign policy, while also helping to identify threats that need to be combated. Consequently, cooperation in Somalia is one of the most tangible outcomes of the rapprochement between the two countries since 2021. This is evident in both countries’ statements regarding actions against Somalia’s sovereignty, their stance on strengthening its central institutions, and the steps taken against actors that could undermine Somalia’s stability.

In the coming period, it is inevitable that Türkiye and Egypt will take more decisive steps in line with their common interests, in response to political, diplomatic, economic and military initiatives that could destabilize Somalia. This increases the likelihood that diplomatic steps will be taken first to resolve crises and that military options will only be considered if diplomatic efforts fail. For all actors wishing to strengthen their relations with Somalia, it is critically important to adopt an approach that promotes unity, not division, among local elements within the country. Comprehensive policies on vital issues for Somalia, such as political stability, economic development, counter-terrorism and maritime security, will benefit all parties, especially Somalia.

The Sudan crisis and the balance of power in the Red Sea

A similar scenario can be said to apply to Sudan, which has been experiencing a civil war for the past three years. Türkiye has long been making intensive diplomatic efforts to prevent instability in Sudan from worsening, but has been relatively isolated in this regard. The direct or indirect intervention of certain regional actors in the Sudanese conflict has exacerbated the situation in the country, resulting in a serious humanitarian crisis. However, Türkiye’s consistent approach, particularly its engagement with key regional stakeholders, has recently begun to bear fruit.

Furthermore, the resolution of the political crisis with Saudi Arabia and the rapid rapprochement process that followed has impacted foreign policy in Sudan. In other words, the normalization of relations between Türkiye and Saudi Arabia has paved the way for bilateral coordination on the Sudan issue, making the Sudanese crisis one of Ankara and Riyadh’s shared foreign policy agendas.

Indeed, the political crisis and instability in Sudan could have consequences that affect not only the domestic balance, but also the entire Red Sea region. Egypt and Saudi Arabia, a maritime neighbor of Sudan, will undoubtedly be directly affected by these developments. The Riyadh administration has made previous attempts to resolve the crisis in Sudan, as it is increasingly concerned about the situation. These diplomatic initiatives and mediation efforts were primarily aimed at preventing the conflict from escalating into a regional proxy war. This scenario poses risks for Saudi Arabia, which lies just across the Red Sea. Similarly, Türkiye is concerned about the potential for the regional crisis to spread, and aims to prevent the deepening of humanitarian tragedies. It has therefore made efforts to protect Sudan’s territorial integrity.

Resolving conflicts rather than competing with each other

Therefore, recognizing their overlapping foreign policy priorities regarding Sudan, Türkiye and Saudi Arabia have begun to demonstrate a willingness to combine their forces in resolving the conflict rather than competing with each other, leveraging their diverse instruments and the actors they interact with. While this approach has not yet caused those responsible for the destructive effects in Sudan to back down, the rebel actors in Sudan are being forced to retreat, particularly due to the deployment of military instruments. The joint stance of Türkiye and Saudi Arabia, as well as Egypt’s support for these initiatives, has been key in determining the outcome of this process.

In conclusion, the relationship that Türkiye has developed with Egypt and Saudi Arabia, prioritizing coordination over competition, has yielded positive results for all parties on a pragmatic, mutually beneficial basis, producing concrete policy outcomes. These dialogue-based relationships could usher in a new era of cooperation in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, replacing competitive policies. This could weaken external factors that fuel instability and create a deterrent effect for those pursuing negative agendas.

Rather than regional actors clashing over their interests in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea basin, it would be more positive and realistic for them to manage these interests through shared foreign policies and coordinated crisis management. Examining the cases of Somalia and Sudan, it can be seen that such a strategic choice is feasible, but the involved parties must also demonstrate their willingness to do so. While it is acknowledged that local actors are the primary subjects of these processes, the abandonment of competitive policies by external powers involved in regional politics is also a key requirement for achieving lasting stability.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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thiopia is hosting a secret training camp for thousands of fighters from Sudan’s Rapid Support Forces (RSF), according to officials, diplomats and satellite imagery reviewed by Reuters, in what analysts say is a major sign that Sudan’s civil war is increasingly pulling in outside powers.

The site lies in the remote western Ethiopian region of Benishangul-Gumuz, not far from the Sudan border. If confirmed, the development would mark the clearest indication yet of Addis Ababa playing a direct role that could significantly bolster the paramilitary group as new fronts open in Sudan’s south.

Ethiopia’s government, its military and the RSF did not respond to detailed requests for comment. Sudan’s army also did not reply.

Eight sources, including a senior Ethiopian government official, said the United Arab Emirates financed construction of the camp and helped provide trainers and logistical assistance. An internal Ethiopian security memo and a diplomatic cable reviewed by Reuters described similar arrangements.

Reuters said it could not independently verify the UAE’s involvement or the exact purpose of the camp. In response to questions, the Emirati foreign ministry denied it was a party to the conflict or involved “in any way” in the fighting.

Sudan’s military has long accused Abu Dhabi of arming and funding the RSF, allegations that U.N. experts and some U.S. lawmakers have previously said they find credible. The UAE has repeatedly rejected those claims.

What the satellite images show

Imagery indicates the camp was carved from forested land near the district of Menge, roughly 32 km from Sudan. Initial clearing began around April, followed by construction of permanent structures to the north. From October, large numbers of tents began appearing.

By late November, images showed hundreds of small tents, heavy machinery and transport vehicles. A January 22 photo captured further expansion, new earthworks and rows of shipping containers ringing the compound.

Based on tent numbers and size, defense intelligence firm Janes estimated the camp could house several thousand people, though it said imagery alone could not prove the site was military.

As of early January, around 4,300 RSF fighters were undergoing training there, according to the Ethiopian security note. Several officials said the total capacity might be far higher.

Two senior military figures who spoke to Reuters described seeing long truck convoys in November heading toward the camp, each vehicle believed to be carrying dozens of recruits. Reuters could not confirm who was inside the trucks.

Six officials said trainees included Ethiopians as well as Sudanese and South Sudanese nationals. A senior figure from the SPLM-N, a Sudanese rebel movement, denied his forces had any presence at the facility.

According to the sources, many of those trained are expected to reinforce RSF operations in Blue Nile state. Some fighters had already crossed the border in recent weeks, two officials said.

Ethiopian command role

The internal memo identified General Getachew Gudina, head of the Ethiopian National Defense Force’s intelligence department, as the official responsible for establishing the camp. A senior government figure and several diplomatic and security sources confirmed he played a central role.

Getachew did not respond to requests for comment.

Roughly 53 km away, Asosa airport has also seen extensive development since mid-2025. Satellite imagery shows new hangars, paved areas and equipment that outside experts say resembles drone ground-control infrastructure.

Ethiopian officials said the military aims to strengthen air capabilities along its western flank, partly to guard against potential instability spilling over from Sudan and to protect strategic projects such as the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD).

Other analysts and diplomats, however, said the upgraded airport has become an important hub for supplying the RSF across the frontier.

Some sources alleged Emirati financing for the works, though Reuters said it could not independently verify that.

Wider regional implications

Sudan’s war erupted in 2023 from a struggle between the national army and the RSF during a stalled transition to civilian rule. The conflict has driven millions from their homes, pushed parts of the country toward famine and drawn accusations of ethnically targeted violence.

Both sides are widely believed to receive varying degrees of foreign support, raising fears the war could evolve into a broader regional proxy fight.

In early January, Ethiopia and the UAE issued a joint statement calling for a ceasefire in Sudan while highlighting close security cooperation between the two countries.

Diplomats say the reported emergence of the Menge training camp is likely to intensify scrutiny of that relationship – and heighten concern about how far the conflict may spread.

(Source: Reuters)

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he Trump administration plans to present a proposed peace plan for Sudan to President Donald Trump’s newly formed “Board of Peace,” alongside the United Nations Security Council, if Sudan’s warring parties agree to the initiative, a senior U.S. official said Tuesday.

Massad Boulos, the U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs, said the two diplomatic tracks would operate in parallel and reinforce one another rather than compete.

“If we can get this accepted by the two parties, we can take it to the Security Council,” Boulos said at an event hosted by the Sudan Humanitarian Fund at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, DC. “We can also take it to the Board of Peace very shortly after that.”

Boulos described the Board of Peace as a smaller, highly engaged group that is eager to support conflict resolution efforts beyond its current focus on Gaza.

“The Board of Peace is very much interested in this process,” he said. “They’re looking forward to providing considerable support.”

Building political momentum

Responding to questions about the board’s role, Boulos emphasized that its involvement would not undermine UN-led efforts. Instead, he argued that initiatives endorsed by the board could help build political momentum alongside existing international mechanisms.

“It doesn’t in any way affect the UN or the UN Security Council,” he said, calling the two approaches “absolutely complementary.”

According to Boulos, the proposed “comprehensive peace plan” has already been agreed upon by members of the Quad—comprising the United States, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates—which has been coordinating diplomatic efforts to end Sudan’s civil war.

He added that the United Nations has established a mechanism for the withdrawal of forces from key Sudanese cities to allow civilians to return safely, noting that the parties have agreed in principle to begin such withdrawals.

The Board of Peace is a Trump-led international initiative initially conceived to oversee Gaza’s reconstruction following Israel’s nearly two-year genocide, which killed more than 71,000 Palestinians and destroyed roughly 90% of the enclave’s infrastructure.

Complement—not replace—UN processes

U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio said during a recent Senate hearing that the board is intended to complement—not replace—UN processes, though he criticized the UN’s effectiveness in Gaza.

The comments came during a donor meeting in Washington as the United States seeks to mobilize up to $1.5 billion in new humanitarian pledges for Sudan, amid efforts to secure a truce ahead of the Muslim holy month of Ramadan, which begins later this month.

Sudan’s conflict, which erupted in April 2023 between the Sudanese army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), has killed thousands, displaced millions, and triggered one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

Strong support for Sudan’s unity

Türkiye has reaffirmed its strong support for Sudan’s unity, sovereignty, and territorial integrity, emphasizing dialogue and diplomacy as the most effective means to end the ongoing conflict, according to Ambassador Sedat Onal.

Speaking Tuesday at an event on Sudan hosted by the Sudan Humanitarian Fund at the U.S. Institute of Peace in Washington, Onal said Ankara considers Sudan’s stability essential for both the country and the wider region.

“Türkiye reaffirms its strong support for Sudan’s unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity, which we consider critically important for the stability of Sudan and the wider region,” Onal said. “We believe that the most effective way for ending the conflict is dialogue and diplomacy.”

Onal said Türkiye sent 30,000 tents to Sudan last December aboard three vessels, in cooperation with the International Organization for Migration, following what he described as “tragic” developments in El-Fasher.

“The Turkish Red Crescent and several Turkish NGOs continue to deliver humanitarian assistance, including food, shelter, and hygiene supplies, across different regions of Sudan,” he added, noting that further in-kind contributions are planned in the coming weeks.

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ince gaining independence in 1956, Sudan has been the scene of long and destructive internal conflicts. The conflict between the wealthier northern region, predominantly Arab and Muslim, and the less developed southern region has been the fundamental cause of chronic civil war and instability affecting millions of people for nearly half a century. It is possible to say that the foundations of this conflict, which has been decisive for Sudan’s future, were laid during the British colonial period.

As a result of the Closed District Policy (Southern Policy) implemented by Britain, particularly between 1930 and 1946, ethnic and religious divisions between the north and south deepened. These deepening divisions became apparent during London’s preparations to withdraw from Sudan as part of the disintegration of the British colonial empire after the Second World War. As a reaction to the transition to independence being managed by the Arabs and the systematic exclusion of the south from this process, demonstrations that began in August 1955, a few months before independence, quickly turned into a civil war.

Civil wars

Although Sudan’s first civil war ended with the Addis Ababa Agreement signed in 1972, which granted limited regional autonomy to the southern region, the failure to reach a resolution between the parties on issues such as resource sharing, political power and cultural recognition led to a new environment of conflict. President Gaafar Nimeiri’s decision in 1983 to revoke the agreement and return the south to its former status triggered Sudan’s second civil war. The establishment of the Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM) in 1983, which would become an important actor for South Sudan, and its central role in the civil war process, was an important step in the south’s organisation and institutionalisation process.

Sudan’s second civil war, which lasted for more than twenty years, ended in January 2005 with the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed between the Sudanese government and the SPLM, and the process of the south seceding from Sudan and becoming independent became clear. The agreement granted the south a six-year period of autonomy, paving the way for a referendum at the end of this period to determine the region’s future status. As a result of the referendum held in January 2011, South Sudan gained its independence.

Sudan has witnessed yet another new and devastating internal conflict in recent years amid the ongoing conflict in the south. Tensions between Arab and non-Arab communities in the Darfur region in the west of the country, which had existed for decades, gave way to conflict in 2002 when non-Arab ethnic groups such as the Fur, Zaghawa and Masalit responded to their continuous and systematic exclusion by the Khartoum government in Darfur by attacking the government’s military and security institutions. With the Sudanese army focused on the ongoing civil war in the south, President Omar al-Bashir turned to Arab tribes in the region to establish control in Darfur.

Accordingly, the Khartoum government began supporting militia forces known as the Janjaweed, formed by approximately thirty Arab tribes in the region. With the aim of ending the conflict and influenced by international mediation efforts, the Abuja Agreement was signed in 2006, the Doha Agreement in 2011, and the Juba Agreement in 2020 between the Sudanese government and rebel groups. Hundreds of thousands of people have died in this civil war in Darfur, while millions have been displaced.

The impact of the RSF

In addition to the devastating effects of the civil war in Darfur, another significant impact on Sudan was that it initiated the process leading to the establishment of the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which would become an important actor in the ensuing period. The RSF was established in 2013 as a result of the Khartoum administration’s aim to give this force an institutional structure in order to make greater use of the Janjaweed militias, fighters mostly of a common ethnic origin who helped bring Darfur under control. Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo (Hemedti), one of the leading figures of the Cancavid militia and someone who had developed good relations with the al-Bashir regime, was appointed commander of the RSF.

Viewing the RSF as strategically important for the security of his regime, al-Bashir mobilised political and financial resources, enabling the RSF to rapidly grow in strength. Despite efforts to integrate it into the Sudanese army, the RSF managed to maintain its independent structure. The rapid growth of its members, whom it employs as mercenaries, and the rapid expansion of its economic power through revenues from the gold mines it controls have also contributed to the rise of the RSF.

Al-Bashir’s removal from office in April 2019 following months of protests, carried out by the Sudanese army in a coup, has plunged the country into an unstable environment that could lead to a new civil war. The main actors in this civil war, which continues with full force today, are the Armed Forces and the RSF. During Al-Bashir’s overthrow, the two actors collaborated, with Armed Forces Commander Abdulfettah Al-Burhan chairing the Transitional Sovereignty Council and Hemedti serving as vice-chairman.

This collaboration was short-lived, however, as disagreements over the future of the RSF became the main source of tension between Al-Burhan and Hemedti. Al-Burhan sought to integrate the RSF into the army in order to control Hemedti’s rapidly growing power, while Hemedti sought to legitimise the RSF presence within Sudan’s political structure. The increasing tension and power struggle between the parties turned into open conflict on 15 April 2023, plunging the country back into civil war.

The first year of the conflict, which quickly spread across the country, saw the RSF gain military superiority, but 2024 brought changes in the course of the civil war. The Sudanese army’s offensive to retake the capital, Khartoum, launched in September, signalled this shift, and the capture of the city in March 2025, after a hiatus of nearly two years, marked a significant turning point. Meanwhile, as the civil war raged on, another significant turning point occurred when El Fasher, one of the major cities in the Darfur region, was captured by the RSF in October 2025 after an eighteen-month siege.

In February 2025 , the signing of a political charter by the RSF and its twenty-three allied groups to establish a parallel government, and the subsequent declaration of the Government of Peace and Unity on 15 April, the anniversary of the civil war, raised concerns that the country would experience renewed division as a result of the civil war, which began as a result of the disagreement and power struggle between the Armed Forces and the RSF.

Interventions

The ongoing civil war in Sudan has also been the scene of interventions by many regional and non-regional actors. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) is the RSF’s biggest supporter. The rapprochement between Hemedti and the UAE, which began during the Yemen intervention, has continued and intensified during the civil war. Egypt, Turkey, Iran and Russia are also important supporters of the Sovereignty Council.

As a result of the search for international support in the early months of the civil war, Sudan and Iran reached an agreement in October 2023 to resume diplomatic relations, which had been severed in 2016. Russia, although it was a significant supporter of the RSF in the first year of the civil war, particularly through Wagner, changed its policy towards Sudan from 2024 onwards and began to support the Sovereignty Council.

The ongoing civil war in the country shares similarities with past civil wars, but there are also differences. The most fundamental similarity is its social destructiveness. As in previous wars, the ongoing civil war is marked by severe human rights violations, with tens of thousands of people killed and millions displaced. One important difference lies in the causes of the conflict. The main cause of previous civil wars was largely the discontent of different ethnic groups with the policies of the dominant group. The current civil war, however, has emerged as a result of a power struggle within the dominant group.

Another difference relates to the scope of the conflict. While previous conflicts were largely regional in nature, confined to the southern region or Darfur, the current conflict has had a devastating impact on most of the country, including the centre. Consequently, it poses a much greater risk than previous conflicts in terms of the collapse of state mechanisms. Although this risk has been relatively reduced by the Sovereign Council’s capture of Khartoum and the RSF’s retreat to the west, the RSF remains a powerful threat. Finally, the warring parties’ search for military and diplomatic support has led to intense external intervention.

(Originally published in Turkish by Kriter)

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ast April, war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces. Thousands have been killed and millions displaced, raising fears that the country could descend into full-scale war.

While there is a confluence of factors driving this war, such as the UAE backing the militias with military support and funding to secure its economic and political interests, on many occasions, the militias have proven that this is also their war to target and annihilate specific groups of different racial backgrounds.

The Rapid Support Forces were created in 2013 through the restructuring of the notorious Janjaweed militia to support the central government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan.

In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing their activities, even though the militia has reportedly committed countless crimes and atrocities during the ongoing war, including killing protesters, unlawfully detaining citizens, and targeting hospitals, churches, and media facilities.

Looting homes

Most recently, during the storming of the city of Wad Madani, militiamen engaged in large-scale looting of homes and markets, as well as the UN World Food Programme’s warehouses which provide life-saving food and malnutrition assistance to 20,000 children and pregnant and lactating women.

As a result, tens of thousands were forced to leave the city to escape the ensuing hell with the militias trying to prevent their flight. In a serious development, the militias offered to protect villages in exchange for young people joining their ranks.

In many other cases, crimes and violations were motivated and committed on the basis of ethnicity.

In Darfur, the Rapid Support Forces and the Arab militias they support launched an attack against the African tribes, specifically the Masalit; innocent civilians were raped and buried in mass graves in Ardamata and El Geneina. Reports have documented that the victims were labeled “slaves” by the militia fighters.

The excessive use of force was deliberate, forcing the tribes to leave their territories, and amounted to ethnic cleansing. The militias’ campaign against the Masalit was led by six key commanders of the Arab-backed militias, who gave orders to carry out the attacks without mercy.

Executions

In a related heinous incident, the militia also kidnapped and executed the governor of West Darfur, who was a descendant of the Masalit tribe, after he publicly called for international protection of the Masalit people.

It was reported that when the militias stormed the town of Wad Madani, their fighters were heard saying that they were looking for “Zurga” (a name for those who come mainly from Black communities), used in this context as an act of humiliation.

Disturbingly, the RSF militia has also resorted to the use of rape as a tool of terror and punishment. In August 2023, a UN expert was quoted in a statement as being alarmed by the increasing number of rape cases in Darfur. The expert showed that some rape cases were racially and ethnically motivated, despite the Rapid Support Forces’ stated zero tolerance policy for sexual and gender-based violence.

Targeting groups from the north

This ethnic hatred does not appear to be limited to Darfur’s African tribes, which the militias have historically viewed as an inferior race: northern groups have also been targeted. In a viral social media video, one of the militia leaders threatened to extend the war to the north and kill northerners who belong to certain ethnic groups.

When it comes to the militias’ campaigns of repression and killing of non-Arab tribes, the phrase “history repeats itself” applies. For years, the militias have systematically targeted these local communities, committing crimes and massacres against them. In 2015, a Human Rights Watch report titled “Men with No Mercy” explained how militia soldiers, then acting at the behest of the central government during counterinsurgency operations, raped girls in groups, burned villages and livestock, and executed villagers.

The Rapid Support Forces’ militia’s tribal formation justifies these heinous actions, as most of the militia’s leadership and advisors come from a particular family or ethnic background, namely the Arab tribes of Darfur. For example, the militia is headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, with his brother serving as deputy head and chairman of the Al Junaid company, the militia’s main gold export arm. Dagalo’s brothers lead a team that wages his social media war. The militia’s top political advisor, who defends its criminal activities in the international media and tours Europe to legitimize its existence, also comes from the same background.

Submissive to the militia?

In fact, not all of the Arab tribes have been completely submissive to the militias. In some cases, there were internal divisions over the course of the expansion of the Rapid Support Forces militias into the homelands of the tribes west of Kordofan.

One of the worst and most serious consequences of the fascist calls of the militias is that the rebel groups, mainly drawn from the Black and African communities in Darfur, who have chosen to remain neutral since the outbreak of the war have declared their intention to join the national army and have consolidated their power in El-Fasher to defend it against the imminent attack of the militia. This development threatens to plunge the whole country into a full-scale civil war.

The Rapid Support Forces militia has worked relentlessly through its public relations campaign to convince the world that it’s a national force that wants to bring peace and democratic transformation to the entire country. Thus, in August 2023, the militia shared what it called a vision for a new state and the need to build the country on the pillar of justice and equal rights for all. They appointed a political committee tasked with coordinating with political parties and other stakeholders, recruiting senior commanders from different parts of the country; however, their influence on the decision-making process within the militia remains weak. Meanwhile the facts on the ground fully expose the falsehood of all these disinterested and patriotic claims.

The looming danger is that if the militia emerges victorious in this war, the whole of Sudan could be turned into a fascist state, and more and more genocides and massacres based on ethnicity will take place. The ongoing investigation by the International Criminal Court into the crimes committed by the militias in Darfur is a crucial step in the right direction and will help deter the militias from targeting local communities.

The international community should put more pressure on the UAE, which funds and supports the militias. Countries that invite representatives of the Rapid Support Forces militia to propagate their lies and deceptions should know that this is a step towards legitimizing a war militia and prolonging the devastating war in Sudan.

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n April 2023, war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese National Army and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF), killing thousands and displacing millions. As the fighting has spread, many now fear that the entire country could be plunged into a full-blown war.

This war has its investors and beneficiaries; for years, the UAE has pursued its narrow interests by providing the RSF with a lifeline of money and weapons to carry out its genocide in Darfur. It’s time for the world to put pressure on the UAE to stop perpetuating this vicious cycle of violence.

The RSF was primarily created in 2013 by restructuring the notorious Janjaweed militia to support the central government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing its activities, even though the militia has reportedly committed countless crimes and atrocities, including the destruction of villages, the killing of protesters, sexual assault and rape, and the unlawful detention of activists.

The UAE’s support for the militia comes in various forms, from direct funding to logistics and military equipment. In December 2019, an investigative report revealed that the militia received vehicles from the UAE that could be easily modified and equipped with machine guns. The report also revealed how UAE-based front companies, such as Tradive, were used to channel the funds to the militia.

Escalated military support

During the ongoing war, and in flagrant violation of the UN arms embargo resolution, the UAE escalated its military support to the militias through Chad, where, under the guise of a humanitarian operation, it established an airport and a hospital to transfer weapons and ammunition to the militias and to treat militia fighters. The national army reportedly destroyed a UAE military shipment to the militia in Nyala, South Darfur.

According to military sources, the shipment included drones, ammunition, advanced rocket launchers, and sophisticated communications systems. At the beginning of the war, the RSF militia received military aid from the Wagner Group through the al-Khadim airbase in eastern Libya, which was controlled by General Haftar, the notorious UAE-backed warlord. According to the U.S. Treasury Department, the Wagner Group also supplied the RSF with surface-to-air missiles.

The UAE is also the hub for the RSF militia’s social media team, which the militia brothers run to disinform the world about their ongoing genocides and violations. Previously, an investigative report revealed that a Dubai-based private equity firm was helping the militia lobby British parliamentarians and influence their opinions about the RSF militia’s crimes in the ongoing war.

The UAE support extends to diplomatic and political support for the militia. For example, the UAE has so far failed to cooperate and implement the sanctions imposed by the U.S. on the companies and leaders of the RSF militia. The UAE is also a safe haven for the militias’ leader. Recently, Dagalo made his first appearance since the outbreak of the war; flight records show that he arrived in Addis Ababa on a royal jet that had flown from Abu Dhabi to Uganda’s Entebbe International Airport.

Why does the UAE support the RSF?

In fact, there are several reasons for the UAE to invest heavily in the RSF militia. In recent years, the UAE has begun working on agricultural projects and signed a $6 billion contract to build a Red Sea port. In April 2020, the UAE hired a firm to lobby the military council, of which the militia was then a core part, to take control of the PortSudan Facility, the country’s most important facility.

Assuming the militia emerges victorious in this war, the UAE will have a strong ally to complete these plans and further its political agenda. In this scenario, the UAE will import more raw gold from Sudan to the UAE. The UAE will also find it easier to resume its shadowy recruitment of Sudanese and send them as soldiers to fight in Libya. Thus, it could be argued that the UAE is not interested in seeing any democratic experiment in the Middle East region that might influence the regime dissidents at home.

This military support provided the militias with the necessary tools to commit countless crimes, such as attacking hospitals, churches, and media facilities, and setting up markets to sell women as slaves. In the city of Wad Madani, the militias engaged in large-scale looting of homes and markets, as well as the UN World Food Programme’s warehouses, which provide life-saving food and nutrition to 20,000 children and pregnant and lactating women. In addition, tens of thousands were forced to leave the city to escape this hell—their flight, however, was prevented by the militia. In a serious development, the militia offered to protect villages in exchange for youth joining their ranks.

Impact on the Darfur region

The UAE’s support for militias has had a more significant and devastating impact in the Darfur region, where the militias have committed several acts of genocide and ethnic cleansing. Armed citizens descended from African tribes, particularly the Masalit, were raped and buried in mass graves in Ardamata and El Geneina. Independent reports have documented that the RSF militias and the Arab militias they supported humiliated their victims and called them slaves as they chased from street to street. In some cases, RSF militiamen recorded innocent civilians as they were being executed. In other areas of Darfur, refugee camps have been besieged, killing and injuring thousands.

The UAE’s irresponsible intervention also caused diplomatic tensions in the region and threatened to exacerbate the situation in Darfur. In December 2023, after being publicly accused by a Sudanese official of facilitating arms transfers to the RSF militia, the Chadian government declared four Sudanese diplomats personae non gratae. In return, the Sudanese government announced that it would take reciprocal measures soon thereafter. Chad initially decided not to intervene directly, and later reversed this decision after the UAE signed several agreements and memorandums promising to help Chad with some energy projects.

By fueling the war in Sudan through its RSF alliance, the UAE insidiously risks threatening the entire Sudanese social fabric and deepening the divisions between tribal and ethnic groups. It can’t be overlooked that the tribes and local communities from which most of the militias come will be targeted and discriminated against in postwar Sudan.

So far, many voices have condemned this military support. For example, a group of Democratic members of the U.S. Congress sent a letter to the UAE Foreign Minister expressing their concern about the continued funding of the militias. The move was welcomed by the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Molly Phee. In addition, scholars, human rights advocates, and a leading expert on Sudan, international law, and the prevention of atrocities issued a statement calling for an end to all sources of UAE funding for the militias. Meanwhile, Sudanese around the world have taken to the streets and launched social media campaigns demanding an end to this military support.

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n a grave turn of events, Wad Madani, Sudan’s second-largest city and a previous haven for the displaced, has become the latest battleground in the ongoing conflict between the national army and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). Reports from the AFP news agency have confirmed a mass exodus as the RSF established a base in the east of the city, prompting the flight of thousands who had sought refuge there.

The RSF’s aggressive maneuver has effectively initiated a new front in the eight-month-old war, destroying one of the few safe zones left in the nation, as observed by William Carter, the Sudan director for the Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC).

Social media footage shows distressing scenes of residents, many of whom had previously fled violence in Khartoum, hastily evacuating their homes with their possessions. Amid the chaos, 45-year-old Ahmed Salih disclosed to Reuters his desperation to find transportation for his family to escape what he describes as “living in hell.”

RSF reinforcements

The conflict, which has been simmering since the army, under General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, and RSF, led by General Mohammed Hamdan Dagalo, clashed over political transition issues, has led to airstrikes and artillery exchanges in the city. Witnesses have reported RSF reinforcements moving towards the conflict zones and RSF presence in surrounding villages, signaling a worrying escalation.

The United Nations has reported that the war, fueled by the fallout from the ousting of former ruler Omar al-Bashir, has already resulted in the displacement of nearly 6.8 million people and conservative death toll estimates stand at over 12,000.

The humanitarian crisis is deepening as 14,000 individuals have reportedly fled Wad Madani, with the United Nations having to suspend all humanitarian missions in al-Jazirah state due to the violence. The city, which shelters over 86,000 displaced people, has more than 270,000 residents reliant on humanitarian aid, now facing disruption.

UN calls for halt of hostilities

United States Ambassador John Godfrey has called for a halt to the RSF’s advance, citing the potential for mass civilian casualties and further impediments to the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The situation has reached a critical point with families, already traumatized by previous displacements, finding themselves in a relentless cycle of flight, with transportation costs soaring and few safe destinations left. The NRC has expressed grave concern for those in Wad Madani, particularly the vulnerable families with no means to escape the encroaching violence.

The Sudanese doctors’ union has labeled the situation as “catastrophic,” with essential services like pharmacies closing down. Meanwhile, skepticism clouds the prospects of an East African mediation initiative to resolve the conflict, which has been marked by reports of human rights abuses in areas already seized by the RSF.

As the international community calls for restraint and a peaceful resolution, the reality on the ground in Sudan remains dire, with the echoes of conflict leading to an uncertain future for millions.

Source: Aljazeera

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n April 2023, a war broke out in Sudan between the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia. Thousands have been killed and millions have been displaced, not to mention the massive destruction of buildings and infrastructure.

With the world turning to social media to follow up on the news, the RSF militia started using X to deceive the public about the unfolding events and evade responsibility for the committed massacres and atrocities.

It’s time to deprive the RSF militia of the X platform and stop providing it with a megaphone to spread its lies.

The RSF militia was formed in 2013 after the restructuring of the notorious Janjaweed militia, which primarily supported the government’s counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law legitimizing its activities.

According to several ​​independent reports, the RSF militia has committed countless crimes and atrocities, including destroying villages, killing protestors, sexual violations and rape, mass killings, unlawful detention, targeting hospitals and churches, ethnic violence, and restricting civilian movement during the ongoing war.

Reliance on social media

For years, the RSF militia has relied on social media to sway public opinion and wage its propaganda war. Most recently, after Facebook removed its official pages, the militia started to rely on its X accounts as its primary tool of misinformation.

In November, the RSF militia allied Arabia militias launched an attack on Ardmata, an area located in Darfur, Sudan, and populated by the Masalit people. According to the testimonies of the survivors and reports by international organizations such as the UN, more than 800 individuals were executed and killed based on their ethnicity. Despite the mounting evidence against it, the RSF’s official X account released a media statement falsely claiming the area was shelled by the Sudanese army forces and former regime members.

The militia provided no proof to back their concocted story. In June 2023, the RSF militia unabashedly tweeted condemning the assassination of the West Darfur governor, whom the militia themselves had killed. This crime pushed the U.S. to place sanctions against senior commanders of the militia.

Allegations of attacking churches

In other cases, despite confirmed reports and the official statement of the Sudanese Council of Churches that militia members had attacked several churches in Khartoum, the militia insisted on rejecting the allegations and described them as diverging attention from military losses.

During the ongoing war, the RSF members have engaged in large-scale looting of residential areas to the degree that several “Dagalo” markets, named after the militia leader, have been established across the country dedicated to the stolen goods. Contrary to all reports and eyewitness affirmations, the RSF responded with its usual tactic, tweeting that violations were a disinformation campaign by the Sudanese Armed Forces.

In a bid to boost engagement with their content, the militia has resorted to fake accounts and networks. For instance, in August 2023, the Atlantic Council’s Digital Forensic Research Lab (DFRLab) revealed how more than 900 potentially hijacked accounts are copying and pasting positive replies to the RSF’s and its leader’s official accounts on the platform to make them appear more popular.

A similar and recently created network was also exposed by Beam Report, a local Sudanese fact-checking organization.

Violation of X rules

The X platform is also utilized to disinform the public about the militia’s activities and its ties to infamous groups such as the Wagner Group so as to avoid any repercussions from this hidden relationship. Both the militia and its political advisor categorically denied the CNN report that the Ukrainian special forces attacked the Wagner Group, which is allied to the RSF in Sudan and supports it with military equipment. It is worth mentioning that the U.S. State Department later accused Wagner of supplying the RSF militia with surface-to-air missiles.

The existence of the RSF militia on X clearly violates two of the social media platform’s rules: the crisis misinformation policy that does not sanction sharing false and misleading information, and the content policy that prohibits violent and hateful entities. X should adhere to these rules and protect its users from the harm the RSF militia has been causing.

X should also listen to the Sudanese people who have created the hashtag #removedaglo requesting X to remove the RSF militia accounts, citing its extended violations and crimes against the country’s citizens.

Continuing to give the RSF militia an online platform will have a dire outcome: it aids it with a powerful tool to legitimatize its existence and, even worse, to cover up its impending genocide in the region.

The RSF militia and its affiliated accounts also utilized X to attack the Sudanese National Army. A recent analysis by Beam Report exposed a network of accounts that praise the RSF militia leader, spreading disinformation that claims Iran is backing the national army to have a foothold in the Red Sea region.

Following international outcry and strong condemnation of its ongoing massacres in Darfur, the official RSF militia account shared a fake meeting for the leaders of the Masalit tribe to show their support for the militia, the same tribe whose members the militia has executed and targeted on the basis of their ethnicity. In fact, no known leaders of the tribe appeared at this purported gathering.

To deceive the world about its ongoing genocides in Darfur, the RSF militia is using the big lie tactic employed during Nazi Germany; it’s simply that if you tell a lie big enough and then keep repeating it, people will eventually come to believe it; the underlying premise, according to Adolf Hitler, who used it to justify the Holocaust, is that no one will think anyone is insolent enough to distort the truth to such a degree.

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n a startling revelation, General Yassir al-Atta of Sudan has publicly accused the United Arab Emirates (UAE) of providing support to the controversial Rapid Support Forces (RSF), marking the first official accusation of the UAE’s involvement in Sudan’s intricate war. The conflict has already caused massive displacement and widespread ethnically driven violence, particularly in the Darfur region.

During a speech to the General Intelligence Service, which was later circulated on social media and reported by Reuters, al-Atta claimed that intelligence sources, including military and diplomatic channels, have confirmed the UAE’s logistical backing of the RSF. The RSF, which evolved from the Janjaweed militias, has been a significant force in the government’s efforts to quell rebellions, most notably the crisis in Darfur during the 2000s.

The UAE, when solicited for comments, reiterated its stance advocating for de-escalation and peace talks in Sudan, contrasting with al-Atta’s allegations. Emphasizing its humanitarian role, the UAE pointed to the establishment of a field hospital in Chad to support those affected by the conflict.

Aid to the RSF

General al-Atta also asserted that the UAE had channeled aid to the RSF via other African nations, including Uganda, the Central African Republic, and Chad. This week, aid was reported to have arrived at Ndjamena’s airport in Chad, which had previously seen aid routed through the city of Amdjarass.

In an unexpected turn, al-Atta commended Russia for its action against the Wagner Group, a paramilitary organization allegedly involved in supporting the RSF. The RSF has refuted any connections with Wagner Group.

The RSF has recently gained a strategic advantage in the conflict, seizing several states within the Darfur region and accumulating advanced military equipment, including drones and artillery. This has led to increased scrutiny of the origins of such weaponry, with some claiming it was captured from military bases.

Mixed responses

Responses to General al-Atta’s claims have been mixed, with Uganda’s state minister for foreign affairs dismissing them as “absolute rubbish.” Meanwhile, the Sudanese army, Chad, and the CAR have yet to provide official statements.

In a video released by the army, references to the UAE were notably absent, which some observers have interpreted as a potential edit. This comes as General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the army leader and al-Atta’s superior, announced an impending visit to the UAE, coinciding with the U.N. climate summit COP28.

The UAE’s involvement in Sudan has been multifaceted, including supporting a failed political transition post-2019 and engaging in economic ventures, such as building a Red Sea port and investing in agriculture.

As the conflict in Sudan escalates, the international community watches closely, weighing the implications of foreign interference and the prospects for peace and stability in a region long-torn by strife and political upheaval.

Source: Reuters

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he war that broke out in April between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces (RSF) militia has killed and displaced thousands of Sudanese, in addition to massive destruction in buildings and infrastructure, with many fearing the whole country could descend into a full-scale civil war.

While some international powers and countries are choosing to remain neutral, France, with its long-term interest in Sudan and the region, should pick a side and push for the militia to be defeated and removed from the scene.

The RSF was formed in 2013 by restructuring the notorious Janjaweed militia with the goal of backing up the counterinsurgency operations in Darfur and South Kordofan. In 2017, the Sudanese parliament passed a law that organized and legitimized the militia’s activities. Several independent reports have exposed the militia’s countless crimes and atrocities, including destroying villages, killing protestors, sexual violations and rape, and unlawful detention, in addition to targeting hospitals and churches and ethnic cleansing during the ongoing war.

France’s role in Sudan

France’s role, hitherto, has been confined to successfully evacuating Western citizens from Sudan, providing humanitarian assistance to the Sudanese and refugees in the neighboring countries, and condemning the war violations in general.

In a preemptive step to any reversal in France’s stance, the RSF militia launched a campaign targeting French leaders and society. The militia sent a political advisor to France to conceal its crimes against civilians, and bribe journalists and TV producers to polish the militia’s leader image as a European ally and the savior of Sudan from Islamists. Moreover, the militia reportedly hired a French PR company to help in its campaign.

Four main practical and moral reasons, analyzed below, should prompt France out of neutrality and make it pick the side of defeating the RSF militia.

Why France should stop being neutral in Sudan

First, the militia’s expansion in neighboring African countries comes at the cost of France’s historical political interest. For instance, most recently, news reports have exposed the fact that before the war the militia was receiving military support supplied via the eastern borders of Chad. Meanwhile an RSF leader has boasted about his intervention to block a coup in the Central African Republic, and UN reports have reported that the RSF has funneled arms into the country.

Second, this expansion also means more influence for Russia and the Wagner group, which is now supplying the militia with surface-to-air missiles in exchange for smuggled Sudanese gold. France is alarmed by the growing cooperation between Wagner and the RSF militia and is monitoring it closely. France needs to think strategically and never give an opportunity to Putin’s future man in the region to succeed. The RSF leader, it should be noted, has visited Russia and has defended its invasion of Ukraine.

Third, the scale of violations committed by the RSF and the destruction it has caused show that the militia leadership does not have complete control over its forces. If the RSF emerges victorious, Sudan will become a fragile state. This chaotic status, among others, will impact the supply of gum Arabic—half of the country’s production of gum Arabic is imported by France.

The RSF and the future of Sudan

Fourth, the country could also become a shelter for many terrorist groups that France is fighting in the Sahel region. This situation will also exacerbate the immigration problem at the European borders. Dagalo, the head of Rapid Support Forces, who previously threatened to overflow Europe with the influx of immigrants, will use this as a pressuring card.

Undoubtedly, dismantling the RSF will prevent the militia from committing its next massacre in Darfur and put Sudan back on the democratic transition path towards a country with one, unified national army. This is a fair demand that the militia leader not only rejected, but he threatened to take the whole country down an unknown path if he were forced to do so. This step will be another diplomatic win for France, which convened the international conference to support Sudan and assisted it with a $1.5 billion bridging loan.

France can practically engage in countering the RSF militia in many ways, such as publicly advocating the agendas to dismantle it. Now, it should move from calling for respect of the UN arms embargo in Darfur to pressuring its allies, such as Chad and the UAE, to abstain from supporting the militia or facilitating the transportation of arms and missiles. France should also motivate European countries and organizations to stop collaborating with the militia on the immigration issue and hiring its companies to provide security services.

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he popular uprising that started in late 2018 in Sudan, one of Africa’s most prominent countries culturally and geo- and socio-politically, has not only failed to bring the country out of its rut, but has dragged it to the brink of a major disaster.

Following the fall of the al-Bashir administration, the successive coup attempts have brought the Sudanese people face to face with a humanitarian crisis. In order to reveal the magnitude of the crisis, it is useful to briefly overview the process of coups.

The beginning of the chaos: The fall of Omar al-Bashir’s government

The desired recovery in Sudan’s economy was prevented by the division of the country in two in 2011 after years of civil wars, the fact that oil, the state’s most important source of income, remained in the southern region, the embargo imposed by the U.S., etc. Meanwhile, the embargo and the foreign trade deficit led to a major contraction in foreign exchange.

The economic distress in the country forced the Omar al-Bashir administration to raise the prices of basic consumer goods at astronomical rates. The hikes, coupled with widespread rumors of corruption, nepotism, etc., brought the anger of the Sudanese people to a peak. In April 2019, the people took to the streets and deposed al-Bashir.

However, the fall of al-Bashir’s regime did not lead to an economic recovery and plunged Sudan into one of the most critical instabilities in its history. Four years after the coup, the country has not recovered and the political and economic chaos has become unmanageable.

The main driver of the people who took to the streets in the capital Khartoum was the economic hardship and corruption that they had suffered for many years. There was no specific ideological ground driving the uprisings, and there was no foresight or plan for what would happen after the fall of al-Bashir.

Meanwhile, the army, which following independence has always been powerful position in the country after independence, did not want to let go of the reins. Realizing that it was no longer possible for the current government to remain, military officers took the lead and tried to seize power. The insistence of the protesters on civilian rule forced the military to back down, albeit to a limited extent, and a joint military-civilian transition administration was formed.

The Transitional Sovereignty Council, which was established to serve as a collective head of state, consisted of six military and five civilian members. General Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the commander of the army, was appointed as the chairman of the council, and Mahammed Hamdan Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, was appointed as his deputy.

Although the Sovereignty Council is dominated by the military wing, the government formed under the leadership of Abdalla Hamdok is predominantly civilian. In a sense, the military and civilian wings were forced into a union. The discord among the members of the Sovereignty Council, the differences of opinion between the council and the government, the disagreements with armed groups, and the discomfort caused by Sudan’s cosmopolitan nature were the precursors of the current crisis.

The civilian wing’s ideological stance

Although the military dominated the Sovereignty Council, the civilian wing, which formed the government and received strong international support, had the opportunity to move the country towards democratic rule. There was an expectation that the newly formed government would prevent corruption and put an end to the high cost of living in the country.

With these expectations, the Sudanese people gave the government almost unlimited credit and strong support in the first period of the transition. However, instead of fulfilling these expectations, the Hamdok government turned towards the ideological aims of a small minority.

The overwhelming majority of Sudanese people are religiously conservative. It was clear that any adverse developments in this area would be met with a public backlash. Yet, Hamdok’s government, instead of laying the groundwork and taking the country to elections, turned to making radical changes with no constitutional basis.

Hamdok tried to close down the country’s well-established religious institutions and Quran courses. The private properties of many businesspeople were confiscated on the basis of links to the al-Bashir administration. All diplomats and bureaucrats who were appointed in the preceding period were dismissed.

A large section of the society was excluded from the political and economic spheres on the grounds that they belonged to the Islamic Movement. The government’s ideological attitude caused great discontent among the religious population. Moreover, during this period, there was no improvement in the economic situation, which, in fact, became much worse compared to al-Bashir’s era.

Military-civilian conflict deepens crisis

The active position of the administration’s civilian wing had bothered the military from the very beginning, but it stayed silent out of fear of international reactions. In a way, the attitude of the Hamdok government served the military wing the opportunity it had been waiting for on a silver platter.

The military claimed that the government was unable to manage the state and worsened the economy, and put pressure on Prime Minister Hamdok to resign. Hamdok’s resignation was not contested by the public in light of his government’s policies and economic failure. Thus, the country’s sovereignty passed into the hands of the military.

However, this change further isolated the Sudanese government in the international arena: foreign aid to Sudan was significantly cut, the pressure on the Sudanese economy intensified, and, the country declared bankruptcy. By taking an ideological stance, the civilian administration under Hamdok squandered an important opportunity.

Power struggle in the military wing

The military wing, which had completely seized the reins with the purge of the civilian wing, this time faced an internal power struggle. Although General al-Burhan was the head of the Sovereignty Council, Dagalu, the commander of the Rapid Support Forces, which is said to have more than 100,000 mercenaries, was in charge of a huge, highly mobilizable, medium-weight armed military force that was loyal to him.

Dagalu’s maverick behavior, encouraged by his military and economic power, caused great disturbance within the military wing and led to a power struggle between him and the army commander al-Burhan. Al-Burhan had long wanted to integrate the Rapid Support Forces into the army and eliminate this dual structure in the security forces.

Dagalu, recognizing that this integration would destroy his power, strongly opposed it. The covert power struggle between the two began to be conducted openly with the military buildup in Merawi. The situation evolved into a civil war with an armed clash between the two forces in the capital Khartoum on April 15, 2023, spreading to other regions shortly afterwards.

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he Nile River basin is shared by eleven riparian states. The vast portion of the river course originates from Ethiopia’s Blue Nile, or Abbay River, while Egypt and Sudan are the predominant consumers of the Nile River’s waters. As a result, the Nile’s key riparian states are Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan.

After several attempts to deal with integrated basin-wide watercourse management, in 2010, the three states along with the remaining eight riparian states, namely Burundi, D. R. Congo, Eritrea, Kenya, Rwanda, South Sudan, Tanzania, and Uganda, were able to craft the first-ever inclusive legal regime known as the “Agreement on the Nile River Basin Cooperative Framework” that would lay the ground for establishing a basin-wide commission.

Unfortunately, the states were unable to reach a consensus, however, on the fate of the major colonial treaties, mainly the 1929 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty and its extended 1959 Egypt-Sudan agreement, as Egypt and Sudan insist on their continued enforcement while Ethiopia and other upstream riparian states assert otherwise.

Save the basin-wide deadlocked negotiations on The Nile Basin Cooperative Framework Agreement (CFA) that is awaiting minimum ratification to enter into force, the three riparian states have been in dispute over various issues concerning the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD), which is being built on the course of the Abbay River since 2011.

Since the commencement of the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam, the three riparian states have held on-and-off talks regarding the references that would create a conducive environment for their roundtable negotiation over the dam. Accordingly, despite the intermittent nature of the talks, the decade-long negotiations have borne fruit in establishing various technical committees, such as the International Panel of Experts (IPoE) in 2012 and the National Independent Scientific Research Group (NISRG) in 2018. The negotiations also brokered the “Declaration of Principles on the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam” in 2015, which is applauded for laying a fertile ground for the forthcoming negotiations, especially, for talks over the dam’s first filling and operation.

With the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam as a corner stone, the three riparian states have agreed to be bound to, inter alia, the principles of cooperation, development, no significant harm rule, and equitable and reasonable use per Article I, II, III & IV of the “Declaration of Principles,” respectively. Furthermore, Article V dictates that the three riparian states respect and act as per the outcomes and recommendations of the technical committee. Although the three states have endorsed the IPoE’s final report, they could not agree to do the same for the studies of the other technical committees. Especially, the NISRG, which was tasked with providing alternative procedures on the first filling and operation of the GERD, made promising progress; however, it failed to come to terms with the baseline scenarios, which dragged them toward the colonial agreements.

The African Union and the GERD

Even though the trilateral and/or AU-led negotiations have not been exhaustively utilized, Egypt internationalized the issue and requested the intervention of the UN Security Council. Ethiopia objected to the request stating that the GERD is a regional matter, which procedurally should either be resolved through tripartite negotiation or be dealt with under the auspices of the AU. The UN Security Council backed down and dictated that the three countries come together and solve their differences amicably.

For the last couple of years, negotiation over the GERD has been put on hold due to the conflict in Ethiopia and political instability in Sudan. Although the three riparian states have not issued an official communiqué, there are reports indicating several confidential negotiations have taken place in the United Arab Emirates, but with no significant progress.

Recently, after Ethiopia’s prime minister vowed to delay the fourth filing of the dam until September 2023, a joint statement was issued following a meeting with the Egyptian president in Cairo in early-July 2023. It was agreed to re-initiate tripartite negotiation over the GERD and a pledge was given to conclude negotiations in four months. Despite the unrealistic ambition of the statement given the track record of the last ten years, the statement shows the ambition, willingness, and commitment of the riparian states to solve the sticking issues quickly. The move is a big step and could be a huge relief if the three states pursue the negotiation in good faith, compromise their interests, and come to agreeable terms in a win-win manner.

Currently, more than a month after the joint statement, it was not clear yet where and when these negotiations were going to take place, until it was made public that the negotiations commenced on August 27, 2023 in Cairo, Egypt. Moreover, recalling the ongoing war in Sudan, it is naïve to assume Sudan is going to engage proactively in tripartite negotiations. What is more, the joint statement was issued by two riparian states, and primarily Ethiopia. Thus, the talks are practically going to be bilateral, notably between Ethiopia and Egypt.

As the move impliedly ignores Sudan, it raises trust issues. Reports have already started indicating that Sudan is dismayed by the move. Although Ethiopia and Egypt are the two major riparian states, Sudan’s concerns should not be ignored given its geographical location midstream, and its role and significance in the tripartite negotiations.

There is little doubt that states are free to negotiate openly or secretly whenever and/or wherever they want in the presence or absence of a third party. The three riparian states might openly or secretly pursue their negotiations either in their respective state/city, under the auspices of the AU, in a third country like the U.S. or UAE or agree otherwise and negotiate accordingly. What matters the most is whenever and wherever talks are going on, it has to be pursued in a good faith whereby their respective national interests, tripartite negotiations, and basin-wide cooperation are prioritized in a balanced manner.

Against the above context, before the actual commencement date was made public, there was an assumption that negotiations might have already confidentially begun in the UAE given the experience of the last two years. Recalling the two downstream riparian states’ mechanisms to pressure Ethiopia, and the Arab League’s position on the GERD, there could be scenarios in which the UAE, using its economic leverage, might pressure Ethiopia to sign a binding deal. Had the assumption been true although the UAE, like the Washington-led negotiations, is not expected to pursue an active role in the negotiation process, it would be unwise to rule out such a possibility.

Now that the whereabouts of the negotiations over the GERD are public, the riparian states need to pursue their talks in a way that would address the remaining unresolved issues on the filling and operation of the grand dam. Most importantly, they should consciously pursue their negotiations in such a way that would not affect future basin-wide negotiations over the equitable and reasonable use, and the fair share of the entire Nile River course among all riparian states.

Furthermore, in the past, the AU has sponsored the GERD matter and has not issued a communiqué indicating any new developments. Thus, the righteous approach would be to continue negotiating under the AU. The riparian states need to pursue the dogma of “African solutions to African problems,” retain the GERD matter under the AU, and transparently walk the talk under its chairmanship.

A

gainst the backdrop of the Nile’s flowing currents, a complex struggle unfurls between Egypt and Ethiopia, each driven by their distinct needs and aspirations. As the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) nears completion, tensions rise, underscoring the challenge of balancing development and preservation in a region with scarce water supplies. The Nile River, one of the longest rivers in the world, passes through eleven different countries from south to north, and its appears that Ethiopia and Egypt are unwilling to share it. Egyptians cannot live without the Nile, and they depend on it completely for water. Ethiopia also needs GRED for development.

Throughout history, Egypt has had a profound connection to the Nile. The country consists of more than 90% desert and the Nile is called the “Gift of the gods.” At the same time, Ethiopia needs the Nile water to fill GERD and help the country supercharge its economy. More than 60% of Ethiopia is not connected to the power grid, which is something the government wants to change.

This is where the tension begins between the two countries. Mohammed Mahmoud, director of the Climate and Water Program at the Middle East Institute, warns, “Folks have never actually gone to war just because of water.” “Now, we could be at the point in history where that changes.”

What will Ethiopia gain from GERD?

With a budget of $4.2 billion, GERD is in the western Benishangul-Gumuz region and has been a source of contention between Ethiopia, Sudan, and Egypt since the beginning of its construction in 2011.

Sudan and Egypt fear the Ethiopian project could reduce their share of the Nile waters. Ethiopia insists the dam is the key to its economic development: the dam is Africa’s biggest hydroelectric project to date and is expected to generate over 5,000 megawatts of electricity, doubling the nation’s electricity output when it has been fully completed.

More than 60% of Ethiopians cannot access electricity. Prime Minister of Ethiopia Abiy Ahmed stated that “Ethiopia doesn’t have any intention to cause harm to Sudan and Egypt.” “But we also don’t want to live in darkness,” he added. Currently, 90% of construction has been completed.

What has caused the Nile waters crisis?

Egypt is in the grip of a water crisis caused by an increasing population and a limited water supply. The country has less water per person each year and is already below the United Nation’s water poverty threshold. By 2025 the UN predicts that Egypt will be approaching an “absolute water crisis.” Climate change, poor water management, recurring droughts, and the new Ethiopian hydropower dam on the Nile River are worsening the water crisis in the country.

In a report by Fast Company Middle East, Mohamed El-Kamel, the managing director of Alashanek ya Balady Association for Sustainable Development (AYB-SD), mentions a combination of factors that make Egypt susceptible to drought such as diminished rainfall, exacerbated by the increase in greenhouse gas emissions which leads to elevated temperatures. These changes also contribute to a shift in the distribution path of water. The escalating temperatures and impacts of climate change further cause water evaporation and decrease the water levels in Egypt’s lakes and rivers.

Depending solely on the Nile presents a heightened challenge in mitigating water scarcity for the country. The shrinking of the Nile is a result of increasing temperatures and prolonged drought periods. During the Cairo Water Week, Egypt’s Minister of Water Resources and Irrigation Dr. Hani Sewilam underscored the country’s significant reliance on the Nile for nearly 97% of its irrigation and drinking water, outlining the interconnected transboundary risks.

Egypt is deeply concerned by the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) in terms of its water security. According to Dr. Sherine Ahmed El Baradei, associate professor at the Civil Engineering Program at the German University in Cairo, “Filling the reservoir over a more extended period would be a beneficial approach, as Ethiopia’s reservoir filling every five to seven years could lead to a reduction of Egypt’s water share by approximately 12 to 25% during the filling period.”

How to solve the water crisis

With a population that exceeds 109 million now, Egypt’s population is predicted to more than double within 50 years. The population problem is exacerbated by a lack of natural resources and habitable space, although Egypt extends over one million square kilometers. Most Egyptians live in just 7% of the country, mainly along the Nile and the Nile Delta. Due to overpopulation, the government began a family planning campaign to reduce birth rates and control overpopulation, dubbed “Two children are enough.” The government believes that this campaign will be a solution to Egypt’s pending water crisis.

Rice plays an important role in Egyptian cuisine with annual rice consumption standing at 67.5 kg per capita. Egypt switched from a rice exporter to a rice importer following governmental measures reducing rice-cultivated areas due to the water shortage crisis. According to the Global Agricultural Information Network (GAIN), the country approved a law to circumvent illegal rice cultivation.

If a farmer is found to be planting rice outside of the allotted rice growing area set by the government, they could face a fine ranging from EGY 3,000 to EGY 10,000, or face a maximum six-month prison sentence. This was another government measure to combat water scarcity. 

Due to climate change, increasing human population pressure, and Ethiopia constructing a giant hydropower dam on the Nile, Africa is facing a water crisis. However, this crisis poses particular challenges for Egypt as the river provides nearly all Egyptians with drinking water. Without water, there can be no Egypt. As part of Egypt’s national strategy to improve accessibility to drinking water, a seawater desalination plant in New Mansoura recently began operations. The project is a part of the first phase of Egypt’s strategy which aims to build 21 seawater desalination plants that will reduce water extraction from the Nile.

The proposed desalination plants will be able to provide the water-stressed nation with an additional 3.3million m³/d of water that can be used to irrigate crops or for public water supply. Once the second phase is completed, the plants are expected to increase the country’s desalination capacity by 8.8 million m³/d at a total cost of $8 billion.

Is a water crisis imminent?

The citizens of Ethiopia are suffering from lack of electricity and hope to remedy this with the Rennaisance Dam. Furthermore, the completion of the Renaissance Dam will boost Addis Ababa’s economy by exporting electricity. However, countries like Egypt, at the end of the trail that receives the water, are worried about not having enough water to survive.

Egyptians have always depended on the Nile for their survival. Meanwhile, the construction of Ethiopia’s dam is currently 90% complete, and many meetings, agreements, and discussions between Ethiopia, Egypt, and Sudan have been held with no mutual agreements.

Egypt and Ethiopia are unlikely to budge as both countries want what is best for their future. At the same time, Egyptians and Ethiopians want a suitable alternative to the impasse – and the sooner the better.

O

n Saturday, April 15, the residents of Sudan’s capital Khartoum woke up to sounds of gun fire as violent clashes erupted between the national army, the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF), and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF). The surreal scenes of fighter jets flying over Khartoum and bombing RSF positions, and tanks rolling in the streets while dark plumes of smoke covered the city captivated the global news and social media platforms. How did the Sudanese peoples’ quest for a transition to a civilian democracy beget deadly clashes in Khartoum and a civil war that could engulf the whole country?

Since February, political tensions have been rising in the country between General Abdel Fatah al-Burhan, the county’s president and chairman of the Transitional Sovereign Council (TSC), and his deputy General Mohamed Hamdan Dagolo, commonly referred to as “Hemedti.” Hemedti is the leader of the RSF, a paramilitary unit of approximately 80,000 heavily armed and pickup truck-riding militiamen that have bases all across the country. Since the ouster of former president Omar al-Bashir in 2019, the RSF and its leader, Hemedti, have become a consequential political and security force to be reckoned with in Sudan’s political sphere.

After the Nile Spring revolution that ousted al-Bashir, the army had to “tame” and accommodate the RSF and its leadership by offering Hemedti the deputy leadership of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) in post al-Bashir Sudan. In the last decade, the RSF was a political lifeline to al-Bashir’s regime, acting like the regime’s Praetorian Guard against any threats from within the military establishment and as an efficient power against rebels in the frontier Darfur region.

Four years after the Nile Spring revolution, what has become of Sudan’s quest for a civilian democratic rule? Will Burhan and Hemedti come to their senses and seek a political truce that will save Sudan from a long civil war and state collapse? To understand the genesis of the current violence, one has to grasp Sudan’s fragile and dispersed security apparatus; the relationship between the military establishment and politics; and the new actors and elites from the margins, such as the RSF and Hemedti, who have “tasted” power and wealth in the capital. When al-Bashir left, the military, security, and economic crony system he held together for three decades came crumbling down. The current violence between the SAF and RSF is one such spatter from a bigger crumbling, metastasizing, and re-ordering of the system al-Bashir left behind.

Democracy aborted

Sudan’s attempted transition to a democratic civilian rule has been a near-impossible herculean task. After three decades of al-Bashir’s military rule and a long history of coup d’états and military dictatorships since independence, an abrupt civilian democratic rule was practically unachievable. Although al-Bashir was ousted by a popular uprising of the masses, still the post-Bashir Sudanese politics was dominated and overseen by a military and security establishment that had no stakes in handing over power to a civilian government. Sudan’s military and security establishment has been the “invisible hand” that guided the supposed transition to democracy—and no wonder it has failed, or, even worse, imploded with violence.

The unwillingness of the military and security establishment to hand over power to a civilian government was clear in the coup that ousted Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok in October 2021. When the transition timeline dictated that the military branch of the TSC was supposed to hand over power to its civilian counterpart, the Forces for Freedom and Change (FFC), instead the TSC ousted Hamdok and created discord amongst the different elements within the FFC. Hence, the military continued to consolidate its power and postponed indefinitely any possibilities of a transition to a civilian rule.

Why should the military and security elites risk losing their powers and interests by handing over government rule to civilians? Sudan is the third-largest producer of gold in Africa, and its military establishment is entangled in this lucrative enterprise. Moreover, to make matters more complicated, the Russian paramilitary group Wagner has joined the illicit mining and exporting of Sudanese gold.

More significantly, there is a new actor on the scene: Hemedti. Hemedti is an outsider to the military and security establishment, but he wields enormous powers and resources, and tilts the levers of power to his interests and advantages. The current war in Sudan is between two factions of the military and security establishment: the entrenched old cadres of the SAF and the newcomers, the RSF—this power struggle between Burhan and Hemedti and their foot-soldiers will either doom or reshape the future of Sudan.

Geopolitical ramifications

Sudan is geostrategically important in the Red Sea and the Sahel region. The current war will impact the region geopolitically and demographically as it will send millions of migrants into the neighboring countries. Egypt will be the most affected. Already hundreds of thousands of migrants have fled to southern Egypt and Cairo, and Sudan’s stability is crucial for Cairo. Moreover, Egypt has historically supported the military regimes in Khartoum. In this conflict, clearly General Burhan and the SAF are their primary interlocutors.

Hemedti is closely linked with the United Arab Emirates. The RSF took part in the Yemen conflict when it sent thousands of soldiers to fight alongside the Saudis and Emiratis in 2015. Nevertheless, Burhan and the SAF establishment also have strong relations with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. All regional powers have a vested interest in seeing a stable Sudanese state, but when push comes to shove, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are skeptical of Burhan since he never decapitated the remnants of the Islamists when al-Bashir was ousted.

Eritrea and Ethiopia are also geopolitically interested in the stability of the Sudanese state. Sudan has always played the balancing factor in the Ethiopia-Egypt Nile water dispute. If this conflict drags out, it could lead to a hydro-geopolitical conflict that affects the whole region. More significantly, South Sudan will be the most affected nation in this conflict. All the oil from Juba passes through South Sudan and is refined and exported from the Red Sea port.

Geographically, Sudan is a big country with a lot of oil and mineral resources. In the event that this conflict is protracted, there is the possibility of the mushrooming of diverse rebel groups and militias in the country and the involvement of neighboring countries in the conflict. Sudan could be the next Democratic Republic of the Congo, but our prayers are that peace prevails soon.

T

he parties engaged in the political crisis in Sudan and the root causes that led to the conflict in the country are relatively multifaceted and complex. In 2019, problems such as the economic crisis, corruption, and social injustice continued accelerating in the country. As a result, protests began in December 2018, and the country’s long-serving president, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown on April 11, 2019.

While the political polarization in the country continued after the uprising, a temporary government was formed under military rule. Even though a civilian administration was established as part of the constitutional amendment in 2021, military forces continued to interfere in the country’s administration. This situation sparked protests and caused lasting political instability in the region.

The parties involved in the political crisis in Sudan are the civilian government, the military administration, political parties, and non-governmental organizations. Factors such as an economic crisis, corruption, social injustice, disruptions in the democratization process, and ethnic and religious conflicts are among the leading causes of the ongoing conflict in the country.

In order to have a better understanding of the recent developments in Sudan, it is necessary to look at the region’s existing parties and dynamics. In this context, Abdel Fattah al-Burhan, the leader of the interim government established after the uprising in 2019, serves as the head of the Sudanese Sovereignty Council and the army commander. On the other hand, General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (known as “Hemedti”), who does not come from a military background, serves as the leader of the Sudanese Rapid Intervention Forces (RIF).

Playing a critical role in Bashir’s administration during the country’s political crises in 2005, Hemedti was regarded as one of the most influential figures in the government. Hemedti is a member of the Rizeigat tribe, based in the west of Sudan, and has maintained his critical position in Sudanese politics in the post-Bashir period as a military leader.

Recent developments in Sudan 

The current upheavals in Sudan indicate that the raging political conflict continues to accelerate in the region. On April 14, 2023, the Sudanese army raided the Rapid Intervention Forces headquarters. The prevailing view is that Hemedti’s units rather than being complementary to the Sudanese army are, in fact, a separate military structure. Presently, Burhan is trying to weaken Hemedti’s troops, but it seems too late.

The conflict in Sudan could further aggravate the political crisis and potentially destabilize the country. In particular, Hemedti commands a robust military presence in the region, and tensions between Hemedti and Burhan may evolve into a larger-scale military conflict, dragging the country into a civil war and harming the political process by further deepening the political deadlock.

What is more, the country’s geopolitical position may cause other countries, especially neighboring ones, to become involved in the political crisis, deepening the existing problems and further complicating the negotiation possibilities.

In order to avoid the prospect of political instability in Sudan affecting it, Egypt may intervene to alleviate its concerns about Sudan’s resources on the Nile which include the Roseires, Sennar, and Merowe Dams. These dams play an important role in Sudan’s hydroelectric power generation and provide irrigation for the agricultural sector.

Second, Egypt and Sudan have conflicting interests regarding the disputes in the Tigray region of Ethiopia, located northeast of Sudan. Third, disputes between Sudan and South Sudan continue to persist. The political crisis in Sudan can negatively affect the resolution process of these conflicts, and South Sudan may also become involved in the current crisis.

Regarding extraregional powers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia have close ties with some groups in Sudan. The crisis in the country may affect the interests of both countries and cause the UAE and Saudi Arabia to become more involved. Besides these countries, the African Union (AU), the League of Arab Nations (LAN), and other regional organizations will likely become involved in resolving the crisis.

A political process is needed

However, all interventions must be conducted peacefully, with respect to the country’s sovereignty, and in alignment with the interest of the Sudanese people. To ensure stability in the country, parties to the conflict must cooperate through dialogue and reconciliation to resolve the tension within the Sudanese administration.

A political process incompassing all parts of Sudan must be initiated and supported for a sustainable solution. Clearly, the conflicts in Sudan threaten the country’s stability, and serious political will and a negotiation process are required to resolve the crisis effectively. Otherwise, Sudan may become the “New Libya.

Meanwhile, Sudan is also engaged in conflicts with neighboring countries such as Egypt, South Sudan, and Ethiopia. The international community needs to support Sudan and make efforts to end the current conflict. At the same time, the economic crisis in Sudan, which deepens the political turmoil and complicates the solution process, should not be ignored. Although it is difficult to be optimistic about Sudan’s future, it is necessary not to give up hope for a peaceful resolution to the ongoing conflict.

I

n 2003, a brief civil war broke out in Sudan between the central government in Khartoum and tribal forces in Darfur underpinned by racism and for control of natural resources. The Sudanese army led by ousted President Omar al-Bashir fought tribal gunmen in the region with the help of the Janjaweed tribal forces, leaving behind some 300,000 dead and more than 2.5 million displaced.

Al-Bashir integrated the Janjaweed forces, led by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, also known as Hemedti, which helped his government fight rebels, into the Sudanese Army Intelligence in 2013 giving them the name “Rapid Intervention Forces” (RIF).

Hemedti headed the force and was the right hand of former president al-Bashir. A former camel trader, Hemedti turned against al-Bashir after popular protests broke out against his rule. He joined the head of the Sudanese army Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and ousted al-Bashir.

The Rapid Intervention Forces, comprised of some 100,000 fighters, have light weapons and vehicles. In recent years, Hemedti came to the fore after talks between the Sudanese army and the RIF, on one hand, and Sudanese political parties and civil society, on the other, failed to form a civilian government.

The RIF controls most of Sudan’s gold mining industry, which is involved in trade with countries such as the United Arab Emirates. It has also been accused of committing a massacre against protesters in June 2019, leaving 120 dead.

Hemedti has served as the vice head of the Sudanese Sovereign Council, which was headed by al-Burhan. He has received support from the United Arab Emirates and Ethiopia while al-Burhan has the backing of the U.S. and Egypt.

The RIF has participated in the Arab Coalition forces in Yemen led by Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Infighting took place in Sudan between the RIF and the Sudanese army after the RIF deployed some of its forces around Khartoum on April 15. Clashes spread to the cities of Marawi, Al-Abyad, Omdurman, and Al-Fashir.

Differences over integrating the RIF into the Sudanese army

One of the main differences between al-Burhan and Hemedti is how they view the process of integrating the RIF into the Sudanese army.

The Sudanese army demanded that the Rapid Intervention Forces be affiliated to the Ministry of Finance, given that it controls the movements and deployment of these forces according to its needs.

Hemedti announced his support for the idea of ​​​​merging his forces into the Sudanese army, but he stated that it should take place according to agreed time frames, suggesting a 10-year period, where al-Burhan suggested that it should take place in two years.

The Rapid Intervention Forces also called for giving their officers the same privileges as those of their counterparts in the army, and demanded that the armed forces adhere to the Sudanese constitution that will be approved.

International efforts including by the EU, the African Union, and the Arab League have all failed to halt the fighting between the RIF and the Sudanese army.

The Sudanese Doctors’ Syndicate announced that 97 people have been killed and 365 others have been injured as of April 16.

Sudan has been witnessing difficult living conditions which saw a serious rise in food prices over the past years. So far, military forces and civil society have failed to reach an agreement that would improve the living conditions of the Sudanese.

Today, the RIF, which was founded to support the Sudanese army in Darfur, seems to be at war with it, making the lives of ordinary Sudanese even more challenging. Will the conflict between al-Burhan and Hemedti end as the conflict in Darfur ended? Only time will tell.

On January 2, 2022, Sudan’s Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok announced his resignation amid deadly crackdowns on on pro-democracy civilian demonstrations and a political deadlock that has compounded Sudan’s political stability and economic prosperity. The resignation of Abdalla Hamdok and his exit from the Sudanese political arena was anticipated; it was a matter of when not how.

On October 25, 2021, the Sudanese military had staged a coup and put then prime minister Hamdok under house arrest when political differences reached near-uncompromising positions while venomous accusations were traded. In a turn of events, Premier Hamdok struck a deal with the military and was reinstated to his position as prime minister in the transition government.

However, pro-democracy protesters continued to occupy streets all over the country despite horrific brutalities, rising death tolls, and documented use of rape and sexual assaults against female protesters. Clearly amid the decadence of the democratic transition in Sudan and the brutalities unleashed upon the pro-democracy protesters, Hamdok’s government reached its limits; his role in Sudan’s transition to democracy seemed untenable.

Now that Hamdok exited the Sudanese political scene, what is the fate of Sudan’s transition to democracy? What will the nature of Sudan’s anticipated democratic future be?

Sudan: A nation in constant transition

The current democratic transition in Sudan is not the first in the country’s history, and neither is the ruling military Sovereignty Council the first one overseeing a political transition. As a nation, Sudan leaps from one political transition to another while punctuated with military dictatorships. This has been the case since the nation’s independence.

Indeed, Sudan’s first transition was even before it gained independence from the British in 1952. Sudan’s first political transition was between 1953 and 1955: this was the era of the self-rule transition that was overseen by a governor general as head of state with an existing elected parliament, a cabinet, and a constitution. The next transition period was after the Revolution of October 1964 that brought down the government of Major General Ibrahim Abboud and replaced him with a ruling Sovereignty Council.

As a nation, Sudan leaps from one political transition to another while punctuated with military dictatorships.

Another Sudanese Sovereignty Council was instituted and ruled the nation after the military coup against President Gaafar Nimeiry. Hence the current ruling Sovereignty Council headed by Abdel Fattah Al-Burhan and dominated by military generals is neither new nor unique in Sudan’s political history. However, the current Sovereignty Council (SC) has two options: either set the stage for substantial civilian democratic rule in Sudan or repeat Sudan’s past political history with different shades of dictatorship colors as intervals between ruling military Sovereignty Councils.

Moreover, political fractures – occasioned by military generals – appeared within the FFC. Different factions of the FFC seemed to have lost confidence in Premier Hamdok as the economic woes continued. Former rebel leaders, tribal political elites, and other political groups that felt marginalized within the FFC movement as well as Hamdok’s government outrightly challenged and criticized the premier. The FFC was crumbling from within. The military generals were subtly smiling. This was the right time to depose Hamdok and crumble democratic aspirations.

The basis of the dispute between the Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change lies on the lack of trust and the issue of accountability which have hampered the proper functioning of the transitional Sovereignty Council.

When in October of last year Premier Hamdok was removed from power, democratic protests continued. The military reinstated Hamdok to power but protests still continued to rage. Both the military and the FFC lost their credibility to transition Sudan to a civilian democracy.

The anxieties of the Military Council

The basis of the dispute between the Military Council and the Forces of Freedom and Change lies on the lack of trust and the issue of accountability which have hampered the proper functioning of the transitional Sovereignty Council. Who is responsible and accountable for the horrendous murders, mistreatments, violence, and sexual harassment of protestors in Sudan for the last three years? The Military Council, which dominates the Sovereignty Council membership and operations, is clearly aware that they will face justice – and even imprisonment – if they hand over power to the civilian Forces of Freedom and Change.

The Sudanese military and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), which are commanded by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the current deputy head of the Sovereignty Council, have committed gross violations of human rights during the democratic protests. The FFC and other political groups calling for the investigation and ultimate accountability for these human rights misconducts have rendered the MC paranoid and fearful of any civilian democratic rule. Indeed, the Military Council has undermined its junior civilian partner in the Sovereignty Council. The Forces of Freedom and Change has been powerless throughout the transition period, and functioned to legitimize the Military Council and facilitate its recognition in international politics.

Sudan is a weak state. There are paramilitary forces, tribal militias, and rebel groups that operate within its sovereign territories.

Moreover, Sudan is a weak state. There are paramilitary forces, tribal militias, and rebel groups that operate within its sovereign territories. All the political actors are armed and powerful, and their interests should be accommodated in the transition period to democracy. The incessant democratic protests and the Forces of Freedom and Change’s call for accountability instilled fears and anxieties into the military elites and establishment. Furthermore, the military itself needs to appease some of these paramilitary groups and tribal militias as in the case of the brutal paramilitary group Rapid Support Forces. This complicates the power dynamics in Sudan. Consequently, the transition to democracy seems a distant reality.

Now that Premier Hamdok has left power and politics, the Military Council will seek a civilian politician to lead the next government – one that would respect the council’s interests and concerns. Protests are raging all over Sudan, and the military is reacting with force and brutality. Sudan’s transition to democracy has hit a wall, but the protestors on the streets are adamant and willing to climb over that wall at all costs.

There are two options for the protesters: it is either a civilian democratic rule or recurring dictatorships and sovereign councils in Sudan. The people – and the streets – have spoken. Will the generals listen? Will there be what one may call “social disjunction” where the Sudanese would wish to extricate from the awkward feelings that come from long years of excessive conservatism to an open country that will be consonant with democracy and dignity?

The year 2021 is seeing regional repositioning of power, competition, and strategic alignment. A series of normalization moves have taken place between Saudi Arabia and Iran, Egypt and Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Qatar, Turkey and the UAE, and Turkey and Sudan, which would have been impossible a few months back. Since 2011, whoever is in the White House has been focusing more on U.S. primacy than the concerns of Washington’s traditional allies. This U.S. policy has directly affected the Middle East and Africa.

Sudan, which has been affected by these transformations since 2019, is not an exception. Even though Sudan suffers from economic challenges, primary among which is inflation, the administration in Khartoum is decisive in diversifying foreign policy alternatives and intensifying cooperation with regional actors. In this manner, the chairman of Sudan’s Sovereign Council Abdel Fattah al-Burhan visited Turkey on August 12-13 to expand the cooperation between the two countries. Official Sudanese statements show that Khartoum is eager to cooperate with Ankara. It is the first-ever visit of Sudan to Turkey at the head of the state level since the country witnessed popular protests against the ousted president Omar al-Bashir in 2019.

Gradual Coherence

Turkey-Sudan relations had reached advanced stages during the term of ousted president Omar al-Bashir. However, after the dismissal of al-Bashir, there was a decline in this relationship, especially politically. What is more, Ankara-Khartoum relations were adversely affected by developments in Sudan. As for regional issues, the two countries had adopted opposite approaches. For example, whereas Turkey supported the Government of National Accord (GNA) in Libya, mercenaries from Sudan fought for Khalifa Haftar. Later, a gradual coherence was observed between the two parties.

Turkish President Erdoğan paid three visits to Sudan in 2006 and 2017. Whether during his prime ministership or presidency, Sudan remained in Erdoğan’s geopolitical vision of Africa. During these visits, the bilateral relations were strengthened by the signing of several agreements. In 2020, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, the vice president of Sudan’s Transition Council, visited Turkey. In April 2021, Vice President of Turkey Fuat Oktay visited Niger where he met with Dagalo.

The photos of the meeting indicate that the Oktay-Dagalo meeting took place in a very warm atmosphere. In his statement, Vice President Oktay reiterated that Turkey wishes to deepen and broaden the two countries’ bilateral relations. Moreover, Turkey’s President Erdoğan talked over the phone with Burhan many times to discuss potential cooperation, and successive visits followed.

Possible Cooperation Areas

During the latest visit of Sudanese officials to Turkey, six memoranda of understanding and agreements from energy to media were signed. As a result, we can expect intense bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the near future. During my field research in Khartoum from March to June of this year, I encountered many Sudanese who are closely following Turkish foreign policy vis-à-vis Africa. Turkey has embraced almost every African country even though there is a strong anti-Turkey propaganda in the Middle East.

Strategic Calculations

The deepening of bilateral ties will provide several strategic benefits to both Turkey and Sudan. Right now, Turkey has been standing by the Sudanese transition government. Turkey refrains from addressing sensitive topics with Sudan like the overthrowing of Omar al-Bashir by non-democratic means. This policy paves the way for Sudan to reach out and reapproach Turkey. The recent visit by al-Burhan, the highest-ranking Sudanese official, to Turkey where he met with President Erdoğan shows that the Sudanese transitional government, which distanced itself from Turkey for a long time after the coup, has realized that it must diversify its foreign policy.

The visit of Sudanese officials to Turkey is linked to the recent Ethiopian official visit to Turkey. There is strategic strangulation in the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan triangle. Serhat Orakçı, an analyst of African politics, told Politics Today that there are three reasons for the increasing tensions between Egypt and Sudan on the one hand, and Ethiopia on the other hand. These are border disputes, the unsettled issue of water resources, and Ethiopia’s Tigray crisis.

None of the efforts by international or regional organizations to reconcile the parties of the conflicts and resolve these issues could lead towards a lasting peace and settlement. Therefore, each party is trying to maximize its material and diplomatic cooperation with relevant regional actors. With this view, Sudan views having good relations with Turkey as part of reinforcing its strategic capabilities.

It is well known that during Omar al-Bashir’s rule, Turkey-Sudan relations were strong. With the new government in Khartoum, though, bilateral relations suffered a setback. Now, it appears that Sudan is more interested in cooperation with Turkey. The latest visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey is an important indicator of this interest. It is most likely the heavy diplomatic efforts made by Ethiopia to approach Turkey might be behind Sudan’s increasing interest in Ankara.

Sudan Needs Turkey’s Support

The recent months have shown that Ethiopia, which is under pressure from the West, is eager to upgrade its bilateral relations with Turkey from an ordinary level to a strategic one. By deepening its ties with Turkey in terms of military cooperation, Ethiopia wants to strengthen its military power. Sudan hasn’t remained silent either. This atmosphere has forced Sudan to move closer towards Turkey. When we compare Sudan’s will to reach out to Turkey, it is Sudan that is more interested in increasing its bilateral cooperation. Sudan could also ask Ankara to play a mediator role in the deadlock between conflicting parties.

The political trajectory of Sudan shows that it wants to escape from the hold of the UAE. The UAE has been trying to build a new regional order in which there is no room for any democratic transition unless the political elite in the region obeys Abu Dhabi. Therefore, by upgrading its relations with Turkey, Sudan wants to balance its relationship with the UAE and Egypt without abandoning them. This policy could be described as a hedging game: Sudan is hedging itself against the UAE and Egypt by getting closer to Turkey. Therefore, Sudan wants to become more independent and exit its isolation by approaching Turkey. The recent visit by Sudanese officials to Turkey can be seen as a clear message from policymakers in Khartoum indicating Sudan’s will to maneuver its foreign policy.

Sudan wants to build an allyship relationship with Turkey. Since 2016, Turkey has conducted several successful military operations in Syria and Iraq. Ankara has contributed to changing the balance of power in the Middle East. The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama argued that Turkey’s drones are a game-changer and are transforming unconventional warfare into more complex ideas in the world. Sudan looks up to Turkey’s highly successful military industry. Furthermore, Turkey is not just powerful militarily, but also in terms of its democratic legacy and institutions. Therefore, if Sudan’s new political elites decide to transform the country, Turkey is the best example to look up to.

The latest visit of Sudanese officials to Ankara will leave a positive impact on bilateral relations, which could be upgraded to strategic cooperation. It seems that Sudan wants to turn a new page in its relations with Turkey; however, Turkey-Sudan relations should not be expected to reach the strength of the relations during the Omar al-Bashir era in a short time as a significant role will be played by actors, such as the UAE, who are uncomfortable with this rapprochement. Nevertheless, such a development can create a win-win situation for both countries. In the meantime, Ankara’s doors are always open for strengthening bilateral relations with Sudan.

Political instability has arisen around the world, driven by rising costs, food insecurity, and current effects of COVID19. Inflation was already hitting many emerging markets, but the pandemic has only exacerbated these dire circumstances. Sudan, Lebanon, and Iran are getting hit particularly hard, with current inflation rates that can only be described as hyperinflation.

Official statistics for Sudan are recording 363.14%, Lebanon 119.83%, and Iran 46.9%. These extreme rates are affecting the people of these countries on every level. The three countries mentioned are all suffering from a lack of energy sources, but these are merely underlying causes of a larger issue: their real struggle will be in overcoming rampant inflation.

As the market loses confidence in a country’s currency, a Central Bank can build up foreign reserves to “backstop” the local currency to restore faith and purchasing power for international goods like food, medicine, and fuel, most of which trade in USD. The U.S. Dollar is the reserve currency of the world, with over 80% of global trade transacting in dollars. If you don’t have access to USD, your country is at a disadvantage.

Here is a simplified example of how trade flow and foreign exchange might work in an emerging market:

• A company in Lebanon uses its dollar reserves to buy raw materials (i.e. fuel).
• They pay workers in Lebanese Pound, who use these wages to buy “goods.”
• The company sells goods locally, taking in Pounds to cover costs and make a profit.
• They can also sell some of their products abroad in USD, which would help “replenish” their reserves to buy more raw materials.
• The firm can also sell 100% in Lebanese Pound and rely on the local Banks/ Central Bank to maintain a steady exchange rate against USD or EUR to keep costs manageable to convert from local to foreign FXA fiat currency—or government-issued currency not backed by a commodity—is only as good as the confidence the market has in it.

A fiat currency—or government-issued currency not backed by a commodity—is only as good as the confidence the market has in it.

But what happens when the banks run low on FX reserves and can’t make the exchange?

A fiat currency—or government-issued currency not backed by a commodity—is only as good as the confidence the market has in it. So, if there are fears of rampant printing, expansive debt, or government instability, people will avoid using the currency, or demand more physical dollars or higher interest on debt to cover the rising risk. As confidence is lost, companies will want to transact in a “stable” currency, but these may not always be available—whether due to sanctions (U.S. sanctions on Iran) or local foreign reserve shortfalls at the Central Bank.

As costs rise, salaries must keep pace to cover bigger bills, and tax receipts fall, resulting in a government who can’t buy basic necessities. If a company can’t manage payroll or COGs (Cost of Goods Sold), how can they hire new employees or invest in facilities? Instead, they will always be reactionary. The same goes for a local consumer trying to manage a household: How can they save up for a house or car if the cost of everything around them is rising?

In Dec 2020, Lebanon experienced a devastating explosion at the Beirut port, resulting not only in the loss of innocent lives, but also crippling vital infrastructure and destroying many local businesses. Lebanon was already facing a slowdown, but now due to political instability and finger pointing, the rebuilding process has been moving at a snail’s pace, only to be hindered further by bottlenecks and shipping delays caused by COVID19.

Lebanon has struggled with power generation and transmission for years, and now with so much stress on an overtaxed system, generators are failing—or even exploding—due to overuse.

As local consumers and the broader market lose faith, they will avoid buying government debt needed to rebuild. Lebanon has struggled with power generation and transmission for years, and now with so much stress on an overtaxed system, generators are failing—or even exploding—due to overuse.

The lack of fuel oil (diesel) also pushes consumers to utilize “other” combustible material that may not be compatible on a BTU level, resulting in misfiring and failure. An economy needs cheap, reliable, and efficient power to grow, but Lebanon faces an inability to borrow and an imploding local currency. There is already anger towards the current government, and now with power outages lasting for 22 hours a day in some spots due to fuel shortfalls, tension is mounting.

The below chart breaks down how bad some currencies are faring vs the USD, and it isn’t just the Lebanese Pound. The Iranian Rial is also spiraling as U.S. sanctions remain in place, crushing the local economy.

In Iran, protests are expanding nationwide with the most recent being oil and petrochemical workers demanding higher wages to compensate for the falling Rial. Salaries have remained mostly stagnant while the currency devalues as the Iranian government expands the balance sheet.

The local infrastructure has also been failing due to terrorist attacks and ignored maintenance, resulting in rampant downtime and fires throughout the energy industry. Even though Iran produces millions of barrels of oil a day and has local refining capacity, they are struggling to maintain infrastructure and sell crude in the international market. If they can sell, it is at a steep discount due to sanctions, which limits Iran’s ability to tap American and European banks (SWIFT) as well as their currencies.

The transitional government has been facing shortages of foreign reserves, so without USD or EUR to back the Sudanese Pound, the market has lost confidence. This creates an inflationary spiral, and the inability to purchase goods such as fuel, food, and medicine (or service over 49 billion euros of foreign debt) is a huge anchor weighing down growth. It just takes one incident (on purpose or by accident) to set off a chain of events that can’t be contained, leading to more unrest, especially with the backdrop of a pandemic.

Emerging Markets are struggling under the weight of COVID19 and a sputtering global economy that is trying to awaken. The poor are getting poorer, and the middle class is being pushed closer to the poverty line as quality of life around the world is diminished. During COVID19, hundreds of millions of people fell out of the “Middle Class” and the $1.90 a day poverty line has only grown. This causes local populaces to become disenfranchised, resulting in more protests and riots against existing governments.

As COVID19 passes and people feel the sting of inflation and unemployment, pressure will mount on governments, and calls for change will rise. Each of the three governments discussed—Sudan: Transitional and Struggling, Lebanon: Fractured and Distrusted, Iran: Repressive and Suspected—will be under additional duress given the lack of local support, mounting debt, and failed policies.

The shortage of necessities (food, medicine, electricity, and fuel) will make it difficult to grow, and put more pressure on local governments. We have already seen food riots and protests . . . and we aren’t even fully out of the pandemic. Pain, despair, and anger has been bubbling beneath the surface for years, and now the match has been lit.

Mutual suspicion and unresolved border disputes have been major issues in the Ethiopia-Sudan relations for the past several decades. These problems heat up when there are developments in the region, such as the dispute over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam with Egypt (GERD), and calm down when the disputes are resolved.

Domestic politics in Ethiopia and Sudan fuel the conflict and the border disputes, which are also conditioned by the geopolitical developments in Northeast Africa.

The most recent border dispute between Ethiopia and Sudan erupted when Sudan’s military took control of Al-Fashqa, a fertile agricultural area in Gonder, in northwestern Ethiopia. Dina Mufti, the Ethiopian Foreign Ministry spokesperson, recently stated that his country is “running out of patience with its neighbor’s continued military buildup in a disputed border area despite attempts to diffuse tensions with diplomacy.”

The spokesperson of Sudan’s Sovereign Council, Mohamed Al-Fakki, said that his country “doesn’t want war with Ethiopia,” adding that Sudan is “capable of protecting our lands and restoring those left with Ethiopia.”

It is vital to notice that the Khartoum-Addis Ababa border tension is happening while the latter is occupied with the law enforcement operation in Tigray. There is fear that the growing tension and hostility might escalate to a conventional war. There is also considerable fear that the border tension will affect the Egypt-Ethiopia-Sudan negotiations over the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam.

Colonial roots of the border tension

In most cases, colonial agreements are used as a reference in the process of border negotiations between African countries. However, the difference in understanding and/or interpretation of colonial agreements sparks disputes, which can lead to full-scale wars between conflicting parties.

Despite this, Ethiopia has chosen to use the 1900 and 1901 agreements as a reference for the negotiations to demarcate their mutual borders, while Sudan favors the Anglo-Ethiopian Treaty of 1902 and the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys as a basis to initiate the demarcation.

Ethiopia emphasizes over and over again that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys were non-participatory and unilateral, and, therefore, they don’t bind Ethiopia.

Ethiopia emphasizes over and over again that the 1903 and 1909 Gwynn surveys were non-participatory and unilateral, and, therefore, they don’t bind Ethiopia. Additionally, the country invoked the necessity to respect the June 1966 status quo accord between the two countries that forbid either side to employ any unilateral action that would affect the de facto situation along the borders until the issue of demarcation is solved.

Why is the current border tension different?

The current confrontation between Addis Ababa and Khartoum is, however, different from the past ones for the following reasons. First, the current confrontation is happening after Eritrea gained independence from Ethiopia and South Sudan gained independence from Sudan. Therefore, if not managed properly, the border confrontations between Ethiopia and Sudan might escalate to include Eritrea and South Sudan, which will have similar complications for Ethiopia and Sudan respectively.

Second, the current confrontation follows the Ethiopia-Egypt confrontation over the Nile River, which shifted from veiled animosity to overt hostility following the official beginning of the construction of the GERD over the Blue Nile in 2011. Third, in the current tension, the military, political and economic roles of emerging actors such as China, Turkey, UAE, and Saudi Arabia are increasing in the Horn of Africa and Northeast Africa regions as never before. So, if a full-scale war breaks out, the possibility of causalities are higher than ever before.

Why Sudan turned its back to Ethiopia

Ethiopia and Egypt, which view each other as natural foes, look at the political activity in Sudan with suspicion and compete to get Sudan on their side. At no time in history has Sudan not been the center of gravity of the Ethiopia-Egypt competition. The ills of internal politics and the weak economic situation in the country created a fertile ground for Egypt and Ethiopia to exploit the weakness of Khartoum for their own political advantage. Particularly Egypt openly uses its economic strength, military superiority, and political dominance in the Arab world to influence Khartoum and to widen the gap between the latter and Addis Ababa.

It is also vital to note that the last decade of the rule of former Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir was comparatively good for Ethiopia. This is true because al-Bashir’s approach to Ethiopia was based on good neighborly relations in regard to the two countries’ water and border issues. Whereas now Abdalla Hamdok and Al Burhan turn their back on Ethiopia and prefer the hardline approach towards these two complicated issues. As a result, Sudan’s forces entered deep into the disputed territories between the two counties violating the 1966 accord that obliged the two countries to respect the status quo until the demarcation process is completed.

Since the beginning of construction of the GERD in 2011, Khartoum has been playing a balancing role in the Ethiopia-Egypt water diplomacy battle. However, recently Khartoum has turned its back on Ethiopia and is favoring Egypt.

The following developments are behind Khartoum’s decision to turn its back to Ethiopia (i) Sudan’s new leaders insist on protecting their rule from Cairo’s subversive role toward the new administration in Khartoum; (ii) Sudan’s new leaders will probably benefit from Cairo’s economic, security, and diplomatic capacity to aid their fragile economy and security; (iii) the new administration in Khartoum might be disappointed because of Ethiopia’s bilateral negotiation with Egypt on the “Trump Deal”; and/or (iv) Sudan’s attachment to Cairo most likely stems from the power rivalry between the pro-Egypt military wing and the civilian administration in Sudan.

The other reason that has been suggested for Sudan violating the status quo and occupying the fertile agricultural region of Al-Fashqa stems from Sudan’s view of Ethiopia as a “weak other” because of the unfolding domestic civil war. History shows that in the 1970s Sudan under the leadership of Jaafar Muhammad Nimeiry made a similar move while Ethiopia was fighting the Ogaden War with Somalia. Further back in history, in 1880s, Sudan attacked Ethiopia while the latter was in confrontation with Italy.