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ommercial shipping through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait dropped to its lowest level in months after Yemen’s Houthi movement launched attacks on Saudi oil installations along the Red Sea coast, raising fresh concerns over maritime security and global energy supplies.

Shipping data from Kpler showed that only 11 commodity vessels transited the Bab el-Mandeb Strait on Sunday, reflecting a sharp decline in traffic as ship operators reassessed risks following the latest escalation. The disruption comes as the Tehran-aligned Houthis seek to impose a blockade on Saudi exports, broadening the regional fallout from the ongoing U.S.-Iran conflict.

The reduced vessel traffic has already pushed physical crude prices in the Middle East, Europe, and Africa to two-month highs, highlighting growing concerns over the stability of key global shipping routes.

Among the vessels that passed through the strait were seven oil tankers, including two very large crude carriers (VLCCs) bound for Saudi Arabia’s Yanbu port to load crude oil. Another tanker linked to Russia also entered the Red Sea.

Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer

Meanwhile, four tankers exited the Red Sea carrying crude destined for Asian markets. These included the Hong Kong-flagged New Explorer, transporting approximately 2 million barrels of Saudi and Emirati crude to Ningbo, China, another tanker carrying 1 million barrels of Russian crude for China, and a vessel delivering roughly 750,000 barrels of Saudi crude to Pakistan.

A second Hong Kong-flagged VLCC, New Pearl, carrying 2 million barrels of Saudi crude to Zhoushan, China, was also reported leaving the Red Sea, becoming the fourth Chinese supertanker to transit the route since the Houthis declared a naval blockade.

The Houthi military said it targeted facilities operated by Saudi state-owned oil giant Aramco in the Red Sea cities of Yanbu and Jizan on Saturday, further escalating tensions in the region.

Traffic through the Strait of Hormuz also remained subdued over the weekend despite a pause in direct U.S. and Iranian strikes. Fewer than 10 commodity vessels crossed the strategic waterway each day, according to Kpler data.

On Sunday, seven vessels transited Hormuz, including three Iranian-linked product tankers leaving the Gulf. The previous day, only three vessels passed through the strait with their tracking systems switched off, including a VLCC heading to Qatar, a liquefied petroleum gas tanker bound for the United Arab Emirates, and a tanker carrying Qatari naphtha to Japan.

The continued disruption across both the Bab el-Mandeb Strait and the Strait of Hormuz underscores mounting risks to global shipping and energy markets as regional tensions remain high.

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emen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement announced a naval blockade against Saudi Arabia on Monday, threatening to expand the regional conflict linked to the ongoing U.S.-Iran war and raising concerns over global energy supplies and international shipping.

The Houthis said the “maritime embargo” would take effect immediately, describing it as retaliation against what they called Saudi Arabia’s continued blockade of Yemen. The announcement broadens the conflict beyond the Gulf, bringing the strategically vital Bab el-Mandeb Strait into focus after shipping through the Strait of Hormuz has already been severely disrupted.

The Saudi-led coalition said it would respond “with force” to the Houthi announcement and confirmed that additional security measures had been implemented to protect commercial and military vessels transiting the Bab el-Mandeb Strait, a critical route for Saudi oil exports.

The latest development raises the possibility of simultaneous disruptions at both the Strait of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandeb, two of the world’s most important maritime energy corridors.

Analysts warn that a prolonged closure of Bab el-Mandeb could significantly reduce Saudi oil exports and further strain global energy markets already affected by the fighting in the Gulf.

Diplomacy continues despite escalation

The Houthi announcement came as diplomatic efforts to restore a ceasefire between Washington and Tehran appeared to continue.

A senior Iranian official told Reuters that mediators had presented Tehran with a proposal for a 10-day ceasefire aimed at preserving the interim agreement reached last month.

Iran’s Foreign Ministry confirmed that mediators had submitted proposals but did not disclose further details.

Separately, Pakistani officials said Iranian Interior Minister Eskandar Momeni had requested Islamabad to resume mediation efforts between the United States and Iran.

Despite renewed diplomatic contacts, military operations continued across the region.

U.S. Central Command launched another wave of strikes against targets in Iran, while President Donald Trump defended the attacks, saying they were carried out in response to recent Iranian attacks that killed American service members.

The Pentagon identified two U.S. soldiers killed in an Iranian strike on a U.S. base in Jordan last week and said unidentified remains believed to belong to a third missing soldier had been recovered. A fourth U.S. service member was killed separately in northern Iraq during the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance from an Iranian drone.

Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said it launched missile attacks against U.S. military facilities in Jordan, Kuwait and Syria, while Bahrain reported repeated air raid sirens and Kuwait said its air defense systems intercepted Iranian drones overnight.

Shipping and oil markets under pressure

The Houthis’ announcement briefly pushed oil prices higher before markets stabilized amid hopes that diplomatic negotiations could prevent a broader regional war.

Insurance premiums for vessels operating in the Red Sea increased as shipping companies assessed the heightened security risks.

Meanwhile, the IRGC said two oil tankers had exploded after attempting to transit the Strait of Hormuz via what it described as an “unsafe” route, though Reuters was unable to independently verify the claim.

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) also reported that a commercial vessel had been struck by an unidentified projectile off the coast of Oman.

The latest escalation underscores the widening geographic scope of the conflict, with military operations now stretching from Iran and the Gulf to Yemen, Jordan, Syria and Iraq.

While diplomatic initiatives remain underway, continued exchanges of military strikes and expanding maritime threats have raised fears that the conflict could further destabilize regional security and disrupt global energy and trade routes.

(Source: Reuters)

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he US/Israel-Iran war has reached a scale far beyond that of a war explainable solely by the military capabilities of the parties involved. The course of the war is being shaped by the risks, disruptions and costs generated at an accelerating pace upon the circulatory arteries of the global economy. Consequently, just as much as the military situation on the ground, the question of which sea lanes, energy corridors and logistical hubs the war is putting under pressure has become a decisive factor.

The geopolitical significance of the current war must be discussed beyond the scope of traditional debates on the expansion of fronts. The real issue is that the critical chokepoints of the global system have begun to generate tension simultaneously. The growing uncertainty and risk premium in the Strait of Hormuz are creating a de facto blockage in energy flows. However, the Houthis’ more direct involvement in Yemen carries the risk of turning the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor into a second flashpoint. This scenario signifies a threshold that extends the cost of the war beyond regional borders and deepens the fragility of the global economy.

In this context, the US/Israel-Iran War, in a sense, heralds a new geopolitical era that could be defined as the ‘Age of Chokepoints’, originating from the Strait of Hormuz. Indeed, it is no coincidence that geopolitical chokepoints such as the Panama Canal, the Suez Canal, the Strait of Malacca, the Bering Strait and Arctic passages in the context of Greenland have come to the fore in recent years. In the current climate, the global economy has become increasingly concentrated. Furthermore, energy, trade, food and data flows now pass through a limited number of chokepoints. Any disruption at these nodes transforms military crises into economic shocks, and economic shocks into political turbulence.

Beyond the Strait of Hormuz

The debate surrounding the Strait of Hormuz is moving beyond the dichotomy of whether it is closed or open. The current situation is generating a risk premium, characterised by a significant slowdown in maritime traffic—even if partial transit continues—along with rising costs for ship insurance, freight rates and trade finance. This risk premium is causing delays and cost increases in global supply chains, going beyond the fluctuations reflected in energy prices.

In this context, the cost of the war is moving towards a scale that cannot be measured solely by the price per barrel. As the risk premium rises, panic over supply security—independent of the physical supply of oil—is spreading through the markets, undermining inflation expectations and weakening the global growth outlook. Furthermore, the persistence of the bottleneck in the Strait of Hormuz is increasing logistics costs for food and industrial inputs, creating new vulnerabilities, particularly in economies reliant on imports. Indeed, logistical issues affecting both petrochemical products and fertilizers carry the risk of directly and profoundly impacting numerous sectors.

A notable aspect of this situation is that a resolution to the Strait of Hormuz impasse will not be achieved by a political decision alone. Even if tensions ease temporarily, it will take significant time for the market to regain confidence. The fact that the insurance and freight markets will not immediately absorb the shock, that companies will not regain their appetite for risk overnight, and that supply chain delays will have cumulative effects, suggests that costs may persist even in the post-war period. Consequently, the strategic importance of the Strait of Hormuz stems not only from its role as a transit point but also from its function as a pivotal point capable of determining the pace of normalisation within the global system.

Is there a risk of a second ‘gate of shock’ alongside the Houthis?

One of the key factors exacerbating the geopolitical risks of the current war is the Houthis’ more direct involvement. This situation carries the risk of turning the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor—one of the most critical points for global maritime trade—into a natural corridor for the war’s expansion. Indeed, just as the Strait of Hormuz is the linchpin of energy flows centred on the Persian Gulf, the Bab el-Mandeb is one of the most critical chokepoints for Europe-Asia trade and access to the Suez Canal.

The increasing risk posed by the Bab el-Mandeb does not merely imply the possibility of attacks on commercial vessels. Tensions along this route carry the risk of increasing global trade costs by forcing route diversions and prolonging delivery times. Furthermore, the Red Sea basin is a region with a significant foreign military presence. Djibouti hosts military bases and forces from various countries, notably the US and China. Consequently, a more direct involvement by the Houthis carries the potential to transform the maritime security crisis into a multi-actor military standoff.

In this scenario, the critical risk is the so-called ‘double-strait crisis’. Whilst the risk premium in the Strait of Hormuz becomes entrenched, the simultaneous pressure on the Bab el-Mandeb Strait would severely constrict the global system’s circulation capacity. In such a scenario, the cost of war would by no means be confined to the Middle East; it would exacerbate inflation and energy supply concerns in Europe, food and logistics costs in Africa, and industrial and supply chain pressures in Asia. Consequently, an escalation along the Bab el-Mandeb corridor is the fastest route for the war to evolve from a regional issue into a global systemic crisis.

Turkiye and the geopolitics of chokepoints

The rise of the ‘age of chokepoints’ is also producing strategic consequences for Turkiye. Although Turkiye is not a direct party to the current war, it lies at the heart of one of the critical nodes of global circulation. The Straits of Istanbul and Dardanelles hold high strategic value not only for commercial transit along the Black Sea–Mediterranean route but also in terms of energy transport, regional security and crisis management. In an era where global competition is played out through these chokepoints, the importance of the Straits is likely to increase more than ever in the near future.

Consequently, this situation yields a two-fold outcome for Turkiye. Whilst strategic weight and diplomatic manoevring space expand on the one hand, the responsibility for risk management increases on the other. As seen in the Strait of Hormuz, in the current era, geography emerges both as an advantage and as a focal point for crisis management. For this reason, Turkiye’s priority must be to keep diplomatic channels open without allowing tensions to cross the threshold of regional escalation, and to contribute to efforts that prevent further constriction of global maritime traffic.

In this context, three policy priorities stand out. Firstly, supporting diplomatic pressure to prevent the war from spilling over to the Bab el-Mandeb–Red Sea corridor and strengthening international coordination to prevent an increase in maritime security risks. An escalation along this corridor would affect regional security and the broader economic landscape—including Turkiye’s own interests—particularly given the context of Turkiye’s investments in the Horn of Africa.

Secondly, given that the blockage in the Strait of Hormuz generates a risk premium that could persist even with partial flow, preventive policies must be implemented to limit the repercussions of fluctuations in energy and logistics markets on the Turkish economy. The pace of post-war normalization must be taken into account as much as the course of the war itself.

Thirdly, the geopolitics of global bottlenecks must be monitored more systematically at the institutional level, and Turkiye’s strategic preparedness capacity must be enhanced in the context of the Straits, ports, maritime security and critical supply lines. This situation stands out as a matter of defense and security, as well as a matter of economic, energy, logistics and crisis management capacity.

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ensions in the Middle East have intensified after senior Iranian adviser Ali Akbar Velayati warned that Tehran and its allies could move to shut the strategic Bab al-Mandeb, a vital maritime chokepoint linking the Red Sea to the Gulf of Aden. The threat comes amid an already fragile situation following disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, raising fears of a severe shock to global trade and energy supplies.

Velayati’s remarks signal a potential escalation in the standoff between Iran and the United States, particularly after U.S. President Donald Trump warned of possible military action if Tehran does not ease restrictions on Hormuz. Analysts say that if both waterways were simultaneously disrupted, the consequences for the global economy could be unprecedented.

The Bab al-Mandeb is one of the world’s most critical shipping routes. At just 29 kilometers wide at its narrowest point, it funnels maritime traffic between Europe, Asia and the Middle East. Around 10 percent of global trade passes through the strait, including vast quantities of oil, gas and consumer goods.

The waterway is bordered by Yemen to the northeast and Djibouti and Eritrea to the southwest. Control of the area has increasingly fallen under the influence of the Iran-aligned Houthi movement, which has demonstrated its capacity to disrupt shipping in recent years.

The strait’s importance has grown even further as alternative routes have come under strain. With instability affecting Hormuz, Gulf states have increasingly relied on Red Sea export routes, making Bab al-Mandeb an essential corridor for energy flows.

Energy markets at risk

Energy analysts warn that the closure of Bab al-Mandeb, especially in conjunction with restrictions in Hormuz, could block up to a quarter of the world’s oil and gas supply. Such a scenario would likely trigger a sharp spike in global energy prices, exacerbating inflation and straining economies already dealing with supply chain disruptions.

In 2024 alone, more than 4 billion barrels of crude oil and refined products transited through Bab al-Mandeb. Major producers such as Saudi Arabia depend on the route to export energy to Europe via the Red Sea and the Suez Canal.

Riyadh has sought to mitigate risks by expanding use of its East-West Pipeline, which transports oil from the Gulf to the Red Sea port of Yanbu. However, experts note that pipeline capacity cannot fully replace maritime routes if both chokepoints are compromised.

“The global energy system is not designed to absorb simultaneous disruptions at Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb,” said one energy market analyst. “Even a temporary closure could send shockwaves through oil markets.”

Beyond energy, a closure would severely disrupt global trade flows. Goods shipped from Asia to Europe—ranging from electronics to clothing—typically pass through the Red Sea en route to the Mediterranean. If the Bab al-Mandeb becomes inaccessible, vessels would be forced to reroute around the southern tip of Africa via the Cape of Good Hope.

Such detours could add weeks to shipping times and significantly increase fuel costs. The result would likely be higher prices for consumers worldwide and delays in the delivery of essential goods.

Shipping companies have already shown sensitivity to security risks in the region. During previous Houthi attacks, insurers raised premiums or withdrew coverage altogether, forcing many firms to suspend operations in the Red Sea.

A “nightmare scenario” for global trade

The potential closure of the strait is closely tied to regional military dynamics. The Houthis have previously targeted vessels they associate with Israel or the United States, and analysts say it would take only a handful of attacks to halt commercial traffic entirely.

Former U.S. diplomat Nabeel Khoury noted that even limited strikes could have an outsized impact. “All it would take is a few successful attacks on ships to effectively shut down the corridor,” he said in recent commentary.

However, such a move could provoke a swift military response. The United States and its allies have repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining freedom of navigation in international waters. Any sustained disruption could trigger retaliatory strikes, particularly against Houthi positions in Yemen.

Experts describe the simultaneous disruption of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb as a worst-case scenario for the global economy. Elisabeth Kendall, a Middle East specialist, warned that such a development could “cripple” trade routes between Asia and Europe.

“It’s a knife-edge situation,” she said, noting that escalation could rapidly spiral beyond control. “The consequences would be felt far beyond the region, affecting everything from fuel prices to food supply chains.”

Despite the rhetoric, some analysts believe that a full closure remains unlikely, as it would risk drawing regional and global powers into a broader conflict. The Houthis, while capable of disruption, may seek to avoid provoking a large-scale military response from Saudi Arabia or Western forces.

For now, global markets remain on edge as diplomatic and military developments unfold. The threat to Bab al-Mandeb underscores the vulnerability of key maritime chokepoints and the outsized role they play in sustaining the global economy.

Whether the warnings translate into action remains unclear. But with tensions rising and strategic waterways under pressure, the world faces the prospect of a major disruption to trade not seen in decades.

(Source: Aljazeera English)

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srael said it intercepted two drones launched from Yemen early Monday, marking the second such attack since the start of the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran. The Israeli military also reported multiple waves of missile strikes from Iran, highlighting a growing multi-front conflict across the Middle East. Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement entered the war over the weekend, raising fears of a broader regional escalation.

Israel’s air force responded with strikes targeting what it described as Iranian military infrastructure in Tehran and other areas. The escalation comes amid intensifying hostilities that have already drawn in several regional actors and disrupted global stability.

Diplomatic efforts continue

Despite the intensifying conflict, diplomatic efforts appear to be underway. U.S. President Donald Trump said Washington and Tehran have engaged in both direct and indirect talks, expressing cautious optimism about a possible agreement. Pakistan has positioned itself as a mediator and is preparing to host potential negotiations aimed at ending the month-long war.

However, Iranian officials remain defiant. Parliamentary Speaker Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf rejected any notion of surrender, accusing the United States of sending mixed signals by discussing negotiations while considering further military escalation.

Regional and global impact deepens

The conflict has spread across multiple fronts, with Israeli strikes reportedly hitting key Iranian facilities, including sites near Tehran and Tabriz. Meanwhile, Iran continues to exert pressure on global energy markets through disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz, a critical route for global oil shipments. Concerns are also mounting over the security of the Bab el-Mandeb Strait after Houthi involvement.

Oil prices have surged, global stock markets have declined, and airlines are adjusting operations due to rising fuel costs. The United States has deployed additional troops to the region, including special operations forces and Marines, amid discussions of potential further military action.

As Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu orders expanded operations in southern Lebanon against Hezbollah, fears are growing that the conflict could widen further, risking long-term instability across the region and beyond.

(Source: Reuters)

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he head of Yemen’s Southern Transitional Council (STC), an ally of the UAE, Aidarus Al-Zoubaidi, has fled southern Yemen under cover of darkness, according to a statement released Thursday by the Saudi-led Joint Forces Coalition.

Coalition spokesman Maj. Gen. Turki Al-Malki said Al-Zoubaidi and several associates “escaped in the dead of night” aboard a vessel that departed from the port of Aden heading toward Somaliland.

According to the statement, the group boarded the vessel BAMEDHAF after disabling its maritime identification systems. The ship later docked at the port of Berbera.

Al-Malki said Al-Zoubaidi contacted Maj. Gen. Awad Saeed bin Musleh Al-Hababi, commander of joint operations of the United Arab Emirates Armed Forces, to inform him of his arrival.

Following this communication, Al-Zoubaidi and his companions boarded an Ilyushin Il-76 aircraft, flight MZB-9102, which departed without declaring its destination.

The aircraft landed at Mogadishu International Airport at 3:15 p.m. local time (1215 GMT), remained on the ground for approximately one hour, and departed again at 4:17 p.m. (1317 GMT) toward the Arabian Gulf.

Identification systems disabled mid-flight

The coalition said the aircraft switched off its identification systems while flying over the Gulf of Oman, reactivating them shortly before landing at Al Reef military airport in Abu Dhabi at 8:47 p.m. (1747 GMT).

Maritime records indicate that the BAMEDHAF is registered under the flag of Saint Kitts and Nevis—the same flag used by the vessel GREENLAND, which previously transported military vehicles and weapons from Fujairah to the port of Mukalla, the statement said.

The disclosure comes amid heightened tensions between Saudi Arabia and the UAE over southern Yemen. Riyadh has previously accused Abu Dhabi of encouraging STC forces to conduct military operations along Saudi Arabia’s southern border in Hadhramaut and Mahra provinces—an allegation denied by the UAE.

STC pushes for transitional phase

On Friday, Al-Zoubaidi announced a two-year “transitional phase” that would include dialogue with political actors in southern Yemen and a referendum on the future of the region.

The STC argues that successive Yemeni governments have politically and economically marginalized the south and has renewed calls for secession. Yemen’s internationally recognized government rejects these claims and maintains its commitment to the country’s unity.

The episode has deepened a growing rift between Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, the two most powerful members of the Gulf coalition backing Yemen’s internationally recognized government. Al-Zoubaidi had failed to appear in Riyadh for crisis talks on Wednesday amid escalating turmoil in southern Yemen, and Saudi claims that the UAE assisted his escape have raised the stakes in a crisis that erupted last month when STC forces swept through southern areas and reached the Saudi border, fracturing the coalition as it continues to battle Iran-backed Houthi forces.

(Source: Anadolu and Reuters)

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audi Arabia said on Tuesday that its national security was a “red line” and backed a demand for United Arab Emirates forces to leave Yemen within 24 hours, marking Riyadh’s strongest language yet toward its Gulf ally amid escalating tensions in the war-torn country.

The warning came hours after a Saudi-led coalition carried out an airstrike on the southern Yemeni port of Mukalla, targeting what it described as unauthorized foreign military support for UAE-backed southern separatist forces.

Yemen’s Saudi-backed presidential council head, Rashad al-Alimi, ordered Emirati forces to withdraw and announced the cancellation of a defense pact with the UAE, accusing Abu Dhabi of fueling internal conflict through its support for the Southern Transitional Council (STC), a separatist group seeking autonomy in southern Yemen.

“It has been definitively confirmed that the United Arab Emirates pressured and directed the STC to undermine state authority through military escalation,” Alimi said in a televised address, according to Yemen’s state news agency.

Saudi Arabia urged the UAE to comply with the withdrawal demand. The UAE’s foreign ministry did not immediately respond to requests for comment.

Gulf stock markets fell following the flare-up, reflecting investor concern over rising tensions between the two longtime allies.

Mukalla strike and separatist advance

The Saudi-led coalition said the airstrike on Mukalla port caused no casualties or collateral damage. Two sources told Reuters the strike targeted a dock where cargo from two vessels had been unloaded.

Coalition officials said the ships arrived over the weekend from the UAE port of Fujairah without authorization, disabled their tracking systems, and unloaded weapons and combat vehicles intended to support the STC.

Yemeni state television aired footage showing black smoke rising from the port and burned vehicles in the area.

The STC, backed by the UAE, has recently made significant advances in southern Yemen, breaking years of military stalemate and seizing control of large areas, including parts of the strategic Hadramout province, which borders Saudi Arabia.

Saudi Arabia had warned the STC against further military moves in Hadramout and demanded a withdrawal, a call the group rejected.

Deepening rift among allies

The UAE was part of the Saudi-led coalition fighting Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthi movement from 2015. Although Abu Dhabi began reducing its troop presence in 2019, it has continued to wield influence through local allied forces, including the STC.

The recent STC offensive has brought Saudi Arabia and the UAE closer to direct confrontation, exposing fractures within the coalition that once fought the Houthis together.

In response to the escalation, Alimi imposed a 72-hour no-fly zone and a sea and land blockade on ports and crossings, with limited exemptions authorized by the coalition.

The STC’s leadership in Hadramout rejected the withdrawal demand, calling the Mukalla strike “a blatant attack on Hadramout and its people,” and described the UAE as an ally that should not be abandoned.

Yemen’s internationally recognized government accused the STC of staging an armed rebellion and serving Houthi interests, while praising Saudi Arabia for acting to prevent eastern Yemen from descending into chaos.

The Houthis continue to control northern Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, while the conflict remains fragmented among rival factions despite years of international efforts to end the war.

(Source: Reuters and Aljazeera)

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n conflict zones around the world, water has become a weapon, leading to dire consequences for civilian populations. From Yemen to Ukraine to Libya, the deliberate targeting or indirect impact on water infrastructure has exacerbated humanitarian crises, highlighting the urgent need for innovative solutions to minimize civilian harm.

In Yemen, a country plagued by civil war since 2014, both state and non-state actors have targeted water infrastructure as part of their military strategy. The Houthis, backed by government forces, have engaged in a tug-of-war over control of water resources, leading to blockades and attacks on water supplies.

The resulting water shortages have contributed to food insecurity and disease outbreaks, disproportionately affecting women and children. Humanitarian organizations struggle to provide assistance amid ongoing conflict and logistical challenges, leaving millions in desperate need of aid.

Destruction of water infrastructure in Ukraine

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has brought devastation to the country’s water infrastructure. The deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure, including the Nova Kakhovka Dam, has led to displacement and water shortages for millions of people.

The interconnected nature of water and energy systems means that attacks on one system can have ripple effects on the other, further exacerbating the crisis. Despite international condemnation, Russia continues to target critical infrastructure, leaving civilians without access to clean water and sanitation.

Libya, torn apart by a decade of conflict, has also seen its water infrastructure targeted and destroyed. The collapse of dams and water systems in cities like Derna has led to catastrophic flooding and displacement. Different factions vie for control over water resources, leading to looting, sabotage, and threats that impact water availability for civilians. The Great Man-Made River Project, a vital water supply network, has become a battleground, further exacerbating the humanitarian crisis.

Devastating consequences for civilian populations

The weaponization of water has had devastating consequences for civilian populations in conflict zones. In addition to water shortages, communities face food insecurity, disease outbreaks, and displacement. Women and children are particularly vulnerable, with girls facing increased risks of violence and barriers to education. Humanitarian organizations struggle to provide assistance amid ongoing conflict and logistical challenges, leaving millions in desperate need of aid.

Addressing the weaponization of water requires innovative solutions and international cooperation. Investing in resilient water infrastructure, addressing climate change’s impact on water resources, and promoting conflict-sensitive development are essential steps. Additionally, enforcing existing international law and holding perpetrators accountable for their actions can help deter future attacks on water infrastructure. However, these efforts must be supported by sustained political will and financial resources to make a meaningful impact.

The weaponization of water in conflict zones represents a global crisis that demands urgent attention and action. From Yemen to Ukraine to Libya, civilians are bearing the brunt of this devastating tactic, facing water shortages, food insecurity, and disease outbreaks. Addressing the root causes of the crisis and investing in resilient water infrastructure are critical steps towards mitigating its impact and ensuring the well-being of affected populations.

Source: Wilson Center

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n the early months of 2024, global trade has encountered significant setbacks as a result of disruptions at two crucial shipping routes, according to the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Attacks on vessels in the Red Sea area have notably impacted traffic through the Suez Canal, a pivotal maritime route connecting Asia and Europe.

Approximately 15 percent of the global maritime trade volume normally traverses this waterway. Simultaneously, a severe drought at the Panama Canal has led to restrictions, substantially reducing daily ship crossings since October, impeding maritime trade through another vital chokepoint.

The Chart of the Week, utilizing data from the PortWatch platform, illustrates the trade volume transiting through these key shipping lanes. High-frequency transit estimates reveal a staggering 50 percent year-over-year drop in trade volume passing through the Suez Canal in the first two months of 2024.

The Cape of Good Hope

In response to the Red Sea attacks and subsequent delays in the Suez Canal, several shipping companies rerouted their vessels around the Cape of Good Hope. This alternative route experienced a remarkable surge of approximately 74 percent compared to the previous year’s level.

Meanwhile, the transit trade volume through the Panama Canal witnessed a substantial decline, falling by almost 32 percent in the same period compared to the prior year. The drought-related restrictions at the Panama Canal have posed additional challenges to maritime trade, further contributing to disruptions in the global supply chain.

The PortWatch platform also indicates a 6.7 percent year-over-year decline in port calls to the 70 ports tracked in sub-Saharan Africa during January and February 2024. Similar declines were observed in the European Union and the Middle East and Central Asia, with reductions of 5.3 percent.

These trends are likely reflective of the transitory effects of extended shipping times. If prolonged, the repercussions of these disruptions may temporarily hinder supply chains in affected countries and exert upward pressure on inflation, partly due to increased shipping costs.

Impact on recorded imports and exports

One significant implication of these shipping disruptions is the potential impact on official statistics related to recorded imports and exports. Customs records, upon which official trade statistics are based, may be influenced by the temporary rerouting of ships. This could complicate the accurate assessment of the underlying momentum of global trade and economic activity in the months to come.

For instance, merchandise trade reports for January in various countries across Africa, the Middle East, and Europe may show slowing import growth, as some imports that would typically be recorded in January were only delivered in February. Moreover, many low-income countries heavily reliant on import duties for fiscal revenues may report lower-than-expected revenue for January due to these delays. The situation calls for close monitoring as stakeholders navigate the challenges posed by disruptions in key maritime chokepoints.

Source: IMF

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outhi attacks in the Red Sea region are causing significant economic and security problems to the U.S. and its allies. The most significant of these is the impact on maritime security, which is causing disruptions to the global supply chain. Insurance risk premiums and transport costs are increasing for companies that do not want to take the risk of navigating the Red Sea and instead extend their route.

Following Israel’s attacks on Gaza, the Houthis began targeting ships they claimed were linked to Israel, creating significant geopolitical risks. They have carried out nearly 30 attacks in the Red Sea since October 19, 2023, and are causing serious security problems in the region. Bab al-Mandeb, one of the most important transit points for international maritime traffic, is likely to be blocked as a result of Houthi attacks.

Indeed, the rising tensions between Ethiopia and Somalia in the Horn of Africa and the increase in maritime piracy in the region have a military impact on the security of the Bab al-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Red Sea. A U.S.-led coalition has been formed against the Houthi attacks, while the Houthis have announced that U.S. ships will also be targeted. There were even expectations that China would contribute to this coalition; however, it took a negative stance.

The Houthis’ attacks are causing significant economic and security problems in the region, affecting the global economy and maritime security, and leading to disruptions in the supply chain. The situation increases the tendency to seek new routes. On the one hand, high risks lead to higher insurance premiums, and, on the other, the transport costs increase for companies that do not want to risk being attacked and take a longer route. At the moment, it is paramount to ensure effective maritime security in the region for the safe passage of tankers, containers, and dry cargo/bulk vessels transiting the Red Sea.

China’s Red Sea Plan

When tensions in the Bab al-Mandeb in the southern Red Sea are viewed in the context of threats to the global market, the importance China attaches to the security of its trade routes becomes clear. In Yemen, the Houthis have declared that they will not attack Chinese ships transiting the Red Sea route. Looking at published data, we can clearly see the increase in Chinese container ships passing through the Red Sea since mid-December 2023.

The importance of this route for China is more understandable when viewed in light of its quest for a new global order. Meanwhile, China’s stance against the Houthis, who pose a global threat, has confused the West as China has refused to join the U.S.-led multinational coalition including the U.K, Bahrain, and others. It is likely that China is charting its own course in this process, independent of the West, without conflict but also without cooperation.

Possible reasons for this situation include, to start off, the problem of security in the Red Sea as China does not want to contribute to the “dissolution” of the tension under the leadership of the U.S. In addition, the fact that the U.S. is in a deadlock in the Middle East and in the global economic context creates a positive situation for China. On the other hand, if China were to join the international coalition, the steps taken by the Houthis in Yemen to punish Israel would damage China’s stance on the Palestinian issue and the ongoing Israeli massacre in Gaza.

Finally, China does not want to support the coalition in terms of furthering the move towards a three-track railway from China to Europe. Shipping companies that cannot pass through the Red Sea due to security risks are extending their routes around the Cape of Good Hope, increasing their costs. It is, therefore, likely that China wants to provide an alternative to prevent companies from bearing the rising costs by directing them to the railway lines it has been building since 2016 and which have cost it billions of dollars.

Rail transport, though, is not as cost-effective as shipping—rail is an alternative route that can be used to reduce extraordinary costs, and share risks and costs. At this point, it is likely that in the future relations with the Central Asian countries and the Turkic world will become more important for the transit of Chinese goods to Europe by rail.

Piracy Risk off the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa lies directly opposite Yemen. In this region, Somaliland and Puntland, which are part of Somalia, have a coast on the Gulf of Aden. However, Somaliland has recently made clear its intention to secede from Somalia by signing a memorandum of understanding (MoU) with Ethiopia. On the other side of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait are Eritrea and Djibouti with Sudan lying to the north of Eritrea. Many of these countries are at risk of war and conflict, and suffer economic and administrative problems and, in the case of Somalia, terrorism and piracy.

In fact, since November 2023, there have been events that indicate a resurgence of piracy in the Horn of Africa. There have been eight hijacking attempts in the last three months: on December 14, 2023, 700 miles east of Bosaso, the MV Ruen was attacked; on January 4, 2024, 470 miles east of Somalia, the MV Lila Norfolk was attacked. There have also been several attempted hijackings. In such a risk environment, the possibility of a gradual resumption of piracy activity in the region has the potential to escalate existing risks even further.

Global Economic Security

Since mid-December 2023, an unusually high density of shipping has been observed in both directions on the route past the Cape of Good Hope to Singapore. Delays in the dry/bulk cargo sector and in tanker and container shipping have a major impact on the global economy. For example, the delay of a ship currently transiting the Cape of Good Hope with over 200,000 tons of iron ore bound for China will cause major production and economic problems. Similarly, delays of other dry cargo vessels carrying coal or grain have the potential to cause serious problems for the global economy.

What is more, the cost of transit through the Suez Canal has risen steadily since the start of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and shipping companies that do not want to bear this risk and cost prefer to extend their route. The change of route to the Cape of Good Hope adds approximately 9-10 days journey time and an additional 4,000 nautical miles to the route. Conversely, the Bab al-Mandeb Strait is very dangerous recently with each ship that passes through this region bearing an additional cost of at least $1 million.

The issue of rising risk premiums was first raised in 2008 after the M/V Yasa Neslihan was hijacked by Somali pirates and held hostage in Mogadishu for approximately 2.5 months. Following this incident, an International Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) was established in the Gulf of Aden. The region from the Red Sea to Sri Lanka was declared a “High Risk Area (HRA)” and insurance premiums for transit through this region were increased. This line was later extended further west. New security companies were set up to provide armed guards for ships passing through the region for a fee. As a result, heavily armed guards are now brought into the region from the west or east, and left upon exiting. When entering and leaving the region, security ships with dozens of heavily armed guards are permanently stationed at certain locations.

It is also possible that the proliferation of hijacking incidents and their increased effectiveness is a deliberate move to increase the profits of insurance companies and to create new security companies. If we look at the insurance and security companies, we see that most of them are British and European.

In conclusion, if the Israel-Gaza war is read together with other regional developments, the Covid-19 pandemic in 2019, the closure of the Suez Canal by the Ever Given ship in 2021, and the economic crisis caused by the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022, it is very likely that the problems and events in the Red Sea today will give rise to a new global economic crisis.

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merican mercenaries, who claim they were paid by the UAE to carry out extrajudicial killings in Yemen and subsequently trained Yemenis to carry out the killings, have spoken candidly about their “work” to BBC international correspondent Nawal Al-Maghafi.

In a discussion about her documentary American Mercenaries: Killing in Yemen at London’s Frontline Club, Al-Maghafi said: “This has been one of the most rewarding films. I received hundreds of messages from people in southern Yemen saying thank you so much for making this film. My uncle was killed last year. We know who it was but were too afraid to say so. My cousin was killed last year and finally someone is shining a light on this. People in the south are absolutely terrified because they know the UAE has incredible surveillance capabilities  – they do not want to talk  on the phone, they don’t want to text. A lot of the work behind the scenes on this investigation was done face to face because it is almost impossible to get information online or on text.”

“In this investigation the bits you think are going to be hard were the easiest and the things that I thought would be the easiest were the hardest. I thought it would be so hard to get to the mercenaries. We  have such great access in Yemen that part [speaking to Yemenis] would be easy. And it was the exact opposite. The Yemen side was so difficult because of the climate of fear. We did speak lots of people who had had family members assassinated but getting people to go on the record was always impossible. But they really fed into our research.”

The death of hundreds of thousands

Yemen’s nine year-long civil war has led to the deaths of hundreds of thousands and created one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises. When a coalition formed by the United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia invaded Yemen in 2015, its stated aim was to return the elected government ousted by Houthis in the north of the country, to power, and to fight terrorism.

But an investigation by BBC Arabic Investigations found evidence that the UAE has been funding a method of covert warfare in southern Yemen – assassinating those who have spoken out against its operations in the country.

The documentary features an interview with Issac Gilmore, a former Navy Seal who later became second in command of a private U.S. military firm Spear Operations Group. Human rights lawyers are trying to prosecute Spear for war crimes in Yemen. Abraham Golan, the founder of Spear, did not respond to the allegations in the film.

Gilmore told BBC he was paid $1.5m a month for this operation. He spoke of a meeting “with appropriate bodies” in the UAE government at an Emirate army base. “The pitch was to put pressure on ISIS and Al Qaeda in Yemen and make sure it did not become another hub of chaotic terrorist activity,” Gilmore said.

A war on Al Qaeda?

But in an exclusive interview, a Yemeni whistleblower alleged that the mercenaries helped in the continuation of the assassinations program by training UAE officers, who in turn trained Yemenis. He also claimed that far from prosecuting the war on Al Qaeda in Yemen, the UAE instead pardoned Al Qaeda members and recruited them as killers for its program of assassinations.

One of the pardoned former Al Qaeda operatives was allegedly Nasser Al-Shibah, a suspect in the attack on the U.S. navy destroyer Cole during a refuelling stop in Aden which killed 17 American sailors. The BBC had a picture of Al-Shibah with the head of the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC) Aideroos Al Zubaydi. The STC is a political grouping campaigning for the independence of South Yemen from the north. One of its roles was to run security in the south. Al Zubaydi denied that Al-Shibah had an active role in the STC and was head of one of its units.

“We are fighting terrorism so it is impossible we would be working with them [Al Qaeda],” Zubaydi said. 

The BBC gained access to one of the UAE’s 2018 ‘Kill Lists’ and learned that Yemeni politicians, clerics and even human rights lawyers who had spoken out against the UAE’s actions in Yemen, were targets.

A Kill list

The mercenary Gilmore admitted that Ansaf Mayo, an MP and Leader of the Islah Party, who escaped an assassination attempt, was on the kill list. Al Islah, one of the largest political parties in Yemen, is the Yemeni branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, which is banned in the UAE. Its political activism and support for elections is seen as a threat to the Emirati royal family. Gilmore agreed to a meeting, but Mayo did not show up.

The name of Huda Al-Sarari, a lawyer investigating the UAE’s human rights abuses in Yemen, was also on the list. Her son was killed. “We hoped the UAE would support law and order but what happened is the exact opposite,” Al-Sarari told the BBC.

In a statement to the BBC, the UAE government said the allegations made against it in the film were false. The U.S. State Department and the Department of Defence declined to comment on a list of questions put to them about Spear. A CIA spokesman said: “The idea the CIA signed off on such activity is false.”

At  the meeting at the Frontline Club  when Al-Maghafi was asked during the question and answer session whether we can now conclude that the south of Yemen is being terrorized by six or seven or eight militias, there is no government, there are no services and all the nice things the Southern Transition Council is saying about inaugurating a House of  Commons in is a lot of eyewash, she replied ‘yes’.

American Mercenaries: Killing in Yemen BBC documentary – Director  Jess Kelly,  Reporter: Nawal Al-Maghafi,  Executive Producer: Monica Garnsey

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he process that began in the Red Sea when the Houthis targeted commercial vessels they claimed were linked to Israel quickly expanded and turned into a hot conflict. Since November 2023, the number of attacks has reached nearly 30 while the attacks have begun to include Western countries, such as the United States, in addition to Israel. In this context, on December 18, 2023, the United States launched the international naval coalition “Operation Prosperity Guardian.”

On January 22, the coalition expanded with the support of the UK, Canada, the Netherlands, and Bahrain, and carried out air strikes on some of the Houthis’ military positions in Yemen. The Houthi attacks in the Red Sea and the U.S.- and UK-led air strikes against the Houthis have had a direct impact on the regional and global balance of power. In this new geopolitical climate, the Gulf states have adopted a cautious policy.

Saudi Arabia’s balancing policy

Despite the U.S. and UK air strikes in Yemen in January, Houthi activity in the Red Sea did not stop. In fact, the Houthis demonstrated their ability to threaten maritime trade by targeting a U.S. ship on January 18, a development which worried regional players, especially Saudi Arabia. Although the U.S. supported the Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm against the Houthis in 2015, the Riyadh regime adopted a cautious stance towards the U.S.-UK offensive in Yemen. Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan announced that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was concerned about the situation in Yemen. The Saudi minister said that the region was going through a very dangerous and difficult process and called for a reduction in regional tensions.

Saudi Arabia’s statements to this effect coincided with the kingdom’s attempts to strengthen relations with the U.S., while at the same time engaging in diplomatic negotiations with Iran and the Houthis. Saudi Arabia has been conducting negotiations with the Houthis under the auspices of the United Nations since April 2022 and has also normalized diplomatic relations with Iran under the auspices of China. Expressing direct support for the U.S. and UK strikes against the Houthis would jeopardize the aforementioned normalization and diplomatic negotiation processes, so Saudi Arabia has preferred a policy of cautious balance. In other words, while Saudi Arabia is strengthening its security ties with the U.S., it does not want to destroy the diplomatic processes it is conducting with the Houthis and Iran.

Indeed, for the Saudis, who are prioritizing economic growth as part of their 2030 vision, the climate of conflict on their southern border could be detrimental to this transformation. In this sense, the government in Riyadh is trying to stay away from the conflict and crisis between the Houthis and the U.S. and UK, and is developing a discourse to calm tensions. However, Saudi Arabia’s lack of active involvement alongside the U.S. and the UK poses security risks.

Staying away from the military operation organized by the U.S. and the UK against the Houthis, who attacked Saudi Aramco’s oil facilities in 2019 and 2022, could create new challenges for Saudi Arabia. The Riyadh government will most probably turn to the option of military activation in a scenario where the Houthis become stronger after the attacks and threaten the Kingdom-backed Presidential Council and the security of Saudi Arabia.

What is behind the Saudis’ failure to take the expected pro-Western stance against the Houthi attacks is the Saudi vision of relations with Washington. In the context of regional tensions, which have been increasing by the day since October 2023, Saudi Arabia is strengthening its relations with the U.S. and sending a message to other actors. Yet, despite its extensive defense cooperation with the U.S., Saudi Arabia is also trying to show that it is not in an alliance with the White House, given the hostility generated by the Houthis towards Washington.

However, it is difficult for Saudi Arabia to challenge the United States directly, considering that almost 80% of the conventional weapons used by Saudi Arabia in Yemen, amounting to $37 billion between 2016 and 2020, were supplied by the United States. The possibility of security suppliers such as China or Russia replacing the United States is quite remote for Riyadh. Finally, by stopping the Houthis’ missiles against Israel in its own airspace, Saudi Arabia is trying to prove itself in terms of establishing sovereignty and security. The situation also shows signs of a shift in Saudi Arabia’s national security policy under the de facto leadership of Mohammed bin Salman.

The cautious policies of the UAE, Oman, Qatar, and Kuwait

Yemen’s eastern neighbor, Oman, has adopted a similar stance to Saudi Arabia. Foreign Minister Badr Al-Busaidi noted that the U.S. and UK attacks were carried out against Oman’s recommendations and would further fuel the dangerous atmosphere in the region. Oman has condemned the air strikes on Yemen by friendly countries, referring to the U.S. and UK, and is known as a proactive actor in the peace talks in Yemen. Like Oman, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait have stated that they are concerned about the rising tensions in the Bab-el-Mandeb and the Red Sea. Qatar’s Foreign Ministry has refrained from making an official statement on the process.

Overall, it can be said that a consensus has been reached for almost all Gulf countries that the Houthis’ operations in the Red Sea and the U.S.- and UK-led attacks against the Houthis in Yemen will increase regional tensions and deepen instability.

The Bahrain exception

Bahrain has stood out from other actors in the Gulf by directly supporting the U.S.- and UK-led attacks. Bahrain’s active policy is influenced by at least three factors. The first relates to Bahrain’s relations with the U.S. Manama, which hosts the U.S. Fifth Fleet, has signed a comprehensive defense agreement with the United States in recent months. The fact that U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken has visited Bahrain twice while Israel’s recent offensive/war on Gaza continues shows that Washington sees Manama as an important player in the regional diplomatic and security equation. Bahrain, which is under direct pressure from the U.S., is different from other Gulf states and is more dependent on Washington’s security umbrella than other actors in the Gulf. This dependence leads Manama to pursue a security and foreign policy on the U.S. radar, and to support the attacks on the Houthis directed by the U.S.

The second factor relates to the fact that Bahrain is one of the countries that feels most threatened by Iran and Iranian proxies in the Gulf. Bahrain, which has a significant Shia population, is disturbed by the Iranian-backed Shia Houthis controlling Yemen. Indeed, Shia activists such as Abdulhadi al-Khawaja posed a direct threat to the Bahraini regime during the 2011 protests and were subsequently imprisoned. Furthermore, in 2021, Bahrain declared that terrorist groups linked to Iran were planning a coup against the government. Thus, by siding with the U.S., the Manama government is hoping to balance Iran, which it perceives as a geopolitical threat. The third and last factor concerns Bahrain’s normalization with Israel in 2020 which has also influenced this process. Bahrain can be said to have adopted a pro-Israeli stance after establishing diplomatic relations with Tel Aviv.

Regional and global implications

The tensions in the Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb correspond to more than one point in terms of global and regional politics. The Red Sea and Bab-el-Mandeb are crucial chokepoints for global maritime trade. A significant portion of the world’s trade, including oil and natural gas shipments, passes through these narrow waterways. Any disruption or escalation of tensions in this region can have a direct impact on the global economy.

The Red Sea region is strategically important for major global and regional powers. Various countries, including the United States, China, Russia, and regional players like Saudi Arabia and Iran, have interests in maintaining stability and influence in this area. The first point relates to the re-establishment of U.S. and UK deterrence. Although symbolic military operations have been carried out, the U.S. and the UK want to strengthen their deterrence and image by attacking the Houthis.

Second, the strikes in Yemen have not created a balance of power against the Houthis. According to many analysts, the U.S.- and UK-led strikes may actually strengthen the Houthis in southern Yemen.

Third, attacks against the Houthis may increase anti-American sentiment among Middle Easterners who oppose foreign intervention. This process could also provide “legitimacy” to the Houthis, who use the narrative that they are fighting the United States.

Fourth, the Houthis can manage the governance problem and the humanitarian crisis in Yemen through the narrative that they are fighting the U.S. and its supporters. In other words, the Houthis are trying to cover up their failed governance in Yemen and the humanitarian crisis which is deepening day by day with the rhetoric of fighting the “external enemy.”

Fifth, the U.S. and UK attacks provide the Houthis with an opportunity to recruit and mobilize fighters through the “external enemy” narrative. In this sense, the Houthis are reported to have recruited many new fighters to  Al-Qassam Brigades.

Finally, the attacks against the Houthis and the relisting of the Houthis on the U.S. terrorist list will deepen the humanitarian crisis in Yemen and cause the displacement of many more innocent civilians. The attacks  against the Houthis will not contribute to the peace process in Yemen.

As a result of all the above considerations, with the exception of Bahrain, the Gulf states have reached a consensus that the U.S.- and UK-led attacks against the Houthis are not the right step to solve the Yemeni crisis, and have adopted a cautious balancing policy in the process.

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n the past couple of months, the Houthis, operating from Yemen and backed by Iran, have executed a series of attacks on vessels navigating the Bab al Mandeb Strait in the Red Sea, specifically those associated with Israel or heading towards Israeli ports. Their declared objective is to dissuade Israel’s military actions in Gaza by calling upon global powers to exert substantial pressure on Tel Aviv.

This has prompted major players in the shipping industry, including A.P. Moller-Maersk A/S, Hapag-Lloyd AG, CMA CGM, Maersk, MSC, and the energy titan BP, to either suspend operations in the Red Sea or redirect their cargo vessels, resulting in a prolonged transportation period of three weeks and a considerable increase in costs.

In response, the United States formed a multinational naval coalition named “Operation Prosperity Guardian” to launch counterattacks against the Houthi forces. This move aimed to safeguard maritime interests and counteract the disruptions caused by the Houthis’ aggressive actions in the region, but its overall effectiveness in deterring the Houthis remains questionable so far.

Economic implications

Amid escalating attacks by the Houthi forces on cargo vessels, a region of paramount significance emerges—one that stands as a critical checkpoint on global trade routes. This area, overseeing 30% of the world’s maritime transit, now grapples with intensified costs. Infusing war risk premiums into insurance expenses has notably inflated the financial burden, soaring from 0.6% to a substantial 2% of the total cargo value.

The repercussions are not confined to the monetary realm alone; an elongated travel time, surpassing initial estimates by 30-50% due to the necessity of circumventing Africa, threatens to disrupt global supply chains. For instance, interconnected sectors face potential disruptions in the timely delivery of raw materials, adding another layer of complexity.

Amidst the prevailing atmosphere of uncertainty fuelled by these attacks, investor confidence in maritime-centric regional connectivity initiatives may experience a decline. For instance, the IMEC project, initially unveiled at the G20 Summit, is now shrouded in ambiguity regarding its future trajectory in the wake of the unsettling developments orchestrated by the Houthi attacks.

To solve this problem, an Eilat-based logistics start-up, Trucknet, offered an alternative, redirecting the seaborne trade route from the Red Sea to a land-based passage, envisions the seamless transportation of goods from Saudi Arabia through the UAE or Bahrain ports, culminating in their arrival at Israeli ports via land. Yet, the future of this alternative remains uncertain, as Houthi attacks occasionally extend to the western part of the Indian Ocean.

The Western response

In response to Houthi attacks, a multinational naval coalition led by Washington and named Operation Prosperity Guardian was formed in December. Initially, over 20 nations were announced to join the coalition with the United States. However, Spain, Italy, and France opted for a more autonomous approach to safeguarding freedom of navigation, deviating from American leadership in the declared operation. Consequently, the burden of the counterattack operation largely fell on the shoulders of the US and the UK. Both nations contribute aircraft carriers and destroyers, and a French frigate, although part of the group, operates independently.

Assessing the operation’s overall effectiveness reveals that, from its inception, it has struggled to establish a significant deterrent effect. Despite thwarting some Houthi missile attacks, shipping companies prefer to avoid the region. Additionally, the operation aims to deter the group by bombing land targets in Yemen; however, this strategy inadvertently strengthens the Houthis’ national and global image as an actor capable of resisting both the United States and Israel. Consequently, the group’s ongoing attacks contribute to a protracted state of conflict.

What’s the endgame?

For many years, the U.S. coordinated with the Houthis, particularly after the fall of Sana’a and the capture of Al-Bayda. The American decision-makers used the same strategy in Yemen as in Iraq and Syria, namely, to use Shiite groups to eliminate Al-Qaeda and Daesh. In many instances, U.S. fighter jets pounded the locations of foes labelled by the Houthis as Daesh.

However, the heightened tensions in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict gave the Houthis a golden opportunity: First, their anti-Israeli posture earned them considerable legitimacy inside Yemen after a decade of civil war in which they could not prevail. Second, their stance earned them considerable clout in the Middle East after being considered a fringe group at best. Third, and more importantly, they strived to be recognised as an actor to be reckoned with militarily and security-wise in the south of the Red Sea and draw the world’s attention to their presence.

Amidst this complex scenario, a key question emerges: Why did the White House react the way it did? The U.S./UK military operations represent the Houthis’ best-case scenario, allowing them to fulfil their objectives. A more effective response could have been through economic sanctions that would dry their funding sources. But it seems the U.S. wants to send a message to Al-Houthi that they have to operate according to American rules of engagement, not Iranian ones. There is also another message to the region at large that the U.S. would not tolerate any action in support of Gaza.

As the situation stands, the most plausible scenario is the continuation and prolongation of Red Sea attacks. The Houthis are likely to persist in targeting vessels, prompting responses from the Anglo-American coalition, followed by retaliatory actions from the Houthi forces. This iterative cycle establishes a tit-for-tat dynamic that prolongs the intensity of the conflict for the foreseeable future and is a reminder that the U.S. is the conventional security provider in the region.

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n a significant display of dissent, Italy, Spain, and France refrained from participating in the U.S. and British strikes against the Houthi group in Yemen, underscoring divisions within the Western alliance. The divergence became apparent as these nations also declined to sign a joint statement issued by 10 countries justifying the military actions.

The disagreement highlights the complexity of addressing the Houthi rebels, who have been targeting civilian ships in the Red Sea, citing opposition to Israel’s military operations in the Gaza Strip.

U.S. and British warplanes, ships, and submarines conducted numerous airstrikes in Yemen in response to the Houthi attacks on one of the world’s busiest commercial shipping routes.

Support from Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and Bahrain

The Netherlands, Australia, Canada, and Bahrain supported the operation logistically and provided intelligence. Germany, Denmark, New Zealand, and South Korea joined in signing a joint statement with the six participating nations, defending the overnight attacks and warning of potential further actions to protect Red Sea trade if the Houthi provocations persisted.

Sources from Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s office disclosed that Italy opted not to sign the statement and was consequently not invited to participate in the military strikes. The decision was attributed to the need for parliamentary approval, which would have incurred a time delay, and Italy’s preference for a diplomatic approach to deescalate tensions in the Red Sea.

However, a later government statement clarified that “Italy supports the operations of allied countries, who have the right to defend their vessels, in the interest of global trade flows and humanitarian assistance.”

Spain and France

A French official, speaking anonymously, expressed concern that participating in the U.S.-led strikes would diminish France’s leverage in talks aimed at defusing tensions between Hezbollah and Israel. France has actively sought to prevent an escalation of conflicts in Lebanon in recent weeks.

U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby avoided providing specific details on France’s participation, stating, “You’ve seen the list of people that participated. Internationally, even those who weren’t actively involved in the dropping of bombs – many of our coalition partners had signed up to the support, non-operational support.” The French foreign affairs ministry issued a statement placing responsibility for the escalation on the Houthis, signaling potential tacit support for the U.S. action.

Spanish Defence Minister Margarita Robles justified Madrid’s non-participation, emphasizing a commitment to peace and dialogue. She stated, “Every country has to give explanations for its actions. Spain will always be committed to peace and dialogue.”

Italian Defence Minister Guido Crosetto, expressing reluctance earlier in the week, emphasized the need to curb Houthi aggression without triggering a new war in the region.

The divergence in Western opinions on addressing the Houthi threat emerged last month during Operation Prosperity Guardian, where Italy, Spain, and France opted not to participate, citing reluctance to place their naval vessels under U.S. command.

All three nations currently contribute to an EU anti-piracy operation off the Horn of Africa. The Spanish defence minister suggested that the European Union might consider a new naval mission in the coming days, reflecting a sense of responsibility and commitment to peace by abstaining from intervention in the Red Sea for the time being.

Source: Reuters

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n a dramatic turn of events, the global oil market witnessed a surge on Friday as geopolitical tensions escalated in the Red Sea region. Simultaneously, stocks experienced gains following U.S. inflation data that reinforced the belief among investors that interest rates might soon decrease.

The oil prices rose by 4% after the United States and Britain announced launching strikes from both air and sea against Houthi military targets in Yemen. This military action was in response to the Houthi group’s attacks on ships in the Red Sea, marking a significant expansion of the ongoing Israel-Hamas conflict in Gaza.

Brent futures showed a 4% increase, reaching $80.52 per barrel, while U.S. West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude saw a 4.1% rise, reaching $74.99.

Oil prices have climbed sharply

Susannah Streeter, Head of Money and Markets at Hargreaves Lansdown, noted, “Oil prices have climbed sharply following the attacks, with Brent Crude now around 7% higher since early December, before Houthi rebels began targeting ships in the Red Sea.”

Reports coinciding with the UK and US military action suggest that the British government is modeling scenarios that could lead to a $10 per barrel increase if the Red Sea crisis continues, with gas prices at risk of rising by 25%.

Meanwhile, global stocks rallied on the prospect of a potential drop in interest rates. The MSCI All-World share index rose by 0.2%, reflecting a bounce in Europe, where the STOXX 600 increased by 0.7%. Aerospace and defense companies led the rally, with the sector index reaching a record high.

U.S. stock futures, however, fell by 0.2%, and government bond yields edged lower, indicating increased demand for safe-haven assets.

The dollar strengthened against major currencies, and gold, benefiting from investor risk aversion, rose by 0.9% to $2,046 an ounce. Traditional safe-havens like the Swiss franc held steady.

Other markets benefit

Analysts pointed out that if the situation escalates further, U.S. Treasuries and safe-haven currencies like the yen and Swiss franc would likely benefit.

In Asia, Japan’s Nikkei extended its impressive gains, jumping 1.5% to another 34-year high. This surge was supported by solid results from Fast Retailing Co, the owner of the Uniqlo clothing brand.

Chinese inflation data revealed that the country’s economic recovery remained weak in December, with the consumer price index falling by 0.3% from a year ago. However, separate trade data showed that exports rose at a faster-than-expected pace, while imports returned to growth.

On the geopolitical front, the United States and Britain’s military intervention against the Houthis in Yemen has raised concerns about the potential impact on global oil supplies and trade routes. The situation adds another layer of complexity to the existing geopolitical tensions in the region.

The oil market will likely remain volatile as developments unfold, and the international community closely monitors the evolving situation in the Red Sea region.

Source: Reuters

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he White House announced on November 21 that the United States is reviewing the possibility of re-listing Yemen’s Houthi rebels as a terrorist organization. This review comes in the wake of the group’s seizure of the Galaxy Leader cargo ship, which was condemned by the U.S., Israel and western allies as a violation of international law.

The Houthi group, which controls a significant portion of Yemen, including the capital Sanaa, has been engaged in a prolonged conflict with a Saudi-led coalition. The United States had previously designated the Houthis as a terrorist group during the Trump administration’s final days, only for President Joe Biden’s administration to revoke the designation shortly after taking office, citing the potential impact on Yemen’s humanitarian crisis.

U.S. National Security Council spokesman John Kirby highlighted the recent escalation in Houthi actions, including attacks on civilian targets and the seizure of the cargo ship, as key factors prompting the reassessment.

Kirby asserted that Iran’s support of the Houthi rebels was evident and unacceptable, urging for the immediate and unconditional release of the ship and its crew.

Israeli-owned ship kidnapped by Houthis

The Galaxy Leader, a Bahamas-flagged car carrier chartered by a Japanese firm and reportedly owned by a unit of an Israeli-based company, was seized in the southern Red Sea and taken to the Houthi-controlled port of Hodeidah.

This move by the Houthis has drawn international attention and raised concerns over the security of maritime routes in the region.

The potential reinstatement of the terrorist designation could have significant political and humanitarian implications for Yemen, which the United Nations describes as experiencing the world’s worst humanitarian crisis.

The international community watches closely

Approximately two-thirds of Yemen’s population relies on international aid, and previous sanctions have disrupted the flow of essential goods into the country.

As the Biden administration considers its options, the international community watches closely. The outcome of the U.S. review could shape not only the future of Yemen’s conflict but also the broader geopolitical dynamics of the region, particularly regarding U.S. and Iranian relations.

The U.S. State Department has not yet released a timeline for the conclusion of the review or the potential implementation of new sanctions or designations. However, the move signals a shift in U.S. policy toward a more assertive stance against the Houthi rebels.

Sources: Reuters and Anadolu Agency.

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n a significant development, Yemen’s Houthi militia claimed responsibility for attacks on Israel on October 31 and November 1, 2023. The group announced that it had launched a “large batch” of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones towards various Israeli targets.

According to Yahya Sarea, the Houthi military spokesperson, this attack was in response to the “brutal Israeli-American aggression” observed in Gaza. He also emphasized that the attack on October 31 marked their third operation to express solidarity with the Palestinians and warned of further missile and drone assaults in the future.

The Israeli military confirmed that its aerial defense system successfully intercepted a surface-to-surface missile originating from the Red Sea area. It was also reported that several other “aerial threats” were neutralized, ensuring none entered Israeli territory.

Growing capabilities of the Houthi

Although the Israeli military did not attribute the attack to any particular group, a senior official from the U.S. Department of Defense, choosing to remain anonymous, indicated that missiles launched from Yemen were intercepted by the Israeli defense systems.

Analysts highlighted that despite the foiling of the attack, it underlines the growing capabilities of the Houthi group. The group, supported by Iran, took control of the Yemeni capital, Sana, in 2014 and has since become a vital component of Iran’s “Axis of Resistance.”

Ahmed Nagi, a senior Yemen analyst at the International Crisis Group, expressed that the Houthis’ involvement in the conflict delivers a distinct message to Israel, suggesting the rise of a new adversary in the region.

The Houthis as a new threat

Over the years, the Houthi group has increasingly supported the Palestinian cause and has consistently demonstrated animosity towards Israel. With the ongoing genocide in Gaza escalating, Houthi leadership has reiterated their willingness to join the fight.

Israel has gradually started to perceive the Houthis as a credible threat, leading to measures such as deploying the Iron Dome batteries near the southern town of Eilat in anticipation of potential retaliatory actions.

Despite these advancements, the extent to which the Houthis pose a substantial threat to Israel remains uncertain. Given the disparity in military capabilities, experts believe Israel maintains a significant edge.

The conflict’s asymmetry is further emphasized by statistics. Between 2015 and 2021, Saudi Arabia reported thwarting over 1,000 missiles and drones launched by the Houthi group, resulting in approximately 120 casualties. In comparison, airstrikes from the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, aided by the U.S., have caused over 20,000 casualties.

The international community watches closely as the tensions escalate in Gaza, with concerns growing over a broader regional conflict.

Sources: The Associated Press and the New York Times

O

n August 10, news of a controversial contract in the Yemeni city of Dhamar went viral. The contract, signed by the Manar tribes in 2021, resurfaced after an ex-political figure from the Islah party posted about the need to implement it across Yemen on Facebook.

The contract included restrictive measures against women in the tribe. For example, it states that women are strictly forbidden to own a smartphone, and if a woman is found having one, her male guardian will be punished. The contract also bans women from wearing makeup, travelling in taxis without a male guardian, and working for humanitarian NGOs.

The contract was reposted by Abdullah Ahmed Al-Adaini, the ex-leader of the conservative Islah party, and sparked a wave of conflicting opinions between supporters and opponents. In a now-deleted Facebook post, al-Adaini claimed that the document should be circulated and implemented throughout Yemen.

This is not the only form of oppression that Yemeni women continue to face under the Houthi leadership. The situation of Yemeni women today is worse than it was eight years ago.

The enslavement of Yemeni women

Regardless of their age, girls and women in Yemen have long suffered. Affected by Yemeni tribal customs, they have struggled for their freedom and rights as independent individuals. Yemeni tribes typically regard women in terms of “honor” and some see it as their duty to control women and restrict their freedom.

An example of extreme control is an incident in 2020, when news broke that a father had sold his daughter to a man for 200,000 YER, the equivalent of 350 USD. The agreement was made on paper between both parties, with no consideration given to the age of the girl, Laimoon, who was reportedly four years old at the time. The papers also contained a formal stamp with signatures of witnesses to the “transaction.”

The incident sparked local and international outrage. Gender-based oppression in Yemen takes place amid the harsh conditions of war, poverty, inflation, and terrible governance.

The forms of oppression against Yemeni women

In an exclusive interview with Politics Today, Nadya Abdullah, the Yemeni deputy minister at the Ministry of Youth and Sports – Women’s Sector, spoke about the different forms of oppression that Yemeni women face on a daily basis. She divided them into two categories: cultural and tradition-related oppression, on the one hand, and postwar oppression, on the other.

Traditional cultural oppression of women centers on the idea that women can’t make good decisions about their own life matters. “Until recently, Yemeni women struggled to have an opinion or a decision about their educational future,” she told Politics Today. “Even today, there are still families who decide on their daughters’ future whether it is education, marriage, or work.”

She also mentioned the issue of inheritance for women in Yemen. “Women always have to lose something, either they fight and lose their family, or they don’t fight and lose their rights,” she said, adding that in some cases, women are forbidden to inherit, regardless of women’s inheritance rights in Islam.

The postwar oppression of Yemeni women

Postwar oppression is a new form of oppression of women, appearing after the 2015 war. It involves the arrest of politically active women and the suffocation of women working for humanitarian NGOs. What is more, Abdullah mentioned that many women have lost their limbs or been killed by mines planted by the Houthis in conflict areas.

“Tens or hundreds of women have lost their limbs or been killed by Houthi mines, and a large number of women have been arrested for political reasons and are still in Houthi prisons,” Abdullah said. Such oppression of women has gone beyond the bounds of tradition and culture.

Despite holding a position in the Yemeni government, Abdullah has also experienced oppression because of her gender. “I fled Sana’a in 2015 because the Houthi forces tried to arrest me at the beginning of Operation Decisive Storm,” she explained, referring to the Saudi-led operation against the Houthis in Yemen. She added, “Since then, I haven’t been able to see my family. All because I am a politically active woman.” What was once shameful has become the norm under the Houthis.

Abdullah is not the only one; the number of women detained in the city of Sana’a alone is estimated at between 200 and 350. Samera al-Huri, a Yemeni activist, was arrested by the Houthi forces for her involvement in politics. Unlike Abdullah, al-Huri wasn’t as lucky. She was captured by the Houthis and tortured for three months until she confessed to false charges of prostitution. The tribal traditions that once protected women from this form of abuse have disappeared under the pressure of war.

On March 12, 2022, Houthis, who currently control the Yemeni capital, Sana’a, demolished part of the memorial to the martyrs of the Ottoman Empire in Yemen. This move speaks of a series of conflicts between the Ottoman administrators and Zaydi imams, the last of which ended with the signing of the Treaty of Da’an in 1911.

The memorial was erected on the western bank of the waterway dividing the historical city of Sana’a in two, near the Al-Aridhi Complex. Its various sections were built by the Ottomans in intermittent periods, and the complex was later turned into large headquarters for the army command, becoming one of the symbols of the Ottoman presence in Yemen.

The Al-Aridhi Complex was built by the Ottomans near the southern wall of the city of Sana’a as  the most important architectural facility outside the old city. It was restored and some facilities were added to it at the end of the rule of President Ali Abdullah Saleh (1978-2012), who turned the complex into headquarters for the Ministry of Defense and the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces. Saleh exercised his presidential duties periodically during the week from the same complex.

The establishment of the memorial graveyard dates to 2011 when it was inaugurated by then Turkish President Abdullah Gül during an official visit to Sana’a, on January 11, 2011. The memorial is symbolic of the bilateral relations, and the Turkish flag continued to fly at an important place in the capital of Yemen—before it had flown only above the Turkish embassy or the ambassador’s residence. The flag flying over the memorial remained exceptional in every sense of the word.

The Zaydi Imamate and the Ottomans: A history of hostilities

It is not possible to understand the Houthi attacks on the Ottoman memorial graveyard without delving into the historical background of the incident, which was widely condemned by Yemenis, as the demolition was linked to the Zaydi Houthi group.

The Zaydi presence in Yemen dates back to the late 9th century, when a person known by his honorific title Imam al-Hadi ila’l-Haqq (835-911) came to Yemen, specifically to Saada, in the northwest of the country.

A historical assessment of the Ottoman presence in Yemen

Since the fall of the Zaydi Imamate in Yemen on September 26, 1962, at the hands of the Yemeni people, who were fed up with them, and the consequent establishment of the Yemeni Republic, the historical assessment of the Ottoman state and its role in Yemen remained a subject of tension between the majority of Yemenis that viewed it as a natural extension of Muslim nation  and a minority that went as far as to describe it as an “Ottoman invasion.”

History textbooks, which were adopted after 1962, presented a positive view of the Ottoman Empire and its rule over Yemen. Nevertheless, this did not prevent Zaydi supporters from maintaining their strict and extremist position on the Ottoman Empire and on the Sunni majority that controlled the public in Yemen during the past six decades.

The view of this historical assessment is necessary to assess the motives that led the Houthis to demolish the Ottoman monument to the martyrs of the Ottoman Empire who had lost their lives in conflicts and confrontations resulting from the Zaydi imams and their rebels in northern Yemen, whose main goal had been to weaken the Ottoman Empire. This goal seemed to have been shared with the Safavid Shiite regime in Iran, thus establishing an invisible shared aim between the hard-liner Zaydis in Yemen and the most extreme Shiite scholars and thinkers in Iran.

Therefore, the Houthis’ demolition of the historical Ottoman monument shows an extremist historical ideological reaction that indicates the fanatic background of this group which wants to revive the Zaydi Imamate. The Houthis consider themselves an extension of the Zaydi imams, and feel entitled to seize the moment to resolve the current war in their favor.

Considering the end of the war with the Treaty of Da’an in 1911, Imam Yahya Hamid al-Din’s a war against the Ottoman Empire came at a time that took full advantage of other historical circumstances. The Ottoman Empire was facing the Italian invasion of Libya, a revolution in the Balkans, and was in a dire need of ending the military attrition it suffered at the hands of the Zaydis in Yemen

The agreement maintained the Zaydis’ influence in Yemen and granted the Zaydi imam the powers to supervise his Zaydi sect. It also meant that the imam would seek outside support which came from Iran. This became a tradition that continues on from the ninth century seen in the Iranian interference in Yemen’s affairs.

The political and regional dimensions

The Houthis chose a timely moment to demolish the historical Ottoman monument: the visit of Israeli President Isaac Herzog to Ankara. In my estimation, the demolition of the monument can be attributed to three reasons.

The first is that the Shiite Houthi group, as a sectarian minority, does not want the Yemeni people to retain a positive historical memory of the role of the Ottoman Empire in their country. Thus, this is a message to Yemenis that there is no legitimate authority other than the authority of the Zaydi imams who today rule Yemen with an iron fist.

The second reason relates to the role played by regional powers, led by Iran, and Arab countries linked to the West. These countries, of course, do not want Turkey to have any historical impact on Yemen.

The third reason is that the Houthi group is trying to stop any future role for Turkey in the region, especially in Yemen. The Houthis know that a large segment of Yemenis have good relations with Turkey and aspire to implement the Turkish model in Yemen; they, on the other hand, aim to break away from Turkey. The Houthis fear the influential role of the current Turkish Republic and the history of the Ottoman Empire in Yemen.

Iran-backed proxies are involved in almost every major crisis in the Middle East. Recently, the Houthis, or Ansar Allah, of Yemen launched another missile attack on Abu Dhabi, called on foreign companies and investors to leave the UAE, and vowed to make the country unsafe. Also, the Fatah Alliance and other Iran-backed parties affiliated with the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) rejected Iraq’s recent parliamentary election held in October 2021 and tried to further destabilize the already chaotic Iraqi politics.

Moreover, elements within the PMF such as Kata’ib Hezbollah and Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq with strong ties to Iran, have been trying to hinder Turkey’s fight against PKK terror in northern Iraq as they present it as “a violation of Iraq’s sovereignty,” a point which was also made by Iraj Masjedi, Iran’s ambassador in Baghdad last year in February.

Most recently, Kata’ib Hezbollah issued a statement which threatened Turkey and demanded the withdrawal of its forces “before it’s too late.” To these Iranian proxies, the presence of Iran’s militias in Syria must also be added. In short, alongside the Hezbollah of Lebanon, Iran’s proxy par excellence, Iran-backed Shiite militant groups are active all across the Middle East.

Why does Iran need proxies?

Iran is undoubtedly a major Middle Eastern power with its geostrategic position, abundant natural resources, and significant human capital. Nevertheless, Iran’s conventional military capacity has, for decades, either fallen behind its political aspirations or remained untested with the notable exception of the tragic and devastating defensive war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq in 1980-1988.

In the twentieth century, the country was not involved in any substantial and direct military conflict against any major enemy. For that, Iranian elites’ masterful political maneuvers and their use of the international balance of power to their advantage deserves a huge credit, but that’s a different story.

The country stayed neutral during the two World Wars, “solved” the oil nationalization crisis in the early 1950s without facing military aggression – unlike Gamal Abdel Nasser’s Egypt which was jointly attacked by Israel, the United Kingdom, and France upon President Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 – and even got away with the Iran hostage crisis at the end of 1979 without an open military confrontation.

While doing this, Iran envisioned itself as the true leader of all the Shiites in the region and beyond. These proxies consolidated Iran’s defensive capabilities but gradually turned into a security risk for the region. Furthermore, although Iran’s short-term expectations from these proxies were mostly military, there was a strong political dimension from the beginning. In essence, Iran was reproducing, in different countries, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps which were established by Ayatollah Khomeini following the revolution and in time turned into a military, economic, political, and even social power.

How do Iran’s proxies function?

From its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran emerged as an interventionist regime that interposed in the affairs of regional states through the rhetoric and practice of exporting the revolution. This was clearly reflected in Article 154 of Iran’s constitution which declared Iran’s support for the “just struggles of the mustada‘fun [the oppressed] against the mustakbirun [the oppressor] in every corner of the globe,” while “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations.”

As it turned out, Iran cared little about the non-intervention principle of the United Nations. The hostility between the Islamic Republic, the U.S., and Israel, along with the unfavorable attitude of certain Arab regimes in the region, with the notable exception of Hafez Assad’s Syria, towards the Islamic Republic’s policies certainly added to Iran’s desire to look for non-state allies to consolidate its security in the region. Nevertheless, paradoxically these proxies caused, for all intents and purposes, Iran’s further isolation in the region.

Although the “axis of resistance,” Iran’s preferred term for the large network of proxies under its control, is anti-American, anti-Zionist, and counter-hegemonic in rhetoric, it is characterized, in fact, by two main features: Iran’s proxies grew in weak and war-torn states, and they targeted Iran’s regional enemies – not only Israel – along with the U.S. as the first and foremost global hegemonic power. Yet, the real risk for Iran’s proxies has always been their political influence rather than their military capability.

Iran’s proxies after Qasem Soleimani

Iran’s Middle East proxies have for a long time been predominantly associated with Qasem Soleimani, the former commander of the Quds Force of the Revolutionary Guard Corps. There is no question that Soleimani played an immensely decisive role in coordinating Iran’s network of Middle East proxies especially after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003.

But, although his assassination by the U.S. in January 2020 came as a shock for Iran, his weight in in laying out Iran’s Middle East foreign policies was already put under increasing question by those such as Javad Zarif, Iran’s former minister of foreign affairs, who sought to reintegrate Iran in the international community.

In the changing landscape of today’s Middle East and Iran’s normalization attempts with its Gulf neighbors, Iran’s proxies can no longer effectively function like they did in the past as sheer militant groups. Yet their political influence in their respective countries also poses challenges to the region.

Their sectarian approaches, reliance on arms, and their close ties with Iran further complicate the possibility of their integration into national politics. In a nutshell, at best, Iranian proxies can hope to replicate the Lebanese Hezbollah, which itself suffers from these defects and acts like a state within a state.

As nuclear negotiations continue in Vienna to find a common ground between Iran and the U.S., Iran’s proxies once again became a critical issue. It goes without saying that the U.S. regards these proxies as a security risk for itself and its Middle Eastern allies, but they are primarily a regional problem.

Thus, although reaching a renewed nuclear deal which would effectively limit Iran’s nuclear capacity and undermine the security risks of its proxies must be a shared priority for the region, there needs to be a regional initiative to secure stability in the greater area.

Turkey’s attempts to normalize relations and repair broken ties with a number of states in the region can be a good starting point to deescalate tensions in the Middle East. Also, the lifting of illegal sanctions on Iran can encourage it to take part constructively in the region’s normalization process.

In order to realize this, Iran must respect the principle of “scrupulously refraining from all forms of interference in the internal affairs of other nations” as stipulated in its constitution.

For decades, the geopolitical and geo-sectarian rivalry between Saudi Arabia and Iran has played out across the Middle East in various destabilizing ways. Since the Houthi rebels usurped control of Sana‘a in 2014, Yemen has been an important flashpoint in this competition for regional influence with Riyadh and Yemeni forces loyal to the UN-recognized Yemeni government waging war against the Iranian-backed insurgents for nearly seven years. The conflict(s) in Yemen still rages on. In recent days, the Government of Yemen “liberated” energy-rich Shabwah while the United Arab Emirates (UAE)-backed al-Amaliqa Brigades has been advancing into Marib. Meanwhile, Houthi missiles attacks keep on targeting their enemies, most recently including the UAE, at least according to the rebel group’s claims.

A major question that analysts have been asking since Saudi-Iranian talks began in Baghdad in April 2021 is, what could such dialogue mean for Yemen? It seems safe to conclude that although these talks have not led to major strategic or necessarily tangible changes in Yemen, there have been some tactical changes that could be grounds for some cautious optimism.

An important development in late 2021 was the death of Hassan Erlou who served as Iran’s ambassador to the Houthis. His passing called into question the relationship between the Houthis and their backers in Tehran, and how that could change the face of the war in Yemen. Erlou, who was smuggled into Yemen in 2020, was likely evacuated on an Iraqi plane from Yemen to Iraq, before flying home to Iran where he died from COVID19 on December 18, 2021.

“Erlou was obviously, from the evidence that we have, someone who was quite closely tied into the [Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)] and the Quds force,” explained Dr. Andreas Krieg, a senior lecturer at the School of Security Studies at King’s College London, Royal College of Defense Studies, in an interview with Politics Today. “He was on the U.S. Treasury watch list. Having someone like him leaving [Yemen] without being actually arrested and then flying over Saudi territory was quite a concession from the side of the Saudis. This was only possible because of Iraqi mediation.”

Yet there were many conflicting reports about Erlou and his situation in Yemen just before leaving the country. The Saudis and Iranians told different stories about what had happened as well as the significance of and reasons for his exit from Yemen. “According to the Saudis, Erlou’s return to Tehran reflected tensions between the Houthis and Iran, but there has been little evidence of a breach in the relationship between Sanaa and Tehran,” according to Dr. Annelle Sheline, a Research Fellow for the Middle East at the Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Some reports even claimed that the Houthis were pushing for Erlou’s exit due to rising domestic pressure to distance themselves from Tehran.

Nonetheless, as Dr. Krieg explained, beyond all the facades and information warfare, there is a renewed willingness to talk between Riyadh and Tehran. In fact, last month when the Organization of Islamic Cooperation gathered in Pakistan to address the situation in post-U.S, Afghanistan, diplomats from the Saudi Kingdom and the Islamic Republic met.

This meeting between Saudi and Iranian officials in Islamabad “suggests that there is a willingness and also permission from the superiors to actually have these talks continue and that’s the most important thing,” according to Dr. Krieg. Additionally, in late 2021 the Saudi government granted Iranian diplomats visas at the OIC—a development suggesting that Riyadh and Tehran could possibly restore diplomatic relations this year.

Last month, the Saudi-led coalition released video footage and photographs that purportedly confirmed that the Houthis are receiving support from Hezbollah and the IRGC. The videos purportedly show a Hezbollah leader giving Houthi leader Abdullah Yahya Al-Hakim instructions, Hezbollah trainers teaching Houthis to operate drones, boxes of drone parts with the Hezbollah logo, and satellite footage showing how the IRGC has assisted the Houthis in transforming the Sanaa International Airport into a drone and missile launching pad.

“The Saudis want the Iranians to stop their surrogate operations across the region, whether it may be in Yemen or Iraq,” argued Dr. Krieg. “The problem with that is that the Iranians are saying there are no surrogate operations, and that these are local operations which we have no control over, which is obviously a lie. But it’s obviously this kind of surrogate game is one that’s based on dissociation and plausible deniability. Hence, why it’s very difficult to come to any conclusion because the Iranians will say in the first place ‘we have no forces on the ground, so we have no control over what’s going on’. It’s true to an extent. The control that the Iranians have over surrogate operations is limited. That’s something that the Saudis understand, and it always provides the Iranians with a degree of plausible deniability and disassociation to tell others that they’re actually not involved. That makes it difficult to come up with a solution that is sustainable.”

These recent developments leave us questioning how Erlou’s replacement will affect the situation in Yemen. Earlier this month, Iranian officials appointed Abdul Reza Shahlai as Erlou’s replacement without giving him an official diplomatic title, which some believe may be a sign of positive relations between Tehran and Riyadh. According to Gregory Johnsen, a nonresident fellow at the Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution: “If the narrative of a split between the Houthis and Iran is true, then it is notable that Shahlai will not be given a diplomatic title, and by selecting an official already in Yemen, Iran honored the Houthi commitment to Saudi Arabia not to bring in a ‘new diplomat’.” However, his appointment could also simply be a means of convenience. Shahlai has been in Yemen for several years, meaning that they would not have to go through the effort to smuggle a new diplomat into the country and he is already a seasoned military commander with experience in Yemen.

In the final analysis, Saudi Arabia will continue to see Iran as a threat in the long term, no matter the direction that dialogue between the two countries takes in 2022. Iranian influence in Yemen will continue terrifying the Saudis. Nonetheless, one can assume that thanks to Iraqi mediation the likelihood of a repeat of the Saudi Aramco attacks of September 2019 has decreased.

Within the context of the Iranians wanting to improve their relationship with Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states in order to create a new architecture in the sub-region, we might see Tehran begin to show more sensitivity toward Saudi security as it directly pertains to the Gulf. But beyond the Gulf, it is tough to imagine talks in Iraq between Riyadh and Tehran leading to the Islamic Republic winding down its surrogate or “proxy” operations throughout the greater Middle East.

Since March 26, 2015, Yemen has become the focus of the international community. It has received attention due to the civilian catastrophe and famine as well as the increase in arms sales from major Arab countries in the Middle East.

Although Yemen is a poor country, its arms purchases have cost it hundreds of millions of dollars over several decades. Warring parties in Yemen have bought large quantities of conventional weapons, some of which are modern weapons from the United States and other Western countries, while most came from Russia and the former Soviet Union. Houthis have greatly benefited from this huge stockpile to fight a long-term battle, and to maintain a superior position in terms of military equipment and firepower compared to the Yemeni national army and the popular resistance groups supported by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

On the other hand, the Yemeni government of Hadi stopped buying weapons, not because it could not afford to do so anymore, but because it was not allowed. The Arab coalition, which was created to intervene militarily in Yemen in support of the legitimate Yemeni government against the Houthi group in 2015 and which was led by Saudi Arabia, imposed a total embargo on the purchase of weapons by the Houthis. This made the Saudis the main gate for the arms supplies to the Yemeni government forces fighting on the ground, allowing the Arab coalition to control the course of war completely.

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution No. 2216, Paragraph 14 (April 15, 2015) authorized neighboring countries, namely the Saudi-led Arab coalition, to conduct inspections of shipments arriving at Yemen’s coasts to ensure that the ships are not carrying weapons to the parties under embargo. The embargo, by the way, does not include the Yemeni government. The resolution was explicit and clear to include the leaders in President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party and the Houthi group and those associated with them.

Here, I will discuss the three main countries that have been involved in arms trafficking, directly and indirectly, in the Yemen civil war: Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Weapons as an indicator of a troubled strategic partnership

There is a close link between the war waged by Saudi Arabia in Yemen and the steady increase in the volume of its arms purchases to such an extent that in 2020, the country jumped to the forefront of countries importing weapons on the global level: according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Saudi Arabia ranked second after India.

There is no better evidence than the information that was revealed by Clark Cooper, the U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and Heidi Grant, the director of the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) that is part of the United States Department of Defense, in a joint press conference held at the Pentagon in early December 2020 at the end of the Trump’s term.

They explained that the United States generated $50.78 billion in intergovernmental “foreign military sales” and $124.3 billion in “direct trade sales.” Meanwhile, President Biden’s strict position on arms sales to Saudi Arabia appears to be a thing of the past as he recently agreed to sell Saudi Arabia $650 million worth of weapons, in a deal that includes 280 AIM-120s air-to-air missiles.

Arms race fueled by regional competition

Over the past decade, the UAE has ranked third and fourth among the most important arms importing countries in the Middle East, according to the Stockholm Institute. The UAE has been the seventeenth-largest importer of American weapons between 1996 and 2020, and the fifth-largest importer between 2016 and 2020.

Moreover, the number of U.S. arms deals with the UAE increased during the past five years, and include Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) and PATRIOT PAC-3 air defense systems. During the same period, the UAE received thousands of relatively low-value armored vehicles and 1,000 guided bombs from the United States. These were used in Yemen along with high-value combat aircraft and missile defenses.

Similar to Saudi Arabia, the UAE bought weapons worth billions of dollars to cover its needs resulting from its active involvement in the Yemen war. This deal is still having a hard time getting through Congress, but President Biden, who halted the deal immediately after he took office, appears to be heading towards releasing it soon, according to statements by Mira Resnick, deputy assistant secretary of state, on November 17, 2021. The United States is fully committed to selling 50 F-35 stealth fighters to the United Arab Emirates.

According to the Middle East Institute, despite the UAE withdrawal from the Arab coalition in 2019, the inheritance it left behind was local groups, including the Southern Transitional Council (STC) that was formed in May 2017, which are in possession of heavy weapons mixed with ambitions of control of contested territories. This has weakened the rule of the Yemeni government in the liberated territories and diverted the coalition’s focus from fighting the Houthis to fighting the Houthis and the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (al-Islah) party, creating inter-coalition divisions as a result.

An influence built through an invisible bridge of armaments support

Iran is one of the major parties involved in the Yemeni civil war. Although its interference remains indirect, it is very effective. Iran’s arms smuggling in Yemen has been recorded since February 2013, when the Yemeni navy intercepted the ship Jihan 1 loaded with weapons for the Houthis en route to the port of Midi in the Red Sea.

Specific weapons, especially winged missiles and drones, in addition to guided anti-armor weapons, all come through extensive and complex smuggling operations. These weapons constitute a major source of supply for the Houthis, and are primarily responsible for the qualitative shift in the course of the war. This has been exemplified since 2018 by the targeting of the Saudi depth with missiles and drones.

On November 25, 2019, a U.S. warship seized a significant cache of Iranian weapons bound for Yemen’s Houthi rebels. The U.S. Navy rarely stops intercepting boats and ships carrying weapons originating from Iran and heading to Yemen. Similar operations are carried out by the Australian Navy in addition to the ships of the Saudi-led Arab coalition. The last shipment of smuggled weapons intercepted by the U.S. military was on May 8, 2021, and it included “prohibited weapons” from a sailing boat which was in international waters north of the Arabian Sea.

In a statement the U.S. Fifth Fleet said that the weapons included dozens of Russian anti-tank guided missiles, thousands of Type 56 assault rifle and Chinese assault rifles, and hundreds of PK machine guns (Pulemyot Kalashnikova), snipers, and rocket launchers. Since the Iranian weapons smuggled to the Houthis in Yemen are not subject to international control, it is difficult to determine the quantities of weapons that have actually reached the Houthis and are being used in the fighting.

However, there is increasing evidence which suggests that individuals or entities in Iran supply significant volumes of weapons to the Houthis as reported by the United Nation’s most recent report by the Panel of Experts on Yemen (S/2021/79) and as proven by the observational shift in the course of the fighting which indicates Iran’s clear armament influence in the Yemeni war. The influence extends to include appointing and sending Hassan Erlo, an officer in the Quds Force of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), as Iran’s ambassador in Sana’a, a move which completely ignores the Security Council resolutions and international law.

Today, Iranian weapons have become an oft-repeated topic in the Arab coalition’s political media, and a topic that preoccupies the United States which has become more understanding and aware of Iran’s serious influence on the war in Yemen, but not to the extent of deterring it.

While there always seem to be efforts to rehabilitate Iran’s image at both a regional and international level, usually attempting to make Tehran appear to be the victim rather than the victimizer, few would be naïve enough to deny the fact that Iranian ambitions can actively be classified as being imperial in nature.

However, Tehran’s clergy-cum-politicians have played the game of empires in an intelligent and subtle manner, preferring to control vassal states by proxy rather than directly imposing their rule directly. In this way, Iran can claim to simply be “providing assistance” to the people of the region that it is now actively terrorizing.

Through a strategy of clever and careful outsourcing of war to ideologically loyal militants across the Middle East, Iran has managed to carve for itself a sphere of influence that threatens peace and security in the region and beyond.

War on the cheap

As previously stated, Iran does not use direct, conventional means of control and military power projection as it knows it can be a costly endeavor, both in blood and treasure.

The last time Iran was involved in a conventional conflict was against Iraq between 1980 and 1988. In almost eight full years of grinding war, Iran was left militarily and economically broken, politically isolated, and the founder of the Islamic Republic, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, famously stated that signing a ceasefire with Iraq was like drinking from a poisoned chalice.

The Iranians learnt the lesson of the war well – no amount of Shia Islamist rhetoric was able to lead the Iranian military and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to victory. After the butcher’s bill of the Iran-Iraq War, the Shia revolutionaries changed tack and began a new strategy of harboring Shia Islamist groups loyal to them, waiting for the right opportunity to install them in positions of power.

Perhaps the most famous of these groups was actually incubated during the war with Iraq and is now Iran’s leading proxy in the region. Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, now led by Hassan Nasrallah, was created, financed, and trained by the IRGC in 1985, ostensibly to resist the Israeli occupation of Lebanon. In cooperation with their Syrian ally in the Assad regime, Iran dispatched hundreds of IRGC operatives to train Lebanese Shia irregulars in guerrilla warfare.

To this end, the PMF have executed Iran’s bidding with bloody enthusiasm. Not only are they implicated in war crimes and crimes against humanity during their campaigns against Daesh between 2014 and 2017 against innocent Sunni Arabs, but they have also recently targeted largely Shia Arab pro-democracy activists, killing at least 600 since 2019, and are actively involved in fighting in neighboring Syria where they have supported Bashar al-Assad’s regime.

But Iran’s proxies are not only active in the traditional “Shia Crescent” stretching from Iran to the Mediterranean Sea, but they also have a presence on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden. The Yemeni Houthi militias, while not as intricately linked to Iran as Hezbollah in Lebanon or the PMF in Iraq, are in the modern day inextricably linked to Tehran’s regional ambitions.

The Yemeni Shia group not only uses similar propaganda by calling for death to America, Israel, and publicly cursing all Jews in what can only be described as anti-Semitic hatred, but has received extensive Iranian financial and military support. This has included the provision of drone technology that the Houthis have used to harass Saudi Arabia and attack its strategically vital energy sector.

The modern Iranian empire is ruled by proxy

These groups are not simply allies, but they are direct proxies of Tehran and an extension of the Iranian leadership’s strategic ambitions.

In the Houthi case, Yemen has been used as a quagmire to bleed Saudi and its allies in an unwinnable war, while simultaneously controlling the capital city and commanding a dangerous position over vital naval shipping routes. In the Iraqi and Lebanese cases, Iranian rule by proxy is so obvious and is seen as existentially vital to Iran’s strategic ambition to dominate the Middle East, far more so than their presence in Yemen.

It is no wonder, then, that senior Iranian officials occasionally allow the mask to slip and openly gloat about their new empire and how they control four Arab capitals: Baghdad, Damascus, Beirut, and Sanaa. They have also made their ambitions of a wider Shia revolutionary uprising clear, and half a decade ago announced the formation of a “Shia Liberation Army”.

Without a regional and international cooperative framework to contain Iran’s ambitions and to roll back its gains in Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon especially, with Yemen of secondary importance, then Tehran will only consolidate its control over these territories that are largely populated by Sunni Arabs. This will be a recipe for disaster as majorities rarely accept being ruled minorities, and therefore there is a significant risk of the outbreak of a regional sectarian war, the results of which will be devastating and must be avoided at all costs.

Yemen is witnessing one of the worst humanitarian crises of the 21st century with a civil war that has been going on for the past seven years. Alongside multiple local and regional actors at play, there are new diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S. special envoy introduced by the Biden administration, whose efficacy in bringing the conflicts to an end is yet to be proven. Nihan Duran of Politics Today interviewed Maysaa Shuja al-Deen, a Yemeni researcher and non-resident fellow at the Sana’a Center for Strategic Studies in Yemen on the current state of war in the country and the prospects of a sustainable peace.

Q. What is the current situation of the civil war in Yemen?

When we talk about Yemen today, we are not talking about one entity nor two entities, divided into south and north, as was the case before 1990. There are several entities in Yemen both in the south and north, and the biggest power in the north is the Houthis. They control a big part of the north of Yemen, which means that they have more than half of the population under their control.

In the north, there are also other powers such as the Muslim Brotherhood-affiliated Al-Islah party controlling Taiz and Ma’rib, the latter being a rich governorate, now besieged by the Houthis. On the western coast of the north, we have the military commander Tareq Saleh, the nephew of the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh.

Q. What is the picture of the south of Yemen?

We have an even more complicated picture in the south, given that there are more actors than in the north, such as the UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). STC is controlling the interim capital Aden and the western governorates Dhale and Lahj and parts of Abyan. Shabwah is a tribal governorate that is neighboring Ma’rib and is affiliated the president Hadi and Islah party has presence there. Coast of Hadhramaut is controlled by Hadhramaut elite which is supported by the UAE and affiliated the STC. Hadhramaut valley is still under the government forces control.

Al-Mahrah region is under the control of local powers. Alongside different local actors, there are also regional actors involved in Yemen, such as Saudi Arabia, Oman and the UAE, who are not aligned and are not very willing to cooperate either.

Q. Alongside these local and regional actors, there are also new diplomatic initiatives such as the U.S. special envoy introduced by the Biden administration. Do you believe that these initiatives are likely to make a difference in resolving ongoing conflicts?

The U.S. policy towards Yemen has changed dramatically after the Biden administration. During the Trump administration, the Yemeni file was completely ignored, but now Yemen is a top priority in Biden’s foreign policy. What is happening now is that Yemen’s war is being considered in connection with the U.S.-Iran Nuclear Deal of 2015, which sees attempts now to be revived.

As we all know, Iran supports the Houthis for Iranians wish to be a powerful regional player and their influence in Yemen gives them a lot of leverage vis-à-vis the West, as we can see in the negotiations for the Nuclear Deal. For Iran, Yemen is the easiest card to be capitulated for a possible concession to Saudi Arabia.

The parties involved in negotiations to end the Yemen war need to understand that one cannot stop this war without addressing the local disputes and disagreements.

Q. In other words, Yemen is the soft spot for the Saudis.

Yes, they can accept the Iranian influence elsewhere, but not in Yemen. The U.S. is now trying to reach a peace settlement between the Saudis and the Houthis. There are also official meetings going on between Iran and Saudi Arabia around regional issues. Though these developments do not necessarily mean Iran will cut through all the relationships with the Houthis, it may put some leverage on the Houthis to accept a peace agreement that recognizes other local parties.

However, what I see right now is that the focus is too much on the regional dimensions of this war, and local dimensions, which are as crucial to consider, are largely overlooked. The parties involved in these negotiations need to understand that one cannot stop this war without addressing the local disputes and disagreements.

Q. On the other hand, we see in the south of Yemen a desire for a two-state or a two-region solution. What is the motivation behind that?

The south and the north were two different states until the unification in 1990. The Republic in the North, which had represented the capitalist camp, was established in 1962, and when the British withdrew from the south, the Southern state was founded in 1967, which represented the communist camp. However, following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the desire for unification grew stronger, especially in the south. Yet, we need to note that, although they were united, the army remained divided and they could not agree on the constitution. So, there was a political crisis directly after the unity, and in 1994, a civil war erupted between the south and north. Yet, it is not very easy to refer to the new tension as a dispute between the south and the north in a classical sense.

Q. What do you mean?

During the civil war in 1994, some Islamist groups in the south fought for the government in the north against the socialist party in the south, who were defeated at that time. Whereas this victory made the north the hegemonic power across Yemen, it was received with resentment in the south, where people felt that they were being politically marginalized.

On top of that, after the discovery of the oil resources in the south, they eventually felt they would be better off without the north, who they have felt had neglected and marginalized them right after the 1994 war. Not surprisingly, the Houthis’ invasion of the south of Yemen in 2015 revived the two-decades-old injuries, which made the south feel that they cannot continue, especially with the Houthis controlling the capital in the north, Sanaa.

Q. Do you think the southern aspiration to have an independent status is realistic?

We need to highlight that the south is not a single entity. There are different groups that are not united, and this was a huge problem. Internationally as well, we can see that most of the countries are not very supportive of the idea of a separation, because if there is a separation in Yemen, there is the risk that it may encourage the aspirations for secessions in other parts of the region. Therefore, it is not very easy to convince the regional powers of this idea. This is one of the reasons why the U.N. resolutions in Yemen emphasize the unity of the Yemeni state. So, here we have a legal obstacle to southern aspirations to separation.

Q. What other barriers are there for these aspirations?

Another reason why some countries would not support the idea of a two-state solution is related to the sectarian composition of the country. In the north, there is a Zaidi Shia sect under the influence of Iran. Given the circumstances, the large Sunni population in the south balance the situation. This is why the Saudis, who were against the unity during the civil war in 1994, are now in favor of the unity of the Yemeni state, because otherwise they will have the risk of a Shia state at their borders. This is another problematic issue.

I do not know what is the price that Yemen is going to pay under these circumstances, but most of the people now are talking about a federal state or confederal state in Yemen. I think this is the most realistic scenario applicable to the current situation in Yemen.

Q. Given the current situation of war, what do you think are the prospects for peace in Yemen?

I think, any peace process in Yemen should follow the principle of inclusivity. Inclusivity of not only two parties, the government of Hadi and the Houthis, but all other local actors that have emerged during these seven years of war. A sustainable peace requires, first and foremost, the political will of political powers. The people of Yemen cannot attain peace without the political will of the STC, the Houthis, or whoever is there. This should also include enhancing the local governance in general because they are more in touch with the real situation there. But without the necessary political will, it is impossible reach peace in Yemen.

The London-based organization Friends of South Yemen (FOSY)  a grass roots organization has developed a three-staged road map to end the war in Yemen, where there are numerous political, economic, and security issues at stake, as well as an ongoing unimaginable  humanitarian crisis. Nihan Duran interviewed Dr. Abdul Galil Shaif, the chairman of FOSY and the former chairman of the Aden Free Zone Public Authority in Yemen, on the current state of war in Yemen and the way forward to finding a peaceful solution.

Q. Before going into details of the three-stage road map, could you please explain the current state of the war in Yemen?

First, this is not just  a war between Yemenis. It is also a  proxy war at a regional and international level  on Yemeni soil. All the partners in this war are self-imposed, and I think it is now obvious that there is no military solution to this conflict. The only solution is a peaceful resolution, and our immediate objective as Friends of South Yemen, a grassroots, self-financed, and independent organization, is to bring an immediate end to the war through a military ceasefire. Otherwise, it is going to be very difficult to find a peaceful solution as people continue to be displaced and killed.

It is evident that so far, the international community and the diplomatic efforts have failed miserably to materialize or  bring a peaceful solution to the war in Yemen. We have 85,000 children who have died in this war among the 250,000 people killed and the millions displaced. Fifteen million people are facing starvation, which could be one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world. The economy has been damaged immensely. GDP in 2015 was 43 billion dollars in 2020 it was 21 billion dollars cut by more than half. While the population has grown from 25 million to 30 million. It is  unbelievable in these economic circumstances how the people of Yemen are surviving.

Q. Why do you think previous efforts have failed to bring an end to the war?

Most of the proposals in the past have been short-term. They were only concerned with how to bring about a ceasefire, without any reflection on how to move forward when the fighting has stopped. But in order to find a peaceful solution that will work, we need to understand the different regions, players, and their positions in this war.

The south of Yemen has been liberated from Houthi control in 2015 and there is now a power sharing government mediated by Riyadh between the legitimate government and the Southern Transitional Council (STC), and the north has almost been taken over by the Houthis, who are trying to expand their influence and territory. Our main objective is to bring an immediate end to the killing fields in Yemen and to do that, we need to make sure that we do something about what is happening now in Marib.

If the Houthis take over the rich oil region of Marib, it will make the peaceful solution much more difficult and complex to resolve.

Q. Why do the cities of Hudaydah and Marib play such a critical role?

If the Houthis take over the rich oil region of Marib, it will make the peaceful solution much more difficult and complex to resolve. It will also give the Houthis the upper hand militarily politically  and economically  as they could be on the verge of taking over  Marib, the last stronghold of the legitimate government of Hadi, which many depend on for oil and gas resources in that region.

Taking over Marib will strengthen the Houthis  and play into their expansionist policies.  This could become very dangerous for the south and the Houthis persuing this policy may  decide to take over the south again through Shabwa. And, I think, such a development is not in the interest of anybody since if they could, the Houthis would take over the whole of Yemen – as they tried to do in 2015.

Allowing the Houthis to take over the country will be a  huge  disaster for the whole of Yemen considering that this is a self imposed unelected  group  that does not want to share power with anyone because they believe they have a God-given right to rule Yemen as they see themselves as descendants of the Prophet Mohammed.

They are also a sectarian group who are creating sectarian divisions that did not previously exist in Yemen.  We need to be aware that the more land they take and the influence they have, the stronger they become as a group at the international negotiating table. The intensification of the war  and Houthi expansionist policy gives them no motivation to engage in international negotiations.

Q. How do you evaluate the recent development of U.S. President Joe Biden taking the Iran-backed Houthis off the country’s terror list?

I believe that the Houthis are a power and a part of Yemen’s reality that we cannot ignore, and therefore they have every right to be involved in a peaceful, negotiated settlement. I also think that being taken off the list of terrorists by the United States has emboldened them. They have seen this as an opportunity to advance into Marib.

I believe that the peaceful solution is the only way forward, but it needs tough and consistent diplomatic effort. I think that an international intervention at this point is critical. I hope that U.S. President Biden is going to push forward a strong diplomatic effort, as was his campaign promise, because the international interest in that region is huge. That is why I think that the international and regional partners of Yemen have a huge role to play.

Yemen might not be a priority for Western countries now, but it will be a priority in the future if extremist elements take over. If geographic areas in Yemen end up ungoverned, Al Qaeda, Daesh (ISIS), and other forms of extremists may fill that vacuum. Therefore, it is in the interest of the international community to bring this war to an end.

We encourage all actors involved to have a look at our proposal seriously because we are confident that our proposal provides a peaceful solution. We also believe that if people have a road map, a vision with regard to their future in Yemen, they will eventually start settling their differences through  proposed peaceful solutions.

Q. The first stage of the Road Map (2021-2022) primarily focuses on an immediate ceasefire and a meaningful series of negotiations with the actors involved. A transitional government could be set up for one year paving the way for a two region solution and ensuring the provision of essential servies. What does the second stage of the proposal entail?

After we manage to resolve the issue of ceasefires during the first stage (2021-2022), we can move towards the second stage (2022-2025), which proposes a two-region solution. While President Hadi may continue to be the president of Yemen, the two regions, one in the north, one in the south, will have their own parliaments, political parties, ministries, legislative and judicial powers, budget, internal security forces, and police. A central administration will be responsible for defense, foreign policy, and the allocation of an equitable share of national revenue to the two regions. There should also be national reconciliation within the northerners and the southerners.

Q. What is the key motivation for your proposal to have a two-region solution in Yemen?

If you look at the north, there are different actors and they are all fighting each other. If you look at the south, there are still skirmishes, even though there is the Riyadh Agreement. If we can achieve a reconciliation among the political divisions in the south and north, we would have extremely positive results. I believe that having two national conferences on both sides would lead to much more trust and understanding between the warring factions in each region.

The two-region solution would also give them time to build the country, the institutions, and the infrastructure, which have been destroyed during the war. Yemen is not a poor country; it is poorly governed. Yemen can be in a better situation. It has almost everything that a country requires to become a great nation. It has rich resources of oil, gas, fisheries, beaches, and tourism.

I would rather have two states live in peace side-by-side than have one state fighting within itself  which is what we have had since 1990. It does not matter whether we have one state or two states or two regions? What matters is that people begin to understand that there is a  potential win-win situation for everybody. That is why the two-region solution is a coherent strategy, which the international community should support with its diplomatic efforts.

Q. The second stage chiefly focuses on the political organization and institutionalization in south and north Yemen. How does this transitional stage relate to the third and final stage (2025–2030) that should determine the future of Yemen?

I believe that once we have the two-region solution running for a couple of years, eventually during the third stage (2025-2030), we could have a national referendum, one in the north and one in the south, where people can decide in each region whether to opt for two independent states (as was the case before 1990) or continue with the two-region solution.

Q. What other challenges or opportunities should we expect with regard to the feasibility of the road map to end the war in Yemen?

The failure to reach an international peaceful settlement in Yemen is a failure of the whole world. Fifteen million people are facing one of the biggest humanitarian crises in the world. There is a new generation of young people, who have not been to school for the last six or seven years.

This crushes the ambition of the children in Yemen, who should aspire to be doctors, engineers, or teachers. Instead, today, we have children carrying guns because they think that the war is a solution to their problems. We need to reverse this psychology. We need to make sure that people think we can make peace possible.

We believe that our peaceful solution is a real opportunity for the Houthis, the STC, and the internationally recognized government to get together around the negotiation table and pursue a peaceful solution that will break divisions among them, the people, the region, and the international community.

APPENDIX

Keynotes from “The First Road Map to End Yemen’s War (2021-2030)

The first stage (2021-2022) focuses on a permanent ceasefire and the imposition of sanctions on anyone profiting from the war. Economic development is given precedence over humanitarian aid with an international body supporting the development of the north and south, and ensuring accountability in the use of the Central Bank funds.

The second stage (2022-2025) proposes a two-region solution: one region in the north and the other in the south each with its own parliament, political parties, executive, ministries, legislative and judicial powers, budget, internal security forces, and police. A central administration will be responsible for defense, foreign policy, and the allocation of an equitable share of national revenue to the two regions.

During the third stage (2025-2030) a national referendum, one in the north and one in the south, would be held to decide whether or not to opt for two independent states (as was the case before 1990) or continue with the two-region solution.

Friends of South Yemen (FOSY) was founded in June 2020 to provide information about Yemen in the English language. Such information was lacking after the suspension of the publication of the Yemen Times and the Yemen Observer due to the ongoing war.

On 10 January, then-US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo announced that the U.S. government would be designating the Houthis as a terrorist organisation drawing criticism from aid agencies and U.N. diplomats.

However, the decision also drew praise from Yemen’s internationally-recognised government and other Yemenis who have lamented the descent of their country into war following the Houthi overthrow of the democratic transition in 2014. Nevertheless, the extent to which the designation will affect the conflict, or even the peace process is unclear.

Aid agencies

Human rights organisations and aid agencies have decried the designation, asserting that it hampers efforts to assist a population that is in the midst of one of the worst humanitarian crises in the world.

The designation complicates the process of acquisition of aid, and its subsequent delivery in territories that are currently under the control of the Houthis. This includes the capital Sanaa which continues to reel from the impact of the conflict, and the wider famine that the country is experiencing.

Moreover, aid agencies have argued that the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organisation is ill-considered as it fails to clarify the necessary exemptions to prevent shipping companies, banks, and other commercial entities involved in the supply of emergency assistance to the country from falling foul of designation.

This therefore threatens to deter these necessary entities from engaging with Yemen, exacerbating the already dire situation.

U.N. diplomats involved in peace efforts have also lamented the designation of the Houthis as a terrorist organization, asserting that it complicates efforts to bring the parties together in what is already a complex political and military landscape. By designating the Houthis as terrorists, the argument is that they will be less inclined to engage with international efforts to bring the parties back to the table once more.

Moreover, the designation is believed to have come at the worst possible time as optimism was increasing prior to the announcement that Saudi Arabia and the Houthis were seriously considering negotiations.

Impact on peace efforts

However, the suggestion by aid agencies and the U.N. that the designation hampers peace efforts has been received by many as naïve, and another example of the failure of the international parties to fully grasp the nature of the conflict and understand its complexities.

However, the international community’s insistence on talks at such an important crossroads in the war eliminated this possibility. Houthis fully welcomed the call for talks, using the negotiation period effectively to re-entrench themselves and regroup, before deciding to renege on the agreement that they never had any intention of abiding by in the first place.

The Houthis have made it increasingly clear that their preferred system of governance is one that recognizes the divine right of the Houthi family to rule over Yemen in a manner similar to the Imamate that was overthrown in 1962.

It is in this context that the international community has been heavily criticized by many for failing to consider Yemen’s unique history in that the Houthis’ armed overthrow of the internationally-recognized government in 2014 was not uniquely the result of circumstances specific to the time, but rather a seventh armed attempt at asserting Houthi supremacy.

Even Houthi participation in the National Dialogue alongside all of Yemen’s political parties and representatives of civil society, and their subsequent agreement to abide by its outcomes and eventual elections, did not suffice to prevent a renewed armed attempt at seizing power. Therefore, the suggestion that the designation hampers peace efforts is detached from Yemen’s more complicated recent history with peace processes generally.

Rather, many have argued that what truly hampers the peace process in Yemen is the imbalance in military power that enables the Houthis to remain entrenched in the capital, and that renders the internationally-recognized government that emerged from the democratic transition (that included the entire spectrum of Yemen’s political landscape) militarily impotent to reassert itself.

In military terms, the designation changes little. The Houthi offensive on Ma’rib continues to rage, and their grip on the capital Sanaa has tightened to the extent that Tehran has sent an ambassador to recognise the Houthi ‘administration’.

The internationally-recognised government, while welcoming of the decision to designate the Houthis as terrorists, is unable to capitalise as it remains hamstrung by its official ally UAE’s preference for the Southern Separatists who are more inclined towards secession, and as Saudi Arabia scrambles to prepare to navigate pressure to rein in military activity from the new Biden administration.

Iran

However, while the focus of the discussion over the designation has been on Yemen, the reality is that it has far more to do with Iran and scuppering prospective attempts by the new Biden administration to pursue a new deal with Iran. Biden has already made clear that he intends to pressure Saudi Arabia and the Arab coalition into ending the war.

This means that Washington is less interested in restoring the internationally-recognised government, and is more inclined to push for negotiations.

Based on the current political and military dynamics, the three main parties that will dominate the negotiating table will be the Houthis who are backed by Iran, the internationally-recognised government which is tentatively backed by Saudi Arabia, and the Southern Separatists who are backed by the UAE. In other words, any negotiations superimposed by the Biden administration will require the buy-in of Tehran, and therefore some form of dialogue between them.

Iran is likely to view negotiations in Yemen as part of the wider talks over a nuclear deal as it seeks concessions and compensation over Trump’s unilateral withdrawal from the 2015 agreement.

The conflict in Yemen began in September 2014 when the Houthi rebels commenced their gradual, but violent takeover of the capital city Sana’a. This led to a coup that forced President Abdurabbuh Mansour Hadi out to his home town and temporary capital city, Aden in February 2015.

By March, Saudi Arabia formed a military coalition, including the United Arab Emirates, to oust the rebels, restore the government and to bring stability to the region. The coalition became notorious for violating human rights, bombing civilians and destroying vital Yemeni infrastructure.

Both Saudi Arabia and the UAE agree that the Houthis are the main threat to regional security. Despite the rebels’ military capabilities have never been enough to change the balance of power in the region, their strong links to the Iranian regime turns the Houthis into a threat by proxy.

The group, which is based in the northern province of Sa’ada, which borders Saudi Arabia, has the capability to attack major Saudi cities, including Jeddah. Rockets fired from Yemeni territory are regularly intercepted, however in situations where they aren’t, the Houthis are able to inflict damage.

On November 23, 2020, the Houthis claimed responsibility for attacking an Aramco oil company distribution station in the city of Jeddah. Houthi spokesman, Yahya Sarea, warned foreign companies and residents in the neighbouring kingdom, saying they should exercise caution as “operations will continue.”

“The strike was very accurate, and ambulances and fire engines rushed to the target,” Sarea said, explaining that the Houthis used an Iranian-made Quds-2 type winged missile to carry out the attack.

Such attacks not only harm Saudi Arabia, but demoralize the rest of the Gulf Arab countries as weaknesses in their military powerhouse begin to show. Therefore, restoring relative stability and disarming the Houthis in Yemen is paramount to both Saudi Arabia and the UAE.

Where differences begin

Whilst Riyadh and Abu Dhabi agree that a stable Yemen is important to regional security, a problem therein lies in what a stable Yemen looks like and where they are able to secure their separate political and economic interests.

The UAE entered the coalition understanding the way in which Aden is significant to Abu Dhabi’s economic and strategic standing in the region. Having a strong presence in Aden means the UAE would have the luxury of the Bab al-Mandab strait, along with easier access to the Indian Ocean and more control over the Red Sea.

Spreading its sphere of influence to the Socotra Island means the UAE would be able to strengthen its commercial and military projection in the Indian Ocean, as it has shown interest through quietly pumping investment into the island and arming secessionists.

The southern separatists seek renewed independence for southern Yemen, which was ruled as a separate state until 1990.

The UAE also heavily backed local resistance forces in Aden and other parts of the southern regions to liberate them from the Houthis. However, areas from the northern areas such as Taiz, which has a reputation for being a Muslim Brotherhood stronghold, did not receive as much help from the UAE, despite it being besieged by the Houthi rebels.

On August 6, 2019, two fighters from the UAE-backed Southern Security Belt were killed during clashes with pro-Hadi government forces. A day later, the STC deputy leader, Hani bin Breik, marched on the Maasheeq Palace in Aden and called on secessionists to overthrow Hadi’s government in the coastal city.

It became clearer than ever that the UAE is fuelling a “war within a war” inside Yemen; not only distracting from the original aim of ousting the Houthis, but putting its interests in Yemen before achieving the aim of the Saudi-led coalition.

From the outside looking in, the coalition was divided which was creating yet more bloodshed in Yemen in addition to the casualties the indiscriminate coalition airstrikes have caused.

Reconciliation and hope for the future

In a bid to restore relative stability, the two sides signed a power-sharing agreement in Riyadh on November 5, 2019. The ambitious Riyadh Agreement aimed to create a 50-50 cabinet and to work together to restore the Hadi government back to Sana’a.

The unity government was initially supposed to be formed in 30 days, but it took more than a year. By December 19, 2020, the government was formed.

The unity government can be as successful as long as the reasons behind its formation remain stronger than the divisions that continue to haunt northern and southern Yemen. It’s impossible to say that the newly formed government will solve a problem that created wars between the two populations and caused southern separatists to believe that northern Yemen was occupying the south.

In order to nurture a strong unity government that goes beyond temporarily sustaining peace, grievances of both populations need to be heard and longer-term solutions must be brought to the table by creating a democratic space and ample conflict resolution. The unity government must be seen as a stepping stone to lasting stability, not an ultimate achievement.

Women, local leaders and religious and tribal figures need to be included and sustainable vision for a well-represented and localised Yemeni government must be on the table for a fruitful post-war vision. As it stands, the unity government is all-male, creating a cabinet that excludes women for the first time in 20 years.

Can the explosion create more divisions?

On December 30, 2020, an aircraft carrying members of the recently formed unity government landed at Aden International Airport, only for the passengers to be met with explosion and gunfire as they disembarked.

The attack left 25 people dead and 110 others injured, but none of the passengers were hurt. At the wake of the attack, there were concerns how such an assault could affect the unity government.

Both the Hadi government and the STC blamed the Houthi rebels of the attack. Yemen’s Prime Minister Maeen Abdulmalik sustained accusation that the Houthis were behind the explosions.

“Preliminary investigations indicate that Houthi militias stand behind this crime,” Saeed said as the newly reshuffled Cabinet met for the first time in Aden on December 31, 2020, adding that “intelligence also indicates that some Iranian experts were prepping for such an operation over the last few months.”

Yemenis are not going hungry. They are being starved.” This statement from the UN Under-Secretary-General Mark Lowcock accurately describes the famine in Yemen which is a man-made disaster brought about by five years of civil war.

The areas worst affected by acute food insecurity are the Marib, Taizz, and Al Jawf governorates in the north, and those of Al Bayda, Abyan, and Hadramaut in the south.

After the Houthis, a hardline Shia sect backed by the Iranian regime overthrew the internationally recognized government in Sanaa in 2014 and took control of most of the north, an Arab coalition led by Saudi Arabia began airstrikes against areas held by the Houthis in March 2015. The bombings still continue; ceasefires are violated and civilians suffer as the infrastructure and health facilities are destroyed.

More than 1,900 of the country’s 3,500 health facilities are currently either not functioning or partially functioning with insufficient staff and equipment, leaving half the population without adequate healthcare. Yemeni forces, the Houthis and the Saudi-led Arab coalition have attacked over 100 medical facilities. Water and sanitation systems have also been destroyed.

According to the UN, as of November 5, 2020, there have been more than 900,000 suspected cholera cases and 2,192 associated deaths have been reported. More than half of the suspected cases are children. People have also been affected by malaria, dengue fever, shortages of clean drinking water, severe flooding, and locust swarms.

Lack of adequate food supplies leading to hunger, malnutrition, and famine is the greatest humanitarian tragedy caused by the war.

Yemenis, many of whose health conditions have already deteriorated, now face the COVID-19 pandemic. As of August 30, the government confirmed 1,950 cases and 564 COVID-19-related deaths, but the UN has warned that the actual number of cases and deaths is much higher.

The World Health Organization’s (WHO) prediction of a worst-case scenario, namely that 93% of a population of nearly 30 million would be infected with the virus, is about to become a reality.

An estimated 4.3 million people have fled from their homes since the start of the conflict in 2014 and approximately 3.3 million remain displaced. The camps of internally displaced persons are fertile ground for the spread of COVID-19 and other diseases such as cholera and scabies.

Lack of adequate food supplies leading to hunger, malnutrition, and famine is the greatest humanitarian tragedy caused by the war. In March 2020, UNICEF estimated that 2 million children under the age of 5 suffer from acute malnutrition.

The magnitude of the crisis is illustrated by the fact that one child dies every 12 minutes.  In May, UNICEF described Yemen as “the largest humanitarian crisis in the world” – a country where 80 percent of the population, which amounts to over 26 million people, were in need of humanitarian assistance.

In 2018, Save the Children reported that over 85,000 children had died since the beginning of the conflict as a direct result of famine. Since then, entire communities have been decimated by hunger. Nearly half of all Yemeni children suffer stunted growth because of malnutrition which also impairs their cognitive development.

However, aid agencies say that in 2019 and 2020, they spent vast amounts of their time and energy struggling to get approvals countrywide to provide assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and without the authorities’ interference.

In late 2019, the UN-commissioned report by the University of Denver Assessing the Impact of War on Development in Yemen confirmed that more Yemenis had died of hunger, disease, and lack of health clinics than from fighting; the figure was estimated at 131,00 people.

War in comparison was responsible for 100,000 deaths – a figure published by the Armed Conflict Location and Event Data Project (ACLED) which tracks confirmed fatalities of war.

Between 2015 and 2019 international donors gave the UN-led aid response in Yemen $8.35 billion, including $3.6billion in 2019 that reached almost 14 million people each month with some form of aid. This was up from 7.5 million people in 2018.

However, aid agencies say that in 2019 and 2020, they spent vast amounts of their time and energy struggling to get approvals countrywide to provide assistance in accordance with humanitarian principles and without the authorities’ interference.

Partly in response to the obstruction of aid, donor support to UN aid agencies collapsed in June 2020, particularly from Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and the United States. As of August 28, aid agencies received only 24 percent of the $3.4 billion they requested for the year.

While funding the aid efforts, the Unites States, United Kingdom, France, Canada, and others have sold arms to the Saudi-led coalition, worsening Yemen’s humanitarian crisis. The U.K. has given £1 billion in aid to Yemen but has licensed £6.5 billion worth of arms to the countries bombing it.

The funding crisis has had a dire impact on Yemeni civilians, including the halving of food assistance to 9 million people and the suspension of support to healthcare services, which the UN says has put the lives of millions on the line.

But there is money in Yemen to assist humanitarian efforts.

A UN Panel of Experts reported in June 2017 that the Houthis had earned up to $1.14 billion from fuel and oil distribution on the black market and that fuel was “one of the main sources of revenue for the Houthis.” However, for the warring factions, humanitarian aid is not a priority.

All parties to the conflict in Yemen have stood in the way of humanitarian aid delivery, demanded that taxes be levied, and aid rerouted so that it would benefit their respective militias.

In September 2020, Human Rights Watch published a 65-page report titled Deadly Consequences: Obstruction of Aid in Yemen During Covid-19 which details systematic interference in relief operations by the Houthi authorities, Yemen’s internationally recognized government and affiliated forces, the UAE, and the Southern Transitional Council.

The Houthis have a particularly egregious record of obstructing aid agencies from reaching civilians and diverting aid to their supporters and fighters.

In 2019 and 2020, aid workers had to push back against Houthi officials insisting they hand over their cars, computers, and cell phones at the end of projects.

But obstruction of aid agencies in government-held areas in the south and east is also on the rise. In July 2020, Lowcock said that aid agencies reported an “uptick in violent incidents, targeting humanitarian assets and [that] local authorities were adding new bureaucratic requirements.”

In March 2015, in violation of the laws of war, the Saudi-led coalition imposed a naval and air blockade that severely restricted the flow of food, fuel, and medicine, on which the vast majority of the population depends.

Yemen’s humanitarian crisis is not a by-product of Yemen’s institutional and political failures. It is solely the result of a protracted military conflict and only an end to the conflict will bring an end to the humanitarian crisis.

The country cannot fight a war on two fronts: the military conflict and the fight against famine and disease. The Yemenis have different political agendas: the Houthis want to continue creating an Islamic state while most southerners want to be independent from the north and establish their own state.

But they are united in their common condition of poverty, hunger, and disease. Ending the fighting and solving the humanitarian problems together can help to end the political stalemate and the pointless war which has no winners except those who trade in arms and the warlords who buy and sell people’s lives.