The headlines in the aforementioned newspapers and TVs leaned heavily towards the perpetrators’ side, with comments such as “The Coup would have been better for Turkish democracy,” “People behind Erdoğan are like sheep,” “These must have been done for a successful coup,” “Fight against DAESH will be negatively affected,” “Erdoğan deserved the coup,” and “Authoritarian tendencies will increase in Turkey.
Many factors can explain this parallel rise of Islamophobia and Islamophilia: first, the French government and the main political parties (with the notable exception of the Far-Right National Front) convincingly explained that the main objective of DAESH was to divide and polarize French society and to turn the general population against its Muslim minority.
In 2014, a group of Kurds had expected the Turkish state to support the PYD against DAESH in the battle for Kobani.
Of primary concern, here, is that acts of violence accelerated by the Arab Spring in the Middle East are subjected to a selective reading in which they are crystallized through DAESH, which helps radicalization to sink in as a religion-based phenomenon only.
In addition, benefiting from DAESH’s presence in Syria, PYD has presented itself as a multi-tool for the USA and Russia.
Increasing Cooperation Between Ankara and Washington on the Syrian Issue: How About Revisiting the Safe Zone Idea?
Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken paid a visit to Ankara where the two sides discussed the ongoing efforts to defeat DAESH and to resolve the Syrian crisis through diplomacy.
org/ex-soviet-state-fighters-in-daesh/On the international front, it is obvious that France, a newly (re)integrated NATO member, does not have the United States of America’s diplomatic and military capabilities.