Morocco’s foreign policy is at a crossroads. The Kingdom is already allocating more attention to West Africa, and there is a combined sense of apprehension and fatigue of perfidious Arab politics. Morocco’s decades-old alliance with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is going through many bumps, which led to a re-evaluation of its strategic posture vis-à-vis many conflicts, such as in Yemen and Libya.

Several multi-layered factors are seemingly behind such repositioning. Chief among them is the post-Arab Spring trajectory. Faced with waves of protests in February 2011, Morocco’s King Mohammad VI decided to deal with the protestors’ demands via dialogue and constitutional reforms, undertaking some significant reform initiatives while also co-opting different activists into the political system. Such a political move helped to stabilize the country, which managed to stand above the political fray in the Middle East and North Africa.

Morocco’s decades-old alliance with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates is going through many bumps.

In contrast, the Saudi/UAE axis chose to follow a different path. Blinded by hubris and the fixation on stopping democratic progress in the region, the axis implemented a bellicose agenda, inflaming conflicts in the process. In Morocco, media reports suggest that the UAE meddled in the internal affairs of the country to undermine the Party of Justice and Development (PJD). Elsewhere, the axis fomented coup d’états (e.g. General el-Sisi in Egypt) and supported counter-revolutionary movements (e.g. warlord Khalifa Haftar in Libya) and terrorist groups. Such an aggressive course of action transformed the Arab uprisings from peaceful demonstrations to civil wars, such as in Yemen and Libya.

In the latter case, Moroccan diplomacy achieved a historical diplomatic milestone, leading key warring parties to sign a peace agreement on December 17, 2015, in Skhirat, Morocco. This pact led to the establishment of the Government of National Accord (GNA), which was subsequently endorsed by the United Nations Security Council. The GNA went on to secure the recognition of the international community as Libya’s legitimate government.

Enjoying the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Egypt, France and Russia, warlord Khalifa Haftar, who commands a ragtag army of former Gaddafi loyalists, tribal forces, Salafi militias and mercenaries, rejected the Skhirat peace accord. Haftar has other plans: he aims to rule over the country by sheer force of arms instead of seeking political solutions. Conversely, the UN-recognised government in Tripoli continues to adhere to the Skhirat agreement, which remains in their view the framework and basis for any political solution in Libya.

Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia, key countries in North Africa, chose the path of neutrality. Morocco proposed to mediate between Qatar and the blockading countries.

The adherence to the UN-sponsored peace process (or lack thereof) has a substantial bearing on why there is little love lost between Rabat (Morocco’s capital) and Haftar. Another episode contributed to exacerbate the situation. Libya became yet another stage, in which the Gulf crisis unfolded. Key countries in North Africa (Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia) chose the path of neutrality, proposing – in the case of Morocco – to mediate between Qatar and the blockading countries.

The Moroccan King even flew to Qatar on November 12, 2017, to find solutions to the crisis. However, such a nuanced approach was not to the liking of the impetuous leaders in Riyadh, and since then Saudi provocations against Morocco multiplied. The fact that Morocco, like Turkey and Qatar (the arch nemeses of the Saudi/UAE axis), have been supporting the UN-recognised government in Libya has created an additional layer of frictions between Morocco and the Saudi/UAE axis.

Moreover, Moroccan authorities are also suspicious of El-Sisi’s designs in Libya, which, if implemented via Haftar, could have considerable spillover effects on the stability of the Maghreb region.

Back in 2013, an Egyptian military officer, who served as part of the peacekeeping force under the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) was caught on tape inciting Sahrawis to revolt against Morocco. Since then, additional reports emerged about the coordination between Egypt and pro-Polisario circles to challenge Moroccan interests. Therefore, if Haftar gets the upper hand in the country, he would likely continue such practices. He could even, like Gaddafi, provide funding and armed support to anti-Moroccan forces. Such policy would present an existential threat to Morocco’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.

If Haftar gets the upper hand in Libya, he could, like Gaddafi, provide funding and armed support to anti-Moroccan forces.

Rabat is arguably also worried about Haftar’s reliance on armed Salafi Madkhali units to expand his control. Morocco is a key regional player in the Islamic religious realm and aims to position itself as a focal centre of Islamic learning. In this context, Rabat has been active in West Africa and the Sahel for decades, promoting its religious “brand.” The latter combines Sufism, Maliki School of Islamic jurisprudence and tolerant teachings. This orientation has been officially endorsed as part of Rabat’s “pivot to sub-Saharan Africa” policy. Thus, if Haftar prevails in Libya, the latter will most likely turn into a Salafi Madkhali hub in Africa, in collision course with Morocco’s religious strategy in the continent.

Because of the destabilising policies pursued by the Saudi/UAE axis, the Arab World is now split in two camps: The first one includes forces that seek to establish constitutional political processes, pluralism, inclusive politics, and the prevention of any downward spiral into violence. Conversely, the second camp consists of the so-called counter-revolutionary forces, which aim to stop the spread of democracy and preserve authoritarianism at all costs, bringing devastation and mayhem to the entire region.

While Morocco features prominently in the former group, the Kingdom’s foreign policy towards Libya is also in sync with its diplomatic, political, security and religious concerns. Evidently, this course of action has heightened tensions between Rabat on the one hand, and Riyadh and Abu Dhabi, on the other hand. In the end, the benefits of Rabat’s principled and cohesive policy largely outweigh its disadvantages.

In the current era, three main camps define the Middle East’s geopolitical order. First, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Bahrain, and Egypt constitute a pro-U.S. bloc that favors the region’s status quo order and opposed the Arab uprisings of 2011. Second, Iran and its allies—Iraq, Syria, and Lebanon—form a pro-Iranian bloc, known as the “axis of resistance,” or the “Shi’a Crescent” as the King of Jordan identified it in 2004. Third, the Sunni Muslim states that support the Muslim Brotherhood and which embraced the political openings of 2011—Qatar and Turkey—form a camp that also includes Tunisia and Libya’s internationally-recognized government.

Jordan is navigating the regional fault lines in this increasingly polarized regional environment. Amman is trying to avoid excessively aligning with one bloc at the expense of Jordan’s ability to maintain positive and healthy relations with any major player in the Middle East. Yet with Saudi Arabia and Abu Dhabi’s Crown Princes Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) and Mohammed bin Zayed (MbZ) conducting increasingly maximalist foreign policies, Jordan, like other Sunni Arab/Muslim states, has come under pressure to back Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s agendas against Iran, Turkey, Qatar, and the Muslim Brotherhood. Yet rather than succumbing to such pressure, the Jordanian leadership has shown significant determination to resist it, largely based on Amman’s perception of MbS and MbZ’s regional agendas, as well as those of the U.S. administration, boding poorly for the Hashemite Kingdom’s basic interests.

Three main camps define the Middle East’s geopolitical order – the pro-U.S. bloc, the Shi’a Crescent, and the Sunni Muslims.

As Jordan finds itself caught in the center of numerous regional conflicts that have left the region in a state of widespread stability, the Hashemite Kingdom is keen to work with new partners that share its view on Middle Eastern challenges. The tensions that have emerged in Amman’s relations with Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Washington have left Jordan looking to diversify its allies, partners, and friends in order to maneuver in this increasingly complex geopolitical landscape. Along with Russia and Morocco, Turkey is an actor that Amman has turned to for a more cooperative relationship. Although Turkish-Jordanian relations are growing slowly, the ties are deepening steadily with much long-term potential for the future, especially given Amman’s perception of Turkey as a Sunni Muslim power that counter-balances Saudi influence in the region.

From the status of Jerusalem to the Golan Heights and threats to Syria’s territorial integrity to the Palestinian question, there are a host of issues that heavily impact Jordan’s security and economic interests, and which align Amman and Ankara. Furthermore, the expansion and consolidation of Iranian influence in the Levant unsettles both Jordan and Turkey although both states have adopted pragmatic approaches toward Tehran, with Turkey and Iran’s cooperation via the Astana Process, energy trade, and coordination against Kurdish separatists in the region being salient examples.

Amid growing geopolitical competition between the Turkish-Qatari alliance and the Saudi- and Emirati-led bloc that has played itself out during the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) crisis which erupted in mid-2017, the Libyan civil war, and the Egyptian army rule of the country since 2013. Unquestionably, the Jamal Khashoggi saga as well as stepped up support for the People’s Protection Units (YPG) from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have intensified friction between Turkey and these two Gulf capitals. The Saudi and Emirati leaders see the expansion of Turkish influence in the Arab world as a threat and officials in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi have grave concerns about a scenario whereby Jordan and Kuwait would have all options open for them to have their own alliance along with Iraq and Morocco with Egypt at a later state or to join the Ankara-Doha alliance. As some analysts have opined, a “nightmare scenario” for Saudi Arabia and the UAE would entail Jordan and Kuwait joining the Turkish-Qatari bloc, possibly presenting itself to Washington as a viable alternative bloc of US allies in the Middle East to counter Iran.

From the status of Jerusalem to the Golan Heights and threats to Syria’s territorial integrity to the Palestinian question, there are a host of issues that heavily impact Jordan’s security and economic interests, and which align Amman and Ankara.

While Saudi Arabia’s relations with a number of Arab monarchies have experienced some strain such as Kuwait and Oman as well as outright diplomatic crises in the case of Qatar and Morocco, Jordan is seeking to gain greater autonomy from Riyadh’s geopolitical orbit at a time in which more players in the Arab world are growing more unsettled by vague Saudi reactions towards some regional issues including the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Algeria and Lebanon.

Notwithstanding the Jordanian monarchy’s grave concerns with Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s actions in the region, Jordan is not on the verge of walking away from either of these two Gulf capitals which have maintained historic ties to Amman. Against the backdrop of protests against price rises jolting Jordan and raising questions about stability in the country, officials in all Gulf states have vested interests in ensuring that no wave of uprisings fuel unrest in the Hashemite Kingdom. Budgetary support to the tune of USD 2.5 billion for Jordan from Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Kuwait, which was offered last year at a summit held in Mecca, underscored Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s commitment to working with the Jordanian leadership to thwart any repeat of the unrest of 2011. Yet such financial assistance from the Gulf comes with strings and officials in Amman are aware that Riyadh and Abu Dhabi’s support will put Jordan under greater pressure to align with the Saudi/UAE-led bloc against other regional players including Turkey and Iran.

For many years, Amman’s close alliance with Washington has heavily concealed many of the Hashemite Kingdom’s internal problems. Yet against the backdrop of declining U.S. influence in the Middle East as the world grows increasingly multipolar and the leadership in Amman finds Trump’s foreign policy too incohesive, aggressively pro-Israel, and transactional, Jordan is beginning to view its foreign policy strategies differently. As chaotic turmoil in countries throughout the region continues threatening Jordan’s security, the government in Amman faces myriad challenges stemming from communal strains, to political agitation, economic weakness, and other drivers of instability. Such circumstances have naturally created major foreign policy dilemmas for the Hashemite Kingdom. Looking ahead, Jordan’s challenge will be to maintain healthy relations with its traditional partners in the Arabian Peninsula while still maintaining enough autonomy to act independently on regional issues where Amman’s interests clash with those of Riyadh and Abu Dhabi.

An overlooked aspect of the United Arab Emirates (UAE)’s approach to international relations is Abu Dhabi’s incorporation of Islam into its foreign policy. In what is called the “geopolitics of religious soft power,” the UAE utilizes Islam to strengthen its regime’s legitimacy, compete with rival states’ visions for Islamic leadership, and project an image of moderation and tolerance before global actors, namely Western countries. Along with Egypt, Jordan, and Morocco, the UAE has sought to present itself as a purveyor of “moderate Islam” that stands firmly against extremism. This pillar of the UAE’s foreign policy became increasingly important following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, which two Emirati hijackers carried out with 17 others mainly from Saudi Arabia, as well as the Islamic State’s meteoric rise to power in Iraq and Syria in 2014.

The UAE is seeking to shape discourse about religion, political Islam, extremism, and terrorism. In the process, the Emiratis are attempting to position the UAE as a central actor in the interfaith dialogue between prominent figures of different religions while also improving their country’s image as a bastion of tolerance in the Middle East. Most recently exemplified by the Gulf state’s decision to become the first Arabian Peninsula country to host the Pope last month, Abu Dhabi’s message to the West, Russia, and many countries worldwide that is that the UAE is at the frontier of enlightened Islam and that the Emiratis are seeking to eradicate extremism from the Muslim world.

The UAE utilizes Islam to strengthen its regime’s legitimacy, compete with rival states’ visions for Islamic leadership, and project an image of moderation and tolerance before global actors, namely Western countries.

Domestic Emirati politics

Unquestionably, domestic considerations heavily influence the UAE’s use of Islam in its foreign policy. At the heart of the Emiratis’ reasons for utilizing religion in this manner is the Abu Dhabi regime’s fears of political Islam fueling change in the Emirates. In the 1990s, the UAE’s leadership began viewing the country’s local Muslim Brotherhood branch, al-Islah, as a grave threat to the Emirati rulers from both ideational and security standpoints, seeing members of the movement as loyal to an international cause above their monarchs.

Since the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011, which led to several autocratic Arab regimes falling before Islamists gained from subsequent democratic political openings, officials in Abu Dhabi have been especially concerned about how the winds of change that picked up in the Maghreb could blow into the Arabian Peninsula. Although the UAE and Qatar (the GCC’s two wealthiest states in terms of income per capita) did not experience major unrest during the Arab Spring, the other four member-states of the Council plus Yemen did to varying degrees, demonstrating how the Gulf region was no longer fortressed from the turmoil throughout the rest of the greater Middle East.

Yet given the UAE’s stability and prosperity, it is worth asking why the Emirati rulers are extremely sensitive about political Islam in the UAE, as well as the region. On what grounds does the UAE’s leadership fear the potential for any Islamist-led revolution or mass uprising in the Emirates?

Islam is extremely influential and deeply politicized in all societies across the Arabian Peninsula’s seven countries. This is the case even for the more seemingly secular ones such as the UAE, where Islam is the official religion of the state. In the Emirates, Sharia law is the basis of legislation and the country’s rulers use religious rhetoric to sustain their legitimacy. The UAE’s leadership is sensitive about religious discourse and its impact on politics. Engaging with religious ideas is important for countering Islamist narratives that accuse the al-Nahyan of deviating from Islamic values and corruption. Such Islamist voices that have attacked the Emirati leadership have often pointed to Western “decadence” in the UAE such as the bikini-clad foreign women on beaches, alcohol, and prostitution that is rampant across Dubai and Abu Dhabi. Concerns about socially and religiously conservative elements of society, who believe that the UAE has “modernized” too quickly mobilizing in opposition to the country’s leadership, will continue to inform the Abu Dhabi regime’s views on political Islam and strategies for addressing it both internally and externally across the region.

From the perspective of Abu Dhabi’s leadership, the potential for Islamists in the UAE to use Islam in public discourse represents a national threat to the Emirates’ stability and security, at least as the country’s authorities see it. Not entering such religious debates that ask fundamental questions about Islam risks allowing Islamists to fill ideological vacuums that the state cannot permit.

On what grounds does the UAE’s leadership fear the potential for any Islamist-led revolution or mass uprising in the Emirates?

Al-Azhar: The Egyptian school

The UAE works with the Cairo-based al-Azhar Mosque to promote its “moderate” religious agenda. The Emiratis have funded al-Azhar hospitals in Egypt and opened branches in the Emirates for this institution of Islamic learning. Following the ouster of Egypt’s first democratically-elected President Mohammed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood party, as well as in the lead up to the military coup of 2013, al-Azhar endorsed the Armed Forces’ usurpation of power.

The UAE’s ties with al-Azhar factor into a coordinated effort on the part of Egypt, the UAE, and Russia to counter the forces of political Islam. An example of Abu Dhabi promoting a greater role for al-Azhar throughout the Sunni Muslim world, was the Chechnya conference held in August 2016. Participants included representatives of many strands of Sunni Islam who came together to discuss a sensitive question in today’s Islamic world: “Who is a Sunni?” Notable was the absence of Salafi scholars and the fact that the Abu Dhabi-based Tabah foundation organized this conference.

The Muslim Council of Elders, understood by many to be an entity established by the Emiratis in order to challenge the Doha-based International Union for Muslim Scholars, played a key role in the conference. The Muslim Council of Elders is closely linked to al-Azhar with its imam, who spoke in Chechnya, serving as its head. The conference ended with a closing statement demanding that Muslims work to restore vitality to al-Azhar. The conference reflected “a concrete expression of the new Emirati-Egyptian-Russian axis seeking to neutralize political Islam and counter Islamic extremism with support for more tolerant Sunni traditions,” as Kristin Smith Diwan wrote.

Looking ahead, will Abu Dhabi have much success in terms of positioning the UAE as a purveyor of “moderate Islam” and interfaith dialogue? Would this image enhance the UAE’s influence with wider segments of societies across the Middle East and wider Islamic world? There is reason to be skeptical based on the ways in which Abu Dhabi’s focus on “moderation” in its efforts to enhance the Emiratis’ soft-power influence is largely about the UAE’s leadership establishing a narrative to justify the state’s dissolution of space for political dialogue.

Internationally, there is growing skepticism of the UAE’s claims to stand for tolerance and openness, especially following the international media’s growing attention to the case of imprisoned Emirati human rights activist, Ahmed Mansoor, against the backdrop of the Matthew Hedges case in 2018. Asking what “tolerance” means within an Emirati context is fair given the UAE’s authoritarian political system that bans political parties and has no tolerance for dissent.

Despite the reasons to question whether the UAE can realistically establish a bloc of religiously “moderate” states in the Middle East, Abu Dhabi’s efforts to do so factor in to Crown Prince Mohammed bin Zayed’s vision for protecting a regional status quo that the Arab Spring uprisings jolted in 2011. The odds are good that the UAE will continue to incorporate Islam into its foreign policy in order to counter perceived threats and achieve greater legitimacy as a rising power in the Islamic world. As Abu Dhabi continues waging its struggle in a battle for ideas and values in an Arab world undergoing drastic change and faced with threats of extremism in virtually all of its countries, the UAE will remain in competition with other state and non-state actors from Saudi Arabia and Iran to Turkey and extremists such as Islamic State and al-Qaeda for control over Islamic discourse.

On December 2, Qatar’s Minister of State for Energy Affairs, Saad Sherida al-Kaabi, announced the withdrawal of his country from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) effective starting from January 2019. The Minister said the decision was a strategic one, which is based on economic considerations that has nothing to do with politics and aims to serve Doha’s long interests.

This sudden and unexpected development came almost one month after the governmental reshuffle in Doha during which Saad Sherida al-Kaabi was named as the new Minister of State for Energy Affairs. Before assuming his new position, al-Kaabi was the CEO of Qatar Petroleum (QP) and the Chairman of Qatar Gas (QG). He joined QP in a very early stage and rose quickly to the highest position. During the last 12 years, al-Kaabi directed QP’s Oil & Gas ventures directorate, where he oversaw all of Qatar’s oil and gas fields’ developments as well as all the exploration activities. In this sense, al-Kaabi was seen as an ambitious and aggressive actor.

Doha is not a big player in terms of oil, it produces around 650k b/d which makes it OPEC’s 11th biggest oil producer accounting for less than 2 percent of the total output. However, when it comes to the gas, there is a different story to tell. The small Gulf Emirate is the world’s leading LNG exporter and holds the world’s third largest gas reserves which accounts around 14% of the global reserves. Before 1997, Doha’s exports of gas were almost zero. Within eight years only, Qatar managed to increase its LNG exports to around 20 million tons. In 2009, it almost doubled that quantity raising it to around 37 million tons and finally to around 77 million tons since the end of 2011.

The Saudi control of OPEC constrains the ability of small countries to express themselves and to play an effective role in the decision-making process.

In a press conference held in July 2017, al-Kaabi announced that QP will be increasing the North Gas Field production by the equivalent of one million barrels of oil per day and double the size of the new gas project in the southern sector of the North Field to 4 billion cubic feet/day. The announcement came amid the Gulf Crisis, which made it a huge challenge. However, despite being under blockade from its neighbors, al-Kaabi’s statement gave the impression that Doha is in favorable position to carry out such a project in terms of timing and costs.

The huge project will take around five to seven years to finish. It is expected to raise Qatar’s gas production from 77 million tons per year to around 110 million tons per year, that is around 43% increase, which is almost equal to the equivalent of 6.2 million barrels of oil per day. Once completed, the mega project will further enhance Qatar’s position to the top of the global gas industry and help Doha defend its leading position against newly coming rivals such as Australia and even U.S.

The decision to quit OPEC is expected to give the Gulf Emirate both the ability and the flexibility needed to better utilize its resources and to focus on expanding its powers in the gas field. Being a minister now means that al-Kaabi enjoys the ultimate power to undertake his ambitious project and turn it into reality. Although the Qatari Minister ruled out the political factor in the decision to quit OPEC, it is really hard to neglect such a dimension in Doha’s calculations. The Minister himself indirectly admitted this fact when he said “We are not saying we are going to get out of the oil business but it is controlled by an organization managed by a country.”

OPEC is being used by the big players to suit their national interests by utilizing the capacity of the smaller players and forcing them to accept policies which might not necessarily serve their own interests at certain times and circumstances.

The Saudi control of OPEC is obviously constraining the ability of small countries to express themselves and to play an effective role in the decision-making process. The organization is supposed to take into consideration the interests of its member states and to utilize their joint powers to their greater good. Instead, OPEC is being used by the big players to suit their national interests by utilizing the capacity of the smaller players and forcing them to accept policies which might not necessarily serve their own interests at certain times and circumstances.

The decision to quit OPEC had a wide support among Qataris. Qatar’s former PM and FM Sheikh Hamad bin Jassim al-Thani expressed his support for the decision by saying “It is a wise decision. This organization has become useless, and adds nothing to us. It’s used for purposes that hurt our national interest.” Like other Gulf countries, Qatar depends on oil and gas revenues to support its economy. However, according to IMF estimates, Doha would need the price per barrel to be around $47 to break even on its fiscal budget compared to $88 in Saudi Arabia. As a small oil player, Qatar had not much to lose by quitting the organization and thus, the political message was much stronger than the step itself.

From this perspective, the decision to quit OPEC is not only a protest against such mechanism which is increasingly monopolized by Saudi Arabia, but also a statement which says that Doha is no longer willing to play by rules and conditions dictated by Saudi Arabia. It is a declaration that from now on, Doha will put its national interest ahead of anything else and will pursue it by following a more independent foreign policy.

The decision to quit OPEC is not only a protest against OPEC, which is increasingly monopolized by Saudi Arabia, but also a statement which says that Doha is no longer willing to play by rules and conditions dictated by Saudi Arabia.

Many experts speculate that no serious consequences will follow Doha’s decision to quit the organization whether regarding the oil prices or regarding OPEC itself. After all, Doha is a small player in OPEC and it is not the first time a member state decides to withdraw its membership. However, this doesn’t mean that the step will be merely symbolic either. Most probably, Qatar’s decision will raise more questions about the way the organization is running and most probably about the feasibility of its existence as long as it is seen under the control of one state.

By leaving OPEC, Doha managed to highlight again the negative implications of the Saudi foreign policies since MBS rose to power in the Kingdom in the last few years. Many countries are feeling frustrated and tired as a result of this shaky reckless Saudi behavior. In this context, the Qatari decision might encourage others to follow the same line especially if Riyadh maintained the same attitude in the future.

Yemen’s revolutionary uprisings in 2011 soon evolved into a complicated crisis that involved many regional and international actors. As in the case of Syria and Libya, the political uncertainty and instability in the country deepened as the intervention of external actors increased. The following process caused a spill-over in the conflict. Today, Yemen is witnessing a struggle between the Saudi-led coalition and the United Arab Emirates, and the Houthis supported by Iran.

The most damaging consequences of the political disagreement and power struggle in the country are on the civilians. The Saudi-led Operation Decisive Storm, which began in 2015, caused the death of a significant number of civilians. Despite the fact that Saudi Arabia had supposedly changed the nature of the operation into a political process by replacing Decisive Storm with Restoring Hope, Riyadh and its allies continued to use disproportionate attacks on civilians. According to international observes, the number of civilian casualties exceeded ten thousand, including children that constitute around 20% of these losses.

Although Saudi Arabia replaced the Operation Decisive Storm with the Operation Restoring Hope with an emphasis on the diplomatic process, Riyadh and its allies still attack on civilians disproportionally.

Increasing intensity of violence and the blockade that has been imposed on the Houthi-led areas in Yemen has created dire conditions for civilians. It has been reported that due to the blockade, at least 5 million people are in risk of losing their lives due to famine and shortage of medical support. This has been closely monitored by international organizations, as well as media channels that have shared heart-breaking images of children who are struggling to survive due to starvation. This has forced the international community to make calls for the termination of the humanitarian crisis in Yemen.

It can be argued that the global public opinion believes that Saudi Arabia and the UAE are the main actors responsible for the humanitarian catastrophe in Yemen. Although the Iran-backed Houthis also play a role in the deepening of the conflict, the use of disproportionate force by the Saudi-led coalition on civilians has caused humanitarian problems on the ground. Both regional and international actors have criticized the coalition due to its targeting of civilians and causing the death of thousands of Yemeni children and women.

A recent UN report states that the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia bombed civilian settlements, market places, funeral ceremonies, weddings, fishing boats, and health clinics, all in the scope of war crimes.

In a report published by the United Nations in August, it was noted that the coalition forces led by Saudi Arabia undermined serious human rights violations in Yemen. The report also stated that coalition forces bombed civilian settlements, market places, funeral ceremonies, weddings, fishing boats, and health clinics, and that these situations could be evaluated within the scope of war crimes.

On the other hand, another significant development in this sense is the fact that some Western countries have decided to stop their arms sales to Saudi Arabia and the UAE due to their human rights violations in Yemen. Most recently, German Chancellor Angela Merkel announced that Germany would no longer approve future arms deals to Saudi Arabia. A similar decision was taken by Spain and Norway. In addition, many influential groups in the U.S., U.K., and Canada have been putting serious pressure on their respective governments in order to cancel their arms deals with these two countries in the Gulf.

To end the suffering of the Yemeni people, the international community must put pressure on Saudi Arabia and Iran and their local proxies to come to the table.

It is therefore clear that the international community is uncomfortable with the war in Yemen. However, the humanitarian crisis in the country still does not play an important role in the agenda pursued by global actors in regards to the Middle East. Issues such as the Syrian Civil War, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Daesh, and the migration of Syrian refugees to Europe are considered to be more serious issues than the Yemen crisis. At this point, it is of great importance for countries like Turkey, who can play a game changer role in the Middle East, to act responsibly and put pressure on the warring parties in order to stop their activities.

The international community ought to take a stance and help to end the suffering of the Yemeni people. The international community must put pressure on particularly Saudi Arabia and Iran as well as their local proxies to come to the table in order to find a peaceful solution to the years-long crisis in Yemen. Otherwise, civilians will continue to pay the price of a regional power struggle between rival ideologies.

Egypt has been experiencing continuing instability since the military coup that took place on July 3, 2013. The coup was a turning point for the political life in Egypt and in the Middle East. A number of regional and international actors closely followed the developments taking place in Egypt since the coup. These actors supported the military coup and the regime that came to power in the following period. This international support for the post-coup regime in Egypt can be analysed on two levels: regional and global.

On the regional level there are three major actors that supported the military coup in Egypt: Israel, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. The main motivation behind this support for the coup was to prevent the Muslim Brotherhood from becoming a regional power base. Therefore, a strategy to eliminate the Muslim Brotherhood from the regional political arena was developed. As the movement rose to power in Egypt, the anti-Ikhwan alliance suspected that the movement would increase its influence in regional politics. The United Arab Emirates and Saudi Arabia in particular have undertaken this strategy. While Abu Dhabi and Riyadh did not provide any political and financial support for the Morsi regime, they funded anti-Morsi protests that took place on June 30, 2013.

Israel, on the other hand, also preferred the end of the Muslim Brotherhood’s rule in Egypt. The possibility of Morsi’s more aggressive policy towards Israel and his aspirations of establishing a strong regional alliance with Turkey were the main reasons for Israel’s support for the regime change in Egypt. Tel-Aviv also believed that the increasing power of the Muslim Brotherhood in the region would seriously affect Israel’s policies in the Middle East.

On the international level, almost all Western countries, especially the U.S., Britain, France, Germany and Italy, supported the military coup in Egypt. There are four main reasons for this support: (1) Removing the Muslim Brotherhood from power, (2) Establishing a pro-Western secular-militarist regime, (3) Instating a government that would serve the interests of the West; and (4) Preventing new regional alliances.

In the aftermath of the coup, the Sisi regime in Egypt paid back its debt to Western countries with large purchases of defense products. Despite economic hardships, Egypt bought around 10 billion USD worth of warplanes and ships from France and the regime became one of top weapons importer from Germany. Similarly, Egypt’s imports of arms from Britain and Italy have also increased.

The support given by the U.S. to the military coup in Egypt was particularly important. In response to this support, the Sisi regime gave full support to Washington’s policies towards the region. The most recent case of this support was the low-level reaction of the Sisi regime in regards to the U.S.’s recognition of Jerusalem as the capital of Israel. Cairo also followed a similar policy line with Washington when it comes to U.S. policy toward the Gulf region.

A similar situation can be observed in relations between the Gulf and Egypt. The most enthusiastic supporters of the military coup were the UAE and Saudi Arabia. In return to their support, these countries expected the Sisi regime to meet their demands in regional politics. As a result, the Sisi administration transferred the strategic Tiran and Sanafir islands to Saudi Arabia and supported the political blockade initiated by the UAE against Qatar. Cairo also followed Saudi and Emirati instructions in its policies toward regional issues such as Libya and Yemen.

It is obvious that the current Egyptian regime cannot follow an independent foreign policy. It is simply because the Sisi regime is directly or indirectly controlled by the actors that supported the military coup in 2013. It can also also argued that as the regime in Cairo has no political legitimacy or popular support, it would be far from achieving a peaceful political environment in the country.

Last Sunday, Turkey held one of the most symbolic elections in its recent history. The election was the final step to shift the political system of the country to a presidential one. By receiving nearly 53% of the votes, Recep Tayyip Erdogan became the first President of Turkey. His AK Party also received around 42% of the votes and become the leading party in parliament. The turnout was almost 90%, making Turkey one of the strongest democracies with the highest rate of participation in elections. The number of world leaders, including presidents of Iran, Russia, France, the U.S., and prime ministers of Germany, the United Kingdom and Japan, called Erdogan to congratulate him for the victory. Erdogan also received phone calls from leaders of Middle Eastern countries, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Morocco, Iraq and Palestine.

The elections in Turkey were closely observed by actors inside and outside of the Middle East. The main reason for this is the growing importance of Turkey in regional and international politics. Erdogan’s leadership has made significant progress in becoming a regional game-changer, despite challenges and threats in domestic politics. The President followed an active foreign policy agenda towards the Middle East, particularly during the post-2011 period. In this context, Turkey has become an important player in regional crises such as Palestine-Israel, Syria, Libya and the Gulf crises. Turkey has been involved in these crises in order to both protect its own interests and the interest of its Arab allies in the region.

Erdogan’s election as the first President of the new political system in Turkey is an indication of Ankara’s continuing interest in the Middle East. It can be said that Ankara will maintain its current policy objectives with regards to the Middle East. This would be summarized in four crisis areas in the region.

The Erdogan administration will focus more on the conflict between Israel and Palestine and will continue to defend the rights of Palestinians. By following such a policy, Ankara would contradict with the policies of the U.S. and Israel. This would further damage the already tense relations between Turkey and these two actors. In the case of Gulf politics, Turkey would continue to support Qatar’s position and provide a security umbrella for its strategic partner. Ankara’s main objective will be to prevent blockading countries, namely Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt, to further damage the Qatari leadership and will also try to prevent Gulf states from taking tougher steps against Qatar.

Turkey’s policy toward Syria will remain unchanged in the coming period. The main goal of Erdogan’s leadership will be permanently removing the “terror corridor” that has been established by the terrorist organization, the PYD, with the support of the United States. Eliminating this region of instability will be a crucial goal for Ankara in order to establish a safe border in its South. At this point, it is vital that the U.S. does not repeat mistakes it made in the past. The U.S., which is the major supporter of the terrorist organization, the PYD, has seriously lost Ankara’s trust with this policy and has become an irrelevant actor in Turkey’s policy toward Syria. The U.S. support for the PYD has further damaged Turkey-U.S. relations in other areas. Therefore, Washington has to re-consider its policy in Syria (and Palestine), if it does not want to lose a powerful ally like Turkey.

Finally, Turkey will follow a more aggressive strategy in its policy toward Libya. This will be an important aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the Middle East in terms of its regional implications. Turkey will continue to challenge the Egyptian and Emirati attempts to destabilize Libya. Ankara will continue to support the central government in Libya and aim to bring stability in the country. Turkey’s historical and commercial links with Libya will contribute to further rapprochement between Ankara in Tripoli.

Turkey is likely to become a more influential actor in the politics of the Middle East. It is therefore vital that Western actors, as well as countries in the region, take into account Ankara’s concerns for the region. Turkey’s importance proved itself in Erdogan’s ability to create a united Islamic front against the U.S. and Israeli policies in Palestine, Ankara’s strategic gains in Syria and its capacity to stop aggressive Gulf countries in damaging the Qatari leadership. These developments will give Ankara enough confidence to follow a more active foreign policy in the coming period.

For many years, Saudi Arabia has followed a passive foreign policy under the security umbrella of the United States. The Arab revolutions, however, changed this traditional foreign policy attitude of the Saudi regime. This situation became more visible especially after Selman bin Abdelaziz’s rise to power in 2015. The latest sign of this transformation is Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman’s (MbS) month-long tour to Egypt, the U.K., U.S., and France.

During the past year, MbS was busy with eliminating domestic actors that could potentially pose a threat to his power. Following his appointment on June 21, 2017, as Crown Prince, MbS became the most influential actor in Saudi politics. As part of this objective, in September 2017, MbS ordered the arrest of about 30 religious scholars who could become an obstacleto his planned reforms. A similar process was applied to the powerful political and business actors in the country. In November 2017, at least 500 princes, bureaucrats andbusinessmen were taken into custody at the Ritz-Carlton hotel in Riyadh. Following these operations, MbS made it clear to all parties that he is the most powerful actor in the country.

In the following period, MbS began to focus on foreign policy, which is another instrument that he employs in order to strengthen his rule. His first visit as Crown Prince was scheduled to Egypt, the country that depended on Saudi cash flow in the post-2013 military coup. During the visit, MbS mainly gave symbolic messages. He visited the leader of the Coptic Church Pope Shenouda III and attended a theatre performance at Cairo Opera House. Another symbolic importance of the visit was the decision of Egypt’s High Court that had given the final approval to transfer the Tiran and Sanafir Islands to Saudi Arabia. Finally, MbSand Egyptian leader Abdalfattah Al-Sisi also agreed on a new $16 billion investment fund that would help boost bilateral trade and investment.

During his second trip, MbS visited Britain and sought to garner support from political actors in the U.K. MbS continued to expand his cooperation with British partners as both countries signed agreements worth billions of U.S. dollars. In one such agreement, Saudi Arabia ordered 48 Typhoon war jets worth about $10 billion from Great Britain. Bin Salman was also welcomed by Queen Elizabeth at Buckingham Palace.

MbS’s next visit was to the U.S., where he spent 3 weeks. During his stay, Bin Salman met with several senior officials, most notably U.S. President Donald Trump, and also met with leading actors in political circles, the business community, media and civil society.

The first objective of this visit can be stated as developing cooperation between Riyadh and Washington. This was especially observed during the press release that Trump made with Bin Salman. Trump shared pictures of 12.5 billion dollars worth aircraft and other defense industry products that were ordered by Saudi Arabia. He proudly emphasized that due to these orders, thousands of people in the U.S. will keep their jobs. This attitude of Trump was interpreted as his perception of Saudi Arabia as a “cash machine” rather than a strategic ally.

Another important reason for MbS’s visit can be stated as improving the negative image of his country, especially in the eyes of the U.S. public. During the past couple of years, the Saudi leadership has tried to change this perception, particularly on the international level. MbS initiated further reforms that would help to create a better image for the country throughout the world. MbS also hinted that the Saudi regime would distance itself from the Wahhabi ideology as the Crown Prince confessed that the U.S. initiated the idea of Wahhabism during the Cold War in order to block Socialist ideology from spreading across the region.

The final dimension of MbS’s visit to the U.S. is the economy. With its petroleum-based economy, Riyadh aimed at diversifying its economic landscape. For this reason, it is of great importance for the Saudi regime to welcome investors that can contribute to the economic well being of the Kingdom. In order to discuss business opportunities, bin Salman met with prominent business and media figures such as Michael Bloomberg, Bill Gates, Masayoshi Son, Elon Musk, Thomas Friedman, Rupert Murdoch and Henry Kissinger. Another group which Mohammad bin Salman visited was the Israeli lobby in the U.S. MbS met with the representatives of the most powerful Israeli lobby organizations such as AIPAC, Anti-Defamation League, and the American Jewish Committee. These meetings can be interpreted as Saudi Arabia’s commitment to establishing strong relations with Israel in both regional and global politics.

Mohammad bin Salman’s final visit was to France where he met with President Emmanuel Macron. Both politicians announced the strategic partnership between the two countries.

It is obvious that Mohammad bin Salman’s Saudi Arabia will continue to become an active and interventionist regional player with strong support from international actors. The country will also continue to employ hard power capabilities in partnership with its regional allies such as the UAE, Egypt and Israel. This process will further accelerate with the rise of Mohammad bin Salman to the top position in the country, a process that will most probably be completed in the near future.

After launching the military base for more than 3000 personnel, Turkey and Qatar has decided on building a naval base at Doha International Maritime Defence Exhibition & Conference (DIMDEX), which is going to be funded by the Qatari government. There have been other significant developments such as the very first exportation of the BAYRAKTAR TB2 tactical UAV to Qatar for a patch of 6 aircraft, 3 control stations with a training simulator. Moreover, the two countries decided on the establishment of a joint venture between national companies Aselsan and Barzan, which is called the BARQ. Through both military technology and security collaboration, Turkey and Qatar have been building a robust security alliance that directly affects the balance of power in the Gulf region.

For decades, small Gulf states were dependent or more realistically “threatened” by Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Saudi-Iran rivalry has shaped a tense structure that has enforced Gulf states to try and fit themselves within right motives and positions. However, with Turkey’s increasing presence in Gulf politics, whether this be through soft power or latently with military presence, this structure has been in a transformative phase. In this sense, the deepening military cooperation between Qatar and Turkey provides a platform for Turkey to penetrate into the Gulf security atmosphere.

Since Qatar has such a strategic geography between Iran and Saudi Arabia, having a military presence in Qatar plays a vital role in the rivalry between these two states. The fact that the U.S. is present in Qatar with over 10,000 soldiers illustrates how important the country’s geo-strategic position is. With Kuwait hosting 15,000, the United Arab Emirates 5,000 and Bahrain 7,000 U.S. soldiers in their territory implicates that the U.S. has a significant bargain in this region. To put plainly, the most significant gain is about balancing and encircling Iran within this territorial dimension.

Turkey’s presence in Qatar

Qatar holds a central position in between all of the military bases established by Turkey in the Middle East. Without Qatar’s inclusion as a military station for Turkey, Ankara’s military presence in the Middle East would be lacking a hub for military transfers and naval warfare. The Turco-Qatari military alliance has a considerable impact on increasing the Turkish influence in the Persian Gulf and the south of the Arabian Peninsula. Although Turkey had several military bases in Iraq, Syria, Afghanistan and Somalia, there was no naval base for Turkish frigates and vessels to utilize as a hub in patrolling overseas.

Middle Eastern geography necessitates a strong maritime capability that will be able to control the Mediterranean, Red and the Arabian Seas in a coordinated and functioning way. In modern methods of warfare holding a strong and capable naval power is key to controlling any kind of region. For the Middle Eastern case, the most important geo-strategic positions are the Eastern Mediterranean sea, which Turkey tries to control through Northern Cyprus, the Gulf of Aden, which Turkey endeavors to grasp control through Somalia and Sudan, and the Persian Gulf which Turkey has now increased its control through the military cooperation with Qatar.

In this sense Turkey’s military cooperation with Qatar and the establishment of a naval base holds the potential to have regional and even global implications. In terms of regional implications, Turkey’s increasing military presence and its influence means a direct reduction and setback for the Saudi Arabian and Iranian influence in the Middle East. Turkey, in this respect, has been advancing to balance the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East as a whole and creating a three-unit game.

The impact of this rivalry is most entrenched in the Gulf. Who would imagine that a small state like Qatar would have managed to resist an embargo of Saudi Arabia, UAE and Egypt together 10 years ago? Qatar managed this successfully during the crisis in 2017 – to such an extent that its national Qatar Airways was hardly affected regardless of the fact that embargo states had shut down their airspaces to Qatari planes.

As of now the Middle East military balance tends to incline towards a two-sided power struggle where Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and Iran are closing on the Russian partnership and Israel, Saudi Arabia and the UAE are deepening their cooperation with the United States. This analogy is on a grand strategy dimension where there are micro rivalries for increased influence in the region between Turkey, Saudi Arabia and Iran while Israel endeavors ensuring its survival through close ties with Saudi Arabia.

10 years ago, if some theorist said that one day Qatari airplanes will not be able to use the Saudi air space but Israel will be, nobody would have believed them. However, this is the actual case for the Middle East, where there is an enlarging rift between Saudi Arabia, the other Arab states and Qatar. Turkey has been at the heart of the matter for Qatar’s ability to weather the storm, through the political support empowered and practiced with the joint military base. However, that rift posed an entrance for Turkey to include itself into Gulf regional security. For the small Gulf states, there is now an alternative regional power [Turkey] to collaborate with rather than collaborating with Saudi Arabia and/or Iran.

Increased Turkish influence and control in each place that witnessed a power vacuum such as the Gulf of Aden and the Persian Gulf, Syria and Lebanon obstructs Turkey’s exclusion from the construction of the Middle East balance of power, as well. Therefore, since Turkey is involved and included into the crises that occur in the region, Ankara is establishing a robust defining role of the distribution of power in the Middle East. At the end, the main idea behind increased military presence and balancing Saudi Arabia and Iran, is establishing a more peaceful region with reduced potential of a bilateral conflict.

Turning the Saudi-Iran quagmire into a three parties bargain necessitates the penetration into the political sphere where Saudi-Iranian duos are dominant. The most salient of these states are Syria and Lebanon. The Turco-Qatari cooperation had an unprecedented impact on the Syrian Civil War as this cooperation turned the tide for the much vanishing Syrian opposition. The second step would be creating a maneuver zone for Lebanese politicians through shaping an alternative structure to Saudi-Iranian rivalry over the Hezbollah-Amal movement and Hariri alongside with pro-Saudi politicians. This two-edged type of politics excludes any type of third party influence, but the Turco-Qatari partnership can pave the way for political engagement through the backdoors.

Up until present, Turkey has been achieving ends strategically designed for this ideal despite having many internal problems. Domestic problems did have the potential to affect the region as a whole since in the actual snapshot, Turkey holds a significant amount of power in the region and any type of destabilization would have a negative reflect on the Middle East. Additionally, the internal struggles that the AK Party government experienced can be considered another motivation behind this cooperative foreign policy.

The Turco-Qatari military cooperation holds a great potential in countering the Saudi-Iranian rivalry in the Middle East and thus the increased balance against them. In the end, if Turkey succeeds balancing Iran and Saudi Arabia without losing much potential in the process, there will be a more collaborative and peaceful security complex considering the methods Turkey utilizes in its military affairs.

The globalisation of finance has produced a structural and ideological transformation in the financial system since the beginning of the 1970s. The globalization of the financial system in turn has accelerated the process of globalisation in other sectors, ever since states first made the decision to enter into the financial markets.  Such involvement has enabled some countries to assume prominent positions in the global financial system. This is clearly noticeable in the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries – Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates (UAE).

These countries have achieved economic prosperity due to the accumulation of wealth generated from oil and gas revenues. However, the Gulf has struggled with regional troubles for the last few weeks. Although a regional diplomatic crisis has plagued the Gulf in the past, the recent crisis has gone beyond a diplomatic one with the imposition of tangible sanctions on Qatar. Although Qatar is a small country in terms of its population and land area, it is an example of the “small States, big politics” trend experts describe in literature about the region. Under these circumstances, the impact of the Qatar crisis on current politics and economics will be not only regional but also global, as can be understood from the official reaction by world leaders.

According to the IMF, Qatar had the highest GDP per capita in the world –  $128,000 GDP per capita (at purchasing power parity) in 2016. Beside this, Qatar, which holds the world’s 9th largest Sovereign Wealth Fund (SWF) worth some $350 billion, has invested in real estate, banking, automotive and technology sectors. This already means Qatar has a significant role in the global financial system. Furthermore, Qatar is one of the biggest financial supporters of professional sports – its SWF owns the French Paris Saint Germain football team, and sponsors the Barcelona Football Team through Qatar Airways. Qatar will host the 2022 World Cup, and is buying beIN Sport, one of the biggest sport channels in the world.

The Qatar crisis has had a negative impact on many markets, and Qatar’s stock market experienced a severe fall. The Qatar stock exchange underwent its largest price drop in 18 months, nearly 8 percent, after the diplomatic rift on Monday. According to Wednesday market data, Although the Qatar Stock Exchange became the world’s worst performer with 8,965.01 point since January, 2016, Qatar Stock Exchange reached the high of 9,237.86 point since Monday, when was started the sanctions against Qatar. Some companies, moreover, were uptrend on Wednesday and Thursday by contrast with Monday, when all companies were down. In addition to Qatar Stock Exchange, the investments of Qatar through SWF, which are, mainly, invested in abroad such as European and Asian countries, could be affected by Gulf crisis in the long term.

http://thenewturkey.org/what-is-behind-the-crisis-in-the-gulf/

In addition to the stock market, the crisis will lead to trade problems in the region, and will have an impact on Qatar’s import-dependent food sector. Food imports from Saudi Arabia account for about 90% of Qatar’s daily food consumption. According to 2016 data, Qatar’s trade volume was around $11 billion with the other GCC countries. However, Qatar’s trade volume with Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Bahrain, which cut diplomatic ties with Qatar, were around 85% of the total GCC trade volume of Qatar in 2016. This data shows that Qatar will be faced with a daily food scarcity in the short term, and a lack of food products in long-run if they don’t find alternative daily food suppliers from friendly countries.

Another impact of the crisis on Qatar’s economy is the changing air route of Qatar Airways, which will decrease customers because of the longer distance and cost-plus pricing the airline will have to follow. Lastly, the businessman who are visiting Dubai and Abu Dhabi, which are financial and business hubs for the region, will not prefer to visit Doha after their UAE visits due to travel difficulties to Qatar from the UAE. After mentioning the potential worst scenario of the Gulf crisis on Qatar’s economy, it is important to emphasise that this crisis will not affect the country’s gas production and its transportation to customers abroad, mainly Asian countries. Qatar may also have a shortage of cash to pay for imports, and the fact that its border with Saudi Arabia is sealed will further exacerbate this problem, but one solution is to find a trade partner the country can import from, in exchange for providing energy and raw materials for construction.

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has clarified that Turkey stands with Qatar, and is focused on mediating between the sides to calm the tension. Turkey’s parliament also approved draft bill allowing troop deployment to a new military base in Qatar on Wednesday. After these political and military steps, it is important to evaluate the impact of the crisis on the economic relationship between Qatar and Turkey, which has historically not been as promising as the political relationship.

In 2016, Turkey’s export to Qatar were around $440 million, mainly comprised of ships, yachts, appliances, furniture, and electronic products. In the same year, Qatar’s exports to Turkey were worth around $271 million, and were chiefly aluminium products, plastics, fertilisers, fossil fuels, and mineral oils.  Turkey has an advantage over Qatar because its products cover a wider range, and Turkey has an overall trade surplus. From this perspective, Turkey has positioned itself as a major supplier to Qatar in the new conjuncture. Turkey, thus, will find an opportunity to increase its exports in the near future. Furthermore, new products, which have not been sold to Qatar before, might be brought into line for export. The increase in Turkey’s exports to Qatar, therefore, would relax Qatar’s shortage of food supplies in the long-run. This trade partnership will initially bring extra cost for Qatar, mainly due to higher transportation overhead, but in the long term, if a viable system of trade is found and new channels opened, Qatar will meet its needs.

Gulf states have been at the center of the world’s attention since the May 20 Riyadh Summit, where President Trump addressed Arab and Muslim leaders from more than 50 countries. The gathering of Arab and Muslim leaders in an already tense political atmosphere meant a lot to the observers of the Middle East, but the real story was Trump’s choice of Saudi Arabia for his first official visit as the US president. The world was discussing why Trump decided to first visit this Muslim state in the Middle East, despite his speeches and ideas on Islam. But the Trump effect in the Middle East and the implications for policy-making of his strategic visit lasted a short time, and the world found itself in a new a diplomatic crisis between Qatar and Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia.

Trump and his Saudi partners announced the opening of the Global Center for Combating Extremist Ideology, which aims to fight against radicalism and terror in the region, in addition to a $110 billion military and arms deal. Trump was not the only partner to the Saudis – the UAE and Saudi Arabia also decided to support Ivanka Trump’s promotion of the World Bank’s Women Entrepreneurs Fund with $100 million in financial aid. Hence, Trump was quite right when saying “That was a tremendous day. Tremendous investments in the United States… Hundreds of billions of dollars of investments into the United States and jobs, jobs, jobs”.

On May 23, Qatar faced a cyber-attack on the Qatar National News Agency (QNA) and news soon broke on a pro-Iran and pro-Israel speech by Emir Tamim, which was not welcomed in the Arab world. Although QNA was hacked and the released data was yet to be verified, the UAE and Saudi Arabia reacted harshly, as if the information was reflecting the reality. Qatari media, including Al Jazeera, was blocked in these two countries, sparking the current crisis.

By June 5, following the blockage of Qatari media outlets, the tension was visible but not overwhelming until recently. Saudi Arabia urged “all brotherly countries and companies to do the same” for Qatar. Thereafter Bahrain, the UAE, Yemen, the Maldives, Egypt, and the interim government of Libya suspended diplomatic relations and withdrew ambassadors. Qatar is familiar with this situation, because Bahrain, the UAE and Saudi Arabia withdraw their ambassadors from Doha in 2014 as well, after declaring their intolerance of Qatar’s relations with the Muslim Brotherhood.

However, this time things have changed.  Not only have diplomatic relations been suspended, but also the Qatari border is closed by land, and sea and air routes have been cut between the countries as well. Qatar has its only land border with Saudi Arabia, which means the Saudis will not let anything into Qatar, including food, and air traffic from other sources is the only option left. This could be disastrous for a country like Qatar, which does not even have enough food storage for one week. After this diplomatic crisis, Qatari citizens are also expected to leave those countries that have cut ties within two weeks.

This anti-Qatar coalition claims that Doha has connections with terrorist organizations and harbors “a multitude of terrorist and sectarian groups that aim to create instability in the region.” Qatar’s alleged relationship with terrorist groups was also emphasized by Trump in his tweet on June 6, which gives a clue to the US role behind the crisis. Trump tweeted “During my recent trip to the Middle East I stated that there can no longer be funding of Radical Ideology. Leaders pointed to Qatar – look!”.

How have Qatar and its supporters reacted?

Kuwait and Pakistan have not supported the anti-Qatar block, and Oman’s Foreign Minister Yusuf bin Alawi bin Abdullah visited Qatar. Although Omani officials state that the visit was a private one, and planned for before the latest developments, Oman has chosen to stand with Qatar rather than add to the tension.

When the tension first arose, eyes were on Turkey. However, the official explanation from Turkey given by Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu indicated Turkey’s role of mediator would be downplayed. Meanwhile, the Turkish public supported Qatar on social media with the hashtag #TurkeywithQatar and recalled the country’s support since the beginning of the Arab Spring. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan got involved in the case on June 5, and spoke on the phone with Qatari, Russian, Kuwaiti and Saudi leaders in an attempt at reducing tension. Increasing his tone the following day, Erdoğan commented that the move against Qatar is a grave mistake and also risky for the stability of the volatile region in the near future.

When it comes to the Qatari reaction, its diplomacy is, so far, a mix of caution and a harsh attitude. Qatari foreign policy has been representing a unique stance in the Middle East as a small state with its mediating role and active policy making in regional disputes. Qatar has recently been more visible in the political scene of the Middle East with its military and political involvement in the Arab Spring in Syria, Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, Bahrain and Yemen.

However, a vigorous state power construction started in 1995 with Sheikh Hamad’s accession to power, followed by Emir Tamim’s role. Although the Arab Spring sparked political differences among Qatar’s GCC partners, Doha’s domestic and external policies have been challenged due to its support for the Muslim Brotherhood, Hamas and its diplomatic relations with Iran and Israel. Thus, we can say that Qatar is familiar with being unwelcome by the other regional states. However, June 5 has brought about a tangible crisis with surprising speed and intensity with the Saudi-led block consisting of Bahrain, the UAE, Yemen, the Maldives, Egypt, and the interim government of Libya.

Foreign Minister Mohammed Bin Abdulrahman Al Thani’s statement on Al-Jazeera shows the shocking effect of the events in Qatar: “Regarding the reasons for this escalation, honestly, we don’t know if there were real reasons for this crisis,” he said. The minister also added that what is happening in the Gulf towards Qatar is unjustified and not based on facts. Experts working on the Gulf are describing the stand-off between Qatar and Saudi Arabia as an effort to re-shape the regime and political power in Qatar to resemble Bahrain, which is a close ally of Saudi Arabia. The statement by Foreign Minister Al Thani also refers to that, saying the imposition of “guardianship” over Qatar is “in itself is a violation of its sovereignty as a state which is categorically rejected.”

Emir Tamim and Sheikh Hamad

This picture has currently been circulating in social media, which is combination of Emir Tamim’s and Sheikh Hamad’s faces. It refers to the unity of Qatari society against any foreign threat with hashtag of #كلنا_تميم, meaning “We are all Tamim”.

Especially after the announcement of the closure of borders, a general panic occurred in Qatar; however, according to my personal observation in Qatar, it was mostly the expat communities who were shocked and went to supermarkets to buy food, rather than locals who are able to reach local food resources and view the crisis more cautiously. However, officials released a statement assuring that food products will be available, and any shortages avoided by using air transportation, saying this border crisis will not affect the daily lives of citizens and of Qatar. Countries like Turkey can support Qatar especially in food security in this month of Ramadan.

Can the GCC stay united against Qatar, or side with it?

Initial reactions to the cyber-attack by the UAE and Saudi Arabia showed that it was only a beginning, and it has already escalated embedded disagreements among GCC states after the Arab Spring. Especially after hackers have released emails belonging to the UAE’s ambassador to the United States, Yousef al-Otaiba. Since 2014, the UAE’s anti-Qatar lobbying in the USA has become obvious. Hacked e-mails of al-Otaiba, a central figure in US security networks, released by Global Leaks indicated the UAE has been conducting a close relationship with a pro-Israel, neoconservative think-tank called the Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) as a part of its backchannel policy.

Qatar airways license has been suspended in Saudi Arabia, which forces the airline to change their routes and use only Iranian air space. Social media and news outlets in these states have blocked feeds from Qatar as another tool in this self-made cold war in the Gulf. This tension is multi-dimensional and does not seem like it will be reduced unless Qatar agrees to the Saudi approach in regional politics and strikes a compromise. David Hearst, the Editor in Chief of the Middle East Eye, has defined this crisis as a planned operation rather than a reaction to the hacking of the QNA.

As pointed out by Dr. Mahjoob Zweiri of Qatar University in an interview with Al Jazeera, in addition to the short term influence of this crisis, it could have long term effects, like those that arose from the isolation of Hamas in 2006, which pushed the organization towards Iran. This is crucial because Iran already officially supported Qatar in the disagreement on cutting diplomatic relations but not solving problems through dialogue.

Kuwait and Oman supported their partners and did not back the Saudi-led campaign; however, if shuttle diplomacy between sides is not conducted via a committed regional power or regional coalition, Qatar could face more difficulties in tackling the crisis. It is important to mention that Qatar has strongly supported a variety of regional states and non-state actors in the last 20 years and its positive approach to the states’ sovereignty is already well-known. Hence, I assume that countries who have good relations with both sides have started conducting diplomacy behind the scenes. The opposite is not possible because we are discussing here substantial elements of the Middle East and global politics.