The Kurdish region of Iraq held elections on 30 September – a year after a troublesome period. The elections were planned to take place almost a year earlier on 30 November, 2017, but the troubles the region found itself in caused delays. The region had already been in turmoil, but what put it in the midst of fierce developments was the independence referendum held on 25 September, 2017.

The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)-led regional government found itself weakened and isolated in the process as Baghdad, Tehran, and Ankara took a common position against the referendum. While Turkey’s position was quite expectable as it is against any kind of de facto secession in the region, Iran used its close ties with the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and created a split in the pro-independence regional position of Iraqi Kurdistan.

Eventually, not only did they fail to put the referendum in action, but the KRG also had to leave the disputed territories to the control of Iraq’s central government. Amongst them, the most important and disputed one was Kirkuk, whose governor Najmaddin Kareem (from the PUK) had to flee the city.

After all this mess, the parliamentary elections were finally held on 30 September, but this time the vote count took too long – due to the allegations of fraud by multiple sides. Weeks after the elections, the election commission finally published the results. The KDP received 688 thousand votes and secured 45 seats in the 111-seated parliament. 11 of those seats were reserved for minorities. This is quite a strong presence in the parliament, especially given that the PUK, the second major party in parliament, only received 21.

The third biggest party, Gorran, only secured 12 seats. In other words, the seats of the second and third parties combined still fall short of the KDP seats. Hence, the KDP increased its seats in parliament from 38 to 45 between 2013 and 2018, while the PUK increase stayed marginal, and Gorran faced the hardest blow by losing more than half of its seats.

The September 25 independence referendum escalated the mistrust between the KDP and PUK as both sides blamed each other for betraying the interests of the Kurdistan region. The two established parties of the region also competed in the presidential elections in Iraq earlier this month. PUK’s candidate, Barham Salih, won the election – allegedly with Iran’s use of its influence in Iraqi politics – against his KDP rival, Fuad Hussein, with 219 votes to a mere 22.

The developments illustrate that the KDP and PUK will continue to dominate Iraqi politics. You can essentially read this as the Barzani and Talebani houses continuing their reign on this shaky settlement, a settlement found based on a delicate division of power in the region.

The PUK secured the presidency, with the outside support (of Iran), and the KDP increased its dominance in the regional parliament. This balance of power can still preserve the status quo in the region if Turkey does not change it in favor of the KDP or Iran in favor of the PUK, which is not likely at the moment.

The KDP tried hard to change the status quo with its referendum initiative and nomination of a presidential candidate, but both failed. In response, the PUK is now trying to maintain its position as the second and only other major party in the region, which it achieved with Iran’s support. What is missing in this picture is Turkey’s cross-border strategy of containing and then eliminating the PKK, which at the moment, is not changing the parameters of the KDP-PUK game.

After two years of stormy relations with Turkey, Haider al-Abadi, the former Prime Minister of Iraq, managed to establish workable relations with Turkey. Had he won the election, he would have continued to work with Turkey on several strategically important issues such as the establishment of a second pipeline for oil export from Iraq to Turkey, and joint efforts in order to eradicate the PKK presence in the Qandil mountains. Both countries were also planning to expand the size of commercial trade.

Adel Abdul Mahdi has been chosen as Iraq’s new prime minister-designate, and Barham Salih as the new president. Now, Turkey needs to be prepared for a post-Abadi era. This piece is about the intensified rivalry taking place between pro-Iranian and pro-American Iraqi political groups, which both seek to form a government, and reflect on how the probable result of this rivalry will affect Turkey-Iraq relations.

U.S. and Iran scramble for the cake

All these depend on the larger scene: What will be Trump’s forthcoming strategy to contain Iran’s expansionist policy in the Middle East? If Trump’s policy is to make Iraq the theater for the first attempt to restrain Iran, as some policy analysts have suggested, then confrontation will be more probable. It is clear that the U.S. and Russia have reached a tacit agreement, agreeing that Syria is in the interest of Russia, and thus leaving the job of containing Iran’s influence in the country to both Tel Aviv and Moscow.

During the last two months, both Brett McGurk, the U.S. Special Envoy on War against Daesh, and Qasim Soleimani, the commander of the Quds revolutionary guard and the person in charge of Iraq’s file, made numerous visits to Baghdad and Erbil to rally support for the groups that they have influence on in order to form the “biggest election bloc” – the largest political alliance in parliament. The U.S. supports the bloc of al-Islah (Reform) headed by Abadi, and Iran favors the bloc of al-Bina (Reconstruction) founded by Nouri-al Maliki. The later has an edge and it has managed to elect Mohammed Halbusi, who is a pro-Iranian Sunni leader, as speaker of Parliament.

Why did Abadi lose his bid for power?

Towards the end of September, many of Abadi’s allies began to desert his camp, and this seriously weakened his chance to be re-elected. Abadi proved too tactless and has been alienated by many in his own camp. On the other hand, al-Maliki has exhibited considerable diplomatic skills and made compromises with both the Sunni Arabs and Kurds. According to unconfirmed reports, he conceded to the Kurds and the right of the Kurdish peshmerga to return to the disputed territories. Abadi has apparently refused to do what forced Masoud Barzani to side with al-Maliki.

In addition, al-Maliki has made deals with Sunni leaders to withdraw popular mobilization forces (Hashd al-Shaabi) from their cities. This irritated Abadi who considered these actions as illegal and being done without his prior knowledge – behind his back. Consequently, he sacked Falih Fayyad, his National Security Advisor, whom he accused of betrayal and inefficiency. The loss of Fayyad, a prominent Dawa leader and the son of a powerful Shiite tribal leader, accompanied by the use of excessive force against demonstrators in Basra, put Abadi’s statesmanship into serious question.

It was probably this state of affairs that convinced Muqtada Sadr, the powerful cleric and leader of the winning Sairoon bloc, to desert Abadi and reconcile with Hadi Ameri, the head of the powerful Badr militia. More, Abadi’s hasty and not so well-calculated statement to implement U.S. sanctions against Iran, has delivered a serious blow to his ability to present himself as a leader of Iraq. A statement in the pro-government daily Erem in Tehran on August 16, 2018, described Abadi as a “governor of Iraq who has been appointed by an Iranian general and who will face the same fate as Saddam.”

However, the final blow to Abad’s bid for a second term came with the statement of Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the most influential Shiite cleric in the country, banning those who have been in office before to take the post again.

Turkey’s stand in Iraqi politics

Turkey should take the existing tension between Iran and the U.S. into consideration as it will not diminish and may even end in direct confrontation in Abdul Mehdi’s era. Turkey should also be prepared for a possible inter-Shiite military confrontation in a proxy war. The burning of the Iranian consulate in Basra, and subsequent unknown missile launches on U.S. interests again in Basra and the Green zone in Baghdad, are clear indications that the U.S.-Iranian confrontation in Iraq has entered an alarming stage.

The Iraqi government accused ex-Baathist elements as being behind the events in Basra, and pro-Iranian groups in Iraq attributed the events to the U.S. and its Arab allies in the region. It can be argued that the events were in general spontaneous and triggered by Iran’s decision to cut off power to Basra due to the economic crisis in Iran. The people in Basra have repeatedly taken to the streets in recent weeks to protest against the lack of government services, and water contamination that left thousands in hospitals.

Besides, both Soleimani and Ameri have already threatened to attack U.S. interests in Iraq if they were excluded from forming a government. Qais Al-Khazali, the leader of the powerful Asaeb al-Haq militia, made similar threats.

In case of a diplomatic rupture between Iraq and Turkey, Turkey’s national interest and security might be jeopardized. First of all, the PKK can avail itself from the chaos by extending its influence on the KRG. There is a boiling situation in the unsettled province of Kirkuk. The rapture may cause a clash there and the Turkmen may suffer in consequence. Besides, Turkey’s 11 billion worth of trade with Iraq can be seriously affected. Therefore, Turkey needs to develop and put in place contingent plans for such eventuality. Thus, Ankara cannot afford to be a bystander as things take a confrontational posture in the relations between Iran and the U.S. in Iraq.

Since the new prime minister is, to a large extent, a man of compromise between the U.S. and Iran, if he manages to form the government he will most probably try to pursue Abadi’s foreign policy objectives. Although he has stated that he wants a full mandate to form the government, he cannot afford to ignore Muqtada Sadr’s (his main patron) pressure with regard to further distancing Iraq from both Iran and the U.S.

Aware of his close ties with the Kurdish leadership in Iraq, he will probably try to open up to the KRG and come to close terms with them in regards to the sale of oil through the existing oil pipeline in the KRG. This means that he will try to please Barzani and most probably ignore or postpone the second pipeline that Abadi and the Turkish government agreed upon – an agreement to the displeasure of KRG leaders.

Being an economist and supporter of the market economy, Abdul Mehdi will try to expand commercial ties with Turkey and will try to avoid any political tension with Ankara. However, his foreign policy towards Turkey will not be free from Iranian and the U.S. influence. Abdul Mehdi’s anticipated foreign policy will in general be a continuation of the Abadi era, and Turkey-Iraq ties will continue on its current course of commercial growth and normalization.

After the electoral victory of the AK Party on June 24, President Erdogan took his oath last Monday in parliament as the first executive president of Turkey. A large number of world leaders (22 presidents, 17 prime ministers) attended the ceremony in Ankara. Kurdistan Regional Government’s PM Nechirvan Barzani was among the guests, as he also attended the ceremony on official invitation from Turkey. This was Barzani’s first official visit to Turkey after the controversial independence referendum in September 2017.

Turkey took a firm approach against the September referendum as it stands against de facto secession attempts in the region. The referendum has become a turning point as the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq –all in favor of Iraq’s territorial integrity- cooperated to halt the one-sided independence move of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG). The cooperation gave quick results with the KRG’s back off, which did not only halt an ill-started independence move but also prevented further instability in Iraq that might likely have led to a civil war. The KRG, particularly the KDP, was surprised with Turkey’s firm anti-referendum stance. I, on the other hand, am still surprised by the KRG’s naivety not to expect such a reaction. Turkey, a country that has long struggled against ethnic secessionism, naturally positioned itself against a de facto secession attempt in its neighboring country.

After this background, one might jump to a conclusion that Turkey and the KRG were split and would be likely to stay so. Barzani’s visit to Turkey has shown the shortsightedness of such quick conclusions. After all, Turkey and the KRG share a border, host families dispersed across the borders, and further share common economic and security interests in a geography where actors are never in short supply of adversaries.

The economy of the Iraq Kurdistan Region (IKR) heavily depends on the flow of goods to and from Turkey and further needs the continuation of investments from Turkey. This is no charity job for Turkey, as the country also benefits from trade with the KRG. The governments of Turkey and IKR also share a more basic interest – security. Both Turkey and the KRG feel threatened by the PKK. The PKK uses the Turkey-Iraq border for its terror attacks against Turkey. The organization’s headquarters and many training camps are located in places under the jurisdiction of the KRG. For this very simple reason, Turkey wants to wipe out the PKK from KRG territories.

The KRG is also not happy with the presence of the PKK in its region. As PM Barzani stated 5 days before his official visit to Turkey, “The PKK uses KRG land it occupies as a base to attack Turkey.” The PKK controls a significant chunk of the KRG territories from Qandil Mountains to the Turkish border, which it calls Medya Defense Zones. The KRG, let alone building up an independent state, cannot even rule its regional territories. Further, the PKK is an imminent threat to the KDP as the two fell onto different sides in a former conflict during the mid-1990s. Further, the KRG has no neighbor that it can fully trust in a world where Turkey and the KRG are hostile to each other. For these reasons, the decision makers in Turkey and KRG are likely to cooperate in the future.

Nevertheless, the future of relations has to change as Turkey is no longer satisfied with the status quo in Iraq where the PKK can recruit, train, and operate in widespread safe havens. Turkey seems to be committed to wipe out the PKK from Iraqi territories but its alliance with the KDP could not provide such a result so far. Turkey sees such a termination for the PKK in Iraq possible only with the cooperation of the Iranian and Iraqi governments. Hence, Turkey prioritizes terminating PKK presence in Iraq with the help of the KDP but also increasingly more and more with the help of Iran and Iraq. Turkey’s rapprochement with Iran and Iraq seemed to alienate the KRG for a while, but Barzani’s visit implies that the KRG is also now aware that it’s not in its interest to abandon Turkey as a partner.

Turkey’s counter-terrorism strategy has undergone a massive transformation, particularly in the fight against the PKK, while the extra-territorial military operations have expanded towards Syria and Iraq where the PKK has been consolidating its political and military influence since the dissolution of the Syrian and Iraqi sovereignties.

Turkey began to operationalize its new counter-terrorism strategy with Operation Euphrates Shield (2016) in Syria and carried out its military operation against the PKK in Afrin with Operation Olive Branch (2018). Even though, these two military operations have different geopolitical aspects and execution methodologies, both military operations had the same strategic objectives: to de-territorialize the PKK in Syria, to eliminate its military capacity including manpower, and to weaken its international cooperation especially with the countries that provide militarily and political support to the PKK since the rise of DAESH.

Turkish authorities believe that the reactionary struggle against the PKK is not the best strategy to degrade and defeat the PKK’s terrorist campaign against Turkey. The best approach, according to Turkish authorities, should be designed by considering three interrelated variables: political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages and sustainability of military operations not only within Turkey but also in extraterritorial spaces such as Syria and Iraq.

Political decisiveness became a central element of the new counter-terrorism strategy following the collapse of the peace process in 2015. Turkish security forces have been able to defeat the PKK’s violent activities through domestic counter-terrorism operations; even though the PKK aimed to establish “liberated zones” by implementing violent urban tactics to widen the conflict zones towards significant city centers in southern Turkey.

The central rationality behind the PKK’s strategic consideration was the Syrian Civil War, in which Turkey has had to deal with many security and political challenges. In such a conflictual environment, the PKK could enjoy its territorial expansion. However, Turkey’s early military reactions against the PKK in the city centers of southeastern Turkey during the urban conflict between 2015 and 2016 have made substantial progress, and the PKK lost its entire terrorist mobilization and public support across the region.

Following domestic-counter terrorism operations, Turkey started to expand its actions towards the PKK in Syria. During this period, Turkey’s priority was to roll back the PKK’s geopolitical expansion along Turkey’s Syria border. Afrin, in this context, was a strategic threshold for Turkey to see how Ankara would be able to maintain its political decisiveness under the regional security vacuum that was somehow antagonistic and the U.S.’s apparent strategy over the presence of the PKK in Syria in the fight against DAESH.

Turkey’s military advantages along with its increasing capacity in defense technologies became central to sustain its military operations and ultimately defeated the PKK in Afrin. Operation Olive Branch resulted in a military and political victory for Turkey. Following the 58 days of the clash, the PKK was defeated and had to leave from the city centers. Following the triumph of Afrin, the Manbij agreement with the U.S. over the issue of the PKK presence showed how Turkey used its political decisiveness and military capacity to change the facts on the ground. From a domestic counter-terrorism struggle to Afrin and Manbij, Turkey has also shown its willingness regarding the continuation of the military offensive against the PKK, even though the regional and international conjuncture is against this policy.

Now, Turkey aims to maintain its counter-terrorism strategy against the PKK in Qandil where the PKK has settled as a safe haven thanks to the lack of Iraq’s sovereignty, the geographical sophistication of the region and the military capacity that the PKK has been building for almost 40 years. At his stage, Turkey has similar strategic goals: securing its border security against terrorist infiltration, eliminating the PKK’s presence in northern Iraq by holding terrorist camps in the region to isolate the PKK from its stronghold in Qandil and preventing the logistical mobilization of the PKK.

Turkey’s military operation now targets the PKK’s two strategically important locations in the region: Khakurk and Qandil. Turkish forces have already secured almost 500 sq. km in Khakurk and opened a safe corridor that reaches the Qandil Mountain since the beginning of the operation in March 2018. This time, the military strategy is not only targeting to eliminate PKK terrorists but also aiming to clean and hold the territory where the PKK has any presence.

The execution of military tactics in operational level on the ground is different compared to the OOB and OES in Syria due to the topographical feature of the region. But, the political decisiveness, Turkey’s military advantages, notably its technological superiority over the PKK, and willingness to maintain military operations toward the center of the Qandil Mountains seem to change the nature of the conflict between Turkey and the PKK.

This will be the first comprehensive counter-terror operation against the PKK. The regional dynamics are also behind Turkey’s military offensive. If Turkey can manage the dynamics emanating from the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) and the central Iraqi government in favor of its new strategy, the PKK cannot sustain its presence in the region. But this does not necessarily mean that the PKK threat for Turkey will disappear in the near future.

Source: Suriye Gündemi

At this stage, there are two critical strategic challenges for Turkey in its fight against the PKK. The first challenge is about the question of how the PKK will transform its overall strategy in Syria and Iraq after the fall of Qandil. More importantly, the real challenge for Turkey is whether the PKK can find another safe haven in Syria or Iraq. The second challenge for Turkey is about the question of how Turkish military can maintain its military presence in northern Iraq particularly in the Qandil area. The Defense Minister of Turkey announced that Turkey would not withdraw its military force until the PKK is ultimately defeated in Iraq.

Turkey now has 14 different military bases in northern Iraq. Compared to the previous military operations against the PKK in this region, the presence of Turkish military troops in different places provide more space to maneuver. However, the continuation of Turkey’s military presence might undermine the relations between Ankara and Baghdad. Therefore, the success of the new counter-terrorism strategy is also part of a regional agreement between Iraq, Turkey, and Iraq against the PKK. Iran is currently neutral toward Turkey’s ongoing operation. If Turkey’s military strategy can succeed in the short term to defeat the PKK in Iraq, then reaching a midterm consensus between Turkey, Iraq, and Iran will be easier.

Following the independence referendum proposed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq on September 25, 2017, the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq have come closer to an unprecedented degree. This analysis will shed light on the post-referendum (and the post-Daesh) developments regarding Turkey’s hunt for the PKK, a terrorist organization that has been targeting Turkish security personnel and civilians for about four decades.

Following the referendum in September 2017, despite its close relations with the KRG, Ankara managed to build a trilateral bloc including Turkey, Iran and Iraq, while also leaving an open door for the less-hawkish and more realistic KRG politicians, such as the regional Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani. Turkey’s reaction to the referendum was not only based on the KRG’s unilateral decision, which Turkey saw, at best, as a sign of irresponsible partnership. Rather, Turkey’s primary concern in Iraq is the future of the PKK, which is already deeply rooted in the country, and which is seeking to increase its sphere of control. Hence, Turkey utilized the referendum crisis as an opportunity for a more effective alliance against the PKK, which is flourishing with the backing of prominent international sponsors in the context of the Syrian Civil War. For Turkey, this new alliance is more promising than what the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could have ever provided in terms of a final defeat of the PKK.

For Turkey, the new alliance with Iraq and Iran is more promising than what the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could have ever provided in terms of a final defeat of the PKK.

For a long time, the PKK was perceived as the winner of the turmoil in the Middle East. Following the Gulf Wars and the regime change that followed in Iraq, the terrorist organization secured itself safe havens in Northern Iraq amidst the power vacuums and buffer zones between the central and regional governments and neighboring countries. The civil war in Syria has also worked to this end for the PKK. The terrorist organization created some nicknames, or umbrella groups (Syrian Democratic Forces being the latest one) in order to carry out its operations and partner with the United States in Syria. Hence, the PKK expanded the territories it captured and began to consolidate its territorial control. As a reaction to this ever-growing threat over the past few years, Turkey shifted its policy goals in Syria to preventing the PKK corridor along its border. While Turkey carried out the Euphrates Shield and Idlib operations primarily for this reason, the main goal was to hit the PKK in its headquarters in Qandil, Iraq.

Nevertheless, Ankara faced a significant problem: Given the concerns shared by the central government and by Iran and the complex web of partnerships between the local and international actors in the region, Turkey’s close relations with the KRG did not permit Turkey limitless freedom for its operations in Iraq. In addition to a military alliance, Turkey has long developed a mutually beneficial relationship with the KRG based on economic cooperation over oil and construction businesses. In this complex web, the Turkish-KRG alliance (particularly with the ruling party, the KDP), was mostly limited to the provision of ground intelligence by the KDP in regards to the PKK and information regarding the organization’s bases in Turkey. In return, the KDP could rely on Turkish support against the PKK or even against a possible Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) aggression. While this relationship seemed to be a win-win situation for both Turkey and the KDP, the PKK’s growing influence in Syria required a more comprehensive reaction from the Turkish administration, which needed more than what the KRG was able to provide.

The PKK’s growing influence in Syria required a more comprehensive reaction from the Turkish administration, which needed more than what the KRG was able to provide.

As a country that witnessed the gains obtained by the PKK in each revisionist step in Iraq and Syria, Turkey backed the status quo in Iraq during the referendum process. Yet the problem was that each revisionist move in the past helped the PKK increase its influence by ensuring that it became part of the new status quo. The PKK not only found safe havens in its camps across the Turkish border, but also begun to rule areas via conscripting the locals to its own ranks by collecting tax and running schools and other public services from what it calls the “Medya Defense Zones” across the Turkish border down to the mountains across the Iranian border as well as a number of refugee camps, Mahkmur being the most famous one. Hence, the only revisionism that Turkey can tolerate in Iraq is one that will target the PKK’s presence in the country. While Turkey’s existing relations with the KRG provided some assistance to its target of the “Medya Defense Zones,” this move was far from wounding the PKK in a degree to question its chance of survival. The PKK’s ability to stretch its goals and motives to the Sinjar Mountains has made Turkey question the limits of its alliance with the KRG.

Given the American support for the PKK in Syria, and the organization’s attempts to control Sinjar in Iraq, Turkey felt the need to find a more effective alliance against the terrorist organization. While the referendum in September was the last thing Ankara could tolerate, it gave the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq a chance to work together. Based on this recent agreement with Iraq and Iran, Turkish military incursions against the PKK can take place in areas that Turkey could not previously operate in. Two examples that reflect this are the recent attacks on the PKK positions in Asos and Mahkmur – both areas are deep inside Iraq, sharing no proximity with the Turkish border.

The Asos area near the town of Mawat of Sulaymaniyah province is a continuation of the Qandil Mountains and cuts across the Iranian border. Turkey’s troubled relations with Iran and Iraq prevented it from carrying out operations in this area, which is 175 kilometers away from the Turkish border – enough for the PKK to comfort itself against Turkish security forces. Hence, the Asos area was a pretty safe-zone for the PKK at times when the organization was not in a hot conflict with Iran, particularly since the 2011 truce. However, the PKK’s comfort in this area has finally been driven to an end as Turkey began to target Asos in repeated bombardments throughout November. During air strikes, Turkish authorities claimed to have killed over 65 PKK terrorists along with destroying their arm depos. The PKK’s main media outlet Firat News also confirmed the attack and claimed that the specific coordinates of the bases were given to Turkey by Iran.

The recent Asos and Mahkmur attacks illustrate that Turkey is forming an effective anti-PKK alliance with the Iranian and Iraqi governments.

Local news outlets stated that Turkey hit the Asos region twice on November 4 and 12 together with many other PKK bases in Qandil, Sinath-Haftanin, Gara, Metina, Avasin-Basyan, Zap and Khakurk. The Asos area was targeted once again in late November, and according to PKK sources, “Iranian scout planes were flying over the area shortly before the bombing of the Turkish jets.” Such news on Iranian scout planes, Iranian artillery shelling and Turkish airstrikes continued in early December, which reflects the fact that Turkey and Iran are committed to root out the PKK from its safe havens comprising the areas from Qandil to Asos. While the shock of the Asos bombardment was still fresh, another wave of airstrikes targeted the Mahkmur area. While the refugee camp in Mahkmur was supposedly a UN-supervised camp, it is currently being ruled by the PKK under the banner “Martyr Rustem Refugee Camp.” While the PKK initially portrayed the attack as if the Turkish state was targeting civilians in the refugee camp, the terrorist organization later announced the names of five PKK members (under the banner of Mahkmur Self-Defense Forces) who died in the strike.

The recent Asos and Mahkmur attacks illustrate that Turkey is forming an anti-PKK alliance with the Iranian and Iraqi governments, while its long lasting western allies are turning their backs to Turkey’s fight against the terrorist organization. Thanks to this new formation, Turkey is now able to target the PKK in areas that provided a safe-zone for the terrorist group. As Turkey is waiting for the right time to face the PKK in Syria (and will probably wait until it finalizes a deal with Russia on Afrin, and until the US retracts support from the group in the east of the Euphrates River), Ankara is determined that now is the best time for such an encounter in Iraq.

On November 6, Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court issued a decision that the country’s constitution which indicates the Republic of Iraq as “a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state” does not allow for the secession of any part of the country from the Iraqi state.

“We believe that this decision must become a basis for starting an inclusive national dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad to resolve all disputes, through implementation of all constitutional articles and in a way that guarantees all rights, authorities and status mentioned in the Constitution, since this is the only way to secure the unity of Iraq, as Article 1 stated” the KRG said in a statement.

The controversial referendum held by KRG on Kurdish regional secession, was considered illegitimate by Baghdad as well as by regional and global actors.

Last month, the Iraqi National Security Council announced that legal proceedings have been initiated on those who carried out the illegitimate referendum.

It was stated that the civil servants who carried out the referendum in the KRG were identified and “legal proceedings” had started.

Many regional and international actors criticized the purpose and timing of the referendum, in apprehension that it would distract Iraq from the ongoing fight against terrorism and further destabilize the region.

Iraqi government forces moved into several disputed areas between Baghdad and the Erbil-based KRG, including the oil-rich Kirkuk province, in the weeks following the poll.

During a joint news conference with his Somali counterpart in Ankara, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said on Thursday that “Regardless of whatever decision the northern Iraqi administration takes, the point we reach today clearly shows that any decision they take would not bear any compensation for the damage they caused.”

The announcement came after the KRG announced that they would freeze the referendum results in order to halt the military operations in Kirkuk.

Prime Minister Yildirim also mentioned the Turkish government’s willingness to work “more efficiently” with Iran and Iraq for peace, security and counter-terrorism operations in the region.

He stated that Ankara is working with the Baghdad administration in transferring the control of the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing – also known as Habur – from the Erbil-based KRG to the central government.

Yildirim emphasized that according to the Iraqi constitution, the border gates belong to the central government.

“We have additionally discussed establishing a new route from the west of Habur. The Iraqi side welcomes it and we will work together to open this border.”

KRG poll results must be cancelled

In addition to the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu commented on the decision to freeze the referendum results.

The Foreign Minister said: “Northern Iraq’s step back is an important step but an insufficient one. This referendum must be cancelled.”

Cavusoglu also mentioned that KRG President Masoud Barzani is in a weaker spot now after the illegal poll, adding that in a one-on-one meeting, he had previously warned the President about the consequences of the illegitimate referendum.

As a result of the Peshmerga failing to resist operations initiated by the Iraqi Army on October 16, most parts of Kirkuk are now controlled by the Baghdad administration.

Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) Peshmergas’ withdrawal with the premise of “not being as powerful as the Iraqi Army” allowed the army to march into Kirkuk with ease. While the Peshmerga Command in Erbil accuses PUK Peshmergas, it could be asserted that these events are the reflection of a political will. While certain PUK factions aligned themselves with Erbil, the Talabani family distanced themselves from the Erbil administration after the division within the party following Jalal Talabani’s sickness. It was known that the PUK was improving relations with Baghdad and Iran while criticizing the Erbil administration for monopolizing the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) revenues, administration and justice system. As the Masoud Barzani administration intended to expand its authority to Sulaymaniyah following the referendum results, the PUK, led by the Talabani family, wanted to benefit from the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil. Withdrawal of Peshmerga units from Kirkuk without resistance could be assessed as a reflection of the political power struggle within KRG. Despite statements made by some Peshmerga forces and the PKK elements in line of defense, the Iraqi Army has captured most of Kirkuk. Baghdad replaced Najmiddin Karim, who played a prominent role in escalating tensions in Kirkuk, with Rakan Saeed Ali Juburi, who is of Arabic descent. The Kirkuk Police Department announced that they are on duty, while underlining their allegiance to Baghdad. Arabs and Turkmens, who were discomforted by the KRG, welcomed the Iraqi Army’s initiative. Baghdad regained control in Kirkuk.

It should be underlined that even though Kirkuk was a “disputed territory” according to the Iraqi constitution, Erbil seized the control of the city by abusing the conjectural opportunities after 2003.

In other words, the KRG administration’s presence in Kirkuk is what is “disputed.” Despite this fact, Barzani’s emphasis on Kirkuk being a “Kurdish city” and the realization of the referendum in the city, with the support of former Governor Najmiddin Karim, clearly indicated that the KRG wanted to establish an “independent Kurdish state,” which included disputed territories, such as Kirkuk. In fact, Iraqi Kurds have shown time and time again that they were seeking for a dominance surpassing their own influence and they have clearly indicated their geographical dominance aims with the 2006 constitution prepared for the KRG.

For this reason, current events transpiring in Kirkuk and north of Nineveh region are the culmination of the power struggle between Baghdad and Erbil for the “disputed territories.”

According to the KRG and the Iraqi administrative provisions, there are 13 cities and 3 towns which are deemed as disputed territories. Some of these territories are mentioned in the 2006 Constitution prepared by the KRG. Thus, the KRG perceives certain cities and towns that are outside of its jurisdiction and under Baghdad’s control as its own. According to the 8^th Article of the 2006 constitution, the following cities and towns are asserted to be within the KRG’s jurisdiction: Dohuk region; Erbil, Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah regions; Akre, al-Shikhan, Sinjar, Tal Afar, Tall Kayf, Karkush, Zummar and the vicinity in Nineveh region; towns of Bashiqa and Aski Kalak; towns of Khanakin and Mandali in Diyala region; towns of Ba’adra and Jesan in Wasit region.

Dohuk, Erbil and Sulaymaniyah are regions with a Kurdish majority. Evaluating the disputed regions in the south of Dohuk, it could be seen that the town of Zummar in Tal Afar is under KRG control. Gaining control of Zummar after Daesh’s withdrawal, the KRG administration revealed its intention to govern Tal Afar in 2006. However, as the city mostly consists of Turkmens, the KRG was unable to do so. Moreover, the line between Dohuk and Mosul up until Tall Kayf is also under the control of Peshmerga. The destruction caused by the fight with Daesh on the line between Tall Kayf to Zummar, going around the Mosul Lake is clear, as there are ghost towns and towns lying in ruins. The KRG was also unable to gain control of Sinjar, which lies on the west of Tal Afar, towards the Syrian border. The population of Sinjar is 40% Arab, 40% Yazidi and 20% Kurdish. While the PKK, Peshmerga, and Hashd al-Shaabi control certain zones of the city, in parallel with the Iraqi Army’s operation in Kirkuk, it has been stated that Hashd al-Shaabi has gained control of Sinjar.

40 kilometers northeast of Mosul, most of the population of al-Shikhan is constituted by Yazidis and was under the control of the Peshmerga while this article was being written. Kirkuk, on the other hand, could be deemed as the most glaring disputed territory among them all, which is also the most discussed city by the Turkish public. The KRG had enjoyed an increased control over Kirkuk especially after Daesh’s withdrawal. However, Turkmen and Arab populations in the city were discomforted by the KRG administration embodied by the former governor Najmiddin Karim. For this reason, Kurds and Turkmens in the city preferred to boycott the September 25 referendum. Having the most oil and natural gas reserves among the regions desired by the KRG, Kirkuk became the very apparent fault line of the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil on October 16.

By deploying military (Peshmerga) and police (Asayish) forces to the territories it controls, the KRG has chosen to consolidate its power.

While northern regions of Mosul were captured by KDP Peshmergas, certain parts of Kirkuk, Saladin and Diyala regions were captured by PUK Peshmergas. While the KRG was initially aligned with the Iraq central government in terms of security, it has increased its autonomy throughout the process. The emergence of Daesh in Sunni-majority regions, which include certain disputed territories, enabled a new process. When Iraqi security forces withdrew from the region, including Kirkuk, in June 2014, the KRG was able to seize control of various disputed territories.

Uncertainties about the disputed territories in the constitution resulted in a fight for geographical dominance since 2005, in which power was the main determinant, rendering the disputed territories increasingly disputed.

While KRG leader Barzani desired to resolve the disputed territories issue in his favor with the September 25 referendum, now he has started to lose previous gains. Entering a new era beginning with the Iraqi Army’s operation in Kirkuk, the crisis between Baghdad and Erbil indicates that further operations to other disputed territories will take place – as was suggested by the mobility in Sinjar. Being successful against Daesh, capturing Kirkuk within a day and being supported by regional and international actors, the Iraqi central government could be expected to launch new operations in the short and mid-term in order to gain control over the disputed territories. Considering that the division between the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) and PUK also caused a division in the military force, the KRG will have a hard time in responding to Baghdad. Meanwhile, the schism between the KDP and PUK, which became apparent over Kirkuk might result in changes that could upset the political, administrative, social and economic balances of the KRG. Lead by the Talabani family, the PUK administration will seek to re-balance the KRG administration which is dominated by Erbil.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the developments in its aftermath led Turkey to develop different policies towards Baghdad and Erbil. This change was caused by the drafted constitution that was prepared by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government Council following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The draft, which was approved by the Council on March 8, 2004, formed the basis of the Iraqi Constitution and paved the way for the country’s federal system composed of two parliaments. In the light of the provisional Constitution, the Iraqi federal legislative elections and the Kurdish regional elections were simultaneously held on January 30, 2005 while the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) gained de facto autonomy. With the January 30 elections, Jalal Talabani, one of the two prominent Kurdish figures in northern Iraq, was elected the President of Iraq, while his opponent Masoud Barzani consolidated his political position by being elected the KRG President. The Iraqi Constitution was ratified on October 15, 2005 with a referendum and recognized the KRG as a regional actor. On October 24, 2005, Masoud Barzani was welcomed as the “KRG President” by then U.S. President George W. Bush at the White House one day before the official results of the constitutional polls were announced.

Although Iraq’s Constitution of 2005 puts emphasis on an “Iraqi” identity, it was built upon a sociology based on ethnicity and sect, which impeded the Constitution to offer an integrative approach. As viewed through the lens of the KRG, the only explanation of rationalizing this volatile coexistence presented by a non-integrative constitution might be a bond of voluntariness that could be abused when the time comes. This is the reason why the Iraqi Constitution gained around 80 percent support from KRG-controlled areas during the polls on October 15, 2005. The notion of region expressed in the fifth section of the Iraqi Constitution is the greatest problem ahead of a unitary Iraq, while also constituting a national security threat to Turkey as well. For Turkey, the two main controversial aspects in the new Iraqi Constitution are the future of the KRG and the status of Kirkuk province.

The Iraqi Kurds belonging to the Barzani tribe have displayed pragmatic responses to all kinds of local, regional and global developments as of 1918 following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As the opportunist and occasionally violent approaches of the group posed military and political threats on a local level to the answering authorities in terms of autonomy and independence, they aimed to increase the capacity of their activities in the region with the reactions they showed to various developments.

These developments can be listed as follows:

• The Treaty of Sèvres, which Turkey did not accede to in 1922
• The British Mandate during World War II in 1943
• Soviet invasion in 1946
• The coup attempt in Iraq in 1958
• The Baath coup in 1963
• The tension between Iraq and Iran-U.S. alliance between 1970 and 1974
• The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1990
• The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003

The 2003 invasion and its aftermath led pro-Kurdish politics, which flourished in 1945 in the domination of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to evolve into a regional threat. Meanwhile, the Daesh incursion of Mosul in 2014 laid the conditions which provided the KRG with an opportunity to move from autonomy to independence. However, the claims of independence were not prevalent in the entire KRG, as they were only revolving around the KDP and its leader Masoud Barzani. Independence assertions within the Goran movement and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have not been as strong as in the KDP. KDP circles were concerned when Daesh was defeated by the Iraqi army and the Iran-backed People’s Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi) in Mosul in 2017 as the territories were taken back by the central government of Iraq. The KDP rationalized its independence argument through the central authority’s re-establishment in areas near the KRG borders, the disturbance caused by the increasing influence of Iran in the region and the good relations developed with Turkey. Therefore, the planned independence referendum became increasingly important in terms of consolidating Kurdish presence in the disputed territories and in terms of institutionalizing Masoud Barzani’s political power.

What should Turkey’s diplomatic, economic and military measures be?

Since the First World War, Turkey has not gained any benefit from the conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria. Contrarily, the country exerted utmost efforts to resolve the problems through diplomatic means without being a party to the conflicts. Turkey generally has only taken active roles in such conflicts when the course of events directly threatened the country’s national security. Turkey’s preventive military operations against the outlawed PKK in northern Iraq, Daesh and People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria were launched as part of this strategy. It is clear that the KRG’s independence vote poses a national security threat to Turkey. When Turkey’s relations with the KRG and the central government of Iraq are considered, it can be expected that the country’s response to a possible independence will entail a list of measures in diplomatic, economic and military terms.

At the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) meeting held on September 22, a number of recommendations were given to the government to implement a list of sanctions in line with regional relations and national security threats. With the rights arising from the 1926 Treaty of Ankara, Turkey is expected to exercise pressure on the Iraqi central government and the KRG. Minimizing the activities of the Turkish Consulate General in Erbil and reducing the diplomatic relations with the KRG to minimum can also be expected. In addition, Turkey might exert pressure on the central government to conduct legislative regulations and take physical measures that would obviate the KRG’s assertive rights in the disputed territories, including Kirkuk.

The economic sanctions Turkey will possibly impose on the KRG include suspending activities at the Habur border gate, stopping shipping at the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, restricting Turkey-based investments in the region, limiting the commercial activities between the KRG and Turkey, suspending the energy projects, and withdrawing grants and credit support given to the region.

The military measures Turkey will take started to become evident before the MGK meeting. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) could turn the military drill it kicked off and expanded in Silopi into an operational assignment depending on a possible conflict in the KRG. Within this scope, the military operation the TSK has launched in coordination with the Iraqi army in Sinjar, located near the Syria-Iraq border, will enable the TSK to engage with the PKK in the region while also enabling the Iraqi army to handle KDP units. This would help to divert the KDP Peshmerga away from disputed territories in the north and east of Mosul. The TSK can be expected to have a direct engagement with the PKK and indirect interventions on the KRG by means of large-scale air raids and special operations it will launch on the PKK camps located in northern Iraq.

Also, Turkish combat troops might be deployed to Kirkuk in the framework of a protocol that is to be held with the central government of Iraq in order to ensure the security of the Turkmens in the province. Extensive special air operations are estimated to be conducted in coordination with Iran against the PKK camps in Khakurk and Qandil regions, which are located within the domain of the KRG. There is also a possibility that Iran could launch a counter-operation to the KDP units deployed near the Iran-Iraq border.

None of Turkey’s military options suggest a direct intervention in KRG units. The engagement conditions will arise against the KRG Peshmerga forces only in case of a direct attack against the TSK forces. Military clashes are most likely to be seen among the Iraqi Army and the KDP Peshmerga, al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the KDP, Iran and the KDP, and between the PKK and TSK, while additional clashes might occur between the KDP and the PUK, the KDP and the Iraqi Turkmen Front, the PKK and al-Hashd al-Sha’abi, and the PKK and the Iraqi army.

Who will benefit from the referendum?

Turkey does not wish to jeopardize its amicable relations with the KDP due to the pragmatic approaches of Barzani and his proponents as such a situation is likely to reduce Turkey’s influence in the KRG. However, it is also seen that the KRG’s independence process overtly threatens Turkey’s national security due to the risks it entails – even the debates on the referendum caused quite a stir and led Turkey to revise its current strategy towards the KRG. The process kicked off with the KRG’s independence venture, presenting two main arguments for Turkey to boost its efficiency in Iraq: new and manageable regional alliances and direct military engagement with the non-state actors.

Even triple alliances might be built in this respect while Turkey-Iraq and Turkey-Iran alliances are anticipated. This reflects the fact that the current situation in the KRG can be regarded as a common threat. Turkey’s arguments concerning non-state actors take shape in consideration of the PKK, leading the Iraqi central government to take direct measures against this terrorist organization. In this way, Iran will see that its own security would also be threatened unless it adopts any direct stance against the PKK.

It must be clarified that the PKK will gain the upper hand if the alliances are not well-managed, and this would certainly neither favor the KRG nor the other regional countries. The most important result of this process is probably the signs indicating that the status of Kirkuk will be determined soon. Within this scope, Turkey’s military, diplomatic, economic and cultural presence in the region might provide a chance for Turkey to meet the expectations of the Turkmens in the region while it will also deepen Turkey’s domain in the crisis points of Iraq.

The Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, which was held upon the insistence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani despite all the objections of local, regional and international actors, poses numerous risks that could drift the entire region into a state of chaos. The rising tension in Kirkuk after the Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim declared the referendum and the subsequent developments have shown how the decision to hold a referendum could drag Iraq and the region into further instability.

Tensions between the Erbil and Baghdad administrations, which have reached their peak due to the referendum decision, have also reverberated into relations between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army. Peshmerga forces were not included in the anti-Daesh operations launched in Hawija, a southern district of Kirkuk. In the midst of this strained atmosphere, only a week before the referendum, a conflict broke out between the Turkmens and Kurdish groups in Kirkuk, illustrating that the tension looming over the city might culminate into a major scale conflict at any moment. In addition, the fact that the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a significant actor in the city, announced that they would not recognize the referendum, revealed that the tension between Turkmens and Kurds would not simmer down after the referendum.

As Erbil increasingly insisted on the referendum, the Baghdad administration did not hesitate in responding with hostile measures. The Iraqi Parliament discharged the Kirkuk governor from duty and vested the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi with all kinds of authorities in order to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq by referring to his title of “Commander-in-Chief.” Vested with this authority, Abadi displayed that they would harshly respond to the KRG’s steps toward independence by stating a day before the referendum that the referendum is null and void. On the day of the referendum, the Iraqi Parliament assigned the Abadi government to send troops to Kirkuk. These developments highlighted that the decision-makers in Baghdad and the Abadi government have taken a determined stance concerning the referendum and the disputed territories in a coordinated and synchronized way. All these factors indicate that the disputed territories, which include Kirkuk, constitute the focal point of the referendum crisis.

The KRG administration insists on seizing control over the disputed territories by affording all the risks of conflict mainly due to the natural resources in those areas. According to the figures provided by the International Energy Agency, the overall oil reserves in the KRG region correspond to 4 billion barrels, while the inclusion of the disputed territories to the KRG will increase this amount to 45 billion barrels. Given that oil forms a large part of the KRG’s total revenues, Kirkuk’s importance for Erbil can be seen more clearly.

Another reason for the KRG’s expansionist policy in the disputed territories is the ambition to control the lowlands and the areas that are fit for cultivation aside from the highlands where Kurds are densely populated. The KRG regards the valleys that contain water resources and which are fit for cultivation, such as Tel Keppe and Zummar located in the north of Mosul, as strategic targets. Therefore, the KRG estimates that an independent Kurdish state would not be sustainable unless it includes the disputed territories.

Possible conflicts that could arise following the referendum

Following the referendum, conflicts could possibly break out in the disputed territories that strained the relations between the KRG and the Iraqi central administration. The Iraqi Parliament’s instructions to Abadi for intervention indicate that the disputed territories will bear witness to a sovereignty struggle in which the rivals may use force. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution rules holding referenda in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine which administration the territories will belong to. However, not all disputed territories are clearly specified in the Article. Due to this, the KRG were able to create an actual state and claim sovereignty, seizing control of a line that expands from Mosul in the west of Iraq to Mandali in the east. Before considering the requirements of organizing a referendum in these territories, it must be discussed whether the areas de facto seized by the KRG are within the disputed territories. A scenario in which these discussions cannot be finalized through negotiations might lead to a civil war. The process as of 2003 has clearly illustrated that if and when desired results cannot be obtained through negotiations, this ends in a civil war for Iraq.

A possible conflict between Baghdad and Erbil will undermine the fight against Daesh while creating a more convenient area of crisis for terror groups such as the PKK and its Syrian wing PYD. Conflict between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces may exacerbate the tension among different ethnic and religious groups in the disputed territories. Daesh and similar terror groups are likely to take advantage of such chaos and expand their domains. Besides, the PKK will want to consolidate its presence in Sinjar and make room for itself by benefiting from the crisis. The PYD stated that they would be ready to perform their duty at a possible conflict in Kirkuk, which clearly illustrates that the PKK and the PYD wish to make room for themselves by taking advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq.

The region’s countries are against the referendum

Iraq’s neighbors, including Turkey and Iran, have adopted a strict stance against the referendum as they foresee the heavy costs of managing the potential risks of a possible independence in northern Iraq. In a statement he issued on the day the referendum was held, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remarked that the border gate with Iraq is only open for Turkey-bound traffic, adding that some additional measures might be taken regarding the KRG’s oil transfer. In addition, it is clearly seen that Turkey has taken some critical steps in terms of economic and diplomatic sanctions considering the increasing coordination between Tehran, Baghdad and Ankara. In addition, the Turkish military launched drills near the Habur border gate, which is an important passage point between Turkey and northern Iraq, demonstrating that high level security measures have been taken with regard to the issue.

Similarly, Iran also believes that the KRG referendum threatens the stability of the entire region as well as Iraq. Therefore, the country closed its airspace to Erbil and conducted drills near the northern Iraq border ahead of the referendum. Besides, Iran displayed a determination to engage in joint action with Ankara and Baghdad concerning the developments in the KRG by pursuing heavy telephone traffic with these capitals. It was also reported that Iranian General Qasem Soleimani wanted to visit northern Iraq in order to stir negative views regarding Barzani within political circles. This indicates that Iran has also activated its influence in the field against the referendum by adopting diplomatic, economic and military measures.

Iran is also concerned about the possibility that an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, with ethnicity-based motives, might threaten Tehran’s control over Iranian Kurds. The country presumes that with the effect of the KRG referendum, the Iranian Kurds might demand expansion of their rights even though they do not ask for independence. An ethnicity-based instability within Iran could threaten the domestic politics of Iran in general, since Iran is a country comprising multiple ethnic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Baloch people and various other minorities.

Another possibility that concerns Iran is the division of Iraq into three parts in case Iraqi Sunnis also found an independent state following the declaration of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In such a case, the Sunni state can join the anti-Iran league since they have had problems with the Shia ever since the occupation, and this would threaten the corridor Tehran has recently formed that extends through Iraq to as far as Syria and Lebanon.

Iran also estimates that it might lose its current allies if an independent Kurdish state is formed since the country has profound ideological differences with allies of the KRG. When the Iranian administration hosted a delegation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tehran in June, the PUK did not take up any stance against the referendum although the Iranian administration expressed its reservations over it. In addition, Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim, who is a PUK member, announced that Kirkuk would also take part in the independence vote. This development showed that Iran, which harshly stands against the referendum, could not alter the opinion of the PUK although the country is known for its close links to the political party.

All in all, given that the PUK has a secular and ethno-nationalist ideology and the public opinion acts as a determinant over the political actors in the KRG, the foundation of a Kurdish state under the leadership of Barzani would undermine Iran’s influence in the KRG.

Finally, Barzani’s amicable relations with the U.S. and Israel escalate Iran’s security concerns. Iran fears that an independent Kurdish state might act as a base for the operations to change the regime in Iran and the KRG might turn into a factor threatening the country.

Due to the clear stance of the Ankara-Tehran-Baghdad triple against the referendum and the fact that other international actors are not supporting Erbil in the current state, it seems that the Erbil administration has taken steps backward in the short term. The fact that KRG officials also emphasize negotiations and positively welcome Ayatollah Sistani’s call for “lowering the tensions and invitation for negotiations” could be interpreted as the willingness to communicate with Baghdad. Considering issues such as sovereignty in disputed areas, the extraction and sale of oil, the status of the Peshmerga within the Iraqi security forces – which are deeply rooted problems – these negotiations can turn into a means of time-gaining between Baghdad and Erbil. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that almost all actors in northern Iraq agree on independence and see it as their “right,” so therefore it would be wrong to expect the Erbil administration to completely eliminate the independence process. For this reason, even if negotiations begin between the two parties, it can be concluded that in the long-term the quest for independence in northern Iraq will continue to remain as an element of tension in the region.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a referendum for independence on Monday despite the objections of many capitals including Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara. Israel’s overt support for the vote was only one among many other developments that cast a shadow on the referendum.

A considerable part of Iraqi Kurds were among those objecting to the vote, which demonstrated concerns surrounding the possible problems that could arise. The main reason for the concerns is the fear that the quest for independence would bring more conflict, instability and suffering to the Kurds instead of bolstering peace and welfare.

Some Kurds and regional countries with a significant Kurdish population were also apprehensive that the appeasement of Kurds for the sake of independence might render them increasingly dependent on some regional and global actors, causing their manipulation for the global powers’ Middle East policies.

Furthermore, it is feared that having included disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, in the referendum could convert the disagreements between Kurds and other peoples in the region into conflict. Iraq, which has already been ravaged by Daesh terror, could therefore be dragged into another civil war. Such concerns surely reflect the realities of the geography.

Past experiences make it clear that drifting the region into conflict and war brings serious consequences for the peoples and countries of the Middle East. Above all, the region surrenders to the activities of terror groups since conflict and war disrupt the states in the region. It must be noted that the wars experienced in the Middle East have constituted the main determinant that keeps the outlawed PKK active in the region for almost 40 years now. We know that the authority gaps seen in Beqaa following the Lebanese Civil War, in northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and in the north of Syria as a result of the Syrian Civil War created convenient spaces for the PKK to improve and expand. Likewise, it is more than obvious that the terror groups including al-Qaeda and Daesh took advantage of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Another consequence of the conflicts in the Middle East is that they enable global actors to employ pretexts to intervene in the region. Global powers, particularly the U.S. and Russia, become a party to the conflicts in the Middle East in order to consolidate their positions in the region, which is very rich in terms of natural resources. Catastrophes befall the peoples of the region as the conflicts are manipulated for the power struggle between global actors.

Therefore, it can be argued that the referendum will start an excruciating period for all the peoples in the region, especially the Kurds, if it foments large-scale conflicts through the independence schemes of the disputed areas in Iraq. As occurred in all the other conflicts in the region, the global actors will surely take up positions in accordance with their own interests. So, the referendum poses a high risk of causing a long-standing atmosphere of chaos.

When viewed through the lens of Ankara, the extent to which the KRG administration, after a possible independence, will cooperate with Turkey in its fight against the PKK is seriously questioned. This is due to the fact that despite the extensive support of Turkey, the KRG has already failed in this matter so far. Considering that the Barzani administration, which had amicable relations with Turkey is far from satisfying Ankara even in this issue, it is predicted that an independent state of Kurdistan, where political actors have close links to the PKK and where the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Goran are influential, could possibly pursue policies that would upset Turkey.

For Turkey, who accomplished a great deal in her fight against the PKK within domestic territory, it is unacceptable for this terrorist group, which seeks to find a de facto state in northern Syria with the support of the U.S., to enhance its influence towards northern Iraq.

As a matter of fact, the Barzani administration has already acquired autonomy to a considerable degree against the unjust impositions of Baghdad and Tehran. The KRG was supposed to prove its sovereignty in its territory through solving the PKK question and this is still true. Barzani and the KRG are required to give the actual fight for independence against the PKK and the actors siding with the terror groups.

The referendum that took place on Monday in northern Iraq asking residents of the KRG-controlled provinces whether they want to break from Baghdad continues to occupy the political agenda in the Middle East.

During a police graduation ceremony at the Presidential Palace in Ankara, President Erdogan stated that Turkey would not permit new “Lawrences of Arabia” to unsettle the region.

“Just as we did not allow the fire which burned in Syria to spread to our country, hopefully, we will stop the attempted instigation in Iraq.”

Referring to the British spy T.S. Lawrence, who was connected to the Arab revolt against the Ottoman Empire during the First World War, the President stated that “New Lawrences [of Arabia] will not succeed this time, I want you all to know that.”

In reference to the recent developments in northern Iraq and the increasing threat of terrorism, Turkey’s Defense Minister Nurettin Canikli told journalists that “the PKK terrorist group appears to be expanding its presence seriously in northern Iraq. So, the threats coming from that side are on the rise.”

“Turkey cannot remain indifferent to this. Turkey will take all necessary steps and measures to eradicate the threat.”

In regard to the KRG’s illegitimate referendum, which is not recognized by the UN, US and western Europe, Canikli said that this move would lead to conflict.

He added that any plan to establish a new state would set the region on fire, and bring more conflicts to the global stage.

Close to the referendum, and following, Ankara has launched a military exercise, along with Iraqi forces, across the border from KRG territory and has threatened restrictions at the main frontier crossing.

New attempts in solving the crisis in Syria

The ongoing civil war in Syria continues to remain a hot topic for Turkey not only because it is a neighboring country but also due to the 3 million Syrian refugees that the country is hosting.

On Wednesday, sources from the Presidency stated that recent developments in Iraq and Syria were discussed in a security meeting in Ankara chaired by President Erdogan.

Turkey’s military campaign against terrorism as well as other developments in the region were also discussed in the meeting.

More, on Wednesday UN special envoy Staffan de Mistura announced that an eighth round of Syrian peace talks is expected to be launched next month.

Speaking at a UN Security Council meeting in New Yotk, Mistura stated that “I wish to confirm today my intention to convene the eighth round of intra-Syrian talks in Geneva in about a month from now – the precise date is to be determined.”

However, he added that “it should be no later than the end of October or very early in November.”

De Mistura urged both sides to “assess the situation with realism,” and to participate in the talks “without any preconditions.”

While mentioning that Daesh was “being beaten back” by a U.S. led international coalition, he warned that the four de-escalation zones created in eastern Ghouta, north of Homs, and in Idlib “must not lead to a soft partition of Syria.”

U.S. envoy to the UN Nikki Haley said that a political transition was “indispensable for peace,” but that it must be “one that does not allow Iranian influence to replace ISIS or Assad in power.”

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) referendum on independence is no great news for an already fractured country and a destabilized region. Independence is an openly stated goal of the Iraqi Kurds who consistently declare it is only a question of when, not if. However, the only outside support for KRG independence is confined to the Israeli promise to recognize a potential Kurdish state. Most stakeholders, including the U.S. and Turkey, oppose the referendum and support Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraq has monumental challenges ahead including terrorism, reconstruction, refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional proxy wars being fought in its territory. A potential declaration of independence would most likely exacerbate these problems and lead to further destabilization of the country.

Some analysts have argued that Turkey might be open to or even embrace a declaration of independence given its close ties with the KRG. Turkey’s reaction so far has been anything but. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that Turkey might be open to Iraqi Kurdish independence especially if the declaration is not sudden and comes after negotiations with the Baghdad government over the long term. The reality is that the referendum is unlikely to lead to a declaration of independence and the KRG will seek an amicable divorce through talks with Baghdad. The most recent agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to fight against ISIS was supported and brokered by the U.S. In the case of independence, however, there is no such common ground and there does not seem to exist any available U.S. or Turkish patronage.

Iraq is fractured and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Unaddressed grievances in the country will likely exacerbate political instability despite the most recent military defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The most important reason for the emergence of ISIS was the failure of the Iraqi political system that left Sunnis out of the political system. Even in the very unlikely scenario where the KRG successfully negotiates Kurdistan’s exit from Iraq, the lack of Sunni say in the matter will continue to destabilize the country and the broader region. An Iraqi Kurdish exit will also be tested by the struggle over disputed territories and the lack of a political agreement.

Turkey’s economic investments and security interests along with its political relations with the KRG make it a critical actor. However, Turkey-KRG relations are now deeply unsettled by what looks like the KDP leader Barzani’s bid to prevail over his rivals with the promise of an elusive independence. If Turkey had supported the independence referendum, the KRG would have overcome a major hurdle in terms of international legitimacy. However, from Turkey’s perspective, the independence bid is a deeply destabilizing move in an environment where, only a few months ago, ISIS held large swaths of Iraqi territory. Turkey has had close relations with the KRG but multiple statements by Turkish officials against the upcoming referendum illustrate the limits of Turkish support for the KRG. Turkish opposition to the breakup of Iraq is so strong that Turkey might take punitive steps, including imposing sanctions against the KRG.

Turkey’s argument against Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence is based on a variety of considerations. First, yet another chapter in the long Iraqi civil war would bring about another layer of instability to the region and adversely impact Turkish economic and security interests. Second, potential new conflict could open up space in Iraq for the PKK which has already gained ground in Syria due to the prolonged civil war and American support for the PYD. Third, Turkey continues to value its relationship with the rest of Iraq and is particularly invested in the fate of the Turkmen community. Fourth, unintended consequences of the breakup of Iraq promise a whole new set of complications that would threaten Turkey’s border security and might weaken its current influence in northern Iraq.

Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the KRG leadership but it does not want to be the enabler of a breakup of Iraq. Turkey spent a lot of energy during the tenure of the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to ensure Sunni inclusion in the Iraqi political system. In an environment where the Sunnis have virtually no say in the future of Iraq, Turkey would not want to contribute to their further alienation by midwifing an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. If the referendum leads to a new era of ethnic conflict, Turkey’s security and economic interests would be negatively, potentially empowering the PKK.

In many ways, the independence referendum has placed the horse before the cart, so to speak. There was already a referendum in 2005 with an overwhelming support for independence. Repeating a referendum with predictably similar results only indicates an effort to strengthen Barzani’s hand politically rather than a step in achieving “self-determination.” While the votes are yet to be tallied, Barzani has officially claimed victory in the referendum vote – an expected repeat of the 2005 referendum result. Yet, it is not entirely clear if this result will actually empower the KRG’s hand, as the Baghdad government has already ruled out negotiations labeling the referendum “illegal.”

The KRG President Barzani has called for negotiations with Baghdad for independence, however, the potential punitive measures and political alienation by Turkey and Iran may weaken the KRG’s hand in forcing such negotiations. In fact, Iran has already closed its border shared with northern Iraq and Turkey is mulling whether to close the border. The KRG’s referendum bid was clearly to prop up Barzani’s position against rival Kurdish parties who have been calling for a new presidential election. Having gone forward without the agreement and patronage of two neighboring powers, Iran and Turkey, the KRG has risked political isolation, not to mention potential for conflict.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq has gone through periods of crises and chaos with short periods of only “relative” calm. It is currently in a highly fragile state and the breakup of the country through the establishment of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would probably lead to yet another round of conflict in Iraq’s never-ending civil war. In the absence of any international backing and legitimacy, the KRG leaders will need to think long and hard before declaring independence.

Following the governing AK Party’s statements regarding the controversial referendum in northern Iraq, the two main opposition party leaders, Devlet Bahceli and Kemal Kilicdaroglu have also supported the government in its stance.

Leader of MHP, Bahceli, issued a written statement from the headquarters of the Nationalist Movement Party claiming that “it has become inevitable for Turkey to pursue an effective and comprehensive deterrence policy that includes the use of military force, and it has become inevitable for them to progressively determine coercive measures and gradually implement them.”

“This is a national security issue that cannot be underestimated by Turkey and I want to repeat that the Nationalist Movement party will stand with the government in its measures that it will take with determination in this regard.”

In the statement Bahceli said that the referendum brings a “message of a dark period” in the region, accusing Masoud Barzani of starting an “adventurous journey” that would end up with him “paying a heavy price and disappointment.”

The MHP leader added that “he [Barzani] will see how this childhood dream will turn into a nightmare.”

He called the poll a “piracy referendum” that had no legal and political legitimacy, adding that it is “void and condemned to stay on paper only.”

Earlier this week President Erdogan had only emphasized that the referendum was initiated by the KRG in order to secure the Barzani family’s political inclusion.

Moreover, CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu has urged for a common solution in regards to the aftermath of the referendum.

Talking to reporters in Ankara, the CHP leader called for Turkey, Iran and the central Iraqi government to find a common solution to the problem in northern Iraq following Monday’s controversial referendum.

“If a common solution can be produced, Turkey can make important progress on this issue.”

Kilicdaroglu also added that Turkey had demonstrated a “national stance” on the referendum and even its parliament was supporting this view.

Commercial, economic and political sanctions due

Prior to the referendum, President Erdogan had made it clear that if the Barzani administration do not listen to their calls, Turkey will not refrain from imposing political, economic and commercial sanctions on the KRG administration.

The first warning comes as the Turkish Radio and Television Supreme Council decides to remove 3 northern Iraq TV channels off air – K24, WAAR and Rudaw have been removed from Turkish satellite Turksat.

The decision was taken after the three channels called some parts of southeastern and eastern Turkey as “northern Kurdistan” in their television broadcast.

The channels did not have a license from RTUK, yet they were broadcasting the transmission using the license obtained from the KRG.

In addition to mere channel obstructions, the Turkish and Iraqi military have launched a joint military exercise on the Turkish-Iraqi border.

While Turkey had already started its military maneuvers in the southeastern Silopi region on September 18, a week ahead of the referendum, announcement of a joint exercise came after the vote took place.

A brief statement published on the Turkish General Staff’s official website announced that the third phase of the military exercise will start on Tuesday 3 October, jointly with the Iraqi military at the Habur border gate, also known as the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing, on the Turkish-Iraqi border in the Silopi district of Sirnak.

The area sits to the north of the Syrian and Iraqi borders and contains the Habur border crossing, which is the KRG’s main access point to the rest of the world.

Voting ended on Monday evening for the controversial referendum on the secession of northern Iraq’s Kurdish region.

The polls were due to close at 6 p.m. local time (3 GMT), but the Kurdish Regional Government’s Election Commission extended the operation by another hour in order to allow voters to cast their votes, with the exception of the Kirkuk province.

According to reports of the Anadolu Agency, the Election Commission also reported that the turnout stood at 76 percent.

While local authorities have urged the residents not to carry out aerial firing while celebrating the results, a shooting incident was reported in which a civilian was killed in the disputed district center of Tuz Khurmatu, Saladin province.

In wary of potential violence that may erupt due to the referendum, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu warned the KRG that the Turkish army will intervene if the Turkmen population are targeted.

UN concerned

As the count begins, many statements have emerged from countries condemning the KRG and underlining that the results will not be recognized.

The UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said Monday that he was concerned about the “potentially destabilizing effects” of the referendum held by the KRG in defiance of the international community.

A statement released by his spokesman Stephane Dujarric, highlighted that Guterres “respects the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq” and recommends that all outstanding issues “be resolved through structured dialogue and constructive compromise.”

The statement further added that the UN Secretary-General expects UN-mandated activities to be allowed to continue, unhindered.

In spite of calls from various leaders all over the world, including Erdogan, Trump, and French President Macron, the KRG President Masoud Barzani chose to go ahead with the independence referendum.

The voters in KRG-held areas vote today, Monday 25 September, on whether to secede from Iraq.

As the vote continues to take place, Iraq Parliament’s speaker Salim al-Jubouri has made it clear that the results of the Kurdish referendum will not be legally binding.

Highlighting the intention of protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity, in a statement Jubouri said that “We [the Baghdad administration] are keen on keeping the Kurds in our homeland.”

Further, he stated that “The unity of Iraq is our main concern and we will not give it up,” going on to blame “wrong policies” for the current state of tension.

Against claims made by Barzani, Jubouri said that “the referendum will affect the upcoming election and will drag the country in a new phase.”

Iran closes border with Northern Iraq

The Iranian President Hassan Rouhani has also come out strong against the referendum, stating that Iraq has his country’s full support for actions necessary to preserve its unity.

According to a written statement by Iraq’s Prime Minister’s office, during a phone call with PM Haider Al-Abadi, Rouhani “stressed his country’s full support for the Iraqi government and all its steps that had taken to preserve Iraq’s unity and territorial integrity.”

“Al-Abadi affirmed the Iraqi government’s efforts to complete the liberation of all Iraqi territory from Daesh’s terrorist gangs, which is a priority for them.”

The statement continued: “Al-Abadi stressed the government’s clear stance to prevent unilateral and unconstitutional procedures that threaten the unity of Iraq, peaceful coexistence among the people of the country, rejection of the referendum and will not deal with its results.”

Following this phone call, the Foreign Ministry of Iran has announced that it has closed its border with northern Iraq’s Kurdish region on Monday.

A day earlier, Tehran ended flights between the territories.

During a news conference in Tehran, Ministry spokesman Behram Qasimi said that “At the request of Iraq, we have closed the airspace and ground borders with the Kurdish Regional Government.”

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has refrained from stepping back from the decision to hold a referendum on independence, where residents in KRG-controlled provinces are scheduled to vote on breaking from Baghdad on 25 September.

The oil rich province of Kirkuk is also among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

In spite of heightening tensions and calls from the US and Turkey to postpone the referendum, calls from Baghdad for further negotiations, the KRG President Masoud Barzani has not announced any cancellation of the referendum.

The statement provided by the Security Council added that the referendum risks detracting from the fight against Daesh, and that it could also disrupt efforts to ensure the safe return of over three million refugees and internally displaced persons to the country.

Council members “expressed their continuing respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq,” urging all issues between the central Baghdad government and the Erbil administration to be resolved “through structured dialogue and compromise supported by the international community.”

International call for referendum to be cancelled

In addition to President Erdogan and the US President Trump who are both in agreement that the vote should not go ahead, French President Emmanuel Macron also stressed the importance of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity.

During a phone call made with Barzani, Macron reportedly asked the KRG President to postpone the controversial referendum.

A statement issued by Barzani’s office stated that the two men discussed the “important role” played by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the ongoing fight against Daesh in Iraq.

Barzani nevertheless confirmed to Macron that the referendum would be held on schedule, while also stressing Erbil’s readiness to hold dialogue with Baghdad after the poll.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-kurdish-quest-for-independence-in-iraq-and-its-repercussions-for-turkey-and-the-region/

Turkey to debate military operation in Iraq and Syria

The ongoing developments in Iraq and Syria remain high on the political agenda.

In this regard, according to the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s parliamentary group deputy chairman, the parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Saturday to debate the extension of Turkish military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.

Mustafa Elitas stated that “the general assembly of the Turkish Parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Sept. 23 at 16.00 [4 p.m. local time] to debate the extension of the Prime Ministry’s motion that enables the government to conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq and Syria.”

The motion had previously allowed the Turkish military to carry out cross-border operations from Oct. 2, 2016 until Oct. 31, 2017.

As the referendum day is coming closer, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) shows no sign of stepping back despite disputes within the region and a number of calls from the central government of Iraq as well as the major regional and global actors. From the perspective of the KRG, a delay is still possible if the West, particularly the US, guarantees recognition after a delayed referendum, but this still has not happened as the referendum day is approaching fast. As for the objections from the global powers, the United States, through the Secretary of State Rex Tillerson, has recently repeated its stance on the issue by calling the KRG President Masoud Barzani to postpone the planned referendum on September 25th.

Likewise, the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Mikhail Bogdanov has also emphasized Russia’s stance on the issue by expressing Moscow’s support for the unity, sovereignty and territorial integrity of Iraq. While the two global powers are disunited on the politics of the Middle East, their concerns seem to be similar in respect to the planned referendum. Both sides show their worries for the possible negative repercussions of the planned referendum regarding the stability of Iraq and the ongoing war against DAESH.

In response to the arguments made concerning unity and the fight against DAESH, Regional President Barzani has retained a constant stance arguing that DAESH is a product of a unified Iraq and that the current state of the Middle East is far from unity and stability anyway. The picture for the position of the global powers does not change when we add Germany and China to the equation as well. They all seem to acknowledge the Iraqi Kurds’ right for self-determination but express their concern with the timing (aka “it is too soon”) and style (aka “talk to Baghdad one more time”) of it. While Germany seems to have had this opinion for quite a while, China seems to have shifted away from a fixed anti-separatism position to a more neutral one with the help of its developing economic ties with the KRG.

As we downsize the scale from global to regional actors, Israel and Iran seem to be the opposite poles of this issue. While Israel supports the KDP’s quest for independence, the toughest objection comes from Iran. Israel seems to view the KRG’s independence call as an opportunity, as it is eager to develop cooperation with an independent Kurdistan, particularly in order to end its own isolation in the region and further to contain Iran and limit its access to Syria. Furthermore, an independent Kurdistan would be a good distraction for Arab states by turning many hostile faces away from Israel.

As for Iran, the primary motivation seems to be its fear of being contained and losing its upper hand in Iraq and Syria. Iran has also reasons to worry from a diffusion effect of the independence seeking Kurdish nationalism, on top of the long legacy of violent separatism in the country, as it is currently facing serious protests in its heavily Kurdish populated cities.

What about Turkey? What is the driving force for Turkish politicians’ calls for caution and wariness to the KRG President Masoud Barzani? For one, Turkey, as expected, also feels threatened by a possible diffusion effect from the independence aspirations of Iraqi Kurds. While this is true, what drives the paramount Turkish approach is not a possible or even probable future scenario regarding popular aspirations, expectations or perceptions. Turkey’s understandable concern is real, tangible and current: the presence of the PKK camps and headquarters in Northern Iraq. The question I believe best summarizes Turkey’s primary concern is “what if the PKK hijacks the planned Kurdish state?” Turkey’s concern is far from a paranoia given the fact that the PKK currently de facto rules certain areas in Northern Iraq, has certain ties with the local actors such as the PUK and Gorran and even with the US through its Syrian branch, PYD. So therefore, Turkey’s concern is not a minor one, nor unsound. While this concern is significant, Turkey’s closest associate in its fight against the PKK at present and in the foreseeable future, is another Kurdish organization, the KDP.

Turkey has long suffered from PKK terrorism and has lost thousands of security personnel, hundreds of teachers and civil servants, politicians and random civilians at the hands of the PKK over the 33 years long history of the conflict. Turkey at times benefited from its Western partners in its struggle with PKK terrorism as in the case of Öcalan’s capture in Kenya in 1999. However, not only are Turkey’s longtime allies now officially providing weapons to the PKK’s Syrian branch, PYD, the PKK’s enlisted members can freely travel in Europe and the PKK are freely publishing death orders in its newspapers printed in Europe.

While Turkey is being left alone by its Western partners, Masoud Barzani’s KDP seems to be the closest ally for Turkey’s fight against the PKK. On top of the violent past of the KDP and PKK in Iraq, the PKK has also accused the KDP for providing ground intelligence to Turkey for its recent military operations and blockage of the passage used by PKK members between Iraq and Syria. On the other hand, the KDP has also condemned the PKK attacks on the Syrian Kurdish National Council (ENKS, the KDP affiliate organization in Syria) offices in Syria amidst the rivalry in Sinjar, Iraq.

Given that the PKK is a destabilizing actor not only in Turkey but also in the KRG-ruled areas, the Turkish government and the KRG have mutual interests in the fight against the PKK. Moreover, Turkey and the KRG’s trade deals are now well-known and ever growing as Turkey is the top investor and trading partner in the region, a situation that has been preserved despite the PKK’s efforts to spoil it. This is why the Turkish official reaction to the planned referendum is not as loud as Iran’s.

It appears clear that any actor wanting to cooperate with Turkey in the region needs to show its commitment to Turkey’s fight with PKK terrorism. Turkey has no means to tolerate neighbors who host, or “partners” who arm its number one security threat, the PKK. Hence, in reference to the referendum, Turkey’s choice seems to be of a conditional one – neither categorically fixed in favor or against the emergence of a Kurdish state. For Turkish interests, what matters most is not the name of the country across its southern borders, but its position vis-a-vis the PKK. Turkey seems to follow one single, straightforward goal: the termination of the PKK headquarters and camps in Iraq (and anywhere else across the region), for once and for all. Thus, Turkey’s choice is the option that enables this end.

Despite criticisms from local groups and regional governments, on September 25, residents in the Kurdistan region of northern Iraq will vote in a referendum on whether they want to completely separate from the Republic of Iraq. While the region has enjoyed autonomy for decades, if the referendum approves the secession, an independent state will be born with a distinctly Kurdish identity, a long held aspiration for the ethnic group. But questions linger about the timing of the referendum, and how the new state will deal with the ethnic and sectarian schisms that are tearing apart the region.

Serif Dilek and Hazal Duran spoke with Hemin Hawrami, senior assistant to President Masoud Barzani, and the head of the Foreign Relations Committee of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.

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Did you negotiate with Baghdad about the independence referendum? How does Baghdad approach this process? How do you expect Baghdad’s position to be after the referendum?

The independence referendum is not a new issue. We have discussed it with Prime Minister Abadi three times. And also, when President Barzani led a large Kurdistan delegation in September 2016, he discussed the forthcoming referendum for independence. But its date had not been fixed. In Baghdad, definitely there has not been that much negative reaction. The major concern of Baghdad is the continuation of dialogue. Of course, they prefer us to stay in Iraq. But we argue that a federal, an inclusive Iraq is over. The federal system has failed in Iraq. Because Iraq has not adhered in practice to a federal state structure although it is written in the constitution. This referendum in fact comes after a long process of dialogue with Baghdad. So, we hope that this positive atmosphere built on the cooperation against DAESH in Mosul and also on the cooperation that the Kurdistan region hosts nearly 1.8 million internally displaced Iraqi people (IDP) will help us to find new formulas in establishing bilateral relationships.

Does the referendum for the Kurdistan region indicate independence? If so, what kind of process does Iraqi Kurdistan expect after the referendum?

Yeah. The referendum is for independence and the referendum has one question: Are we with an independent Kurdistan, yes or no? So, there is no third question or a third option. After the referendum, there will definitely be a long process with Baghdad. The Kurdistan delegation, from representing all the political parties, all the components, including Christians and Turkmen; they will talk to Baghdad about for example how we can establish a healthy economic interdependence between Baghdad and Kurdistan in the post-referendum process; how we can continue on a joint military defense strategy built on what we did in Mosul together; how we can use, for example, pipelines between Iraq and Kurdistan; and how not to have visas; how to have one market for both sides and some kind of other further economic interdependency. So, these are the details that we will be taking in the post-referendum period.

Some Kurdish parties (Gorran, for example) harshly criticized the decision of the referendum. Was the referendum decision a result of general compromise between the Kurdish parties or just a decision of President Masood Barzani and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP)?

I cannot speak on behalf of Gorran. But, in principle, Gorran is not against independence. The charter of Gorran stipulates that they support self-determination and the independence of Kurdistan. Maybe they have concerns about the mechanism of the referendum. Well, President Barzani has communicated with all the political parties, including Gorran and we sent invitations to them for a meeting on the  7^th of June. There are eleven blocks represented in the parliament and Gorran is one of them. Except Gorran and the Islamic Group of Kurdistan, the other nine blocks came to the meeting with President Barzani. The referendum issue was discussed and put to unanimous vote with the participation of the nine blocks. So, the decision was taken unanimously by all the political parties attending the meeting. It was not a unilateral decision made by President Barzani.

http://thenewturkey.org/intra-kurdish-approaches-to-the-independence-referendum-in-northern-iraq/

It is stated that the referendum will also be held in the disputed territories. According to Article 140 of the Constitution, it was specified that the people living in these regions would be connected to the Central Government of Iraq or Iraqi Kurdistan through a referendum, but the mentioned referendum did not happen. Will it mean that these regions will be a part of Iraqi Kurdistan if the result will be “yes” in the referendum?

The referendum decision was made unanimously by all the parties and with President Barzani. This referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan. Disputed territories mean that both the Iraqi government and Kurdish regional government have a right in administration. In fact, we have been waiting for 10 years for Article 140 to be implemented, however, it was not. If the people of this region participate in the referendum and if they vote ‘yes’, it means that they want to be part of independent Kurdistan.

Of course, Kirkuk has a special state in Kurdistan. We believe that the Turkmen, right now, enjoy much more rights and freedom than they enjoy in other parts of Iraq. The Turkmen will be the second largest ethnic group and they will be true partners in governing the Kurdistan region. If you look at the election results in 2005 in the disputed territories, the majority voted for the Kurdistani list, which included the Kurds, the Turkmen and others. And the fight against ISIS… If it was not for the Peshmerga and KRG, this area would have been controlled by ISIS like Mosul. So, although right now we have the full military, administrative and political control of the area, we don’t want to impose anything.

In addition to this, the disputed territories have been historically and geographically parts of Kurdistan as it has faced Arabization. But we don’t want to impose a de facto situation and asked them whether you want to have a Kurdish ethnic state. It’s a Kurdistani state based on partnership.

The regional and international actors’ approach to the referendum is not positive. How accurate is it to take a decision on independence at a time where international support is weak? In addition to this, is it possible that there will be any breaks in the relations between the Iraqi Kurdistan and some international actors after the referendum?

First of all, this is a domestic issue between Kurdistan, us and Baghdad. Secondly, the international community is more interested in whether this referendum might affect the fight against ISIS negatively. Well, long before the referendum in 2014, we had nothing but we fought against ISIS. We reassure the regional and international community that an independent Kurdistan will be much stronger in fighting terrorism. Thirdly, when the Iraqi government violated the constitution and the Iraqi army melted down against Daesh, was there really an international community to stand against the chaotic situation?

Please look at the last 26 years and make an analogy. Kurdistan’s contribution to Iraq’s security and stability is immense. Take Turkey, for example. Kurdistan contributes to Turkish national security by acting like a buffer zone between the unstable part of Iraq and the Turkish southern borders. It also makes a positive contribution to the trade relationship with Turkey and the other countries. It provides energy security. In terms of governance, despite a small region with only 5 million people, we are hosting 1.8 million IDP’s and refugees. So, if we were not a functioning political entity, all these people would flee to Turkey or Europe.

Of course, we don’t except the international community to say “okay, we are officially supporting the breakup of Iraq.” But our message for the international and regional community is that the current status quo cannot continue; that Iraq is already divided on sectarian and ethnic lines between the Shiites and Sunnis, between the Arabs and the Kurds. I recently have heard from the head of a Shiite endowment, who said that “there is no room for Christians to stay in Iraq anymore.” Even if you take Kurdistan out, the remainder of Iraq is divided. It is a failed state and we need to prevent the Iraqification of the Kurdistan region.

As you know, the economy of Iraqi Kurdistan is largely dependent on oil revenues and also the budget of the region is dependent on Baghdad. How can a politically independent Kurdistan survive in economic terms? What kind of policies are you going to implement to ensure economic independence?

First, I don’t agree with the term “economic independence.” Now, all economies are interdependent and there is no independent economy. Secondly, we have survived two sets of sanctions in the past: UN sanctions on Iraq and Iraqi sanctions on Kurdistan. Third, Iraqi Kurdistan – here I should underline that I did my masters on the political economy of Kurdistan, on the rentier state – primarily wants political independence, because we want to get rid of the understanding of a frontier mentality we inherited from Baghdad. We want to diversify our economy by not relying only on oil.

We don’t have a taxation system in Kurdistan because of the central budget law. We need sovereignty first in order to go through a systematic reform to change the equation from a public-oriented economy to a private-oriented one and to help the private sector to grow. So, the Kurdistan region can survive. And Kurdistan has the 9th largest oil reserves in the world and has 8 trillion cubic meters of proven natural gas. The world economy needs that. Turkey needs that. You need our resources; we need your pipelines and your transportation. So, it’s a win-win situation. We do believe an independent Iraqi Kurdistan will be a more strategic economic partner for Turkey.

Do you have another option to export your natural gas or oil to other countries?

Turkey is our strategic partner but we will also be looking forward to have a strong partnership with Baghdad so that our economic interdependence would allow us to export our natural gas and oil through Baghdad.

We just want to get back to the point we have discussed earlier. There is ongoing regional instability in the Middle East. In addition to the chaotic situation of Iraq and Syria, there are millions of people who have either been displaced or became refugees because of DAESH. Today Iraqi Kurdistan is home to about 1.9 million refugees. How suitable is it to take a decision of referendum in such kind a complicated environment?

My question to you: when will there be a perfect environment? Those who criticize and say that it’s not perfect timing, our question to them is “just tell us two or three perfect times in the next ten years?” When is the ideal timing? There is no ideal and perfect timing. If we keep the current status quo, we can’t be sure of our future.

I am asking myself, “have we been part of the problem or have we been part of the solution?” It was not us who created DAESH but it was us who broke the myth of DAESH. In terms of the Shiite-Sunni sectarian fight, we are not taking a side. The Kurds are Sunnis, we say. We don’t care about Shiite-Sunni division because we are Sunnis.

Look, we’ve been providing support to the IDPs regardless of their sectarian affiliation. In terms of the economic stability, we were the second largest market for Turkey after Germany. Out of $12 billion trade with other parts of Iraq, why is there $9 billion with Kurdistan region? Because we’ve been part of that solution for Turkey. So, when some argue about the instability, we have not been the factor behind it. Actually, the instability in the Middle East is the result of post-colonial failed state systems, Sykes-Picot more precisely. The borders are not reflecting the true realities of the people in the region.

What do you think the referendum will result in?

In 2005, we did an informal referendum and 96% of the people voted ‘yes.’ So, this time, I believe that the landslide majority of people, including the Turkmen, Christians, and Arabs living in the disputed areas, will vote “yes” and prefer to live in a stable Kurdistan rather than for an unknown future.

How about your personal expectation about the forthcoming elections in Iraq, the general and provincial elections?

Are you sure that there will be elections? Because we aren’t. If the Iraqi parliament is going to be elected according to the current election law, which gives Shiites majority, no matter how many Kurds or Sunnis participated, we, as the Kurds, are not going to participate in the next Iraqi parliament election. Because we are giving legitimacy to an illegitimate situation. For example, if all Kurds participate in the upcoming election, we will have only 60-65 seats. That’s why we want this election law to be amended from 18 constituencies to make all of Iraq one constituency.

How will an independent Kurdistan deal with minorities such as the Turkmen, as they are opposing the independence referendum at some point, and some minor groups also oppose this idea. Which rights and guarantees will they have?

We don’t call them minorities. That’s the first guarantee. Irrelevant of their number, we will accept them as ethnic groups. Secondly, they have 5 members in the current parliament. They have the right to have education in their native language from kindergarten to university.

We don’t call it a Kurdish state; we call it Kurdistan state. Because, Kurdistan, like Turkey, is the homeland for the Kurdistani citizens. You don’t call everyone who lives in Turkey a Turk. Right? Because Turkey is home to citizens with Circassian, Armenian, Kurdish, Turk, and Arab background. So, Kurdistan is also home for whoever lives there and that’s another guarantee.

Absolutely, we will need international support for it. I mean how we can draft the constitution before the declaration by law. The rights of different ethnic groups must be guaranteed and what kind of mechanism could be established to assure their participation? I can assure you the oppressed people are not going to oppress others.

http://thenewturkey.org/mosul-in-ruins-kirkuk-awaits-a-similar-destiny-what-can-turkey-do/

What are your ideas about the PYD in Syria? Commonly, you know that there is a major dispute between them and PDKS (Partiya Demokrat a Kurdistanê li Sûriyê – Kurdistan Democratic Party of Syria).

PYD is the PKK. There is no difference between them. We have supported the Kurdish uprising and Syrian opposition since the beginning. We wished and supported them to have a kind of Supreme Council through the first Erbil Agreement in 2012, Second Erbil Agreement 2013 and then the Duhok Agreement in 2014 to help them to have a kind of shared and common administration. But unfortunately, the PYD did not have a clear vision for the future of the Rojava. They’ve been collaborating one time with the Syrian regime and with others without having a political future. And the PYD has been oppressing non-PYD political parties like closing their offices by not allowing them to have any political activities, or by arresting them. Because of that we’ve been against such actions of the PYD.

Do you have any ideas of a population exchange?

No. I want to make it clear. This independence referendum is for Iraqi Kurdistan and it is not going to change the current Iraqi international border, which will be the official border of Kurdistan with Turkey, Iran, and Syria. This is a propaganda by some PKK circles, who argue that there will be a connection between Rojava and Kurdistan. That’s not true. That’s not going to happen.

Our last question is about the name of the state. How will it be named if the referendum results in “yes”? Kurdistan or the Republic of Kurdistan?

Definitely, it will be a liberal republic. But the name, I can’t tell. It has something related to Iraqi Kurdistan. Honestly, I have no idea. You should ask that question after the referendum either to the referendum committee or to the founding fathers.

There is an alarming rise in the tension between Baghdad and the Kurdistan Regional Government in Erbil (KRG). From an approaching conflict between the two in Kirkuk, Turkmen will suffer the most. The oil flow from Kirkuk and KRG will be disrupted too. The clash could weaken both sides and the PKK will avail itself of the possible power vacuum. All these can severely harm Turkey and cause a serious foreign policy crisis. What has sparked the crisis and what options does Turkey have to prevent a clash?

The apparent reason in the rise of the intensity in the conflict is KRG President Masoud Barzani’s insistence on holding an independence referendum on 25 September 2017. A close scrutiny of the ties between the two parties, however, reveals that there is a wide range of issues keeping them apart. The Baghdad government’s preoccupation with the war against Daesh has delayed the inevitable clash. With the battle of Mosul approaching its end, the political and military resistance of Sunni Arabs has been severely dealt with. There have been numerous recent calls from Baghdad to end the only defiant Shiite -dominated regime Iraq faces, that in the north from KRG. Should Turkey remain inactive and unable to defuse the tension, Iraq may soon witness its worst civil war and the Iraqi state could melt away. The consequences can be ruinous for all Iraqis and regional actors, especially for Turkey. Iran will avail itself of this new round of violence to assure its total dominance over Iraq and the building of a Shiite crescent will be completed.

Rising Tension

During the last decade, the relations between Erbil and Baghdad have been plagued with numerous contentious issues. This became apparent with the departure of US forces from Iraq in late 2010 when the former Prime Minister Nouri al- Maliki inaugurated a sectarian policy which alienated and marginalized both Sunni Arabs and Kurds. Although the current Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi promised to undue his predecessor’s policies and make the regime inclusive, al-Maliki’s followers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias have hindered his efforts. The Iraqi regime is now more exclusive than ever. Only two weeks ago Ibrahim al-Jafaari, the foreign minister, issued a decree which removed several Sunni individuals from Iraq’s foreign diplomatic corps.

Recently the US has failed to convince al-Abadi to allow several Sunni politicians, who have been forced into exile by al-Maliki, to attend a conference in Baghdad to build a credible Sunni leadership in Iraq. On July 20, 2017, the Shiite militias in Mosul clashed with the Nineveh Guards which is a further indication that Shiite militias are determined to re-establish their pre-2014 exclusive security rule in Mosul.

The ongoing conflict with KRG should be also viewed within this context. The KRG arguably feels that the partnership in government, which Kurds feel that the post-Saddam era will present to them, is all but an illusion. On 19 June 2017, in a response to al-Abadi’s statement which described the referendum as illegal, Barzani said “the Iraqi constitution, which was intended to create an inclusive government ruling by consensus of its major components, is dead in letter and spirit. Why is Article 140 of the constitution, which was supposed to be implemented in 2008, not implemented and neither is it on the agenda of the government in Baghdad?” Barzani pointed out that the Kurds have been gradually forced out from most important security, military and political positions, and al-Malik’s slogan to establish a government of the “political majority has been completely established in reality.”

Lately Iran’s Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that the referendum in northern Iraq is unacceptable. There is a heated exchange in the media and political statements made in Baghdad, Tehran, and Erbil. Although al-Abadi has been generally accommodating, recently his language became more threatening to the Kurds. Even Ammar al Hakeem, who has been in the past a close ally of Barzani, has recently threatened him with dire consequences should he proceed with the referendum. On 20 July 2017, the all-powerful bloc of State of Law in the Shiite Alliance issued a call in a statement to put Barzani on trial for charges of treason and collaborating with Israel and Turkey against Iraq. The Iranian regime too is threatening Barzani.

Having failed to dissuade the leaders of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan from supporting the referendum, on 18 July 2017 Muhammed Baqri, the of Chief of Staff of the Iranian armed forces, reminded the Kurds of Iran’s punitive and powerful weapon capacities.

 The Possible Clash in Kirkuk

Kurdish sources allege the Baghdad government has deliberately delayed the expulsion of around 2,000 Daesh militias from Haweja district, south west of Kirkuk, in order to use it as a pretext to attack Kirkuk. Peshmerga sources have recently detected the arrival of hundreds of Iranian revolutionary guards in areas adjacent to Kirkuk.

Unless the US and Turkey deliver a strong message to Iran, one can expect Qasem Suleimani, the head of Quds Corp, to soon appear in the ruins of Kirkuk to boast of victory over the so-called pro-Israeli and Saudi agents among the Kurds. The attack on Kirkuk can make tens of thousands of Turkmen homeless and asylum seekers at the frontiers of Turkey. The toothless Turkmen National Front and its followers can be caught in the middle of a devastating conflict. One of the possible consequences of an attack on Kirkuk is that it can also deepen the crisis between the Shiite and Sunni Turkmen groups. It is noteworthy that Iranians have already mobilized 12,000 Turkmen as part of the Shiite militias in Iraq for a possible attack on Kirkuk. There is also a potential for the Baghdad regime to use the old rivalries between Kurds and Turkmen and this might hurt Turkmen who have no military power to match that of the Kurds.

What can Turkey do to rescue Kirkuk?

Barzani and all other Kurdish parties have put too much stakes on the referendum and Kirkuk to retreat from their decision to hold the referendum. Forcing Barzani to give up the referendum will be a serious blow to his standing among the Kurds and will only help his foes, especially the PKK. Regardless of the stated objection of many Western countries to the referendum, Barzani appears to have received some assurances from many circles in the West to go ahead with the referendum. It suffices to say that on 28 June 2017, The Washington Post, which is close to the circles of decision making in the US, had Barzani write an op-ed to sell the idea of the referendum.

Turkey can still use its economic and political leverage with Barzani to delay the declaration of independence after the referendum. Donald Trump’s administration and several European Union countries prefer to enhance al-Abadi’s position in Baghdad in order to enable him to curtail the drastic Iranian influence over his country. This policy requires KRG not disrupt al-Abadi’s work. Barzani can be pressured by the US to be content with the de-facto annexation of the disputed territories and more independence using its current policy of selling its oil and gas abroad.

Being aware of this realty, Turkey can seek US support to defuse the situation before the current tension goes out of control and gives Iran access to Kirkuk. In addition, Turkey should give clear signals to both al-Abadi and Iran that Kirkuk is an issue that touches its national security and it will not stand by watching if things deteriorate. Besides, Turkey could use its leverage with Barzani to safeguard Turkmen rights if the referendum is held in Kirkuk. Hosting a meeting with both Barzani and Turkmen leaders in Turkey is long overdue. Shortly, Turkey needs to engage both Baghdad and Erbil in a more vigorous and foreword policy to spare Kirkuk from the destruction which has been inflicted on Mosul.

The densely Kurdish populated areas of Iraq obtained political recognition and autonomy from the central government of Iraq with the 2005 Iraqi constitution. This is how the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG), originally established in 1992, and Kurdistan Region Presidency, formed in 2005, came to this day. Since then, Masoud Barzani, the president of the KRG, along with many other local political actors, has occasionally stressed the need for the region’s independence. Hence, independence calls are not new for the KRG. They have been made before, but never this loud, never this close. On June 7 Masoud Barzani, after a meeting with the major political parties of the region –with the exception of Gorran (Change Movement) – set the date for the referendum as September 25.

The referendum is planned to be held not only in KRG provinces such as Erbil (Hawler), Duhok, Suleimani, and Halabja but also in areas still claimed by the central government such as the oil-rich province of Kirkuk. The planned referendum will be a cornerstone not only for the KRG but also for the broader region. Nevertheless, there are pressing concerns and conflicts of interests on the referendum, its aftermath and political consequences at the local (KRG), national, and international levels. Here, concerns of the local actors in the KRG-ruled areas are of vital importance.

The upcoming independence referendum seems far from uniting the local actors in the KRG controlled areas. The Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) has come first in all the parliamentary elections up to now and is the party of both the regional president Masoud Barzani (since 2005) and the regional prime minister Nechirvan Barzani (since 2012 and previously from 2006 to 2009). While the party is the leading Kurdish political actor of Iraq, it is not uncontested. The Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Gorran, disappointed with the KDP’s governance in the KRG and Masoud Barzani’s ruling beyond his legally constrained presidential term, made an agreement in May 2016 to join forces for a number of causes, but most importantly for the reactivation of the regional parliament and counterbalancing the KDP. The two parties have more or less stuck to this deal so far despite occasional dissent from within the parties.

The PUK and Gorran, combined, make up 42 seats in the deactivated regional parliament, outnumbering the 38 seats held by the KDP. While the PUK and Gorran seem to embrace the idea of Kurdish independence from Iraq, the two also declared that “complete preparations” for a referendum on independence should be made after the normalization of the parliament, which has not sat since October 2015. Although the PUK and Gorran are concerned about the KDP’s hijacking of an independent Kurdistan, they are also not without problems given that Gorran split from the PUK as a result of internal rifts and has long charged both the KDP and PUK with corruption, on top of its tough rivalry with the PUK, particularly in Suleimani, which both see as their stronghold.

The PUK and Gorran’s deal to act as a bloc is not without problems. Moreover, both of the parties are going through a succession crisis to replace former Iraq president and PUK leader Jalal Talebani, who is in the midst of severe health problems, and the recent death of Gorran leader Nawshirwan Mustafa. Suffering from the absence of such charismatic and experienced leaders, the two parties seem to be far behind Masoud Barzani’s influence over the people of Iraq Kurdistan, the official name of the region according to the 2005 constitution. That’s also the primary reason why the tougher of the two, Gorran prefers a parliamentary system over the KDP’s presidential system proposal. And that is just part of a long list of disputes between the major political parties in the region.

While the three major parties in the Kurdistan Region have serious trust issues and problems on the table, the politics of the region is further troubled with the longstanding existence of the PKK in the region. The PKK has long struggled against the KDP’s authority across the Turkish border and could maintain its own areas up to this day. Yet now it is on the move again to expand at the cost of the KRG’s, particularly, the KDP’s interests.

Since breaking an over two-year long ceasefire with Turkey in July 2015, the PKK has also become more aggressive in Northern Iraq. The PKK could exploit DAESH’s presence to the best of its interests both in Syria and Iraq and now will likely destabilize the region further as the deadly clashes between the PKK affiliated forces and KRG Peshmerga in Sinjar in March 2017 showed. While the KDP and Turkey have had ups and downs in the course of their relationship since the Gulf War of 1991, the KDP, compared to other local actors, has remained the closest entity to an ally for Turkey. Once again Turkey and the KRG under the rule of the KDP are in a win-win game, deepening their commercial ties to an unprecedented degree while cooperating against the PKK. The two governments on the two sides of the border have allied against the PKK’s terror activities against Turkey and ambitions of expansion in the Iraq side of the border.

With its terror camps in Northern Iraq scattered from Metina to Qandil and its relentless use of violence against any adversary, the PKK is a real threat for the KRG’s move towards independence and what comes after. Any definition of statehood makes reference to Max Weber’s classical definition with its emphasis on the monopoly on the legitimate use of violence and the PKK has repeatedly shown that it has no intention to stop challenging the KRG or any other government’s claim on this.

Given the parameters, President Barzani’s call for independence will not be a smooth path. The upcoming referendum on September 25 is likely to exacerbate the existing tensions amongst the Kurdish actors settled in Northern Iraq. Of course, no local actor could directly object to Masoud Barzani’s referendum call, which would threaten the mass support they have. Nevertheless, all the relevant actors in the region, with the natural exception of the KDP, question the timing and aftermath of the expected referendum and express their concern that the referendum is not genuine but a political card being used by the KDP to extend and expand its rule of the KRG.

On the other hand, Masoud Barzani seems to be aware of the risks and opportunities that the post-DAESH Iraq will pose and he is eager not to leave the ground to the endless claims of the PKK while the PUK and Gorran are also trying to counterbalance his de facto supremacy. The referendum and possible independence process gets even more complicated when the non-Kurdish actors –both within and out of Iraq- are taken into account but Masoud Barzani is not naive enough to start a game that he has no chance of winning. Either way, the referendum is a fair game that Barzani dares to play.