Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan had said earlier in September that he would discuss the problems between Turkey and the United States when he met with the U.S. President Donald Trump on September 25, as part of his trip to New York for the opening of the United Nations General Assembly. But neither side has revealed what was discussed and if anything was resolved.

There was no shortage of issues for the two leaders to talk about. There are still Americans imprisoned in Turkey. The U.S. refuses to deport Fetullah Gülen, whom Ankara holds responsible for the 2016 coup attempt. There is an ongoing dispute over the enforcement of sanctions on Iran. Perhaps most immediately and gravely, Turkey’s purchase of the S-400 anti-aircraft system from Russia will, by the letter of American law, incur sanctions that could do serious harm to the Turkish economy.

Still, there are creative ways around most of these issues. For example, the U.A.E. has strong economic ties with Iran, and the U.S. abides it. Proposals have already been put forth to finesse the S-400 issue, and so on. The crux of the U.S.-Turkey dispute, and the one where interests are radically incompatible, is Syria.

In the summer of 2011, after months of trying to find a peaceful resolution between Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad and protesters failed because of the regime’s  continuing murder of civilians, the Turkish government, which already provided a safe haven for refugees fleeing the carnage, began supporting the nascent armed rebellion. The U.S. ostensibly supported the revolutionary movement, though never seriously tried to tip the balance in its favor and over time shifted its policy ever-more-firmly in Assad’s favour for reasons related to Iran policy.

When the U.S. was eventually forced to intervene in Syria in late 2014 by the rise of the Islamic State (ISIS / Daesh), the U.S. tried to engage in counter-terrorism alone. The U.S. wanted to avoid entanglement in the underlying Syrian war, particularly any anti-Assad activity, because the Iranians had made it clear that they would walk away from nuclear negotiations if their proxy regime in Syria was threatened. The attempt by the U.S. to run a narrow counter-terrorism war in Syria was inherently flawed on its own terms, since Assad was the incubator of ISIS and counter-terrorism cannot be separated from the political context. But in the choice of partner for this mission, the U.S. created a whole new crisis.

The U.S. chose to work with the Democratic Union Party (PYD) and its armed wing, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), to defeat ISIS. The PYD/YPG has had close relations with the Assad regime, Russia, and Iran for decades, and retained cordial relations with the pro-Assad coalition after the war began. The PYD/YPG thus could be trusted not to draw the U.S. into a confrontation with the regime. As a side-effect of the anti-ISIS war, the PYD/YPG was left in control of nearly one-third of Syria that ISIS had taken away from the rebels—a radical redrawing of the political map in Syria that the U.S. was publicly opposed to meddling in. And this created problems that were not limited to Syria.

The PYD/YPG that the U.S. has so vastly empowered is a department of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), a terrorist group that has waged war on Turkey since the mid-1980s. The attempt to rebrand this force as the “Syrian Democratic Forces” (SDF) by attaching a few dependent Arab groups might suffice to convince the Western media that “Rojava” is a multi-ethnic democracy, but it is hardly convincing to the people who live under its authoritarian rule.

Whatever the ethnic composition of the SDF and its civilian affiliates, the PKK retains sole military-political control. Within Syria, this has created an explosive situation where a demographically and politically alien party is ruling over resistant Arab populations, and for Turkey a PKK state on its borders is seen, not unreasonably, as a dire security threat. That the U.S. is underwriting this project has created a rift in NATO that Russia has been quick to exploit.

Turkey has twice intervened in Syria, in 2016 and 2018, to push the PKK away from areas of its border in the west and continues to hold these zones through Syrian Arab proxies. These operations left the PKK holding territory mostly to the east of the Euphrates, and Erdogan has repeatedly threatened to initiate a third operation against this zone.

The U.S.’s response to this has been to try to avert a Turkish incursion in eastern Syria where its own forces are based. To do this, the U.S. proposed the “Manbij roadmap”, a model that would, in theory, assuage Ankara’s concerns by removing YPG/PKK control of various urban centres and setting up joint U.S.-Turkish patrols. This has since morphed into a proposal for a “safe zone” that would buffer between Turkey’s border and the PKK-held areas. Given the failure of this concept in Manbij, where the PKK simply reflagged its cadres, Ankara was understandably sceptical to begin with and negotiations have duly stalled. While there has been misdirection on all sides, and proposals for the U.S. to arm-and-equip a 100,000-man PKK force in Syria indefinitely do little to improve the atmosphere, the fundamental problem is less bad faith than diametrically opposed priorities.

Turkey sees the PKK as the primary issue and wants a twenty-mile (30 km) zone under its control inside Syria to deal with this. The U.S., focused monomaniacally on ISIS, wishes to preserve “stability”, however short-termist the definition, and is therefore prepared to grant a much more limited Turkish presence in an area it intends to continue to control, but which is supposedly clear of PKK forces. Displeased with the process, the Turkish government has attempted to gain leverage by signaling a willingness to act unilaterally.

In early August, Erdogan said that Turkey could “only be patient for so long”. At the end of that month, the Turkish president said, “If our soldiers do not control the region [east of the Euphrates] within a few weeks, we will put our own operation plan into effect”. On 18 September, Erdogan said the U.S. has two weeks (to 2 October) to deliver “results”, or else Turkey would go it alone. Most recently, in his U.N. speech, just hours before he met Trump, Erdogan spoke of establishing a 30-km “peace corridor” along a 480-km stretch of the Syria-Turkey border into which two million Syrian refugees in Turkey could be resettled. To underline his point, Erdogan brought along a map.

So, what happens now?

It is extremely unlikely that Turkey will intervene east of the Euphrates by the early October deadline, and highly unlikely that Ankara will risk clashing with U.S. forces at any other time. As such, some version of the status quo—with the U.S. buying time and Turkey preparing to intervene but never quite getting there—could perpetuate for quite some time. That said, low probability, high impact events are not unknown in the Middle East, and this is a situation that has two major wildcards, Erdogan and Trump, plus a trendline that from several angles favours one particular outcome.

From the Trump side, he wants to leave Syria—he has tried twice and been restrained by his officials—and it is possible that he might finally get his way, especially with people like National Security Adviser John Bolton now out of the administration. Trump’s “maximum pressure” rhetoric is a thin veneer for his desire for a deal with Iran, and he might well follow Obama in trading Syria away to get Tehran’s signature.

If the U.S. withdraws under a deal to let the Turks in, it could significantly mend U.S.-Turkey relations; without a deal, Erdogan could still get what he wants but there would be much less political windfall to the alliance. It is also possible, however, that the U.S. would withdraw after organizing with Russia to reconcile the PKK and the Assad/Iran system. Even if Turkey got a narrow buffer zone under this latter arrangement, it would fully restore to Damascus the PKK weapon it used for decades against Turkey.

On the other side, because it is so clear Trump wants out—the number of U.S. troops has been halved to 1,000 this year—Erdogan might calculate that an incursion would not result in triggering the U.S. tripwire, but in Trump deciding to wash his hands of the Syria dilemma altogether. He might even be correct, though it would be a reckless gambit with profound political costs to a relationship with America that is, after all, and despite the current President’s view, about more than just Trump.

The phenomenon of foreign (terrorist) fighters recently became a matter of international politics when U.S. President Donald Trump made an abrupt call to European countries, chiefly Britain, France, and Germany, to take back their citizens who have been foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) in the ranks of DAESH and who now are prisoners in Syria. What made the issue a bone of contention further especially across Europe was the call by Shamima Begum, a British teenager who had joined DAESH four years ago, who requested to return to the United Kingdom. The British government’s response was stripping her of British citizenship.

Needless to say, no country is willing to take back its citizens who have been in the ranks of DAESH one way or another in Syria and Iraq. The issue is so much a concern for countries so that there are even a United Nations Security Council resolution (2178) specifically targeting foreign fighters. To some extent, countries are right to be concerned about the implications of accepting their citizens back, who have been in war-zones for a while as members of terrorist organizations. It is possible to mention a number of threats that FTF returnees are likely to pose, on which there is also a quasi-consensus in the literature.

First of all, a significant source of concern is the fact that FTFs –most of the time- gain battlefield skills during their time in the ranks of a terrorist organization, unless they are deemed “extremely useless” and employed in trivial jobs such as cooking. This makes them experienced militants with abilities to use different types of weaponry and in some cases improvising explosive devices as well as bomb disposal.

Secondly, FTFs are exposed to ideological indoctrination of the organization they join not less than the indigenous militants. Ideological indoctrination aims at instilling a different conscious and a different set of “values” in the members of the organization. Furthermore, it helps to make the militants identify more with the “cause” of the organization, provide and maintain the motivation to fight for it and turn a mere sympathizer into a reckless militant.

Thirdly, FTFs have a higher propensity to use violence in case they return to their country of origin, compared to the home-grown sympathizers or members of a terrorist organization. This is due to the fact that they experience real war and violence in war-zones and this “socialization” with violence makes it more “normal” for FTFs to carry out a violent act with more ease and skill.

Fourthly, FTF returnees would be in contact with networks or sleeper cells of the terrorist organization in their home country. These contacts could either be developed overseas or returnees might come back with certain references.

Foreign terrorist fighters gain battlefield skills during their time in the ranks of a terrorist organization and this makes them experienced militants with abilities to use different types of weaponry.  

All of these potential threats that the FTF returnees of a terrorist organization, say DAESH pose, apply to FTF returnees of the YPG – the PKK’s offshoot in northern Syria, without any exception. Still, it is almost impossible to see a similar stance politically and legally towards the latter in case of return. Nor do they spark a Europe-wide controversy as did DAESH’s Shamima Begum. For instance, none of the FTF returnees of the YPG have been stripped of citizenship before and after their return so far.

There are instances of interrogation and prosecution of YPG’s FTFs especially in the U.K. and Australia but none of their cases were handled similar to the ones of DAESH and none of them faced a serious prison sentence. Moreover, they are not even deemed as “foreign fighters” in mass media accounts, but as “volunteers,” which also shapes the public discourse and perception of these FTFs. In addition, some of the FTF returnees of the YPG have been interviewed by major media outlets and they even wrote opinion pieces on those media outlets such as the BBC, The Independent, The Guardian, Daily Telegraph, and Daily Mail, which is inconceivable for their DAESH counterparts.

This conspicuous difference in the treatments of FTFs of DAESH and the YPG stems from the difference in the perception of the two in the eyes of both governments and the public with regards to the threat they pose. In fact, the YPG/PKK has not carried out outrageous attacks such as bombings and ramming vehicles into crowds in European cities so far as DAESH has. Nevertheless, both FTF returnees of the YPG and indigenous PKK members in Western countries have engaged in different sorts of crimes and violence than those of DAESH. To illustrate, a number of FTF returnees of the YPG have been making propaganda for YPG mostly through their social media accounts and also through other online platforms. Likewise, some of them got into the act of recruitment for the YPG, again through online platforms. On the other hand, an FTF returnee of the YPG was involved in a monstrous murder once he returned to his home country.

All potential threats posed by foreign terrorist fighters that returned from DAESH also apply to those that returned from the YPG. Still, it is almost impossible to see a similar stance politically and legally towards the latter in case of return.

Apart from these materialized crimes and violence, there are also other potential threats that would likely be posed by the FTF returnees of YPG upon their return to their home countries. Firstly, although nothing has been reported as such, it is very likely that a considerable number of FTFs suffer from PTSD since they were exposed to extreme levels of violence in Syria. It is already known that some were suicidal even before travelling to the war zone in Syria.

Secondly, they are likely to target state institutions in case of a disagreement with a given policy. This was showcased by PKK members two weeks ago as they attacked the Council of Europe HQ in Strasbourg and injured three policemen. Thirdly, they are likely to engage in PKK’s crime and terror activities in their home countries such as vandalism against especially Turkish state properties, attacks on Turks and Kurds who are not PKK supporters and violent demonstrations. These were already undertaken by indigenous PKK members in European countries many times and it is a matter of time for FTF returnees of the YPG to follow suit.

Despite the disregard by governments and public in Western countries towards the threats or risks that are already posed and are likely to be posed by FTF returnees of the YPG, a considerable element of instability and violence is simmering in their bosom. Western governments should take the issue of FTF returnees of the YPG seriously at least for the sake of their own public order and stability if not for taking an ethical stance by not differentiating between two terrorist organizations. 

Yesterday in Geneva, Foreign Ministers of Turkey, Russia and Iran – Mevlut Cavusoglu, Sergey Lavrov, Muhammad Javad Zarif – agreed upon the establishment of a constitutional commission of which the composition is yet to be set.  

Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov read the joint statement after the three ministers met UN Syria peace envoy Staffan de Mistura yesterday in Geneva, Switzerland. The statement emphasized that the agreement will be oriented “by a sense of compromise and constructive engagement.” 

Turkish Foreign Minister Cavusoglu said that the three countries have reached an important phase in the establishment of the commission, which will write the future constitution of Syria, speaking to the press after the meeting.

Cavusoglu stated that there is no disagreement on the names proposed by both the Syrian regime and the opposition; he added “However, there are some differences of opinion on the list of non-governmental actors. In this matter, as the guarantor states we are working with the United Nations.”

Cavusoglu added that the three ministers also discussed the rules of procedure of the constitutional commission and said “In what percentage the commission has to take decisions, two-third or more, will there be a president or will he have deputies, will there be a co-president. We have discussed these kind of issues. So, we are coming towards an end gradually.”

Highlighting the intensifying efforts of the three countries in order to establish the commission as soon as possible, Cavusoglu said, “We anticipate that the first meeting of this commission will take place in the first month of next year. As the Astana guarantors of the process, we will continue the process by intensifying our efforts. In this regard, today’s meeting has been very productive. We hope that these meetings will bear best results for the political solution and the future of Syria. As an important actor, we (Turkey) will continue to retain our contribution to the process.”

On the other hand, according to Sputnik News, spokesman for the Iranian Foreign Ministry – Bahram Qasimi – told Tasmin news agency that if the military operation, which Turkey wants to initiate towards the YPG/PYD in north of Syria, starts without the consent of the Syrian regime, the application of the agreements that have been agreed upon in Astana process will be difficult. 

Meanwhile, speaking to Asharq Al-Awsat newspaper, Siban Hamo – the leader of YPG in northern Syria – said that Russian officials are pleased with Turkish threats to the U.S.-backed YPG in northern Syria and complained that the Syrian regime is not doing anything to defend its northern border. Hamo added “Turkey is seeking through all means to eliminate the gains made by the YPG and has mobilized its troops on the border and bombed terrorists inside Syria. We are ready for a joint action (with Syria) to deter Turkey.”

While Turkey is waiting for the ‘moment’ to start its military operation against the YPG controlled areas in Northeast Syria, Sputnik News reported that the one of the commanders of the Syrian Peshmerga under the autonomous Kurdistan administration in north of Iraq – Badal Bandi – stated that their forces will move to Syria soon.

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Speaking at the 18^th Doha Forum in Qatar yesterday, Cavusoglu responded to a question on whether or not Turkey will accept a Syria with Assad in the future. The FM said, “What we are trying to do at the moment is work for a creation of a constitution for Syria by the Syrians.”

Cavusoglu emphasized the importance of preparing for democratic elections in Syria and stated, “This process needs to be conducted under the umbrella of the UN. Everybody should have their rights. It should embrace both those Syrians inside and outside Syria, who are currently living in my country and other countries as refugees. Credible, transparent and democratic elections should be done. After this kind of an election Syrians should decide who will govern their country.”

Answering a question posed by the moderator, CNBC correspondent Hadley Gamble, as to whether or not Turkey will work with Assad if he is elected in those elections, Cavusoglu said, “If there will be democratic and credible elections, in that case everybody needs to consider this (possibility).”

Gamble also asked whether or not any new step of the U.S. President in Syria will change Turkey’s position, to which Cavusoglu responded, “I believe President Trump is thinking to leave Syria once again.”

Regarding the meeting of guarantor states at the minister level in Geneva next week, Cavusoglu announced, “We are working to announce that we have agreed on the constitution committee next week in Geneva. There are some issues regarding the list of NGOs. The (Syrian) regime demands a two-third majority, Turkey and the United Nations are against this. Therefore, we are working (on it).”

Cavusoglu remarked that they are striving for an authentic agreement to be executed and said, “We intend to go to Geneva to announce that the constitution committee has been completed and meet again probably at the end of this year or the beginning of next year.”

Apart from the issues in Syria, Cavusoglu was also directed a question about the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, the FETO leader. “In Argentina, Trump told Erdogan they were working on extraditing Gulen and other people… I have recently seen a credible probe by the FBI on how the Gulen organization avoids taxes.”

Reuters reported yesterday that the FBI declined to comment on “whether the law enforcement agency was investigating individuals or entities with ties to Gulen for tax evasion.”

Last week, Turkish President Erdogan said that Turkey would start new initiatives abroad to target the finance of Gulen supporters.

Finally, commenting on the possible military operation to be launched by Turkey on the YPG/PKK in north Syria, Cavusoglu said, “We will not risk the lives of American soldiers. Our goal, like the operation in Afrin and Operation Euphrates Shield, is the YPG/PKK… Are Americans guardians of the PKK? They should not be. This is the problem. Why did they provide so much weaponry (to the YPG/PKK)?”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi

Reporting for Anadolu Agency, Levent Tok and Muhammad Mislo wrote in an article, “Excluding the west of the Euphrates, YPG sits at the top of a square that deepens 45 thousand kilometer square from the line between the east of the river and Iraqi border.” According to the article, this area is one-third of the total lands of Syria.

With the intense help of U.S. airstrikes and weapon support, the YPG/PKK has been able to spread to the east of the Euphrates River.

The article adds that the biggest settlements at the east of the Euphrates are Aleppo’s Ayn al-Arab (Kobani), Rakka’s Tel Abyad and Tabka, Al-Hasakah’s Qamishli, Amude, Rasullayn towns and the north parts of Deir ez-Zor; approximately 70% of the population in this zone are still Arab. Terrorist elements intend to control the occupied lands easier in the process of state-building by forcefully re-designing the demographic structure. The YPG has forced Arabs, Kurds, and Turkmens from their lands and has prevented those that want to return as the Daesh threat has been eliminated.

According to the data provided by the High Council of Syrian Tribes and Clans, the YPG/PKK has forced approximately 1.7 million people to migrate.

The U.S.-backed YPG/PKK has seized Syria’s richest energy sources in the name of ‘fighting Daesh.’ For example, YPG/PKK terrorists seized the biggest natural gas facility in Konoko in the north-east of the petrol-rich Dier ez-Zor in September 2017. The terrorists also captured the Jafra petrol field as well as the biggest petrol field in Syria – Al-Omar.

The article in discussion claims that the terrorist elements in the region have also taken control of the three biggest dams of Syria with the air support provided by the U.S. 70% of the total electricity need of Syria is provided by these three dams.

According to Joseph Dunford – Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – “(In YPG area) We are estimating 35-40 thousand local force to be trained and equipped in order to provide stability.”

Abdulkadir Selvi provides some details from the operation. According to his sources, the operation that will be launched does not carry the same pattern as previous operations, and a different strategy will be applied. Regarding the question of ‘facing Americans,’ according to Selvi’s sources, the military presence of the U.S. is within the plan and that the U.S. military will not be a target.

The main goal of the operation is to pull 1.200 Free Syrian Army soldiers from the area of OES and placing them in Akchaqala, just across Tel Abyad. In addition to this, Turkish Armed Forces have sent reinforcement troops to the Ceylanpinar area across Ras al-Ayn. The main reason for the Turkish military to enter these is the fact that, like pulling Afrin apart from Ayn al-Arab, with the operations conducted from these two points, Ayn al-Arab will be pulled apart from the Jazira at the east. This will be a huge blast to the YPG’s attempt of state-building; while enhancing Turkish dominance in Syria, it will destroy the unity of YPG.

In response to President Erdogan’s announcement of the operation, the U.S. defense ministry has stated that a one-sided military operation towards the northeast of Syria is “worrying” and “unacceptable.”

*Written by Selahattin Emre Celebi 

Since the beginning of the 2000s, Turkey has been one of nine prime partner nations of the JSF and one of its biggest customers – with 116 stealth fighters on order. Besides, Turkey has been partnering with Lockheed Martin for over 25 years, primarily on the F–16 and continued this partnership by joining F–35. However, a bill introduced by senators Lankford, Tillis and Shaheen aims to prevent the transfer of F-35s to Turkey and aims to keep the country out of being a maintenance depot for stealth fighters.

The bill set the stage for reconsidering relations between Turkey and the U.S., as it seems like the two country’s are no longer strategic partners, but rather are turning into foes. As can be expected, neither will the U.S. or Turkey live happily ever after, nor will the hostile attidue of the senators continue forever. In any case, in the end, “mutual interests” will probably suppress the “clash of interests.”

U.S.-Turkey relations have soured since March 1, 2003, when the Turkish Parliament refused to pass a proposal to allow U.S. troops to operate from the Incirlik Base during the Iraq War. Since then, Turkey has repeatedly come face-to-face with the U.S. in the Middle East. So the current F-35 case is not the first and will not be the last case for Turkey having experienced undesired congressional responses whenever the country disagrees with U.S. policy due to its defense and security needs. An example of this in recent years is the big clash that arose due to the “local force” that was initially designed by the U.S. to be used against Daesh.

For Turkey, the PYD/YPG is a terrorist organization and the Syrian arm of the PKK – which the country has been fighting against for almost 40 years both within and outside its borders. The same terrorist organization – the YPG – is accepted by the U.S. as the most capable ground force (although it is initially listed by the CIA as an offshoot organization of the PKK in Syria) in fighting Daesh, and thus deserves to be fully supported with aids and arms. In addition to this, the Turkish government has been seeking the extradition of Fetullah Gulen, while American pastor Brunson is still being judged in Turkey. Tensions again rose to a higher level due to the AK Party’s severe criticism towards Israel and U.S. opportunism in Syria and Palestine, as well as Turkey’s planned purchase of S400 systems and the contract signed for domestic industrial cooperation.

Same Punishment Methodology

Ankara eventually got used to undesired responses, threatening patterns of Congress and sanctions whenever the interests of the U.S. clashed with Turkey’s. As you may also recall, the Cyprus issue (Johnson’s letter warning Turkey not to use NATO equipment), the 1974 Peace Operation (U.S. Congress to impose an embargo on arms transfers to Turkey), and the political differences between the U.S. and Turkey, especially in regards to the fight against terror, are the first examples that come to mind. Congress is once again utilizing the punishment methodology on its strategic partner and wants Turkey to be sanctioned if Ankara completes the purchase of Russia’s S-400s. However, Congress needs to remember that the U.S. was also a bidder in the T-LORAMIDS but could not fully meet Turkey’s criteria in regards to technology transfer, local contribution, delivery date and price.

Besides, Congress should also keep in mind that Greece is the only NATO member that purchased the Russian made S-300PMU-1 system in the mid-1990s (Bulgari and Slovakia are also NATO members that posses S-300s in their inventories). Moreover, at the NATO Missile Firing Installation in Crete, in December 2013, Greece carried out its first test firing of the missle as part of an operational live exercise, “White Eagle.” Here we must ask why Greece has the privilege to make use of a Russian system operative after so many years and why Israel is the only country allowed to customize U.S. F-35s.

Political reaction, not final decision

The bill is a political reaction against the AK Party government, and is not really dealing with technological concerns. Certainly, the political reasoning behind the bill is Ankara’s close ties with Moscow. For the U.S. and NATO, F-35s symbolize the deterrent power of the West against challenger powers such as Russia and China. If Turkey purchases S400s, then Turkey will become a strategic deterrent with Russian military technology. If Russia sells this system to a NATO country, then it will also increase its own current deterrent.

From a different perspective, the main goal of acquiring high tech systems such as F-35s is to increase deterrence and military capabilities against hostile state and non-state military actors. As a matter of fact, the U.S. clearly defines the potential hostile countries as Russia, China, North Korea and Iran. Therefore, Turkey’s cooperation and trade in military technology with Russia is somewhat perceived as a successful attempt of the Putin administration to shade U.S. power. However, Turkey’s external orientation in purchasing a missile system from Russia must be analyzed through the whole process – namely how Turkey was left alone in struggling to meet its defense and security needs.

Lose-lose situation

If Senate approves the bill to punish Ankara, then it will punish its own defense company Lockheed Martin as well. Yet Turkey is one of the company’s biggest customers, with 116 stealth fighters on order. Either way, Turkey will pay a high price for a fifth-generation jet fighter purchased from either the U.S. or another country. None of the world’s largest arms exporters would want to lose a customer such as Turkey while Russian and Chinese companies are dying to sell their own combat jets. In other words, during a time where rivalry is increasing among suppliers, none of the world’s largest arm exporting countries – including the U.S. – would ever want to lose such a major client. In this respect, the Senate needs to carefully examine its gains and losses in regards to the income that will be earned by companies within the defense ecosystem as well as their power of lobbying. Losing Turkey by keeping it out of the JSF also means that the U.S. would weaken its own strategic objectives in the Middle East.

What really happens if Turkey is left out of the F-35 program?

Firstly, Turkey’s deteriorating relationship with the U.S. will worsen; the increasing tension between the two countries will bring unfavorable reflections over deals in areas such as terrorism, especially against Daesh in Syria. More, this decision might also have negative impacts on relations between Turkey and NATO. As it is known, NATO plans to set up a 30,000-strong reserve force in order to improve its combat readiness. As a NATO member sanctioned by the U.S., Turkey would most probably not want to contribute to the Atlantic Alliance and would not want to take an active place in a variety of missions.

Secondly, Turkey will bring the issue to a trial and file a claim for compensation in accordance with the original agreement. This agreement is not only about purchase through foreign procurement, but is also about co-production. For instance, Turkey’s Roketsan collaborated with Lockheed Martin for the development, production, marketing, selling and supporting of Turkey’s SOM-J air-launched cruise missile for the F-35 Lighting II combat jet. Likewise, TAI has also undertaken important responsibilities in contributing to the program. For instance, one of the most complex structural sections of the aircraft, “F-35A Center Fuselage” is produced by TAI as a second source. There are also other work-packages such as F-35 A/B/C Composite Components, F-35A’s Metallic Sub-Assemblies and Air Inlet Ducts and F-35 A/B/C Air-to-Ground Alternate Mission Equipment Pylon Manufacturing.

Thirdly, Turkey might embark on a quest to buy fifth generation fighters from other countries such as Russia’s SU-57 and China’s J-31. However, if Turkey decides to buy a fighter jet from a non-NATO country, this may lead to infrastructure and technology problems. Lastly, the Senate’s sanction method does not seem to be the best way to keep Turkey in NATO’s security architecture. While political issues are undermining relations between Turkey and the U.S., the military aspect is without a doubt the most crucial part to sustain strategic relations between the two countries.

The Syrian Civil War and its consequences have posed the most difficult strategic challenges to the U.S.-Turkey relationship in recent years. Issues such as the status of the Assad regime, the composition of the opposition, and the U.S. relationship with the YPG have strained bilateral relations. Most of the differences were manageable, as they had an indirect bearing on the security of the U.S. and Turkey. However, the YPG challenge has been of a different nature given that it is the PKK’s Syrian branch and the PKK continues to pose a threat to Turkey’s security.

Over the past couple of months, the two NATO allies finalized an agreement to take concrete steps toward addressing this challenge. While the “roadmap” agreement promises to deliver a serious reassurance to Turkey’s security requirements, its implementation will be key in determining whether it can succeed and lead to future cooperation. If successful, the plan could go a long way toward helping to rebuild the long-damaged mutual trust between the U.S. and Turkey.

The Manbij roadmap announced on Monday foresees the departure of the YPG forces from Manbij and the administering of the city by its local population over the next few months. The U.S. and Turkish security forces are supposed to cooperate on the ground to bring about a sustainable local governance model that is not dominated by the YPG. Both the Euphrates Shield and Afrin military operations have provided Turkey with a lot of experience in building functioning governance structures that are reflective of the ethnic realities of the various localities.

Turkey has long opposed what it calls “demographic engineering” and will continue to do so in the future. This will result in the governance of Manbij by local Arabs who were previously pushed out by the YPG. Once, and if, successful, Turkey will most likely push to implement this model east of the Euphrates as well, in order to reduce the dominance of PKK-aligned groups. This is critical not only for Turkey’s own security, but also for a durable and sustainable stabilization operation on the ground in Syria.     

If the best case scenario is realized as described above, Turkey’s immediate security concerns can be addressed and mutual trust can be rebuilt. It would certainly not solve all the challenges in the U.S.-Turkey relationship, but it would potentially remove one of the most pressing strategic disagreements between the two countries. However, U.S. support for the YPG would continue to be a sore point. U.S. officials and analysts underline the “limited” and “temporary” nature of this support, but for Turkey it certainly means much more. By partnering with the YPG on the ground, the U.S. lends credibility and legitimacy to YPG forces that goes beyond narrow assistance. It also empowers the YPG against other local groups, including those that are not aligned with the PKK. In the end, giving up armed struggle against Turkey becomes less attractive and unnecessary for the PKK and its allied groups.

This dynamic would continue to strain the bilateral relationship, although Turkey’s Afrin operation that put an end to the YPG march toward the Mediterranean and the prospect that the YPG may no longer be in Manbij will help address some of Turkey’s immediate security concerns. The current U.S. willingness to work with Turkey is a good sign. Nevertheless, it will need to be coupled with concrete action on the ground.

If Manbij can serve as an example of a successful stabilization effort and a sustainable and representative governance structure, the U.S.-Turkey strategic conversation would improve and could be broadened to include areas east of the Euphrates river. This kind of cooperation has been lacking between the two countries and is critically important if robust stability is to be achieved. The U.S. will need state allies like Turkey, especially if it intends to pull out of Syria, or at least further reduce its footprint. Investing in a sub-state actor will not help bring stability to northern Syria in the long run. In that sense, a successful implementation of the newly announced Manbij roadmap can help start a meaningful strategic dialogue between the two allies.

On March 29, French President Emmanuel Macron met with leaders of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Élysée Palace. Following the meeting, Le Figaro first reported that France is sending troops to northern Syria, and then re-wrote the caption that France might send troops – referring to members of the SDF as source for the news. A day before this happened, U.S. President Donald Trump announced that U.S. troops will retreat from Syria. This was followed by a telephone conversion between Trump and his French counterpart, and increasing cooperation with Turkey. Combined with statements made by the YPG, recent developments have made it seem that France will take the place of the U.S. if the latter retreats from the region.

Élysée Palace refuted the claims with the statement that France will send reinforcement units to Manbij. However, the statement also touched upon the target of reaching “stability,” particularly in the secure zone located in northeastern Syria within the framework of an inclusive and balanced order. This might implicate France’s possibility of coming up with an administration model for the Syrian Kurds living in the region nearby the Syria-Turkey border in case Manbij is included in Turkey’s field of control. Élysée Palace also announced that they hope to see the establishment of dialogue between the SDF and Turkey with the support of the international community.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reminded that his French counterpart remarked similar opinions during their one-on-one meeting and added: “We are deeply sorry about the latest statements coming from France, which we find wrong and hope to have stemmed from a misunderstanding. Those hosting the terror group members in a top-level office must know that this only means an antagonistic move against Turkey.”

The latest statements are far from being peculiar when considering the record of France in Syria, as the country has engaged in many atrocities in the Middle East. When France and the U.K. divided Arab territories into mandate governments according to the Sykes-Picot Agreement, France had Syria. Although the reports made after the Macron-SDF meeting were refuted, they still evoked memories of the French military’s invasion of Damascus 97 years ago. During France’s 20-year mandate government in Syria, the foundations of Syria’s future were laid. The mandate government divided the country into six regions and founded the “Special Forces of the Levant.” Comprising mostly of Nusayri and Druze soldiers, the Special Forces then formed the grounds of the Syrian Army. It is argued that the Nusayris gained dominance in the state despite being a minority group due to this ground laid by the French.

In 1970, Hafez al-Assad came to power by staging a military coup. In Syria, where more than 70 percent of the population is Sunni, the minority Nusayris ruled the country with the Baath regime, which is a peculiar combination of Arab nationalism and Soviet socialism. The French government and the Assad family always acted in favor of each other. Regardless of whoever came to power in France, this situation never changed. For instance, when Hafez committed the 1982 Hama massacre, socialist president François Mitterrand was serving his first term in Élysée, but he did not even issue a single condemnation to Assad. More, Hafez’s brother Rifaat al-Assad, the commanding officer allegedly responsible for the Hama massacre, moved to Paris after having tension with his older brother, and allegedly engaged in embezzlement and money laundering. He spent a serious amount on financing Channel Tunnel and received his residence permit thanks to that.

Republican President Jacques Chirac also displayed red-carpet treatment to Assad, who made his first visit abroad to Paris in 1998 after 30 years. In 1999, Chirac hosted Bashar al-Assad in Élysée before he had any official status. He was also the only western leader that attended the father Assad’s funeral one year later. Throughout all these decades, France has never shown any concern about the situation of Syrian Kurds, whom Assad deprived of citizenship. Plus, the country always supported Saddam Hussein, the perpetrator of the 1988 Halabja massacre. While Turkey opened its border gates after the Halabja massacre, France only accepted 500 Kurdish refugees. A French diplomat friend of mine was surprised at the fact that Turkey opened its borders without pursuing any form of screening. When I asked him how the French authorities selected people, he pointed to his teeth and said, “they look at their teeth.”

Although relations between Paris and Damascus hit a low after the assassination of Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri, who was Chirac’s close friend, Chirac’s successor Nicolas Sarkozy restored relations between the two countries. He hosted Bashar Assad three times while Assad paid return visits. However, the Arab Spring changed the course of events, as France could not foresee the phenomenon that started in Tunisia, where the Ben Ali dictatorship favored by France was overthrown. It can be contended that France showed such a hasty demeanor in Syria for this reason. The country favors dictatorial regimes, but as soon as their decline becomes obvious, it starts to criticize the same regimes. The statements issued by Élysée Palace regarding the Macron-SDF meeting stressed the male and female parity within the delegation. But they did not touch on the fact that many international NGOs issued various reports indicating that the YPG and PKK terror groups, which adopt an ideology with Stalinist and fascist elements, armed 10-year-old children and made 15-16 year-old children organize kamikaze attacks.

On the 58^th day of the military campaign Operation Olive Branch, Turkey declared its victory against the PKK/YPG in Afrin. Following the collapse of the PKK’s defense strategy and its unexpected isolation within the geopolitical struggle, the city is now under full control of the Turkish Armed Forces and the TAF-backed Free Syrian Army. One way or another, it is clear that this military-political victory of Turkey will provide more opportunities for strategic manoeuvres in Ankara’s next military move, particularly towards its ongoing military campaign against the PKK in northern Syria. Upon the liberation of Afrin city, with the surprisingly little resistance by the PKK, Turkey is now reconsidering its military and political options to minimize the PKK’s role in the midterm, and de-territorialize the PKK and YPG in Syria and Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, a day after the TAF and Free Syrian Army cleared Afrin, President Erdogan vowed to further Turkey’s fight against terrorism beyond Afrin. In his speech, Erdogan said: “We have eliminated most of the terror corridors in the region,” and “we will continue this process until we entirely eliminate this corridor that includes Manbij, Qamisli, Ayn al Arab (also known as Kobani) and Rasuylayn.” President Erdogan also underlined that Turkey’s next military move will take place in Manbij – a region that is still under the control of the U.S.-backed PKK/YPG forces. Following the visit of former U.S. Secretary of State Rex Tillerson to Turkey to negotiate about the PKK issue in Manbij, Turkey’s foreign minister Cavusoglu expressed that the YPG will hand over the governance of Manbij to the Turkey-led Free Syrian Army in the presence of the U.S. military units there. However, after Trump’s unexpected Pompeo move, as the new Secretary of State, Cavusoglu made a minor revision in his early announcement about the agreement with Tillerson over the issue of Manbij. Cavusoglu stated that Turkey and the U.S. have not reached an “agreement,” but a common “understanding” regarding the issue of the U.S.-PKK alliance in Syria. At this stage, there is still an ambiguity regarding the position of the new State Secretary in negotiations with Turkey.

While the U.S. administration’s stance towards Turkey remains unclear, President Erdogan said that Turkey would also continue its fight against the PKK in Sinjar, a region that has been controlled by the PKK since 2014. Now, the foreign and security policy circles in Ankara are speculating how Turkey will carry out its military campaign against the PKK in Iraq. Turkey sees Sinjar just as strategically important as Afrin and other PKK-controlled regions. The geographical proximity of Sinjar to Turkey, and the role of Sinjar as a hub between Qandil and northern Syria threatens Turkey’s national security, and provides the PKK with more space to freely mobilize its militants and military equipment. It is crucial to note that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar threatens Iraq’s territorial integrity as well as the political stability of northern Iraq.

The strategic rationality behind Turkey’s move against the PKK in Sinjar is very simple. Turkey believes that the PKK’s presence in Sinjar does not meet with the regional geopolitical expectations, similar to the PKK experience in Afrin. Turkey and Iraq recently reached a tacit agreement over the PKK issue in northern Iraq. Iran seems to share a similar perspective regarding the PKK presence in northern Syria and Iraq. The KRG’s independence referendum showed how an intra-regional competition turned into an ad hoc realistic alliance in the presence of a common threat. Therefore, it is possible to claim that the PKK lacks an intra-regional support in maintaining its political and military presence in Sinjar. More critically, the PKK does not benefit from the U.S. air protection in Sinjar. Thus, the security and foreign policy centers in Ankara believe that the PKK will be isolated if Turkey decides to intervene against the PKK in Sinjar.

However, this does not necessarily mean that Turkey will take unilateral action against the PKK in Iraq. There are three alternative scenarios that should be taken into consideration. First and foremost, Turkey will try to evacuate the PKK from Sinjar by encouraging the Iraqi central government to take military action. Secondly, Turkey and Iraq will take a joint military action against the PKK together, if the PKK does not peacefully hand over the city. The recent visit of Hulisi Akar, Turkish Chief of General Staff, was the first step in convincing Iraq to take military action against the PKK. After his visit, the two countries underlined the importance of commonality in the fight against terrorism. The third and yet undesired option is part of Turkey’s ongoing military activism in the region against the PKK. At domestic, regional and international levels, Turkey benefits from its trans-frontier military initiatives as the active use of military forces provide a strategic superiority for Turkey to contain security threats and strengthen its diplomatic relations. The launch of Operation Olive Branch is a good example in understanding how the use of power consolidates Turkey’s diplomatic efforts on regional and international scales.

Articulated as such, according to the third option, Turkey is likely to act unilaterally against the PKK in Sinjar. Many in the governmental circles believe that Turkey might also use its new proxy forces against the PKK in Iraq. It is fair to conclude that Turkey wants to secure its borders, and also its regional strategic priorities. The use of military power will be part of this strategy in the future until Syria and Iraq reach a level of sustainable stability and security. The regional dynamics, as well as the new trends in Turkish security and foreign policy, enables Turkey to carry out its military campaign beyond Afrin.

Germany’s Muslim organizations have called on all citizens to unite and speak up against the recent wave of violence targeting mosques across the country.

“For decades, Muslims have faced threats from far-right extremists. This threat situation has further exacerbated now by foreign terrorist groups,” representatives of largest Muslim organizations said during a news conference in Berlin on Thursday.

At least 27 mosques in Germany were targeted in attacks in the first three months of this year, after the terrorist PYD/PKK group threatened to carry out violent acts to protest against Turkey’s counterterrorism operation in northwestern Syria.

Aiman Mazyek, who chairs the Central Council of Muslims in Germany, underlined that no excuse could be made for such attacks.

“Irrespective of the motivations of the extremists, whether they are racially or religiously motivated, or nationalists, we should take a clear stance against these attacks,” he said.

Mazyek warned that silence of society might further encourage extremists to continue their violence against mosques.

Terrorist PYD/PKK group and far-left organizations claimed responsibility for at least 11 acts against mosques, including arson attacks this month on mosques in Berlin and Ahlen.

Dr. Zekeriya Altug from the Turkish-Islamic Union for Religious Affairs, one of Germany’s largest Muslim groups, regretted the lack of solidarity with the Muslim community.

“What we find missing is a clear and unambiguous condemnation of these outrageous acts by politicians and civil society leaders,” he said.

Authorities urged to act

The PKK terrorist organization has been banned in Germany since 1993, but it remains active, with nearly 14,000 followers among the country’s Kurdish immigrant population.

The PKK is listed as a terrorist organization by Turkey as well as the U.S. and the EU.

Altug called on German authorities to step up security for mosques and other Muslim institutions, amid growing threats from the PYD/PKK, far-left groups and the German neo-Nazi gangs.

Threats by far-right groups forced Central Council of Muslims in Germany this week to temporarily close its office in Cologne.

Germany, a country of 81.8 million people, has the second-largest Muslim population in Western Europe after France.

Among the country’s nearly 4.7 million Muslims, 3 million are of Turkish origin.

Many of them are second or third-generations of Turkish families who migrated to Germany in the 1960s, and well integrated.

EU’s largest economy witnessed growing Islamophobia in recent years triggered by a propaganda from far-right parties, which have exploited fears over the refugee crisis and terrorism.

Some 950 Muslims and Muslim institutions were attacked in 2017, according to the official figures.

At least 33 Muslims were injured in these attacks, which included assaults against Muslim women wearing headscarves and attacks against mosques.

Source: AA

A total of 3,444 terrorists have been “neutralized” since the start of Operation Olive Branch in Syria’s northwestern Afrin region, the Turkish General Staff said in a statement on Wednesday morning.

Turkish authorities often use the word “neutralized” in their statements to imply the terrorists in question either surrendered or were killed or captured.

On Jan. 20, Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch to clear YPG/PKK-Daesh terrorists from Afrin, northwestern Syria.

According to the Turkish General Staff, the operation aims to establish security and stability along Turkey’s borders and the region as well as to protect Syrians from the oppression and cruelty of terrorists.

The operation is being carried out under the framework of Turkey’s rights based on international law, UN Security Council resolutions, its self-defense rights under the UN charter, and respect for Syria’s territorial integrity, it said.

The military also said only terror targets are being destroyed and that “utmost care” is being taken to avoid harming civilians.

Source: AA

Ever since Turkey launched Operation Olive Branch in northwestern Syria, its goals have been mischaracterized and quite a few myths continue to thrive. One of these is that Turkey is conducting the operation because it cannot tolerate any “Kurdish” gains in northern Syria. It has become commonplace to describe the PKK-linked YPG as “American-backed Kurdish militias” or simply “Kurds” as if they represent the majority or all of Syrian Kurds. In fact, the YPG has sought to dominate the region at the expense of Kurdish groups not aligned with the PKK.

Back in the fall of 2014 during the battle for Kobani, the YPG refused to allow a large contingent of Peshmerga forces to help with the fight against Daesh. At the time, Turkey had even allowed the Kurdish Peshmerga forces from Iraq to travel through its territory – a first in Turkish history – to arrive in Kobani. From the beginning, the YPG has only been interested in creating a PKK stronghold in northern Syria. This is clearly unacceptable for Turkey but it is a far cry from an “obsession” with any Kurdish political gain in Syria. If anything, Turkey has encouraged unity among Syrian Kurds and sought to convince the PYD to join the opposition forces against Assad. Turkey also supported non-PYD Kurdish representation in a national dialogue congress.

Another major myth has been the YPG’s “effectiveness” as ground forces against Daesh. It should be remembered that the PYD had made a deal with the Assad regime at the beginning of the Syrian uprising. It was only after the sudden rise of Daesh that the YPG started to promote itself as “staunchly secular” and fearless fighters against Daesh. The Obama administration decided to utilize them as “local partners” against Daesh in an environment where the American public was opposed to any “boots on the ground.” Ever since then, the YPG has dominated the military battlefield largely thanks to US military support including critical air cover and protection.

The devil’s bargain continued under the Trump administration but the YPG’s utility is now proving limited at best. The political commitment of the YPG to the PKK’s goals in Syria is so strong that they announced that they would redeploy their forces from the Daesh fight to Afrin against Turkey. The irony should not be escaping anyone that the YPG is willing to abandon the fight against Daesh – the very rationale for the US support – in order to fight a US NATO ally. Some analysts have suggested that the US can broker a deal with Turkey and somehow convince the YPG to sever ties with the PKK. However, Turkey’s Afrin operation has exposed that the congruity between the two is so deep and organic that the PKK’s strategic and political goals take priority over the fight against Daesh.

The myths about the YPG can be maintained so far as the US policymakers choose to ignore realities on the ground for political expediency or the lack of a coherent Syria policy. Turkey’s Afrin operation has already exposed many of the ill-conceived notions about the YPG. It is time for the US to coordinate with Turkey strategically and rely on its NATO ally for its policy goals. Establishing stability in northern Syria is a common goal but it cannot come at the expense of Turkey’s national security. Ensuring that Daesh does not come back is also a common goal but the YPG cannot be relied upon to achieve it. Abandoning the myths about the YPG would serve the US well. Then comes the hard task of crafting a realistic Syria policy that is coordinated with Turkey and one that can achieve lasting stability.

Washington’s indefinite policy in Syria and increasing active support to the People’s Protection Units (YPG) and its variations violate U.S. national law alongside international agreements and principles recognized at the international level under the umbrella of the United Nations and other regional organizations.

With the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Terrorists (AUMF), which was passed by Congress following the September 11 attacks, the U.S. Armed Forces were authorized to exercise military power across its borders with an aim to prevent possible terror attacks against the country. However, the Obama administration reinterpreted the limits of the authorization and expanded its scope by employing the phrase “Al-Qaeda and associated forces.” With this broad interpretation, the Obama administration also encompassed the military force that would be employed against Daesh within the scope of the authorization. In brief, the national law system acknowledged that the U.S. Armed Forces have been involved in Syria due to the fight against Daesh. Resorting to further military power or unauthorized engagements however is against the AUMF.

In 2015, the Obama administration agreed with several non-state actors including the YPG and the Democratic Union Party (PYD), repeatedly asserting that they would cooperate in the fight against Daesh. The U.S. identified these actors as “coalition partners” by predicating on its own judicial system. However, the notion of coalition partnership comprises some problematic and questionable aspects in legal terms. First of all, the U.S. administration interpreted the AUMF in an utterly broad way and selected and supported a coalition partner within this context. Secondly, the U.S. administration allowed the involvement of the YPG and the PYD among these partners, which are both known for their association with the outlawed PKK. Thirdly, the strategy initially defined as anti-Daesh fight ceased to be the primary objective and sustaining the coalition partnership was prioritized. In this respect, the current situation explicitly violates U.S. national law as the legislative body of the country only authorized to fight against Daesh within the scope of fighting against “Al-Qaeda and associated forces.” The U.S. administration’s defence of any coalition partner means exceeding the authority vested by national law.

Furthermore, the National Defense Authorization Act formed the legal grounds of the U.S. administration’s support to Syrian opposition groups as from 2015 and set certain criteria in choosing the groups to be supported. These groups must be “appropriately vetted elements of the Syrian opposition.” The YPG and the PYD, which are the offshoots of the PKK, do not comply with these criteria in terms of their objectives and other traits. Although these groups are closely allied to the PKK and organize terrorist attacks against Turkey – who is initially accepted as an “ally,” all kinds of military support have been provided to them as they were included in the scope of opponent groups.

The U.S. Patriot Act, as a federal law, criminalizes providing “material support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” As a result of the authority vested by the law, the PKK has been listed as a terror group by the U.S. Department of State since it has inflicted heavy damage to many countries, particularly to the U.S. and Turkey. Aside from being recognized as a terror group on various lists, the PKK was also recognized as a terrorist organization posing a serious threat by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case “Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project.” Hence, the support the U.S. administration provides to the offshoots of the PKK constitutes serious contradictions and casts doubts on the rule of law principle.

The indications of International Law

The situation does not differ when considered from the perspective of international law. Even though terrorism is widely considered a controversial topic in international law, sovereign nations are aware that they must cooperate to prevent terrorist acts and to eradicate terrorist groups. The fact that terrorism is an international issue that does not recognize borders leads nations to cooperate. The norms of international law reiterate that sovereign nations must not support terrorism or any terrorist group. International agreements signed under the umbrella of the UN and many other intergovernmental regional organizations explicitly prohibit providing financial aid and the sales of weapons to terrorist groups.

The duty of vigilance was first accepted by the UN General Assembly and then became “a widely recognized principle of international law. It means that “every state has the duty to refrain from organizing, instigating, assisting or participating” in plans or actions to commit terrorist acts in another state. This very fundamental principle was emphasized in the International Court of Justice, “Armed Activities” case, as customary international law. In the present situation, even a “tactical” relationship between the U.S. and the named terrorist groups is a failure to uphold the duty of vigilance. The toleration displayed by the U.S. Armed Forces towards groups like the YPG and PYD, which harbor terrorist elements, amounts to a violation of international law.

The Operation Euphrates Shield (OES) which was launched on August 24, 2016 in order to clear the presence of terrorist organizations along Turkey’s southern border and to prevent the illegitimate PKK entity in Syria, seems to have reached its major objectives. While Turkey has carried out an intense counter-terrorism campaign at home in recent years, she has also adopted a strategy of eliminating terrorist threats at their roots by increasing military activism abroad. Along with the waves of frequent terrorist attacks in the country, the rapid proliferation of terrorist groups with the exploitation of the civil war in Syria made this strategy shift imperative.

Although it is often claimed that the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) would face capability problems in case of a military operation in foreign lands due to the discharges after the July 15 coup attempt, the OES was successfully completed on March 30, 2017. The OES, planned and implemented with the concept of Joint Operations, has demonstrated that the TAF has the level of capacity and readiness, capable of dealing with hybrid terrorist threats in foreign lands as well as in urban environments. The fact that the operation was carried out with the Free Syrian Army (FSA), is an experience that further raises the value of the success and makes the OES an exemplifying campaign. However, it is understood that hybrid warfare practices and innovative terrorist tactics encountered in the theatre of war have created some problems for the course of the OES.

Military and Tactical Experiences

During the operation, the biggest threats faced by OES elements were Suicide Vehicle-Born Improvised Explosive Devices (SVBIED) and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM). A significant number of the martyrs given during the operation was the result of SVBIEDs, and many of the destroyed armored vehicles are of those ATGMs. Particularly in the western and northern parts of al-Bab, the tanks were repeatedly exposed to ATGMs allowing SVBIED attackers to become more able to reach the OES base areas. The fact that suicide attackers instantly had car bombs ready in their present location at the time increased the shocking effect of the threat, exacerbating  the obstruction of the attack.

Smashing the enemy defense lines with the maneuverability and the fire power of the armors and mechanized units was a vital component of the OES. However, the high level of armor losses calls attention to the necessity of a number of regulations and developments in the tactical deployment, use, and handling of tanks in the hybrid warfare environment. On the other hand, due to limited TAF personnel at the beginning of the operation, the armor advances that were heavily dependent on the FSA infantry capacity, has come to a standstill due to the problems originated from the FSA components in adapting to the rapidly developing battle environment. This situation was only improved after the deployment of the Turkish Special Operations Forces (SOF) and Commando Teams to the battlefield at increasing rates. Furthermore, the lack of close air support was felt in many cases, in particular when the armored units were in vulnerable positions against the sudden attacks.

It was observed during the OES that DAESH evaluated the timing factor in the theatre of war. The time slot in question is the period of temporary fragility of the OES elements during deployments in liberated areas immediately after it was captured. In that time slot, which generally came across the early hours of the morning, DAESH resorted to its traditional counter-attacks with raids and hit and runs. SVBIED, guided missile and mortar attacks were followed by the close engagement of small DAESH teams into OES elements. During these raids, it was observed that DAESH provided effective cover for its attacking militants as well as putting pressure on the OES elements by suppressive fire via ZSU-23 Shilka anti-aircraft weapons. DAESH militants also harassed positioned tanks through these weapon systems, aiming tanks to leave their positions and to turn them into open targets for guided missiles. Another significant factor that created difficulties in DAESH counter-attacks was the weather conditions. Particularly the serious fall of visual range due to the dense fog made it inevitably difficult to counter asymmetrical and sudden threats.

The Necessity of Stable Diplomatic Relations

It should be noted that the inability to overcome some diplomatic problems is another critical factor that slowed down the operation. After rapid acquisitions in the early days of the OES, the Manbij became a target of the operation. However, it was forced to halt by the US’s manipulation and intimidation strategy. Afterwards, the OES continued towards the western direction. Another development was that in the time period between the capture of Dabık and the preparation stage for the al-Bab operation, both Syria and Russia created various problems with military threats by means of air forces, which caused the operation tempo to be adversely affected. In the same period, the US-backed YPG/PKK attacked elements of the OES in the vicinity of Mare, rapidly multiplying and complicating instant security threats. The fact that the Russian Air Forces hit Turkish soldiers on the 9th of February shows the seriousness of the whole complexity. Therefore, stable dialogue between interstate relations is a necessity for the military initiatives carried out on thin diplomatic lines.

Population Centric Counter-Terrorism and Intelligence

Through the OES experience, it became clear that counter-terrorism strategies must be population-centric. The reason for this is due to the fact that public acceptance of the OES components was not only essential for the successful completion of the operation but also for its long-term returns. In respect to counter-terrorism, it can be suggested that Turkey has succeeded in the activities of Human Intelligence (HUMINT) during the operation. The most crucial factor that contributed to this success was the support of the local people. While the evaluation of HUMINT during the OES highlights its success, it can be stated that technical intelligence activities should be intensified and surveillance in general should be upgraded to a stronger technological infrastructure.

Military Operation with a Local Partner

By allying with the local opposition groups, Turkey initiated the OES as an alternative model of Joint Operations. Conducting a military operation in a different geography, operating in an environment in which the dominant language is different and variations in socio-cultural dynamics in the region made Turkey more reliant on FSA forces during the operation. While combating hybrid threats, operations with local partners require a number of improvements in terms of motivation and battle performance.

On the tactical and organizational level, an ideal military cooperation that overcomes the principal-agent problem can be achieved through an integrated approach to the concepts of initiative, intelligence, and integration between units and services, leadership, motivated soldiers and learning. However, in these phases, it is inevitable not to encounter structural problems. First of all, local partners participating in the operation may need to conduct patrol and ambush operations outside the garrison and at night, so that an operation against irregular/terrorist elements can be successfully carried out. Disruptions in the implementation of these tasks may slow down the operational tempo and may even cause retreatment of the forces. At this stage, taking into account the components of the FSA forces, it should be noted that the traditional warfare culture of FSA is different from the TAF. In the light of this information, it may be necessary for the FSA forces to be trained at a tactical level regarding the necessities of the battlefield.

Secondly, in areas of complex conflicts like the Syrian Civil War, the advantage of local opposition groups is to have a deep and strategic knowledge of the population and local conditions. However, being deprived of this advantage or reducing it to a minimum can have vital consequences. In order for intelligence regarding the  population and local conditions to be beneficial for the operation, it is important to integrate intelligence gathering as well as analyzing and spreading capabilities and general knowledge of acquired knowledge. However, most of the time, information may not be shared among armed actors formed by the integration of several different groups such as the FSA, and informational disparities between the units may have negative consequences on the scene. In this context, it is necessary to establish a common ground between the commanders and the units to provide trust and information sharing.

Thirdly, in order to ensure complete control and security of an area in the operation, it is necessary for the forces participating in the operation to have the ability to work together. Besides, when unexpected resistance by terrorist elements are detected, reinforcement of forces may turn out to be a necessity. In the case of OES, the FSA forces formed an important part of the offensive force, while the armored units supported the FSA forces. This situation increased the role and significance of the FSA in the operation, as the main offensive force in the elimination of potential anti-tank units targeting armored troops.

Establishing Dynamic Coordination

On the other hand, the collaboration of commanders with leadership qualities among local partners constitutes a more dynamic coordination of the co-operative forces. From time to time disagreements among the commanders of the components of the FSA, and the suicide attacks of DAESH on these commanders have been one of the major problems affecting the course of the operation during the OES.

Moreover, the disagreement between the local partner and the protecting power may lead to motivation problems. For a long time, Turkey tried to persuade the opposition forces, who perceive the Syrian regime as the primary threat, to fight against DAESH instead of the regime. With the change of this threat perception of the FSA towards DAESH, the integration of the groups with low motivation to the operation posed a trouble in the conduct of the OES.

There is no doubt that tactical training is intended for conventional military operations. However, operations such as the OES, which are conducted with a local partner against irregular/terrorist elements, will require continual learning for conventional and hybrid threat operations, moving beyond high-level skills and standard procedures.