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ewly released documents from the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) show that disgraced financier and convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein attempted to cultivate relationships with influential political and business figures across the Middle East.

The most immediate fallout in the region came with the resignation of Sultan Ahmed Bin Sulayem, chief executive and chair of Dubai-based ports operator DP World.

According to two sources familiar with the matter, the decision followed increased scrutiny after Bin Sulayem’s name appeared in the DOJ’s document release. DP World confirmed the leadership change but declined further comment. Bin Sulayem did not respond to requests for comment.

Dubai’s ruler also issued a decree appointing a new chairman for Dubai’s Ports, Customs and Free Zone Corporation, one of several roles previously held by Bin Sulayem.

Email exchanges and personal correspondence

Some of the correspondence reviewed by Reuters included personal email exchanges between Epstein and Bin Sulayem. In one 2007 email, Bin Sulayem described meeting a woman in New York with whom Epstein had helped arrange contact.

An undated photograph included in the files shows Epstein and Bin Sulayem cooking together in what appears to be a relaxed setting.

Being named in the files does not constitute evidence of criminal wrongdoing. However, following the disclosure, some of DP World’s international financial partners raised concerns.

The UK development finance agency British International Investment (BII) and Canadian pension fund La Caisse announced they would pause new investments in DP World pending clarification. After the resignation was announced, both institutions signaled their willingness to continue cooperation under new leadership.

Attempted political influence during Qatar blockade

The DOJ documents suggest Epstein also attempted to engage political figures during the 2017–2021 blockade of Qatar by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain and Egypt.

In exchanges with Sheikh Jabor Yousuf Jassim Al Thani, a Qatari businessman and member of the ruling family, Epstein offered strategic advice during the diplomatic crisis. He reportedly criticized Qatar’s leadership at the time and suggested steps to improve relations with Washington.

Epstein urged Doha to consider strengthening ties with Israel to maintain favorable relations with then–U.S. President Donald Trump. Qatar ultimately maintained its policy course, and the regional blockade ended in 2021 when ties were restored.

Qatar’s current prime minister and foreign minister, Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, has not publicly commented on Epstein’s characterizations in the documents.

The files also reveal that Epstein discussed the potential public listing of Saudi Aramco in multiple email exchanges.

In correspondence dating back to 2016 and 2017, Epstein warned that a public offering could expose Saudi Arabia to legal risks and asset seizures. He also floated alternative proposals, including selling a major stake to China rather than pursuing a traditional IPO.

Saudi Aramco declined to comment on the emails.

Outreach to Egypt’s Mubarak family

Epstein’s network appeared to extend to Egypt as well. Documents show that following the 2011 ouster of former President Hosni Mubarak, a request for assistance from a family member — reportedly connected to Gamal Mubarak — was passed on to Epstein.

The nature of the requested assistance remains unclear, and Reuters was unable to determine whether Epstein took any action.

The large cache of emails, text messages and related documents reinforces what investigators have previously alleged: that Epstein sought to leverage his wealth and global access to build relationships with powerful figures in politics, finance, academia and business worldwide — including across the Middle East.

Reuters reported it could not determine how successful Epstein was in influencing decision-makers in the region.

The latest revelations add to ongoing scrutiny surrounding Epstein’s international connections, years after his 2019 death while in federal custody in the United States.

(Source: Reuters)

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he Gulf region is one of the areas with which Türkiye has had the most intense foreign policy interactions in recent years. Since 2020, this rapprochement has intensified, and Türkiye’s partnerships with the region’s leading foreign policy actors have grown. Notably, its long-standing close relations with Qatar have evolved into a strategic partnership. Meanwhile, relations with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, which were once defined by competition, have transformed into cooperative engagements.

Meanwhile, Ankara has also maintained contact with other countries in the region, including Kuwait, Oman, and Bahrain. These interactions have brought potential cooperation opportunities in various sectors, including the defense industry, trade, energy, and manufacturing, to the forefront. In line with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s approach of establishing direct contact with Gulf countries, reciprocal visits have increased.

From October 21 to 23, 2025, President Erdoğan undertook a Gulf tour covering three countries. Accompanied by numerous ministers, bureaucrats, and journalists, he visited Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman. There, he engaged in activities aimed at strengthening Türkiye’s relations with Gulf countries, particularly in areas such as the defense industry and energy. The signing of 24 cooperation and partnership agreements during the visit suggests that the relationship is evolving into a stronger partnership.

What makes Qatar, Oman and Kuwait different?

There are certain points that distinguish Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman—the three countries visited by President Erdoğan on his recent tour of the Gulf region—from other Gulf countries. First, these three countries differ from others in the region, such as Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain, particularly in terms of their foreign policy approaches and orientations. Notably, Qatar’s relations with Türkiye, its North African policies, and its moderate stance on the Muslim Brotherhood distinguish it from Riyadh and Abu Dhabi. Conversely, unlike Saudi Arabia and the UAE, Oman and Kuwait tend to adopt a neutral and conciliatory stance in their foreign relations.

Another aspect that sets Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman apart from other Gulf countries is how they handle the Palestinian issue. Notably, the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Bahrain normalized relations with Israel by signing the Abraham Accords in 2020. Recently, there has been discussion about the possibility of Saudi Arabia taking a similar step. In contrast, Kuwait, Qatar, and Oman have opposed Israel’s occupation policies in Palestine on many regional and international platforms.

These countries also use their diplomatic influence on the global stage to advocate for Palestinian rights. For example, Qatar has hosted Hamas members for many years and uses the Aljazeera channel to create international public pressure against Israel. Since October 7, Oman has strongly criticized Israel’s massacres in Gaza in official statements. This reaction is also evident at the societal level. In Qatar, Oman, and Kuwait, Friday sermons, television broadcasts, and civil society organizations have condemned Israel while expressing solidarity with Gaza and the Palestinians.

Qatar and Oman: Diverting from Saudi Arabia and the UAE

On the other hand, one could argue that Qatar and Oman have diverged from Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and Bahrain in their policies toward Iran. In fact, Qatar is closely aligned with Tehran due to its cooperation with Iran in the Persian Gulf and their similar policies on other regional issues. During the 2017 blockade, Iran and Türkiye provided Qatar with significant support, particularly by supplying food products.

Oman, on the other hand, is said to have the strongest historical and cultural ties to Iran of any country in the Gulf region. Recently, these two countries conducted military exercises involving land and naval forces. In contrast, Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama have adopted policies closer to those of the U.S. and Israel regarding Iran. Thus, they differ from Doha and Muscat in this respect.

Finally, it is known that all three countries closely cooperate with the United Kingdom in the defense industry. In this context, Türkiye has been planning to purchase Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets for some time. Due to growing regional risks and security concerns, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman have added 22, 15, and 12 Eurofighter jets, respectively, to their air forces in recent years.

Despite their security partnerships with the U.S. and the U.K., these countries have been striving to develop their own capabilities. According to reports, Qatar ordered 36 Eurofighters, Kuwait ordered 28, and Oman ordered 12. Considering that Türkiye has put the purchase of used Eurofighters on its agenda, President Erdogan’s choice of these three countries for his Gulf visit becomes more meaningful. Indeed, statements made after the visit indicated that the purchase of Eurofighter jets was specifically negotiated with Oman and Qatar.

From cooperation to strategic partnership

President Erdoğan’s Gulf tour from October 21 to 23 is significant because it elevates Türkiye’s relations with regional countries beyond traditional cooperation into strategic partnerships. Considering the nature of relations and partnerships in recent years, this has already been achieved with Qatar. Türkiye provided critical support to Qatar when it became the target of a political blockade initiated by its neighbors on June 5, 2017. As a result, relations between the two countries strengthened. Following the blockade, Türkiye established a military base in Qatar, becoming one of the Doha administration’s most reliable global partners.

Over the following years, Türkiye and Qatar continued to strengthen their relationship, particularly with regard to regional policies. They pursued common policies in regions such as the Horn of Africa and North Africa. Most recently, during Israel’s attacks on Gaza, Ankara and Doha pursued overlapping policies, calling for Tel Aviv and the Benjamin Netanyahu government to be held accountable under international law. Disturbed by Qatar’s stance, Israel bombed the offices of Aljazeera and the Qatar Red Crescent in Gaza.

Then, in September, Israel directly targeted Doha, the capital of Qatar, carrying out an attack against Hamas members there. Despite Israel’s aggression, Turkey continued to support Qatar. After the attack, President Erdoğan attended the Doha summit and expressed his support for Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani. As part of his Gulf tour, Erdoğan also made his second visit to Qatar within two months.

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he occupying state’s attack in Doha, the capital of Qatar, targeting Hamas’ leadership cadre has been recorded as one of the important developments that could trigger profound transformations in Middle Eastern politics after 7 October 2023. This act, which is a continuation of Tel Aviv’s reckless and unrestrained aggression, carries considerable strategic significance not so much because of its timing but because of where it took place, and could be considered a new milestone in the region following the attacks on Iran.

As is well known, over the past two years, the Zionist regime has carried out numerous attacks on Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen, and Iran. The fundamental factor that distinguishes the attack in Doha from the others is the target country’s position vis-à-vis Tel Aviv. Considering that all of the aforementioned countries are perceived as threats by the occupying state, this attack, which violated Qatar’s sovereignty, is also indicative of the implementation of a new strategy by the Zionist regime.

Indeed, Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet, composed of extremist members, have for the first time demonstrated a political practice that breaks with convention by targeting one of the United States’ closest allies in the region, with whom it has never had hostile relations.

The purpose and strategic context of the attack

Senior leaders of the Zionist administration had long been threatening Hamas’s leadership. The psychological breakdown caused by Operation Al-Aqsa Flood, the resulting shift in global perceptions, Tel Aviv’s loss of epistemological superiority during this process, and the steadfast stance of the people of Gaza despite all odds have rendered all claims of Hamas’s demise futile. Netanyahu and his team, planning to cross another critical threshold to realize their theopolitical vision by annexing Gaza, continued one of history’s bloodiest genocides without pause, driven by their ideal of eliminating Hamas, paying no heed to the rising international outcry. Well aware of Hamas’ role in consolidating Palestinian politics and strengthening resistance, Zionist leaders and elites prioritised dismantling Hamas’ organisational and ideological structure during the last two years, which saw all manner of aggression and savagery.

The assassinations of Salih Aruri, the movement’s second-in-command, and leader Ismail Haniyeh were an attempt to undermine Hamas’ cohesion and weaken the spirit of resistance in Gaza and even Palestine. The fact that Haniyeh’s martyrdom did not have the expected negative impact on Hamas and that the resistance, under Yahya Sinwar’s leadership, produced an even stronger rhetoric meant an even greater danger for Tel Aviv. In particular, the repeated announcements that moves to purge the entire leadership of the movement after Haniyeh would be carried out worldwide reflected the Zionist administration’s desire to deal Hamas a significant blow not only organisationally but also ideologically.

The eventual collapse of all the fabrications about Yahya Sinwar and Hamas, and Sinwar’s martyrdom while fighting the occupying forces on the front lines, led to Hamas’ political perspective having a broader impact globally. Despite the occupying state’s attempt to destroy Gaza with its heaviest weapons and starvation, the determined resistance of the Palestinians and Hamas’s negotiation process, conducted without compromising its principles, deepened Tel Aviv’s strategic defeat on the global stage, even though it gained a significant advantage on the ground. Consequently, Netanyahu and his team saw the sudden elimination of Hamas’s leading figures as the most direct route to achieving their strategy and consolidating their gains.

The daily narrowing of the operational space in Gaza and the significant losses suffered by the Kassam Brigades’ command structure were factors that brought the Zionist administration closer to annexing Gaza. However, Hamas’s preservation of its organisational integrity and the presence of charismatic figures with influence over the movement meant that resistance against the occupier would be carried out in different environments and forms. On the other hand, eliminating most of Hamas’ leadership in one fell swoop could accelerate the movement’s dissolution and lead to the crushing of resistance in Gaza. This would make it extremely difficult for the movement to survive while maintaining its integrity, and it could also experience ideological drift.

The roadmap Qatar should follow

Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Defense Minister Yisrael Katz, as the main architects of the attack in Doha, have issued a significant challenge not only to Hamas but also to Qatar, one of Hamas’s biggest supporters. This attack on Qatar, which Tel Aviv does not see as a direct threat and which is one of the White House’s closest allies, necessitates stronger steps by regional actors against the Zionist regime.

Netanyahu and his team, who are seeking to expand their territory in Syria and Lebanon in addition to Palestine, and who aim to reaffirm the political status quo in the Middle East through their attacks in Yemen, Iraq, and Iran, have signed off on an action that falls outside the current paradigm with the Doha attack. This attack, which undermines the perception of the inviolability of US allies, marks a turning point that will likely lead to a range of both negative and positive consequences in the coming period.

Considering the distance covered by numerous warplanes belonging to the occupying state’s air force and the number of countries whose airspace was used, it is also possible that this situation will turn into a trust issue between Doha and Washington. Furthermore, the aforementioned attack may also cause a similar problem in bilateral relations in the Gulf or the Arab world. Qatar, which has made significant efforts to resolve many crises in the region with its moderate stance, has been subjected to an attack that violates its sovereignty rights. This incident may negatively affect Doha’s position in the region in the coming period.

Therefore, Qatar should not merely present the option of ‘reserving the right to retaliate’ as rhetoric, but instead establish a realistic roadmap for deterrent measures.

Qatar’s role in regional politics

This attack on Qatar, which is undergoing a significant transformation in the Middle East and playing a pivotal role in this process, presents Doha with a challenging test of its political capabilities and limitations. Failure to implement a strategy of responding strongly in the political, legal, diplomatic, and economic spheres against the occupying state will seriously damage Qatar’s effective role in regional politics.

Qatar’s mission will be pretty limited not only in Palestine but also in the reconstruction process in Syria, and this situation may bring about a gradual shift in the balance of power in the Gulf, to the detriment of the Doha administration. Therefore, the only option under the current circumstances is for Doha to adopt a much stricter stance against Tel Aviv and, in this way, rapidly mobilise the Arab world. Furthermore, the US dimension of the attack should not be overlooked, and strong messages should be sent to the White House regarding such an attack, even if it was unaware of it or not involved.

If Trump was aware of this attack, Qatar should then re-evaluate its alliance with the US and, if necessary, take some steps towards closing the American base in its country with a radical move. Suppose the American administration was genuinely unaware of the attack. In that case, Doha should exert pressure on Trump to increase his influence over Netanyahu and his team and demand that he issue a strong ultimatum to Tel Aviv to secure a ceasefire.

The main lesson learned in the period following 7 October is that the policy of ‘strategic patience’ towards the occupying state has not yielded any gains. Therefore, the Doha administration must pursue a much more active policy, using its financial power, to constrain Tel Aviv and encourage the Western world to adopt a more consistent approach. Strong support for international initiatives to establish a ceasefire in Gaza and steps taken by Doha to break the blockade will undoubtedly be the most significant and effective response to the attack in question. If Doha chooses to remain silent during this process, it will result in a deepening of the crisis in Gaza and the region as a whole, and Qatar will face the risk of losing a significant position in the Middle East’s political equation.

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srael’s ongoing genocide and aggression in Gaza has not been limited to Palestine but has taken on a regional dimension with airstrikes targeting Tehran, Beirut, Damascus and Sanaa. On September 9, 2025, the Tel Aviv regime launched an air strike on the Qatari capital, Doha, claiming to target Hamas leaders. Five Hamas members and a Qatari internal security official were killed in the attack, which targeted Hamas’s negotiation delegation. This step went down in history as another direct attack on the territory of a sovereign country by Israel.

While the Doha administration described the incident as ‘state terrorism,’ President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan also emphasised that the Netanyahu government now poses a threat not only to Palestine but to the entire region. This attack demonstrated that Israel’s aggression knows no bounds and pushed regional countries to adopt a common stance. Even the United Arab Emirates (UAE), which had previously entered into a normalization process with Israel, condemned Tel Aviv. Arab and Islamic countries viewed Israel’s move as a threat that sabotaged the search for peace.

The U.S. security umbrella

Qatar hosts the U.S.’s largest military base in the region, Al-Udeid. Despite this, it was unable to protect itself from the Israeli attack. This situation has led to questions about Washington’s security commitments. Although U.S. President Donald Trump emphasised Qatar’s importance in a cautious statement, he only issued symbolic warnings to Israel. He even reiterated his support by sending U.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio to Israel. This stance increased doubts about the U.S.’s reliability in the Gulf.

In fact, this loss of trust is not new. In 2019, Washington’s indifference following the Houthis’ attacks on Saudi Arabia’s Abqaiq and Khurais oil facilities caused great disappointment in Riyadh. Today, similar mistrust has resurfaced following the attack on Qatar. Gulf countries believe that the U.S. is applying double standards in favour of Israel and that its security guarantees are no longer valid. As a result, the U.S.’s traditional role as a security provider has been seriously undermined.

Regional security efforts

The collective response following Israel’s attack on Qatar indicates that a new security architecture is emerging in the Middle East. Qatari Prime Minister Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani called on the international community to abandon double standards and adopt a collective response. The extraordinary joint summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) and the Arab League, held in Doha on September 15, 2025, was a concrete example of this response.

At the summit, 57 OIC and 22 Arab League countries adopted a united stance against Israel’s attacks. Iran’s proposal for a ‘joint operations centre’ brought military cooperation among Islamic countries to the agenda. At this point, Egypt also brought the idea of a joint Arab defence force, which had been shelved for years, back to the table. According to Cairo’s plan, a joint army consisting of land, air and sea armies from member countries would be established, with initial command given to Egypt. This structure, which could be spearheaded by powerful armies such as those of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Iran, aims to provide regional deterrence. Thus, similar to NATO’s Article 5, the principle that ‘an attack on one is an attack on all’ could be transformed into a concrete defence mechanism within the OIC and Arab League.

Turkey-Qatar solidarity

A few days after Israel’s attack on Qatar, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan travelled to Doha to attend the extraordinary summit of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC). President Erdoğan met with the Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani, and conveyed Ankara’s message of solidarity. In his speech at the summit, President Erdoğan strongly condemned Israel’s attacks on Gaza and its provocation towards Doha. Ankara stated that Israel’s actions pose a threat not only to Palestine but to the security of the entire region. Turkey also called for supporting diplomatic initiatives such as Palestine’s full membership to the United Nations (UN) and a permanent ceasefire in Gaza. Stating that Israel must be economically pressured, President Erdoğan said that concrete steps could be taken within the OIC and new mechanisms could be established.

Turkey’s role in the new process in the Middle East is not only diplomatic but also prominent in terms of its military capacity. Ankara’s progress in the defence industry in recent years sets an example for countries in the region. Domestic UAV and missile systems, as well as national fighter jet projects, have made Turkey an actor that reduces its dependence on foreign countries. Countries such as Qatar and the UAE have also begun to add these military equipment to their inventories. This situation is encouraging Gulf countries to increase their defence investments in a similar manner. Saudi Arabia’s acceleration of domestic defence projects is an indication of this trend.

Turkey’s military strength has been proven in many parts of the region, such as Syria and Libya. Iran’s direct or proxy wars with Israel, Egypt’s military capacity, and the Gulf’s economic power could present a tangible power projection against Israel. Therefore, the Middle East is on the verge of a new era in response to Israeli aggression. In this sense, Israel’s attack on Doha has brought the region to a critical threshold. Regional countries are seeking joint mechanisms to ensure their own security at a time when the U.S. security umbrella is increasingly losing its meaning.

On the other hand, the joint statement issued at the Doha summit conveyed the message that there would be no silence in response to Israel’s actions. The Qatari Emir’s statement that ‘our right to respond is reserved’ indicates that military options are also on the table. In the coming period, if Turkey’s diplomatic and military power, Egypt’s military experience and the Gulf’s financial support are combined, the establishment of a new security order in the Middle East could accelerate. As long as Israel’s aggression continues, the solidarity reflex of the countries in the region seems likely to strengthen. These developments point to a turning point that could fundamentally change the balance of power in the Middle East.

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.S. Secretary of State Marco Rubio arrived in Israel on Sunday seeking clarity on the country’s war strategy in Gaza, days after an Israeli strike on Hamas leaders in Qatar upended fragile ceasefire negotiations and intensified global outrage over genocide in the Palestinian enclave.

The Doha strike, which killed five Hamas members — including the son of senior official Khalil al-Hayya — and a Qatari security officer, was condemned by governments across Europe and the Middle East as a violation of sovereignty and international law. It has further complicated Washington’s efforts to mediate a ceasefire and secure the release of Israeli hostages, even as international bodies, including a growing number of academic and legal associations, accuse Israel of pursuing policies amounting to genocide in Gaza.

Rubio told reporters before leaving Washington that President Donald Trump was “not happy” with the Qatar strike but stressed U.S. support for Israel remained firm. “We’re going to talk about what the future holds, and I’m going to get a much better understanding of what their plans are moving forward,” Rubio said. “Obviously we’re not happy about it … now we need to figure out what comes next.”

Fallout from Doha strike

The Israeli airstrike in Doha marked a rare extension of the Gaza war beyond Palestinian territory, hitting Hamas officials as they discussed a U.S.-backed ceasefire plan. The timing effectively collapsed negotiations, leaving hostages in limbo and prompting anger from Qatar, Saudi Arabia, the UK, France, and Turkey.

“This attack shows Israel has adopted terrorism as state policy,” Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said, warning that the strike risked deepening regional instability. Qatar called the bombing “cowardly,” while France described it as “unacceptable.”

Critics say the operation reflects a broader strategy that has already left more than 64,000 Palestinians killed in Gaza since October 2023, with rights groups and legal experts accusing Israel of genocide through indiscriminate bombardment, forced displacement, and the deliberate destruction of civilian infrastructure. Israel denies the charge, insisting its campaign targets Hamas.

U.S. diplomatic balancing act

Rubio’s two-day visit highlights the Trump administration’s difficult balancing act. On Friday, he and Vice President JD Vance met Qatar’s prime minister in Washington, while Trump later hosted him in New York in an attempt to reassure Doha of its central mediation role. Yet, the decision to send Rubio to Jerusalem signals that Washington still stands by Israel, even amid accusations of genocide.

Trump himself has publicly distanced from the strike, calling it a move that “does not advance Israel or America’s goals.” The U.S. also supported a U.N. Security Council statement condemning the attack without directly naming Israel. Still, Trump has vowed to continue backing Israel militarily while pressing for an end to the war.

“Trump wants Hamas defeated, he wants the war to end, he wants all 48 hostages home, and he wants it all at once,” Rubio said. “The events last week have complicated that goal.”

Next steps in Israel

Rubio will hold meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and senior officials on Sunday and Monday. The discussions are expected to be tense, as Netanyahu has rejected international pressure to halt the war or accept Palestinian statehood, even as Britain, France, and Canada prepare to recognize it at the U.N. General Assembly later this month unless Israel changes course.

The secretary also plans to visit the City of David, an archaeological site in east Jerusalem often criticized for displacing Palestinians while bolstering nationalist narratives.

As Rubio landed in Tel Aviv, the question remained: can the U.S. salvage a path to peace after a strike that fractured negotiations, deepened Israel’s isolation, and intensified global condemnation?

(Source: The Associated Press)

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srael launched a surprise air strike on Hamas leadership in the Qatari capital, Doha, killing five members of the group, including the son of senior official Khalil al-Hayya, and a member of Qatar’s security forces, in an escalation that has drawn sharp international condemnation.

Qatar denounced the strike as a “cowardly” act, stressing that it had received no prior warning from the United States, Israel’s closest ally. Officials in Doha vowed to hold Israel accountable for what they called a blatant violation of Qatari sovereignty.

Turkey: Israel has adopted ‘terrorism as state policy’

Turkey joined the chorus of nations condemning the attack, with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan saying Israel’s actions were designed to “deepen conflict and instability in the region.”

“This attack, which constitutes a clear violation of international law and Qatar’s sovereignty, has also targeted the security and peace of our brotherly nation, Qatar,” Erdoğan said in a statement from Ankara. “Turkey stands with its Palestinian brothers and its ally, strategic partner and friend, Qatar, with all its capabilities.”

Turkey’s Foreign Ministry went further, accusing Israel of adopting “expansionist politics in the region and terrorism” as state policies. The ministry stressed that the targeting of Hamas officials while ceasefire talks were ongoing demonstrated that “Israel does not aim to reach peace, but rather continue the war.”

Widespread international condemnation

The attack has triggered swift backlash across the globe. France called the strike “unacceptable,” while the United Kingdom described it as a breach of Qatar’s sovereignty. Saudi Arabia denounced it as “a brutal Israeli aggression.” Italy’s Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni warned against “any form of escalation that could further worsen the crisis,” expressing solidarity with Qatar and reaffirming support for efforts to end the genocide in Gaza.

Switzerland’s Foreign Ministry condemned the assault as “a clear and unacceptable violation of Qatar’s sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Portugal emphasized that a ceasefire and hostage release remain the “immediate priority,” while stressing that “a two-state solution is essential for lasting peace.” Belgium’s Foreign Minister Maxime Prevot said the strike violated international law and insisted “there will be no military solution to the conflict in Gaza.”

War in Gaza casts long shadow

The attack comes as Israel’s war on Gaza approaches its second year. Since October 2023, at least 64,605 Palestinians have been killed and 163,319 wounded, according to Gaza health authorities, with thousands still missing under the rubble.

Israel maintains that the assault on Qatar targeted “terrorist operatives responsible for orchestrating attacks,” but did not immediately release further details. Hamas confirmed the deaths of its members, vowing retaliation.

The escalation has raised fears of a wider regional conflagration. Qatar has long played a central role in mediation between Israel, Hamas, and other regional actors, and analysts say the strike could undermine fragile diplomatic efforts to secure a ceasefire and hostage deal.

Diplomatic fallout

The strike also places renewed pressure on Washington, which has relied on Qatar as a strategic partner in the Middle East. Qatari officials said they were shocked that the U.S. had provided no warning, fueling speculation over whether Israel acted independently or with tacit approval.

With global powers voicing alarm and regional states warning of a dangerous precedent, the Doha strike marks a dramatic turning point in a conflict that has already destabilized much of the Middle East.

(Source: Aljazeera English and Reuters)

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he Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani recently celebrated 10 years in power. His father, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa, abdicated in his favor in 2013 when his son was 33 years old. The handover was significant and exemplary in that it did not involve a coup d’état which is quite common in the region; however, it coincided with a very difficult period. The Arab Spring was in full swing, and the state of Qatar found itself at odds with the authoritarian Arab regimes in the region for actively supporting popular uprisings.

Regional and international actors wondered whether the emir would change the country’s foreign policy which was based on Doha’s active partisanship. A U-turn in foreign policy was seen as normal, but what if he followed the path of his father? Would he be able to cope with the difficulties at a time when The Arab Spring was slowly turning against the people who were rebelling. The answer to this question was on everyone’s mind.

As soon as Sheikh Tamim came to power, he decided to continue the foreign policy inherited from his father and to use a slightly softer discursive language. But Sisi’s Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Bahrain wanted to hold Qatar accountable for supporting popular uprisings. In fact, they triggered a diplomatic crisis by withdrawing their ambassadors from Doha in March 2014.

The emir asked these countries to reconsider their decision, but to no avail. While dealing with hostile states, Sheikh Tamim also sought to revive the mediation diplomacy that had been a feature of Qatari foreign policy before the Arab Spring. For example, he acted as a mediator between Iran and the West, and brought the Taliban and American officials together in Doha to find a lasting solution.

The blockade of Qatar

In June 2017, Qatar’s neighbors, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and further afield Egypt, began to blockade Qatar by air, land, and sea. Qatar suddenly found itself on the verge of losing its independence. The angry four demanded full allegiance from Qatar. They made a series of demands, from the closure of Al Jazeera to a commission to verify that Qatar had fulfilled the commitments they had demanded—officially all this meant taking over Qatari sovereignty. If the emir accepted the demands, Qatar would become a kind of satellite state. If he didn’t, Qatar would face sanctions.

Although his country was besieged from all sides—even the sending of food was forbidden—the emir did not give up and, with the support of his closest ally, Turkey, and his neighbor Iran, he reduced the destructive aspect of the blockade and managed to keep his country afloat for four years until the Al-Ula agreement was signed in 2021, which lifted the blockade.

Qatar was able to emerge from the blockade without any significant damage, which was a great personal success for Sheikh Tamim. The effect of the soft power factor, invested in since Sheikh Hamad’s reign, was crucial to this success. Since Sheikh Hamad came to power, the Qatari government has been nurturing good foreign relations and making new friends. Thanks to soft power moves such as hosting the U.S. army at the Al Udeid Air Base, actively using the Al Jazeera media group in foreign policy, providing a base for the Turkish army, balancing Saudi Arabia with Iran, and attracting Western support through investment, the blockade was overcome with almost no serious repercussions.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup

Sheikh Tamim also continued to work to improve the country’s image at a time when its sovereignty was under threat. Under his leadership, Qatar organized the 2022 FIFA World Cup. He began preparations for the tournament as soon as he succeeded his father and managed to organize the world’s largest event at an unusual time, in November-December 2022, spending a total of almost $200 billion. The 2022 FIFA World Cup has always had an important place in the image of Qatar. For decades, Qataris have wanted to put Qatar on the map for all to see and thanks to this event, the whole world had the opportunity to get to know Qatar better. In addition, the fans gained knowledge about the Arab Muslim culture.

Meanwhile, Qatar’s investment in football encouraged its Arab neighbors and brought them into the competition. For example, Saudi Arabia brought top players, including Cristiano Ronaldo, to the Saudi Football League; bought Premier League’s Newcastle United; and invested heavily in e-sports and golf—all after Qatar boosted its image thanks to the World Cup.

On the domestic front, Sheikh Tamim allowed elections for the Shura Council, even though Qatar is an emirate. The first elections took in October 2021. By law, 30 of the council’s 45 members are elected by popular vote. Although the council does not share power, it is an important development that the members of such an institution are elected by the people. Sheikh Tamim also abolished the kafala (sponsorship) system before the World Cup in response to criticism of labor rights abuses.

Normalization of diplomatic ties

On the foreign policy front, relations with the blockading Arab states have been normalized and ambassadors have been appointed on a reciprocal basis. The Qatari government has also abandoned its active interventionist foreign policy in recent years and begun to play the role of mediator again. In particular, the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan through Qatar and the Taliban’s opening to the world through Qatar are the most notable achievements of Qatari foreign policy in recent years. In the upcoming period, the Emirate of Qatar under Sheikh Tamim is expected to continue its mediation diplomacy and not to get involved in regional conflicts.

Among others, Sheikh Tamim is expected to play an active role in foreign policy, bring the conflicting parties in the region to Doha, pursue a policy of balancing between the great powers, continue to be involved in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, personally deal with issues of the Islamic world, and increase aid to other countries. In short, Qatar’s maverick foreign policy, handed down from father to son, will continue as it has for the past three decades.

It should be noted, however, that this will come at a price. Although Sheikh Tamim has improved relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, it is certain that rivalry will continue. UAE leader Mohammed bin Zayed (MBZ) and Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MBS) are locked in an unrelenting rivalry to become the leaders of the Gulf and even the Arab world.

If, despite their rivalry, they continue to be hostile to Sheikh Tamim’s Qatar, then competition will be inevitable. If the fierce competition is confined to MBZ and MBS, there is a possibility that Qatar under Sheikh Tamim will benefit from it. However, given that the latter has a different character and style from the other two leaders, it seems more likely that relations will be strained again and that the Qatari emir will refrain from aligning himself with either MBZ or MBS.

It is safe to say that Sheikh Tamim will somehow bring his country safely to shore with each new problem. In the last decade, he has successfully dealt with complex problems, effectively protecting his country and gaining valuable experience. It appears that Qatar is in safe hands and will continue on its chosen path without compromising its principles.

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he 2022 FIFA World Cup Qatar ended on December 18, at Lusail Stadium, north of Doha. The World Cup sparked much controversy in the international media, and seemed to represent more than just a sports tournament.

In December 2010, Qatar won the right to host the 2022 World Cup after a vote at FIFA headquarters in Zurich, becoming the first Arab and Middle Eastern country to host this world championship.

Since then, many doubts were raised about Qatar’s legitimacy to host the tournament.

First, Qatar was accused of paying bribes to FIFA officials in order to obtain the right to host the World Cup.

Several questions were raised about the ability of Qatar to host such a big event; the readiness of stadiums and sports infrastructure being among the most serious ones. Possible health risks that players may be exposed to due to the weather conditions in Qatar also became a topic of discussion.

However, such controversies did not prevent Qatar from completing all preparations for the World Cup. Then, suspicions shifted from logistical readiness to accusations of violating human rights and lack of freedoms.

From the beginning of the World Cup on November 20 to the final game on December 18, Qatar’s World Cup stadiums became a platform for political and, sometimes, cultural messages.

Human rights in the construction sector

Among all the accusations leveled against Qatar, the issue pertaining to the rights of migrant workers was the most controversial and widespread with several reports and investigations published on it.

In 2013, The Guardian published an investigation indicating such violations. The investigation claimed, “Dozens of Nepalese migrant laborers have died in Qatar in recent weeks and thousands more are enduring appalling labor abuses.” The report indicated that, according to documents obtained from the Nepalese embassy in Doha, at least 44 workers died between June 4 and August 8. More than half died of heart attacks, heart failure, or workplace accidents.

In addition, the newspaper described the working and living conditions faced by the workers as  “slavery in modern times.” The investigation spoke of very harsh working conditions. For example, the report referred to “forced labor on a huge World Cup infrastructure project.” Moreover, some Nepalese men alleged that they had not been paid for months while according to the same investigation, others said employers routinely confiscate passports and refuse to issue ID cards.

In 2016, Amnesty International reported that migrant workers were exploited at a Qatar World Cup 2022 site. The report claimed that “migrant workers on Khalifa International Stadium and the surrounding Aspire Zone have been subjected to a range of exploitative practices.” These practices included high recruitment fees, false promises about pay, passport confiscation, dirty and cramped accommodation, and threats over complaining about their conditions.

Traditional values and conservative culture

The World Cup organizers expected that at least one million people would visit Qatar during the World Cup period. FIFA stated that “more than 1.2 million tickets have been requested by fans worldwide in the first 24 hours of the initial sales period.”

Questions were then asked along the lines of how such a small country with a conservative culture can receive such number of visitors.

Alcohol consumption in Qatar is not completely prohibited, but is allowed only in licensed restaurants and bars. Moreover, the legal drinking age is 21.

Two days before the start of the World Cup, FIFA announced that “a decision has been made to focus the sale of alcoholic beverages at the FIFA Fan Festival, other fan destinations, and licensed venues.”

In remarks to BBC Sport, the tournament’s chief organizer, Nasser Al-Khater, confirmed that alcohol will be served “in select areas within stadiums.”

Indeed, alcohol was available in the fan zone and selected areas. Moreover, the Arcadia Music Festival, which offered “the most immersive shows on Earth” and a capacity of 1,500 spectators, offered alcohol between 10 a.m. to 5 p.m. every day.

One of the key accusations/criticisms leveled against the Qatar World Cup 2022 was the presence of gay fans. Although homosexuality is illegal in Qatar, CEO Nasser Al Khater said to Sky News that “gay fans will be welcome to display affection and rainbow flags.”

Moreover, in a speech to the United Nations General Assembly, the Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani stated that “Qatari people will welcome football fans from all walks of life with open arms.” The emir confirmed that Qatar will open its doors to all fans without “discrimination.”

Despite this, the players could not wear the OneLove armband and fans weren’t allowed to fly rainbow flags.

The Football Association of Wales (FAW) stated that they “were extremely disappointed by reports that members of Y Wal Goch, (a s pre-match song and fan club about the survival of Welsh culture and language), which included FAW staff members, were asked to remove and discard their Rainbow Wall bucket hats before entry to the Ahmad Bin Ali Stadium.”

In the same context, the England Football Association noted that “FIFA has been very clear that it will impose sporting sanctions if our captains wear the armbands on the field of play.” The statement by Germany’s players was the most controversial and widespread. In their opener against Japan, they covered their mouth with their hands; denying them their right to wear the LGBT support armband was like muting their voices, a statement by the German Football Association (DFB) noted.

During the World Cup, the Moroccan national team’s qualification came as a big surprise. Morocco was the first Arab and African team to reach the World Cup semifinals.

After the Moroccan team’s victory over Spain in the 16th round and Portugal in the quarterfinals, some Moroccan players raised their index fingers towards the sky, an action that sparked a lot of reaction in international media.

German news channel Welt accused the Moroccan national team players of using the “Islamic State (ISIS) signal” by raising their index finger after their victory over Portugal. This link between the celebration of three Moroccan players and ISIS caused great discontent in the Arab and Muslim worlds, as Muslims use this gesture to express thanks to God.

Germany-based U.S. journalist Hebh Jamal described calling the players terrorists a “hate crime.” She posted pictures of Argentinian Lionel Messi and Brazilian Neymar Júnior raising their fingers to celebrate scoring, and sarcastically wrote, “Messi is an Islamic state terrorist” and “Neymar is a terrorist too.”

The Moroccan players’ mothers stole the limelight at the World Cup. Pictures spread of Moroccan players celebrating and dancing with their mothers after winning every match, and kissing their foreheads.

According to Al-Jazeera, team coach Walid Regragui and Royal Moroccan Football Federation President Fouzi Lekjaa had ensured that the family members chosen by the players were offered an all-inclusive trip to Qatar.

“Our success is not possible without our parents’ happiness,” Regragui, who also celebrated with his mom, said upon taking the job in August.

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s the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar kicked off on November 20, 2022, and with hundreds of thousands of football fans across the globe making their way to the Gulf country to attend the significant sports event, Israel seems to be the only loser of the tournament. Here is how Israel lost the battle of public opinion at the FIFA 2022 World Cup in Qatar.

The solidarity with the Palestinian people expressed both in the streets of Qatar and in the stadiums during the World Cup was remarkable. The Palestinian flag, keffiyehs, and chants for the freedom of the Palestinian people were repeatedly reported to the shock of Israeli reporters who travelled to cover the global football event.

Four Arab teams had qualified for the World Cup, namely Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Tunisia, and the solidarity with Palestine expressed through the waving of Palestinian flags or wearing the traditional Palestinian keffiyeh was very visible not only at the matches of the Arab teams but at matches of other teams as well as in the streets. Football fans who came from all over the world persistently expressed solidarity with Palestine.

Israeli media coverage of the World Cup has shown that fans from Japan to England have expressed solidarity with the Palestinian people by either chanting “Free Palestine” or refusing to speak to Israeli media about their experience during the World Cup.

Should we be surprised?

The truth is that many Palestinians are astonished that Israeli media crews were surprised by the treatment they received at the World Cup. There is no explanation for the Israelis’ surprise other than the general feeling of isolation many Israelis experience today as a result of being out of touch with reality and their inability to see the implications of 74 years of occupation and displacement, and what these years have meant for the Palestinian people.

In contrast, Palestinians are not surprised by this wave of solidarity, which was especially remarkable this year as it coincided with the International Day of Solidarity with the Palestinian People on November 29.

Israeli successive governments have historically normalized ties with certain Arab governments, but not with the Arab peoples. The Israeli government, and some people in Israel, were always aware of this fact, but they tried to sell a different narrative to the Israelis, namely that the publics in the region are also fond of having ties with their state in its current form. The World Cup in Qatar has just proved the exact opposite.

Israel’s ongoing violations

In the span of one week from November 28 to December 3, Israel has killed 10 Palestinians. The latest of Israel’s victims was Omar Manaa, 22, who was killed near the West Bank city of Bethlehem. This year, Israel has killed around 150 Palestinians and its forces continue to break into Palestinian towns and cities every day, leaving behind more wounds that time cannot heal.

The manner in which the Israeli soldier killed Omar Manaa, which was caught on camera, shows without a shadow of a doubt that Israeli forces feel completely immune. Omar clashed with an Israeli soldier and during the clash in which Omar posed no threat to the Israeli soldier, the soldier decided to take out his pistol and kill him. It is certain that the Israeli soldier knew very well that he will not be held accountable for the crime he was about to commit.

On the contrary, in fact, he might have felt that he would be rewarded for his action. Itamar Ben Gvir tweeted that he supports the soldier’s “heroic act.” This is the current state of Israeli politics: Palestinians have to choose between right-wing politics and extreme right-wing politics. Ben Gvir, who was once banned from practicing law for his radical views and later defended settlers who assault Palestinians when the ban was lifted, is most likely to serve as Israel’s next national security minister with unlimited powers.

On December 4, Palestinians woke up again to the sounds of Israeli airstrikes in Gaza, targeting the coastal enclave, which has been under a tight Israeli siege since 2007. The discourse of Israeli politicians today resembles that of the founders of Israel who were more open about their Zionist ideology that was based on the removal of the Palestinian people by force in order for the Zionist dream to come true. Today, we are back in the era of the iron wall, where Israel brags about the use of force to get Palestinians to surrender.

Solidarity with Palestine and the way forward

The FIFA World Cup in Qatar has shown once again that the issues of Palestine and the injustice its people have been and are still suffering are alive in the hearts of many people across the globe. The World Cup in Qatar sent the message to Israeli leaders that lasting justice will only be realized when Palestinians are given their rights back and the wrongdoings of the Nakba are reversed without further delay.

Football fans in today’s world can’t be separated from politics. In fact, stadiums have always been used to express political messages and the message from the stadiums in Qatar was loud and clear: the Palestinian people will eventually be victorious and have equal rights on their land.

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atar has become the first Middle Eastern country to host a FIFA World Cup football championship. However, critics have raised their voices about migrant workers’ living conditions and human causalities that reportedly occurred during the construction of stadiums and other organization-related facilities.

Qatar hopes that hosting the World Cup 2022 will significantly contribute to its national development and progress. Yet, certain western media outlets have called on Qatar for the conditions migrant workers have faced during the preparations for the World Cup 2022. Such bad publicity was the last thing Qatar wanted.

Workers’ conditions

30,000 foreign workers have moved to Qatar since 2010 when the country won the bid to become the FIFA World Cup host in order to aid in the preparation for the mega-event. These migrant workers came mainly from South-East Asian countries like Nepal and India.

Leading up to 2022, there have been concerns voiced among unions regarding the poor conditions of foreign workers in Qatar. Poor working conditions were detailed in the 2014 International Trade Union Confederation Special Report which also emphasized the conditions in detention centers, the Qatari legal system, corporate behavior, and labor inspections.

Given the pressures by the unions regarding the workers’ conditions and the deaths that have occurred on the government’s watch, the kafala system has been overridden, but concerns remain whether it continues and will continue in practice.

Kafala system

The kafala system is a law framework that is a bridge between migrant workers and employers, and relates to issues regarding international law and workers’ rights. The system allows for cheap labor, but is controversial as it paves the way for exploitation at the hands of employers or governments.

The system lacks “regulations and protections for migrant workers,” according to the Council of Foreign Relations, with workers becoming subject and exposed to poor working conditions, low wages, employee control, and abuse. This control means that employers are able to exert certain powers over the workers including changing their jobs, revoking their residence permits, and even deporting them. There is fear among workers about reporting abuses or the deteriorating situation of forced labor.

The system is predominantly seen in countries that have used this framework to help boost their rapid economic growth. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have fostered this system. Calls have been made to reform or abolish it due to the adverse effects it has on workers’ rights, and it has come to be regarded as a form of modern-day slavery.

Qatar took steps to abolish the kafala system in December 2016, and it was officially abolished in 2018. Thus, Qatar took considerable steps to align itself with international law and secure workers’ safety. The abolishment came alongside reform packages to enhance the labor market in Qatar.

The West reacts, but how?

When raising concerns over workers’ poor working conditions and lack of regulations, a special emphasis is paid to the number of deaths among workers in Qatar leading up to the World Cup 2022. However, there are serious inconsistencies with the numbers given.

David Mednicoff stated that there have been major reforms in Qatar thanks to the constructive pressure by unions and the International Labor Organization (ILO). Given the growing news on Qatar and the working conditions there, he highlighted that Western criticism may also conceal other agendas.

Mednicoff noted that the historic moment of Qatar being the first Middle Eastern country to host the FIFA World Cup was presented in an Islamophobic context in the French publication Le Canard enchaîné which depicted the Qatari football players as terrorists.

The Qatari Minister of State Dr. Hamad Al-Kawari responded to the publication, stating that “even caustic satire is welcome!!” He went on, “But the Chained Duck [Le Canard enchaîné] decided to resort to lies, hatred and resentment to attack Qatar and denigrate it. Keep some loyalty and sportsmanship at least.”

In fact, there has been pressure on Qatar since the bid for the World Cup 2022, and how it has all been portrayed is newsworthy in itself.

Oil has been fueling the world’s economy for about a century while coal is still widely used across the globe. Together with natural gas, fossil fuels constitute more than 80% of the global energy supply. Every single country depends on oil at least to fuel its vehicles. Even though natural gas is not as commonly used as oil and coal, in 2020, it generated about 24% of the global electricity supply while coal generated 35%. However, only a limited number of states dominate the world’s fossil fuel supply, and each uses its energy resources differently.

Russia as a fossil fuel giant

For more than three decades, Russia has been one of the world’s top oil, natural gas, and coal producers and exporters. The primary destinations for Russian energy resources are European countries, led by Germany, Italy, and France. Though Russia is the only gas supplier for many Eastern European countries, its energy share in Germany makes the country the most dependent on Russian natural gas. Germany receives 19% of Russia’s total gas exports. Germany is Russia’s number one importer of oil, oil products, and coal. Not surprisingly, this affects Germany’s and other European states’ foreign policy towards Russia.

When Putin’s army annexed Crimea in 2014, European leaders declared the move unacceptable. Nevertheless, their economies’ dependency on Russian energy resources prevented them from taking any deterring action. The EU imposed a number of sanctions targeting the energy sector but could not prohibit the import of oil, gas, or coal. At the same time, Russia threatened to halt gas flows in response to the sanctions.

However, Putin continued to export energy commodities to Berlin, and Germany went ahead with the construction of the Nord Stream 2 Natural Gas Pipeline, which has long been at the heart of the harsh criticism of Germany by U.S. and European leaders. Russia had planned for the new pipeline to replace the ones passing through Ukraine. But the EU insisted on keeping the gas pipelines via Ukraine flowing and paved the way for a Russia-Ukraine deal. Now, the EU is importing gas through Ukraine and the Nord Stream 2 pipeline project has been suspended.

Turkey is another top recipient of Russian gas, which has the largest share in Turkey’s annual gas imports. Russia also exports crude oil and oil products to Turkey, and its national nuclear power company, Rosatom, is building Turkey’s first nuclear power plant. Yet, in 2015, when the Turkish military shot down a Russian war jet after it violated its airspace, and following the assassination of Russian ambassador to Ankara Andrei Karlov at an art exhibition in Turkey’s capital, Russia did not halt gas flows to Turkey nor did it suspend the Akkuyu Nuclear Power project.

It’s clear that there is an interdependence both between Russia and the EU, and Turkey and Russia. European countries and Turkey need Russian gas and are not able to replace it in the short term. At the same time, Russia also needs to sell its gas in order to generate income. Moscow cannot replace and does not want to lose the European market, which constitutes approximately 75% of its gas, 50% of its oil, and 30% of its coal exports. In conclusion, both sides need their energy trade to continue. The collaboration between the two continues today, and Russia still Turkey’s top energy partner.

Since the beginning of the Ukraine war, U.S. pressure on Europe continues while the U.S. administration encourages its domestic gas sector to increase its export capacity. The U.S. is now the third-largest LNG exporter after Australia and Qatar, and is aiming to become number one by 2030.

Qatar’s endless quest to be an LNG power

As the technological developments enabled natural gas producers to export their commodities overseas, Qatar has been one of the countries wisely using this opportunity to expand its share in the global gas market. Although natural gas has been liquefied since the 1960s, it became more popular as demand increased across countries. Economic developments in emerging states have played a significant role in this expansion.

As the Ukraine war pushed European countries to shift away from Russian gas, leaders began to look for new suppliers. But importing gas through new pipelines would take at least 3-5 years. In the short term, increasing the LNG supply is the only way for Europe to slash its imports from Russia, and Qatar is one of the countries from which the EU wants to import more gas.

Even though the Gulf state claims it wants to export greater quantities of gas to Europe, most of its long-term gas contracts are held by Asian countries such as Japan, South Korea, and China, which cover more than 70% of Qatar’s annual gas exports. Moreover, the U.S. and Australia have been expanding their production of gas. Overall, it does not seem possible for Qatar to export more gas to Europe to replace Russian gas imports. In order for Qatar to expand its share in the global gas market, it needs to invest more in the upstream sector.

Energy as a weapon or a means of collaboration?

The Ukraine war has reminded world leaders of the significance of the energy supply’s security. Russia, the U.S., and Qatar, as countries affecting economies by directly exporting energy commodities, have drawn the most attention recently. While Russia sometimes barks but does not bite, the U.S. oppressively uses its power to suffocate its ultimate rival (see Russia), and Qatar is trying to play the role of a lifeguard.

However, it is evident that exporters are dependent on each other just as exporters and importers are interdependent. Russia needs the EU and Turkey in order to generate income, and the U.S. needs a greater share in the European market to weaken its rival. However, the oil and gas market is global and one player’s loss is felt across the board. Witnessing the Western sanctions’ effect on rising energy prices, the U.S. and Qatar need Russian oil and gas to continue to flow to decrease the repercussions felt by their citizens.

The Gulf reconciliation at the Al-Ula Summit suddenly changed the regional atmosphere and the rhetoric of war among Saudi, Emirati, and Qatari decision-makers. The themes of building trust and confidence over broader regional security moved out of the Gulf context, given the new trend of Gulf diplomacy that favors economic interest over political conflict. The emerging Gulf portrait requires Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar to polish their international image as the region’s natural stabilizers and peaceful actors.

Although the Al-Ula Summit put an official end to the Gulf crisis, it threw a veil over political divergences for an unpredictable period of time, at which point it may lead to the redefinition of the Gulf states’ security interests. In fact, there is an intolerant ambiance in the post-Al-Ula era. Peace appears on the surface; however, beneath it lies the spirit of competition and aggression via the indirect foreign policies of Qatari and Emirati decision-makers who hide behind the foreign policy rhetoric of peace and stability for the eyes of the international community and, particularly, the United States.

Both Qatar and the UAE use their financial and media powers to challenge each other’s narratives as the central stabilizer establishing regional order. While other regional powers like Turkey, Israel, and Iran expect to benefit from the new Gulf diplomacy and its economic offers, the overall security perceptions of political actors in the Gulf and the Middle East continue to be unstable.

The central question here is to what extent Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE can tolerate each other’s regional aspirations in negotiating the process of regional order? As the Gulf states don’t have a joint foreign policy and a common defense agenda, establishing bilateral military relations with Gulf and non-Gulf actors independently seems inevitable.

It has been over a year now since Qatar and the UAE agreed on restoring bilateral ties and ending adverse statements against each other. However, the institutional rhetoric of the GCC (Gulf Cooperation Council) on foreign policy and bilateral relations do not change rapidly as illustrated in a speech by Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, the foreign minister of Qatar, who stated, “It could take some time to move past this difficult period.”

Official delegations of Qatar and the UAE held a meeting in Doha in early February 2022, and stated their commitment to creating joint mechanisms and procedures for implementing the Al-Ula Declaration. Afterwards, the photograph of Emir of Qatar Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani and Crown Prince of Abu Dhabi Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan shaking hands during the opening of the Olympic Games Beijing 2022 demonstrated the intention of the parties to portray a positive diplomatic ambiance at the highest level.

Before the Al-Ula declaration, Qatar and the Emirates continuously utilized their financial power through media and lobbying abroad to put pressure on each other. Recently, Qatar objected to the Abraham Accords signed between Israel, the UAE, and Bahrain, by criticizing the UAE’s efforts to initiate a diplomatic move without negotiating a solution to the Palestinian cause.

After the Al-Ula declaration, one might mention the continuity of the indirect competition over the Hollywood movie The Misfits that portrays Qatar as “Jazeeristan,” a terrorist state and a global financier of terrorism.

The movie, co-produced by the UAE, Paramount Pictures, and Highland Film Group, mentions actual Qatari institutions such as Al-Emadi Hospital, the Lekhwiya police force, and Al Jazeera supporting the state’s “terrorist” activities. Another incident of behind-the-scenes competition can be seen in the UAE’s attempts to encourage journalists in Africa to campaign against Qatar’s hosting of the 2022 FIFA World Cup.

In another case, the UAE’s ambassador to Israel, Mohamed Al Khaja, accused Al Jazeera of continuously manipulating the narrative of the Palestinian cause and shifting the credibility of the events from the truth.

Likewise, Qatari newspapers published the visit of Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed, the foreign minister of the UAE, the first Emirati official to visit Damascus since 2011, to discuss “new horizons” by referring to the Syrian civil war as a brutal and multifaceted war that has killed innocent civilians.

One can also come across news in Qatari media criticizing the UAE’s labor sponsorship system as problematic given that thousands of migrant children lack schooling and access to healthcare because they are not issued birth certificates by the authorities as a result of being born to unmarried or single parents and not paying medical bills.

The marring of the UAE’s international image during its military involvement in the Yemeni civil war decreased the chances of the Biden administration perceiving the UAE as the primary peacebuilder in the Gulf. The Biden administration’s recent selection of Qatar as a major non-NATO ally to cooperate in security and investment sectors demonstrated that the U.S. foreign policymaking would not tolerate aggressive foreign policies against the region’s instability and neighbors.

The Biden administration’s intolerance of aggressive foreign policies and military activities benefited Qatar’s previous regional narratives during the blockade period.

As the issue of Muslim Brotherhood is no longer on the table in intra-Gulf discussions or a factor in the Gulf states’ relations with other countries, ideological war narratives  are now replaced with a competition over the display of state capacity to promote peace-building and regional stability.

The process favors Qatar for now, but all this is tied to the U.S. administration’s foreign policy. Upon realizing that, the UAE recently established a new foreign policy built upon the theme of “good neighborliness” so as not to return to the hostile competitive environment and to avoid recalling its notorious military aggression in Yemen.

The UAE’s diplomatic move to reconcile and improve ties with Turkey through highest level visits and positive statements about the visit of Israel President Isaac Herzog to the country in January 2022  indicate the UAE’s determination to diversify regional allies peacefully and independently of its Gulf neighbors. In this new era of narrative wars built upon peace rhetoric, Qatar as a major non-NATO ally of the United States, appears to be the UAE’s primary competitor.

Qatar, a natural gas-rich country in the Gulf, makes significant investments abroad thanks to its financial power. Although Qatar is a small country geographically, it has a large sovereign wealth fund that has a substantial influence on global markets. Today, Qatar holds shares in the world’s most important stock markets, largest automotive companies, and most prominent financial institutions.

Qatari Investments in a Changing Economic Environment

Qatar is one of the leading countries in exporting liquefied natural gas (LNG). As the largest LNG supplier to Europe, the country has a significant share (between 45% and 67%) in the LNG imports of Poland, Belgium, Italy, and England. After Qatar, the U.S. comes second and Russia third in LNG exports to Europe.

Qatar manages capital accumulation through the Sovereign Wealth Fund (Qatar Investment Authority, QIA). While Qatar’s investments generally exhibit a more long-term trend, in certain investments gaining prestige comes into prominence as a primary motivation since the latter is an important source of political legitimacy and credibility in the international system.

In addition to its investments in popular sports clubs around the world, it is particularly noteworthy that Qatar will host the 2022 FIFA World Cup and it has already spent more than $200 billion for this purpose.

According to 2019 data, Qatar made foreign direct investments worth $44.78 billion.

Qatar has achieved a significant growth in global investments in recent years and has considerably increased its foreign stock investment. According to 2019 data, Qatar made foreign direct investments worth $44.78 billion. Out of more than 80 countries in which Qatar has invested, the share of the EU is 34% whereas the rest of the Gulf countries (GCC) make up 24% of the investments.

The Increasing Share of Qatari Investments in Western Countries

In the last 20-30 years, Asian and Middle Eastern investors have increased their investment power in the global economy. In this environment, where the focus of the world economy has shifted from the West to Asia, Western countries pursue an array of strategies to attract investments from Asian and Middle Eastern investors.

For example, it is reported that a number of European countries such as the U.K., France, Italy, Greece, and Germany are competing to attract Qatari capital and are trying to establish close ties with Qatar in the field of energy. At the EU level, cooperation with Qatar is perceived as a strategic partnership.

The QIA has substantial investments in different sectors around the world. The fund has an investment of over $400 billion in more than 40 countries; $30 billion is invested in the U.S., $40 billion in the UK, €25 billion in Germany, and €30 billion in France. The QIA has become the largest shareholder of the London Stock Exchange with a 10.3% share.

The QIA also has considerable real estate investments in strategically important Western cities such as London, Paris, and Washington D.C.

During the 2008 global financial crisis, the QIA purchased shares in Barclays, Credit Suisse, Porsche, and Volkswagen, which are among Europe’s most important companies. Then, it invested in Deutsche Bank, which could not overcome financial difficulties after the global crisis.

The QIA also has considerable real estate investments in strategically important Western cities such as London, Paris, and Washington D.C. Apart from this, it should be noted that there are many Western companies doing business in Qatar. For example, more than 850 companies from the U.S., 700 companies from the U.K., and 330 companies from Germany operate in Qatar.

A few years ago, Qatar signed a strategic dialogue agreement with France in the field of security, energy, and economic cooperation. In 2008, then President Nicolas Sarkozy introduced tax exemptions on earnings for properties purchased by Qatar in order to attract Qatari capital to the country. Following this, a lot of real estate in Paris, including luxury hotels and prominent historical structures, were purchased by Qatar.

After three and a half years of paralyzing strife, the blockade of Qatar was brought to an end ahead of the 41^st Summit of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), turning the page on perhaps the darkest period in the union’s four decade history.

The diplomatic breakthrough was heralded by the arrival of Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad on a Qatar Airways flight to Al-Ula, Saudi Arabia. In an astonishing scene given the acrimony of the past few years, Sheikh Tamim was greeted and embraced on the tarmac by Saudi Crown Prince Muhammad bin Salman—widely considered one of the two main architects of the blockade along with Muhammad bin Zayed, the crown prince of Abu Dhabi.

Despite the geniality on display between the two Gulf leaders, however, it is difficult to mask that the reconciliation is both limited and fragile. Ending the blockade does not resolve the underlying frictions between Gulf states that led to the crisis in the first place.

Moreover, the absences of Muhammad bin Zayed and the King of Bahrain from the summit given this year’s heightened importance, has led some observers to speculate that rapprochement with Qatar was a Saudi-led initiative that the other partners to the blockade perhaps felt less enthusiastic about bringing to an end without achieving concessions from Qatar.

Indeed, the only publicly-acknowledged requirement of Doha was to drop all pending lawsuits against the blockading countries in international fora. In other words, nothing that preceded the rift itself.

That being said, it is difficult to argue that reconciliation was not a win-win for the entire GCC. While the Gulf body was never a model of effective multilateralism, restoring unity offers mutual benefits for all its members, as well as its foreign partners who have had the extra burden of navigating its fractured politics since June 2017.

Normalizing ties within the GCC allows for the resumption of cross-border cooperation and coordination at a time when all six members face a confluence of challenges on political, economic, security and public health issues.

No GCC member, for example, is immune to the severe downturn in global energy prices, the Covid-19 pandemic, or the potential outbreak of war with Iran and its consequences. Addressing complex challenges like these will always be more effective as a united bloc.

Fragile and limited: Will conflict return? 

Discord among states in the Arab Gulf is common, often stretching back generations and tied to tribal rivalries and territorial disputes. Yet the acute tension between Qatar and its neighbors developed in the mid-1990s, when Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa took control of the state in a bloodless coup against his father.

In 2014, a significant diplomatic rupture occurred between the same GCC members (minus Egypt) that was only brought to a close after nine months of Kuwaiti-led mediation. At issue was Qatar’s support for revolutionary forces, especially Sunni Islamists who were making significant gains amid the upheaval, as well as its positive relations with regional powers Iran and Turkey, all of whom Saudi Arabia, the UAE and Bahrain felt threatened Gulf interests.

When Donald Trump visited Saudi Arabia shortly after becoming President of the United States in 2017, the Saudi-led axis felt it had received a green light from the new American leader to dramatically escalate the pressure on Doha and, perhaps, bring it to its knees once and for all. However, with the help of Turkey, Qatar was able to survive the initial shock of the blockade, ward off a potential military invasion, and steady itself in preparation of a long, drawn out affair.