Following the independence referendum proposed by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in Iraq on September 25, 2017, the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq have come closer to an unprecedented degree. This analysis will shed light on the post-referendum (and the post-Daesh) developments regarding Turkey’s hunt for the PKK, a terrorist organization that has been targeting Turkish security personnel and civilians for about four decades.

Following the referendum in September 2017, despite its close relations with the KRG, Ankara managed to build a trilateral bloc including Turkey, Iran and Iraq, while also leaving an open door for the less-hawkish and more realistic KRG politicians, such as the regional Prime Minister, Nechirvan Barzani. Turkey’s reaction to the referendum was not only based on the KRG’s unilateral decision, which Turkey saw, at best, as a sign of irresponsible partnership. Rather, Turkey’s primary concern in Iraq is the future of the PKK, which is already deeply rooted in the country, and which is seeking to increase its sphere of control. Hence, Turkey utilized the referendum crisis as an opportunity for a more effective alliance against the PKK, which is flourishing with the backing of prominent international sponsors in the context of the Syrian Civil War. For Turkey, this new alliance is more promising than what the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could have ever provided in terms of a final defeat of the PKK.

For Turkey, the new alliance with Iraq and Iran is more promising than what the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) could have ever provided in terms of a final defeat of the PKK.

For a long time, the PKK was perceived as the winner of the turmoil in the Middle East. Following the Gulf Wars and the regime change that followed in Iraq, the terrorist organization secured itself safe havens in Northern Iraq amidst the power vacuums and buffer zones between the central and regional governments and neighboring countries. The civil war in Syria has also worked to this end for the PKK. The terrorist organization created some nicknames, or umbrella groups (Syrian Democratic Forces being the latest one) in order to carry out its operations and partner with the United States in Syria. Hence, the PKK expanded the territories it captured and began to consolidate its territorial control. As a reaction to this ever-growing threat over the past few years, Turkey shifted its policy goals in Syria to preventing the PKK corridor along its border. While Turkey carried out the Euphrates Shield and Idlib operations primarily for this reason, the main goal was to hit the PKK in its headquarters in Qandil, Iraq.

Nevertheless, Ankara faced a significant problem: Given the concerns shared by the central government and by Iran and the complex web of partnerships between the local and international actors in the region, Turkey’s close relations with the KRG did not permit Turkey limitless freedom for its operations in Iraq. In addition to a military alliance, Turkey has long developed a mutually beneficial relationship with the KRG based on economic cooperation over oil and construction businesses. In this complex web, the Turkish-KRG alliance (particularly with the ruling party, the KDP), was mostly limited to the provision of ground intelligence by the KDP in regards to the PKK and information regarding the organization’s bases in Turkey. In return, the KDP could rely on Turkish support against the PKK or even against a possible Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) aggression. While this relationship seemed to be a win-win situation for both Turkey and the KDP, the PKK’s growing influence in Syria required a more comprehensive reaction from the Turkish administration, which needed more than what the KRG was able to provide.

The PKK’s growing influence in Syria required a more comprehensive reaction from the Turkish administration, which needed more than what the KRG was able to provide.

As a country that witnessed the gains obtained by the PKK in each revisionist step in Iraq and Syria, Turkey backed the status quo in Iraq during the referendum process. Yet the problem was that each revisionist move in the past helped the PKK increase its influence by ensuring that it became part of the new status quo. The PKK not only found safe havens in its camps across the Turkish border, but also begun to rule areas via conscripting the locals to its own ranks by collecting tax and running schools and other public services from what it calls the “Medya Defense Zones” across the Turkish border down to the mountains across the Iranian border as well as a number of refugee camps, Mahkmur being the most famous one. Hence, the only revisionism that Turkey can tolerate in Iraq is one that will target the PKK’s presence in the country. While Turkey’s existing relations with the KRG provided some assistance to its target of the “Medya Defense Zones,” this move was far from wounding the PKK in a degree to question its chance of survival. The PKK’s ability to stretch its goals and motives to the Sinjar Mountains has made Turkey question the limits of its alliance with the KRG.

Given the American support for the PKK in Syria, and the organization’s attempts to control Sinjar in Iraq, Turkey felt the need to find a more effective alliance against the terrorist organization. While the referendum in September was the last thing Ankara could tolerate, it gave the governments of Turkey, Iran and Iraq a chance to work together. Based on this recent agreement with Iraq and Iran, Turkish military incursions against the PKK can take place in areas that Turkey could not previously operate in. Two examples that reflect this are the recent attacks on the PKK positions in Asos and Mahkmur – both areas are deep inside Iraq, sharing no proximity with the Turkish border.

The Asos area near the town of Mawat of Sulaymaniyah province is a continuation of the Qandil Mountains and cuts across the Iranian border. Turkey’s troubled relations with Iran and Iraq prevented it from carrying out operations in this area, which is 175 kilometers away from the Turkish border – enough for the PKK to comfort itself against Turkish security forces. Hence, the Asos area was a pretty safe-zone for the PKK at times when the organization was not in a hot conflict with Iran, particularly since the 2011 truce. However, the PKK’s comfort in this area has finally been driven to an end as Turkey began to target Asos in repeated bombardments throughout November. During air strikes, Turkish authorities claimed to have killed over 65 PKK terrorists along with destroying their arm depos. The PKK’s main media outlet Firat News also confirmed the attack and claimed that the specific coordinates of the bases were given to Turkey by Iran.

The recent Asos and Mahkmur attacks illustrate that Turkey is forming an effective anti-PKK alliance with the Iranian and Iraqi governments.

Local news outlets stated that Turkey hit the Asos region twice on November 4 and 12 together with many other PKK bases in Qandil, Sinath-Haftanin, Gara, Metina, Avasin-Basyan, Zap and Khakurk. The Asos area was targeted once again in late November, and according to PKK sources, “Iranian scout planes were flying over the area shortly before the bombing of the Turkish jets.” Such news on Iranian scout planes, Iranian artillery shelling and Turkish airstrikes continued in early December, which reflects the fact that Turkey and Iran are committed to root out the PKK from its safe havens comprising the areas from Qandil to Asos. While the shock of the Asos bombardment was still fresh, another wave of airstrikes targeted the Mahkmur area. While the refugee camp in Mahkmur was supposedly a UN-supervised camp, it is currently being ruled by the PKK under the banner “Martyr Rustem Refugee Camp.” While the PKK initially portrayed the attack as if the Turkish state was targeting civilians in the refugee camp, the terrorist organization later announced the names of five PKK members (under the banner of Mahkmur Self-Defense Forces) who died in the strike.

The recent Asos and Mahkmur attacks illustrate that Turkey is forming an anti-PKK alliance with the Iranian and Iraqi governments, while its long lasting western allies are turning their backs to Turkey’s fight against the terrorist organization. Thanks to this new formation, Turkey is now able to target the PKK in areas that provided a safe-zone for the terrorist group. As Turkey is waiting for the right time to face the PKK in Syria (and will probably wait until it finalizes a deal with Russia on Afrin, and until the US retracts support from the group in the east of the Euphrates River), Ankara is determined that now is the best time for such an encounter in Iraq.

As the dust of the war in Kirkuk and the disputed territories in northern Iraq settle down, there are two issues on the forefront: the future of relations between Erbil and Baghdad, and the future status of Masoud Barzani. It is fair to maintain that the Kirkuk Operation signaled the end of Kurdish independence for decades to come and spelled the demise of Barzani.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) is likely to remain a weak and divided region, increasingly subservient to Baghdad. With the loss of over 50% of the disputed territories and the majority of its oil fields, combined with the commitment for Iraq’s territorial integrity, as was displayed by the international community during the Kirkuk Operation, Kurdish leaders lost any hope they had for independence in the foreseeable future.

The future of Barzani in KRG politics

Masoud Barzani was elected as president of the KRG in the 2009 general election. His term was extended in 2013 through a political arrangement made between the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP). On August 19, 2015, his presidency expired and this led to a crisis of legitimacy and mass protests, which were led by the Gorran movement. During the campaign for the referendum, Barzani repeatedly asserted that he will not run for presidency, and that accepting to be president of the KRG was the biggest mistake of his life – apparently Barzani thinks he is too important to occupy a position which was like being a governor of three provinces.

Though late, Barzani seems to have realized that being leader of the KRG automatically puts him in a hierarchically minor position vis-à-vis the Baghdad government. Following the losses inflicted on the KRG during the Kirkuk Operation, fingers were internally and externally pointed at Barzani as he was held responsible for the Peshmarga’s major defeat.

Moreover, officials in Baghdad and abroad, the US in particular, sent the KRG unfailing messages of possible repercussions of the referendum, which were single-handedly carried out in spite of objections raised by the international community. Thus, he gambled and lost more than what he estimated.

Having heard the message clear and loud, on October 29 Barzani sent a letter to the KRG parliament in which he requested for his powers to be delegated between the government and parliament. It is noteworthy that on October 24 Kurdish lawmakers voted overwhelmingly to extend the current term of the parliament for eight more months to be followed by an election. In his resignation speech, Barzani vigorously defended his decision to hold the September 25 referendum. He stated: “The results can never be erased… the Iraqi attack on Kirkuk and other Kurdish held territory vindicated my position that Baghdad no longer believed in federalism and instead wanted to curtail Kurdish rights.”

Following his resignation, Barzani has repeatedly stated that he will stay fighting as “an ordinary Peshmarga.” On November 1, 2017, he toured Peshmarga forces on the new frontiers, separating them from Iraqi troops and Shiite militias near Fishhabur in Dohuk and Makhmour in Mosul.

Political analysts anticipate that Barzani will remain leading KRG politics from behind the scenes for several reasons. In his letter to the KRG parliament, while Barzani did not admit defeat or apologize, he requested for his nephew and son-in-law Nechirvan Barzani, the ongoing prime minister of the KRG, to lead the country out of the current crisis. Nechirvan Barzani does not have the personal caliber to stand to Barzani. While the Barzani dynasty is formed on the basis of a religious hierarchical order where the orders of the elders are strictly obeyed, his close aides are not at pain to conceal this reality. “Barzani will stay in Kurdish politics and lead the high political council, but on Nov. 1st he will no longer be president of the region,” Hemin Hawrami, a senior advisor of Barzani stated. Umed Khoshnaw, head of the KDP group in the KRG parliament stated that the resignation of Barzani will give him “more time to play a bigger role in supporting Peshmarga efforts to defend Kurdish rights,” and that “he will stay to be the only person capable of guaranteeing Kurdish rights and the unifying element of Kurdish society.”

The Abadi factor in future relations between Baghdad and Erbil

Following the success of the Iraqi forces, the Baghdad administration re-negated from earlier agreements they made with PUK officials for a joint administration in Kirkuk and in other disputed territories. Qasem Soleimani, the commander of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Quds Corp, who planned and executed the Kirkuk Operation (October 16-20, 2017), had made a secret deal with leading members of the PUK in order to divide and eventually overrun the KRG. Should the plan realize, it will lead to the formation of a new region in Sulaymaniyah and Halabja.

Other than departing from the arrangements made, Abadi issued decrees in order to try officials who participated in the independence referendum. Thus, sixteen Kurdish law makers are currently facing trial in Iraqi courts. The central government is now planning to send 221 employees to the KRG in order to monitor airplanes and crossing gates in the region. Moreover, the Baghdad government is trying to force the KRG to hand over its remaining oilfields, tax incomes and other internal incomes in exchange for sending some KRG employees their salaries. Besides, Abadi has requested for all border points and airports, which have initially remained under KRG control, to be surrendered to the Federal authorities. Finally, the prime minister has also insisted for the KRG military and security forces to be downsized and for the surrender of their heavy weapons to Baghdad. However, Kurdish authorities have not, and most probably will not, accept downsizing the number of Peshmarga forces or surrender weapons, as they do not trust the Baghdad administration. It is also significant to note here that the number of Kurds and Sunni Arabs in the Iraqi federal army and security forces have been decreased to less than 7 percent.

On October 20, 2017, the US called for direct negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil in order to deescalate the fighting. Prior to this, the KRG had already welcomed Abadi’s initiative for dialogue between the two parties, and had requested for the international community to help start such talks. However, just after the call from the US, an Iraqi court issued a decree to arrest Kosrat Rasul Ali, PUK’s acting General Secretary and the Deputy President of the KRG, on the ground that statements he made were provocative and against the safety of the Iraqi army. Kosrat had stated that the entrance of Shiite militias into disputed territories during the Kirkuk operation was an occupation and was the result of internal treason within the PUK.

In addition to the decree issued to arrest Ali, Abadi emphasized that negotiations will only take place between Baghdad and Erbil if the latter declare the referendum results null and void. More, the Iraqi prime minister asked for the surrender of all the international crossing gates, which the KRG still controls. It is worth noting here that the KRG leadership could not afford to conform to such a request. However, on 25 October, Masoud Barzani issued an order freezing the results of the referendum and expressed readiness to negotiate with Baghdad on the basis of the constitution. Therefore, on 20 November Iraq’s Federal Supreme Court declared that the Kurdish independence referendum “was unconstitutional and the results void.” This further strengthened Baghdad’s hand in a stand-off with the KRG.

Abadi welcomed the court ruling and called on Kurdish authorities to respect the constitution. His government described the court decision as “further vindication” of its “constitutional position.” While the KRG under Nechirvan Barzani has not declared whether they will accept or reject the ruling, N. Barzani himself has condemned the process, claiming that the court made its decision “unilaterally and without the presence of Kurdish representatives.” In addition, Masoud Barzani described the Federal court’s decision as biased and politically motivated.

In spite of all developments, the US and EU member states maintain their pressure on Abadi in order to begin negotiations with the N. Barzani administration and for the end to any further military operations. On November 24, 2017, the Iraqi government prevented a planned visit of the German Foreign Minister to Erbil. This caused Germany to cancel the visit to Iraq.

It can be argued that there are two distinct reasons for why Abadi is maintaining a firm stand on the KRG: firstly, Abadi is concerned that he may be perceived as too soft on the issue of Kurdish separatism and secondly, in preparation for the national elections in May 2018, the prime minister plans to run on a separate platform from that of an al-Maliki’s State of Law bloc, which he currently belongs to. Nevertheless, he is also well aware of the existing fragile and vulnerable political condition of the KRG, which has been brought about by the Kirkuk Operation.

Although Masoud Barzani remains as president of the KDP and is playing a consultative, though not insignificant role to Nechirvan Barzani, his career as a “national” leader seems to have come to an end. Thus, as Abadi continues to build his authority in the country, relations between the Baghdad and KRG administrations have entered a new era in which the semi-independent status of the KRG has become something of the past. The much spoken about Kurdish ascendance in the Middle East has inevitably proved to be a mirage.

On November 6, Iraq’s Supreme Federal Court issued a decision that the country’s constitution which indicates the Republic of Iraq as “a single federal, independent and fully sovereign state” does not allow for the secession of any part of the country from the Iraqi state.

“We believe that this decision must become a basis for starting an inclusive national dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad to resolve all disputes, through implementation of all constitutional articles and in a way that guarantees all rights, authorities and status mentioned in the Constitution, since this is the only way to secure the unity of Iraq, as Article 1 stated” the KRG said in a statement.

The controversial referendum held by KRG on Kurdish regional secession, was considered illegitimate by Baghdad as well as by regional and global actors.

Last month, the Iraqi National Security Council announced that legal proceedings have been initiated on those who carried out the illegitimate referendum.

It was stated that the civil servants who carried out the referendum in the KRG were identified and “legal proceedings” had started.

Many regional and international actors criticized the purpose and timing of the referendum, in apprehension that it would distract Iraq from the ongoing fight against terrorism and further destabilize the region.

Iraqi government forces moved into several disputed areas between Baghdad and the Erbil-based KRG, including the oil-rich Kirkuk province, in the weeks following the poll.

During his region tour, which included stops in Egypt, Jordan, Saudi Arabia and Turkey, Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi stated that the illegitimate referendum on Kurdish regional independence should be “entirely annulled” and not simply “suspended.”

Al-Abadi’s assertion came following the Kurdistan Regional Government’s proposal to “suspend” the referendum results in order to halt the military operations in Kirkuk.

“The referendum was held at a time when we were fighting a war against the Daesh terrorist group,” Al-Abadi said on the sidelines of a meeting in Tehran.

“We warned them [the KRG] not to hold the poll, but to no avail,” he said.

“Our ability to impose federal authority over all Iraqi territory is a victory for all Iraqi citizens,” he added. “We plan to bring all these areas under the authority of the [Iraqi] state.”

Further, Abadi claimed that “The only acceptable outcome is for the referendum results to be completely annulled and that they [the KRG] conform to the Iraqi constitution.”

In terms of relations between Iraq and Iran, al-Abadi called for stepped-up cooperation between the two, “with a view to serving our people and ending the interventions that have led to destruction and widespread displacement.”

He added: “We offer development as an alternative to the disputes and conflicts that have long plagued the states of the region.”

During a joint news conference with his Somali counterpart in Ankara, Turkish Prime Minister Binali Yildirim said on Thursday that “Regardless of whatever decision the northern Iraqi administration takes, the point we reach today clearly shows that any decision they take would not bear any compensation for the damage they caused.”

The announcement came after the KRG announced that they would freeze the referendum results in order to halt the military operations in Kirkuk.

Prime Minister Yildirim also mentioned the Turkish government’s willingness to work “more efficiently” with Iran and Iraq for peace, security and counter-terrorism operations in the region.

He stated that Ankara is working with the Baghdad administration in transferring the control of the Ibrahim Khalil border crossing – also known as Habur – from the Erbil-based KRG to the central government.

Yildirim emphasized that according to the Iraqi constitution, the border gates belong to the central government.

“We have additionally discussed establishing a new route from the west of Habur. The Iraqi side welcomes it and we will work together to open this border.”

KRG poll results must be cancelled

In addition to the Prime Minister, Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu commented on the decision to freeze the referendum results.

The Foreign Minister said: “Northern Iraq’s step back is an important step but an insufficient one. This referendum must be cancelled.”

Cavusoglu also mentioned that KRG President Masoud Barzani is in a weaker spot now after the illegal poll, adding that in a one-on-one meeting, he had previously warned the President about the consequences of the illegitimate referendum.

Following the independence referendum in Northern Iraq, the KRG had been subject to political and economic sanctions from regional and international actors.

Amid the military operation conducted by the central Baghdad administration in Kirkuk, the KRG administration proposed on Wednesday to freeze its illegal referendum in an attempt to halt the operations.

A statement published by the KRG read: “As Iraq and Kurdistan are faced with grave and dangerous circumstances, we are all obliged to act responsibly in order to prevent further violence and clashes between Iraqi and Peshmerga forces.”

Highlighting the clashes between the Iraqi and Peshmerga forces that erupted on October 16, 2017 the KRG stated: “Clashes have caused damage to both sides and could lead to a continuous bloodshed, inflicting pain and social unrest among different components of Iraqi society.”

“Certainly, continued fighting does not lead any side to victory, but it will drive the country towards disarray and chaos, affecting all aspects of life.”

In order to fulfill “our responsibilities and obligations towards the people of Kurdistan and Iraq,” the KRG proposed an immediate ceasefire and halt of all military operations, freezing the referendum results and starting an open dialogue with the Iraqi government on the basis of the Constitution.

Following the Kurdish independence referendum which was held in northern Iraq’s Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controlled areas, the central Iraq administration have responded with political and economic sanctions.

In addition, with the withdrawal of the KRG-loyal Peshmerga fighters, Iraqi military forces have taken control of Kirkuk.

Following the military operation, on Thursday a Baghdad court issued an arrest warrant for Kosrat Rasul, vice-president of the KRG.

A statement released by Iraq’s Supreme Judicial Council read: “The Rusafa investigations court has issued an arrest warrant for Kosrat Rasul following the latter’s recent statements in which he referred to Iraqi Federal Police units in Kirkuk as ‘occupying forces.’”

“The court views Rasul’s statements as a kind of incitement against the Iraqi Armed Forces,” it added, noting that the arrest warrant has been issued in line with Article 226 of Iraq’s penal code.

On Wednesday Rasul, who is also a leading member of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), compared the recent “invasion” of Kirkuk by Iraqi forces – along with other disputed areas of Iraq – to the “Anfal operation.”

Here Rasul was referring to a series of ethnic cleansing campaigns carried out in northern Iraq by former President Saddam Hussein during the 1980s.

Oil fields in control of Baghdad administration

Confirming that the Iraq forces have re-gained control of the oil fields in Kirkuk, the Iraq Oil Ministry spokesperson Asim Cihad said: “The ministry now also holds oil wells and facilities in Kirkuk.”

Following this move, the Iraqi government asked British Petroleum (BP) to develop oil fields in Kirkuk.

The ministry called on BP to urgently make the necessary plans for developing Kirkuk’s oil fields, adding that the central government has the right to develop oil fields in all cities of Iraq.

Following the Kurdish independence referendum which took place on September 25 in Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controlled areas in northern Iraq, the Iraqi government had responded with multiple economic and political sanctions.

After imposing political and economic sanctions on the KRG, including the control of its airspace, the Iraqi army have intervened in Kirkuk – a major disputed area, which is rich in oil.

According to a local police source, Iraq forces entered Kirkuk’s main government headquarters on Monday, following an earlier retreat from the area by Kurdish Peshmerga forces.

Speaking to the Anadolu Agency, Kirkuk Police Captain Hamed al-Obaidi said: “A large Iraqi Federal Police Force has entered the government headquarters [in Kirkuk] over which they have raised the Iraqi flag.”

According to the police captain, “hundreds” of local residents gathered outside the building, welcoming the police.

The move came shortly after Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi commanded Iraq’s security forces to raise the Iraqi flag in all areas of dispute between Baghdad and the KRG.

Following, while no detailed information was provided, on Tuesday, a ministry spokesman announced that all oil fields and facilities in Kirkuk are now under the full control of Iraq’s Oil Ministry.

Turkish support

On Monday the Turkish National Security Council issued a statement making clear its support for Baghdad’s operation in Kirkuk.

Referring to the meeting held, the statement said: “Our sensitivity and anticipation of the central Iraqi administration’s operation in Kirkuk… and the aim to establish the city according to its historical depth has been particularly emphasized.”

Following the National Security Council, speaking at the AK Party group meeting on Tuesday, Prime Minister Binali Yildirim stated that Kirkuk should be run in accordance with its “historic depths,” claiming that “It is a positive development that Kirkuk has been taken under the control of the Iraq central government.”

He added: “The points to consider here are that an administrative system that should re-establish a demographic status based on the historical depths of the region should be put in place.”

While Turkey has come out in full support for the central Iraq administration, President Trump announced his administration’s neutrality in this regard.

Talking to reporters at the White House, Trump said: “We’ve had for many years a very good relationship with the Kurds, as you know, and we’ve also been on the side of Iraq, even though we should have never been there in the first place. We should never have been there. But we’re not taking sides in that battle.”

Referring to the Iraqi force’s operation in Kirkuk as a “battle,” the U.S. State Department issued a statement, which read: “We strongly urge all parties to avoid provocations that can be exploited by Iraq’s enemies who are interested in fueling ethnic and sectarian conflict.”

More, the statement added: “In particular, we note that there is still much work to be done to defeat Daesh in Iraq, and continued tensions between Iraqi and Kurdish forces distract from this vital mission.”

“The United States will continue to stand with our Iraqi partners to ensure the defeat of Daesh.”

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s latest visit to Iran put a spotlight on Turkey-Iran relations across the Middle East. Prior to Erdoğan’s visit, Iranian Chief of General Staff Gen. Mohammad Bagheri’s Turkey visit in August and Turkish Chief of General Staff Gen. Hulusi Akar’s return visit to Iran indicated that security issues stand out as the primary concern of the relations between two countries in the recent period. Bagheri’s visit was also significant since the military chiefs of the two countries had not visited each other since the Iranian Revolution in 1979.

The issues of Iraq, Syria and the outlawed PKK have been highlighted in these meetings between Turkey and Iran. Confronting each other in the civil wars and power struggles taking place in Syria and Iraq, Ankara and Tehran have seen that the picture emerging while the cloud of dust spread by Daesh in Syria and Iraq is about to dissolve, constitutes a serious threat to both countries’ security-related interests. This threat, which mainly consists of the PKK, its Syrian offshoot PYD and the Kurdistan Free Life Party (PJAK), is evidently jeopardizing the territorial integrity of Turkey and Iran aside from Iraq and Syria. Separatist pro-Kurdish movements started posing enormous danger to Ankara and Tehran as some circles in the U.S. and other Western states assumed that Turkey and Iran could be restricted, and possibly divided by supporting the PKK and its counterparts. This assumption shaped their policies regarding the Middle East.

The independence vote organized by the Barzani administration in northern Iraq also made it clear that this danger is not limited to the PKK and its counterparts. The acquisitions of pro-Kurdish movements in Iraq and Syria, thanks to the support given to them by some groups in the West in line with their Middle East policies, forced Turkey and Iran to set divergences aside and to cooperate on security issues. The recent visits paid by President Erdoğan and the two generals are required to be evaluated as steps taken in this respect.

While lately Turkey and Iran have been impelled to cooperate in the face of a common threat, security relations between the two countries have a problematic history. Although there has been no war for hundreds of years that redefined borders between the two countries, the relations between Turkey and Iran have long been strained. One of the main reasons for this tension is because Ankara and Tehran have accused each other of abetting terrorism: while on some occasions Turkey accused the Tehran administration of supporting the PKK, Iran on the other hand accused Ankara of siding with terrorist groups that pose a threat to Iran, for instance the People’s Mojahedin Organization.

Although Iran has had to fight against the PJAK, an offshoot of the PKK within its domestic boundaries, Tehran has been driven to adopt wrong policies with regard to its fight against terrorism, as it has occasionally regarded Turkey as a bigger threat than the PKK and PJAK.

More, Iran also followed policies that were interpreted as a support to the PKK by Turkey and abstained from siding with Ankara in its fight against the terrorist organization.

This stance is the mere outcome of not comprehending the fact that cooperating with Turkey, an important regional power in the Middle East, is key to becoming a global actor for Iran. Embarking on a power struggle with Ankara will only divert Tehran from this objective.

As the power struggle between two countries with regard to Syria and Iraq led to the consolidation of the PKK, which threatens both countries’ territorial integrity, they have been obliged to look for new ways of cooperation. Time will illustrate as to whether Ankara and Tehran will set aside their centuries-old lack of trust and manage to ensure a close alliance. The two parties do not need to experience a catastrophe similar to the World War II in order to lean towards a cooperation that is reminiscent of the France-Germany partnership. The turmoil caused by the Syrian and Iraqi civil wars and the growing threat of the PKK, PYD and PJAK as a consequence of the wars must be a sufficient reason for this cooperation.

The influence of the U.S. and Europe on Turkey-Iran relations

It must be underlined that the U.S. and other Western countries are very clear in their approach to Turkey-Iran relations. To sum up their approach, Washington and European capitals are not willing to leave the relations to their natural course by any means.

These countries regard the formation of any cooperation between Turkey and Iran that will establish an order in the Middle East as a massive threat against their interests and utilize every effort to hinder this.

Their efforts to prevent Turkey-Iran relations have succeeded on multiple occasions, and the pressure applied on Ankara in this respect has caused Turkey to step back. While there have been numerous impediments to the improvement of relations between Turkey and Iran stemming from both sides, the negative attitude of the West towards this bilateral relation has posed the greatest obstacle to the establishment of a healthy relation between the two countries.

As international relations necessitate states to follow developments that pose a potential threat to their own interests, and to take action when necessary to eliminate such threats without giving them a chance to grow, the U.S. and European countries who are influential within the international arena strictly follow the Middle East in order to prevent any developments that might threaten their interests. Within this scope, the primary subject they attach importance to is the prevention of any close cooperation between regional actors in the Middle East, which would encompass economic, political or security-related issues. This is a delicate issue for especially the U.S. and Europe since the regional forces in question can be said to have somehow problematic relations with the West.

Thus, viewed through the lens of the West, a possible cooperation between Turkey and Iran would have a different meaning from cooperation between Saudi Arabia and Israel or Egypt. Close cooperation between Ankara and Tehran unsettles Washington and European capitals to a great extent since both capitals have turbulent relations with the West. The indications of this disturbance have been visible especially in the “axis shift” rhetoric, which has been employed in several instances, including the times during President Turgut Özal’s efforts to establish an Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO) with Iran and Pakistan as an extension of his multidimensional foreign policy. More, this rhetoric was adopted during late Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan’s initiative to found the D-8 (Developing-8) and to sign a comprehensive natural gas agreement with Tehran. A final example of the utilization of this rhetoric was during the years 2009-2010 when relations between the Justice and Development Party (AK Party) and Tehran were at their peak in terms of economic, politics and security-related issues.

One of the greatest impediments to the improvement of relations between Ankara and Tehran was the U.S. crackdown on Turkey at times she tried to contravene Washington’s policy of isolating Iran. Relying heavily on foreign sources to meet its energy need, Turkey signed an agreement in 1996 to annually purchase 10 billion cubic meters of natural gas from Iran with an aim to decrease its dependence on Russia. Upon this move, U.S. and Europe-based media outlets alleged that this agreement was a step to develop close ties with Iran, while the Washington administration listed BOTAŞ Petroleum Pipeline Corporation, Turkey’s state-owned energy company, among the companies subject to sanctions. Organizing relations with Iran on a rational basis, focused on economic cooperation and free of ideological and western influences during the AK Party period also heavily frustrated Washington.

Turkey’s reluctance to restrict economic relations with Tehran and desire to solve the nuclear program issue through diplomatic means intimidated the Obama administration, which has imposed heavy economic sanctions in order to end Iran’s nuclear program and attempted to subjugate the country with pressure of the Israeli lobby.

As a result, sanctions that would cover a number of Turkish companies and Turkish state-owned Halkbank came to the fore, while Ankara was compelled to keep pace with one-sided sanctions imposed by the U.S. on Iran. With the effect of this pressure, the trade volume between Turkey and Iran decreased below $10 billion respectively in 2015 and 2016. Today, it is crucial for both countries to resist the pressures of global actors in order to ensure that Turkey-Iran relations can flourish on a healthy ground.

While the Iraqi central administration and other regional and international actors have spoken out against the Kurdish independence referendum that was held on September 25 in KRG-controlled areas, different institutions within Iraq have diverged on their mutual stance on this issue.

On Wednesday an Iraqi court issued an arrest warrant for the head and members of the election commission responsible for the independence referendum.

Spokesperson for the High Judicial Council, Abdulstar Bayraqdar stated that “The Rusafa Investigation Court has issued an arrest warrant for the head and members of the commission who supervised the referendum in the Kurdistan region.”

He said that the warrant was issued after the National Security Council “filed a lawsuit arguing that the referendum was contrary to the decision of the High Federal Court.”

While an arrest warrant has been issued for the head and members of the election commission, Iraq’s Federal Court rejected a parliamentary request to rule on whether or not the participation of Iraqi Kurdish MPs in the poll violated the Constitution.

The Court issued a statement underlining that “The court is not competent to deliver a verdict – or give an advisory opinion – in this regard.”

“We have therefore dismissed the request [by parliament] as the issue remains outside our jurisdiction.”

Baghdad insists on the cancellation of the referendum

Following the independence referendum, while the Baghdad administration have emphasized they will not negotiate with Erbil unless the referendum vote is cancelled, the Kurdistan Regional Government administration insist they are ready for dialogue with Baghdad “without any preconditions.”

In a statement published by the KRG’s official website, the Kurdish administration also said that the sanctions imposed by the Iraqi central government in retaliation to the referendum were “unconstitutional” and that exacerbating tensions would benefit nobody.

After the referendum Baghdad banned all international flights to KRG-controlled areas and closed all foreign diplomatic missions based in the region

Barzani continues to seek the independence bid he initiated with nationalist and emotional arguments seemingly without any international support, at least on paper. Being one of the actors that has influence over Northern Iraq, the US, initially objecting to the referendum by underlining the timing, demanded it to be cancelled for the preservation of Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iran opposes the division of Iraq, which is already under its zone of influence, is against establishing new relations with northern Iraq and is against the newly formed state becoming an operations center for Israel. Turkey on the other hand is concerned that the post-referendum power-vacuum and instability will both strengthen the PKK and also harm its border security. While the independence initiative has been objected by various states from Europe to the Arab world for different reasons, it received the most open support from Israel.

While Israel backed the independence with both emotional and geopolitical discourses, Northern Iraq’s gratitude to Israel was also note-worthy. Prime Minister Netanyahu stated that he was in favor of the independence of Iraqi Kurds, whom he defined as “Western-oriented, brave and sharing common values.” Later, Ayelet Shaked, deputy of the settlement lobby’s representative Habayit Hayehudi Party and also the acting Minister of Justice expressed that Kurdish independence would be in the interest of Israel. Many articles written by experts in Israel also claimed that independence would benefit Israel.

History of the relations between Iraqi Kurds and Israel

The relations between Iraqi Kurds and Israel is not a new phenomenon. This relationship has both emotional and geopolitical dimensions to it – two factors which have been intertwined in most recent debates surrounding the Kurdish independence vote. Although kept undercover, relations between Israel and Iraqi Kurds go back to the mid-1960s. For years Israel supported Iraqi Kurds against the Saddam Hussein regime by providing military and financial aid. Due to the threat it perceived from Iraq, by utilizing the concept of a common enemy, Israel created a proxy out of northern Iraqi Kurds. While northern Iraq became its intelligence hub, Israel used both its own agents and Iraqi Kurds, who were able to infiltrate Iraq easier, as the main actors of its intelligence activities against Iraq. Before 1979 Israel supported Iraqi Kurds with their joint operations with Iran – namely, until the period up to the Iranian Revolution, an alliance was created between Israel, Iran and the Iraqi Kurds against the Saddam regime. After 1979, however, Israel used Iraqi Kurds as a means of intelligence against Iran. Being close to Iran and maintaining good contact with Iraqi Kurds in general, the northern Iraqi Kurds provided to be a useful partner for Israel against Iran. In other words, directing intelligence operations against Iran and Iraq from northern Iraq, Israel maintained a unique relationship with Kurds for a long period.

Israel’s “Peripheral Doctrine”

The alliance with Iraqi Kurds was actually a part of Ben Gurion’s “Peripheral Doctrine” – which amounted to one of Israel’s most fundamental foreign and strategic policies. Iraqi Kurds were one of the smaller yet prominent partners of this doctrine. As a result of alliances formed with non-Arab groups against common enemies, Israel maintained a close relationship with Kurds, Turkey, Iran and Ethiopia during different periods of time. Maintaining deep relations for a long time with Iran against the Saddam threat, Israel also preserved close military and intelligence relations with Turkey against a perceived common-enemy threat in the Middle East. Reaching its climax during the February 28 Process in 1997, this strategy brought Kurds and Israel closer around the common hostility towards the Saddam regime.

Currently, the idea that an independent “Kurdish state” would prove to be a useful buffer zone and base of operations against Iran is a crucial factor constituting Israel’s support for the independence bid. More precisely, it is observed that independence will institutionalize and guarantee the future of relations between northern Iraq and Israel. However, this thought is problematic due to the fact that Iran maintains a great amount of influence over northern Iraq and will continue to remain one of the most effective actors even in the case of a so-called independence.

This is because neither northern Iraq, Iraq nor Iran maintain the same conditions they did in the 1960s. In contrast to the Saddam era, Iraq and Syria have now become a proxy of Iran, which has allowed the later to expand as far as becoming neighbors with Israel. If the Iran-backed Syrian regime capture Deir ez-Zor, this will enable the rendering of the Tehran-Beirut line by the Iranian supported Shiite militia. In addition, due to the political divisions in the North, Iran has increased its political influence in Iraq. The Goran Movement and the PUK are in a strategic cooperation with Iran and for this reason Israel’s expected intelligence services will be more challenging than expected. Nevertheless, northern Iraq has the ability to provide Israel with geographic, social and political advantages over Iran that no other actor in the region will or is willing to provide. .

The emotional argument “a stateless people having a state” is inspired from the relation between the Jewish people and Israel. Yet this sensuality alone is not enough to explain the harmony between the Kurds and Israel as Israel has a stateless population right beside itself (Palestinians) to whom it denies independence. Besides their Western-oriented appearance, the usefulness of the Kurds (against Iraq and Iran) renders them reputable for Israel. In particular, increasing media attention in the west for the Kurdish fight against Daesh, and once again through the media, being perceived as a secular society increased the positive acceptance of Kurds within the Israeli public. Within its regional strategy, having been the least problematic actor of all that Tel Aviv has worked with is also related to the positive Israeli public perception of Iraqi Kurds. In particular, there is an emphasis on the maintenance of positive relations with Iraqi Kurds even during times when Israel’s relations with Turkey and Iran were tense.

Leaving emotional statements aside, Israel intends to transform northern Iraq into a base of operations against Iran and in particular against Iranian expansionism in the region. Israel’s greatest challenge in this undertaking will be Iran’s increasing influence in the region. Even if Israel does not reach its ultimate objective, any conflict to emerge between northern Iraqi Kurds and its neighbors will provide Israel with new operation opportunities, as did the post-occupation environment in Iraq.

Following the Kurdish independence referendum which took place on September 25, where residents in KRG-controlled areas were asked whether they wanted to separate from Baghdad, tensions have escalated between Erbil and the central Iraqi administration.

While the results of the referendum have been announced as 93 percent in favor, the Iraqi administration have repeatedly underlined that they do not recognize the result as it is an infringement on the Iraqi Constitution.

In addition to the central Iraqi administration, Turkey, Iran and the US have openly opposed the referendum, calling for the territorial integrity of Iraq.

In most recent developments, Prime Minister al-Abadi emphasized that “The central government is solely authorized to provide security in disputed areas [of Iraq].”

While according to Iraq’s 2005 Constitution, Kurdish Peshmerga forces are answerable to the central government in Baghdad, on the ground they take their orders from the Kurdistan Regional Government.

In regards to this, Al-Abadi said “I urge Peshmerga forces deployed in these areas to refrain from fighting federal government forces.”

Gold and oil: economic limits on the KRG

Increasing political and economic sanctions on the KRG following the independence vote, on Tuesday Iraqi authorities banned the import of gold and other precious metals through airports in the northern region.

Iraq Planning Ministry spokesman Abdul Zohra al-Hendawi stated that “The ministry’s economic committee has decided that, from now on, only Iraq’s Baghdad and Najaf airports will be used for the import of gold and other precious metals.”

He added that the decision was made in order to prevent the “illegal import” of gold into the country.

In addition, Turkey’s government is considering the decision they will take on whether to continue the KRG’s oil transfer through Turkey.

Speaking at the 8^th Turkey Energy Summit, Energy Ministry Undersecretary Fatih Donmez stated that while no decision has yet been made, the issue is currently on the agenda and is being examined.

He asserted that “We will decide on our stance based on instructions from the [Turkish] government. As of today, there is no decision yet, although this does not mean that there will not be one.”

Oil is a main asset of the KRG, and the regional government has enjoyed close ties with Ankara by using a pipeline stretching from northern Iraq to the Turkish Mediterranean port of Ceyhan in order to export oil.

However, following the independence referendum relations between Turkey and the KRG have deteriorated.

Similar to Iraq, 95% of whose economy depends on oil revenue, the Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) economy is also heavily dependent on oil. Following Saudi Arabia, Iraq is the second largest crude oil producer of OPEC and the fifth country in terms of oil reserves. Important for the global energy markets, southern Iraq, which is oil-rich, is mostly controlled by the central government in Baghdad, while most of the oil reserves in the north are managed by the KRG. KRG officials claim that there is an oil reserve around 45 billion barrels in the region, including reserves of disputed regions like Kirkuk. In the case of independence, the KRG may become one of the top ten OPEC countries with such a reserve. However, it is a matter of concern whether the KRG will be able to maintain independent policies with an economy relying mostly on oil. Rather than being like Norway or Canada, an independent KRG is more likely to become an unstable country like Venezuela or Kuwait.

The KRG produces around 650,000 barrels of oil per day and 85% of this oil (approximately 550,000 barrels) is stored in Ceyhan through the pipeline. After the budget crisis with Baghdad in February 2014, in May the same year, the KRG began to directly export oil through Turkey. The revenue from oil exportation through Turkey allowed the KRG to compensate budgetary cuts and served as a life preserver for the sustainability of the current economic structure. In this respect, the KRG’s oil export to the global markets realized through Turkey continues to be vital for the regional government. Pre-Daesh conditions in which the price of oil was over US$110 per barrel had ensured economic prosperity in the region. However, security threats posed by Daesh, chaos and the declining oil prices along with refugees seeking shelter in the region, triggered an economic crisis that crashed like a tsunami on KRG’s shores.

The KRG’s Current Economic Structure and its Sustainability

Following the Iraqi central government’s initiation of the institutional reconstruction of the state, the KRG adopted a more liberal policy compared to other Middle Eastern states, including the Iraqi central government. By adopting a different foreign policy than the central government, the KRG provided many incentives to international energy corporations. Unlike the central government, the KRG implemented the “Investment Law” in July 2006, which came into effect in 2007, granting incentives to foreigners who wanted to invest in the region.

Treaties signed by the KRG for the survey and production of natural resources with international energy corporations reached a level which could only be achieved by an independent country. The KRG’s relations with international corporations over energy, which could be used as a trump card for independence, were perceived as a threat and risk by the Iraqi central government. While Baghdad implemented centralist policies to prevent a possible secession, Erbil continued to adopt economic and political policies that aimed to render the already autonomous KRG increasingly independent.

One of the most important elements of the dispute between the Iraqi central government and the KRG is natural resources. Debates over Kirkuk which is rich in terms of energy resources are a clear sign of this. As natural resources are an issue that concerns the sovereignty of both Erbil and Baghdad, it complicates reconciliation, making the share of oil a main issue between the two parties. The Iraqi central government seeks to increase centralization and ensure the KRG’s economic dependence in order to prevent a possible secession.

In order to diversify its economic structure which depends on oil revenue, the KRG has made significant investments in tourism. Indeed, Erbil was named the 2014 tourism capital by the Arab Council. Visited by 3 million tourists in 2013 before Daesh attacks, this number has now declined to less than a million. Underscoring stability and security to bolster tourism, the KRG was visited by 1.5 million tourists in 2016.

The KRG’s economy, which is dependent on consumption rather than production and dependent on oil revenues, is inherently unsustainable. The KRG has a consumer society that relies on import and therefore the development of the private sector and diversification of the economy through competition is hard to achieve in such a structure. The KRG’s public sector has a greater role in the economic structure: public expenses constitute over 50% of the KRG’s GDP.

Therefore, lack of national taxation, excessive subsidies provided to the people, the domination of the public sector, minimal private sector and patronage policies along with accusations of corruption indicate that the KRG is a classic example of a rent-seeking state. Even though the KRG is a classic rent-seeking state, its position is weaker in comparison to others; not having direct control over its natural resources and depending on the budget provided by Baghdad is the principal reason for this weakness.

Besides having an unnecessary and ineffective spoils system, there are deficiencies in industrial and agricultural production. Despite having fertile land, agriculture and light industry are also underdeveloped. This situation makes it harder for local producers to compete with exported goods. Heavily dependent on exports, the KRG procures raw materials and manufactured goods from neighboring countries such as Turkey and Iran. Within these circumstances, it was not possible for the KRG to sustain the potential to attract foreign investments – something that was achieved while the regional government was stable and oil prices were high.

Turkey-KRG Economic Relations

Iraq ranked third in Turkey’s exports with US$7.6 billion in 2016 – exportation to Iraq corresponds to 5.4% of Turkey’s total exports. Even though access to official figures is not possible, it is estimated that 70% of this export is realized with the KRG. Despite the objections of the central government, one of the world’s largest oil companies ExxonMobil’s oil agreement with the KRG that also covers disputed territories has caused Turkey to revise its approach towards the KRG. Following suit, many other prominent corporations like Chevron, Total and Gazprom Neft started to sign agreements with the KRG at the cost of risking their investments in other regions of Iraq. The idea that the KRG was to become one of the most prominent oil producers with ExxonMobil had a tremendous impact on this interest.

In the face of these events, Turkey chose to deepen economic relations and improve energy cooperation with the KRG. Having small and medium-sized enterprises within the KRG, Turkey encouraged these enterprises to be more active in the region while also incentivizing the construction of a pipeline, which would supply oil and natural gas to the global markets through Turkey. This increased the KRG’s dependence on Turkey. Thus, the KRG became the most prominent trade partner of Turkey; most of the companies and products being of Turkish origin in the KRG indicates the volume of trade between the two parties.

Having the third most investments in the KRG, Turkey differs from other countries due to the numerous projects it encounters in the region (currently 15). The high number is due to having many construction projects in the KRG. Meanwhile, the top four investors (United Arab Emirates, Lebanon, Turkey and the UK) constitute more than 90% of the investments made to the KRG in the last 10 years. Another important aspect is that Turkey dominates the KRG with approximately 1500 companies out of a total 3,000; UAE, Lebanon, the UK, US and Germany have around 100 companies each active in the region. Beside trade relations, Turkey has an important base in Iraq in terms of construction business.

Considering the impact of foreign trade on relations between Turkey and the KRG, the foreign trade volume with Iraq was lower than US$1 billion in 2003. However, after a decade, it has increased to US$12 billion in 2012. Despite the decline in foreign trade because of security issues and the emergence of Daesh, figures stood around US$9 billion in 2015 and 2016.

Effects of the Independence Referendum and the Future

The Kurdish independence referendum initiated by the KRG took place on September 25, 2017 and was deemed illegitimate by regional and international actors. This process, which may entail political risks and uncertainties in the region will have some possible effects on the global economy. As a result of the geopolitical risks realized by the Iraqi central government’s economic and political sanctions to the KRG and regional powers’ repudiation of the referendum, the price of oil has increased to US$60 per barrel. Therefore, the price of a prominent commodity that is demanded by numerous countries in the global energy market has reached its highest point in the last two years. Affecting global markets through oil prices, it is made clear that the KRG independence referendum has an impact on regional and international actors.

Relying on export and oil revenues, the KRG’s consumer economy causes numerous vulnerabilities. The importance of questioning an economic structure in which 1.5 million people are paid their wages by the government, along with implementing reforms required by the bureaucracy and business world has become much clearer for the KRG after the financial crisis.  Lacking a self-sufficient economic structure and full-fledged institutional order, the KRG will have a hard time in managing its own population and refugees within its territories. Iraq closing KRG’s airspace as its first sanction following the independence referendum, thus resulting in the cancellation of all international flights, poses a threat to travel and tourism industries in the KRG, which consists of 4,000 companies and 7,000 employees.

The KRG’s discourse and actions for independence are not deemed realistic by both regional and international actors, due to the fact that not only does the regional government suffer from a fragile and vulnerable economic structure, its political actors also have different expectations. It would be more realistic for Iraqi Kurds to seek a mechanism that would further regional reconciliation instead of interests of foreign actors, especially in such a time the Middle East needs stability and security. Above all, mending the damaged trust with Turkey and preventing further damage to long-term energy and trade cooperation is vital for the KRG.

Debates continue following the Kurdish independence referendum initiated by the Kurdistan Regional Government in northern Iraq.

On September 25 residents in KRG-controlled areas were asked whether they wanted to separate from Iraq. While results turned to be 93% in favor, the referendum lacks legitimacy due to the lack of international support. More, the referendum is a violation of the Iraqi Constitution.

While sanctions have been imposed on KRG by regional and international actors including Turkey, Iran and the central Iraqi administration, Israel is the only country that has openly welcomed the referendum.

Support from the Israeli government and the Barzani regime’s warmest welcome drew attention. In relation to this, veteran Kurdish politician and former leader of the Kurdistan Socialist Party, Mahmoud Othman, spoke to the Anadolu Agency.

In respect to the Israeli support for the referendum, Othman claimed that “nothing good would come” from Israeli support to the Kurdish cause, emphasizing that Israel simply wanted to “exploit” the Kurdish people.

While there has been literature published regarding the contacts and relations between Israel and the northern Iraqi Kurds, highlighting how Israel maintained Iraqi Kurds as a proxy against Iran, Othman stated that contacts between Israel and Iraqi Kurds first took place in the early 1970s.

Warning that “If Israel supports us, all the Arab states will stand against us,” Othman insisted that “We have nothing to gain [from Israeli support]. We don’t even share any borders with Israel.”

“For this reason,” he added, “I have urged Kurdish officials not to cooperate with Israel.”

Othman also slammed the appearance of Israeli flags during the celebrations that took place after the referendum results had been announced.

Describing the waving of Israeli flags during the rallies as a “mistake,” Othman underlined that “Now some countries of the region are claiming that we [i.e. the KRG] will be a second Israel.”

Baghdad to appropriate northern Iraq’s mobile phone networks

Following the referendum, the central Iraqi administration has retaliated within its own sovereignty, claiming that the referendum is illegitimate as it is a violation of the Constitution.

While the central government has refused to recognize the result and has emphasized that it will not be able to negotiate with the KRG unless they cancel the result, a statement released by the Prime Minister’s office announced plans to assume control of all mobile phone networks in northern Iraq’s Kurdish region.

The statement released by the office of PM Haidar al-Abadi read: “Iraq’s Council of Ministers has decided that all mobile phone networks [in the Kurdish region] should be brought under the control of the federal government.”

In addition to the appropriation of northern Iraq’s mobile phone networks, on Monday Iraq’s Council of Ministers also noted that legal procedures had been taken against all KRG employees involved in holding last month’s illegal poll.

On September 25 Iraqis residing in KRG-controlled areas in northern Iraq voted on whether to declare independence from Iraq.

While the referendum result was announced as 93% in favor, the international community criticized the Kurdistan Regional Government for holding the referendum. Only Israel has openly supported the initiative.

Following the referendum and following the death of former President Jalal Talabani, President of the KRG, Masoud Barzani called for dialogue between Baghdad and Erbil in order to solve issues with the central government.

“We will work to solve problems and differences with Baghdad through dialogue,” Barzani told reporters after he laid a blanket of flowers on the tomb of the former Iraqi President.

“We hope that Talabani’s death will be a chance for rapprochement between all political parties in the Kurdish region,” Barzani said.

Deal ‘non-binding’

Following calls from the KRG, on Saturday Barzani met with Allawi and al-Nujaifi in Sulaimaniyah for talks aimed at easing tension between the two administrations.

According to a statement released from Barzani’s office, the three leaders agreed on starting dialogue between Erbil and Baghdad in order to “calm the tense atmosphere” following the independence referendum.

The three also supposedly agreed on carrying out talks with an open agenda, agreed on lifting sanctions on Erbil and launching meetings between the two administrations as soon as possible.

While Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi called for the KRG to cancel the illegitimate referendum results, claiming that this is the only way talks between Baghdad and Erbil will begin, on Sunday the Iraqi Parliament also decided that an agreement reached between Barzani and Vice-President Ayad Allawi and Osama al-Nujaifi were not binding.

Saad al-Hadithi, a spokesman for the Prime Minister’s Office said in a statement that “the Iraqi administration will not recognize anything violating our Constitution and the attitude of the central government has not changed.”

The Kurdish independence referendum, initiated by Masoud Barzani in northern Iraq, has occupied the political agenda for a long while.

On September 25 Iraqis in the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) controlled areas were asked whether they wanted to declare independence from Iraq.

While the result of the referendum has been announced to be 93% in favour of independence, the international community, including the UN, US, Turkey and Iran refuse to accept the result.

Deeming the referendum as illegitimate, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu has once again claimed that it is not too late for the KRG to resolve the issue.

He insisted that the KRG should take necessary initiatives in order to cancel the result of the referendum “within the given time.”

He added: “If necessary steps are taken within that time, then ok, but if not, then the demands and steps [made by] the Iraqi administration will be an important criteria for us.”

While the referendum in northern Iraq has received worldwide criticism, Turkey’s presidential spokesman Ibrahim Kalin confirmed that Turkey’s objection was to the illegitimate referendum held by the KRG “not against the Kurdish people.”

During a live television interview, Kalin was also asked about President Erdogan’s visit to Iran.

Kalin confirmed that “We are on the same page with Iran on that issue [KRG referendum]. Protecting Iraq’s territorial integrity is not a thing that Turkey and Iran agree on. Practically the whole world thinks the same.”

Speaking at a joint news conference with his Iranian counterpart Hassan Rouhani in Tehran, Erdogan said: “What is the referendum organized by northern Iraq’s regional administration for? No country in the world apart from Israel recognizes it.”

Colonialist ambitions in the Middle East

In further comments regarding the independence referendum, President Erdogan said on Thursday that global colonialist groups were deploying the “divide and rule” strategy in the region.

During a meeting in Ankara the President said: “Our ancient geography has been going through a tough, painful and unsteady period in which the cards are being reshuffled and the maps are being reshaped.”

“Exactly like the past century, the motto for this century is ‘divide and rule.’ This strategy has been implemented successfully by global colonialist groups for many years.”

Further, he claimed that the purpose of this strategy was to divide Syria and Iraq along ethnic and sectarian lines in order to surround the south of Turkey.

In reference to the September 25 referendum, the President said: “Nothing has finished, everything has just started.”

Adding that an air embargo has been imposed on the Kurdish region, Erdogan stated that: “You have Iran on one side, Turkey in the north, Iraqi government in the south and Syria in the west. What will you do? Where will you go? How will you get out?”

“Who is giving advice to you? You have only Israel backing you. You put the former French foreign minister on your right and a Jewish Zionist on your left, and are working together on a table. They are not your friends… They are with you today and will disappear tomorrow.”

Source: AA and other agencies

The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 and the developments in its aftermath led Turkey to develop different policies towards Baghdad and Erbil. This change was caused by the drafted constitution that was prepared by the Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) and transferred to the Iraqi Interim Government Council following the fall of Saddam Hussein. The draft, which was approved by the Council on March 8, 2004, formed the basis of the Iraqi Constitution and paved the way for the country’s federal system composed of two parliaments. In the light of the provisional Constitution, the Iraqi federal legislative elections and the Kurdish regional elections were simultaneously held on January 30, 2005 while the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) gained de facto autonomy. With the January 30 elections, Jalal Talabani, one of the two prominent Kurdish figures in northern Iraq, was elected the President of Iraq, while his opponent Masoud Barzani consolidated his political position by being elected the KRG President. The Iraqi Constitution was ratified on October 15, 2005 with a referendum and recognized the KRG as a regional actor. On October 24, 2005, Masoud Barzani was welcomed as the “KRG President” by then U.S. President George W. Bush at the White House one day before the official results of the constitutional polls were announced.

Although Iraq’s Constitution of 2005 puts emphasis on an “Iraqi” identity, it was built upon a sociology based on ethnicity and sect, which impeded the Constitution to offer an integrative approach. As viewed through the lens of the KRG, the only explanation of rationalizing this volatile coexistence presented by a non-integrative constitution might be a bond of voluntariness that could be abused when the time comes. This is the reason why the Iraqi Constitution gained around 80 percent support from KRG-controlled areas during the polls on October 15, 2005. The notion of region expressed in the fifth section of the Iraqi Constitution is the greatest problem ahead of a unitary Iraq, while also constituting a national security threat to Turkey as well. For Turkey, the two main controversial aspects in the new Iraqi Constitution are the future of the KRG and the status of Kirkuk province.

The Iraqi Kurds belonging to the Barzani tribe have displayed pragmatic responses to all kinds of local, regional and global developments as of 1918 following the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. As the opportunist and occasionally violent approaches of the group posed military and political threats on a local level to the answering authorities in terms of autonomy and independence, they aimed to increase the capacity of their activities in the region with the reactions they showed to various developments.

These developments can be listed as follows:

• The Treaty of Sèvres, which Turkey did not accede to in 1922
• The British Mandate during World War II in 1943
• Soviet invasion in 1946
• The coup attempt in Iraq in 1958
• The Baath coup in 1963
• The tension between Iraq and Iran-U.S. alliance between 1970 and 1974
• The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 1990
• The U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003

The 2003 invasion and its aftermath led pro-Kurdish politics, which flourished in 1945 in the domination of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP), to evolve into a regional threat. Meanwhile, the Daesh incursion of Mosul in 2014 laid the conditions which provided the KRG with an opportunity to move from autonomy to independence. However, the claims of independence were not prevalent in the entire KRG, as they were only revolving around the KDP and its leader Masoud Barzani. Independence assertions within the Goran movement and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) have not been as strong as in the KDP. KDP circles were concerned when Daesh was defeated by the Iraqi army and the Iran-backed People’s Mobilization Forces (al-Hashd al-Sha’abi) in Mosul in 2017 as the territories were taken back by the central government of Iraq. The KDP rationalized its independence argument through the central authority’s re-establishment in areas near the KRG borders, the disturbance caused by the increasing influence of Iran in the region and the good relations developed with Turkey. Therefore, the planned independence referendum became increasingly important in terms of consolidating Kurdish presence in the disputed territories and in terms of institutionalizing Masoud Barzani’s political power.

What should Turkey’s diplomatic, economic and military measures be?

Since the First World War, Turkey has not gained any benefit from the conflicts in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria. Contrarily, the country exerted utmost efforts to resolve the problems through diplomatic means without being a party to the conflicts. Turkey generally has only taken active roles in such conflicts when the course of events directly threatened the country’s national security. Turkey’s preventive military operations against the outlawed PKK in northern Iraq, Daesh and People’s Protection Units (YPG) in northern Syria were launched as part of this strategy. It is clear that the KRG’s independence vote poses a national security threat to Turkey. When Turkey’s relations with the KRG and the central government of Iraq are considered, it can be expected that the country’s response to a possible independence will entail a list of measures in diplomatic, economic and military terms.

At the Turkish National Security Council (MGK) meeting held on September 22, a number of recommendations were given to the government to implement a list of sanctions in line with regional relations and national security threats. With the rights arising from the 1926 Treaty of Ankara, Turkey is expected to exercise pressure on the Iraqi central government and the KRG. Minimizing the activities of the Turkish Consulate General in Erbil and reducing the diplomatic relations with the KRG to minimum can also be expected. In addition, Turkey might exert pressure on the central government to conduct legislative regulations and take physical measures that would obviate the KRG’s assertive rights in the disputed territories, including Kirkuk.

The economic sanctions Turkey will possibly impose on the KRG include suspending activities at the Habur border gate, stopping shipping at the Kirkuk-Ceyhan Oil Pipeline, restricting Turkey-based investments in the region, limiting the commercial activities between the KRG and Turkey, suspending the energy projects, and withdrawing grants and credit support given to the region.

The military measures Turkey will take started to become evident before the MGK meeting. The Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) could turn the military drill it kicked off and expanded in Silopi into an operational assignment depending on a possible conflict in the KRG. Within this scope, the military operation the TSK has launched in coordination with the Iraqi army in Sinjar, located near the Syria-Iraq border, will enable the TSK to engage with the PKK in the region while also enabling the Iraqi army to handle KDP units. This would help to divert the KDP Peshmerga away from disputed territories in the north and east of Mosul. The TSK can be expected to have a direct engagement with the PKK and indirect interventions on the KRG by means of large-scale air raids and special operations it will launch on the PKK camps located in northern Iraq.

Also, Turkish combat troops might be deployed to Kirkuk in the framework of a protocol that is to be held with the central government of Iraq in order to ensure the security of the Turkmens in the province. Extensive special air operations are estimated to be conducted in coordination with Iran against the PKK camps in Khakurk and Qandil regions, which are located within the domain of the KRG. There is also a possibility that Iran could launch a counter-operation to the KDP units deployed near the Iran-Iraq border.

None of Turkey’s military options suggest a direct intervention in KRG units. The engagement conditions will arise against the KRG Peshmerga forces only in case of a direct attack against the TSK forces. Military clashes are most likely to be seen among the Iraqi Army and the KDP Peshmerga, al-Hashd al-Sha’abi and the KDP, Iran and the KDP, and between the PKK and TSK, while additional clashes might occur between the KDP and the PUK, the KDP and the Iraqi Turkmen Front, the PKK and al-Hashd al-Sha’abi, and the PKK and the Iraqi army.

Who will benefit from the referendum?

Turkey does not wish to jeopardize its amicable relations with the KDP due to the pragmatic approaches of Barzani and his proponents as such a situation is likely to reduce Turkey’s influence in the KRG. However, it is also seen that the KRG’s independence process overtly threatens Turkey’s national security due to the risks it entails – even the debates on the referendum caused quite a stir and led Turkey to revise its current strategy towards the KRG. The process kicked off with the KRG’s independence venture, presenting two main arguments for Turkey to boost its efficiency in Iraq: new and manageable regional alliances and direct military engagement with the non-state actors.

Even triple alliances might be built in this respect while Turkey-Iraq and Turkey-Iran alliances are anticipated. This reflects the fact that the current situation in the KRG can be regarded as a common threat. Turkey’s arguments concerning non-state actors take shape in consideration of the PKK, leading the Iraqi central government to take direct measures against this terrorist organization. In this way, Iran will see that its own security would also be threatened unless it adopts any direct stance against the PKK.

It must be clarified that the PKK will gain the upper hand if the alliances are not well-managed, and this would certainly neither favor the KRG nor the other regional countries. The most important result of this process is probably the signs indicating that the status of Kirkuk will be determined soon. Within this scope, Turkey’s military, diplomatic, economic and cultural presence in the region might provide a chance for Turkey to meet the expectations of the Turkmens in the region while it will also deepen Turkey’s domain in the crisis points of Iraq.

Following the independence referendum that took place on September 25 in KRG-held areas, relations between the Erbil and Baghdad administrations have reached their ever-lowest point.

While receiving no international support, except from Israel, according to the results announced by the KRG, almost 93 percent of registered voters cast ballots in favor of independence.

Following the referendum many diplomatic, economic and military measures have been taken by Baghdad, Ankara and Tehran.

Earlier this week Iraq’s Prime Minister Haidar Al-Abadi warned the KRG against mobilizing their armed Peshmerga forces in the disputed northern province of Kirkuk.

Al-Abadi said: “I warn of the actions of the region’s military mobilization in Kirkuk, it is dangerous… The imposition of a status quo by force over the disputed areas is unacceptable.”

More, Al-Abadi called for a joint administration between the Iraqi government and the KRG over the disputed areas in Kirkuk under the leadership of the federal government in Baghdad, without giving further details on how this would work.

In addition to Al-Abadi’s comments and suggestions, on Tuesday the Iraqi Parliament adopted a bill that would force Baghdad to halt all financial transactions with the KRG.

The bill – which is now legally binding – was submitted by the Parliament’s financial committee.

While a large number of Iraqi-Kurdish lawmakers failed to attend the parliamentary session, the legislation was approved by a majority of assembly members.

Another decision the Parliament made concerns the Iraqi Kurdish MPs that voted in the illegitimate referendum.

During a press conference, Parliamentary Speaker Salim al-Jabouri requested the assembly’s legal committee to reveal the names of all Iraqi Kurdish MPs who cast ballots in the referendum.

According to al-Jabouri, lawmakers who took part in the illegitimate referendum will be referred to Iraq’s Federal Court, which will initiate legal proceedings against them if they were found to have violated Iraq’s constitution by casting ballots.

Al-Jabouri stated that “The Iraqi state is undergoing the greatest crisis in its history, which threatens the country’s unity and social fabric. Parliament is obliged to adhere to the Constitution and decisions issued [on the referendum].”

In reference to the crisis that is occurring in Iraq and emphasizing the importance of Iraq’s territorial integrity, Jordan’s King Abdullah II reaffirmed his country’s support for Iraq’s security, stability, territorial integrity and the cohesion of its people.

According to a statement issued by Jordan’s Royal Court, during a phone call with Haider Al-Abadi Abdullah stressed Jordan’s full support for the Iraqi government’s efforts in counterterrorism and launching a political process aimed at including all components of the Iraqi people, with a view to contributing to a secure, stable and unified Iraq.

Not too late for KRG to normalize relations

In echoing comments made by the governments of Turkey, Iran, U.S., and many western Europe states, Turkish opposition MHP leader Devlet Bahceli emphasized the importance of the territorial integrity of Iraq for the security of the wider region.

Claiming that the territorial integrity of Iraq is “indispensable for Turkey,” Bahceli called for the KRG President to give up his “ambition for independence.”

Post-referendum Iraq also maintained its place on the agenda of the President, as Recep Tayyip Erdogan stated that “Any incident taking place in Syria and Iraq is not independent from us, they are linked directly to our domestic affairs.”

Insisting that the referendum has done nothing but harmed KRG relations with the region and increased the likelihood of safe-zones for terrorist organizations including the PKK, YPG and Daesh, Erdogan emphasized that “The referendum crisis in northern Iraq is a new attempt to strike he heart of our region with a dagger.”

He once again criticized the KRG administration and stated that “we hope the northern Iraq administration comes to its senses soon.”

Calls for negotiations between Baghdad and Erbil have been raised from different countries across the region, and within this concern, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu claimed that it is “not too late” for the KRG to “step back.”

Re-instating that the referendum was “neither democratic, nor legal,” Cavusoglu expressed confidence in return to normal relations with the KRG if they correct the “mistake” they made.

The Minister stated, “It is not too late yet. The Barzani administration could take a step back. If the KRG corrects its mistake, then we can continue with our relations just as we did before the referendum took place.”

The Iraqi Kurdistan independence referendum, which was held upon the insistence of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Masoud Barzani despite all the objections of local, regional and international actors, poses numerous risks that could drift the entire region into a state of chaos. The rising tension in Kirkuk after the Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim declared the referendum and the subsequent developments have shown how the decision to hold a referendum could drag Iraq and the region into further instability.

Tensions between the Erbil and Baghdad administrations, which have reached their peak due to the referendum decision, have also reverberated into relations between the Peshmerga forces and the Iraqi army. Peshmerga forces were not included in the anti-Daesh operations launched in Hawija, a southern district of Kirkuk. In the midst of this strained atmosphere, only a week before the referendum, a conflict broke out between the Turkmens and Kurdish groups in Kirkuk, illustrating that the tension looming over the city might culminate into a major scale conflict at any moment. In addition, the fact that the Iraqi Turkmen Front, a significant actor in the city, announced that they would not recognize the referendum, revealed that the tension between Turkmens and Kurds would not simmer down after the referendum.

As Erbil increasingly insisted on the referendum, the Baghdad administration did not hesitate in responding with hostile measures. The Iraqi Parliament discharged the Kirkuk governor from duty and vested the Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi with all kinds of authorities in order to protect the territorial integrity of Iraq by referring to his title of “Commander-in-Chief.” Vested with this authority, Abadi displayed that they would harshly respond to the KRG’s steps toward independence by stating a day before the referendum that the referendum is null and void. On the day of the referendum, the Iraqi Parliament assigned the Abadi government to send troops to Kirkuk. These developments highlighted that the decision-makers in Baghdad and the Abadi government have taken a determined stance concerning the referendum and the disputed territories in a coordinated and synchronized way. All these factors indicate that the disputed territories, which include Kirkuk, constitute the focal point of the referendum crisis.

The KRG administration insists on seizing control over the disputed territories by affording all the risks of conflict mainly due to the natural resources in those areas. According to the figures provided by the International Energy Agency, the overall oil reserves in the KRG region correspond to 4 billion barrels, while the inclusion of the disputed territories to the KRG will increase this amount to 45 billion barrels. Given that oil forms a large part of the KRG’s total revenues, Kirkuk’s importance for Erbil can be seen more clearly.

Another reason for the KRG’s expansionist policy in the disputed territories is the ambition to control the lowlands and the areas that are fit for cultivation aside from the highlands where Kurds are densely populated. The KRG regards the valleys that contain water resources and which are fit for cultivation, such as Tel Keppe and Zummar located in the north of Mosul, as strategic targets. Therefore, the KRG estimates that an independent Kurdish state would not be sustainable unless it includes the disputed territories.

Possible conflicts that could arise following the referendum

Following the referendum, conflicts could possibly break out in the disputed territories that strained the relations between the KRG and the Iraqi central administration. The Iraqi Parliament’s instructions to Abadi for intervention indicate that the disputed territories will bear witness to a sovereignty struggle in which the rivals may use force. Article 140 of the Iraqi Constitution rules holding referenda in Kirkuk and other disputed territories to determine which administration the territories will belong to. However, not all disputed territories are clearly specified in the Article. Due to this, the KRG were able to create an actual state and claim sovereignty, seizing control of a line that expands from Mosul in the west of Iraq to Mandali in the east. Before considering the requirements of organizing a referendum in these territories, it must be discussed whether the areas de facto seized by the KRG are within the disputed territories. A scenario in which these discussions cannot be finalized through negotiations might lead to a civil war. The process as of 2003 has clearly illustrated that if and when desired results cannot be obtained through negotiations, this ends in a civil war for Iraq.

A possible conflict between Baghdad and Erbil will undermine the fight against Daesh while creating a more convenient area of crisis for terror groups such as the PKK and its Syrian wing PYD. Conflict between Peshmerga and Iraqi forces may exacerbate the tension among different ethnic and religious groups in the disputed territories. Daesh and similar terror groups are likely to take advantage of such chaos and expand their domains. Besides, the PKK will want to consolidate its presence in Sinjar and make room for itself by benefiting from the crisis. The PYD stated that they would be ready to perform their duty at a possible conflict in Kirkuk, which clearly illustrates that the PKK and the PYD wish to make room for themselves by taking advantage of a possible crisis in Iraq.

The region’s countries are against the referendum

Iraq’s neighbors, including Turkey and Iran, have adopted a strict stance against the referendum as they foresee the heavy costs of managing the potential risks of a possible independence in northern Iraq. In a statement he issued on the day the referendum was held, Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan remarked that the border gate with Iraq is only open for Turkey-bound traffic, adding that some additional measures might be taken regarding the KRG’s oil transfer. In addition, it is clearly seen that Turkey has taken some critical steps in terms of economic and diplomatic sanctions considering the increasing coordination between Tehran, Baghdad and Ankara. In addition, the Turkish military launched drills near the Habur border gate, which is an important passage point between Turkey and northern Iraq, demonstrating that high level security measures have been taken with regard to the issue.

Similarly, Iran also believes that the KRG referendum threatens the stability of the entire region as well as Iraq. Therefore, the country closed its airspace to Erbil and conducted drills near the northern Iraq border ahead of the referendum. Besides, Iran displayed a determination to engage in joint action with Ankara and Baghdad concerning the developments in the KRG by pursuing heavy telephone traffic with these capitals. It was also reported that Iranian General Qasem Soleimani wanted to visit northern Iraq in order to stir negative views regarding Barzani within political circles. This indicates that Iran has also activated its influence in the field against the referendum by adopting diplomatic, economic and military measures.

Iran is also concerned about the possibility that an independent Kurdish state in northern Iraq, with ethnicity-based motives, might threaten Tehran’s control over Iranian Kurds. The country presumes that with the effect of the KRG referendum, the Iranian Kurds might demand expansion of their rights even though they do not ask for independence. An ethnicity-based instability within Iran could threaten the domestic politics of Iran in general, since Iran is a country comprising multiple ethnic groups such as Kurds, Arabs, Turks, Baloch people and various other minorities.

Another possibility that concerns Iran is the division of Iraq into three parts in case Iraqi Sunnis also found an independent state following the declaration of a Kurdish state in northern Iraq. In such a case, the Sunni state can join the anti-Iran league since they have had problems with the Shia ever since the occupation, and this would threaten the corridor Tehran has recently formed that extends through Iraq to as far as Syria and Lebanon.

Iran also estimates that it might lose its current allies if an independent Kurdish state is formed since the country has profound ideological differences with allies of the KRG. When the Iranian administration hosted a delegation of the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Tehran in June, the PUK did not take up any stance against the referendum although the Iranian administration expressed its reservations over it. In addition, Kirkuk governor Najmiddin Karim, who is a PUK member, announced that Kirkuk would also take part in the independence vote. This development showed that Iran, which harshly stands against the referendum, could not alter the opinion of the PUK although the country is known for its close links to the political party.

All in all, given that the PUK has a secular and ethno-nationalist ideology and the public opinion acts as a determinant over the political actors in the KRG, the foundation of a Kurdish state under the leadership of Barzani would undermine Iran’s influence in the KRG.

Finally, Barzani’s amicable relations with the U.S. and Israel escalate Iran’s security concerns. Iran fears that an independent Kurdish state might act as a base for the operations to change the regime in Iran and the KRG might turn into a factor threatening the country.

Due to the clear stance of the Ankara-Tehran-Baghdad triple against the referendum and the fact that other international actors are not supporting Erbil in the current state, it seems that the Erbil administration has taken steps backward in the short term. The fact that KRG officials also emphasize negotiations and positively welcome Ayatollah Sistani’s call for “lowering the tensions and invitation for negotiations” could be interpreted as the willingness to communicate with Baghdad. Considering issues such as sovereignty in disputed areas, the extraction and sale of oil, the status of the Peshmerga within the Iraqi security forces – which are deeply rooted problems – these negotiations can turn into a means of time-gaining between Baghdad and Erbil. Nevertheless, it should not be forgotten that almost all actors in northern Iraq agree on independence and see it as their “right,” so therefore it would be wrong to expect the Erbil administration to completely eliminate the independence process. For this reason, even if negotiations begin between the two parties, it can be concluded that in the long-term the quest for independence in northern Iraq will continue to remain as an element of tension in the region.

There is great joy in Erbil, celebrations and parades on the streets. Iraqi Kurds are exhilarated; they feel like they are progressing towards independence after the September 25 referendum. I was in Erbil right after the referendum and these were my first impressions. However, when I started to talk with people on the street and visit cities like Kirkuk and Sulaymaniyah a couple of days after the referendum, I observed that this mood was shifting. Exhilaration is replaced by unease. Threats of sanctions combined with sharp remarks by Ankara, Tehran and Baghdad along with attacks and escalated tensions in Kirkuk are making people think about what kind of an adventure they have embarked. Everyone is talking about where this is going; the fear of losing all that is achieved could be felt in the air. All people, from the person on the street to politicians, believe that Western countries and Israel will protect them. They aren’t afraid of expressing this openly; however, the look in their eyes, the anxiety indicates that this belief isn’t strong.

Ultimately, the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) led by Masoud Barzani and KDP was able to hold the referendum on September 25 in regions including the disputed areas. The timing along with the realization of the referendum despite all regional and international objections raise some questions. The international legitimacy was derived from the balance of domestic politics, consolidating regional authority and Baghdad’s vulnerability combined with fighting against Daesh. Assessing the situation rationally, it seems that opportunities provided by the political conjuncture triggered KRG’s quest for independence. Yet, I’m questioning the existence of other factors that were effective in the referendum process; whether an ecstasy caused by late ethic nationalism and overconfidence or the manipulation of certain international forces, that I don’t know. Nevertheless, they suffered from an eclipse of reason that blinded them to the threats they were to face.

What now?

Even though KRG was prepared for the reactions following the referendum to an extent, it seems that they couldn’t calculate the collective reaction from Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara. They are trying to relieve tensions with Turkey by making some positive remarks regarding the country. Moreover, they are running an international campaign on why KRG’s independence bid must be supported by implying that they play a prominent role against Daesh and have the potential to further Western interest in the region. On the other hand, they are trying to gain the US and EU’s protection by suggesting that Kurds are under a ruthless siege by three countries.

Meanwhile, Erbil is seemingly open to political resolutions and negotiations with Baghdad while refraining from conflict. However, the statements made by Barzani indicate that these negotiations will only be about managing the independence process, which Ibadi has clearly rejected. My observations from the field suggest that Turkey, Iran and Iraq could force KRG to act in a way that doesn’t infringe Iraq’s territorial integrity by creating realpolitik dynamics that could impede their quest for independence, if not completely rendering it irrelevant, through coordinated efforts. The politics of sanction is prominent in this respect; with political, economic and military sanctions, KRG could be forced to negotiate with Baghdad.

Turkey has a number of trump cards in this matter. While establishing correspondence with Iran and Iraq, Turkey should develop a careful strategy that would not allow KRG to fall completely into the area of influence of Tehran-Baghdad. Without severing ties with KDP, Turkey should consolidate its relations with other actors that are critical of the referendum. Turkey should also refrain from seemingly targeting the local populace, keeping the existing sympathy towards Turkey intact. More importantly, however, Turkey should seek opportunities to constrain PKK during this new engagement with Baghdad. Along with searching for a common ground resolution for the Sinjar region, Turkey should break the line between PYD/YPG and KRG, while establishing an alternative border checkpoint to Habur. Moreover, Turkey should persuade Baghdad to protect the rights of Turkmens in Iraq, especially those in Kirkuk.

Following the KRG-initiated Kurdish independence referendum, which took place in KRG-controlled areas in northern Iraq, the U.S. has re-emphasized that it is willing to act as a negotiating power between Erbil and Baghdad.

While criticized by the international community – Turkey, Iran, U.S. and UN were against the referendum – according to the Anadolu Agency, official preliminary results revealed that 93 percent of voters backed the independence.

On Thursday State Department spokeswoman Heather Nauert told reports that “The United States, if asked, would be willing to help facilitate a conversation between the two [Erbil and Baghdad].”

Reiterating that the U.S. would only act as a mediating factor if asked, Nauert added “But I want to be clear about that – if asked. If we were asked to assist in any way.”

Following the outcome of the vote, later on Thursday the Iraqi Foreign Ministry announced that the UN offered to mediate between Iraq’s central government and the KRG.

Following a meeting with the UN Iraq Envoy Jan Kubis, in a statement Iraqi Foreign Minister Ibrahim Jaafari stated that he was told “The UN is ready to help you solve the problem with the KRG. The international community supports the territorial integrity of Iraq.”

The statement added that “Iraq has become the center of attention for the whole world, especially after its victory against the Daesh terrorist organization.”

Jaafari called for the UN to play a more effective role in Iraq and pointed out that all Iraqi provinces contributed to the country’s fight against Daesh, which showed sectarian and ethic unity inside Iraq.

Bringing Turks home

Following the decision announced by the Turkish Consulate in Erbil that flights from Turkey to northern Iraq would be suspended as of Friday, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu said that the government would help citizens to leave the KRG region.

“We will use all means available to help our citizens who want to return to Turkey.”

Cavusoglu reminded that the Turkish government had issued travel warnings for Turkish citizens prior to the referendum.

The Foreign Minister added that “We may send planes with special permission [to evacuate the citizens] in the coming period. The decision [whether to stay or leave] of our citizens is important.”

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) held a referendum for independence on Monday despite the objections of many capitals including Baghdad, Tehran and Ankara. Israel’s overt support for the vote was only one among many other developments that cast a shadow on the referendum.

A considerable part of Iraqi Kurds were among those objecting to the vote, which demonstrated concerns surrounding the possible problems that could arise. The main reason for the concerns is the fear that the quest for independence would bring more conflict, instability and suffering to the Kurds instead of bolstering peace and welfare.

Some Kurds and regional countries with a significant Kurdish population were also apprehensive that the appeasement of Kurds for the sake of independence might render them increasingly dependent on some regional and global actors, causing their manipulation for the global powers’ Middle East policies.

Furthermore, it is feared that having included disputed areas, such as Kirkuk, in the referendum could convert the disagreements between Kurds and other peoples in the region into conflict. Iraq, which has already been ravaged by Daesh terror, could therefore be dragged into another civil war. Such concerns surely reflect the realities of the geography.

Past experiences make it clear that drifting the region into conflict and war brings serious consequences for the peoples and countries of the Middle East. Above all, the region surrenders to the activities of terror groups since conflict and war disrupt the states in the region. It must be noted that the wars experienced in the Middle East have constituted the main determinant that keeps the outlawed PKK active in the region for almost 40 years now. We know that the authority gaps seen in Beqaa following the Lebanese Civil War, in northern Iraq after the 1991 Gulf War and in the north of Syria as a result of the Syrian Civil War created convenient spaces for the PKK to improve and expand. Likewise, it is more than obvious that the terror groups including al-Qaeda and Daesh took advantage of the conflicts in the Middle East.

Another consequence of the conflicts in the Middle East is that they enable global actors to employ pretexts to intervene in the region. Global powers, particularly the U.S. and Russia, become a party to the conflicts in the Middle East in order to consolidate their positions in the region, which is very rich in terms of natural resources. Catastrophes befall the peoples of the region as the conflicts are manipulated for the power struggle between global actors.

Therefore, it can be argued that the referendum will start an excruciating period for all the peoples in the region, especially the Kurds, if it foments large-scale conflicts through the independence schemes of the disputed areas in Iraq. As occurred in all the other conflicts in the region, the global actors will surely take up positions in accordance with their own interests. So, the referendum poses a high risk of causing a long-standing atmosphere of chaos.

When viewed through the lens of Ankara, the extent to which the KRG administration, after a possible independence, will cooperate with Turkey in its fight against the PKK is seriously questioned. This is due to the fact that despite the extensive support of Turkey, the KRG has already failed in this matter so far. Considering that the Barzani administration, which had amicable relations with Turkey is far from satisfying Ankara even in this issue, it is predicted that an independent state of Kurdistan, where political actors have close links to the PKK and where the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) and Goran are influential, could possibly pursue policies that would upset Turkey.

For Turkey, who accomplished a great deal in her fight against the PKK within domestic territory, it is unacceptable for this terrorist group, which seeks to find a de facto state in northern Syria with the support of the U.S., to enhance its influence towards northern Iraq.

As a matter of fact, the Barzani administration has already acquired autonomy to a considerable degree against the unjust impositions of Baghdad and Tehran. The KRG was supposed to prove its sovereignty in its territory through solving the PKK question and this is still true. Barzani and the KRG are required to give the actual fight for independence against the PKK and the actors siding with the terror groups.

The Kurdistan Regional Government’s (KRG) referendum on independence is no great news for an already fractured country and a destabilized region. Independence is an openly stated goal of the Iraqi Kurds who consistently declare it is only a question of when, not if. However, the only outside support for KRG independence is confined to the Israeli promise to recognize a potential Kurdish state. Most stakeholders, including the U.S. and Turkey, oppose the referendum and support Iraq’s territorial integrity. Iraq has monumental challenges ahead including terrorism, reconstruction, refugees and internally displaced persons, and regional proxy wars being fought in its territory. A potential declaration of independence would most likely exacerbate these problems and lead to further destabilization of the country.

Some analysts have argued that Turkey might be open to or even embrace a declaration of independence given its close ties with the KRG. Turkey’s reaction so far has been anything but. A recent RAND Corporation report argues that Turkey might be open to Iraqi Kurdish independence especially if the declaration is not sudden and comes after negotiations with the Baghdad government over the long term. The reality is that the referendum is unlikely to lead to a declaration of independence and the KRG will seek an amicable divorce through talks with Baghdad. The most recent agreement between Erbil and Baghdad to fight against ISIS was supported and brokered by the U.S. In the case of independence, however, there is no such common ground and there does not seem to exist any available U.S. or Turkish patronage.

Iraq is fractured and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Unaddressed grievances in the country will likely exacerbate political instability despite the most recent military defeat of ISIS in Mosul. The most important reason for the emergence of ISIS was the failure of the Iraqi political system that left Sunnis out of the political system. Even in the very unlikely scenario where the KRG successfully negotiates Kurdistan’s exit from Iraq, the lack of Sunni say in the matter will continue to destabilize the country and the broader region. An Iraqi Kurdish exit will also be tested by the struggle over disputed territories and the lack of a political agreement.

Turkey’s economic investments and security interests along with its political relations with the KRG make it a critical actor. However, Turkey-KRG relations are now deeply unsettled by what looks like the KDP leader Barzani’s bid to prevail over his rivals with the promise of an elusive independence. If Turkey had supported the independence referendum, the KRG would have overcome a major hurdle in terms of international legitimacy. However, from Turkey’s perspective, the independence bid is a deeply destabilizing move in an environment where, only a few months ago, ISIS held large swaths of Iraqi territory. Turkey has had close relations with the KRG but multiple statements by Turkish officials against the upcoming referendum illustrate the limits of Turkish support for the KRG. Turkish opposition to the breakup of Iraq is so strong that Turkey might take punitive steps, including imposing sanctions against the KRG.

Turkey’s argument against Iraqi Kurdistan’s independence is based on a variety of considerations. First, yet another chapter in the long Iraqi civil war would bring about another layer of instability to the region and adversely impact Turkish economic and security interests. Second, potential new conflict could open up space in Iraq for the PKK which has already gained ground in Syria due to the prolonged civil war and American support for the PYD. Third, Turkey continues to value its relationship with the rest of Iraq and is particularly invested in the fate of the Turkmen community. Fourth, unintended consequences of the breakup of Iraq promise a whole new set of complications that would threaten Turkey’s border security and might weaken its current influence in northern Iraq.

Turkey has enjoyed strong ties with the KRG leadership but it does not want to be the enabler of a breakup of Iraq. Turkey spent a lot of energy during the tenure of the former Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki to ensure Sunni inclusion in the Iraqi political system. In an environment where the Sunnis have virtually no say in the future of Iraq, Turkey would not want to contribute to their further alienation by midwifing an independent Iraqi Kurdistan. If the referendum leads to a new era of ethnic conflict, Turkey’s security and economic interests would be negatively, potentially empowering the PKK.

In many ways, the independence referendum has placed the horse before the cart, so to speak. There was already a referendum in 2005 with an overwhelming support for independence. Repeating a referendum with predictably similar results only indicates an effort to strengthen Barzani’s hand politically rather than a step in achieving “self-determination.” While the votes are yet to be tallied, Barzani has officially claimed victory in the referendum vote – an expected repeat of the 2005 referendum result. Yet, it is not entirely clear if this result will actually empower the KRG’s hand, as the Baghdad government has already ruled out negotiations labeling the referendum “illegal.”

The KRG President Barzani has called for negotiations with Baghdad for independence, however, the potential punitive measures and political alienation by Turkey and Iran may weaken the KRG’s hand in forcing such negotiations. In fact, Iran has already closed its border shared with northern Iraq and Turkey is mulling whether to close the border. The KRG’s referendum bid was clearly to prop up Barzani’s position against rival Kurdish parties who have been calling for a new presidential election. Having gone forward without the agreement and patronage of two neighboring powers, Iran and Turkey, the KRG has risked political isolation, not to mention potential for conflict.

Ever since the invasion of Iraq by the U.S., Iraq has gone through periods of crises and chaos with short periods of only “relative” calm. It is currently in a highly fragile state and the breakup of the country through the establishment of an independent Iraqi Kurdistan would probably lead to yet another round of conflict in Iraq’s never-ending civil war. In the absence of any international backing and legitimacy, the KRG leaders will need to think long and hard before declaring independence.

While prior to the referendum countries such as US and Turkey made it clear that the independence referendum initiated by the Barzani family-run Kurdistan Regional Government was illegitimate, calls from the international community continue post-referendum.

German Foreign Minister Sigmar Gabriel criticized the KRG for ignoring calls from the international community and for holding a referendum on the region’s future without the agreement of the central Baghdad administration.

In a statement, referring to the ongoing contest between Erbil and Baghdad on contested areas, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk, Gabriel said that “the referendum has no binding effect, particularly with respect to the disputed territories.”

“We are calling on all sides to avoid further escalation and to refrain from unilateral steps towards independence or coercive measures.”

Gabriel called for dialogue between the two Iraqi administrations in order to address and negotiate on existing issues.

Russia joins rejection

In addition to Germany, on Tuesday Russia reiterated its support for the territorial integrity of states in the Middle East.

According to Russia’s official TASS news agency, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov stated that “Russia’s position has not changed: We continue to believe that preserving the territorial and political integrity of states is extremely important for maintaining stability and security in the region.”

Peskov informed that Putin had discussed the recent referendum with Erdogan and Hassan Rouhani by phone on Monday.

Putin and Erdogan will meet on Thursday in Turkey, Ankara, where they are expected to discuss bilateral relations and regional developments.

Arab League discomfort

On Tuesday a statement by the Arab League renewed calls for Iraqis to heal rifts and to engage in dialogue under Arab and international guarantors to resolve contemporary issues.

The League’s Secretary-General Ahmed Abul-Gheit said that “it’s still possible to contain repercussions of this [referendum] if concerned parties acted with wisdom and responsibility.”

Without specifying, he criticized efforts by some to fuel division and conflict in the region.

Abul-Gheit stated that the “interests of the Kurdish people in Iraq will only be achieved within a unified, federal, democratic Iraq based on respect of the Constitution, equality and citizenship.”

While KRG President Barzani has stated that the outcome of the referendum will not result in an automatic declaration of independence but with further negotiations with Baghdad, many have criticized him for risking the stability of the region for his own political safety.

While once a close ally with the Kurdistan Regional Government, the Turkish administration had urged the Kurdish administration to postpone the referendum and sit at a negotiating table with the Baghdad government.

The US has also maintained this position, claiming the independence referendum will harm the fight against terrorism in the Middle East.

Turkish President Erdogan has called the independence referendum as a “betrayal” emphasizing that “You will be left in the middle anyway, from the moment we start implementing sanctions.” “It will be finished when we close a valve. All your income is over.”

The decision to hold the referendum has not only diminished relations with Turkey but also with Iran, that the country has already closed its border with northern Iraq.

Speaking in Ankara, President Erdogan said “the moment that [Turkish] trucks do not work in northern Iraq, they will not be able to find food and clothes.”

He added, “Frankly, we did not give credence until the last moment that Barzani would make a mistake like this.”

“This means that we were wrong. The decision, which was taken without a prior consultation or meeting, is a betrayal to our country in an era where our relations were at their best level in history.”

The President re-iterated comments that he made earlier, claiming that the referendum was unconstitutional and lacked international support.

The only country recognizing and supporting the idea of an independent Kurdistan is Israel. Concerning this, the President asked “Who will accept your independence? Israel? But the world is not constituted only of Israel.”

In regards to Israel being the only country supporting the referendum, Turkish Foreign Minister Mevlut Cavusoglu also stated that “Israel’s support alone will not be enough for the KRG. No one’s support will be enough. No one will side with them the next day.”

In an interview aired live on 24 TV news networks, Cavusoglu re-emphasized that “saying ‘we support Iraq’s territorial integrity’ is not a statement in vain. If Iraq appeals to Turkey with such a request, we will provide support to Iraq for protecting its territorial integrity.”

The Foreign Minister had already warned the KRG administration that if any Turkmen residents in the disputed territories are targeted that the Turkish military will intervene.

In most recent deelopments, Turkey’s General Consulate to Erbil announced on Wednesday that from Friday 29 September onwards, flights to and from Turkey from Erbil and Sulaymaniyah will be paused.

The statement released informed that this matter includes Turkish Airlines, AtlasGlobal and Pegasus – Turkish companies that operate flights from and to northern Iraq.

The maneuver comes as the KRG refused to hand over airports to the Baghdad administration.

The Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) has refrained from stepping back from the decision to hold a referendum on independence, where residents in KRG-controlled provinces are scheduled to vote on breaking from Baghdad on 25 September.

The oil rich province of Kirkuk is also among the contested areas where the vote is planned.

In spite of heightening tensions and calls from the US and Turkey to postpone the referendum, calls from Baghdad for further negotiations, the KRG President Masoud Barzani has not announced any cancellation of the referendum.

The statement provided by the Security Council added that the referendum risks detracting from the fight against Daesh, and that it could also disrupt efforts to ensure the safe return of over three million refugees and internally displaced persons to the country.

Council members “expressed their continuing respect for the sovereignty, territorial integrity and unity of Iraq,” urging all issues between the central Baghdad government and the Erbil administration to be resolved “through structured dialogue and compromise supported by the international community.”

International call for referendum to be cancelled

In addition to President Erdogan and the US President Trump who are both in agreement that the vote should not go ahead, French President Emmanuel Macron also stressed the importance of maintaining Iraq’s territorial integrity.

During a phone call made with Barzani, Macron reportedly asked the KRG President to postpone the controversial referendum.

A statement issued by Barzani’s office stated that the two men discussed the “important role” played by the Kurdish Peshmerga forces in the ongoing fight against Daesh in Iraq.

Barzani nevertheless confirmed to Macron that the referendum would be held on schedule, while also stressing Erbil’s readiness to hold dialogue with Baghdad after the poll.

http://thenewturkey.org/the-kurdish-quest-for-independence-in-iraq-and-its-repercussions-for-turkey-and-the-region/

Turkey to debate military operation in Iraq and Syria

The ongoing developments in Iraq and Syria remain high on the political agenda.

In this regard, according to the Justice and Development (AK) Party’s parliamentary group deputy chairman, the parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Saturday to debate the extension of Turkish military operations in northern Iraq and Syria.

Mustafa Elitas stated that “the general assembly of the Turkish Parliament will hold an extraordinary session on Sept. 23 at 16.00 [4 p.m. local time] to debate the extension of the Prime Ministry’s motion that enables the government to conduct cross-border operations in northern Iraq and Syria.”

The motion had previously allowed the Turkish military to carry out cross-border operations from Oct. 2, 2016 until Oct. 31, 2017.