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urkey’s parliament ratified Sweden’s NATO membership bid on January 23, 2024, overcoming a 20-month delay and eliminating a significant obstacle to expanding the transatlantic military alliance. The vote, with 287 in favor and 55 against, took place in Turkey’s general assembly, where President Tayyip Erdoğan’s ruling alliance holds a majority.

Sweden initially applied for NATO membership in 2022, seeking to enhance its security amid Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The approval process had faced hurdles, with Turkey and Hungary raising objections, particularly concerning the two countries’ protection of groups deemed as terrorists.

While Turkey had previously endorsed Finland’s NATO membership in April of the previous year, the approval for Sweden had been delayed. The Turkish Parliament’s approval was hailed by U.S. Ambassador Jeff Flake, who stated that Turkey’s commitment to NATO demonstrated a lasting partnership.

Hungary is yet to approve Sweden’s bid

Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom welcomed the parliamentary approval, expressing anticipation for President Erdoğan to sign the ratification document. President Erdoğan is expected to sign the legislation in the coming days, leaving Hungary as the sole member state yet to approve Sweden’s accession.

Hungary’s Prime Minister Viktor Orban, known for his amicable relations with Russian President Vladimir Putin, invited his Swedish counterpart for negotiations on joining the bloc. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg urged Hungary to complete its national ratification promptly.

The Turkish delay in approving Sweden’s bid had allowed Turkey to extract concessions, including urging Stockholm to take a tougher stance on the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), considered a terrorist group by the EU and the U.S. In response, Sweden introduced a new anti-terrorism bill and, along with Finland, Canada, and the Netherlands, eased policies on arms exports to Turkey.

US welcomes Turkey’s move

President Erdoğan had linked the ratification to U.S. approval of the sale of F-16 fighter jets to Turkey. The White House supports the sale, and analysts anticipate a swift deal following Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s bid. However, there is no clear timeframe for the U.S. Congress to approve the deal.

In a related development, the U.S. welcomed Turkey’s approval of Sweden’s NATO membership bid, with National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan emphasizing its importance to President Biden. Sullivan stated that Sweden’s NATO membership would make the U.S. and the alliance “safer and stronger.”

The situation unfolds as global leaders navigate the complexities of NATO expansion and regional dynamics, with particular attention to Turkey’s evolving relations with both Sweden and the wider NATO alliance.

Sources: Reuters and Anadolu Agency

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urkey’s parliamentary foreign affairs commission has given the green light to Sweden’s NATO membership bid, signaling a crucial step forward in the enlargement of the Western alliance. After 19 months of intricate negotiations and diplomatic maneuvering, the commission, dominated by President Tayyip Erdogan’s ruling AK Party, voted in favor of Sweden’s bid after an extensive four-hour debate.

The commission’s approval sets the stage for the next decisive step – a vote in the parliament general assembly, where the Turkish President Erdogan’s party maintains a majority. Anticipation is high for a swift passage in the assembly, potentially within the coming weeks, which would lead to Erdogan formally signing Sweden’s NATO membership into law.

Fuat Oktay, the head of the commission, tempered expectations for an immediate general assembly vote, emphasizing that the timing would be decided by the parliament speaker. He cautioned against interpreting the commission’s decision as indicative of the speed at which the general assembly would ratify the bid. Parliament is scheduled for a two-week recess in early January, adding an additional layer of complexity to the timeline.

Broad political support and Swedish enthusiasm

The approval in the commission saw broad political support, with Erdogan’s AK Party, its nationalist MHP allies, and the main opposition CHP all voting in favor of ratification. The small Islamist Felicity party and the right-nationalist Iyi party cast votes against Sweden’s NATO membership.

In response to the commission’s approval, Swedish Foreign Minister Tobias Billstrom expressed his country’s eagerness to join NATO. The sentiment was echoed by Boris Ruge, NATO Assistant Secretary General for Political Affairs and Security Policy, who termed the commission’s decision “excellent news” for the alliance.

Diplomatic complexities and conditionalities

The path to Sweden’s NATO membership has been riddled with diplomatic complexities and conditions set by Turkey. In May of the previous year, Erdogan raised objections to both Sweden’s and Finland’s requests to join the alliance, citing concerns about their perceived protection of individuals Turkey deems terrorists and defense trade embargoes.

While Finland’s bid was ratified in April, Sweden faced a waiting period until it took steps to address Turkey’s specific security concerns, particularly those related to the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK). In response, Stockholm introduced a comprehensive anti-terrorism bill, making membership in a terrorist organization illegal. This move was seen as a significant step in fulfilling the agreement signed with Turkey the previous year.

Additionally, Sweden, along with other NATO members such as Finland, Canada, and the Netherlands, took measures to relax Turkey’s arms-export policies, further easing the path to ratification.

U.S. support and congressional challenges

The U.S. State Department has welcomed the Turkish parliamentary committee’s approval of Sweden’s NATO bid. A spokesperson conveyed the U.S.’s anticipation of swift passage by the full parliament, recognizing Sweden as a highly capable defense partner that would strengthen the alliance.

However, the sale of F-16 jets to Turkey, a key element linked to the NATO membership ratification, faces hurdles in the U.S. Congress. Some lawmakers have vowed to oppose the deal unless Ankara approves Sweden’s NATO membership bid. While the Biden administration has expressed support for the sale, the timeline for congressional approval remains unclear.

Strategic implications and ongoing tensions

The approval of Sweden’s NATO bid carries significant strategic implications for the alliance, particularly in the Baltic Sea region. Turkey’s diplomatic maneuvering over the past 18 months, coupled with its complex relationship with Russia amid the ongoing conflict in Ukraine, has added layers of complexity to NATO’s dynamics.

As the conflict in Ukraine continues and diplomatic relations between NATO members evolve, the ratification of Sweden’s NATO membership remains a critical development with far-reaching consequences. The international community is closely monitoring the situation, recognizing its potential impact on regional security and broader geopolitical dynamics.

The upcoming vote in the parliament general assembly will be a key moment to watch, as it is expected to pave the way for Sweden’s formal inclusion in NATO and further shape the alliance’s strategic landscape in a rapidly evolving global context.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Reuters

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estern Europe is currently experiencing a wave of public desecrations of the Quran. In the Netherlands, the leader of PEGIDA tore pages from the Quran and trampled them. In Denmark and Sweden, activists have on several occasions burned copies of the Quran in front of buildings belonging to Islamic organizations.

What is striking is that the authorities in these countries have acted as mere bystanders, claiming that they are powerless to deal with such activities. They argue that the desecration of the Quran is a reprehensible act, but that it is legal and therefore cannot be stopped. Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson recently said, “It can be legal and still be horrible.”

Many Muslims in the countries concerned and around the world are outraged by the authorities’ passive attitude and are calling on them to act. In July, the UN Human Rights Council adopted a resolution, introduced by Pakistan and Palestine, condemning such desecration and calling on states to close the legal loopholes that prevent them from tackling it.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been a vocal critic of the Swedish authorities’ refusal to stop such desecrations. This raises the stakes considerably, as Sweden’s accession to NATO has yet to be ratified by the Turkish parliament. President Erdoğan has indicated that this is unlikely to happen as long as copies of the Quran are being burned. Thus, the question of whether the Swedish authorities are right to claim that their hands are tied has become politically important.

Freedom of expression?

The Swedish authorities claim that rallies where the Quran is burned are protected by freedom of expression and therefore cannot be restricted, thus giving freedom of expression priority over other rights. However, Sweden is a party to the European Convention on Human Rights, which does not recognize such a hierarchy of rights. All rights in the convention are equal, and if they conflict, they must be weighed against each other. In the case of the desecration of the Quran, there is a conflict between freedom of expression and freedom of religion.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), in its judgment in E.S. v. Austria, has shown how the right to freedom of expression must be balanced against the right of others to have their religious feelings protected. The case concerned an Austrian politician who had been fined for making derogatory remarks about the Prophet Mohammed. She claimed that the fine amounted to an unlawful interference with her freedom of expression.

The ECtHR disagreed: it recognized that religious groups must tolerate criticism by others of their religious beliefs. However, if that criticism incites hatred or religious intolerance, restrictions are justified. The applicant’s offensive attack on the Prophet Mohammed  went beyond the permissible limits of objective debate and her comments were likely to cause justified indignation among Muslims. The ECtHR reiterated that state parties have an obligation under the convention to maintain religious peace, i.e., the peaceful coexistence of religious and non-religious groups.

ECtHR key judgement

It is not clear what is stopping the Swedish authorities from applying E.S. v. Austria to the desecration of the Quran. The verdict is not obscure: the ECtHR has described it as a key judgment, meaning that it has strong precedential value, and although the ruling concerned Austria, it is expected to be followed by all state parties, including Sweden. The ECtHR is the final authority on the interpretation of the convention and state parties are expected to apply the principles arising from its judgments.

The convention has been incorporated into Swedish law by an Act of Parliament and the Swedish Constitution prohibits the adoption of laws that contravene the convention. Thus, even if there were a law allowing people to burn the Quran, such a law would be contrary to the convention, which would render it null and void. The authorities also cannot avoid banning the desecration of the Quran by claiming that they have no express legislative authority to do so; Swedish courts have consistently held that the convention can serve as a legal basis for action in the absence of enabling legislation.

The Swedish government has announced that it has introduced legislation to tighten border controls in order to prevent the entry of persons who might endanger Sweden’s security interests. Presumably this is intended to silence fervent critics of Sweden’s hands-off policy; however,  this is not how the ECtHR expects Sweden to maintain religious peace. The Swedish government has also indicated that it is considering changing the law to allow the police to prevent copies of the Quran from being burned in public. It need not look far: a simple application of E.S. v. Austria will suffice.

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n April 4, 2022, Finnish President Sauli Niinistö and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan held an official meeting. In accordance with the official statement, the two leaders discussed the intricacies of Turkish-Finnish relations, the defense industry, military exports, and the pressing matter of the Russia-Ukraine conflict, which had begun a month prior. The Russia-Ukraine war, in fact, ignited a profound transformation within Finland’s national security and defense policy, prompting considerations regarding potential accession to NATO. Prior to engaging in dialogue with Erdoğan, Niinistö had previously held discussions with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, focusing attention on the procedures associated with new and prospective NATO members.

Unraveling the dynamics

A similar shift was also occurring in Finland’s neighboring country and close partner, Sweden. The two nations engaged in discussions with prominent actors such as the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, France, and Jens Stoltenberg, expressing their desire for full membership. They were reassured of a warm reception. However, the limitation of consulting only a select few members became evident when journalists queried Erdoğan regarding his stance on Swedish and Finnish membership. Erdoğan, along with a significant portion of Turkey, held an unfavorable view on the matter.

The media was ablaze with theories, circulating in well-established journals and newspapers, attempting to decipher why Turkey was impeding Swedish and Finnish accession: Was Erdoğan maneuvering to gain leverage in the F-35 and F-16 negotiations with the Biden administration? Was Turkey seeking to regain political prominence, or was there a complex plot aimed at assisting Vladimir Putin in managing a crisis?

It is likely that the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Sweden’s reference to the PKK does not solely pertain to the public demonstrations occasionally held by the organization and its supporters in Sweden. Instead, he alludes to the PKK’s extensive network within the country, and describes the PKK’s activities in Sweden as substantial, emphasizing that the funds collected there are utilized by the PKK for terrorist operations against Turkey.

While public protests in support of the PKK serve to illustrate the organization’s presence in Sweden, they pale in comparison to the PKK’s clandestine undertakings. The PKK is deeply intertwined with organized crime, not only in Sweden but throughout Europe. Consequently, Swedish organized crime becomes an inadvertent financier of terrorism in Turkey, while terrorism in Turkey remains one of the central concerns tied to criminal gangs and organized crime in Sweden. However, none of these revelations should come as a surprise to Sweden. Turkey has been raising this issue with its European counterparts for years, only to be met with indifference from all those who have failed to consider terrorism as a relevant problem in any country other than their own.

In a documentary on Sweden’s NATO accession process, which appeared on by the Swedish national public television broadcaster SVT, an interview with former Swedish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ann Linde (2019-2022) was aired, during which she openly acknowledged that while Turkey faced a severe terrorism threat, Sweden and other European countries failed to take the terrorism in Turkey seriously. Linde further affirmed that Turkey’s claims regarding Sweden’s financial support for the PKK were accurate, acknowledging the legitimacy of Turkey’s criticism.

The loss of lives in Turkey has been met with resounding indifference across Europe. On the rare occasions when PKK-related stories capture European headlines, they often portray support for the organization. Many media outlets and policymakers prefer to highlight the PKK’s fight against DAESH and its supposed pursuit of freedom, conveniently overlooking the fact that the organization is recognized as a terrorist group by both the EU and the U.S. Moreover, the PKK is widely acknowledged as an active organized crime network, responsible for a significant portion of drug trafficking throughout Europe.

The permissive stance toward the PKK’s actions has also created problems in France, as a recent case exposed instances of racketeering, blackmail, kidnappings, and extortions carried out by PKK members in southern France.

Sweden’s transformative path

In order to demonstrate its commitment to Turkey and strengthen its approach to counterterrorism and the security of partner nations, Sweden implemented a significant change to its counterterrorism laws. Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson took the extraordinary step of writing an article for the Financial Times to publicize the new legislation. The updated laws now criminalize participation in a terrorist organization and prescribe penalties of up to four years for basic terrorism offenses and two to eight years for more serious offenses. Moreover, leaders of terrorist organizations can face sentences ranging from two years to life imprisonment.

In his article, Kristersson described this development as a means to close a legal loophole in the Swedish system. Previously, being a member of a terrorist organization and supporting such an organization was not explicitly illegal. Prosecution was only possible if the actions of terrorists could be directly linked to a specific terrorist act. As a result, individuals providing logistic, administrative, or financial support to terrorism without direct involvement in a terrorist act itself were not committing a crime; for instance, sending money to a terrorist organization was not illegal unless prosecutors could establish that the funds were used for a specific terrorist act.

Since the implementation of the new anti-terrorism law, Sweden has already charged and convicted one individual on terrorism-financing charges. This person, a Turkish citizen of Kurdish ethnicity, had been in custody since February. He was found guilty of extorting money for the PKK, aggravated blackmail, and related weapons offenses after threatening someone with a gun. The perpetrator also maintained close contact with PKK members in Germany and France, including a senior leader responsible for the PKK’s collection activities in Europe. The Swedish intelligence and counterterrorism service, SÄPO, verified at least 11 instances where the convicted individual was seen moving alongside high-ranking PKK members in Stockholm before visiting restaurants and wholesalers. On July 6, 2023, the Swedish district court convicted the individual on all charges and sentenced him to four-and-a-half years in prison, followed by deportation.

While the issues with Finland were relatively superficial and primarily centered around the ban on defense exports to Turkey, which was even mentioned in the readout of the April 4 phone call between Niinistö and Erdoğan, the challenges with Sweden were of a more substantial nature, necessitating significant changes. Over the past few decades, Sweden has become a safe haven, recruitment hub, financial center, and propaganda base for terrorist organizations operating in Turkey. Swedish ministers have held meetings with PKK members and representatives of the YPG, promising them support.

Taking it a step further, the Swedish government at the time relied on the support of independent Member of Parliament Amineh Kakabaveh, a former Iranian Peshmerga member, who extended her support based on the promise of increased assistance to the YPG/PYD, the Syrian branch of the PKK. The details of this agreement were shared in a Facebook post bearing the signatures of Social Democratic Party leader Tobias Baudin and the party’s international secretary, Johan Hassel.

The reason Turkey questions Sweden’s sincerity and commitment to the trilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) lies in a series of events that unfolded during the process in Sweden. Since Sweden announced its intention to join NATO, protests have erupted across the country featuring Abdullah Öcalan and PKK flags. There have been instances of hanging effigies of Turkish President Erdoğan, projecting PKK symbols onto Swedish government buildings, and even the burning of the Quran by far-right activists.

The latter drew widespread condemnation from the Muslim community and escalated the terrorism risk within Sweden. In response, the Swedish police initially banned two further attempts at public Quran burnings, but this decision was later overturned by a Swedish court. The subsequent rejection of the ban was upheld by an appeals court on June 12. Although there have been no Quran burnings in the days following the overturn, it is only a matter of time before such incidents occur again.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, NATO and its close partners have increasingly provided military support to Ukraine. The  nature of the support has changed over time and some policies that were previously avoided in order not to cross Russia’s “red lines” have been chosen. For instance, after much controversy, Germany authorized the delivery of Leopard tanks to Ukraine. Britain provided Challenger tanks. Poland and Slovakia gave Ukraine MiG-29 aircraft. This military support has had a significant impact on the course of the war. Thanks to the military aid given to Ukraine, countries have removed Soviet legacy weapons from their inventories. These were mostly replaced by American military equipment. With the intensive military support provided, the Ukrainian army has become considerably more modernized than it was before the war.

However, Ukraine does not believe that the current military support is sufficient, at least in the long term. On July 11, the first day of NATO’s Vilnius Summit, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy slammed NATO for its lack of a timeline for his country’s future NATO membership, calling it “unprecedented and absurd.” Ukraine’s main goal in the summit is to be presented with a road map for NATO membership. In this regard, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky and senior Ukrainian officials have frequently made statements and succeeded in putting pressure on NATO. It was even stated that Zelensky’s participation in the summit would be meaningless if there was no signal from the Alliance in this direction. Thus, Ukraine’s possible future NATO membership and the security guarantees that could be provided until then became one of the main items on the agenda ahead of the Vilnius summit.

In September 2022, Zelensky announced that Ukraine was already a de facto NATO member and that it was applying for membership in order to formalize its status. Ukraine is currently awaiting an official invitation to become a member in response to this application. In Ukraine’s view, if accession to NATO is not assured at the end of the war, a new war with Russia will be inevitable. The only way to prevent this is to deter Russia by Ukraine becoming a NATO member.

While Ukraine’s NATO membership will only be possible after the end of the war, it will be difficult to draw a clear road map with concrete security guarantees in the interim period, as security guarantees are inherently ambiguous. In a climate of uncertainty, many countries are more likely to avoid such commitments and to show a desire to maintain military support for Ukraine. Only a clear commitment by the United States can resolve this dilemma.

On the other hand, NATO’s top priority since the start of Russia’s aggression against Ukraine has naturally been to strengthen the Alliance’s eastern flank. In this scope, various measures have been taken, in particular to increase the Alliance’s level of combat readiness. New multinational battlegroups were established and deployed to Bulgaria, Hungary, Romania, and Slovakia; Turkish soldiers are serving in the groups deployed to Bulgaria and Hungary.

Of course, mobilizing such a large multinational force in a short period of time is a very demanding and costly endeavor which requires the member states to increase their military expenditures in many dimensions such as personnel, logistics, and equipment.

Lastly, by ratifying Finland’s accession in March 2023, Turkey had demonstrated its historic and principled support for NATO’s open-door policy and sent a message to Sweden, which was given the green light by Turkey on the first day of the Summit. Indeed, the trilateral memorandum had broken the deadlock in Madrid last year and shown that a diplomatic compromise could be reached quickly. This is because such major summits always offer the possibility of last-minute solutions, and this was the case with Turkey’s last-minute green light for Sweden’s NATO membership. Turkey will expect Sweden to continue to increase its efforts against the fight against terrorism in its all forms in the coming period.

Since the beginning of the Russia-Ukraine war, the scope of support for Ukraine has been diverse and constantly expanding. Supporting Ukraine has now become a trend with weapons and platforms of strategic value being provided to the country. The support has been effective, especially in Ukraine’s newly launched operation. Yet, this effect is only visible in certain areas and the military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s withdrawal from all regions it occupied. The main reason for this is that such support could deepen the war or escalate the conflict by provoking unpredictable responses from Russia.

Military support in the absence of air superiority—as is currently the case of Ukraine against Russia—prevents Ukraine from achieving the capability to drive Russia completely out of the region and regain some of its territory. There may be different and more rapid developments once the F-16s are delivered and deployed to the battlefield after the training period. But for now, military support is not enough to ensure Russia’s defeat or to force Moscow to negotiate peace.

Can Ukraine become a NATO member? It seems unlikely that NATO will support this. Yes, at least 21 NATO members support Ukraine’s membership, but the continued occupation is one of the biggest obstacles to membership. NATO is unlikely to take such a risk.

Security guarantees could be considered in this context, but they are not very possible without agreement and foresight on how the future of the war will develop. Even now, security guarantees are unlikely within NATO. Even with the support of countries at the level of bilateral relations, it seems that member countries will not be able to provide Ukraine with a security guarantee that could end the conflict with Russia.

In the meantime, NATO’s strategy document, the new Strategic Concept, published last year, does not address the China issue in detail. However, this is the first time that China has been identified as a strategic challenge, given NATO’s post-Cold War history and transformation. At this stage, China poses more of a political and economic challenge than a military threat to NATO, the Alliance’s member countries, and the region they shape. It appears that NATO is not yet ready to portray China as a threat.

The U.S. perspective in the Sino-American rivalry is to transform NATO into a global organization, but not all NATO members share this view. For the time being, it does not seem possible for NATO as a whole to act against China. However, depending on how the dimensions of the Washington-Beijing rivalry evolve in the coming period, NATO may renew its position internally. That said, in the short term, it is not possible to define China as a threat.

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aving fought both the Soviets and the Nazis in World War II and suffered territorial losses, Finland declared neutrality at the end of the war and has not joined any military alliances since then. However, with the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the fear of Russia in Finland’s collective memory resurfaced. As a matter of fact, in Finland, which shares a 1,340 km land border with Russia, only 20 percent of the Finish people viewed NATO membership positively before the Ukraine war, but this percentage increased almost fourfold afterwards.

In other words, there was a strong expectation among Finns for an expedited NATO accession process that would guarantee the country’s national security. To meet these expectations, the Finnish government applied for NATO membership in May last year together with Sweden. On the other hand, Turkey requested that the two countries end their support for the FETO and PKK terror groups before approving their memberships.

The NATO membership process

Before moving to any detailed assessment of the topic, it should be noted that in accordance with the Washington Treaty (also known as the North Atlantic Treaty) that formed the legal basis of NATO, a country must complete a process consisting of seven stages in order to join the alliance. In the first phase, the parties negotiate a road map for the membership application. In the second phase, the candidate country declares with a letter of intent that it accepts the obligations for NATO membership. In this process, the parties also determine the reform calendar, if necessary. In the third phase, accession protocols are prepared for membership.

In the fourth and most important phase, as a natural consequence of the collective defense principle, every NATO member country must ratify the accession protocols. In other words, for a country to join NATO, it must receive the support of all member countries. In the fifth and sixth phases, the member states that allow the membership of the candidate country declare that they accept the accession protocols and invite the candidate country to the alliance. In the last stage, the candidate country completes the legal process and joins NATO.

Turkey’s approach

After Turkey became a NATO member in 1952, it has always approached the enlargement of the alliance positively and facilitated the membership processes of countries that want to join the alliance. Even today, Turkey, in principle, supports the memberships of Finland and Sweden, which want to join the collective defense umbrella of NATO. However, in accordance with the Madrid Memorandum signed in June last year, Turkey requires these two countries to cooperate with it in the fight against terrorism and to actively support its fight against FETO and the PKK.

Thus, Ankara is right in this regard, because Finland and Sweden have an important role in the European branches of both terrorist organizations. Unlike countries that hinder Turkey’s European Union membership process due to ideological prejudices and political calculations, Ankara does not seek to turn the situation that Finland and Sweden are facing into an opportunity. On the contrary, based on the principle of reciprocity, it desires to protect its own national security in the same way its counterparts protect theirs. In addition, Turkey is trying to strengthen its strategic autonomy on the axis of its own national interests by challenging all kinds of pressures.

Why Finland and not Sweden?

As tension over NATO membership between Turkey and the two Nordic continues, an important development took place last week. Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan declared that Turkey had lifted the veto for Finland’s NATO membership in the meeting with his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinistö in Ankara. Erdoğan cited Finland’s more sincere attitude towards the fight against terrorism as a reason for Ankara’s policy change.

Taking a closer look at the issue, Stockholm has shown that it is not truly sincere in its fight against terrorism by allowing anti-Islam demonstrations of right-wing extremists and anti-Turkey rallies of PKK militants in recent months. Finland, conversely, showed greater sensitivity by avoiding such incidents on its territories. In other words, Helsinki did not provoke Ankara in this process, and, in return, received Turkey’s support for its NATO membership. In addition, Turkey’s policy of minimizing foreign problems played a positive role in its change of attitude towards Finland’s NATO bid.

Sweden, which applied to NATO together with Finland, made some concrete arrangements on the way to membership in accordance with the Madrid Agreement. For instance, it passed an anti-terror law in November, and the new government has been trying to pass a new counterterrorism bill against the financing, aiding, and propagation of terrorist groups.

Turkey’s expectations

However, none of these meet Ankara’s expectations and to date, Sweden has not taken any serious step to address Turkey’s security concerns. So much so that Sweden still turns a blind eye to the actions of PKK militants on its streets and refuses to comply with extradition requests by Turkey. Moreover, it has allowed anti-Muslim attacks such as the burning of the Qur’an in front of the Turkish embassy in Stockholm.

Ankara is not against NATO enlargement per se. On the contrary, Turkey supports NATO’s open door policy, and this holds true for Finland and Sweden as well. However, since Turkey is determined to protect its national security and interests, it requires from these two countries to take a clear stance against the PKK and FETO, both of which threaten Ankara’s national security.

Turkey removed its veto on Finland’s NATO membership on March 17, 2023, showing that it will reciprocate if its counterparts keep their promises. If Sweden, like Finland, abides by Turkey’s red lines and takes the necessary steps, it also can achieve a tangible gain on the way to NATO membership before the Vilnius summit in July 2023.

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n March 9, the trilateral talks between Turkey, Sweden, and Finland restarted in Brussels. Following the talks, Turkey acknowledged that Sweden and Finland have taken some steps to meet Ankara’s concerns over the activities of terrorist groups in their countries.

On January 21, Turkey had suspended talks as part of the memorandum to ease Finland and Sweden’s accession process until the two countries addressed Turkey’s concerns.

Sweden and Finland applied to join NATO last year to safeguard themselves against possible Russian acts of aggression as such concerns became manifest with the Russia-Ukraine war. Hungary and Turkey are the only NATO members yet to ratify their bids.

In addition to the free movements and activities of terrorist organizations in Sweden and Finland, both countries also impose an arms embargo on the Turkish military industry.

While Turkey has always firmly supported NATO’s open-door policy, it also expects its key concerns to be addressed in the spirit of the alliance.

The PKK is designated as a terrorist organization by the EU, the U.S., the UK, and Turkey, and for four decades has waged a war against Turkey.

A tougher stance?

Ankara also wants Helsinki and Stockholm to take a tougher stance against the FETO terrorist organization, which staged a foiled coup attempt in Turkey on July 15, 2016.

At the moment, Turkey considers Sweden, in particular, too hesitant and lenient in banning the PKK’s fundraising and other activities.

Ibrahim Kalin, President Erdoğan’s spokesperson, said that the meeting on March 9 was held in a positive climate, and that further steps needed to be taken by Finland and Sweden.

“The Vilnius summit in July is presented as a deadline for us. Our security concerns are at stake. Ratification of their bids depends on the steps the Nordic countries will take,” he said.

The suspension came after the far-right Danish politician Rasmus Paludan, an outspoken Islamophobe, burned a copy of the Quran in front of the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm despite Turkey’s persistent warnings to Swedish authorities to prevent it.

Sweden’s chief negotiator for the talks, Oscar Stenström, said that Sweden had met its obligations and that it takes Turkey’s concerns over the PKK militants in Sweden seriously. The Swedish government introduced a new anti-terrorism bill to parliament on March 9.

The new anti-terror law, which the government hoped would come into force on June 1, 2023, was poised to grant authorities greater power to detain and prosecute individuals who back terrorist organizations, through financing or other means. Traveling abroad to assist a terrorist organization will also be punished if the law takes effect.

The Swedish Parliament was scheduled to ratify the new anti-terror law on March 9, but it was postponed to May 3.

Pass to Finland but not Sweden

On January 29, Turkish President Erdoğan said Turkey might approach Finland’s bid differently than Sweden’s.

Although the two countries initially said they would join NATO together, on March 14, the Swedish Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said that the ratifications of the two countries might be at different times and that his country is prepared for such a development.

Finland’s President Sauli Niinistö traveled to Turkey on March 16-17 for a solidarity visit to the earthquake-affected areas and to discuss his country’s NATO bid.

Having visited the earthquake-ridden areas, he met President Erdoğan in Ankara.

On Wednesday, March 22, during Niinistö’s visit, Erdoğan told reporters that they would fulfill their pledge to Finland. Even though he did not give further details, it is interpreted as greenlighting Finland’s NATO bid.

Turkish parliament

Also on Wednesday, two Turkish officials told Reuters that the Turkish Parliament is likely to ratify Finland’s NATO bid in mid-April before the Parliament closes prior to the elections on May 14.

Until recently, Hungary has also delayed Helsinki’s and Stockholm’s NATO bids.

In a letter published on Tuesday, March 14, the Hungarian Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén requested that a parliamentary session scheduled for March 20 to vote on Finland and Sweden’s membership be postponed to a week later.

Nevertheless, Turkey and Hungary declared that they will ratify Finland’s application for NATO membership.

“We have decided to start the protocol of Finland’s accession to NATO in our parliament,” Erdoğan said during a press conference in Istanbul alongside his Finnish counterpart Sauli Niinistö.

Speaking on Sweden’s application, Erdoğan said Turkey cannot greenlight Sweden’s bid as Stockholm has refused to extradite 120 suspected terrorists.

At a joint press conference alongside German Chancellor Olaf Scholz in Berlin, Sweden’s Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson said, “We believe that we are ready for ratification, but we respect that only Turkey can make Turkey’s decisions.”

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weden has paid a heavy price in domestic politics for supporting terrorism for decades. Over the years, the country has become a safe haven for the PKK terrorist organization and other radical left-wing organizations targeting Turkey. In recent decades, the organizations have carried out, among others, their financial, political, and cultural activities on Swedish territory. By providing them legal and political protection, Sweden has helped such organizations stay in touch with the world. In this sense, their presence in Sweden has served as a protective shield for their activities elsewhere and granted them legitimacy.

Various groups in Sweden, which are directly or indirectly linked to the PKK terrorist entity, employ concepts respected by Western publics in order to enjoy the comfort of those countries’ diplomatic and political frameworks and engage in illegal activities. In this manner, they receive legal and political support to continue to exist within the local systems. In turn, the organizations and networks which have organized themselves in the guise of civil society on Swedish soil by utilizing Western-friendly concepts, and the immigrant ghettoes, which largely consist of political asylum seekers, have become a fertile ground for radicalization and all kinds of extremism.

In addition to the PKK, PYD, MLKP, and DHKP-C, groups like Daesh and the Al-Nusra Front have recruited dozens of members from the ghettoes. Although local intelligence services monitor such radical ghettoes very closely, the activities of such groups have been largely ignored as long as they did not commit any acts on European soil.

The Swedish authorities have disregarded repeated warnings and criticisms from countries that have been hurt by terrorism for long years, including Turkey. Swedish politicians, too, have exploited claims about human rights and free speech to clear the path for all forms of extremism – provided that they themselves did not suffer the consequences. Indeed, individuals linked to terrorist groups have even served as members of the Swedish parliament in an attempt to influence the country’s policies.

To some extent, Sweden’s indifferent attitude towards extremist views reflects the perspective of the Social Democrats, who have formed the backbone of Swedish politics for many years. Accordingly, various organizations and groups, which identify as radical left movements “fighting for freedom,” have operated under very favorable conditions during the Social Democratic rule. However, mainstream parties in many European countries, including the Social Democrats in Sweden, have been losing support in the face of radical right-wing parties. Indeed, the current government, led by the right-leaning prime minister Ulf Kristersson and his Moderate Party, enjoys the support of liberal and extreme right-wing parties. Whereas the Moderate Party and the extreme right-wing Swedish Democrats keep terrorist organizations at a greater distance, they are more receptive to Islamophobic and anti-immigrant approaches.

Sweden’s changing international standing

Hosting some of the world’s leading peace research and conflict resolution centers, Sweden also ranks highly among global arms manufacturers. The country has been ‘neutral’ in international politics since the nineteenth century, and with the exception of various peacekeeping operations, it successfully avoided being dragged into major wars. Whereas Sweden’s 1995 admission into the European Union and gradual efforts to link itself to the European security architecture have partly eroded its neutrality, its decision to join NATO represented a radical step for Sweden. Having stayed out of alliances for nearly two centuries, the country had already begun to change its approach under the influence of its EU membership. Nonetheless, NATO membership will represent a truly radical shift in the country’s policies.

In this sense, the NATO membership debate has been raging in Sweden, too. Although Sweden and Finland asked to join NATO at the same time, one could argue that the latter, which shares a 1,340-kilometer-long land border with Russia, has been more enthusiastic about joining the Alliance. Meanwhile in Sweden, the Social Democrats and some extreme right-wing parties, among others, remain divided over the issue. Still, NATO membership is particularly popular among young Swedes.

Sweden’s two centuries of so-called ‘hypocritical neutrality’ played a significant role in transforming it into an island of welfare. By remaining neutral within the international security architecture, the country was able to sell weapons and other industrial products to warring parties during major conflicts, allowing it to accumulate a significant amount of capital and welfare. Considering Sweden’s history, its attempt to join NATO represents an anomaly and faces heavy criticism from some Swedes, who believe that the new policy places their national interests at risk. Whereas the Russian invasion of Ukraine increased the number of advocates of NATO membership, it is important to underline that Sweden’s recent decision was radical and risky.

Meanwhile, some NATO allies, starting with the United States, criticize Turkey instead of mounting pressure on Sweden and Finland. Accordingly, there has been an increase in the number of articles and comments taking a jab at Turkey and advocating its removal from NATO, targeting President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, and even arguing that Turkey must be kicked out of the Alliance because it is a Muslim country.

At the same time, supporters of the relevant terrorist organizations under official supervision continue to stage shameless protests targeting Turkey and its president. It is important to note that all the acts of aggression take place under state protection. Certainly, the most unacceptable of the most recent attacks involved the burning of a copy of the Qur’an near the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm which not only targeted Turkey but also the sacred values of some two billion Muslims around the world.  It is no secret that Rasmus Paludan, the Danish provocateur that carried out the attack, received support from certain circles. However, he is a mere pawn, and it is necessary to concentrate on those pulling his strings.

The road map to prevent Swedish support for terrorism to which the three countries agreed on in Madrid is crystal clear. At this time, Sweden needs to abide by it and take all necessary steps. Attempts to falsely portray the attacks as anti-Turkish and anti-Erdoğan, as opposed to anti-Islam, don’t convince anyone and undermine Swedish officials. The Swedish authorities need to live up to their responsibilities instead of distorting the debate. At the same time, the Alliance’s senior leadership, starting with U.S. and NATO officials, should pressure Sweden instead of Turkey.

Taking stock of the current situation from a fair perspective, it would be more realistic to say that the problem is rooted in the confusion the Swedish society and politicians have about Turkey’s security – as opposed to Turkey’s reservations. Right now, Sweden attempts to divert attention away from its failure to uphold its commitments by targeting Turkey, President Erdoğan, and Islam’s sacred values. Those steps and approaches, however, only serve to deepen the crisis of confidence between Sweden and its potential allies.

Instead of instrumentalizing anti-Turkish and anti-Islam sentiments, Swedish society and Swedish politicians must face their Madrid commitments without further delay. Turkey and President Erdoğan are likely to face greater pressure during this process as Sweden refuses to comply with the NATO member’s legitimate security demands. In this sense, it would be more reasonable to make a distinction between Finland, which took steps in line with the Madrid memorandum, and Sweden, which did not comply with it.

Certainly, Washington and Brussels, which have been pressuring Ankara, would be disappointed by this approach as they are trying to ensure that Sweden and Finland are treated like two parts of a whole. Indeed, Turkey stands to experience greater tensions with Washington and Brussels if it were to come under additional pressure over Sweden’s NATO membership. On that front, it is necessary for the abovementioned players, at the very least, to take certain steps to alleviate Turkish concerns over terrorism and security. However, they are unlikely to make any moves that could potentially play into President Erdoğan’s hand ahead of Turkey’s upcoming elections.

F

ollowing Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, NATO membership was deemed so essential and urgent for Russia’s neighbouring countries, Sweden and Finland, that an intense diplomacy traffic was initiated immediately after the start of the war. Just two months later, on May 18, 2022, Sweden and Finland simultaneously submitted their official applications to NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg to join the Alliance. As the Russia-Ukraine war approaches the completion of its first year,  Stoltenberg stated that “in a more dangerous world, it is even more important that Sweden and Finland become NATO members.”

The accession, which requires the approval of all NATO member states, has brought forward the long-lasting policy of disregard by Sweden and Finland of Turkey’s security concerns. Sweden and Finland have close relations with terrorist organizations such as the PKK and the DHKP-C, which pose a great national security threat to Turkey. The policies and practices of these two countries have now become challenges that need to be addressed for Turkey to give them the green light to join NATO.

On June 28, 2022, Sweden and Finland signed a tripartite agreement with Turkey at the NATO Leaders’ Summit held in Madrid, according to which the two Nordic countries would not support the PYD/YPG and FETO as banned terrorist organizations. In particular, Finland and Sweden should prevent the activities of the PKK and all other terrorist organizations, their extensions, and the activities of persons involved in or affiliated with these organizations.

Sweden’s attitude since signing the agreement

Immediately after the agreement, a positive process started. Turkey viewed the significant change in perceptions and discourses towards the PKK and PYD, especially in Sweden, as an important development.

Sweden made efforts to take concrete steps towards the extradition of terrorists sought in Turkey’s fight against the PKK/PYD terrorist organizations. The extradition of Mahmut Tat, who was convicted of PKK membership, to Turkey was another remarkable step taken by Sweden. Turkey expressed its satisfaction with the constitutional amendments that came into force on January 1, 2023 in Sweden, allowing for the adoption of stricter laws in the fight against terrorism.

However, some policies and practices that will overshadow these positive developments have recently come to the fore. On January 13, 2023, supporters of the PKK directly targeted President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan at a demonstration where a mannequin resembling Erdoğan was hanged in front in front of the city hall in the capital, Stockholm. Immediately afterwards, prosecutor Lucas Eriksson declared that there was no need to even initiate an investigation into the acts in question, basing his stance on “freedom of expression” and stated that these acts cannot be punished under Swedish law.

The last straw was the permission given to burn the Qur’an on January 21, 2023, near the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm. Rasmus Paludan, the leader of the racist Stram Kurs based in Denmark and a Swedish citizen, burned the Qur’an as the police simply watched. The reaction of the Swedish government was again weak, and Prime Minister Ulf Kristersson was content with stating that what was done was “disrespectful.”

The limits of freedom of expression

The concept of “limitless freedom of expression,” which is drawn in the official statements of Sweden at the government level, is fundamentally incompatible with the real legal situation. When the statements made are examined legally, they show the intention to create a political approach over a “sympathetic” concept such as freedom of expression rather than relying on a legal basis.

The ECHR, to which forty-six European states, including Sweden and Turkey, are parties, defines the right in question, under the title of “Freedom of expression” in Paragraph 1 of Article 10. Can people say or express what they want even if they hurt millions of people, or even just one?

The answer to the question is basically given in Paragraph 2 of Article 10, which clearly puts forward that freedom of expression is not unlimited:

“The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.”

The court stresses that freedom of expression cannot be regarded as the right to humiliate others on the basis of race, language, religion or gender. In this context, the court applies the principles of “proportionality” or “balancing of rights” while drawing the limits of freedom of expression.

While the person who burned the Qur’an in Sweden had many ways to express his views on the Qur’an without insulting Muslim believers, burning the Qur’an should be clearly considered disproportionate. The person in question did so in a way that would harm the rights and honor of others. As a matter of fact, the court has stated that it is of the opinion that it is necessary to determine whether comments regarding religion are insulting and directed at believers, or an abusive attack against sacred symbols.

If the act of burning the Qur’an is accepted as a form of legitimate expression, attacking mosques, which are places of worship for Muslims, and even burning mosques could be presented as a form of acceptable expression too. This is an action that cannot be considered legitimate from any point of view.

Article 9 of ECHR

The Swedish political and judicial organs’ disregard for this disproportionality essentially violates Article 9 of the ECHR, which regulates freedom of religion and conscience, and Article 14, which regulates the prohibition of discrimination. Burning the Qur’an has harmed the fundamental rights of Muslims in particular. Therefore, the statements of the Swedish foreign minister or other officials along the lines of “there is a wide area of freedom of expression” in Sweden, which sound good at first glance, are essentially an effort to cover up attacks on other fundamental rights through freedom of expression.

T

urkey has been an active member of NATO since it joined the alliance in 1952. Although, (1) it was not a neighbor of the Atlantic countries, (2) had an eastern sociopolitical culture, and (3) a weak economy, its desire for positing itself in the West through westernization (and secularization) and the Soviet threat led it to knock on the door of NATO several times. While NATO allies refused the first three applications, they welcomed Turkey in 1952.

Since then, Turkey has become a crucial NATO member, thanks to its positive contributions to the alliance. The first contribution made by Turkey to NATO was prior to its membership, when the Turkish army fought alongside Western countries in the Korean Peninsula. After seeing the capabilities of the Turkish army, the U.S.- and U.K.-led NATO admitted Turkey into the organization. Another reason was that while war-torn Western countries had a total of 32 military divisions ready for combat, the Turkish army alone had the same number as it did not fight in World War II.

With accession, Turkey became NATO’s frontline as it neighbored the Soviet Union. NATO’s land forces, jets, missiles, radars, and intelligence staff were deployed to Turkish territories. Perhaps, the fact that Turkey was a NATO member deterred the Soviet Union from attacking Turkey, but at the same time it transformed Turkish soil into a target in any likely war. Particularly, the storage of nuclear weapons in Turkish bases posed a great threat to Turkey’s security. Yet, throughout the Cold War, Turkish governments took all risks and remained loyal to the NATO Treaty they signed.

Turkey’s contributions to the alliance did not end when the Soviet bloc was dissolved in 1991. Right after the Dayton Treaty that ended the Bosnian War, Ankara sent troops to Bosnia and Herzegovina to uphold peace there. It also participated in NATO’s Kosovo operation and deployed troops after Kosovan territories were liberated.

The Turkish army went to Afghanistan after Americans called on NATO to invoke Article 5 in 2001. Furthermore, the Turkish army supported the Darfur Mission of the UN-African Union as a NATO member between 2005 and 2007. In addition, the Turkish navy has been present in the Gulf of Aden to prevent attacks of Somalian pirates and stop irregular immigration in the Mediterranean Sea.

What is more, the center of NATO’s land forces (LANDCOM) is based in Izmir, and the Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) of NATO member states are free to land at Konya Airport. There is also a radar system located in Malatya. Moreover, the Turkish army is the second-largest in the organization, and the Turkish government is among the top five governments contributing to NATO expenses.

Despite Turkey’s evident commitment to NATO, Ankara’s relations with main NATO members, particularly the U.S., are not at the desired level. While the majority of NATO members argue that Turkey distances itself from the West, the Turkish side claims that its allies estranged Ankara with their policies. For instance, Turkey’s procurement of Russia-made S-400 missiles angered the U.S., which in return exerted CAATSA sanctions and removed Turkey from the F-35 program.

Yet, Turkey says it turned to Russia because earlier the U.S. did not sell Patriot missiles to Ankara. In addition, there are undeclared sanctions on the Turkish defense industry. From small guns to tank engines, many components are not sold to Turkish defense firms, with the reasons offered for the sanctions being nonsensical. For example, Turkey’s military operations against the PKK/YPG terrorism are used as an excuse to ban arm sales. Ankara, in turn, views such positions as support for the terrorist groups.

Support for the PKK

Indeed, the U.S. and European countries openly support terrorist organizations fighting against Turkey. While they claim that the support is to defeat ISIS, the weapons they donate are used against the Turkish army. In addition, many members of terrorist organizations live safely in European countries, which claim that the Turkish government abuses the terrorists’ rights, forcing them to flee. The Turkish government sees Europe’s actions as a way of hurting Turkey.

Ankara also has differences with NATO members due to Sweden and Finland’s NATO membership, Greece’s irresponsible actions, and the Ukrainian war. Beginning with Ukraine, unlike other NATO members, Turkey did not cut its relations with Russia in order not to punish the Russian people and not to worsen the situation in Syria, where NATO has left Turkey alone against Russia. On the other hand, the Turkish government sent weapons to Ukraine and has never approved of Russia’s aggression. Moreover, the Black Sea Grain Initiative, facilitated by Turkey and NATO, allowed Ukraine to sell its grains to the world, primarily benefitting European countries who bought the most. So, Ankara’s policy is perhaps not anti-Russian, but is certainly pro-Ukraine, and nobody can deny how this policy has been beneficial to Ukraine.

Regarding Sweden and Finland, the Turkish government asks these two Nordic countries to distance themselves from terrorist groups and extradite certain wanted criminals. Although both countries made a deal to fulfill Ankara’s requests, none of the conditions have been met. What is more, the Swedish government allowed anti-Turkey protests and the burning of the Qur’an at a time when it seeks the approval of Turkey for NATO membership. Needless to say, such acts are disrespectful and insolent, insult Islam, and aim to provoke Turkey and the Muslim world. No NATO member state can ratify candidates who challenge a member state instead of respecting its demands for security.

Greece and NATO

As for Greece, Athens wants to have the same nautical miles (12) for the territorial waters of its islands, which are quite small and only two kilometers away from Turkish shores, as for its mainland. By doing so, it ignores the territorial waters of sizable pieces of Turkish lands. Furthermore, Greece militarizes islands though past treaties ban doing so. Turkey has repeatedly warned Greece that if it does not change its militarization policy and the self-declaration of 12-mile territorial waters, it will declare war.

Since the U.S. is NATO’s leading country, the policy it should follow is to broker between the two countries and end the dispute peacefully. However, instead, the U.S. arms the Greek islands and sells advanced weapons like F-35s to Greece, which it did not sell to Turkey. Moreover, certain U.S. congresspeople and senators, who are under the influence of the Greek lobby’s payroll, violate Washington’s balance policy between Turkey and Greece.

Based on the above analysis, the Turkish government and people feel betrayed by their NATO allies. They question why NATO members did not show solidarity when Turkish jets downed a Russian jet in 2015. Turks also do not understand why the U.S. army allies with a terrorist organization and protects it against its NATO ally, Turkey. They also have difficulties understanding why the U.S. government allows the leader of the July 15, 2016 failed military coup, Fethullah Gülen, to live in Pennsylvania.

W

hat distinguishes the attack on the Qur’an in Sweden from other hate crimes? How have Swedish officials approached the most recent attack on the Qur’an? These and similar questions will be addressed below in an effort to understand the story behind the hate crime of burning a copy of the Holy Qur’an in front of the Turkish embassy in Sweden.

What distinguishes the attack against the Qur’an in Sweden from other hate crimes?

First and foremost, this attack must not be treated as a random hate crime by an isolated individual. That is because Rasmus Paludan, a Danish politician who chairs the Stram Kurs (Hard Line) party in Sweden, carried out the attack, and the courts have already established that Paludan, who also has Swedish citizenship, is a racist. In 2020, he received a prison sentence in Denmark and was disbarred. Paludan’s acts of provocation have consistently been placing Muslims in Sweden and Denmark at risk. The Swedish police continues to protect the politician despite the fact that since 2017 he has committed hate crimes against Islam and undermined public order. The situation is only made more severe as these attacks have been perpetrated by a collective/political movement, have become international, and have been defended by government officials.

How do Swedish officials approach the latest attack on the Qur’an?

Last year, citing freedom of expression, the Swedish police and justice minister allowed Paludan to burn the Qur’an during the holy month of Ramadan, despite objections from the country’s Muslim minority, which constitutes approximately 8 percent of the population, and Muslim countries. Something similar occurred within the framework of the most recent attack. Despite Turkey’s warnings, Paludan burned the Qur’an near the Turkish Embassy in Stockholm with the Swedish police’s permission. In a written statement, the Swedish police stressed the importance of freedom of expression and assembly. However, an important point that Swedish and other European officials who share the same view seem to miss is that such racist behavior has hijacked the political mainstream which has been for the most part ignored.

Why do hateful and insulting statements and acts, which target sacred values, not qualify as free speech?

Like many other rights and liberties, neither the freedom of expression nor the freedom of assembly are unlimited in modern democracies. One cannot enjoy such liberties in a way that violates the rights of others or undermines public order. Indeed, Article 19 of the United Nations International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) stipulates that freedom of expression may be subject to certain restrictions to ensure respect for the rights or reputation of others, or for the protection of national security, public order, public health, or morals. Moreover, Article 20 takes a more authoritative step by stating that “any advocacy of national, racial or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”

The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) features a similar regulation. Accordingly, Article 10 of the convention stipulates that freedom of expression “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder and crime [and] for the protection of the reputation or rights of others.” The United Nations International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (ICERD) also prohibits racist propaganda and activities.

Likewise, the European Commission for Democracy through Law (Venice Commission) stresses that hate crimes and the incitement of discrimination must be punished. Accordingly, the commission argues that such punishment would send a strong signal to all social groups that democracy does not condone any action that violates its fundamental values, including tolerance, respect for human rights, pluralism, and non-discrimination.

Freedom of expression is undoubtedly a sine qua non of liberal democracy. However, it is unacceptable for the freedom of expression to jeopardize pluralism, a fundamental goal of democracy, and peaceful co-existence. That is exactly why international norms include reasons for its restriction. It goes without saying that the true purpose of insults and attacks against Islam’s values, such as the burning of the Qur’an and defamation of Prophet Muhammad, is to target European Muslims and, by extension, pluralistic societies.

Is Sweden’s position in line with international human rights laws?

Sweden is a party to the conventions of the United Nations and the Council of Europe that have been mentioned above. Accordingly, Sweden’s decision to allow Paludan, who was convicted of undermining public order in his country last year, to engage in the same act of provocation represents an abuse of freedom of expression, and violates the rights and liberties of others and undermines public order. In this regard, Sweden’s position is not in line with its commitments under international law. At the same time, such attacks, which promote discrimination and target multiculturalism and tolerance, also place Swedish democracy at risk.

Indeed, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), in its General Policy Recommendations Nos. 5 and 15, asked all member states, including Sweden, to combat and discourage hate speech in light of concerns over racist attacks and hate crimes targeting Islam. It is obvious that hurling insults at the Qur’an lays the groundwork for racist/discriminatory attacks against Muslims and aims to provoke Muslims. Consequently, permitting Paluden’s actions despite the severe and present danger they pose to public order represents a violation of international human rights laws.

What does the European Court of Human Rights’ 2018 ruling mean for attacks against religious values?

On October 25, 2018, the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) ruled in E.S. v. Austria that insulting sacred values was not covered by freedom of expression, citing the possibility of inciting religious intolerance. The court also held that imposing a ban on acts like the most recent attack in Sweden, which involved harassment against religious values, was legitimate and necessary for upholding a democratic public order. Moreover, the court agreed with the local courts in Austria that the defendant’s statements regarding Prophet Muhammad amounted to “harassment,” rightfully fueled anger among Muslims, and placed religious peace at risk by promoting prejudice.

All in all, the ECtHR ruling establishes that Sweden’s reference to freedom of expression cannot be considered lawful. In this sense, it is necessary for the Swedish authorities to overhaul their national laws and practives to prevent the abuse of freedom of expression in a way that threatens to eliminate the culture of tolerance and social pluralism and to undermine public order.

The Swedish government’s approach is not in line with the country’s domestic laws either, since the Swedish Constitution requires public institutions to combat religious discrimination. Moreover, individuals who humiliate a social group based on their religious beliefs and incite others against that religious community can be sentenced to up to four years in prison under the Swedish penal code.

According to official data, 3,150 hate crimes took place in Sweden in 2020 alone. The weak response of Sweden’s public institutions to the rise of Islamophobia and hate crimes, together with their failure to enforce international and national laws, is deeply worrying.

F

inland and Sweden’s political aspiration to join NATO has been on a rocky and problematic path. After some years of grooming Finnish and Swedish officials on joining NATO, the countries abandoned their individual grand strategies of national survival, used to navigate the geopolitical risks and obstacles of the old Cold War, and opted away from military non-alignment, present on paper only.

Sweden is attempting to opt out of the idea of a Swedish model to be exported to the world and the notion of Swedish exceptionalism, and throw its efforts into joining the declining Western-centric, United States-led unipolar order (together with the institution of Western liberalism). Thus, the Finnish and Swedish governments, of their own free will and volition, have chosen to become objects and not subjects at a point in time that sees a shift and evolution in the global geopolitical order.

It seemed that Finland and Sweden assumed that there will be no obstacles to their anticipated smooth entry into NATO, a product of a sense of self-entitlement and spending too much time in the echo chamber that is the divisive ideological environment of Western liberalism.

There were hints and signs from several NATO members that would or could potentially delay the process. After years of arrogant and didactic lecturing from Sweden to the non-Western world on the ethical righteousness and superiority of Swedish values and norms, their theoretical model of Swedish liberalism (with an “exceptional” twist) met and clashed with the model of Turkish realism.

Western decline?

Western decline is a complex and multidimensional interaction in international relations in an era when the power and influence capabilities and capacities of core Western liberal countries are in a state of relative decay and decline. It includes various dimensions such as ideology versus pragmatism and liberalism versus realism, where a clash of wills and perceptions is taking place in a hyper-politicised environment. In spite of what Finland and Sweden may think, based upon their assumptions of moral superiority, it is Turkey that holds the trump card in this international negotiation.

At a political level, Finland and Sweden have fully committed themselves to the aim of NATO membership, which Turkey can make happen if certain security guarantees are made and kept. The negotiation involves the trade of facilitating NATO membership for Finland and Sweden in exchange for rather concise and concrete assurances for Turkey on the matter of the Kurdish terror group PKK. In the initial round of the negotiation process, Finland and Sweden refused to offer and guarantee those assurances, and thus the initial stage of NATO offering membership was stalled.

Perhaps, coming to the realization that Turkey held the high ground in the negotiation process, there was the appearance of agreement by Finland and Sweden as signaled in official information sources on the NATO membership process. Western mainstream media discourse places the blame on Turkey for delaying the process without engaging in the reasons for the delay. This is also very much part of the negotiation process: using information channels to cognitively coerce Turkey into making concessions for emotional reasons rather than the real underlying pragmatic reasons.

Why are Sweden and Finland hesitant? 

There is a great deal of hesitancy by the Finnish and Swedish governments to meet the Turkish conditions for agreeing to their membership. The source of this hesitancy is found in the level of political risk among the voter constituencies that would react strongly. Although Finland and Sweden acted in bad faith in their negotiations already, they believe and try and present themselves as being the victims and that eventually Turkey will give them what they want.

In particular, it would likely prove to be political suicide for a Finnish or Swedish government to extradite the individuals named by Turkey; the unwillingness to co-operate is instead blamed on legal obstacles. However, the true concern is a political backlash by voters.

This creates a conundrum and dilemma for Finnish and Swedish policymakers. On the one hand, there is the desired “holy grail” of NATO membership and full integration into the Western-centric world from an ideological and political point of view. On the other hand, the likely high political costs of achieving this goal by granting Turkey the necessary assurances. The cost-benefit ratio for Turkey is somewhat different, where the costs of permitting membership are not high from a technical and administrative perspective.

Golden opportunity for Turkey 

For Turkey, this is a golden opportunity to make the best use of its leverage to increase state security. The PKK is a significant state and human security concern for Turkey as the death toll from its terrorist acts continuously increases. Turkey cannot compromise on the issue of security, placing the necessity to concede on Finland and Sweden.

It would appear that the Finnish and Swedish governments are trying to gradually wear down Turkish resolve on the NATO membership question, and based on their presumptive public statements, they assume that time is on their side. However, this would only be valid if Turkey perceived itself at a power and time disadvantage to its counterparts, when the reverse is actually true.

Formal NATO membership is a very high political priority for the Finnish and Swedish governments. There are certain steps to achieve this goal, but the two governments do not want to take the required steps owing to the constraints and restraints of domestic politics. At the same time, provocative public acts of political activism in Sweden are bound to guarantee that Turkey as a matter of honor remains ever more resolute on its terms and conditions.

Alliances are permanent institutions of mutual guarantees to the constituent parties that require long-term, stable, and determined commitments. Once the alliance is set up, the partners invest their faith in survivability. Yet, selecting the party on which to rely for the guarantee of a smooth future should not be a fait accompli. NATO is not an exception to this calculus because each member brings its own interests, security concerns, or complicated geopolitical environment.

The reason for this calculus is the mutual burden on the members of the alliance. The initial calculation is the contributed surplus of the member state to the overall structure of the alliance and other members as well. The second calculation is the structure of, say NATO, and security coverage addressing the individual and collective security concerns. These two give-and-take calculi form the parameters for membership that has pains and gains for the designed collective security architecture.

If the current debates on—or Turkish reservations regarding—the application by Sweden and Finland for NATO membership are reviewed, the calculus of the alliance, per the identified parameters, can expose the pains and gains for these countries, NATO, and, specifically, Turkey.

Sweden and Finland are rather small-sized states in terms of demography and military posture. The Russian aggression in Ukraine, as a potential pattern during the coming decades, has pushed them to review the possibility in case a war escalates in the vicinity. The population of Sweden is a little more than 10 million while Finland’s is around 5.5 million. The median ages are 41.1 and 42.8 respectively, and population growth rates are 0.74% and 0.26% respectively.

The land mass of Sweden is 338,450 square km and that of Finland 447,430. The fit for service military manpower in Sweden is 3.4 million and in Finland 1.9 million. On duty active forces in the militaries of Sweden are 22,000 and in Finland 16,000 except for a small number of paramilitary forces. The defense budget of Sweden is $8.60 billion and Finland’s is $6.03 billion; both are lower than the average defense budgets of NATO countries, except for the very small-sized ones such as Montenegro and Latvia.

Given the above facts and figures, the military capacities of both Sweden and Finland are highly limited to respond to any external conventional threat, which makes the two countries potentially dependent on foreign security guarantees in the realm of Russian conventional and unconventional threats. Meanwhile the contribution of Sweden and Finland to their own security is very limited due to the low level of military preparedness and the geopolitical positioning in the security architecture of the Baltic Sea.

Sweden hosts a considerable number of FETO and PKK/PYD/YPG offshoots that facilitate these organizations’ work with wider Europe against Turkish interests through fundraising, propaganda, and conscription. There are eleven PKK-affiliated organizations in Sweden, besides four media institutions, which receive funding from the Swedish government.

The efficacy of terror propaganda in Sweden is also evident in another significant figure: the number of Swedish conscripts in the PKK which was around 50 in 2017. Furthermore, the PKK had built a Scandinavian Brigade in its cadre under the pretense of fighting DAESH, though these individuals fought against the Turkish military.

Another interesting fact about Sweden is the paradox that makes the current policy of the Swedish government questionable. As Sweden became a safe haven for PKK terrorists in 1984, an internal dispute among them broke out. Due to disagreements among PKK cells, the PKK leadership in Sweden carried out executions against dissident members.

Targeting PKK dissident members mobilized the Swedish government to deport eighteen PKK members which led to the alleged assassination of Prime Minister Olof Palme on February 28, 1986, by the PKK, according to the confessions of Semdin Sakik, an arrested PKK leader. The current Swedish government, from the point of view of the Turkish leadership, tolerates, facilitates, and protects the existence of these PKK cells despite their alleged role in the assassination of Olof Palme.

Turkey is concerned about the Swedish grants to terror cells in the form of direct funding and arms supply at no cost. In 2021, it has been assessed that Sweden granted the PKK/PYD/YPG $376 million—a development that is strongly opposed by Turkey. This funding goes to the PKK/PYD/YPG despite the fact that the PKK and its sister organizations in Syria and Iraq continuously plot terror attacks on Turkish soldiers and Syrian civilians.

Another hotspot is the “hosted” FETO members in these countries. FETO members are gradually offered permanent residence and citizenship while having the privilege of occupying roles at universities and think tanks, mainly provoking malign narratives against Turkey.  Ankara has shared arrest warrants with the Ministries of Justice of these states with adequate proof for indictment, but neither Sweden nor Finland have arrested and deported these individuals.

The second reason for the Turkish reservations about Sweden’s and Finland’s membership is the arms embargo of their governments on the Turkish defense industry. In addition to certain European countries and the U.S. implementation of either overt or covert embargos on Turkey, two additional countries adopt the same policy: Sweden and Finland. The current escalation in Ukraine is a clear indicator that any embargo on Turkey will weaken the defense capacity of NATO.

In this sense, Turkey’s approach is to handle this constraint with all NATO member states and with these two countries. Sweden was very committed to calling for an arms embargo on Turkey in October 2021 due to Ankara’s military campaigns against the PKK/PYD/YPG.

After all, Sweden and Finland will gain more by becoming NATO members whereby they will enjoy a heightened sense of security, especially against potential risks and threats. NATO will bear the burden of their desire to join the alliance, which will have limited gains from their membership. Turkey had to sacrifice the lives of Turkish soldiers in Korea with a 22% casualty ratio in the three years of the Korean War.

Sweden’s and Finland’s quest is to become NATO members leaning on the EU solidarity while taking upon themselves a very limited burden. In this calculus, Sweden and Finland benefit from NATO membership while contributing a very limited military capacity to the alliance. Given the expectation that allies defend each other against all sorts of threats, both hard and soft of the current age, Turkey has lost trust in Sweden and, to some extent, Finland due to their long-lasting, anti-Turkey malign activities.

Consequently, Swedes and Finns must agree to give up their malign activities against Turkey, a future ally, which in turn would commit to sacrificing the lives of Turkish soldiers in order to guarantee their security as NATO members.

When the war broke out in Ukraine on February 24, 2022, many observers were caught by surprise in spite of the dire predictions and warnings in reporting by mainstream Western media. The “old” global crisis of the COVID19 pandemic was quickly relegated to a secondary role and replaced in the headlines with the Russia-Ukraine war.

However, a lot of the reporting and analyses from Western countries have drawn global generalizations based on Western-centric values and interests. These generalizations, in turn, have informed and influenced the Western world’s perception, understanding, and reactions to the events unfolding in Ukraine. In the long run, such reporting concludes that the process may incur unforeseen or unanticipated threats and expose weaknesses for countries seeking to integrate further into the Euro-Atlantic structures as a pre-emptive security measure.

The shock effect of the Russia-Ukraine war

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine caught various international observers by surprise, not the least, owing to the almost universal belief that the various threatened sanctions would mean that costs would outweigh any benefits of a military campaign.

The lack of foresight and predictions hints at a possible divergence in international relations between the U.S. unipolar global order and the countries and civilizations that fall beyond this geopolitical realm. There has been an expected international shock and uncertainty caused by the war, but it has been far from a universal condemnation of Russia for launching its military operation against Ukraine.

What seems to have happened in this increasing global divide between Western and non-Western countries is a growing gap in national interests, values, and perceptions with the process already beginning before the current Ukraine war. The idea of global messianic universalism under Western leadership—especially that of the United States—is fading away as the world grows more diverse and unstable in the wake of Western ascendency after the outcomes of the Cold War.

Although a physical war is taking place in Ukraine, its implications and repercussions are much wider in the context of the United States seeking to defend its global hegemonic position against countries such as China and Russia.

Finland learned a particularly painful lesson in the wake of the Soviet Union’s attack on the country in the 1939-40 Winter War, and the subsequent alignment with Nazi Germany to remedy those territorial loses in the 1941-44 Continuation War, which proved to be disastrous.

A hard lesson was learned on the risks of being a junior partner to a larger military power. Therefore, a more nuanced and independent foreign and security policy was pursued in order to ensure national interests could be protected without foreign entanglements.

However, there have been an increasing number of events and attempts to push Finnish and Swedish public opinion incrementally towards the NATO membership option. NATO has been actively lobbying both countries through diplomatic activities to join the alliance. There were also highly publicized events of the unconfirmed “Russian submarines” in Helsinki Harbor and the Stockholm Archipelago, which increased public support for NATO membership.

Sweden has been increasingly integrating with NATO before the Russia-Ukraine War broke out, for example, by hosting military exercises with NATO forces in Exercise Aurora. These efforts to shift public opinion towards a more favorable view of NATO membership have been based on fear: the fear of something bad happening (see Russian military attack), and that something bad can happen to the citizens of both countries. This is captured in the parting words of former U.S. ambassador to Sweden, Mark Brzezinski, who said that NATO was like an insurance policy for Sweden.

Even though Finland and Sweden are not yet NATO members, they both gave up the policy of neutrality long ago. When the war in Ukraine broke out, Sweden initially rejected any consideration of joining NATO and the Swedish prime minister stated that the country had no such intentions.

The underlying reason given by Sweden for not wanting to join NATO was that to do so would destabilize the Northern European security. This stood in contrast to the Finnish prime minister who promised a quick public debate on the issue of NATO membership.

However, Sweden’s official government position on the NATO question changed to align with Finland’s, with both countries pledging to decide on the matter by the end of June 2022. The war in Ukraine has successfully shaped a slight majority of public opinion in favor of joining NATO in both countries, although this all comes in a time of war and through the use of fear. The Swedish and Finish decision on exploring the NATO option is likely to have been decided before the Russia-Ukraine war at the political level, and it still requires time and circumstance to engineer public consent.

Possible consequences of NATO expansion in the Baltic Sea

The dilemmas of Finland and Sweden are tied to the current environment of politics of perceived risk. These mainly pertain to risk considerations such as Russia’s border politics, lack of hard security capacity, and potential dangers posed by Russia owing to perceptions of unpredictability and lack of reliability.

However, by seeking NATO membership, there are multiple risks. Finland and Sweden joining NATO may be seen as a de facto declaration of war against Russia; they will become entangled in great power politics that is not in their national interests; it is likely to harm bilateral relations and issues of collaboration/cooperation; they will lose the independent ability to influence and manage foreign relations with Russia; and they will be at the frontline of any possible wider armed conflict, if one were to break out.

Certainly, Russia has warned of the consequences of Finland and/or Sweden joining NATO given their perception of security interests being further compromised by the U.S.-led alliance. In addition to a likely Russian military redeployment to take into account the new status of Finland and Sweden, there are also likely to be political and economic consequences of joining NATO.

It would also spell a likely end to initiatives of a non-nuclear Baltic region and negatively impact Sweden’s initiatives to influence the world in a positive direction—for example the obvious contradictions that will arise with its “humanitarian superpower” brand and feminist foreign policy.

A new iron curtain for a new Cold War?

In recent years, as the multipolar order gained strength and influence, there have been increasing discussions and speculations about a “New Cold War.”. Given the global effects on international relations, there seems to be a new Iron Curtain descending not only on Europe but across the entire globe, which divides the Western-centric and non-Western centric powers. This is a point in time when the U.S. seeks to claim back its global hegemony, which increases the risks for everyone owing to a volatile global geopolitical polarization.

There have been a number of worrying public statements that suggest and confirm that the war in Ukraine concerns much more than the territorial integrity and sovereignty of the country. In a relatively underexposed moment of clarity, General Curtis Scaparrotti, the former Commander of the United States European Command and NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander, Europe,  stated, “We are in a proxy war with Russia. We are using the Ukrainians as our proxy forces.”

More recently, the U.S. Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin stated that the U.S. wants to weaken Russia. Messaging of a U.S. proxy war against Russia has been echoed by former U.S. secretary of defense Leon Panetta. In other words, apart from the political and geopolitical repercussions and consequences of the war in Ukraine, there are also strong economic shocks that will be further exacerbated by the Western world’s sanctions against Russia for invading Ukraine.

The Russian invasion of Ukraine stirred up debates and policy decisions regarding defense and security, especially in Europe. Many countries made decisions to increase military spending. Recently, Finland and Sweden, which traditionally take an approach of non-alignment and military independence, face predicaments of policy change with respect to their pacifism and the historic decision of joining NATO.

The Russian aggression and the growing public concerns put pressure on the governments of Sweden and Finland to join NATO. Finland, which shares a border with Russia, seems to be treating the situation with more urgency and plans to join NATO as soon as the summer of 2022. Sweden, which was taking a more cautious path towards membership, also seems to be in favor of following in Finland’s path.

According to local media the Nordic countries will submit their NATO application simultaneously in mid-May, likely the week of May 16. Finnish Minister of Foreign Affairs Pekka Haavisto commented that no fixed date has been set but that it would be “useful” for the bid to launch in conjunction. On April 25, Finnish media Iltalehti reported that suggestions from the Swedish leadership about submitting the applications at the same time had met with agreement from the Finnish side, providing Sweden goes ahead with its plan to join NATO.

Why are Sweden and Finland neutral states?

Historically, Finland has been a buffer state. Until the Russian Imperial Army annexed it in 1808, Finland was a part of the Swedish Kingdom. It remained an autonomous buffer state for a century under the Russian Empire, known as the “Grand Duchy of Finland,” and declared independence during the Russian Revolution in 1917. During the interwar period, relations between Finland and the Soviet Union were tense. Later, during World War II, Finland was regarded by the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany to be under the Soviet sphere of influence.

Finland officially adopted neutrality in the Cold War period, and a 1948 treaty with the Soviet Union consolidated its desire to remain out of great power conflicts. The treaty would ensure that Finland would not be hostile towards the Soviet Union and deter any attack on the Soviet Union carried out via Finnish soil by Germany or its allies. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, Finland tilted towards the West and finally became an EU member in 1995.

Sweden was a historically non-aligned country and stayed out of both world wars. Although Sweden saw the Soviet Union as a threat and cooperated with NATO during the Cold War period, the country opted for military independence and stayed out of the alliance. It joined the EU the same year as Finland.

Remaining outside of the NATO umbrella— similar to Ukraine—and observing NATO’s limited response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine have provoked Sweden and Finland to rethink their military neutrality and non-alignment policy. With their foundation from earlier training programs, the integration of Finland and Sweden to NATO will not be difficult. Both the U.S. and NATO have given positive signals that their membership request would likely be accepted swiftly; however, the admittance process may take four months to a year. It is also unlikely that the countries would face difficultly fulfilling the unanimous vote requirement to join NATO.

Public opinion and political will in both countries favor NATO membership

The public opinion and political will in both countries are in favor of joining the military alliance. In Finland, the public that had been uninterested in joining NATO now see its importance. Opinion polls show that more than 60% of Finns favor joining NATO, a figure that had remained at 20-30% before the war in Ukraine. In the upcoming weeks, Finland is to come to an official decision as well as an outline to its path to joining NATO.

The ruling party in Sweden, the Social Democrats, released a statement that read, “When Russia invaded Ukraine, Sweden’s security position changed fundamentally.” The party’s position is in favor of following in Finland’s path in terms of NATO membership. However, the Swedish government will face general elections in September 2022 and may want to avoid voter alienation by making such a drastic change, and, therefore, has been treading a more careful path in the past weeks.

Swedish newspaper Svenska Dagbladet reported earlier in April that Magdalena Andersson, prime minister of Sweden, was planning to apply for membership in time for a NATO summit in late June. A poll on April 20 showed that the percentage of Swedes that are in favor of joining NATO went up from 51% in March to 57%, those opposing fell to 21% from 24%, and undecided votes decreased to 22% from 25%. This shows more certainty among the public as Russia increases its threats.

The expansion of NATO was essentially the situation Russia wanted to avoid. Dmitry Peskov, the Kremlin spokesperson, stated that the NATO alliance remained a tool towards confrontation and its expansion would not bring stability. Moscow threatened to readjust the balance at the border and reposition nuclear weapons in the Kaliningrad region between Poland and Lithuania if Finland and Sweden joined NATO (nuclear installations in the region already exist).

Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of the Security Council of Russia, also mentioned that Russia would have to strengthen its land, naval, and air forces in the Baltic Sea.

For now, the accession process of Sweden and Finland to NATO is set to heighten tensions, but the possibility of direct confrontation from Russia is unlikely given that its troops are allocated to Ukraine. Still, nuclear buildup in the Baltic puts the region on edge.

It was not long ago when NATO’s divisions were running deep. Until recently, many in the West were questioning the security alliance’s purpose.

As a presidential candidate in 2016, Donald Trump said that if Baltic states weren’t “paying their bills” the U.S. shouldn’t necessarily protect them from Russia notwithstanding treaty obligations. In 2019, French President Emanuele Macron asserted that NATO was “becoming brain-dead”. The following year, tensions between Greece and Turkey led some experts to conclude that NATO was “paralyzed”.

At that time, 70 percent of Turkey’s population saw the U.S., NATO’s dominant military force, as a threat to their country. Many voices in the West accused Germany of being a “shaky alliance partner” and “NATO’s biggest freeloader.”

But Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February was a geopolitical tsunami that fundamentally changed the strategic stakes for NATO members. Amid drastic changes in Europe’s security architecture, the Western alliance has regained a sense of purpose. Today NATO is more unified and cohesive than it ever has been since the Soviet Union’s implosion in 1991.

“Threat is the glue that binds together a security alliance,” explained John Feffer, the director of Foreign Policy In Focus, in an interview with Politics Today. “When the threat increases–and there is a consensus on the nature of the threat–the alliance necessarily becomes more cohesive. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has served to smooth over a number of disagreements within the alliance.”

The Ankara-based Foreign Policy Institute’s Dr Tarik Oguzlu wrote that “as we witness NATO’s European members awaking from their geopolitical hibernation, NATO is almost returning to its founding mission.”

The war in Ukraine quickly led to a “revolution in German military affairs” with Berlin now committed to a hike in defense spending. The Germans put Nord Stream 2 pipeline on hold. Berlin is also arming the Ukrainian resistance with lethal weapons despite previously opposing NATO’s militarization of Ukraine.

Since 24 February, NATO members “have rallied together and acted quickly with new defence and deterrence measures such as activating the NATO defence plans, activating elements of the NATO Response Force, and approving the deployment of four new multinational battlegroups in Eastern Europe,” Mihai Chihaia, a policy analyst at the Brussels-based European Policy Centre, told Politics Today.

“Reinforcing the Eastern flank has been a top priority and the Allies have shown a very high degree of solidarity. In addition, the strong commitment to Article 5 (mutual defense) has been constantly reiterated.”

Expanding the Alliance

NATO is not only becoming more unified because of a growing common threat perception of Russia. The security alliance might be on the verge of expanding its membership. Sweden and Finland appear close to abandoning their decades-old foreign policy tradition of neutrality and entering NATO. Finland doing so would add 810 miles to the border between Russia and NATO members.

“If Sweden and Finland join, NATO’s presence and coordination in the Baltic Sea area, as well as more broadly in the Nordic and Arctic, will be strengthened, together with NATO’s defense and deterrence posture,” said Chihaia. “Their armed forces would be an asset to the alliance as both Sweden and Finland have been close partners for years, they have invested in modernizing their armed forces, and there is a high degree of interoperability and adherence to NATO standards.”

This deeply alarms Moscow, which has been warning Stockholm and Helsinki about political and military consequences. “Russia has threatened to place nuclear weapons in its Kaliningrad enclave if Finland or Sweden join,” explained Feffer.

“[Russia] has threatened to increase its military presence in the Baltic region to deal with NATO’s extended border with Russia if Finland joins. But I’m not sure that the security architecture will change that much. Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, but they have coordinated with the security alliance for some time. Russia, meanwhile, has reportedly already placed nuclear weapons in Kaliningrad (according to the Lithuanian government). But it does mean that the space for neutrality in Europe is shrinking,” Feffer added.

The Orban and Le Pen Factors

There are some limits to NATO’s unity, which brings us to Hungary. With Prime Minister Viktor Orban at the helm, Hungary is the Western alliance’s most Russia-friendly member. In the past, he has hailed Russia as a model for his “illiberal” country.

Although Budapest did not veto EU sanctions on Moscow following Russia’s invasion of Ukraine earlier this year, Orban has vowed to block EU sanctions on oil and gas from Russia. The Hungarian leader has also opposed demands to halt the expansion of the Rosatom-financed Paks Nuclear Plant. As the leadership in Budapest sees it, Hungarian citizens should not be burdened by costlier bills because of energy sanctions against Russia.

“Hungary is the problem child of Europe because of the ties [that Russia maintains with] the Orban government. As long as [Orban] is there, Budapest will be a problem,” Dr Theodore Karasik, the former Senior Political Scientist in the International Policy and Security Group at RAND Corporation, told Politics Today. Nonetheless, Budapest is not defending Russia’s violations of Ukrainian sovereignty. “It’s important to note that Orban is not siding with Russia here,” as Feffer pointed out. “He has condemned the invasion.”

The current and latest waves of upheaval in international relations and the global order that have been precipitated by the Russian military operations in Ukraine in the latest iteration of the Ukrainian crisis are likely to have significant implications, even if the war is not yet over. The situation creates a lot of rumors and speculations regarding what will stem from these events in the wider world, beyond the war zone.

How will the Russia-Ukraine War affect the stance of countries that have historically followed a non-aligned or neutral status? Past political and military tensions with Russia have been used to open public discussion in Finland and Sweden, and to lobby for the idea of breaking with the past security identity policy and join NATO.

The Past and Public Opinion in Sweden and Finland on the NATO Debate

Sweden and Finland have a rhetorical tradition of neutrality or at least non-alignment in times of armed conflict. Sweden has adopted this stance after a disastrous series of wars with Russia in the 18th and 19th centuries, culminating in the loss of Finland during the Napoleonic Wars. Finland adopted the non-aligned strategy as a national survival mechanism in the wake of the struggles and challenges of being caught between the geopolitical ambitions of the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany during World War II (known as the Winter War of 1939-1940 and the Continuation War of 1941-44). The Swedish stance has evolved over time and circumstances, driven by mainstream establishment politics.

Historically, Sweden has walked a very fine line that defies its claim to neutrality or non-alignment, for example sending arms to Finland during the Winter War, Swedish volunteers serving in the Nazi SS (Protection Squadron), or deporting Baltic civilians and soldiers back to the waiting Soviet NKVD, the predecessor to the KGB. In the wake of the Cold War, Sweden undertook large defence cuts to a self-sufficient military structure created to deter either side, but also drew closer to NATO cooperation.

The Swedish government’s political rhetoric in the 21st century began to move away from the word “neutral” and even downplayed non-alignment as a policy. Conflict events occurring elsewhere were used to try to gauge and manipulate public opinion to be more positive towards NATO membership. The events in Crimea in 2014 were used to shift public opinion, though unsuccessfully. What did shift public opinion was the story of a “Russian submarine” in the Stockholm Archipelago.

Although, the Swedish political elite favors NATO membership, the population is less enthusiastic.

Although, the Swedish political elite favors NATO membership, the population is less enthusiastic. Finland has also faced dilemmas, especially concerning the historical legacy of the country and its attitude towards neutrality or at least non-alignment. There have been periods of NATO lobbying Finland and Sweden to join the alliance, for example, in the wake of the alleged “Russian” submarine sightings near Stockholm and Helsinki (Helsinki – the two countries are the only non-NATO members in the Baltic Sea other than Russia).

But, for now, the issue of NATO membership is still off the table as the countries’ governments lack sufficient parliamentary and public support to push through such a “controversial” security proposal.

Rather, there is the understanding that the Russia-Ukraine War provides the basis for spurring a broader debate. Meanwhile, Finland has adopted what it calls the “NATO option provision,” whereby if it feels that NATO membership is required for ensuring Finnish security, it will begin the membership application process.

The general opinion and consensus of various non-partisan observers on the two countries’ attitude and prospects towards joining NATO is that there is currently limited likelihood of this happening in the immediate future. In spite of the external and foreign environment and pressures that create an increasingly closer relationship between these countries and NATO, there are sufficient divisions and constraints in domestic politics that hinder the pursuit of such a move.

Possible Consequences of the Different Scenarios 

Finland and Sweden’s neutrality/non-alignment status has long been used as a means of regulating and managing their geopolitical security, and to navigate the pitfalls and traps of getting actively involved in the wars of larger belligerent powers. These national foreign policy identities have been successful for both countries in preventing undue foreign interference and manipulation from the time of the Cold War onwards.

The identity of being neutral or at least non-aligned has signaled an independence from what Russia in the last two decades has seen as an increasing threat from NATO. Although there are differences and strains in the diplomatic relations between the two Nordic countries and Russia, the relations are on the basis of what can be classified as a “cold friendship.” Should Sweden or Finland actually join NATO, it would without a doubt change Russia’s security calculations concerning both countries pushing them to an enemy or adversary status.

Consequently, the notion of collective security by joining NATO is likely to have the opposite effect through increasing the collective insecurity of the two countries based on the new relationship that will result from their sovereign choice. It becomes a matter of achieving a harmony between freedom of action and a reasoned security perception that avoids the geopolitical traps experienced by both Finland and Sweden in their respective national histories.

Finally, it’s been put to rest. The passionate and polemical debate between those of true faith and the heretics; equality and exclusivity; those who believe in freedom and those who oppress. If anything could sound the moral death knell of Europe’s purported universalism and nonsenses their ethical absolutism, it is their treatment of refugee children. The awful abuse by those with unrivalled power upon the powerless – that too, children, is the surest indicator of venality.

Whether it’s the sexual abuse of unaccompanied children throughout Europe or the recent forcible seizure of children in Sweden, something truly unholy is happening. What kind of sick, depraved system relishes in inflicting further suffering on the grief-stricken? Pity the weak in the lands claiming liberty. More specifically, the manner in which Sweden is precariously confiscating refugee children from their biological parents is outright shocking. Not just in the grotesque manner that children have been treacherously taken away from their parents, but in the cruel, sanctimonious justifications by Swedish Social Services.

High-sounding, grand glutinous words that boldly advocate for child welfare are parroted to claim the moral high ground and then weaponized to pulverize their tender lives. Imagine the utter hypocrisy of justifying mental anguish upon already troubled, scarred families and their children, all of whom fled war. This is a criminal absurdity. Without due care, thought or consideration, the Swedish state violently disrupts the lives of some of the most alienated segments of their own society, and justifies inflicting violence with reckless allegations of parental impropriety. Could anything be more perverse and misshapen? Villainy wears many masks, none more dangerous than virtue.

Critically, to further explore this crime of stealing innocence from war-scarred refugee children, it is important to judiciously deconstruct the claims that Sweden makes. How does it justify such unscrupulous behavior? In other words, what is the rationale for taking children away from their loved ones? To begin, Sweden justifies these extreme steps based on promoting their own self-image of being ‘champions of children’s rights and by claiming “Sweden has very strong legislation in order to protect the welfare of children.” Of course, nothing more to talk about then. Let’s just take their word for it.

The Swedish state – through its child welfare services  – the ‘Social,’took possession of a newborn baby immediately after delivery.

With such logic, it is inconceivable that the Swedish social system is not altruistic, trustworthy and reliable. However, when probing the reasoning behind child seizures, the opposite is true. Stealing children is often on unfounded, flimsy allegations by third-parties, unverified checks of domestic abuse, or dubious contentions of extremism. The Swedish state – through its child welfare services  – the ‘Social,’ rapidly intervenes without a process of mediation.

In one alarming case, they took possession of a newborn baby immediately after delivery. What is especially unbelievable is that any basic level of understanding of the principles of social work and child welfare undisputedly cautions against taking children away from their families and allows so only under the strictest situations and as a ‘last resort.’

A few further problematic issues further stand out: (a) What is the record of Swedish social services when seizing children; (b) How effective are they in providing a loving, caring home to the seized children; (c) Are the religious, moral rights of the parents being respected in raising the stolen children as Muslims? First, the situation for unaccompanied refugee children in Europe, and state-seized refugee children in Sweden specifically, is abysmal.

A report, based on research conducted by Human Rights Watch in Sweden from January 25 to February 8, 2016 identifies key shortcomings in the Swedish child welfare system. As a result of these shortcomings, some children “are not receiving the care and attention they need and to which they are entitled.” In other words, the evidence by independent investigators is the Swedish child welfare program suffers from serious drawbacks. Second, there are horrific stories of child abuse occurring in the homes of the children by their adoptive guardians.

The situation for unaccompanied refugee children in Europe, and state-seized refugee children in Sweden specifically, is abysmal.

In fact, on October 16, 2021, Swedish TV Channel aired a segment on the sexual abuse of Syrian refugee children, including instances of rape of children by their Swedish legal guardian. Also, there are at least, two cases of Syrian children, Yasmine and Dina, who were forcibly taken away from their families and later committed suicide.

The suicide of those two children should raise alarm about the repercussions of the Swedish Social horrific process. So much for the unquestionable standards of Swedish child welfare. Third, the seized children rarely are placed in the care of families that recognize, or even respect, the rights of their families to have their children raised according to their own faith and ethical values. Is this not basic in a democracy which recognizes and allegedly champions pluralism? Again, no concern for the Muslim faith and heritage of these children.

Altogether, the Sweden government’s reasoning is not convincing. In fact, it is eerily familiar to the residential school system in Canada that led to unspeakable crimes against Native Canadian children who were seized by the state. Similarly, the horrible situation of child welfare services in Sweden curiously ignores the following: clear directives to only institutionalize children as a last resort; ensure the safety of refugee children; account for the horrific suicide of refugee children and prevent the alarming cases of rape and drug abuse by refugee children taken away from their families.

All of this, unequivocally, indicates that that Sweden’s policy on seizing refugee children is illegal, immoral, and untenable. And what we are witnessing in the new emerging global political, socio-economic, and cultural transformations is not just the making of a counter-world order. Rather, it is the unmasking of the utter hypocrisy, of countries like Sweden, who advocate for rights of children in order to erase them.

As diplomatic and military tensions increased between Russia and the West in and around Ukraine, European security came to the fore again as the focal point of the debate over the past year. Russia has been blamed for attempting to change the post-Cold War security order in Europe as Moscow demanded legally binding security guarantees from the U.S. and its NATO allies at the end of 2021.

The U.S. and NATO have already given some written answers to the Russian side, but the Kremlin says its demands have yet to be met or have even been ignored by the West. In the current situation, the parties entered a cul-de-sac of (in)security, where a zero-sum game for both Russia and the West is unavoidable – unless they decide to ignite another world war.

In this whole picture, the future of European security architecture seems somewhat blurry in the years to come. On the one hand, Russia wants to augment disagreements, hereby enhancing geopolitical fault lines among the EU member states in order to reduce Europe’s common decision-making capacity. On the other hand, NATO, which comprises most EU countries, so far could not agree on a security pact to deter Russia.

However, there are third parties in Europe that have been affected the most by these decades-old geopolitical and military rivalries between Russia, the U.S., and NATO. Needless to say, first and foremost, this includes Sweden – namely Europe’s and Russia’s upper north on the edge of the map. As the largest country in population and the strongest by virtue of its historical and political peculiarities among the Nordic countries, Sweden is well known for its non-alignment with a military bloc in its foreign affairs – if not for its political neutrality. Sweden has been a member state of the EU since 1995, but is not a member of NATO.

The Swedish leadership has adopted this policy since the postwar period. The country has focused on creating a welfare social state model, which greatly succeeded in the 1970s and ’80s, and was identified with former prime minister Olof Palme, who was assassinated in 1986. Palme and his fellow social democrats assumed a path of independence, assuring that Sweden does not interfere in military conflicts as part of its foreign policy, and utterly objected to NATO membership during and after the Cold War.

This time, however, the country has become an object of Western policy-making in security spheres, especially as non-conventional security threats have been challenging Sweden for decades, mostly due to the wrongdoings of the U.S., NATO, and the EU in the Middle East and North Africa. New-generation leaders of both social democrats and center right-wing moderates have confronted such problems as the West continued to make geopolitical and military mistakes in Iraq, Syria, Libya, Afghanistan, and elsewhere around the Mediterranean and the Near East.

In the current situation, while Moscow and Western capitals have been accusing each other of escalating the crisis and tension over Ukraine’s break-away regions in the southeast Donbas basin, non-NATO countries near Russia like Sweden and Finland, have started to feel the ages-old security dilemma vis-à-vis the so-called Russian threat on their borders. Looking back in history, since the 18^th century, these two countries together with the Baltic trio and Poland, have had negative experiences with Russia and these problematic past relations and path dependency still negatively influence the formal and informal cultures, institutions, and mentalities in these countries and among their people(s).

Non-NATO countries near Russia like Sweden and Finland, have started to feel the ages-old security dilemma vis-à-vis the so-called Russian threat on their borders.

As for Sweden, the post-Westphalian superiority of the Swedish Kingdom in the north was lost to Russia at Poltava during the Great Northern War of the early 18^th century. In many ways, Russia’s resurgent post-Soviet foreign policy under Vladimir Putin resembles for the Swedes today the age of Peter the Great in the early 1700s – a time when the fear of Russia, namely rysskräck, or “Russophopia,” emerged and was later institutionalized to this day.

From the Russian side, this path dependency is also seen as one of the main sources of the Russian threat rhetoric in Sweden, but nevertheless, it does not necessarily explain the whole picture with regard to the NATO debate in the country. Rather, there are also other arguments which either recommend or discourage the government on armament and military spending. These debates have been used by both social democrats and moderates in order to maintain political neutrality or military non-alignment, as well as to pay attention to the increasing security needs of the country in the Baltic and the Arctic where in recent years Russia has been muscling its military might.

Hence, NATO supporters have gradually gained ground and the erstwhile “peaceful” social democrats became hawkish advocators of militarization; in October 2020, the minority government approved to increase the defense budget by approximately 40% for 2021-25. This move has also brought lots of claims from inside and outside the country. While some say the Swedish government and the media have been using the “Russian aggression” narrative as a pretext to enhance military spending, other arguments reject this approach and blame the Kremlin for the alleged pro-Russian propaganda and disinformation, which accuses the Swedish establishment of reinventing and spreading “Russophobia” across society.

Sweden has been divided over NATO membership; however, according to recent surveys, the general public tends to give support to the country’s bid to join the alliance with a slim majority.

In brief, both claims attempt to securitize Sweden’s long-lasting NATO debates, and it seems the situation will be continued as long as the tension soars between the West and Russia in the months and years to come. It is clear that both at state and society levels, Sweden has been divided over NATO membership; however, according to recent surveys, the general public tends to give support to the country’s bid to join the alliance with a slim majority.

One way or another, the so-called Russia threat discourse constitutes the backbone of these debates in Sweden, and the country is coming closer to the Western alliance, not only in political terms, but also with a full-fledged military partnership. Stockholm has been already cooperating with NATO through the Partnership for Peace program since 1994 and it is likely that the security challenges posed by Russia will trigger a NATO debate in favor of the advocators.

Quo Vadis? Sweden’s litmus test on Ukraine

A priori thoughts suggest a possible Swedish NATO membership, but in praxis the Swedish leadership has so far not formally applied to the alliance. Yet, Sweden, in particular, and Scandinavia, as a whole, have lost the principle of non-alignment in foreign and security policies and tended to lean on the U.S.-led NATO bloc against Russia’s recent assertiveness in and around Eastern Europe. From the former foreign minister Carl Bildt to the incumbent Ann Linde, the Swedish foreign policy decision-makers have already expressed Stockholm’s show of support to Kiev on the current security deadlock between Russia and the West.

In Moscow, however, Stockholm’s pro-Ukrainian stance has also been deemed as its intention to access NATO – a move that the Kremlin fundamentally opposes for security reasons.

In Moscow, however, Stockholm’s pro-Ukrainian stance has also been deemed as its intention to access NATO – a move that the Kremlin fundamentally opposes for security reasons. Thus, the Russian Foreign Ministry has warned NATO over possible Swedish and Finnish bids to join, although both countries’ membership issue was not mentioned in the security guarantees which Moscow has demanded from the U.S. and the alliance.

Following the Russian move, the Swedish side did not publicly state their intention to join NATO, but both Prime Minister Magdalena Andersson and Foreign Minister Ann Linde stated that it is up to Stockholm whether to join NATO as they signalled closer cooperation with the security pact.

Sweden prides and projects itself as being a very modern and liberal society, and an integral and active member of the international community. It is a country that seeks “to punch above its weight.” In practical terms this refers to its desire to have an effect on shaping global developments that is above and beyond its tangible resource availability.

Branding and reputation management play a key role in Swedish foreign policy as an attempted perception force multiplier and with special attention given to curating the impression of Sweden as a value entrepreneur in 21^st-century international relations. This begs the logical and critical question: does the communication hype match the substance of the practical implementation of Sweden’s foreign policy?

Ideological Basis of Swedish Foreign Policy

One of the central components of Swedish foreign policy is its international brand, used as a means to legitimize its actions and ideologically informed by politically central-based norms and values. There are four key profile areas in the “Brand Sweden” strategy that has been active since 2013: society, creativity, innovation, and sustainability. This is about how Sweden has officially defined Swedes, and how they desire to project Sweden and Swedishness to the world in its foreign policy as a template for others to follow. For example, “Brand Sweden” defines Swedish society in the following idealistic picture:

The Swedish social model inspires interest from around the world. The “Swedish model” is built on a core of economic growth, social responsibility and trust expressed through a universal welfare system and strong institutions. This profile area also includes values such as gender equality, respect for human rights, sustainable development, low corruption, and use of new technologies, and it can therefore be used in different ways to create trust in international contexts.

There is a palpable level of idealism and arrogance in the manner “official” Sweden views itself in relation to other countries and other peoples, which it pursues with a messianic zeal in spite of the obvious flaws and physical realm realities that paint a very different picture. The “unofficial” accounts of a system, such as the work of Masoud Kamali on the effects of neo-liberalism in and on Sweden, do not follow what it is preaching to the rest of the world.

The four profile areas noted above from the Brand Sweden campaign are in turn used to inform key Swedish foreign policy programs and approaches. This is where Sweden tries to project itself on the world stage as a progressive and forward-looking norm and value entrepreneur, and a “responsible” member of the international community.

Swedish Foreign Policy in Practice in the 21st Century

There are concrete practical and pragmatic reasons for Sweden’s efforts to cultivate a strong international brand image, which is used as the basis for realizing political objectives; encouraging scientific and cultural exchanges; attracting tourism, investment, and human talent; and promoting trade. It also serves the basis for what are considered as being negative rumors and disinformation.

Recently, institutional mechanisms have been created that are intended to uphold the official narrative in Sweden and abroad, such as the Department for Psychological Defense. These act as gatekeepers and defenders of the country’s idealized and curated image. The cracks are becoming more numerous and obvious in the utopian promises of Swedish foreign policy, and the dysfunctional reality is coming through.

Sweden intends to be an international actor serving for the good in the world. However, the country exports weapons to states involved in armed conflicts.

The notions and practices of Sweden’s humanitarian superpower brand and feminist foreign policy are coming under increasing critical scrutiny owing to obvious discrepancies and contradictions between word and practice. For example, the promise of Swedish feminist foreign policy is for Sweden to be an international actor and a force for good in the world. However, Sweden exports weapons to belligerent states involved in armed conflicts, such as the Gulf states and their war of attrition against Yemen.

The fact that Sweden is willing to arm non-democracies involved in a protracted bloody conflict such as that in Yemen and other conflicts, defies the rhetorical promises and gives a very hollow ring to the idea of Sweden as a responsible international actor bringing enlightenment, innovation, and sustainability to marginalized and dispossessed global peoples.

In contradiction to the idea of Sweden’s positive and peaceful contribution to international relations, encapsulated in such norms as neutrality or non-alignment with international brands, discrepancies are obvious. Thus, the Swedish political establishment elite is increasingly integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures and hosting NATO military exercises on Swedish soil. This suggests a general idea to build up hard power, not as an independent actor, but within the context of an existing military alliance.

Perhaps one of the major reasons for the failure of Sweden’s ideologically informed foreign policy is that this is better suited to a Western-centric global order, where the United States is the unipolar hegemonic power. In the global information and cognitive realm where liberalism was the ideological lens, the Swedish approach made sense. This is no longer the case as a non-Western-centric and multipolar order is gradually gaining power and influence, where pragmatic and non-ideological approaches and styles of communication are more effective.

Sweden is not detached from the mainstream, but rather is integrated into the global mainstream and the liberal politics establishment. It rarely ventures too far from the strategic priorities of mainstream liberal politics, and, on occasion, can engage with some leeway in foreign politics of lesser importance. In spite of all of the talk and rhetoric, Sweden does not follow an independent and innovative path of foreign policy – it follows the lead of such institutions as the European Union and the United Nations. At this point in time, the distinction between the promises of the ideological façade and the resulting dysfunctional reality cannot be more obvious.