A

s the global and regional security environment has become more complex, unpredictable and fragile in recent years, it is evident that a country’s capabilities play an effective role in both deterrence and the establishment of a peaceful environment. In such a context, the EFES 2026 Combined Joint Live-Fire Field Exercise, hosted by Türkiye, goes far beyond being merely a military show of force. The exercise can be interpreted as a ‘deterrence and peace equation’ where military, diplomatic and technological messages are synchronized on the ground.

Both the tactical depth of the day and night scenarios and the domestic and national defense industry solutions integrated into the exercise each year are noteworthy. The Turkish Armed Forces’ (TSK) flawless capability in both “combined and joint operations” is being demonstrated. During the Distinguished Observer Day activities, attended by high-ranking state officials and representatives of friendly and allied nations, Türkiye’s role as a guarantor of regional peace and stability is proclaimed to the world through the language of strategic communication.

The Defense Industry Exhibition within the scope of the EFES 2026 Exercise serves as the clearest demonstration of Türkiye’s leadership in the transformation of modern warfare doctrines and its commitment to the goals of full independence. This exhibition goes beyond traditional fair concepts; it is not merely a space where systems are displayed statically, but also serves as a ‘laboratory’ where they are tested against the realities of the actual battlefield.

Integration with allies and partners: Libya and Syria

One of the key elements that makes the EFES Exercise unique on a global scale is the ability to manage forces from different nations—despite differences in language, doctrine and operational culture—with a ‘united and joint’ will within the same scenario. EFES 2026, meanwhile, saw a record level of foreign personnel participation, in line with both the current geopolitical context and Türkiye’s position within the global system. A particularly notable aspect was the fact that a total of 502 personnel from eastern (331) and western (171) Libya—regions that had recently been at war with one another—underwent joint training with the Turkish Armed Forces during the exercise.

This goes far beyond ordinary military cooperation. The fact that Türkiye’s long-standing objective of “One Libya, One Army”, pursued on the ground in the name of regional and global peace, has materialised in such a massive international exercise demonstrates Ankara’s capacity for diplomatic and military integration. Similarly, the participation of a core element of the Syrian army, which is currently undergoing a restructuring process, in the exercise demonstrates Turkey’s determination to shape the regional security architecture in line with its own vision.

“Putting the future concept of warfare into practice”

The Russia-Ukraine War, the US/Israel-Iran War and other regional conflicts currently dominating the global agenda are bringing the transformation of the modern battlefield into sharp relief. During this period, it has become increasingly clear that manned and unmanned platforms are working in tandem, decision-making processes are being accelerated through AI-integrated solutions, and autonomous systems are creating a multiplier effect. An examination of the EFES 2026 scenarios clearly demonstrates how closely Türkiye is following this transformation and developing pioneering doctrines.

The inclusion of Türkiye’s unmanned combat aircraft, KIZILELMA, in the demonstration flight formation alongside manned platforms such as GÖKBEY, HÜRKUŞ and HÜRJET during the various scenarios conducted throughout the exercise signals the dawn of a new era in air power. The fact that autonomous and AI-supported unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicle systems (Baykar K2 and Sivrisinek kamikaze UAV, VTOL KALKAN UAVs; Skydagger FPV drone; STM’s 20-strong KARGU swarm) struck targets simulated with live warheads astonished everyone. In exercises conducted worldwide, it has not previously been observed that unmanned kamikaze aerial vehicles of different types were operated in a similar scenario within a ‘swarm architecture’.

Either live warheads were not used, or only formation capabilities were demonstrated. EFES 2026 went down in the records as the first live, explosive application field. Furthermore, within the scope of the exercise, F-16s’ HGK-84 (Precision Guidance Kit), alongside the 20mm cannon of the ATAK helicopters and their attacks with UMTAS missiles, and the coordinated scenario involving supporting fire from 155mm FIRTINA II howitzers, demonstrates the level of network-centred warfare capability achieved by the Turkish Armed Forces. This ultimately proves that Türkiye is not merely limited to producing platforms; it has built up significant tactical expertise regarding how these systems are to be utilised as part of combined and joint forces within complex combat scenarios.

The defense industry’s field test

One of the most significant innovations that elevates the EFES exercises beyond a mere military manoeuvre is the organic integration of the Defense Industry Exhibition into the exercise. The realities of the battlefield are always different from laboratory tests. Thanks to the visionary coordination of the Ministry of National Defense and the Presidency of the Defense Industry, domestically developed systems are being tested directly under the dust, smoke and stress of the field. The entire process is operated within a structure that includes foreign personnel. The performance demonstrated by the systems will undoubtedly feature in the ‘reports’ that these foreign personnel will present upon their return to their home countries.

The “Steel Dome” system demonstration presented to the country’s leadership and international guests as part of the Distinguished Observer Day marks the pinnacle of the strategy on display. The participation of the STEEL DOME – the integrating element of Türkiye’s layered air defense architecture – in an international exercise simulating combat conditions serves both to convey the message of “full independence in national defense” and to demonstrate the system’s operational readiness to potential buyer nations. Projects such as the Denizhan, a national naval gun produced by MKE and currently in active service, are the clearest indication of how Türkiye is gradually breaking its dependence on foreign sources. The opportunity for foreign delegations to meet directly with the engineers responsible for production on the operational field ensures that they experience Türkiye’s technological capabilities not through brochures, but by observing them in the field. This situation creates an invaluable opportunity and reference point for defense exports.

H

akan Fidan met Mark Rutte in Ankara on Wednesday, as part of the NATO chief’s official visit to Türkiye, amid a broader focus on defense cooperation and regional security challenges.

According to diplomatic sources, the talks were held within the framework of ongoing engagement between Türkiye and the NATO alliance. Rutte is also scheduled to meet Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan later during his visit.

Speaking separately in Istanbul, Rutte praised Türkiye’s rapidly advancing defense sector, describing it as a “defense industrial revolution” from which NATO allies could draw important lessons. His remarks came during a visit to Aselsan, one of the country’s leading defense firms.

Central to NATO’s security

Rutte emphasized that boosting defense production and innovation is now a top priority for the alliance, particularly as global security challenges intensify. He said these issues would be central at NATO’s upcoming summit in Ankara in July, stressing that increased military spending alone would not be sufficient without stronger industrial output.

He highlighted the need for greater production of key capabilities such as air defense systems, drones, ammunition, radar technologies and space-based systems. “We have to do better, we have to do more,” Rutte said, noting that NATO could “learn a lot” from Türkiye’s recent progress in these areas.

Describing the global security environment as increasingly volatile, Rutte pointed to a range of threats spanning multiple domains—from missile and drone attacks to cyber warfare. He referenced Russia’s war in Ukraine, China’s military expansion, and Iran’s regional activities as key sources of instability, adding that Türkiye is directly exposed to several of these risks.

Rutte also revealed that NATO had intercepted ballistic missiles heading toward Türkiye from Iran on four separate occasions, underscoring the alliance’s commitment to collective defense.

Arms exports across Europe

Highlighting Türkiye’s growing role in the defense industry, he noted that Turkish firms are expanding internationally, with exports and operations across Europe. He cited recent deals involving Aselsan, including the sale of advanced electronic warfare systems to Poland and operations in countries such as Albania and Romania.

Founded in 1975 and headquartered in Ankara, Aselsan has grown into one of Türkiye’s largest defense companies and ranks among the top 50 globally in its sector. The company reached a market value of $30 billion in January 2026, marking a significant milestone for the country’s defense industry.

Rutte concluded by stressing the importance of innovation and human capital, pointing to the relatively young workforce at Aselsan as a key driver of its success. He urged engineers and industry leaders to accelerate production and technological development to meet the alliance’s evolving security needs.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

I

n the digital age, social media platforms have transformed into tools of social engineering and informal educational spaces that shape the worldview of young people. Content promoted by algorithms has now transcended individual preferences and become a matter of social and national security. TikTok is a striking example of this. Launched in 2016 by the China-based company ByteDance, it surpassed 1 billion users worldwide within a few years and became the most popular platform among young people. The secret to its unique success lies in its special recommendation algorithm, which captivates users from the very first moment by offering an endless stream of videos. Unlike classic social networks, the platform offers an independent viral discovery mechanism, allowing videos from unknown content creators to reach millions.

However, perhaps the darker side of this algorithmic power lies in content selection and allegations of invisible censorship. Leaked communications from 2020 revealed that TikTok applied filters to ‘create a desirable vibe’, hiding users deemed unattractive, poor or disabled from the feed. Similarly, leaks revealed that videos with dilapidated or slum-like backgrounds were deemed ‘not cool enough’ and not shown to a wider audience. Interestingly, many news sites around the world that reported on these leaks were forced to remove their articles in 2021 and 2022. Without this information about the 2020 TikTok leaks, we might not have found these articles.

How does the TikTok algorithm work?

TikTok’s recommendation algorithm, which offers personalized video streams, is the most important factor that makes the app so popular and addictive. But how well is this algorithm developed in relation to neural networks? How does it trigger the neural system? Is it solely related to social psychology or is there an algorithm and content system compatible with the hormonal system? How does it create the cycle that causes a dopamine surge in the brain? Is there a new system that deciphers the neural system directly, replacing the film, television, and advertising industries shaped by archetypes? These are topics for other articles.

Returning to our research topic, the “For You” page on TikTok is designed to offer each user new videos tailored to their interests. When a new user joins the platform, the algorithm gathers interest signals by initially showing popular videos in different categories. Interactions, such as which videos the user watches and how much they like or share, quickly create a profile. If a user watches a video all the way through or rewatches it, the algorithm assumes they are interested in that content and recommends similar videos more frequently. Thus, TikTok’s recommendation algorithm creates a kind of “vulnerability map” of the user by analyzing every micro-interaction.

Although personalization enables users to swiftly discover content they may enjoy, it can also foster a hazardous cycle of dependency. Rather than being about digital platform loyalty, it is more accurate to say that this is an addiction involving the brain’s stimulation centers. Because the TikTok feed is designed for endless scrolling, users have difficulty controlling their content consumption. Each video is optimized to be short and attention-grabbing, constantly triggering the brain’s reward mechanism and releasing dopamine. Young people, especially children, have not yet fully developed impulse control, making it easier for them to get caught up in this rapid reward cycle and spend hours on the app. The platform constantly prompts users with the question, “What will the next video be?” This makes them lose track of time. Indeed, research shows that compared to other platforms, TikTok users lose control of their time more quickly and stay on the app much longer than planned.

This can be explained by TikTok’s psychological use of a “variable reward” principle. With each scroll, users experience uncertainty about what the next video will be. Although some mundane content appears occasionally, the frequent appearance of entertaining or interesting videos reinforces addictive behavior similar to pulling the lever on a slot machine in the hope of winning a big prize. The Washington, D.C., attorney general’s indictment also describes the TikTok algorithm as “intentionally addictive”, emphasizing that it keeps young people online for hours, which can lead to mental health issues such as depression, anxiety and attention deficit disorder.

Another concerning aspect of TikTok’s algorithm is its tendency to show users sensitive and harmful content. Various studies have revealed weaknesses in the platform’s content moderation. For instance, Global Witness’s 2025 experiment involved creating new accounts that appeared to belong to 13-year-olds. Even with “Restricted Mode” enabled, sexually explicit terms were suggested to these accounts in the search bar. After a few clicks, the platform itself suggested pornographic and inappropriate content. The suggestions were so inappropriate that researchers had to report videos featuring individuals who appeared to be under 16 to the relevant authorities for suspected child abuse. In short, not only does TikTok fail to fully implement the rules it claims to have introduced to protect young users but its algorithm also directs them toward objectionable content.

Persona experiment

To understand how the TikTok algorithm influences users, we conducted an experiment with fictional users who had different profiles and interests. We created 12 distinct personas that varied in age, gender and interests and opened a new TikTok account for each persona. These personas included children, teenagers, young adults and middle-aged individuals. Their interests ranged from humor and gaming to music, religious content, news, history and recipes. On the first day, each persona signaled their interests to the algorithm by searching for or watching a few related videos. For the next week, each persona passively watched content that appeared on their “For You” feed. On the third and seventh days, we recorded and compared the algorithm’s suggested content profiles for each persona. This allowed us to observe how the algorithm constructed user profiles and trapped them in specific content bubbles over the course of a week.

The findings at the end of the experiment were quite striking. In particular, the initial interests of children and adolescents quickly shifted towards inappropriate and potentially harmful content. For instance, a 13-year-old male persona initially watched gaming videos and innocent jokes but by the third day, his feed was dominated by crude humor and dangerous “challenge” videos. By the seventh day, he was being exposed to violent content, including street fights and the glorification of carrying knives and other sharp objects.

Similarly, a 15-year-old female persona initially watched popular dance trends and posts from high school students. Within a few days, however, the algorithm pulled her toward more sexually suggestive dance videos and erotically suggestive content. Even with “Restricted Mode” enabled, TikTok was showing sexually explicit search suggestions in the young account’s search section. After a week, the girl’s feed was filled with lewd jokes, exhibitionist dances and advertisements for adult dating apps. These examples clearly demonstrate how inadequate TikTok’s content filtering mechanisms are for children and teenagers.

Extreme content among young people

The algorithm was also seen pushing users toward increasingly extreme content, particularly among young adults and middle-aged individuals. An 18-year-old female user, who was initially interested in makeup tutorials and college entrance exam preparation videos, found that her feed was soon filled with videos promoting consumption and the luxurious lifestyles of popular influencers. By the seventh day, she was inundated with perfectionist beauty trends, cosmetic surgery advertisements and content glorifying wealthy lifestyles. This led her to question her own appearance and living standards.

A 30-year-old male user who initially consumed tech news and economic content was bombarded with conspiracy theory-like political videos by the third day. His feed was flooded with unverified and sensationalist claims about topics such as the pandemic or the global economic crisis. By the end of the week, this person was overwhelmed with ideologically polarizing and provocative content. In fact, an independent test by Guardian Australia reported that even a completely new TikTok account, created without any interaction, was quickly flooded with violent, far-right content and racist videos, which is parallel to our research.

One of our religiously inclined personas underwent a complete transformation. Initially, the 40-year-old conservative woman watched content related to religious discussions and family values. However, by the third day, TikTok began presenting her with increasingly nationalistic yet secular content. There was an increase in posts with racist and Turkish nationalist themes, and Islamic references were relegated to the background in the videos. After a week, this devout profile was confronted with harsh Turkish nationalist discourse that largely relegated religious identity to the background. These findings suggest that the platform prioritizes content that serves a specific agenda in Türkiye. Some news pages on social media have been accused in the press of being controlled by Zionist groups that promote “Turkishness without Islam.” Similarly, despite her religious sensibilities, this persona was exposed to anti-religious, nationalist content by the algorithm.

T

The idea that YouTube’s algorithm steers users towards increasingly extreme content has long been debated. Brenton Tarrant, the perpetrator of the Christchurch attack, confessed during his investigation that YouTube had inspired him. The Prime Minister of New Zealand also stated that the platform’s algorithm was the source of radicalisation. Similarly, it is known that Anders Breivik, who killed 77 people in Norway in 2011, had contact with racist and far-right circles online long before carrying out the attack, and adopted and tried to spread an ideology of violence through manifestos and videos. Academic studies also show that a significant proportion of videos recommended to right-leaning users promote extremist ideologies. In short, these examples reveal that YouTube’s algorithm can gradually bring users of different ideologies closer to extremism. YouTube adapts its content distribution and visibility algorithms according to pressure points in different countries.

In Türkiye specifically, marginal radical content with religious motifs is spreading rapidly among young people. Some Salafist preachers on YouTube define the current socio-political order in terms of the concept of ‘taghut’ (tyranny/false gods), constructing a language that justifies violence through theological concepts such as jihad and martyrdom. The romanticization of death and martyrdom in this content in Turkey can pave the way for the glorification of armed struggle against state institutions and trigger processes of individual radicalization.

Young people can easily encounter such propaganda online without any control. Given all this, it is inevitable to ask whether the YouTube algorithm can rapidly radicalise a young person who starts out with pure religious curiosity.

Experimental research method

For our research, we created personas of conservative young people who are interested in Islam but not violent. Using three different phones and clean YouTube accounts with no search history, we conducted daily religious content queries (e.g. ‘What is Islam?’, ‘What does Sharia mean?’, ‘What is martyrdom?’, ‘What is Jihad?’) in different locations over the course of a week. We watched the first videos that appeared and continued by clicking on the new videos suggested after each one. In this way, we observed and recorded the content recommended by the algorithm based on the user’s viewing history, day by day.

Initially, the videos watched contained more moderate religious discussions and basic religious information. However, the suggested content gradually became more severe in the following days. By the end of the week, the person’s viewing history had reached an extremely “extreme” point: “fighting against taghut’ “. At this stage, we changed our search strategy, searching for terms such as ‘fighting against taghut’. Based on the videos we watched, we then searched for terms consistent with them, such as ‘weapon making’, ‘bomb making’, ‘how to use’ and ‘how to fight against taghut’. Our goal was to test whether the algorithm would present violent content to a user with this profile. Using this methodology, we were able to demonstrate how a user with innocent curiosity can quickly become caught up in a cycle of radicalization.

The radicalization cycle in the suggested content

In the first few days, the suggested videos were balanced and moderate. They mostly consisted of sermons by renowned preachers, explanations of Islamic jurisprudence and interpretations of the Quran. However, by the second and third days, the algorithm had learned about the user’s preferences from the videos watched, and the recommendations became more extreme. By the end of the third day, the main page was dominated by content from preachers of the Salafi school of thought. These videos criticized the existing regime as ‘taghut’ and urged true believers to oppose it.

On the fourth and fifth days, the suggested videos became even more extreme. We came across videos of sermons by preachers who are known in Turkey for their Salafist leanings, and who have previously been arrested for radical propaganda. Videos of a preacher known for his violent views were also consistently suggested.

By the end of the week, the suggested videos were almost entirely focused on a single ideology. However, during the experiment, we never searched for terms such as ‘ISIS’ or ‘al-Qaeda’; we only followed the videos suggested by the algorithm. This demonstrates the power of the algorithm to create an echo chamber.

Based on our viewing history, YouTube assigned a Salafi identity to the persona and shaped its recommendations accordingly. Consequently, the user encountered increasingly extreme videos instead of traditional Islamic content. At each stage, the algorithm shifted the threshold of interest to a slightly more extreme point. Our observations showed that the ‘filter bubble’ effect observed on social media was also present on YouTube. As the user was surrounded by like-minded content, they began to normalise increasingly extreme views.

Left-tilted content experiment

Using a similar method, we experimented with creating a persona who was young, left-leaning, interested in justice and equality, and concerned with social issues, but not violent. Using a newly created account, we conducted general left-wing searches, such as ‘social justice’, ‘equal society’, ‘what is the left’ and ‘left-wing thought in Türkiye. The first videos to appear were educational content about social inequalities and labour rights, or mainstream left-wing discourse. After watching these videos, similar, balanced left-wing content also appeared on the YouTube homepage. Over the course of a week, we did not observe the extreme tendencies seen in right-wing personas in the left-wing persona. Videos from radical left-wing organizations such as DHKP-C or MLKP did not appear in the suggested content list. The suggested content remained focused on mainstream topics such as inequality, labour struggles and historical left-wing leaders.

These results show that the YouTube algorithm in Türkiye can promote some ideologies to a greater extent than others. While significant radicalization was observed in right-wing conservative content over a short period, a similar process did not occur in left-wing content. This difference may be due to radical left-wing content having less visibility on the platform, or it may stem from the algorithm’s interaction dynamics. Nevertheless, these findings suggest that the risk of radicalization, particularly along the religious-right axis, is higher in Türkiye.

F

ollowing Elon Musk’s acquisition of Twitter in late 2022 and its subsequent rebranding as “X,” expectations emerged that the platform would undergo fundamental changes in the way it delivers content. The algorithmic “For You” feed, which largely replaced the chronological timeline, became the default main feed presented to users. That algorithm was introduced with the stated aim of ranking posts that users might find engaging regardless of whom they follow. However, over time, intense debates arose, particularly regarding political content in Türkiye, over whether the algorithm operates in a neutral and genuinely personalized manner.

In 2023, several journalists and researchers, together with Daily Sabah, argued that X’s recommendation algorithm was manipulating the content flow in Türkiye. According to those claims, X disproportionately amplified opposition-leaning content regardless of users’ interests or political preferences, to the extent that even pro-government users were consistently exposed to opposition posts in their feeds. In response to those criticisms, Elon Musk acknowledged that the algorithm had shortcomings and pledged to open the code for the sake of transparency and to implement improvements.

So what has changed since then? Does X’s content recommendation algorithm in Türkiye genuinely operate with political bias? And how does this affect user experience and public discourse? To address these questions, I conducted a series of experiments toward the end of 2025. From the final days of November 2025 through early December 2025, I closely examined X’s “For You” feed using a total of eight accounts that were created from scratch on entirely new devices. Those accounts were configured with different locations and distinct political orientations. The findings obtained indicate that X’s recommendation algorithm exhibits serious problems with both technical and societal dimensions.

The “for you” feed: Personalized or a uniform digital enforcer?

In our experiments, the situation Ix encountered when logging into X with zero-profile accounts (no followers, likes or prior activity) offered a striking illustration of this issue. Despite the complete absence of user data, the algorithm immediately presented political content and accounts belonging to political actors. Approximately 90 percent of the initially recommended accounts to follow were users known for opposition-oriented views. Of the remaining 10 percent, roughly half consisted of official accounts such as the Presidency and ministries, while the other half included one or two pro-government accounts.

Unless users explicitly switched to the “Following” tab, without having expressed any interests, new accounts were directly exposed to popular tweets featuring government criticism and accounts widely recognized for their oppositional stance in Türkiye. This pattern suggests that the algorithm prioritizes currently trending and sensational political debates on the platform rather than attempting to assess user preferences through gradual interaction signals.

Within the scope of the experiment, four of the accounts I created followed only pro-government politicians, journalists, and affiliated accounts. The remaining four accounts followed exclusively figures and accounts aligned with the opposition. Despite this deliberate differentiation, all eight profiles were predominantly presented with content featuring the rhetoric of opposition politicians, government criticism, and posts from popular opposition-oriented accounts, as well as misleading or false news that framed the political authorities in a negative manner. Pro-government profiles were rarely exposed in their feeds to posts from the accounts they explicitly followed. In some cases, even when a journalist’s original tweet from an account that the user followed was not shown in the feed, the user was nonetheless exposed to an opposition-oriented post because that same journalist had replied to it, thereby amplifying the visibility of the oppositional content.

Conversely, the profiles designed with an opposition-oriented stance were exposed to a similar feed structure. While posts from the opposition accounts they followed were consistently displayed, those were frequently supplemented by content from additional opposition-aligned accounts that the users did not recognize or follow. Notably, those opposition-oriented profiles were almost never recommended pro-government content. As a result, in both scenarios, the algorithm effectively enclosed users within a bubble dominated by opposition discourse.

That situation points to two possible explanations. The first is that the algorithm attempts to introduce viewpoint diversity by presenting opposing content but fails to maintain a meaningful balance. The second is the presence of a structural bias embedded within the system’s underlying architecture. Although X engineers argue that the recommendation system operates not on the basis of political labels but according to interaction networks and aggregate engagement metrics, the higher levels of engagement typically generated by opposition content in Türkiye inadvertently transform the algorithm into a one-directional echo machine.

The misinterpretation of comment-based engagement: the algorithm’s affective blindness

X’s algorithm interprets all forms of user interaction including likes, reposts, comments, and even views; as signals of interest. However, it does not differentiate between positive and negative forms of engagement. Following changes implemented after 2023, the tendency to treat all types of interaction as inherently positive has become even more pronounced. During the experiments, it was observed that when a pro-government profile commented on an opposition tweet with a remark such as “This information is false,” the algorithm did not reduce the visibility of similar content; on the contrary, it increased it. Even the act of commenting alone led to a higher volume of recommendations related to the same topic. Likewise, merely clicking on a controversial post or viewing that briefly was sufficient to cause similar content to proliferate within the feed.

At the core of those outcomes lies X’s failure to analyze the semantic content of posts and the qualitative nature of user engagement. This form of affective blindness causes undesirable content to cascade onto users’ feeds. In particular, posts that provoke anger or political polarization tend to generate large volumes of comments and quote reposts. The system interprets thas pattern as “high engagement equals high relevance” and consequently rewards such content.

Misinformation and algorithmic amplification

Perhaps the most alarming aspect of X’s recommendation algorithm is its capacity to enable the rapid and large-scale dissemination of posts containing misinformation. The claim examined in 2025 that “Türkiye donated 7,000 police vehicles to Syria” constitutes a striking example. Although this post lacked any official basis, it received millions of views, while subsequent corrections circulated only minimally. Whereas the false content exceeded 7 million views, the corrective post reached only 211,000 views. Moreover, when accounts that continued to amplify the false claim through quote reposts are taken into account, the total number of views was estimated to surpass 10 million.

A similar pattern emerged in a post shared by a politician affiliated with the İYİ (Good) Party. The user presented footage from a Christian religious ceremony as if it had been recorded in Türkiye’s İznik district, accompanying the video with a provocative message asking, “Are we christianized?” In reality, the video was neither recent nor filmed in Türkiye. It was older footage recorded in Spain, a fact that was uncovered shortly thereafter. Nevertheless, many users reacted with anger and outrage, initially accepting the fabricated “scandal” as genuine and responding emotionally before the correction became widely known.

These examples demonstrate how algorithmic amplification can pose serious risks to the information ecosystem. In psychology, the phenomenon known as the “truth effect” refers to the tendency for false information to be perceived as true through repeated exposure. X’s recommendation algorithm appears to intensify precisely this mechanism by repeatedly presenting the same false narratives to users, effectively imprinting them onto their cognitive frameworks. Users with low levels of media literacy or those unable to critically assess information to which they are repeatedly exposed are particularly susceptible to such waves of misinformation. In this way, “vibes” initially shape emotions and subsequently translate into behavior as an outcome of identity formation.

T

he word “cloud” sounds ethereal—light, floating harmlessly above us. Then you step into a data center, and the romance hits a wall of concrete. The digital world is not made of mist. It is built from industrial chillers, heated copper, and the constant drone of fans pushing hot air away from machines that never sleep.

Once you adjust to the noise, a blunt fact remains: the AI boom has turned technological competition into a raw contest for electricity.

We call this competition “digital,” as if it lives in a weightless realm of code. In practice, it has the heavy texture of transformers, substations, permits, and long lead times. Strategic advantage will belong to countries that can build boring things fast—lines, switches, redundancy—without breaking public trust.

Unlike office towers that sip energy with polite moderation, data centers are voracious. They devour power steadily, day and night, punishing any grid that fluctuates. A single facility can rival the electricity demand of a town while employing surprisingly few people on-site. That imbalance creates political strain. When grids struggle, governments reach for whatever delivers capacity quickly. What begins as a “temporary” fix has a habit of becoming a new default.

Major technology firms are no longer just buying power; they are shaping how it is produced, secured, and priced. Renewables remain central to corporate branding, but reliability is the non-negotiable. Solar goes dark at night. Wind can stall. Data centers cannot pause because the weather is inconvenient.

The grid is no longer background infrastructure. It is industrial policy.

The strategic pivot

Türkiye enters this global electricity squeeze at a critical moment. The country is being offered a chance to be more than a consumer of cloud services—it is being invited to host the engines of processing themselves.

One marker is the Turkcell–Google Cloud partnership, which envisions a new cloud region in Türkiye and a $1 billion multi-year push into data centers and cloud technologies through 2032. For a country long positioned as an energy corridor, the prize is distinct. Sovereignty in the 21st century is not only about pipelines and transit routes. It is also about hosting the machines that refine data into economic and strategic value.

But this digital ambition rests on a physical foundation: The grid. The World Bank’s power transmission modernization project underscores a reality that policy debates too often soften: If you want scale in the digital economy, you must modernize transmission, integrate renewables, and improve reliability.

Data centers are indifferent to geopolitical slogans. They run on one thing: Electrons arriving on schedule.

The bill on the kitchen table

Türkiye’s physical backbone will set the ceiling for its digital ambitions. The strategic question is not whether Türkiye can attract data centers. It is whether Türkiye can integrate them without turning the AI boom into a domestic legitimacy problem.

Legitimacy here is not abstract. It is the bill on the kitchen table.

Nobody votes for a data center, but everyone feels its footprint. A hyperscale facility can draw enough power to change the mood of a city while employing a small team on site. The optics can turn quickly: A massive, windowless complex rises on the outskirts of town, consumes an outsized share of local electricity, and receives priority connections. If households experience price pressure—or brownouts—while that facility appears “protected,” the story stops being “strategic investment” and becomes resentment.

Industrialists will not miss the shift either. Factory owners worry about voltage dips halting production lines and unpredictable outages damaging equipment. If the grid creates an informal hierarchy where data centers eat first and manufacturers eat last, the economic fallout will be measurable.

Hosting global compute can be a national advantage, but only if it does not undermine the perceived fairness of energy access at home. A state can sell a grand digital vision to investors. It still has to explain that vision to citizens who experience the grid as daily life.

The hidden water battle

Electricity is the headline constraint, but water is the quiet second front.

Cooling demands vary by facility design and climate, yet they can be substantial. In a country increasingly exposed to water stress and seasonal volatility, this matters. Municipal systems are not built for sudden industrial-scale cooling needs alongside growing residential demand.

The politics here is local and immediate. If a municipality must weigh irrigation against industrial cooling in a dry season, the conflict moves from engineering meetings into public pressure. Water disputes tend to escalate faster than electricity debates. Price hikes generate anger; water shortages generate fear. A serious data center strategy must treat water governance as part of digital governance, not an afterthought.

Around 520,000 people gathered on Istanbul’s Galata Bridge on New Year’s Day for a mass demonstration in support of Palestinians and to call for an end to the war in Gaza, according to organizers.

The march, held under the slogan “We won’t cower, we won’t keep quiet, we won’t forget Palestine,” was organized by the Humanity Alliance and the National Will Platform, with the participation of more than 400 civil society organizations. The Turkish Youth Foundation (TUGVA) led the event.

Participants began assembling before dawn after morning prayers at major mosques across Istanbul, including Hagia Sophia, Sultanahmet, Fatih, Suleymaniye and the Eminonu New Mosque. Carrying Turkish and Palestinian flags, crowds gathered in mosque courtyards before marching on foot toward Galata Bridge.

Despite freezing temperatures, turnout was high. Authorities imposed extensive security measures, particularly around Sultanahmet Square, and provided hot refreshments to demonstrators. The main program began at about 8:30 a.m. local time.

Officials, artists join demonstration

Ministers, senior officials and figures listed in the official state protocol joined the march. A large banner depicting “Hanzala,” the iconic Palestinian cartoon figure created by the late artist Naji al-Ali, was displayed near the main press platform.

The event also featured performances by well-known artists, including Lebanese-Swedish singer Maher Zain, Turkish singer Esat Kabakli and the band Grup Yuruyus.

Speaking to reporters, Bilal Erdoğan, chair of the Ilim Yayma Foundation’s Board of Trustees and a member of TUGVA’s High Advisory Board, said the new year had begun with prayers for Palestine and described the gathering as a demonstration of moral and spiritual unity.

Addressing the crowd, TUGVA Chair Ibrahim Beşinci said the scale of participation reflected a collective stance against what he described as the ongoing violence in Gaza. He cited figures on civilian deaths and destruction and commemorated three Turkish police officers killed days earlier in an operation against the Daesh militant group.

Sports figures and cultural resistance

Support for the march was also voiced by prominent sports officials. The chairmen of Beşiktaş, Galatasaray and Trabzonspor, along with a Fenerbahçe board member, publicly encouraged participation, alongside statements from several other clubs.

An art installation titled “Roots” was unveiled on Galata Bridge, featuring an olive tree rising from rubble and scattered cultural objects, symbolizing memory, resilience and cultural resistance in Gaza, organizers said.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan said on Wednesday that Türkiye would not tolerate coercion, piracy or other provocations threatening its maritime interests in the Eastern Mediterranean, saying Ankara was closely monitoring risks to its Blue Homeland, a term used in Türkiye to refer to Türkiye’s maritime borders, and to Turkish Cypriots.

In a New Year’s message released by the Presidency, Erdoğan said Türkiye was alert to rising tensions in the region and would defend its rights and interests. “We will never tolerate coercion, piracy or banditry in our seas,” he said.

Erdoğan used the address to reflect on domestic and foreign policy developments over the past year, paying tribute to Turkish security forces killed in operations against terrorism and organized crime and thanking veterans for their service.

Despite the growing climate of war and crisis in the region, Erdoğan said Türkiye was continuing its path with confidence. He said the government’s economic program was yielding results, citing easing inflation, strengthening central bank reserves and gains in production, investment, employment and exports.

He added that Türkiye had broken records in sectors including tourism and the defense industry, and said a large-scale social housing project of 500,000 units would help low-income citizens and ease housing and rental pressures.

Earthquake reconstruction priority

Erdoğan said rebuilding areas devastated by the Feb. 6, 2023, earthquakes remained the government’s top priority. He noted that keys to the 455,000th housing unit had been handed over to beneficiaries in Hatay on December 27, and said infrastructure, public spaces and cultural sites in affected cities were being restored.

He thanked workers, institutions and donors involved in reconstruction and said the government would continue to deliver on its promises.

On regional affairs, Erdoğan said Türkiye would continue to support communities beyond its borders, pointing to its policies in Syria and Gaza.

He said recovery in Syria had accelerated following the country’s December 2024 revolution, adding that political stability was advancing and voluntary returns were increasing. According to Erdoğan, around 600,000 Syrians had returned from Türkiye to Syria over the past year.

Türkiye would continue to support Syria’s new administration to ensure security and stability without discrimination based on ethnicity or sect, he said.

On Gaza, Erdoğan said Türkiye would not remain silent until those responsible for the deaths of tens of thousands of Palestinians were held accountable. He said a ceasefire reached in October was holding despite Israeli violations, and that Ankara was working to increase humanitarian aid and support reconstruction.

Erdoğan also said Türkiye would continue efforts to help end the war in Ukraine through a just and lasting peace.

Domestic security

Turning to domestic security, Erdoğan said key thresholds had been crossed in the government’s “terror-free Türkiye” initiative, adding that a parliamentary commission was nearing completion of a report intended to give the process new momentum.

He said the initiative should not be undermined by short-term political interests and pledged that the government would do what was necessary to ensure its success.

Erdoğan concluded by saying his government would continue to focus on concrete projects and investments in 2026, extending New Year’s wishes to Türkiye, the region and the world.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

A

t this historic crossroads, as the global power equation is rewritten and paradigms are shaken, the parameters of national sovereignty are undergoing a fundamental transformation. Full independence is now measured by control over not only land, sea, and airspace but also the digital (cyber) and space domains, which connect these elements via invisible networks. At the heart of this equation is one of the most critical technologies: national positioning systems. Turkey’s decision to develop its own national positioning system is a strategic response to 21st-century challenges and a concrete manifestation of the “Turkey Century” vision.

A country’s economic functioning and military operational capabilities depend on invisible signals, namely Global Navigation Satellite Systems (GNSS). Turkey, a long-time user, is now taking decisive steps toward becoming a system builder. Developing a national navigation and global positioning system is not just a technological ambition, but a strategic necessity that has become one of the cornerstones of the country’s future sovereignty, security, and prosperity.

Alongside Turkey’s space program, the Regional Positioning and Timing System (RPS) will be established as a vital capability. Thus, Turkey’s positioning, navigation, and timing data needs will be met with high-precision, domestically produced systems that will replace those currently in use.

Warning from the field: Breaking the dependency spiral

There is experience from various war environments regarding jamming and interference activities targeting Global Positioning System (GPS) systems. The precision guidance capabilities of today’s modern armies’ striking elements are priority jamming targets. In this context, reports have emerged of Russian GPS jamming (electronic warfare) applications against HIMARS and various smart munitions provided to Ukraine in the Russia–Ukraine War. Even advanced systems equipped with receivers that obtain data from different positioning systems and anti-jamming subcomponents are not immune to jamming or deception under current conditions.

Although GPS is an important data source, sophisticated munitions do not rely solely on a single GNSS source or GNSS-based guidance technologies. Ballistic and cruise missiles can currently operate without being affected by jamming with inertial navigation systems; however, the increase in flight time causes deviation errors to grow proportionally over time. For this reason, hybrid structures that support data such as GPS are needed.

Counterterrorism operations in Syria and Iraq, as well as in areas of national interest such as Libya and Azerbaijan, have confirmed the Turkish defense industry’s game-changing role in technologies such as unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and missiles. However, there is a bitter truth on the other side of the coin: the risk of strategic blindness. Our long-range ballistic and cruise missiles depend on foreign-sourced GPS signals, particularly those controlled by the U.S., for position and target data. Rival powers can compromise the effectiveness of our most advanced weapon systems by jamming or misleading these signals through intensive electronic warfare applications, even momentarily.

This situation represents an unacceptable strategic vulnerability that undermines Turkey’s ability to determine its own destiny. Rival forces’ ability to jam or mislead these signals through electronic warfare measures means the effectiveness of your most advanced weapon systems could be compromised at the most critical moment. This situation is an unacceptable strategic vulnerability that conflicts with Turkey’s determination to chart its own course. A national system would eliminate this vulnerability by providing a military signal similar to a P/M code that is resistant to such interference, fully encrypted, and accessible only to the Turkish Armed Forces.

Examples from around the world: Regional positioning systems

Today, many GNSS satellites are in operation. Each satellite has its own unique frequencies for transmitting navigation and timing information and typically operates in low and medium orbits. The global positioning (GPS) data they provide is intended for different users. GPS services include the C/A code, accessible to all users, and the encrypted P(Y) code, accessible only to authorized users. The system operates with three components: space (satellites), ground (ground control stations), and user (GNSS or GPS receivers). Receivers determine position using signal data from both space and ground components.

Regional positioning systems result from the need to provide positioning data for specific areas or purposes using indigenous resources. Japan’s Quasi-Zenith Satellite System (QZSS) enhances GNSS signal performance in Japan and neighboring East Asian regions by employing a mix of satellites in various orbits (GEO and MEO) to augment GPS. The QZSS program was announced with four operational satellites and currently operates with seven.

India launched the NavIC program to end its dependence on foreign GPS data amid tensions with Pakistan. Designed to cover mainland India and the surrounding region within a 1,500-kilometer radius, the NavIC system uses geostationary (GEO) satellites. Furthermore, satellite-based augmentation systems (SBAS) have long been used in North America (“WAAS”) and Europe as a method of providing positioning services for critical applications, such as civil aviation.

Turkey’s National Technology Initiative: Actors and roadmap

Recognizing the importance of independence in strategic capabilities is the driving force behind Turkey’s national technology initiative. The leading institutions of the defense industry are transforming this vision into reality. TÜBİTAK UZAY’s satellite technology expertise, ASELSAN’s electronic warfare, signal processing, and cryptology expertise, ROKETSAN’s launch and fuel technology competence, and FERGANİ’s satellite target team form the pillars of this major project. Rather than a series of disjointed efforts, Turkey’s goal is a complementary, holistic strategy coordinated by the Turkish Space Agency.

This goal will not be achieved overnight, but rather through systematic accumulation over many years. In the first stage, rather than bearing the enormous cost and time burden of establishing a global system, the goal is to establish a regional positioning system (RPS) that covers Turkey and its sphere of influence, including the Balkans, the Caucasus, the eastern Mediterranean, and the Middle East. This system will provide a more precise, secure, and uninterrupted service in a specific geographical area using fewer satellites than existing global systems. Successful implementation of the first phase will provide Turkey with invaluable technological expertise and lay a solid foundation for the TR-KKS, which aims for full global coverage in the long term.

The first and most realistic goal is to establish a regional satellite navigation system covering Turkey and its immediate surroundings, such as the Blue Homeland, the Balkans, the Caucasus, and the Middle East. This system would be similar to India’s NavIC or Japan’s QZSS. Like other systems, this one will consist of three to seven satellites operating in different orbits (GEO and MEO) and will provide a much stronger and more accurate signal in the region than existing global systems. Implementation of this phase is expected to begin in the early 2030s with the launch of the first satellites.

The long-term objective is Global Coverage (TR-KKS). Upon building on the success of the regional system and the technological expertise gained, the long-term goal is to transition to a full global constellation of 24–30 satellites placed in low- and medium-Earth orbits (LEO and MEO). This would elevate Turkey to the same level as systems such as GPS (US), GLONASS (Russia), Galileo (EU), and Beidou (China). This phase could be realized by the 2040s.

All electronic warfare systems developed and delivered by the Turkish defense industry are combat-proven, meaning they have been used in combat, regardless of their class or capabilities. Some activities are carried out in the field even during the development phase. After delivery, solutions continue to be updated based on feedback from the field and evolving processes.

Electronic warfare (EW) has repeatedly demonstrated its critical role in modern warfare environments. It plays a multifaceted role by neutralizing radar systems operating in the electromagnetic spectrum, intercepting communication systems, and protecting friendly elements. Electronic warfare systems have high-tech applications and are divided into sub-branches with specific roles, such as countermeasures, support, and attack. Countermeasure/self-protection systems protect against electronic warfare applications and jamming by hostile elements targeting the platform.

Electronic support systems gather intelligence on hostile elements through activities such as interception and monitoring. While providing early warning of threats to friendly forces, their primary mission is to generate targeting data. Electronic attack systems, on the other hand, are capable of suppressing, jamming, and deceiving target forces. Their areas of application vary, and systems of various classes and capabilities are being developed.

Ultimately, on the battlefield, parties seek to destroy the enemy and protect friendly forces through electronic warfare applications. During the Ukraine-Russia War and the Iran-Israel War, when electronic warfare applications were intense, Turkey’s capabilities and approach to electronic warfare systems became a matter of curiosity.

From Ukraine and Russia to Iran and Israel

Communications are the most critical capability on the battlefield. Activities such as maintaining the command echelon’s function and ensuring field coordination in joint and cross-unit operations are crucial. To disrupt these activities, parties engage in intense electronic warfare practices against each other.

While these activities may sometimes affect friendly elements, i.e., their own units, the primary objective is to inflict damage on the opposing side. As part of the assistance provided to Ukraine, advanced integrated electronic warfare systems and infantry-style portable electronic warfare solutions were provided. Russia, on the other hand, has a variety of advanced electronic warfare solutions in its inventory. The extensive use of kamikaze drones by both sides in the war has further increased electronic warfare activities.

Thanks to its strong ties with the United States, Israel has significant reach and the ability to develop and adapt electronic warfare capabilities to meet its needs. As a result of the war, Israel is considered more successful in electronic warfare applications. These applications have been instrumental in enabling Israeli strike and reconnaissance groups, comprised of numerous fighter jets and armed UAVs, to easily operate in Iranian airspace. These applications include jamming radar components in Iranian air defense systems and providing self-defense against electronic attacks targeting Israeli aircraft.

Land-Based Robust Structure

The technical specifications of electronic warfare systems are highly confidential, yet they are shared. However, the power supply/output of a system, for example, represents highly critical information and is therefore not shared. Keeping this in mind, we can briefly examine the systems developed in Turkey.

ASELSAN, a leading company in this field, developed these systems, which are currently classified as “families.” The Koral family, known for its success in various regions, comprises the first and second generations. These integrated systems include support and attack components and vehicles. Similarly, the REDET/VURAL radar electronic warfare system family has an integrated structure. VURAL is an advanced system designed specifically for radar systems, incorporating both support and attack components. Another family is the SANCAK/MİLKAR, which was developed for electronic attack applications.

This family of systems can carry all its components on a vehicle platform. Its most recent model, the MİLKAR-4A2, has entered the inventory of the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) and boasts high mobility. Additionally, there are the SÖKMEN and MILKED/PUHU electronic support families. These systems are designed specifically for electronic support, such as interception and estimation, for communication systems.

The PUHU 3-LT product has been delivered to the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK). The ILGAR 3-LT, a mobile electronic attack system currently in the TSK inventory, was developed to attack target communication systems operating in the V/UHF frequency band. The ILGAR system also features electronic support modules. Meteksan Defense is developing the NAZAR system to counter threats such as electro-optical and infrared-guided missiles. The NAZAR system is intended for land and naval platforms. Meteksan Defense is also developing a specific project: the Navigation Electronic Warfare System, SEYMEN.

Solutions for Air, Sea, and Land

In addition to land-based solutions, Turkey is developing air and naval platforms. ASELSAN’s ARES 2-A electronic support measures system will be used on the HAVASOJ/HIK aircraft set to join the Air Force. Meanwhile, existing air platforms (e.g., helicopters and aircraft) are being modernized with domestic electronic warfare suites and systems. Electronic warfare (EW) pods for air platforms are being developed. EHPODs have been developed for fighter jets and have entered the inventory. The ANTIDOT 2 family of electronic warfare pods was developed for armed UAVs following the MAM-L electronic warfare pod.

The Naval Forces utilize the integrated ARES 2-NC electronic warfare system. The ARES family eliminates the Turkish Navy’s external dependency. The TCG UFUK is an integrated ship with various electronic warfare capabilities in the Turkish Navy’s inventory. The Turkish defense industry participated in the project from start to finish, significantly improving the Turkish Navy’s electronic warfare capabilities. Projects to equip unmanned maritime vehicles with electronic warfare capabilities are underway. The MARLIN SIDA system is currently in service with the Turkish Armed Forces.

Turkey has a broad portfolio of electronic warfare solutions for individual soldiers and infantry systems. SekizAltmış’s MS-23, Meteksan’s MERTER, and ASELSAN’s manpack jammer systems are currently in use. Additionally, there are fixed-base and mobile vehicle versions of these systems (MERT and Kangal) that are still in use. ASELSAN offers electronic warfare solutions, including İhtar, Bukalemun, and Kangal, as well as Meteksan Defense’s Trap, which is designed to counter UAV and FPV drone threats.

A

planned update to the free trade agreement between the United Kingdom and Turkey is set to serve as a “great example” of modern, forward-looking trade partnerships, according to the UK’s Consul General in Istanbul and Trade Commissioner for Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Kenan Poleo.

Speaking in an exclusive interview with Anadolu, Poleo said the first round of negotiations concluded on a positive note, covering key areas such as trade in goods and sustainability. Future discussions, he noted, are expected to broaden the scope to include services, innovation, and digital sectors, reflecting a mutual ambition to modernize bilateral ties.

“The most exciting thing about this new free trade agreement is the opportunity for the UK and Turkey to set a great example for the whole world around what a modern free trade agreement between two important partners looks like,” said Poleo.

Negotiators are preparing for the next round of talks later this year, with both sides aiming to build a roadmap for deeper cooperation in technology, climate-related industries, and other future-oriented sectors.

With bilateral trade already exceeding £27 billion (approximately $36 billion) annually, Turkey has become one of the UK’s top 20 trading partners. That number is expected to grow, driven by shared economic goals and geopolitical developments that are encouraging both countries to diversify supply chains and expand global trade ties.

“Given the depth of our relationship, really, the sky’s the limit,” said Poleo, highlighting the growing synergy between the two economies.

A Relationship of Strategic Depth

Poleo described trade ties as “huge,” pointing to recent gains across multiple sectors including clean energy, advanced manufacturing, and mobility. The UK, in its post-Brexit trade strategy, sees Turkey as a gateway to wider regional markets. For Turkey, the UK represents not just a major consumer market but also a valuable partner in innovation and regulatory reform.

“There isn’t a sector where we don’t see positive opportunities,” he said.

The two countries are also finding alignment in high-tech and defense cooperation. A standout development came during the International Defense Industry Fair (IDEF) in Istanbul last month, where the UK and Turkey signed a memorandum of understanding paving the way for Turkey to acquire Eurofighter Typhoon aircraft.

Describing the deal as emblematic of a “strategic and defense partnership,” Poleo emphasized the economic as well as security benefits.

“A third of those aircraft are going to be built within the UK,” he said. “It provides huge opportunities for both countries in terms of defense and security, but also economic growth.”

The Eurofighter Typhoon, a multirole aircraft equipped with advanced radar and cutting-edge combat capabilities, is co-produced by the UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain. Turkey’s inclusion as an operator reflects deepening trust and interoperability with NATO partners.

Clean Energy and Nuclear Power Collaboration

Beyond defense, clean energy and next-generation nuclear power represent some of the most promising areas of UK-Turkey collaboration, according to Poleo. He spotlighted the UK’s Offshore Renewable Energy Catapult, a research institution in northern England, as a hub attracting Turkish firms interested in wind energy technologies.

“We’ve developed innovation capability and capacity that have allowed Turkish companies, who are looking to explore those opportunities globally and also in Turkey, to come and become part of that ecosystem,” Poleo said.

With Turkey aiming to install 5 gigawatts of offshore wind capacity by 2035, the UK’s expertise could accelerate progress. The British envoy sees the potential for Turkey to “leapfrog” into a leading position through targeted partnerships.

On nuclear energy, cooperation could involve regulatory development and capacity building, especially as Turkey moves forward with its first nuclear power plant in Akkuyu and pursues small modular reactor (SMR) technologies by 2050.

“There’s an opportunity for us to collaborate and learn from each other on our experiences,” Poleo added, referring to the UK’s decades-long leadership in nuclear infrastructure.

A Diplomatic Farewell to a Dream Posting

As Poleo prepares to conclude his assignment in early 2026, he reflects on a tenure marked by personal and professional milestones. Born in South London to a Turkish Cypriot family, he described his post in Turkey as a dream come true.

“This was always my dream job,” he said. “It is both a joy to have served here, but it’s also a tragedy for me that it has to come to an end.”

During his time in Istanbul, Poleo oversaw a steady expansion of bilateral trade, high-profile joint projects, and cultural diplomacy. Fluent in Turkish, he charmed local audiences with an emotional farewell speech, switching languages mid-sentence to remark with a smile:

He also spoke warmly of his daily view of Istanbul’s Golden Horn, calling it one of the “great joys” of diplomatic life.

Poleo first visited Istanbul as a student at the age of 21 and recalled standing outside the British Consulate building, dreaming of working there one day. Now, nearly three decades later, he is set to leave the city having fulfilled that vision.

(Source: Anadolu Agency)

On July 15, 2016, Turkey experienced an attempted military coup that seemed, by all conventional measures, destined for success. Backed by significant segments of the armed forces, including elements of the air force and navy, the coup appeared technically unassailable. And yet, within a matter of hours, it collapsed. Understanding how this happened requires us to look well beyond the military dimension and into the political, sociological, and organizational fabric of contemporary Turkey.

One of the most compelling analyses of this failure comes from Prof. Dr. Cemil Koçak, a leading historian of 20th-century Turkish history. Drawing on decades of research on the early republican period, authoritarianism, and Turkish civil-military relations, Koçak, in his recent talk at the Institute Social, a newly founded think-tank in Istanbul, frames the July 15 coup as a singular event, one that both fits within and dramatically departs from Turkey’s long history of military interventions.

Prof. Koçak lays out a multilayered analysis that reveals the sociopolitical complexity behind the failure. He places the July 15 coup attempt outside of conventional categories. His analysis is crucial to understanding how the FETÖ (Fethullah Gülen Terrorist Organization) emerged as an “exceptional” example of clandestine state infiltration – and how, despite its reach, the coup unraveled.

In Koçak’s view, FETÖ’s organizational structure occupies a highly unusual place in Turkey’s history of covert movements. On one hand, it found support, at times tacit, at times explicit, from different layers of the state and successive political governments. On the other hand, it built a vast educational and financial network within a legal framework, while simultaneously developing international alliances. Through institutions like schools and media outlets, the group maintained a public-facing, legitimate image while quietly capturing key positions within the state and pursuing covert infiltration of the judiciary, bureaucracy, and the armed forces. This dual structure, namely legal visibility and covert penetration, gave the organization a kind of institutional flexibility and strength unseen in prior examples.

Koçak draws a stark comparison between the 1960 military coup and that of 2016. The former was executed with just 12 tanks; a 13th couldn’t be found. In contrast, the July 15 plotters commanded enormous force, especially from the air forces, substantial portions of which were under FETÖ’s influence. The fact that dismissals are still ongoing years later illustrates the scale of infiltration. For Koçak, this means the July 15 coup was, technically, an operation with a high likelihood of success. So why did it fail?

The Night the Military Lost Control–and the People Took Over

Koçak points first to weaknesses internal to the organization. One key issue was the degradation of merit within military recruitment and promotion. Military entrance exams became formalities; loyalty to the movement, not professional competence, became the primary criterion. This created a cadre of officers who, during moments of crisis, lacked the initiative and flexibility required to act decisively. The leadership deficit was further compounded by mistrust within the organization itself. Officers were often subordinated not to military superiors, but to “imams” appointed by the organization’s internal, non-military hierarchy. In one telling example, Koçak notes that coup plans sent to the U.S. were reviewed not by strategic experts but by a theology-trained imam, a sign of the movement’s internal insecurity and preference for tighter control over “professional” insight.

These structural flaws played out in operational decisions. The most obvious was the last-minute decision to launch the coup earlier than planned. Originally set for 3:00 a.m., the operation was abruptly moved to 8:00 p.m. due to fear of exposure. This shift disrupted the previously coordinated plans, triggered panic, and paralyzed the command structure. Orders did not flow properly, and the chain of command disintegrated. According to Koçak, this failure of coordination, rooted in organizational dysfunction, was a decisive factor in the coup’s collapse.

Yet, Koçak argues that the most critical failure was not organizational, but societal. Unlike in previous military coups, there was no meaningful support from political parties, the media, or large segments of society. The opposition’s support and approval of the coup attempt were tacit and silent. In 1960 and 1971, however, larger parts of the public and political class supported the military, either actively or passively. This time, both the press and the public at large resisted. People took to the streets in unprecedented numbers. Koçak suggests the coup plotters failed to account for this possibility. Without historical precedent, they assumed no such resistance would occur. “They could not imagine that something which had never happened before might actually happen,” he notes.

This shift in civic behavior, Koçak emphasizes, is deeply tied to changing political reflexes. Since the 2000s, and especially following the 2007 e-memorandum, the AK Party government and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular began to push back against military tutelage. The firm stance taken during that period, Koçak argues, instilled new confidence in society. A collective awareness emerged: that military interventions were neither inevitable nor unstoppable.

In this regard, Koçak underlines Erdoğan’s leadership on July 15 as a decisive factor. The refusal to flee, the direct appeal to the public, and the call for resistance all contributed to a new political dynamic. “Give Caesar what belongs to Caesar,” Koçak says. In all previous coups, civilian leaders had capitulated. This time, they did not. Nor did the public. Nor the media. July 15, then, marks not only the failure of a coup but the collapse of long-standing expectations about how such events unfold and how institutions respond.

J

ust a year earlier, the issue of right-wing politics had come to the forefront of discussions in Turkey. Its significant impact on the national discourse, coupled with its remarkable performance in the May 2023 elections, had put the xenophobic and anti-immigrant Victory Party in particular in the spotlight.

Under the leadership of Ümit Özdağ, the Victory Party carved out a distinct niche in Turkish politics by echoing European far-right parties, particularly through its exclusionary rhetoric against immigrants. This stance sets it apart from Turkey’s other nationalist factions. In the 2023 general election, the party’s presidential candidate, Sinan Oğan, received 5.2 percent of the national vote, while the Victory Party itself received 2.3 percent. Following these results, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who finished behind Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the first round of the presidential election, noticeably sharpened his stance on immigration, marking a departure from the more inclusive tone he had maintained throughout the campaign.

The success not only of the Victory Party, but also of the Iyi Party in alliance with the CHP, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the Grand Union Party (BBP), partners of the AK Party, had sparked debates about the popularity of nationalism in Turkey. In this context, the Iyi Party, which broke its alliance with the CHP, has gradually moved away from its goal of becoming a center-right party by increasing its nationalist tone.

Total defeat for Akşener’s Iyi Party and Özdağ’s Victory Party

The local elections on March 31 were a total defeat for the Iyi Party and the Victory Party. The Iyi Party, led by Meral Akşener, who has set her sights on the presidency, had a decent record in the three previous elections in which it participated, with close to 10% of the vote. This time, however, in Istanbul, where the elections were held in a general election-like atmosphere, the party fell to 0.6 percent.

Only a year ago, the Iyi Party had won 8.2 percent in Istanbul. Moreover, the Iyi Party received only 3.7% of the national vote this time. It should also be noted that some of these votes were partly due to the high profile of some of their candidates in some provinces, such as Ordu and Nevşehir.

Contrary to the predictions of many political analysts that the Victory Party would increase its votes, its share of the vote in Istanbul fell from 2.8 percent a year ago to 1.7 percent, despite having nominated a very strong mayoral candidate. In Turkey as a whole, their share of the vote fell to 1.5%.

In other words, these two political parties in the opposition bloc lost a huge chunk of their votes, which totaled around 12% in the last election. This lackluster performance also means that the influence of the right-wing in Turkey’s political debate will decline, at least for a while.

Ümit Özdağ’s rhetoric

Ümit Özdağ’s rhetoric, which focused on anti-immigrant sentiments, did not accurately reflect the complexity of Turkey’s migration challenges, although it had some success in influencing Turkish political discourse and the 2023 election results. In areas with large immigrant populations, the vote share of the winning party was not significantly different from its performance in other regions. For example, in the 2023 elections, the Victory Party’s vote share in Esenyurt and Sultanbeyli, the two Istanbul districts with the largest immigrant populations, was 2.6 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively, slightly below the provincial average.

A similar trend can be observed in other provinces and districts. Iyi Party, which is known for its hardline stance on immigrants and came in second after the Victory Party, also failed to gain additional support in districts with large immigrant populations. This suggests that support for these parties is driven more by ideological orientation than by labor market concerns.

The main opposition CHP, which refrained from intensifying its nationalist rhetoric during these elections, emerged as the main recipient of votes that might otherwise have gone to the Iyi Party. In addition, the actions of the CHP’s Istanbul mayor, Ekrem İmamoğlu, aimed at securing Kurdish votes in the election’s final weeks—actions that deviated significantly from nationalist talking points—did not prevent this shift of support.

Inflation

Turkey has been struggling with rising inflation for some time. Following the 2023 general election, the incumbent economic team began implementing a series of measures that signaled a period of fiscal austerity for citizens. Against this backdrop, the main opposition party, the CHP, came out on top in the March 31 local elections for the first time in nearly half a century. In his initial reaction to the election results, President Erdoğan acknowledged that the electorate’s concerns about the economy had been taken into account.

Thus, as economic grievances became more pronounced, the appeal of right-wing ideological rhetoric seemed to diminish. Voters chose to express their dissatisfaction with the government’s economic policies by supporting the most viable opposition candidate.

These results are likely to spur economic policymakers to devise solutions that mitigate the adverse effects on middle- and lower-income groups. Therefore, simplistic explanations that attribute the rise of right-wing sentiments solely to economic factors deserve a thorough reassessment.

T

urkey has become the third largest exporter of TV series in the world, behind the United States and Britain. In recent years, international audiences have become more aware of Turkish history and culture, as well as Istanbul’s beautiful sceneries and astonishing Bosporus views.

This incredible achievement masks difficult beginnings and some controversial trajectories taken by the Turkish film industry.

Until recently, the movie business in Turkey was tightly controlled under military oversight, which pursued a staunchly secularist agenda. However, political shifts invariably impact the cultural landscape. Over the last twenty years, Turkey has been emancipating itself from this oversight, steering towards a more inclusive political and social order. This transformation is mirrored in its cultural outputs, paving the way for global audiences to explore Turkish culture through new and diverse lenses in the future.

It is noteworthy to mention that in the 2010s an important debate about the Turkish movie industry raised the question, “Why are there no characters representing women wearing Islamic headscarves in TV series?”.

Back then, the wife of the elected prime minister, who wore an Islamic headscarf, preferred not to attend receptions on important days because of the reaction of the security establishment. She could not enter a military hospital because of her Islamic attire.

Understanding Turkey’s transformation

In 2007, the possibility of electing a religious president resulted in the issuance of a memorandum by the General Staff and leading opinion columnists in prominent newspapers, and a significant part of the political and bureaucratic elite made statements in support of this memorandum. When the Justice and Development AK Party cadres came to power as conservative democrats, they fought against the tutelage powers within the state. It was only in the 10th year after the government came into power that the Islamic headscarf was allowed in universities.

Understanding Turkey’s transformation goes beyond high-level political crises and legal changes. The headscarf movement epitomises the religious majority’s fight to assert its place within the political core, modern society, urban spaces, education, the upper echelons, economic spheres, and, naturally, state institutions.

The primary barrier to Turkey’s journey towards democracy has been the military tutelage system and its political backers, which staunchly resisted the integration of religious perspectives into the political mainstream. This division fostered a profound disconnect between the state and its citizens, becoming a pivotal source of social polarisation for years. Issues such as unequal access for religious groups to public resources, cultural disparities, and the security bureaucracy’s dominance over civilian governance have consistently sparked significant debate within Turkey’s political arena.

CHP changes its line

The AK Party’s coming to power in 2002 was an important turning point in terms of gaining such freedoms in Turkey. Since 2002, The Republican People’s Party CHP, the main opposition party, has supported these anti-religion restrictions and bans under the guise of protecting secularism.

However, having lost several elections since 2002, the CHP has gradually started to change its line. Following multiple electoral defeats in the past two decades, the CHP has been shifting its ideological stance. As the 2023 elections approached, it tried to dilute its earlier positions and move beyond the previously entrenched polarisation. Therefore, in the run-up to the 2023 elections, the political environment in Turkey transcended this axis of polarisation.

The two major contesting alliances, the People’s Alliance and the Nation’s Alliance, both included parties that appealed to secular and religious constituencies. The People’s Alliance, led by the AK Party, included the DSP, which had previously split from the CHP and had a similar ideological position, while the Nation’s Alliance, led by the CHP, included parties founded by people who had left the AK Party. Moreover, the CHP leader Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s election campaign produced a discourse that criticized and apologized for past practices that excluded religious people.

These developments represent an important milestone for Turkish politics. The alliances and discourses of the parties in these elections were indicative of social progress.

Polarization

In the meantime, Turkey’s cultural environment was also moving in a similar direction. For some time now, Turkish TV screenplays have been produced on historical figures that feature religious themes more than ever before. Religious lifestyles, which had previously been allocated to low classes in society, such as housekeepers and peasants, have now become associated with successful urban youth characters in modern Turkey. Examples of recent television series in this context include Ömer, which tells the story of a religious young man; Kızılcık Şerbeti, which tells the story of two families, one secular and the other religious, who meet around a love story; and Kızıl Goncalar, which brings to the screen the social encounters between people who belong to a traditional religious sect and the former practitioners of harsh secularism in Turkey.

Given the significant increase in rural-urban migration in Turkey since the 1970s and the emergence of new urban religious practices for over fifty years, it’s evident that mainstream Turkish media was slow to reflect this social trend. Similarly, the CHP’s belated shift towards inclusivity did not bring the success they expected in the elections.

On the other hand, the increase in the number of religious characters in Turkish TV series should be noted as a positive development, both as a sign of overcoming the secular-religious polarization and as a means of socialization and durability of this progress.

It is still difficult to say that the film industry has captured the full societal picture. But, at least, this means that international audiences will watch a more kaleidoscopic and inclusive take on Turkish life.

T

he United States and Turkey are commencing comprehensive talks to address longstanding disagreements and explore possibilities for improved ties. Senior officials from both nations will engage in several rounds of discussions at the State Department, covering a range of topics, including Syria, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, defense cooperation, energy, counterterrorism, and the Israel-Hamas conflict.

These talks, known as the Strategic Mechanism, will set the stage for a meeting between U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan on Friday.

The relationship between the two NATO allies has faced challenges, with issues such as Turkey’s acquisition of the Russian S-400 defense missile system leading to sanctions and its removal from the F-35 program.

While recent visits and discussions have hinted at positive momentum, there are no illusions that these talks will resolve all the ongoing strains. Tough conversations are expected, particularly regarding the way forward in Syria and Turkey’s economic ties with Russia.

A common ground

Despite differing perspectives, officials express optimism about finding common ground where interests align, especially in areas like counterterrorism.

The two-day visit aims to navigate complex issues and foster cooperation, acknowledging that some longstanding differences may persist. The U.S. remains concerned about Ankara’s ties with Moscow, especially in light of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. Tough discussions on Syria are also anticipated, given differing approaches and priorities. Despite challenges, officials express a desire to deepen conversations where cooperation is possible.

The talks come amid evolving geopolitical dynamics, and while the outcomes are uncertain, there is a recognition of the potential for positive developments in key areas of mutual interest.

T

he KAAN fighter jet, developed as part of the National Fighter Aircraft Program, made its maiden flight on February 21, 2024. This was the first time the Turkish public witnessed the flight of a manned fighter jet developed entirely with domestic resources.

The contract for the KAAN development project was signed between Turkish Aerospace Industries and the Secretariat of Defense Industries (SSB) in August 2016. Turkish Aerospace, as the prime contractor, completed the KAAN preliminary design activities in 2018-2022. In 2023, the KAAN fighter made its runway debut, known in aviation as a rollout, before making its maiden flight on February 21, 2024. In other words, KAAN made its first flight eight years after it graduated from an idea to an active project.

By comparison, the United States, which has developed numerous fighter jets to date, took approximately five years from the initiation of the F-35 project to its first flight. The completion of the KAAN project in eight years is commendable for Turkey, especially considering that it is the first domestically developed fighter jet.

Turkey’s domestic and national defense industry

This important achievement can be attributed to Turkey’s “domestic and national defense industry” policy, which the country began to implement decisively, especially after 2004. In a key meeting of the Defense Industry Executive Committee (SSİK) in 2004, it was decided to forgo the purchase of many off-the-shelf systems from abroad and instead focus on “co-production” or production using “domestic capabilities.”

The KAAN fighter is a complex “system of systems” requiring the development of numerous subsystems and technologies. These include special materials for low radar visibility, air-to-air and air-to-ground munitions, an AESA radar, electro-optical systems, communication systems, electronic attack and support systems, and flight computers. The significance of the first flight on February 21 underscores Turkey’s remarkable progress in defense and military aviation over the past two decades, demonstrating significant developments in advanced technology.

Within the Turkish Air Force’s inventory, the F-16 Block 30/40/50/50+ aircraft are classified as 4^th-generation aircraft. In contrast, Turkey’s upcoming procurement of F-16 Block 70 fighters is considered 4.5 generation due to the integration of the AESA radar, which enables more precise and long-range detection of air and ground elements. Similarly, aircraft such as the Eurofighter Typhoon (Europe), the KF-21 (South Korea), and the Rafale (France) fall into the 4.5-generation category.

5th generation stealth capabilities

On the other hand, the F-35 (U.S.), F-22 (U.S.), J-20 (China), Su-57 (Russia), and KAAN are classified as 5th generation due to their stealth capabilities, which include low radar (RF) and infrared (IR) visibility, as well as advanced sensor systems and situational awareness. Notably, only four countries, including Turkey, currently operate 5^th-generation fighter jets.

The KAAN, which measures approximately 21 meters in length, is capable of operating at an altitude of 55,000 feet and reaching speeds of up to 1.9 mach. Currently, the KAAN is powered by F110 engines, which are identical to those used on the F-16. Unlike the single engine configuration of the F-16, the KAAN has two F110 engines. However, for KAAN to achieve 5^th-generation status, it must be able to reach supersonic speeds without relying on the afterburner. This is critical because the afterburner increases both fuel burn and the aircraft’s thermal, or IR, signature, reducing its range and making it more vulnerable to IR-seeking missiles. Efforts are underway within the SSB to develop an advanced turbofan engine to replace the F110 engine.

KAAN is equipped with internal weapon stations similar to many 5^th-generation fighters and as a result, it doesn’t visibly carry ammunition during flight. Instead, when engaging air or ground targets, the covers on the weapon stations and sides of the fuselage retract, allowing ammunition to be fired. This provides two significant advantages: maintaining a minimal radar cross section due to the reduced aircraft surface area, and maintaining operational secrecy by concealing whether the aircraft is armed or unarmed.

In essence, Turkey has acquired an aircraft that is significantly more advanced than the F-16 Block 70, Eurofighter Typhoon, Rafale, and even the F-35, especially in terms of air-to-air combat capabilities. This is a triumph not only for the Turkish defense industry, but also for Turkish diplomacy. Just as indigenous alternatives were developed following the Canadian embargo on the electro-optical cameras used in Turkish UAVs, the KAAN fighter jet foreshadows the indigenous development of the Eurofighter Typhoon, previously unattainable due to Germany’s veto. Despite the short- and medium-term challenges posed by embargoes, particularly in the defense industry, the eventual emergence of indigenous versions of these products offers significant strategic and economic advantages.

KAAN’s flight testing

The strategic importance of Turkey’s domestic and national defense industry becomes clear when one considers the procurement of 40 F-16 Block 70 fighter jets, along with billions of dollars’ worth of ammunition and pods, which sparked significant public debate. The crux of the matter is that while Turkey can develop ammunition and other payloads domestically, integration into the F-16 Block 70 is hampered by the proprietary flight computers and software, or “source codes,” owned by the United States. As a result, the manufacturer mandates the purchase of ammunition, which poses a risk to the sustainability of ammunition stocks in potential war scenarios. Therefore, Turkey’s emphasis on developing its domestic defense industry is not just a preference, but an imperative.

Following its maiden flight, KAAN’s flight testing will continue with various prototypes until 2029, accompanied by ongoing design and hardware improvements. Then, between 2029 and 2033, the Turkish Air Force will add the first 10 KAAN Block 1 aircraft to its inventory, allowing Turkish pilots to gain flight experience with KAAN through intensive operations. From 2033 to 2040, Turkish Aerospace will diversify KAAN configurations and continue full-scale production.

While this timeline may seem long, it’s worth noting that the F-16 fighter jet, introduced in 1974, is still in production today and has evolved to its Block 70 configuration over nearly five decades. It’s important to note that KAAN is expected to reach full operational capability in about a decade.

KAAN is important not only for Turkey, but also for Azerbaijan and Pakistan. Both countries have recently decided, to varying degrees, to participate in the national fighter project. Pakistan, which currently operates a fleet of Chinese fighter jets, has decided to participate, while Azerbaijan, with an aging fleet of Soviet-made fighter jets, is undergoing modernization by the Turkish defense industry, rebranding its Su-25 fighter jets as “Su-25 LACIN.” As a result, these friendly nations are poised to become the second and third users of KAAN after the Turkish Air Force.

A

holistic assessment of the defense industry as a comprehensive ecosystem, rather than the combat effectiveness of individual large platforms, will make it easier to understand its impact on the fight against terrorism. With the progress made, Turkey is now in a position to produce systems and subsystems that are vital in the fight against terrorism.

The establishment of a national defense industry, with the breakthrough achieved in the recent period, has strongly influenced Turkey’s defense strategies and the instruments used in this field. The technology-intensive dimension of the fight against terrorism is one of the most obvious indicators of this breakthrough. In the 1990s and 2000s, Turkey began to produce its own platforms and subsystems, which were considered essential for operations against the PKK and up to that point in time had to be procured from abroad.

This resulted in a number of important advantages, including the prevention of personnel losses, better intelligence gathering, access to hard-to-reach areas, maintaining the tempo of operations, and cost efficiency. In the process, Turkey has raised its offensive and precision strike capabilities to a higher level, particularly through developments in unmanned systems and national munitions. This development, in turn, initiated a process at the doctrinal level, which included an increased focus on targeting the so-called senior members of the terrorist organization.

The emergence of unmanned systems

The importance of armed and unarmed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) becomes clear when considering the fight against terrorism, in general, and the geographical characteristics of certain areas in northern Iraq occupied by the PKK as safe zones. Military technological developments have provided various solutions in these areas, which are very difficult to reach with conventional forces. Operations that were previously limited to fighter aircraft such as the F-16 can now be carried out more flexibly and over longer periods with UAV systems. In this sense, UAV systems have played a decisive role in operations that require approaching the target in closed and difficult terrain.

By using UAV systems, the safety of the pilot’s life is not jeopardized, and, at the same time, the flight time of fighter jets and the cost of their ammunition are saved. Similarly, due to their characteristics, UAV systems have eliminated problems such as aerial resupply, and the inclusion of a large number of UAVs in the inventory has enabled uninterrupted surveillance of PKK targets. Such an opportunity paved the way for the rapid neutralization of PKK targets, especially the so-called senior members of the PKK. In recent years, the security forces and the MIT have carried out numerous operations in this way, and statements by members of the terrorist organization indicate that they are feeling this pressure.

It should also be noted that Turkey has adopted a continuous development line in the field of unmanned systems, working on complementary products that can meet all kinds of needs. For example, the Alpin, a rotary-wing UAV system or an unmanned helicopter developed by Titra, began providing logistical support to security forces in mountainous, hard-to-reach areas last year, which is a significant development. In the coming period, we can expect UAV systems to become increasingly capable of performing some of the functions of not only fighter aircraft such as the F-16, but also helicopter platforms such as the ATAK and Sikorsky.

PKK efforts to acquire military technology

Meanwhile, the risk of military technology products falling into the hands of terrorist organizations or non-state armed groups should always be considered. The concept of UAV attacks, popularized by DAESH in Syria and Iraq by planting explosives in commercial drones, has been seen in other countries in recent years and has become even more sophisticated in regions such as Yemen. In recent years, the PKK has made similar attempts at a rudimentary level, attacking Turkish military posts and tactical units on Turkish soil and in Iraq and Syria with improvised explosive devices attached to commercial drones or model aircraft.

Although the PKK has not achieved any results from these attacks, it is likely that it will continue to invest in this area as part of its long-term strategy in a security environment where UAV systems are becoming increasingly popular among terrorist organizations. Past examples show that the presence of a supporter/supplier plays an important role in the acquisition of such capabilities by terrorist groups or non-state armed actors.

Border security

Undoubtedly, one of the most important factors in the fight against terrorism is to ensure strong border security and to deter members of a terrorist organization from using certain points. It is also important to deploy low- and very low-altitude air defense systems on the border line against old-generation rocket and mortar systems that can be fired by terrorist elements across the border. The problems caused by both the infiltrations from the border line and rocket attacks from the other side have been clearly understood aftermath the civil war in Syria and ensuing proliferation of terrorist groups such as the PKK and Daesh.

The Turkish defense industry is carrying out extensive work to strengthen the border line, from advanced radar systems to cameras that can provide high-resolution surveillance and low-altitude air defense systems to patrol robots. Given the length of Turkey’s southern borders, it is reasonable to assume that unmanned systems will become increasingly important for this area, too. For example, there is a global trend towards the increased use of robot dogs in border areas, particularly for patrolling. While the U.S. is known to have various plans in this regard for the Mexican border, it is understood that similar efforts are underway in Turkey. Similar platforms may also be used in specific missions such as for cave operations against the PKK which are riskier due to the advantages the caves provide to terrorist components.

T

urkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan announced a groundbreaking achievement as Turkey embarked on its first human space mission, marking a significant milestone as the nation enters the second century of the Republic.

In a video message, Erdogan expressed pride in this historic moment and underscored the importance of Turkey’s manned space mission, which symbolizes a new chapter in the nation’s scientific history.

“We are taking a step into the second century of our Republic, the Century of Turkey, with the manned space mission we have undertaken for the first time,” declared president Erdoğan, emphasizing the cultural and scientific contributions of Turkey throughout history.

He highlighted the mission’s inspirational aspect, as Turkey sends its first citizen, Alper Gezeravci, a former pilot in the Turkish Air Force, into space. Gezeravci’s journey to the International Space Station is part of Turkey’s National Space Program, and Erdogan expressed pride in achieving one of the program’s key goals.

13 experiments

Erdoğan emphasized the scientific significance of the mission, with 13 experiments covering diverse fields such as astronomy, medicine, genetics, and material science to be conducted during the 14-day mission at the International Space Station.

The launch, initially planned for January 9, took place on January 18 from Cape Canaveral, Florida, under the Ax3 mission by private space exploration firm SpaceX. Four space travelers, including representatives from Turkey, Spain, Italy, and Sweden, are set to conduct over 30 scientific experiments and demonstrations during their orbital research on the ISS.

Axiom Space Astronaut Mission

In a separate development, Axiom Space successfully launched Turkey’s first astronaut, Alper Gezeravci, and three other crew members on the Ax3 mission from NASA’s Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral.

The Axiom quartet, aboard a SpaceX Crew Dragon capsule atop a Falcon 9 rocket, embarked on a 36-hour flight to the International Space Station (ISS). The mission is a testament to Axiom’s growing business of arranging commercially sponsored missions from its Houston-based startup.

The launch was a significant achievement for Turkey, marking its entry into the exclusive group of ISS-guest countries. The mission aims to conduct more than 30 scientific experiments during the crew’s approximately 14 days in microgravity aboard the ISS, focusing on various aspects of human health and disease in space.

The success of this all-European commercial astronaut mission reflects the increasing global interest in space exploration and enhances the prestige and capabilities of participating nations.

Source: Anadolu Agency and Reuters

I

n response to the recent attacks by the PKK terrorist group in northern Iraq, Turkey’s Ministry of National Defense declared the elimination of at least 26 terrorists in airstrikes carried out in both Iraq and Syria. The retaliatory actions came following the murder of 12 soldiers in PKK attacks.

The ministry specified that the airstrikes targeted terrorist targets and resulted in the neutralization of 26 terrorists. The operations focused on areas along the Turkish border with Iraq and Syria, regions that have historically been favored hideouts for the PKK.

Defense Minister Yaşar Güler stated that the assessment of the total casualties is ongoing, and further details will be provided as the information becomes available. Previously, on December 24, Güler announced that 30 terrorists had been neutralized since the soldiers’ killings.

A series of airstrikes and operations

Turkey’s response involved a series of airstrikes and operations to dismantle PKK targets, including caves, bunkers, shelters, and oil installations. The operations, overseen by Defense Minister Güler, aimed to deliver a strong message of deterrence against the terrorist group.

Additionally, Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) reported the neutralization of Erdinc Bolcal, codenamed Ali Xebat, a high-ranking PKK member responsible for the Silan Guyi Academy. Bolcal, who provided ideological and military training to terrorists, was eliminated in a targeted operation in Sulaymaniyah.

Turkey to prevent the emergence of a terrorist structure

President Recep Tayyip Erdogan reiterated Turkey’s unwavering commitment to combat terrorism, stating that the country would pay any cost to prevent the emergence of a terrorist structure in northern Iraq and Syria. Since the recent PKK attack, Turkey has neutralized a total of 56 terrorists in ongoing counter-terrorism efforts.

Speaking at an event in Istanbul on Saturday, Erdogan emphasized that Turkey is determined to prevent the existence of any terrorist organization in northern Iraq or northern Syria, underscoring that the country will spare no effort, regardless of the cost, to ensure the security of its southern regions.

The PKK, designated as a terrorist organization by Turkey, the U.S., and the EU, has been engaged in a decades-long terror campaign against Turkey, resulting in the loss of more than 40,000 lives. The recent operations are part of Operation Claw-Lock, launched in April 2022 to target PKK hideouts near the Turkish border in northern Iraq.

Sources: TRT World, Daily Sabah and Aljazeera English

I

n a strategic move to upgrade its military capabilities, Turkey has announced plans to acquire 40 Eurofighter Typhoon fighter jets, as stated by National Defense Minister Yaşar Güler on November 16, 2023. This significant defense procurement aims to enhance Turkey’s air force, ensuring readiness for current and future operational requirements.

The Eurofighter Typhoon, a highly effective multirole combat aircraft, is the product of a European consortium involving the UK, Germany, and Spain. Minister Guler informed the Turkish parliament that while the UK and Spain have signaled their assent, efforts are ongoing to secure Germany’s agreement to finalize the deal.

This development comes amidst Turkey’s ongoing quest to modernize its air forces. The F-16 and F-4 jets, currently in service within the Turkish Air Force, are considered adequate for Turkey’s immediate tasks. However, the defense strategy is forward-looking, seeking advanced options beyond the existing fleet.

Removal from the F-35 program

Turkey’s path to this procurement has not been without its challenges. Ankara faced removal from the F-35 fighter jet program in 2019 by the United States, following its acquisition of the Russian S-400 missile defense system—a move the U.S. argued could jeopardize the security of the fighter jets.

Despite the U.S. claim, Turkey has consistently argued that there is no conflict between the S-400 system and its NATO commitments, advocating for a commission to examine the issue more closely.

In addition to the Eurofighter jets, Turkey has expressed intentions to modernize its F-16 fleet by acquiring 40 ready-made F-16 Block 70 Vipers and upgrading 79 aircraft at Turkish Aerospace Industry (TUSAS).

A request to Washington in 2021 for the F-16 jets and modernization kits was met with informal notification to Congress about the potential sale, though various congressional objections have introduced a degree of uncertainty into the proceedings.

Commitment to self-sufficiency

Despite these hurdles, Turkey’s defense ministry remains committed to self-sufficiency in defense capabilities. The nation has made significant strides in its domestic defense industry, notably developing its own two main planes, including the Hürjet and the 5th-generation KAAN aircraft, which is expected to make its maiden flight later this year.

Turkey’s defense agenda under President Erdoğan’s administration has been marked by a push towards local production, reducing foreign dependency for military needs. The nation’s domestically manufactured arsenal now includes unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs), air defense systems, and national warship and tank programs.

The Eurofighter Typhoon procurement and the modernization of the F-16 fleet are seen not only as a boost to Turkey’s defense autonomy but also as a reinforcement of its commitment to NATO’s collective security framework.

As Turkey navigates these complex procurement processes, it showcases its determination to maintain a robust and modern defense posture on the international stage.

Sources: Anadolu Agency and Daily Sabah

T

he first contact in Turkish-U.S. relations began towards the end of the 18th century when the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. established maritime trade relations in Ottoman Mediterranean ports. Despite the interaction in the Mediterranean and the appointment of a U.S. consul in Izmir in 1802, no official relations between the Ottoman Empire and the U.S. were established until the opening of a U.S. embassy in 1831.

Likewise, the Ottomans were slower than European countries in assigning diplomatic missions to the U.S. and the first Ottoman consulate in the U.S. was opened in 1858. Bilateral relations began to deteriorate over time due to the U.S. missionary activities in Ottoman territories, the U.S. policies against the Ottoman Empire in favor of Armenians, and the U.S. reluctance to sell weapons to the Ottoman Empire.

Then, Turkey-U.S. relations were completely severed in World War I when the U.S. declared war against Germany, an ally of the Ottoman Empire. Despite the establishment of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, which ended the Armenian and Eastern Questions, and notwithstanding the negotiations and signing of an agreement to restore relations between the two countries, official relations did not commence until February 17, 1927, four years after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

The delay in the resumption of diplomatic relations between the newly established republic and the U.S. can be traced to the support of the United States for the Western occupying states and its attitude towards the Treaty of Lausanne after the War of Independence in spite of the U.S. claim to a neutral policy during the war. In this period, Turkey ended its enmity with the states it had opposed in the War of Independence, took advantage of the opportunities offered by peace, and took steps to strengthen its relations with these countries in the course of time.

Strategic approach

The defining approach of Turkish foreign policy was succinctly expressed in the words of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the republic: “Peace at home, peace in the world.” Between 1923 and 1945, the newly established Republic of Turkey adopted a foreign policy based on neutrality and non-alignment that prioritized peace, sovereignty, and national development. Between 1920 and 1955, Turkey pursued a policy of securing its national security through various pacts and declarations of friendship with neighboring countries.

Despite these regional pacts, Turkey, which was not a member of any official organization until 1939, managed to remain independent in its foreign policy and maintain friendly relations with all states. As a continuation of this policy, Turkey refused to enter World War II despite pressure from the Allied powers.

However, the Soviet threat that emerged in the post-World War II era played an important role in the development of Turkish-U.S. relations. The Soviet threat caused the U.S. to abandon its traditional isolationist policy in the bipolar world order and turn to a policy of containment. Moreover, the Soviet Union’s annulment of the Non-Aggression Pact it had signed with Turkey in 1925 and its subsequent demands for military bases in the Turkish Straits and for the possession of Kars and Ardahan in 1945 led Turkey to abandon its traditional policy of neutrality.

These developments are important factors in the evolution of Turkey-U.S. relations and show how the relationship evolved into a strategic partnership. The Truman Doctrine in 1947 highlighted the dangers facing Ankara and sowed the seeds of Turkey’s transatlantic relations. In the same year, Turkey was included in the Marshall Plan, which was designed to utilize U.S. economic aid to reduce Soviet influence in Europe.

Overall, the Soviet Union and security-oriented policies were the common strategic threat linking the U.S. and Turkey during the Cold War. This common threat made Turkey an important Western ally on the southern flank of NATO, and, at the same time, ensured Turkey’s protection from Soviet aggression and played an important role in the U.S. containment policy as a buffer state against the Soviet Union.

Although one of the main reasons for Turkey’s desire to position itself with the West was rooted in security concerns, there were other normative reasons. The pivot towards the West, which began with Westernization and modernization during the Ottoman Empire between 1839 and 1876, continued with reforms after the establishment of the Republic of Turkey and became an important feature of Turkish foreign policy.

After World War II, the ideals of liberal internationalism such as democracy, self-determination, and transnational institutions/organizations were revived by U.S. President Franklin Roosevelt. As a member of many international organizations established as part of this rules-based liberal international order led by the United States, as of 1947, Turkey positioned itself along the line of liberal values and the institutions that supported them.

However, this did not necessarily mean that the strategic partnership continued smoothly during the Cold War. The 1964 Cyprus crisis was a turning point in Turkey-U.S. relations. The letter of then U.S. President Lyndon Johnson admonishing Turkey after Turkey’s involvement in Cyprus led to a questioning of NATO’s support for Turkey and raised serious concerns about the reliability of the alliance with the West.

Developments after 1960 led to a deterioration in Turkey-U.S. relations. These developments included inadequate U.S. military aid; NATO’s adoption of the “flexible response strategy” instead of the “massive retaliation policy,” which had relied on the capacity for a response to the aggressor with nuclear weapons; the withdrawal of Jupiter missiles from Turkey during the Cuban Missile Crisis without consulting the Turkish government; poppy cultivation in Turkey; and Turkey’s eventual 1974 intervention in Cyprus.

With the end of the Cold War, the Truman Doctrine became obsolete, and the disappearance of the common threat raised questions about the future of the relationship. However, the change in the world order did not alter Turkey’s geostrategic importance for the Western alliance. Since the emergence of new centers of conflict and Turkey’s geographical proximity to Iraq, Iran, and the Caucasus made cooperation indispensable in any crisis, strengthening relations with Turkey was again an important security strategy for the United States.

In short, the two countries’ experiences, especially between 1960 and 1980, laid the groundwork for the current mutual mistrust and brought historical concerns to the forefront. On the other hand, although crises and differences of opinion have occasionally caused tensions between the U.S. and Turkey, such temporary crises have never become structural.

In recent years, the gradual decline in U.S. defense support to Turkey, which eventually turned into indirect or direct arms embargoes, forced Turkey to seek alternatives in the defense sector, leading to the purchase of the S400 missile defense system from Russia and the subsequent U.S. imposition of the Countering Adversaries Through Sanctions Act (CAATSA) targeting Turkey’s Defense Industry Directorate. This development led to further friction in bilateral relations.

The U.S. support for Greece’s and the Greek Cypriot Administration of Southern Cyprus’s theses on the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in the Eastern Mediterranean, the U.S. support for the YPG (the Syrian extension of the PKK in Syria), and the failure to extradite the leader of FETO, who carried out the July 15, 2016 coup attempt, to Turkey are issues that have long been awaiting solution in Turkey-U.S. relations.

Despite strategic mechanisms established between the two countries to resolve some of these disputes, no concrete progress has been made to date. The past has shown that there is always a way for transatlantic partners to make their alliances work, even if such differences sometimes cause cracks that undermine transatlantic solidarity. Given the involvement of both actors in regional and global issues beyond Turkey and U.S. bilateral issues, the war in Ukraine presents an opportunity for the two countries to reconsider their foreign policy approaches and bilateral relations.

P

olitical parties are shaped by the different divisions within society. Studies on the emergence of political parties generally take into account different variables such as socioeconomic divisions, religious and ethnic distinctions, urban and rural divisions, sentiments towards the current system of governance, foreign policy preferences, and whether economic policies are state-oriented or private entrepreneur-oriented. However, the shaping of politics over time, the presence of parties in the political arena, as well as their rise or fall in influence, are also explained through various other dynamics.

Although political tendencies in the world are categorized on the basis of two main labels, namely right and left, the breadth of the political spectrum cannot be explained solely on the basis of this distinction. The practice of political culture, the conjunctural positioning of election periods, and the constitutional and legal obligations of the political and electoral system often render a distinction solely based on a template of values ambiguous. In Turkey, despite the changes and transformations in politics and society, the main issues and axes that shape voter behavior still remain decisive.

For example, in the 2023 elections, as a manifestation of Turkish modernization, the idea of shaping society from the top down through elites influenced the political actors of the opposition bloc as they tried to bring together parties with different identities under the leadership of the Republican People’s Party (CHP), assuming that the electorate would accept their engineered political vision. Through the discourse of the “historical and intellectual background of the Table of Six,” the opposition bloc tried to idealize the combination of right-left, conservative nationalist and secular liberal as a search for a kind of social contract, through ideas that even the actors sitting at the table themselves were ambiguous about.

Some of those who expressed this view, which was put forward as a “Century of accumulation,” did not hold back from declaring that after the elections the last thing they would want in their political lives was to be a CHP candidate. They misconstrued the transformation in politics and society in Turkey and presented de-politicization as a political tactic. This interpretation of politics was a manifestation of a failure to analyze fully the dynamics of Turkish politics and the basic worldviews and perspectives of Turkish society.

Continuities and ruptures in political culture

The divide that has existed between society and elites since Ottoman modernization has been the dominant determinant of Turkish politics in the last century. This dividing line, which stands out in political and sociological analyses as the center-periphery divide, has formed the founding basis for political parties in Turkey and the way they relate to society.

Since the Tanzimat period, certain elitist interest groups led and articulated by the military and civilian bureaucracy, mainly the forces representing the center, have supported political parties hat represent the interests and worldview of the latter. Meanwhile the more traditional, conservative, and religious segments of society, representing the periphery, have mostly clustered around the parties that are the main carriers of right-wing politics within the periphery bloc. Periodically and conjecturally exceptions exist and there are partial crossovers between these two main blocs, but for the most part identities are the main determinant of the behavior of the majority of voter clusters. In other words, the weight and determinacy of right-wing politics in Turkey persists.

Since its foundation, the CHP has represented the central forces, while the Democrat Party and its successors have been the representatives of the periphery. In the entire history of the republic, these two main blocs have also determined the course of ruling-opposition relations. Although the manifestations of social transformation were clearly visible in the 2000s, the CHP failed to achieve a meaningful increase in voter support, let alone win elections. Unable to come to power through democratic means, elitist interest groups and the tutelary structures with which they are allied have historically relied on the fragmentation of political space and the weakness of political structures to reduce the determinism of right-wing politics.

Since the 1960s, intellectuals and the press have played a central role in the fragmentation and polarization of Turkish politics. Most political scientists agree that the fundamental problem of fragmentation and volatility in Turkish politics is the result of intervention through different means and methods in the political sphere.

Political parties in Turkey were established at the beginning of the last century. A multiparty system was first introduced during the Second Constitutional Monarchy (Ikinci Meşrutiyet). In the early Republican period, the opposition attempted to form political parties, but they were soon shut down, as for example in the case of the Progressive Republican Party (Terakkiperver Cumhuriyet Fırkası). In the single-party period, opposition parties were not permitted, and in 1936, the CHP, which was the only party, was integrated into the state.

Multiparty politics began in 1946, but democratic politics began on May 14, 1950 when the Democratic Party (DP) came to power. Since the DP’s first years in power, the state elites—civil and military bureaucracy, the majority of the educated class including the academia, and the economic class fed by the state—wanted democracy to be practiced in a restricted sphere and aspired to monopolize the normative sphere of politics.

By supporting military coups against civilian politics and demanding the permanence of the tutelage establishment, these groups created mechanisms of distrust towards political parties. They believed that only they, as opposed to democratically elected politicians and political parties, could determine the developments that would be in the long-term interests of society.

Thus, when political parties “went astray,” military coups could be “legitimized.” From this perspective, these self-interested tutelage groups supported the coups and coup attempts of 1960, 1971, 1980, 1997, and 2007, blaming the parties elected by popular vote. In order to justify their undemocratic behavior, they took refuge behind the argument that the “political parties had deviated from Atatürk’s principles.”

In order to construe a “flawed democracy,” the elite blamed the people who voted for political parties they did not approve of. When the parties they opposed were elected, they devalued the people’s preferences by saying “democracy is not just about the ballot box” and that the majority of voters belonged to the “ignorant masses.” The idea that the main characteristic of Turkish modernization was its top-down, coercive nature, that democracy could be dictated from above, and that the people should vote for the indicated parties was defended even by political scientists who described themselves as democrats.

Parties voted into power by the people were punished, periodically removed from power, and had their institutional structures banned from the political arena. Their replacements were asked to engage in politics in a limited and narrowly defined field and, if they came to power, to deal only with roads, sidewalks, bridges, and infrastructure services. Foreign policy, security, higher education, even education and youth policies were required to be framed and implemented by the presidential office under the control of tutelage and the civil and military bureaucracy under its command.

Since the transition to democracy and until the Justice and Development Party (AKP) government, no party has been in power for a long period of time, with the exception of the DP’s 10-year uninterrupted government that ended with a coup d’état. In every election held from the late 1980s until 2002, a different party came out on top.

In Turkey, political parties have always lacked institutionalization and existed as leader-centered entities. The parties of leaders who could not manage political elite change and management well were constantly divided and lost ground. Again, as a result of the lack of institutionalization, external interventions in political parties’ elites often facilitated divisions. With the exception of the AK Party and the DP, none of the parties that were founded as offshoots of major parties have been able to become an alternative to power; these efforts have only contributed to the fragmentation of the political sphere, serving populism and the devaluation of politics.

O

n the morning of Sunday, October 1, around 9.30 a.m., during the opening day of the new legislative session of the Turkish Grand National Assembly (TBMM), two PKK terrorists arrived in a light commercial vehicle at the entrance to the complex housing the Turkish Ministry of Interior and the General Directorate of Security. Using long-barreled firearms, they carried out a suicide attack.

In the aftermath of the incident, an initial official statement by the Turkish Minister of Interior Ali Yerlikaya revealed that one of the terrorists detonated an explosive device, while the other assailant was effectively neutralized by law enforcement personnel.

The Ankara terrorist attack, due to its timing, target, the affiliation of the perpetrators, and the modus operandi requires a careful and thorough examination.

Examining the unusual aspects of the attack

At the outset, it is imperative to acknowledge the limited open access information on the planning, reconnaissance, and financing phases of the attack. Nevertheless, a comprehensive examination of the operational methodology is possible by examining CCTV footage.

The available footage shows that at approximately 9:30 a.m. local time, a grey Renault Kangoo vehicle arrived at the prescribed coordinates. Two terrorists, armed with long-barreled firearms and a rocket-propelled grenade launcher, alighted from the vehicle and proceeded to directly target the guards stationed at the compound’s checkpoint gate.

The attack took the form of an abrupt incursion, with one of the assailants attempting to breach the checkpoint’s ballistic fortifications with the rocket launcher. At the same time, the other assailant activated an explosive device in order to facilitate the entry of the second terrorist into the area, while rendering the checkpoint security personnel ineffective.

Intelligence reports indicate that an armed confrontation ensued between the first assailant, who was trying to breach the checkpoint, and the law enforcement personnel. The prompt intervention of the security forces resulted in the neutralization of both assailants, although two police officers, Alim Reis Demirel and Erkan Karataş, were slightly injured.

While the manner in which the Ankara terrorist attack was carried out, i.e., a sudden and violent breach of a checkpoint,  has tactical parallels with an earlier incident in Mersin, it is important to highlight the notable technical differences between the latest incident and the Mersin episode, including facets such as the typology of targets, the specifications of equipment, and the profiles of the perpetrators.

Weapons cache and connections

In the aftermath of the attempted attack, following an investigation launched by the security forces, a cache of weapons was seized, consisting of 9,700 kg of C-4 explosives, three hand grenades, a rocket launcher (specifically the RPO-A Shmel thermobaric rocket launcher), a Glock pistol fitted with a suppressor, a Blow pistol, a M4 carbine with an extended barrel, and a AK-47 with an extended barrel.

Of particular importance is the M4 carbine, a weapon developed by the American company Colt. Celebrated for its rapid-fire capabilities and lightweight design, the M4 is primarily used in close-quarters combat, with an effective range of 350 meters, and is among the weapons sent by the United States to the PKK/YPG.

The most conspicuous among the seized weapons systems is the RPO-A Shmel with a range of 20 to 1,000 m. This weapon was used by the assailant who attempted to breach the ballistic defenses at the checkpoint gate. The RPO-A Shmel, similar to the Light Anti-Tank Weapon (LAW) developed by the Soviets, is characterized by its thermobaric composition, which gives it incendiary properties, and had been previously seized by the Turkish Armed Forces (TSK) during operations in Syria in 2022 and 2020.

Furthermore, the RPO-A Shmel was used in an attack by PKK terrorists in the Metina region in 2020, which resulted in the death of five Peshmerga fighters. It is known that operatives in terrorist organizations are subjected to specialized training regimes to achieve proficiency in the operation of this weapon system. Meanwhile, the protracted Syrian civil war has, to some extent, facilitated the acquisition of such weapons by terrorist organizations.

Terrorist faction and motivation

The attack, which took place on the opening day of the Turkish Grand National Assembly, was claimed by a faction of the People’s Defense Forces (HPG), the military wing of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK), known as the “Immortal Battalion.” The terrorist organization named the perpetrators as operatives under the aliases “Rojhat Zihan” and “Erdal Şahin.”

Following forensic investigations, the government authorities have officially confirmed that one of the neutralized terrorist was Hasan Oğuz. The identity of the other assailant is currently the subject of ongoing forensic investigation. As the results of these investigations crystallize, they will serve to clarify the context of the attack.

Given that the “Immortals’ Battalion” operates under the direct authority of the terrorist organization’s top leadership, specifically under the command of Murat Karayılan, it is reasonable to assume that the order for the attack came from the highest levels of the organization’s hierarchy.

The communiqué issued by the terrorist organization claiming responsibility for the attack,  stated that the attack was dedicated to the memory of deceased terrorist Hülya Demirer, known by the alias “Axin Muş.” Demirer is said to have been a member of the HPG and YJA Star Command Council and, in particular, served as the “Amed” province commander within the organization’s hierarchy. The attack was explicitly dedicated to her associates, specifically “Rohat Pasur” (Cihat Ay), “Egid Berxwedan” (Habib Karakoç), and “Demhat Setkar” (Çetin Temel). These terrorists had been neutralized in an operation carried out in Diyarbakır’s Kulp district in September 2022.

The operation had been carried out under the auspices of the Intelligence Directorate of the General Directorate of Security, and involved the use of the latest technology, including UAVs of the General Directorate of Security and UCAV platforms of the Gendarmerie General Command. The neutralized terrorists had been prominently featured on the Ministry of Interior’s list of wanted terrorists, color-coded “red,” “orange,” and “grey”  respectively.

Importantly, Hülya Demirer is known to have played a key role in orchestrating a series of bomb attacks: the attack in Istanbul’s Sancaktepe district on May 12, 2016; in Istanbul’s Fatih-Vezneciler district on June 7, 2016; in Istanbul’s Beşiktaş district on December 10,  2016; and, most recently, along the Diyarbakır-Mardin highway on December 16, 2022.

From the point of view of the terrorist organization, the decisive neutralization of such a consequential figure represented a profound development, especially in terms of eroding the morale and motivation of its domestic human resources in Turkey. The attack of October 1 served the dual purpose of sending a message to the organization’s dispirited human resources in Turkey, and confirming the organization’s continued ability to carry out attacks on strategic targets within Turkish territory.

T

Qadir’s observations underscore an important point: Muslims living in the West often find themselves caught up in the complexities of politics and day-to-day life. While this might sound exhausting, it’s not a rarity, but rather a common experience for Muslims in the West.

In stark contrast, Qadir points out that this level of complexity is noticeably absent in Turkey. The challenges Muslims face in the West seem less pronounced in the Turkish context and daily life as a Muslim is significantly less burdensome. The more streamlined and unburdened life gives Turkish Muslims a sense of ease and clarity.

Qadir’s perspective is a testament to the attraction Istanbul holds for Western Muslims and provides insight to the growing trend of Western Muslims moving to Turkey.

Islamic heritage and Western comfort

Adding to Turkey’s allure is the presence of numerous mosques, shrines, and landmarks intimately tied to Islamic history. These structures serve as tangible reminders of Turkey’s rich spiritual heritage and accentuate its appeal to Western Muslims, allowing them to embrace their faith openly while staying connected to their Western lifestyle. 

Lauren Booth, a British Muslim, author, and activist, shares her perspective on Turkey’s appeal: “It’s a great mix of Islamic and Turkish culture—that’s what’s incredible to me as a European.” “I can feel at home here as a Muslim and as a European. For me, it’s like two sides of my life are matched, finally,” she adds.

Booth also notes the growing trend of many Muslims being drawn to Turkey from countries such as the United States, Canada, and the United Kingdom. She describes this as a significant coming together that promises a hopeful atmosphere of prosperity and unity. Her experiences in Turkey, especially her visits to the grand mosques, led her to reevaluate her ideas about the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish people, and to acknowledge that her earlier understanding had been influenced by Western-centric Orientalism.

The lure of Western comfort and Islamic character make Turkey an ideal destination for Western students of Islam. Students from countries such as the United States find the mix of a developed society and political freedom and Islamic values particularly appealing.

Turkey’s educational institutions offer comprehensive Islamic Studies programs which attract those with a thirst for in-depth knowledge of theology, history, Islamic fine arts, and jurisprudence. Western Muslims who want to learn more about their faith, history, and culture respond to these points of attraction as well. 

Family ties and cultural bridges

Family ties and cultural heritage influence Western Muslims’ decision to make Turkey their new home. These ties provide a familiar touchstone in a foreign land and foster a sense of community and support. The presence of established networks can ease the transition and help newcomers navigate their new lives in Turkey.

Turkey’s social openness, and the warmth and welcome by the local population offer comfort and a sense of acceptance to Western Muslims who face discrimination in their home countries. In addition, the diversity within expatriate communities creates a supportive environment for newcomers seeking companionship and mutual understanding as shared experiences bridge cultural differences.

Muhammad Tahiri, a longtime resident of Turkey who leads a community of Western Muslims, emphasizes the appeal of Istanbul’s Islamic diversity and modernity. Unlike other Muslim countries with polarizing labels, Turkey has a harmonious atmosphere where labels such as “Salafi” or “Sufi” are less important. The ease of hearing the adhan (call to prayer) on the street and then shopping in well-stocked malls adds to this unique experience.

In addition, the freedom to access the Internet and mobile applications without surveillance contrasts with more controlled environments. Complementing this context, the Majlis of Istanbul Muslims has emerged as an initiative dedicated to fostering spiritual, social, intellectual, and professional dialogue within the Istanbul Muslim community, providing avenues for growth, collaboration, and the promotion of Islamic values and thought.

The migration of Western Muslims to Turkey reflects a blend of historical significance, religious freedom, social openness, and educational prospects. Turkey’s rich history, religious tolerance, and promising opportunities continue to attract Western Muslims seeking a fresh start. In their search for an environment that is consistent with their values and conducive to their faith, Turkey is proving to be a destination where these aspirations can be realized.

G

old has long been considered a safe haven asset. Together with foreign exchange reserves and assets, it forms an integral part of a country’s reserves. Gold can facilitate trade, either in national currencies or in digital currencies. Moreover, wars, geopolitical tensions, financial crises, and high price volatility can all lead to increased demand for gold. However, recently, political impulses have played a relatively greater role than fundamental supply-demand or arbitrage dynamics.

Gold has recently been the main instrument of political revolt against the U.S.-dominated financial order. The dominance of the U.S. dollar is increasingly being challenged by gold and digital currencies as well as the growing trend to trade in national currencies. Many emerging or developing economies are building up their gold reserves. Even the BRICS countries are now working on a new gold-backed reserve currency.

Other key risk factors driving demand for this precious metal include, but are not limited to, rising geopolitical tensions in the South China Sea, the Middle East, South America, and the war in Ukraine. In addition, the tendency to avoid sanctions, the impulse to avoid other external influences, and the fact that the dollar’s role as an international reserve currency is increasingly being replaced by gold, the euro, and the renminbi all contribute to the same end. Moreover, rising interest rates and realized losses due to decreasing market value of the treasuries in reserves is also raising demand for gold reserves.

Despite rising interest rates, there is still a general increase in market demand for gold due to the risk of a banking crisis, geopolitical risks, and the financial turmoil. Gold should therefore continue to be used for hedging against catastrophic scenarios. For all these reasons, this most archaic—for some, even barbarous—instrument of trade and investment has today become a modern instrument of hedging and even of revolt against the financial hegemony of the U.S. dollar.

The rush to gold reserves

Central banks around the world are building up their gold reserves. In fact, these purchases are at one of their highest levels since the 1960s (Fig. 1). Central banks now account for almost a third of monthly gold demand. Meanwhile, most of these record purchases in 2022 were made by central banks of countries at odds with the West. Central banks are reducing their dollar and even euro reserves and replacing them with more and more gold.

Sizable gold imports are now a reality in most developing countries as they seek greater economic and financial independence. In this vein, a huge current account deficit challenge is also a certainty: exports are strong, but imports are even stronger. Energy and other commodity imports (such as gold) are massive in emerging markets. Thus, imports, energy, and broader commodity dependence have led to a new current account deficit spree.

As shown in Figure 1, according to the World Gold Council, gold purchases rose 152% year-on-year to a record 1,136 tonnes in 2022. This buying cycle is expected to continue this year. However, in order to keep gold reserves free from the direct influence or intervention of other major external powers, it is better to keep gold within one’s country.

Russia’s recent experience of increasing its gold reserves is a good example. Russia has been gradually increasing its reserves for a long time, doubling them to $640 bn in the last five years alone. Especially since the annexation of Crimea in 2014, Russia has consistently reduced its dollar-denominated reserves and has tripled its gold reserves.

Brazil and France are also well known for their criticism of over-reliance on the U.S. dollar for trade and financial transactions. Many experts believe that countries and companies alike are now too dependent on the U.S. dollar as their main currency. Some, such as French President Macron, have even called it a “sovereignty issue.” EU members such as Poland and Hungary, two of the largest Eastern European countries, have also recently increased their gold reserves.

Indeed, major continental European countries such as France, Germany, and Italy, already hold around 60% of their reserves in gold (Fig. 2). Many others are already accumulating huge amounts of these gold reserves. Turkey, Germany, and Russia (even China and Iran) are steadily increasing their precious metal reserves as an independent tool against the financial dominance of the U.S. dollar.

Perhaps a similar idea was behind the gold reserves that Turkey has built up or withdrawn from the UK and the U.S., especially in the last 10 years (Fig. 2). Thanks to its recent attempts, Turkey is currently pushing for a place among the top 10 countries in the world in terms of gold reserves (Fig. 3).

Turkey’s gold reserves

Turkey has been accumulating gold reserves for a long time, mainly, among other things, in response to rising geopolitical tensions and increasing efforts to pursue an independent policy. According to the World Gold Council, the Turkish Central Bank has been accumulating gold reserves in a continuous cycle for at least the past few years. Meanwhile, Turkey has also been withdrawing its gold reserves from the U.S. and the UK. Today, as the importance of this precious metal has begun to grow, the value of these initiatives is clear.

Reserves are rising fast. Turkey has increased its gold reserves by 148 tonnes in 2022 to a total of 542 tonnes by the end of 2022 according to data from the World Gold Council. They bought another 30 tonnes of gold reserves in 2023 and as of the first quarter of 2023, has a total of 572 tonnes. Nearly a third of all its reserves (34%) are gold. Central Bank of Turkey (CBRT) statistics from June 2023 show that the Turkish Central Bank had $67 billion in foreign exchange reserves and $41 billion in gold reserves.

However, an extraordinary sale of more than 130 tonnes of gold to meet domestic demand in the second quarter of 2023 should also be noted. Though, thanks to its recent bullion moves, Turkey is closer today (more than ever) to being among the top 10 countries in gold reserves (Figure 3). The withdrawal of gold reserves from abroad, on the other hand, had been on the agenda in Turkey since at least the 1960s; however, it held the potential to leave the country in deep political turmoil.

Other developing economies

The sanctions against Russia have surely led to great concerns about where to keep international reserves, especially among the central banks of countries that are not aligned with the West. The sanctions following the war in Ukraine froze almost $300 bn of Russian reserves held abroad. Russia was able to use its huge gold reserves even during the sanctions in 2022, but most other international reserves were frozen. If these reserves were in bullion and held at home, they would not have been affected by the sanctions.

Following the invasion of Crimea, Russia has made an even more assertive attempt to diversify its reserves and other countries may follow suit. This de-dollarization trend, or shift away from U.S. assets, could in turn have major implications for the role of the U.S. dollar, its value relative to gold and other currencies, and its impact on the global economy.

Another example is China, which has increased its gold reserves to more than 2,000 tonnes for the first time in history. India is the world’s number one gold buyer with Indian consumers accounting for almost 20% of global demand per annum. China, Russia, and India are building up huge gold reserves. Together, these BRICS economies are making no secret of their ambition to find an alternative to the currently dominant U.S. dollar and are even looking for a new gold-based global reserve currency.

With Turkey’s transition to a presidential system in April 2017, after a historic referendum that saw 51.4% of the votes cast in favor of the new system, political parties in Turkey immediately began to adapt to the new system. The presidential system, which requires candidates to win an absolute majority of first-round votes, forged pre-election alliances. It became clear to all opposition parties, led by the Republican People’s Party (CHP), that on their own they could not defeat Erdoğan or the AK Party (Justice and Development Party) under Erdoğan’s leadership.

The rapprochement between the AK Party and the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party) after the July 15, 2016 failed coup attempt merged into an alliance called the “People’s Alliance” for the June 2018 presidential elections. The People’s Alliance was also joined by the BBP (Great Unity Party). This was followed by the opposition’s first serious move to form an alliance: the CHP, the Iyi Party, the Felicity Party (SP), and the Democratic Party (DP) formed an alliance for parliamentary elections, but disagreed on supporting a common presidential candidate. The June 2018 presidential election was a disaster for the opposition with Erdoğan’s winning 52.59% of the vote in the first round.

Over the past few years, Turkey has experienced a major economic crisis and recently a devastating earthquake. This led many political analysts to surmise that Erdoğan’s long, invincible reign in Turkish politics may be coming to an end with the presidential elections of May 14. Nevertheless, the opposition had to take over the reins tight and embark on an impossible mission: to bring together Turkey’s liberal, democratic, right-wing, left-wing, Turkish nationalist, and Kurdish nationalist circles and societal segments. This ideologically incoherent, politically unstable, and sociologically irreconcilable alliance united for one purpose: to overthrow President Erdoğan.

The coalition formed by opposition to Erdoğan was named the “Nation Alliance” or the “Table of Six,” which included most of the political groups in the opposition except the HDP, which contested the May 14 general elections under the YSP (Green Left Party). The YSP, overwhelmingly dominated by Kurdish ethno-nationalists, including some far-left political groups, did not nominate a presidential candidate, which translated as open support for Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu.

The implicit inclusion of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist separatists in the coalition created an insurmountable ambiguity and a bizarre situation for the opposition. If there is one thing that Turkish society as a whole would not accept, it is an overt or covert coalition with the HDP, the political wing of the PKK terrorist organization, as Erdoğan’s discourse reveals on every occasion. Kılıçdaroğlu’s promises to release Selahattin Demirtaş, the currently imprisoned former co-chair of the HDP, to grant autonomy to the Kurdish-majority provinces, and his perpetual silence to the statements of the leading PKK figures supporting his candidacy were perceived by most of the Turkish people as an imminent threat to the unity of the state.

The rallies of the opposition in the eastern and southeastern provinces of Turkey brought the tacit coalition to the surface. The CHP and YSP flags were waved together, and especially the victory signs by Selvi Kılıçdaroğlu, the wife of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and Dilek İmamoğlu, the wife of Istanbul mayor Ekrem İmamoğlu, angered Turkish people who frowned on the now obvious enlargement of the alliance to include Kurdish nationalists in an already Kemalist, liberal, secular, conservative, and nationalist coalition.

This incoherence led a wider public to see the opposition as insincere, unreliable, and unsustainable, so they once again turned to Erdoğan because he symbolized stability and a kind of idealism for the nation despite the economic crisis. The result on May 14 was yet another electoral defeat for the opposition candidate —for the 11th time—with 44.88% of the vote, and another victory for Erdoğan with 49.52% of the vote.

President Erdoğan pioneering the national will, yet not necessarily adhering to a nationalist view, has managed to regain the confidence of the masses and is now very close to winning the runoff on May 28, 2023, on the eve of the symbolically important day of the conquest of Istanbul by the Ottoman Sultan Mehmet II, the Conqueror. The irony is that a few days before the runoff, the opposition, as if lurching from one frustration to another, insists on the strategy that already cost them the election. Once again, they are attempting a “mission impossible.”

To win the votes of Sinan Oğan, a right-wing candidate who surprisingly won 5.17% of the vote, Kılıçdaroğlu’s newly formed campaign team clumsily and abruptly shifted the focus of the discourse to an anti-refugee and nationalist one. On May 24, after long negotiations, Kılıçdaroğlu was able to reach an agreement and secure the support of Ümit Özdağ, the far-right leader of the Victory Party, a staunch nationalist and the most vocal political figure promising the immediate deportation of millions of Syrian refugees. As well as injecting a nationalist discourse into Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign, Özdağ tacitly revealed on his Twitter account that in return for support he would be appointed interior minister if Kılıçdaroğlu won the runoff.

The agreement infuriated YSP voters, who took to social media to express their anger, while the YSP’s central board expressed its dismay over the terms of the agreement between Özdağ and Kılıçdaroğlu. However, despite the agreement, the YSP publicly stated that they would still support Kılıçdaroğlu since Erdoğan is their biggest enemy and called voters to vote for the Nation Alliance’s candidate. It is unknown how people in the eastern and southeastern provinces will respond to this call and whether they will be able to overcome their disapproval. Kılıçdaroğlu’s final political tango could cost him the large number of YSP votes from Turkey’s eastern and southeastern provinces, estimated at around 10% of the country’s total.

Endorsed by Sinan Oğan in his presidential candidacy on May 22, President Erdoğan can comfortably watch his rival’s final political maneuver from left to right. Obviously, this latest episode by Kılıçdaroğlu is also doomed to failure, as the opposition’s deadlocked and irreconcilable coalition has proved to be incredulous, untrustworthy, and incoherent in the eyes of the public.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is again on the horns of a dilemma: he wants to win the support of Turkish nationalists while retaining the support of Kurdish nationalists. The Nation Alliance’s far-fetched election campaign is most likely to fail, and this latest episode may be remembered as yet another political short-sightedness on the part of Turkey’s opposition parties.

O

n May 21, the leader of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and presidential candidate of the Nation Alliance, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, attended the program “Mevzular Açık Mikrofon” on Babala TV where he addressed a wide array of controversial topics. Some of his answers prompted responses from public figures, including the CEO of Bakar Haluk Bayraktar.

On whether he would shut down Baykar factories if he came to power, Kılıçdaroğlu responded, addressing Bayraktar: “He [Bayraktar] may produce UAVs/ UCAVs himself, there is no obstacle against that. Our only concern here is creating a competitive environment because there are other establishments that produce the same UAVs/UCAVs, including government agencies. We shouldn’t raise any obstacles, but there must be competition. As befits the name: national defense.”

Earlier, Ali Babacan, chairman of the DEVA Party, a constituent of the Nation Alliance, had targeted Baykar during a program on the Turkish Fox TV channel. Talking about UAVs and UCAVs, Babacan said, “They have been made sacred by the government. They say we will burn those who touch them. With all due respect, we will touch them.”

“We don’t ask for support; just don’t stymie our efforts, we ask for nothing else“

Following Kılıçdaroğlu’s answer, Haluk Bayraktar responded by sharing a lengthy and reproachful tweet in which he criticized Kılıçdaroğlu for distorting truths and failing to address slanderous claims made by his party’s MPs.

The tweet reads: “Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu, when talking about Baykar, you said, ‘Our only problem is the creation of a competitive environment.’ Not only you, but also those who have voiced the slander and defamation we have been facing recently have clung to this baseless argument… If you remember, you did not answer the question of why you raised the position of your MPs, he called the national UCAVs ‘JİTEM’ [Gendarmerie Intelligence Organization], who slandered us for stealing human resources from state companies, who lied that we received money from the municipality, on the lists in Diyarbakır, Izmir, and Malatya. When Sezgin Tanrıkulu’s name was mentioned, you ignored it.

Our late father had denounced these slanders to you years ago in letters and on the phone, but you remained oblivious then too. Finally, when you made another slander, our father Özdemir filed a lawsuit against you and the court sentenced you to pay compensation. He had wished for the amount awarded to be donated to the families of martyrs. We once again present your inconsistent behavior before the public’s judgment.”

In 2022, CHP Diyarbakır MP Sezgin Tanrıkulu had shared a provocative tweet implying that if the CHP came to power, Selçuk Bayraktar would be put on trial.

“Why should we be afraid of competition?“

Bayraktar highlighted Baykar’s international success in the defense field, and repetitively emphasized that Baykar was not afraid of competition—on the contrary, it worked to promote it.

The tweet continued, “As for the issue of competition… Baykar was born out of competition, and became one of the world’s leading companies in its sector through competition. Before Baykar, Turkey was buying UAVs from Israel. Baykar produced UAVs, competed with the Israeli company, and supplied Turkey with better quality UAVs at one-tenth the cost. Currently, there are seven companies, one of which is a foundation-owned company, producing UAVs in Turkey. Baykar has outcompeted U.S., Israeli, and Chinese companies, and exported to 30 countries. It has become the world’s largest UAV exporter.”

Bayraktar stated that this year’s Teknofest, which was organized under Baykar’s leadership with the participation of more than 2.5 million visitors, had garnered more than 4,000 UAV teams among the 332,000 participating teams, with one million young people competing in total. He argued that new technology companies are born from these competitions.

Bayraktar added that Baykar had made all its R&D investments with its own resources; had not received any government grants or bank loans; and earned 75% of all its revenues and 99.3% of the current year’s revenues from exports.

“Baykar’s share of total defense spending in Turkey is less than 1%. Which monopoly are you talking about? … Let me explain again: our concern is not to become a monopoly in Turkey. We produced these UAVs for Turkey, for our fight against terrorism. Before Baykar, there was a monopoly and foreign dependency. We want our country to maintain its world leadership in this field.”

Bayraktar went on to add, “From Greece to the United States, the world’s most important media outlets have published articles saying that our national UCAVs have changed the paradigm and rewritten defense doctrines. However, what is said and written about what we do at home is always under the same perception, always the same slander… While extending your support (!), I wish you had not distorted the truth… We don’t ask for support; just don’t stymie our efforts, we ask for nothing else.”

M

uch has been written about the winners and losers of Turkey’s May 14 elections, but there is almost unanimous agreement that nationalism was the overall winner. The rise of nationalism in Turkish politics has been continuing unabated for about ten years. Ideologies such as liberalism, socialism, and Islamism, which have an international character, are either localized or weakened. The synthesis of Islamism, conservatism, and nationalism crafted by the AK Party with the foundation of the People’s Alliance has gained social support. Indeed, with this synthesis, the AK Party managed to come first in the parliamentary elections with 35.5% of the vote.

On the other hand, the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and the IYI Party each received 10% of votes; more precisely, the MHP 10.07% and the IYI Party 9.69%. The Kurdish ethno-nationalist Green Left Party (YSP) won 8.82% of votes and the Victory Party received more than 2%. If other small parties are included, the total support for the nationalist parties increases even more. Sinan Oğan, the presidential candidate of the ATA Alliance, who defines himself as an “Atatürk nationalist,” played a key role in the presidential race, winning more than 5% of the vote.

As nationalism becomes more popular and all political actors adopt a nationalist stance, it gradually hollows out and the pretexts of nationalism become more prominent. Undoubtedly, a nationalist wave swept the May 14 elections; however, it would be useful to have a closer look at the nature of this wave. Is it a sacred nationalism, a secular nationalism, a statist nationalism, an idealist nationalism, or an anti-immigrant nationalism that has emerged as a reflection of the European far right, a nationalism that focuses on race and ethnicity, an inclusive nationalism that focuses on shared political values, a unionist nationalism, or a Kurdish ethnonationalism?

CHP and HDP getting closer

As a matter of fact, all these types of nationalism could write their own success stories in the May 14 elections. Each claims to be a winner. In particular, the far-right, anti-immigrant line of the Victory Party, which forms the backbone of the ATA Alliance, gained new prominence when Sinan Oğan pushed the elections into a runoff. The political line represented by Muharrem İnce, who was forced out of politics by a FETO criminal cult conspiracy, and his Kemalist approach to politics are being marginalized on the political scene by the Republican People’s Party (CHP) itself. The CHP’s deviation from the Kemalist nationalist position deserves to be addressed as part of a broader political strategy.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, who has politically neutralized the sincere Kemalist line in the CHP since the day he became president, has tried to make his party capable of forming alliances with other ideological positions. Kılıçdaroğlu’s most important “achievement” during his presidency is that he has eradicated the CHP’s Kemalist vein and enabled his party to form alliances with other political actors in order to cross the 25% threshold—historically, the CHP’s maximum support rate. Kılıçdaroğlu’s transformation of the CHP began with bringing his own party’s base closer to the HDP. This was a strategically important move.

In the course of ten years, the HDP and CHP bases have become closer. The rapprochement between the CHP and the HDP was the main strategic thrust that paved the way for Kılıçdaroğlu’s idea of forming the Table of Six. Without the behind-the-scenes CHP-HDP alliance, the other actors would be worthless. It was Kılıçdaroğlu’s CHP that compromised its values. With the purges of Önder Sav, Emine Ülke Tarhan, and, most recently, Muharrem İnce, the Kemalist character of the CHP seems to have been largely destroyed.

The CHP changed its shell

The vacancies left in the CHP by the ousted Kemalists were filled by actors with ethnic, sectarian, or leftist ideologies, and the party changed its shell. The well-known Atatürk nationalist CHP has been replaced by a very different CHP. Although this change caused discontent among the Kemalist faction within the party, many CHP dissidents have either been silenced or cowed into submission in the face of a major rival like Erdoğan. The CHP purged the Atatürk nationalists from its ranks and paved the way for cooperation with “Kurdish ethnonationalists” along the lines of the HDP.

Uniting secular nationalists and Atatürk nationalists in an alliance was the second phase of CHP leader Kılıçdaroğlu’s plan to come to power. It was precisely this gap that the IYI Party tried to fill in Turkish politics: the IYI Party tried to become a rallying point for nationalists who had broken away from the MHP, nationalist Kemalists, and more extreme anti-immigrant populist nationalists. Although the IYI Party gained considerable momentum in the Table of Six format for a while, it lost this upward momentum over time. Kılıçdaroğlu faced IYI Party leader Meral Akşener for his own presidential candidacy and won.

Although Kılıçdaroğlu is adept at neutralizing smaller political actors, he failed to do so in the presidential race. The HDP/PKK shadow over the Nation Alliance was its weakest side. Kılıçdaroğlu, who had to face these criticisms, eventually fell behind President Erdoğan in the first round of the presidential elections. In this environment, Oğan managed to win over the reactionary votes that had broken away from the CHP and İnce.

A nationalist approach

In the May 14 elections, Turkish voters preferred a nationalist approach that is closer to a patriotic line expressed in terms of the strength of the state. The political line that received the most support was the nationalist formula that prioritizes a strong state, security, and integrity. Thus, the People’s Alliance, which prioritized the defence industry, an independent foreign policy, and the survival of the state, was the most successful.

This line was agreed upon by the AK Party, the MHP, and the Great Unity Party (BBP). On the other hand, the New Welfare Party (YRP) represented the Islamist-nationalist line, while HUDA PAR manifested a line that synthesized Islamic values with the Kurdish identity. HUDA PAR’s position within the People’s Alliance raised serious questions. As a result, HUDA PAR contributed as much to the People’s Alliance as it damaged it; overall, it could be argued that it contributed to the creation of a more inclusive political framework for the alliance.

The more populist nationalism of the IYI Party has lost momentum due to its participation in Nation Alliance. The Victory Party, which is more associated with the far right and is notable for its anti-immigration stance, has made an interesting entry into Turkish politics. In the coming period, there may be voter transitivity between these two parties.

Under Turkey’s presidential system, as long as the president continues to be elected with a 50%+1 electoral mandate, nationalist parties will continue to be an element of winning alliances. However, the competition between unifying nationalism and divisive and otherizing nationalism will continue to grow in the coming period. The main paradox of nationalist actors in Turkey will be the permeability between these positions. The unifying and state-oriented nationalism of the People’s Alliance was the victor in the May 14 elections; however, as in the West, anti-immigrant and ethnicity-based nationalism is likely to have a place in Turkish politics from now on.

The Victory Party’s recent agreement with Kılıçdaroğlu could backfire by weakening the support of liberal Islamists and Kurdish nationalists who backed Kılıçdaroğlu in the first round of the election.

T

he May 14 presidential and parliamentary elections in Turkey have been the subject of much reflection both inside and outside the country. The elections were significant in terms of several global issues, given President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s distinct approach to global politics.

The Peoples’ Alliance and Erdoğan himself appear to be satisfied with the results of the first round of the election, which was held smoothly and without major problems. The election followed a period of high political tension and was widely considered a success because it was peaceful, free and fair.

The concept of free and fair elections

Free and fair elections are considered a fundamental civil right and the backbone of democracy. Article 3 of Protocol I to the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) states, “The High Contracting Parties undertake to hold free elections at reasonable intervals by secret ballot, under conditions which will ensure the free expression of the opinion of the people in the choice of the legislature.”

A similar approach is followed by the Organization on Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The OSCE has 56 member states and was established to promote human rights, democracy, and rule of law in Europe, dating back to the 1975 Helsinki Final Act. The member states assign a special importance to the holding of democratic elections.

In the landmark 1990 Copenhagen Document, they declared that “the will of the people, freely and fairly expressed through periodic and genuine elections, is the basis of the authority and legitimacy of all government.” The key principles laid down in this and other related OSCE documents and elections can be summed up in seven words: universal, equal, fair, secret, free, transparent, and accountable.

Furthermore, the OSCE has established a special office called the “Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR)” to support and assist member states in “promoting democracy, rule of law, human rights and tolerance and non-discrimination.” The organization has even designed a special process for election observation. In December 2006, the OSCE Ministerial Council tasked the ODIHR to “further strengthen the observation methodology” and “to give utmost attention to the independence, impartiality and professionalism” of its election observation activities.

Selection of the election observation mission members

Members of the ODIHR election-related field activities are selected through an open recruitment procedure. Prior to each activity, the ODIHR issues a call for applications on its website and contracts core team members from among these applicants, based on the qualifications and experience of the candidates. Nationality and gender are also taken into account to ensure diversity in the teams’ compositions.

Observers, both long- and short-term, are seconded to the ODIHR by OSCE participating states. Additionally, some long- and short-term observers are recruited through the ODIHR’s extra budgetary fund for the diversification of the Election Observation Missions (EOMs). ODIHR election observers must be citizens of OSCE participating states.

On occasion, the ODIHR has accepted short-term guest observers from OSCE Partners for Co-operation. To ensure neutrality, the ODIHR’s methodology does not allow citizens to observe elections in their own countries.

The May 14 elections in Turkey

In accordance with its international obligations, Turkey extended an invitation to the Council of Europe (CoE) and the OSCE to observe the presidential and 28^th-term parliamentary elections held on May 14, 2023.

Moreover, Turkey accepted international observation delegations from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (PABSEC), the Organization of Turkic States (OTS), the Parliamentary Assembly of Turkic States (TURKPA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Mediterranean (MEDPA) upon their request. Eventually, a total of 489 international observers followed the elections. The ODIHR alone observed the elections in Turkey with a team of 401 observers across the country from 40 countries. Turkey officially stated that cooperation has been provided by the authorities to the observation missions so that they could properly carry out their activities.

The reports of these delegations suggest that the elections were held in accordance with the standards of free democratic elections and with a level of participation that is exemplary in the OSCE and the CoE geography. International observers confirmed with various statements that the security of ballot boxes was assured, and that the elections were held in a transparent, free, pluralistic, and fair manner that complied with international standards.

On Monday, May 15, a day after the election, the International Election Observation Mission (IEOM), composed of observers from the OSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Election Observation Mission (EOM), the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly (OSCEPA), and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) published the “Statement of Preliminary Findings and Conclusions” regarding the findings on the election process and held a press conference.

At the Ankara press conference, Ambassador Jan Petersen, the head of the ODIHR Election Observation Mission, said that the elections were “mostly peaceful” despite a few incidents and that Turkey’s Supreme Election Council (YSK) had worked efficiently. The delegation praised the high turnout, stating that it was a clear indicator of a “strong democratic spirit.”

There were, however, some negative remarks raised by the same delegation. It was noted that current President Erdoğan and the country’s ruling parties “enjoyed an unjustified advantage over opposition parties who had faced unequal conditions for campaigning.” Another criticism was that the YSK showed a “lack of transparency in its handling of Sunday’s elections” especially in “handling complaints at all levels of the election administration.” Further criticism included the “biased state media coverage of the contest” and “widespread intimidation against the pro-Kurdish Green Left Party (YSP).”

Finally, Farah Karimi, the head of the OSCEPA delegation, said that the denial of accreditation by the Turkish authorities to Danish parliamentarian Soren Sondergaard and Swedish parliamentarian Kadir Kasırga as election observers was a “regrettable decision.”

A

fter the May 14 elections in Turkey, disturbing comments emerged on social media platforms aimed at earthquake survivors. How earthquake survivors would affect the election outcome had been heavily speculated, and many had criticized the government for the way it handled the disaster. Foreign and domestic opposition media alike considered that the earthquake would shake support for incumbent president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in the earthquake-hit provinces, yet the results of the election proved otherwise. This prompted supporters of the opposition to share hateful remarks towards the earthquake victims who voted for Erdoğan. Such actions were condemned by government officials and investigated by the police.

How the earthquake-stricken region voted

Seven out of the ten earthquake-stricken provinces of Turkey showed preference for Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. In Kahramanmaraş, the epicenter of the earthquake, Erdoğan received a whopping 71.88% of the votes against Kılıçdaroğlu’s 22.20%. Other provinces, where Erdoğan maintained a large lead from his main opponent were Malatya (69.39% Erdoğan, 27.02% Kılıçdaroğlu), Gaziantep (59.76% Erdoğan, 34.65% Kılıçdaroğlu), Adıyaman (66.33% Erdoğan, 31.09% Kılıçdaroğlu), Osmaniye (62.33% Erdoğan, 30.70% Kılıçdaroğlu), Şanlıurfa (62.01% Erdoğan, 36.06% Kılıçdaroğlu), Elazığ (67.19% Erdoğan, 28.19% Kılıçdaroğlu), and Kilis (65.62% Erdoğan, 26.87% Kılıçdaroğlu). In these districts, the votes for Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance only slightly dropped compared to the 2018 presidential and parliamentary elections.

Kılıçdaroğlu emerged victorious in the remaining three provinces. In Hatay, one of the provinces with the most extensive destruction, Kılıçdaroğlu’s and Erdoğan’s votes were neck and neck with Kılıçdaroğlu winning by a 0.04% margin. Kılıçdaroğlu dominated in Diyarbakır with 71.96% of the votes, while Erdoğan received 26.48%. Adana also witnessed a competitive race between the two candidates with Kılıçdaroğlu collecting 50.89% of the votes against Erdoğan’s 43.92%. The turnout rate for the region was 80%.

Insults towards earthquake victims are investigated

Social media was flooded with posts aimed at earthquake victims by opposition supporters ranging from profanities, cursing, and insults to threats and victim-blaming. They claimed their support for Erdoğan was the reason for the devastation of their cities, and some said that they would never bother sending aid or financial assistance to them. A TikTok influencer who said “We will not do anything for you as of now. First, we’ll ask who you voted for” was arrested and later released on accusation of insult. A man shared a video swearing at the earthquake victims and asking how it was possible to vote for Erdoğan in the wake of the disaster.

Several social media users labeled the earthquake victims as “ungrateful” for the humanitarian aid poured into the disaster zone by the CHP-run municipalities and supporters of the opposition. Angered by the reaction, certain earthquake survivors even sent money to Kılıçdaroğlu “paying back” the aid. There were tweets that went as far as saying that the earthquake survivors who voted for the ruling party should have died in the deadly February 6 earthquakes.

Figures from the CHP were among those who shared insulting comments. In a post she shared on Instagram, CHP Ezine District Women’s Branch Chairwoman Cansu Doğan wrote, “I wouldn’t even throw my snot at you, you’ll regret it like a dog, you’ll die hungry.”

Kicking earthquake victims when they’re down

A striking incident took place in the Tekirdağ province governed by the CHP. Earthquake survivors accommodated by the municipality received a statement that their stay would be ended on May 21. Mayor Kadir Albayrak denied the claims that the decision was associated with the election outcome, and announced that their stay would be extended. He made accusations of a “perception operation,” by pro-government people. The accusation was ill-received by earthquake victims.

Melahat Karaman, who was injured during the earthquake in Hatay when a column fell on one of her legs, spoke to Demirören New Agency and said that they do not fabricate perception. Stating that she arrived in Tekirdağ three months ago, she said, “A column fell on my leg, I stayed in the rubble for two hours. Since I could not be treated in Hatay, I underwent surgery at Istanbul Bağcılar State Hospital. I have three platinum rods in my leg. I am currently staying in a house provided by a philanthropist. I did not stay at a hotel. My grandchildren and my daughter are in a hotel, my granddaughter called me crying. I came here when she said, ‘They kicked us out, where are we going to go?’ Yesterday evening, we were told that we were being subjected to a perception operation. Can you show Mr. Kadir [Albayrak] my leg?”

“Am I in the position to fabricate perception? I am already an earthquake victim; my wounds, my fears are enough for me. I will now return to Hatay, I have no home. The only thing I trust is my state. What was he trying to do by taking us out one day after the election? Were we being looked after for votes? Since we didn’t get the votes, we were fired. Now, did I do the perception operation or did he do it? I don’t have a seat to lose.”

Analysts say Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s vow to rebuild devastated cities reassured voters in the earthquake-stricken region, which are mostly AK Party strongholds, accompanied by doubts about the opposition’s ability to meet voters’ expectations. The runoff presidential election will show how reactions toward the earthquake survivors translate to the ballot box.

E

specially after Erdoğan won the first round with 49.5% of the vote, migrants, refugees and people who have acquired Turkish citizenship through investment came under attack. The Turkish opposition, represented by its presidential candidate, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, lashed out against refugees, with Kılıçdaroğlu promising to send them back once he takes office. This position reflects a change from one of his earlier statements, where he said he would send them back “within two years the latest.”

The change in Kılıçdaroğlu’s discourse was expected as he aimed to win more nationalist votes from those who voted for Sinan Oğan, who won 5.2 per cent of the vote in the 14 May elections. In addition to reducing inflation and tackling the economic crisis, the ATA alliance that nominated Oğan promised to repatriate refugees, who, together with asylum seekers, number some 13 million.

Oğan decided to support Erdoğan in the run-off, while some of his alliance parties decided to either support Kılıçdaroğlu or remain neutral.

Real refugee numbers

People with knowledge of Turkish affairs know that the figure of 13 million is not accurate and that the real number is closer to six million refugees, but in the election season everything is possible.

Kılıçdaroğlu, feeling a bitter defeat in the first round, lost his temper in front of the camera, “I am here, and I will fight until the end.” In another video, he warned Turkish voters that the number of refugees, migrants, and asylum seekers will jump from 10 to 30 million if the ruling party in Turkey wins the elections. Last month, he said there are 3.6 million Syrian refugees in the country, but his zeal to win more nationalist votes made him spice up the number. This should not be the case for an accountant; however, polarization in the country seems to be the reason why the 74-year-old presidential candidate decided to manipulate the number in a matter of three weeks.

The question is how people who were granted Turkish citizenship would vote in the elections. It is hard to give the exact number of these new Turkish voters, but estimates suggest that some 210,000 Syrians have obtained Turkish citizenship, while tens of thousands of others from different nationalities have become Turkish nationals after years of working in the country, investments, or marriage. Of the 210,000 Syrians who are now Turkish citizens, some 150,000 can vote.

How do people, who obtained Turkish nationality, vote?

It is not unexpected that the majority of people who have acquired Turkish citizenship would vote for the ruling party and President Erdoğan because they feel more welcome by them, but this is not the only reason or case. Some of them don’t vote at all, while a small number vote for the Turkish opposition. The Turkish opposition’s anti-migrant discourse is the main reason why many new Turkish voters vote for Erdoğan, and the only way for the Turkish opposition to win more votes from people who gained Turkish citizenship is to soften its discourse against them. The Turkish opposition does not seem to be interested in this as it eyes the majority of Turkish voters who are in favor of sending the refugees back, whether willingly or unwillingly.

The Turkish government has adopted a policy that would encourage refugees to return to their home countries, and it did, in fact, deport some 124,000 illegal migrants in 2022, including 70,000 Afghans and 58,000 Syrians. The Turkish government argues that Syrians should be encouraged to go to safe zones in northern Syria and that sending them to areas controlled by Assad means sending them to an uncertain future. Since the Turkish government’s policy of encouraging Syrians to return to northern Syria, some 500,000 Syrians have chosen to return.

Safe return of refugees

Turkey is now in talks with Russia, Iran, and Syria, sponsored by Moscow, to find a political solution to the problem of Syrian refugees in Turkey. Conditions may be ripe for their safe return after the Turkish elections on May 28, 2023. The Turkish opposition does not have a clear plan on how to send the Syrians back, and it knows full well that the European Union, which it claimed in its election campaign would lift visa restrictions on Turkish citizens “within three months”, may object to such a move.

Turkish Interior Minister Süleyman Soylu said his government has been implementing a plan to ensure the safe return of Syrian refugees. This plan includes creating industrial complexes, providing them with jobs, and building housing units, schools, and clinics to facilitate their return. The plan is supported by countries such as Qatar.

Soylu emphasized that most of these refugees come from Aleppo, which the Turkish “National Pact” of 1920 includes in its borders and that many of them have Turkish roots, sending a message to national voters that the policy of the Turkish government is in line with national security.

Despite their small numbers, which do not affect the outcome of Turkish elections, the majority of new Turkish citizens would not vote for the Turkish opposition, and proposals such as banning them from voting for 10 years would only create additional fear for them.

Perhaps it is time for the Turkish opposition to adopt a friendlier discourse towards people who have acquired Turkish citizenship, as they are now citizens by law and should be treated as such. The Turkish opposition should review its mistakes instead of looking for a scapegoat to justify its continued failure to defeat Erdoğan for 21 years – a record that will most likely become 26 years on May 28, 2023.

T

urkey held presidential and parliamentary elections on Sunday, May 14. The results show that while the Erdoğan-led People’s Alliance obtained a majority of seats in the parliament, the next president will be elected in a runoff on May 28 as President Erdoğan was 0.5% short of the 50% threshold. On the other hand, the opposition’s candidate Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu got 44.9% of the votes followed by Sinan Oğan who surprisingly secured 5.2% of votes.

The elections in Turkey were given great importance not only by competing alliances and parties but also by the electorate, 89% of which voted. The majority of poll companies, most of which are pro-opposition, predicted that Kılıçdaroğlu would win in the first round – which did not happen, nor did he lead the elections.

There are many noteworthy aspects regarding the elections in Turkey. The most striking is certainly the disappointment of the Turkish opposition, which this time was confident about overthrowing Erdoğan and was shocked when all votes were counted. Kılıçdaroğlu had allied with five right-wing parties (Table for Six) plus the pro-PKK party HDP to win the elections. When the ratios of the opposition parties in the previous elections are added up, one could have expected a landslide victory for Kılıçdaroğlu. What is more, their cooperation in mayoral elections had worked well.

In addition, in order to ensure his victory, Kılıçdaroğlu even granted 37 of his party’s parliamentary seats to the small parties of the Table for Six who each get around 1% of votes if they run independently. While the smaller parties are the biggest winners in the Nation Alliance, handing over so many seats to parties with such small vote percentages will certainly be used against Kılıçdaroğlu by his party. The aim of allying with Erdoğan’s former aides was to weaken him, but ironically it looks like the alliance may actually cause Kılıçdaroğlu to lose his CHP chairmanship.

Moreover, unlike expectations, the de facto alliance with the HDP did not help Kılıçdaroğlu achieve victory. The CHP-led Nation Alliance must have thought if it can add the 10% of HDP votes to its own, it could easily win the elections. Kılıçdaroğlu and his companions gave many promises to the HDP such as releasing the party’s former leader Selahattin Demirtaş and discharging the trustees who had replaced HDP mayors.

The HDP was also confident that Kılıçdaroğlu would win: some went so far as  to mention freeing Afrin while others claimed they would release Abdullah Öcalan and other inmates. All these claims became viral on social media and, as expected, they caused a backlash. While Kılıçdaroğlu got almost all the votes of the HDP electorate, his concessions to the HDP, led Turkish nationalists to leave the alliance.

This is why the opposition alliance’s nationalist member, the Iyi Party, got only 9.75% of votes since nationalists slide to Sinan Oğan, who was another presidential candidate representing far-right groups. Oğan surprisingly got 5.2% of votes and suddenly became the pivot politician for the runoff.

Oğan has just declared that he will support Erdoğan in the runoff, further reducing Kılıçdaroğlu’s chance of being elected. It is clear that allying with Kurdish nationalists only provoked Turkish nationalists and boosted right-wing parties’ votes including the MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), the nationalist party in the People’s Alliance.

As a result, not the Kurdish nationalism but the Turkish nationalism was (and will be) decisive for the election results. It is therefore clear that any party that allies itself with the HDP should not have high expectations at the polls due to the party’s strong ties with the PKK. The AK Party had also lost votes during the peace process that continued between 2013 and 2015.

Regarding the People’s Alliance, they will be represented by 323 members in the parliament, which means that they obtained the majority in the legislative body. The AK Party will be represented by fewer MPs as its votes shrunk to 35.5%, a 5% decrease from previous elections. On the other hand, the YRP (Yeniden Refah Partisi, New Welfare Party), headed by Fatih Erbakan, the son of former prime minister Necmettin Erbakan, won five seats in the parliament.

Voters who left the AK Party voted for either the YRP or the MHP. Thus, in a sense, voters remained in the alliance. Thus, it emerges that while people’s loyalty to Erdoğan continues, this is not the case for the AK Party. Perhaps both Erdoğan and the AK Party should focus on why people differentiate between the leader and the party.

As for the runoff, both Erdoğan and Kılıçdaroğlu will most probably keep their current voting rates as people have cast their vote consciously. Erdoğan will additionally get votes of Oğan’s supporters though not all of them. It is not clear whether Erdoğan promised anything to Oğan but logically siding with Erdoğan was the best choice for Oğan since the president needs only 0.5% to win.

Turkey will elect its new president on May 28 and the incumbent president Erdoğan is more likely to win since he is 4.5% ahead of his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu. If no extraordinary developments take place, Erdoğan will start his last term on May 29. Meanwhile, it should be noted that he is 3% behind his vote ratio when compared with the previous election. That said, the result is still a success as he is close to a new victory. In addition, since the previous elections, Turkey has experienced two economic crises, a pandemic, and devastating earthquakes. Despite these man-made and natural disasters, Erdoğan will most likely lead his country for five more years.

In countries where democratic elections are held, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has been the only leader to be elected president by exceeding 50 percent in the first round in two elections (in 2014-2018) in his quarter-century political life. Despite the global COVID pandemic, a war next to its borders, an earthquake disaster devastating 11 provinces and affecting a region the size of the Netherlands, and an economic crisis, Erdoğan, this time, narrowly missed being elected in the first round, but finished the race ahead.

Despite the hateful articles and comments published under the headline “Dictator” in all Western media from the Old to the New Continent, Erdoğan finished the first round ahead. He managed this despite Joe Biden’s call as the Democratic Party presidential candidate in 2020 to cooperate with the Turkish opposition in order for Erdoğan to lose the 2023 elections; despite the U.S. actions towards this during Erdoğan’s presidency; and despite the joint EU-U.S. maneuvers to put Greece in opposition to Turkey.

Erdoğan has delivered more services in the last 21 years than the Turkish Kemalist establishment has on the previous 80 years: He democratized the military-civilian relationship in the country. Muslim conservatives have been liberated. He removed barriers to education and employment for headscarved women. There is now a Kurdish-language channel on state television. Kurdish became an elective subject in schools and Kurdish language chairs were opened at universities.

He opened Hagia Sophia for worship, changed the face of Turkey politically, militarily and economically, completely renewed transportation and health services from west to east, and took the country over several thresholds in the field of technology and space. The Erdoğan administration built the first domestic automobile, established the first nuclear power plant in the country, discovered natural gas and oil in the Black Sea region, and built the first UCAV (unmanned combat aerial vehicle) ship.

The reconnaissance and combat drones produced by Turkey “changed the world war strategy” according to Francis Fukuyama and transformed Turkey into a regional actor. Thanks to Erdoğan Turkey has risen to prominence with its humanitarian aid across Africa, and has become a military power in North Africa. Erdoğan played a key role in the liberation of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenian occupation. In fact, for the first time in history, members of the Organization of Turkic States declared their support for a leader—Erdoğan—before the elections.

Erdoğan aptly mediated many crises in the Balkans, brought together two warring countries, Russia and Ukraine, and saved the world from a food catastrophe by opening a grain corridor through a grain deal, which has just been extended yet again. Only 67 days after the earthquake, he handed over the keys to 1,442 houses, 250 village houses, and 47 workplaces. He started the construction process of more than 105,000 houses affected by the earthquakes.

Undoubtedly, over the past 21 years, Erdoğan is far ahead in terms of performance compared to his European and U.S. counterparts. The Western press also acknowledges this, albeit in reverse. In the smear campaign against Erdoğan, he used to be compared to Iraq’s Saddam and now he is compared to Russia’s Putin! After the first round of the presidential elections, this too has changed: Newsweek, which had previously described Erdoğan and Putin as two dictators who admire each other, risked contradicting itself by stating, “Stop Calling Erdoğan a Dictator. Dictators Don’t Go to Runoffs”

But what is surprising is not Erdoğan’s victory, as the Western press or the opposition in Turkey claims. After all these years, it was still Erdoğan in fact that was defining the elections as the electorate was being asked to either side with him or against him. Kılıçdaroğlu even took his election slogan from Erdoğan’s nickname for him and gladly accepted it: “(Bay Kemal) Mr. Kemal”! What is, in fact, surprising is that, yes, Erdoğan finished 5% and nearly 2.5 million votes ahead of Kılıçdaroğlu, but that Kılıçdaroğlu could still collect 44.88% of the votes!

This is a significant success for Kılıçdaroğlu, even though he has the full support of the Western world and that he has gathered five, large and small, political parties of various ideological orientations ranging from secular nationalist to religious conservative, plus, the HDP, the political arm of the PKK. The astonishing part of this success does not stem from the fact that he is an Alevi or, as the Armenian intellectual Sevan Nişanyan put it, “probably the most incompetent, defeatist and unrepresentative person in the history of politics, who ran and lost 10 [now 11] elections.”

What is surprising is that he achieved this vote share as the CHP leader in Turkey. As a matter of fact, the CHP, whose presidential candidate was considered the election favorite, received 25.35% in the parliamentary election, 10 points behind the AK Party, which still received 35% of the votes after all these years.

In Turkey, May 14, the 2023 election day, was also the anniversary of the transition from a one-party to a multiparty political life and the victory of the Democratic Party (DP), on May 14, 1950. DP leader Adnan Menderes was declared a “dictator” by the CHP just a week after the elections, just like President Erdoğan. May 14, 1950 marked the end of one-party political life in Turkey—in other words, the end of the CHP rule. The CHP has never even once been in power on its own, and on May 14, 2023, it received 25% of the votes.

On May 14, 1950, right after the DP’s greatest electoral victory, the “young military officers” had already decided to overthrow Menderes. The CHP was not only the political mastermind of the process leading up to the May 27 coup d’état, but also organized the conditions for the coup and supported it. Immediately after May 14, 1950, a trivet was set up comprising a formula that matured over time: the country was to be ruled by a tutelage system established by the military, the judiciary, and the CHP. Prime Minister Menderes and three of his ministers were executed, and the country’s future was brought under full control with the 1961 constitution.

This situation was checked and adjusted by other military coups and constitutions when necessary. As the prime minister of the minority government formed in 1963, National Chief İsmet İnönü, CHP chairman, passed a law declaring the May 27 coup a national holiday called “Freedom and Constitution Day” (Hürriyet ve Anayasa Bayramı). Muslim conservatives, Kurds, Alevis, non-Muslims, people of all identities inherited from the Ottoman Empire were oppressed by this sovereignty for 80 years. This is the whole history.

Erdoğan, too, has had to grapple with this system from the moment he entered politics: he was banned from politics, imprisoned, his party was shut down, the party he founded was sued for closure, he was the target of military coups, and attempted military coups. Finally, in the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016, there were direct attempts to eliminate him—not by execution this time like Menderes. The coup plotters tried to kill him in the hotel where he was staying and on a plane in the air. With the bitter memory of the May 27 coup and the hanging of Adnan Menderes in mind, thousands of people said “Never Again” and took to the streets, foiling the coup attempt.

As has been the case since May 14, 1950, CHP voters did not understand why their party finished the elections with 25% of the votes and why Kılıçdaroğlu, the presidential candidate, lagged behind Erdoğan. On his social media account, the left-oriented Turkish intellectual and mathematician Ali Nesin asked: “What must we have done to this people in 80 years that we can’t easily win in the first round despite 20 years of government wear and tear and economic crisis and an earthquake? Let those who have any sense think from this perspective!” As always, Nesin’s interlocutors do not seem to be willing to seek the answer to his question. Maybe they thought that with a few changes in Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric and tactics over the past few years, everything would be forgotten.

As happens every time, CHP voters, led by their politicians, created outrage on social media claiming that the elections were rigged. This despite a difference of over two million votes! Clearly numbers don’t matter to them: in 2018, the difference of votes between CHP’s Muharrem İnce and Erdoğan exceeded 10 million, yet the CHP and their advocate media for a week tried to set the agenda with the same allegations. Again, as has been the case after every election since 1950, those who partially believed in the election result were insulted on social media.

They accused Erdoğan’s 26.5 million voters of “ignorance, stupidity, idiocy, and idleness.” In response to President Erdoğan’s vote support in the earthquake-hit provinces exceeding 60%, angry pro-CHP voters tweeted, “We wish you had died, we wish our hands had been broken so we wouldn’t have helped you.” A CHP mayor even kicked earthquake victims out of the hotel where they were being offered temporary shelter.

O

n May 14, Turkey held one of its most critical elections in recent history. While on the one hand, the ruling Justice and Development Party (AK Party) led by President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan was confident enough to win the parliamentary elections and lead the presidential one in the first round, the Nation Alliance was committed to end the two-decade-rule of President Erdoğan. President Erdoğan is seen as the favorite in the runoff presidential elections to be held on May 28 with a scorecard that includes many positive developments from democratization to gains in foreign policy, and accelerated development projects to the increasing capabilities of the Turkish defense industry. On the other hand, the Turkish opposition had claimed that they were closer than ever to ending the 21-year rule of the AK Party and its leader.

In their election campaigns, the People’s Alliance highlighted national security concerns and the moves that paved the way for Turkey’s independence in domestic and foreign policy, and the Nation Alliance conducted a campaign that focused on economic challenges and delivering unconvincing messages to the youth and women. It was clear that the Nation Alliance’s absurd proposals such as reducing onion prices instead of producing unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) which have become one of the most critical instruments of Turkey’s national security and foreign policy, drew the reaction of voters.

The elections were held in a competitive, yet democratic environment. President Erdoğan won the presidential election with 49.5% of the votes, but as he did not receive the 50+1 votes required to become president, a runoff is required. The fact that the Nation Alliance received around 45% of the votes revealed that the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the other members of the coalition did not have a successful election strategy nor could they accurately understand the voting behavior of the Turkish voters.

As both domestic and international observers are trying to make sense of the election results, it would be useful to make some related observations. First, the picture that emerged with the end of the May 14 elections is that Turkish voters prioritize national security issues and projects in areas that are seen as a matter of survival for Turkey rather than focusing on economic difficulties. At this point, the decisiveness of the AK Party and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the two prominent components of the People’s Alliance, in the fight against terrorism and their independent foreign policy are the two most important factors that pushed Turkish voters to vote for them.

Turkey, which has become a game-changer in conflict and crisis areas in its immediate geography thanks to its defense industry, is taking important steps both to protect regional interests and increase its international reputation as a broker in Ukraine, Syria, Libya, and Azerbaijan. In addition to this, thanks to its strong UAV capacity and operational know-how, Turkey maintains its cross-border operations, and in this way, the durability and flexibility of the PKK terrorist organization in Turkey have almost ended. Although the defense industry projects introduced by the Turkish government were appreciated by almost every segment of Turkish society, the CHP developed a discursive opposition to these projects, causing them to lose votes in the May 14 elections.

In a recent interview, Ünal Çeviköz, one of the CHP’s most important names, harshly criticized Turkey’s Libya policy and asked, “What are we doing in Libya?” However, the “Blue Homeland” Doctrine, which was put forward by Turkey regarding the protection of maritime jurisdiction areas in the Mediterranean, placed Libya at a critical point. By being involed in the crisis on behalf of the UN-recognized government, the balance of power in Libya has improved in favor of Turkey’s interests, and Turkey has pushed many regional and international actors into retreat.

Similarly, senior officials of the CHP started a disinformation campaign against the support given to the Azerbaijani army during the Second Nagorno-Karabakh War. Çeviköz, CHP’s Chief Advisor for Foreign Relations at the time, claimed that Turkey had sent Syrian mercenaries to Karabakh, and later retracted his words. In the following days, the Azerbaijani army achieved a historic victory with the support of Turkey and an important territory was recaptured by Azerbaijan after signing a peace agreement with Armenia.

On the other hand, the CHP’s relationship with the Green Left Party (YSP), which is affiliated with the PKK, received a significant reaction from nationalist Turkish voters. Unlike the determination of the People’s Alliance in the fight against terrorism, the covert alliance of the CHP with the YSP caused Turkish voters to view the People’s Alliance as critical to the survival of Turkey. With the election of Kılıçdaroğlu as president, voters  feared that Turkey would weaken in its fight against terrorism. Additionally, the strategy followed by President Erdoğan in Syria stands out as the biggest obstacle to the PKK’s forward-looking territorial and independence demands.

Overall, the May 14 elections revealed a picture in which nationalist voters were influential and voters put national security issues at the forefront. Despite the elections being held in the shadow of economic difficulties and a destructive earthquake, the Turkish people made their choice in favor of the continuity of national policies and stability. Also, the results show that the Turkish people question the opposition in terms of their political cadres and potential national policies. In contrast, the People’s Alliance’s main election agenda of “nationhood” and “national security” resonated with and gave hope to voters.

T

he results of the May 14 elections in Turkey have surprised many voters, pro-government and pro-opposition alike. With all the ballot boxes opened for the presidency, current president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leads with 49.52% of the votes, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu follows with 44.88%, Sinan Oğan received 5.17%, and Muharrem İnce, who pulled out of the race two days ahead of the election, received 0.43% of the votes.

Partially, what caused this shock has been the inaccuracy of opinion polls. Prior to the elections, wide discrepancies between polling agencies were a topic of discussion. The majority of the polls predicted a significant decline in the support for Erdoğan with many of them anticipating a win for Kılıçdaroğlu. Moreover, it wasn’t only the results of the presidential race that went against expectations, polls also failed to predict the preferences of right-wing voters in the parliamentary elections. Where did polling agencies go wrong?

Polling agencies’ damage control

Predictions by notable agencies such as KONDA, Türkiye Raporu, MAK, and ORC strayed beyond the margin of error. KONDA’s latest poll from May 6-7 predicted the runoff election; however, it showed Kılıçdaroğlu in the lead with his votes falling just below 50%, whereas Türkiye Raporu’s poll on May 12 predicted Kılıçdaroğlu’s votes at 50.5%. This opened up speculations of reputability, bribery, and fabrication, which put agencies on damage control duty.

Türkiye Raporu director Can Selçuki posted an introspective tweet a day after the elections denying slanderous claims about receiving any kind of payment, and affirmed that the agency would review its methodologies to provide more accurate results.

ORC, which placed Kılıçdaroğlu at 51.7% and Erdoğan at 44.2%, shared a statement that aimed to restore its reputability, highlighting its accuracy in the elections that took place in 2018, and emphasized that it was the only agency that came close to predicting the Nationalist Movement Party’s (MHP) rate in the parliament.

Chairman of MAK Mehmet Ali Kulat shared a thorough public statement on May 17 about where the inaccuracies of his agency may have originated. The statement points to four types of errors that may have been made. First, there may be issues with the surveys’ interview technique conducted by call centers and causing +/- 2.9% margin of error.

Second, surveys were conducted in a hybrid format and there were issues detected in the overall reporting. Third, the surveys took place 12-18 days before the election date. The statement mentions that the presidential campaigns took a fast-paced turn in the last ten days leading to the election, resulting in an increase of factors influencing voters.

The fourth point expanded on the factor that may have affected the nationalist right-wing votes. It assessed Erdoğan’s emphasis on security policies, the defense industry, and other issues that ignite national sensitivities, alongside the accusation aimed at the opposition for failing to put a distance between itself and terror-associated actors as the main factors that kept votes within the People’s Alliance (with votes going to the MHP and YRP) rather than the opposition—even if voters were dissatisfied with Erdoğan. MAK had predicted Kılıçdaroğlu’s votes at 50.9% and Erdoğan’s at 45.4%.

Polls were unable to foresee nationalist right-wing votes

The parity amongst all opinion polls was the inability to predict the distribution of nationalist right-wing votes both for the presidential and parliamentary elections, as well as their above-average performance.

The Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), which was predicted to have a margin between 7% and 9%, overperformed by collecting 10.07% of the votes for the parliament. Similarly, Sinan Oğan’s achievement was beyond expectations at a rate of 5.17% when the polls placed his votes for the presidency at around 2-4%. Cihan Tuğal, a professor of sociology at Berkeley University, warns, “We need to be careful because this is not only an issue for Turkey. In Brazil, in Hungary, in the United States, everybody thinks that this mistake was made because of their own internal balances. In all four countries, the gains of right-wing parties are not reflected in the polls, they are reflected in the ballot box. In the polls, we see that a part of the far right’s electorate is embarrassed, they cannot stand behind what they have done, but they support the far right, which is a very general and common situation in these countries. The polls failed to see the New Welfare Party’s (YRP) big leap in votes, given its size, and the rise in the MHP.”

The New Welfare Party (YRP) will be represented by five deputies in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, having garnered more than 1.5 million votes. So how did the YRP make this vote leap? Tuğal states, “It is said that the YRP received the votes of the working class.” He adds, “Although the polls didn’t show it, working class people, activists and researchers on the ground saw and said it, but there was no numerical support for it. When it comes to more closed structures like the MHP, it becomes impossible to see this.”

Additionally, researchers believe that seeking support from the HDP was counterintuitive. Hakan Bayrakçı, the head of SONAR, told the newspaper Aydınlık, “There are those who see the HDP as a key party. That is the case with Mr. Kılıçdaroğlu. But the problem here was that the HDP is not a key party in terms of votes. Yes, it has a vote of 8-9%, sometimes 10 points, but it also reduces votes from the side it is on. It alienates Kemalists and nationalists, and that is exactly what these elections proved.”

In the same interview, Hilmi Daşdemir, the head of Optimar, added, “We have stated before that those who make political calculations with the HDP and separatist movements will be in the wrong. It has once again become clear that the main force that will determine the government in Turkey is the nationalist trend. The results of President Erdoğan and the MHP are proof of this. The sum of secular nationalists and conservative nationalists is well above 50%. Even if their party preferences change, this group is sensitive to national sentiment. This center will determine the fate of Turkey in the second round and in the future. Secular nationalism will become stronger. Sinan Oğan seems to feed on this nationalist trend. The main reason for the opposition’s defeat is the appearance of cooperation with terrorist elements.”

N

umerous media outlets in the Middle East have shown a keen interest in the Turkish elections. The interest in the election results reflects Turkey’s regional importance as it has become a vital actor in Libya, Syria, Iraq, and the Gulf. The first round of Turkish elections took place on May 14 with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan leading votes with 49.5%, Kılıçdaroğlu following with 44.88% and Sinan Oğan with 5.2%.

The first-round results show a clear win for Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party (AK Party), with his chances of winning the runoff on May 28 being very high. Erdoğan’s victory in the runoff would have a significant impact on regional politics compared to Kılıçdaroğlu becoming president, who has promised to withdraw Turkish forces from Northern Syria, retreat from Libya, send millions of Syrian refugees in Turkey back to Syria, and join the West’s sanctions against Russia. Here is a review of what the most renowned media outlets in the Middle East wrote about the May 14 elections in Turkey.

Aljazeera noted that elections in Turkey were held amid a severe economic crisis and under the shadow of a destructive earthquake that hit the country on February 6. It highlighted that the election results in earthquake-hit provinces such as Kahramanmaraş, Adıyaman, Elazığ, Gaziantep, Kilis, Malatya, Osmaniye, and Şanlıurfa were in favor of President Erdoğan. The news outlet also wrote that “citizens in these areas know that only Erdoğan can fix this damage.”

Aljazeera described Sinan Oğan, a nationalist candidate whose votes will be crucial in the runoff, as a “kingmaker.” It quoted Oğan as saying, “If I weren’t running for presidency, Erdoğan would have given his victory speech last night,” referring to May 14. Aljazeera also shared Oğan’s opinion on the “wrong decisions” made by the Nation Alliance and their failure to win the trust of the Turkish people.

Mohammed Kawwas, a contributor to the UAE-based Skynews Arabia, wrote that “what comes after elections in Turkey is different from what is before, and al-Assad in Syria will have to deal with whoever is elected as a president in Turkey, although Damascus prefers Kılıçdaroğlu.”

Al Arabiya network, a Saudi-owned news outlet, claimed Syrians in Northern Syria prefer Erdoğan over Kılıçdaroğlu, as the latter plans to send refugees back, while in Kurdish-majority areas in Syria, it claimed, they prefer Kılıçdaroğlu.

In an editorial, Al-Quds Al-Arabi wrote that democracy and the electoral system are the winners of the Turkish elections, the most prominent election in Muslim-majority countries. It noted that this is witnessed by the voting rate of 88.92% inside Turkey and 51% among Turks in the diaspora, and that Turkish democracy proves itself to be strong especially considering the declining rates of voter participation in Western democracies. The newspaper website added that all parties agreed that the Turkish elections took place smoothly and without troubles.

Another indication of the strength of Turkish democracy, the newspaper noted, is that two of the leaders of the opposition alliance, the Nation Alliance or the Table of Six, had previously served under the AK Party. The newspaper concluded that the AK Party lost some of its MPs in Istanbul and Ankara, with Turkish voters sending mixed messages: on the one hand, they showed their trust in the party, and, on the other, took note of its mistakes. The article concluded that despite campaigns by Western media, Turkish democracy emerged victorious and all labels describing Erdoğan as a “dictator” or a “second Putin,” were shown to be fabricated.

Al-Ahram newspaper in Egypt noted that the reason why French, American, and British media outlets were so interested in the Turkish elections had to do with the geostrategic location of Turkey, a country that connects Asia with Europe; overlooks two of the most important straits in the world, the Dardanelles and Bosphorus; and has access to the Mediterranean Sea, the Black Sea, and the Aegean Sea. This has allowed Turkey to play an important role in foreign policy, and to become involved in strategic investments, and military, security, and economic affairs in the region.

Al-Ahram described Turkey as a “pivotal country” which possesses strategic political, military, economic, and intellectual elements that make it highly influential in the region and which qualifies it to be a center of attraction for major world powers. Any change in the map of alliances or hostilities of such a pivotal state affects the balance of power between global political actors.

The interest in Turkish politics and elections was not limited to media outlets, but extended to people on the ground. The publics in countries such as Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Egypt, Libya, and Algeria followed the results of the May 14 elections. This interest can only speak of Turkey’s growing influence in the region—an influence that is closely and eagerly watched in the Middle East by politicians, media outlets, and the people alike.

N

o doubt, the most fundamental pillar of democracy is free and fair elections. Indeed, what gives a regime its democratic character is elections based on universal suffrage in which more than one political party contests in a free competitive environment. Of course, today’s democracies are not just about the ballot box. It is indispensable for liberal democracies that political powers, even once elected, are limited by checks and balances, that power is distributed through the principle of separation of powers, and that an independent judiciary protects fundamental rights and freedoms. But nothing lessens the importance of elections—democracy’s most characteristic and valuable feature.

Especially in countries like Turkey, where large segments of society have long been kept in the periphery, away from the political and economic centers of power, elections are the only way to give the larger public open access to politics. Turkish voters have embraced their right to vote ever since the transition to multiparty life in 1950. Turkey has always had one of the highest voter turnout rates in elections: in the 21 presidential and parliamentary elections held since 1950, the average turnout rate has been 82.2 percent. This is one of the highest turnout rates in the world.

Actually, citizens’ active participation in the elections and their prudent choices have always guided Turkish politics in the right direction. The bureaucratic elite’s attempts at social and political engineering in Turkey have failed multiple times at the ballot box. Elections have been the main breathing space for Turkish democracy against efforts by the military and the judiciary to restrict freedoms and place politics under their tutelage.

The demilitarization of the political sphere, the elimination of tutelage, the strengthening of the regime’s democratic legitimacy, the more equitable distribution of welfare, and the elimination of marginalizing practices targeting religious masses and different ethnic affiliations, especially Kurds, have all been made possible in Turkey by the civilian politicians who were brought to power through fair elections.

The Primacy of the Ballot Box in Turkey

In Turkey’s elections, the national will has been able to manifest itself to the detriment of the ruling political parties, i.e., those that dominate the state apparatus. Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party, which left its mark on a decade of Turkish politics with its paradigm-shifting reforms, was defeated as the third party in the 1989 local elections.

In its thirteenth year in power, the AK Party, which has managed to stay in power for the longest period in Turkey’s multiparty political life, lost 9 percent of its votes in the June 7, 2015 elections compared to the previous elections and lost the majority in the legislative assembly. In the 2018 general elections, the AK Party won the presidential elections, but failed to win an absolute majority in the Turkish Grand National Assembly. In the 2019 local elections, the AK Party lost the mayorships of Ankara and Istanbul, although it did not lose the overall national vote.

These examples show that the election mechanism in Turkey delivers healthy results regardless of who is in power. Leaving aside the shady 1946 elections, recent and distant experience shows that the people’s preferences are truly reflected in the election results. In other words, Turkish elections have proven their credibility in practice.

Almost 200 Years of Electoral Experience

Turkey’s experience with elections can be traced back approximately 200 years. Although the municipal council elections held during the Tanzimat period (1839-1876) were primitive in terms of the right to vote and be elected, they can be considered the first democratic elections during the Ottoman time. In the following period, during the First and Second Constitutional Monarchy periods, elections became widespread and multiparty democracy developed. Since 1950, multiparty democracy has been successfully implemented in Turkey.

In the last decade alone, Turkey has gone to the polls a total of eight times for presidential, parliamentary, and local government elections, and referendums. This intensive polling practice means that both the voters and the institutions organizing the elections have gained significant experience, which is an insuring factor for election security.

Judicial Management and Supervision of Elections

The fact that elections in Turkey are under the supervision and management of the judiciary provides the most effective guarantee for electoral security. Elections have been administered and supervised by judicial bodies since 1950, when the Supreme Election Council (YSK) was established, whose members are elected by the General Boards of Court of Cassation and the Council of State. The judicial administration of elections was constitutionally guaranteed by the 1961 Constitution, when the YSK became a constitutional institution, and continued with the 1982 Constitution. Article 67/2 of the Constitution stipulates that “elections and referendums shall be held on the basis of free, equal, secret, one-run, universal suffrage, open counting and casting, under judicial administration and supervision.”

Judicial guarantees are provided by the YSK, whose members are directly elected by the Court of Cassation and the Council of State from among their own members, and by the provincial and district election boards, whose members are also composed of judges. These committees are authorized to take the necessary measures to ensure that the elections take place in an orderly and fair manner.

The YSK is tasked with “carrying out and having carried out all procedures related to the orderly conduct and integrity of the elections from the beginning to the end of the elections, examining and finalizing all corruption, complaints and objections related to election matters during and after the elections.”

Another important measure is the participation of political parties in the electoral commissions to oversee the process. According to Law No. 298, the four political parties that received the highest number of votes in the last parliamentary general election and political parties that have a group in the parliament can have one representative each at the YSK. Provincial and district election boards also have political party representatives. Thus, the work of the electoral commissions is carried out under the supervision of the political parties, i.e., the parties to the competition. This not only ensures that errors and irregularities are eliminated, but also increases the reliability of the results.

The ballot counting and casting committees are composed of a chairperson and six members. The chairperson and one member are elected from among the public officials in that location, while five board members are appointed by the five political parties with the highest number of votes in the district where the polling station is located. These elections are also held under the supervision of district election boards, i.e., judges.

Law No. 298 regulates the counting and casting of votes in great detail in thirteen articles. Accordingly, the ballot committees count the votes cast at the polling station and in the presence of the public officials, and record the results in the minutes. Political party observers are also given a copy of the ballot box result reports. The merging of the ballot box result reports at the district and provincial election boards is also carried out under the supervision of political parties. The ballot box result reports are published and made available on the YSK website after the elections.

Today, for example, it is possible to access the minutes of the results of any polling station where votes were cast in the 2018 presidential elections on the YSK’s official website. Moreover, the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly and the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe are also following the election process upon Turkey’s invitation. For example, the 2018 elections in Turkey were monitored by 350 international observers.

No doubt, the election process in Turkey is transparent and open to public scrutiny. In the May 14 elections, the experience and institutional capacity of the Supreme Election Council alongside the efforts of the political parties to ensure election security will once again guarantee the healthy manifestation of the national will.

W

estern analysts acknowledge that Turkey’s May 14 elections are among the most important elections of 2023. Europeans follow the polls almost as eagerly as Turks because for the first time in two decades, there is hope in Europe that the Erdoğan administration can change. Many European- and U.S.-centered media outlets publish opinion pieces on Turkish elections on a daily basis. Roughly half of these articles predict that President Erdoğan will win the election again, while the other half speculate that Erdoğan will not accept the election results, if he loses.

The reason why European actors closely follow Turkey’s elections and are in favor of a government change is that under President Erdoğan’s leadership, Turkey has become an international actor capable of establishing a sphere of influence in the Middle East, the Balkans, the Turkic world, South Asia, and many countries in Africa.

President Erdoğan has taken Turkey out of the Western political orbit and turned it into a more independent player, adopting more autonomous and indigenous policies. This approach finds a response beyond Turkey’s borders. European political circles are equally disturbed by Turkey’s influence on Muslim minorities in Europe, including those of Turkish origin, which have become intensely sympathetic to Turkey under Erdoğan.

Europe’s Expectations and its “ideal” Turkey

Europe’s main expectation from Turkey’s May 14 elections is to see a weaker political profile come to power and for the country to follow a more inward-looking and less assertive regional foreign policy. There appears no plan in sight for Europe to revive membership negotiations with Turkey for the European Union. Even if Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance win the elections, there is no easy and fresh start with Turkey, which will continue to be pushed back. In fact, Kılıçdaroğlu’s promise to “lift visas to Europe” if elected was already denied by German officials.

A vision of a Turkey which follows EU foreign policy and integrates into the European economy as much as EU member states allow, but that remains outside of the union, is the ideal relationship between the EU and Turkey for European politicians. Against this backdrop, President Erdoğan’s vision of the “Axis of Turkey” with an expanded strategic autonomy and a balanced foreign policy is at odds with the European vision of Turkey.

European experts do not shy away from saying that Kılıçdaroğlu’s Nation Alliance would be more in line with their “ideal” Turkey. At the same time, the opposition’s possible election victory also worries them. As there is no plan in Europe’s short-term agenda to initiate a new phase in its relations with Turkey, it is easier and more convenient to maintain the status quo if Erdoğan remains in power. Europe seems to have no road map for how it will redefine relations with Turkey if the opposition wins. Although some European politicians are giving Turkish opposition figures pats on the back, this may not have immediate positive repercussions.

European Media’s Approach to Turkey

Dreaming of a Turkey without Erdoğan, many European think tanks, politicians, and media outlets have taken a firm stance on Turkey’s May 14 elections. Even though, they cannot foresee what the consequences of a possible government change would be for the European Union, they are aware that their capacity to influence Turkish politics will be extremely limited if Erdoğan is reelected. As a result, they have persistently avoided taking any political steps that could set a constructive agenda with Turkey, as they believe that revitalizing Turkey-EU relations could strengthen Erdoğan’s hand.

The EU’s short-term foreign policy expectations from Turkey are the following: Sweden’s admission to NATO, and Turkey’s abandoning a balanced position in the Ukraine War and taking a clear stance against Russia. However, European political actors are uncertain about the Turkish opposition’s possible approach to the migration issue and view the opposition’s discourse on the deportation of Syrian refugees in Turkey with hesitation. Europe is not prepared for a wave of migration through Turkey. That is why, there is also a narrow group of politicians who advocate in favor of the continuation of the current administration in Turkey. While there are opportunities for mutually beneficial cooperation between Turkey and the EU in many areas such as energy, agriculture, transportation, industry, and technology, there is no political will to mobilize this potential.

While European analysts recognize that the Nation Alliance is an ideologically fragmented and fragile political entity, they agree that it is a preferable alternative to a strong Erdoğan administration. They believe that they can get along more easily with some members of the Nation Alliance. Moreover, possible cracks in the alliance can create a framework in which they can exert their own influence. In fact, many articles in German, French, and British media outlets argue that that the Turkish economy will decline further if the current government remains in power.

Nobody knows whether there will be a renewed mobilization in potential areas of cooperation, if Kılıçdaroğlu becomes Turkey’s new president. Some even suggest that if Erdoğan is reelected, Turkey-EU relations could regain a positive momentum through a gradual progress based on mutual interests. Moreover, the Erdoğan administration’s expectations from the EU are more modest than those of the opposition.

The Two Portrayals of Turkey in Europe

There are two different portrayals of Turkey’s May 14 elections being presented to Europeans. European politicians and journalists often interact with Turkish citizens living in Europe who are white-collar migrants, media journalists, and members of academic elites. These individuals are largely politically pro-opposition, are ideologically motivated, or adhere to certain ethnocentric factions. Consequently, European media understand the developments in Turkey through the biased perspective of such actors, who publish partisan articles in media outlets on contemporary Turkish politics.

Turkey is also portrayed by a secularist European elite, whose perspective largely overlaps with the Turkish opposition, depicting Turkish politics one-sidedly. Articles produced by prejudiced actors are then translated into Turkish, generating another impact layer in Turkey. This offshore opposition, supported by Europe, aims to influence Turkish politics from abroad, and forms a biased political enclave that despises a conservative and nationalist government with Islamic moral codes in Turkey represented by a strong leader personified in Erdoğan. Having invested all their hope for change in the Nation Alliance, this enclave has the potential to influence its elite interlocutors in Europe.

However, citizens of Turkish origin across Europe draw a completely different picture. Almost two-thirds of those of Turkish origin in Europe voted for President Erdoğan in the 2018 presidential elections. This rate is on average 10 points higher than the support Erdoğan received in Turkey. In the 2023 presidential and parliamentary elections, the picture is not expected to change dramatically. There is a silent majority of people of Turkish origin in Europe supporting Erdoğan. European politicians and bureaucrats are aware of this silent majority, whose views are not reflected or represented in the press or in academic circles.

T

urkey’s May 14 elections are a critical turn for the country which finds itself at a historic crossroads. This, in turn, has set the stage for a campaign period in which all candidates and parties are leaving no stone unturned. The quiet period of the campaign during the month of Ramadan, which witnessed the expansion of both alliances and the drafting of MP candidates, has now entered its hottest phase. Now the final 100-meter stretch of the nearly 2-year-long election marathon is taking place featuring the fierce competition between the People’s Alliance and the Table of Six (Nation Alliance).

There is no doubt that this election will be the hardest for undecided voters in Turkey’s recent history. This is because the polarization between the two main alliances is determined by the “President Erdoğan factor” rather than ideological distinctions such as right/left or conservative/secular. The Democrat Party (DP), the Felicity Party (SP), the Future Party (GP), and the Democracy and Progress Party (DEVA), which are running on the CHP list, have many politicians who opposed the CHP mentality.

Despite Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s rhetoric of making amends, the CHP has not yet finalized its new ideological formation. It is still unclear whether the Republican Party is now Kemalist, nationalist, or leftist. While Kılıçdaroğlu is pushing all the ideological buttons to win votes, the CHP media maintains its Kemalist and secularist character viewing the AK Party and the People’s Alliance as “misogynist and radical Islamist.” Today’s CHP does not represent a consistent identity, and even capitalizes on a politics of ambiguity.

Kılıçdaroğlu’s message to Muharrem İnce, reveals his ideological zealotry. According to journalist Fikret Bila, Kılıçdaroğlu told İnce, “Turkey is under occupation. The Republic is under threat. This election is of historic importance and requires a historic responsibility.” Like Kılıçdaroğlu, certain writers working in the CHP media companies are as ideologically radicalized as they were in the 2007 mass Republican and Kemalist rallies.

However, the conservative-religious segments of society have never viewed the Erdoğan’s government demands as misogynist and radical Islamist, including the headscarf. Resentful conservatives do not accuse the AK Party of radical Islamism and will not vote for the CHP just for the Felicity Party or Future Party to win a few parliamentary seats. There are other motives, but it remains to be seen whether they will trust Kılıçdaroğlu’s word when he keeps changing it; or whether Kurdish voters will vote for the CHP candidate instead of Erdoğan, who gave them their identity rights.

Turkish nationalist voters will also have a hard time making an ideological choice: on the one side, there is the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) and, on the other, the Iyi Party. Kılıçdaroğlu claims that he is the true nationalist despite the open support the Nation Alliance is receiving from the PKK. While the fight of the People’s Alliance against the PKK and FETO terrorism is established, the HDP line imposes its radical demands on the Nation Alliance. In fact, the argument that the “Republic is under threat” can more accurately be used by the People’s Alliance.

Leftist voters, both Turkish and Kurdish, overwhelmingly support the CHP and Kılıçdaroğlu. However, with the Democratic Left Party’s (DSP) decision to join the People’s Alliance, this has become somewhat ambiguous. Some may say that the DSP is not leftist, pointing to its nationalist reflexes. But the DSP was founded by the late Bülent Ecevit, former prime minister and famous leftist politician, and its political stance perplexes some voters who would otherwise vote for the CHP.

Muharrem İnce, who criticizes both the People’s Alliance and the Nation Alliance, attracts the attention of nationalist-secular voters. The situation is such that different Turkish parties can utilize the rhetoric of “Menderes, Özal, Ecevit, Türkeş, and Erbakan are turning in their graves” against each other. All these parameters indicate voters will have problems deciding how to cast their vote on May 14.

Alliance of Contradictions

Kılıçdaroğlu’s election campaign displays a low tempo in terms of polemics. I don’t know if this will change in the final stretch, but it is clear that Kılıçdaroğlu’s current low tempo is a campaign tactic. He may have preferred this approach following the suggestion of his campaign advisors that he follow a tactic similar to Ekrem İmamoğlu’s in the 2019 local elections. He may also have chosen to remit harsh accusations toward Iyi Party leader Meral Akşener and some CHP members. But Kılıçdaroğlu’s profile as a presidential candidate is quite different from that of İmamoğlu’s profile as mayor. This is because Kılıçdaroğlu is behind a lot of harsh rhetoric and broken promises that need to be forgotten.

His reading of FETO tapes out loud in Parliament; his denial of the July 15 coup attempt, and, what is more, deeming it as a “civil coup” plotted by the government itself; his opposition to the freedom of wearing a headscarf in the Constitutional Court; and his failed tenure as director-general of the Social Social Institution (SSK) experience during the coalition period are all in the public record. In other words, Kılıçdaroğlu is an old name with a lot of baggage and polishing his profile is not an easy job.

It remains to be seen to what extent softening his harsh rhetoric will give Kılıçdaroğlu a new “responsible statesman” profile. However, Kılıçdaroğlu’s tactic serves as a litmus test of the Nation Alliance as a disorganized and incoherent coalition in terms of ideology, identity, and policies. Despite all the documents produced by the Table of Six, the Nation Alliance has still not moved on from being simply reactionary. The opposition to President Erdoğan and the goal of transition to a “strengthened parliamentary system” are not enough for Kılıçdaroğlu to reach a coherent discourse.

The opposition parties’ stress on democracy does not provide a common vision for the Nation Alliance. Keeping some political and ideological issues vague may also be a campaign choice; however, the space left vacant by the Nation Alliance parties and their candidate is being filled by the Green Left Party (YSP-HDP’s backup party for the election), the TİP (extreme leftist Turkish Labor Party), and CHP-supporting media.

Classical CHP secularists, the HDP, and the TİP supporters are increasingly declaring the People’s Alliance and Erdoğan as “radical Islamist.” On the other hand, DEVA and the pro-GP media claim that the AK Party is harming religion. The liberal leftist names nominated by the YSP also play a role in casting doubts on the heroic popular defense of July 15 and creating an agenda for the “Kurdish question.”

They advocate the idea of starting a new Peace Process, if Kılıçdaroğlu wins, forgetting that the HDP and the PKK ended the previous Peace Processes and were responsible for the Kobani incidents and the trench clashes. The HDP has engaged in no self-criticism about its support of terrorism. In fact, its inclusion in the Nation Alliance rescued the HDP from being marginalized. Moreover, the HDP started formulating policies and discourse for the Alliance and its candidate Kılıçdaroğlu, which make his efforts to unify the disorganized opposition even more difficult. The harsh rhetoric of the Turkish and Kurdish left merges with the CHP secularism, leaving DEVA, the SP, and the GP rooting for Canan Kaftancıoğlu.

Erdoğan and the People’s Alliance

President Erdoğan, as the candidate of the People’s Alliance, stands out with his twenty years of experience and his effective role in international politics. Erdoğan aims to strengthen the “Axis of Turkey,” which he has already started to build with his approach that addresses security, defense, and foreign policy. Between 2016 and 2020, when necessary, Erdoğan risked rising tensions with the U.S., Russia, and certain regional powers. In the last two years, however, he consolidated Turkey’s gains with a policy of normalization. After the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Israel, Turkey is now entering a new phase of normalization with Egypt.

After the U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, it became a trend in the Middle East to diversify classical alliances and normalize problematic relations. The Gulf countries’ neutral position in the Russia-Ukraine War and China’s role in the normalization of relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia point to new equations in the Middle East. Moreover, French President Macron’s quest for strategic autonomy for Europe and his efforts to stay out of the Taiwan crisis speak to the diverging interests of the great powers at the global level. One of the most active countries in this new global and regional era is Turkey under Erdoğan’s leadership.

The May 14 elections mark a crossroads for Turkey’s role in the region and Turkish foreign policy. Either Turkey will maintain its strategic autonomy or it will return to its traditional foreign policy codes and abandon its current assertive foreign policy. The Turkish people will choose between these two options. There is a vision/declaration of Turkey as a regional leader and global actor, on the one hand, and the promise of retreating from the problem areas in the region with an inward-looking policy, on the other. Taking place on the centennial anniversary of the Republic, the May 14 elections are an important turning point for Turkey and its entire region.

T

he unprecedented rise of Muharrem İnce, which caused alarm in the opposition bloc, has intensified after the February 6 earthquakes, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy, the rapid round-trip crisis of the İYİ Party at the “Table of Six,” and the nomination of former AK Party (Justice and Development Party) members as deputy candidates in CHP (Republican People’s Party) lists. In other words, Kılıçdaroğlu’s choices were perhaps more influential in the rise of İnce than İnce himself.

Kılıçdaroğlu and his team were quite pleased when Muharrem İnce announced his resignation from the CHP in February 2021. Especially after the 2018 elections, the power struggle and fraction between İnce and Kılıçdaroğlu escalated, with İnce becoming a burden to Kılıçdaroğlu. After İnce’s resignation, political figures close to him were also purged from the CHP, and İnce was subjected to a character assassination. First, the media power of the CHP headquarters targeted the relationship of trust between İnce and the party base, based on what happened on the night of the election.

Although it has now been forgotten, it was implied by Kılıçdaroğlu that “İnce went to the Külliye (Presidential Complex) and made an agreement with President Erdoğan,” and İnce was accused of treason. These and similar accusations were circulated by the CHP media every time İnce was mentioned. This effort has been largely successful, and, in this way, by using the CHP’s institutional power, Kılıçdaroğlu managed to dismiss his only serious rival in the party.

Contrary to what is believed or has been calculated, İnce did not stop being a threat to Kılıçdaroğlu after his resignation. On the contrary, he became a candidate in the 2023 elections despite the efforts of opposition media and their elites. For Kılıçdaroğlu, İnce’s status as a rival and threat within the party turned into a new threat that has the potential to win votes from the “Kemalist” grassroots. Although not a serious contender for the presidential elections, İnce’s candidacy was not calculated, but instead was overlooked and pushed to the side. For this reason, as elections approached, İnce became one of the greatest enemies of the opposition media and its elites: all the media power started once again to target him.

The unexpected rise of Muharrem İnce

In my analysis for “Sabah Perspektif” on February 13, 2021, I wrote that the most rational choice for İnce was to become an important and strategic actor within the multiparty opposition bloc. In other words, I argued that instead of making unattainable claims, İnce could be successful with small but rational and achievable goals. The way to achieve this was to have a discourse and position that would attract Kemalists who were dissatisfied with the CHP and secular nationalists who could not find what they were looking for in the IYI Party.

Over the past two years, the opposition bloc led by Kılıçdaroğlu has almost ignored İnce. İnce, whose name was not even mentioned when the “Table of Six” was set up, was persistently excluded by the opposition bloc. However, his unexpected rise alarmed the opposition, and was heightened after the February 6 earthquakes.

At this juncture, İnce reinforced his rhetoric of the “Third Way” with a Kemalist and nationalist populism, which has been frequently used by all newly emerging parties trying to differentiate within the opposition. Especially the IYI Party’s decision to leave the “Table of Six” after Kılıçdaroğlu announced his candidacy, Meral Akşener’s statements which harshly denounced Kılıçdaroğlu, and the party’s return to the table after two days of crisis disturbed some of its secular nationalist bases.

At this point, İnce’s strategy once again proved that, although it is a trite cliché, the “Third Way” being a necessary and worthwhile discourse. İnce managed to attract the attention of this constituency with his rhetoric. In addition, he managed to attract the attention of some voters, the majority of whom were young, with his oratory talent and energy that Kılıçdaroğlu lacked during the campaign period. So much so that İnce has become one of social media’s most popular political figures. Again, with his activeness in the field, he transformed the emotional reaction towards politics after the February 6 earthquakes into partial support. This increased the interest in İnce, especially among opposition voters.

The opposition’s miscalculation

Considering all the intimidation policies targeting İnce, the reasons for the political pressure and attacks by the opposition media and its elites can be better understood: İnce emerged as an alternative candidate for the Kemalist voters who are excluded from the “CHP’s institutional transformation” project, implemented for some time now by Kılıçdaroğlu. These voters have been pushed to a secondary level, humiliated at the slightest criticism, and considered the sole culprits of all past mistakes.

So much so that İnce became the only actor who disrupted Kılıçdaroğlu’s game plan which gathered all opposition actors, including the HDP, under one roof, managing to get their support in a political equation in which Sinan Oğan was ignored in terms of vote rating. In other words, İnce, who was forcibly purged from the CHP, now has a critical position despite not being taken seriously during the opposition’s negotiations and being excluded from the opposition bloc in which parties with even  0.1 percent of votes became actors.

Kılıçdaroğlu and his team have taken a position that directly disrupts the political strategy they have been building for a long time. The opposition elite’s “İnce hatred” stems from the possibility that, from their perspective, with the Kemalist votes stolen from the base of the CHP, İnce could cause Kılıçdaroğlu to lose the election even if he, in turn, does not win.

İnce, the least guilty party

However, despite all his personal ambitions, İnce is the least guilty party. Although it is clear that İnce’s sole motivation is his political gain, the only culprit here is Kılıçdaroğlu’s political mistakes and short-sightedness. The first big mistake was persistently excluding a person who received 30 percent of the votes in the last general elections during negotiation efforts in which unknown names were visited, support was requested from them, and they were even invited to an alliance under the name of “electoral cooperation.” The second big mistake was that until İnce became a presidential candidate, his rise as an alternative choice with his populist Kemalism and nationalism was not taken seriously.

What is more, İnce, who was ignored until the election process started, whom the CHP and its media tried to discredit, who was not given a chance to exist politically, and who was even accused of treason, is now exposed to political harassment by the oppositional media. Rather than interviewing and asking questions, even the journalists who feature İnce in the media, try to persuade him to withdraw his candidacy. The reason for this is that İnce exposes the danger of the deterioration of the strategy that Kılıçdaroğlu and his team have built by attracting quite openly different constituencies whose only common motivation is their opposition to Erdoğan.

So much so that the CHP elites, with their media power, are establishing community pressure based on the threat of prestige assassination and lynching, by accusing everyone who does not support Kılıçdaroğlu of being an “Erdoğan supporter.” On the other hand, Ince is stealing votes from different opposition electorate clusters, which the opposition has forced together with a stick. These votes are not enough for him to win the election, but they increase the risk of another electoral defeat for the opposition.

As a result, İnce has become a game changer in a political strategy constructed over a long time especially by Kılıçdaroğlu and the CHP administration. İnce, who was excluded by the opposition and forcibly pushed out of its circle, has no fault here. İnce has not achieved any tangible success apart from excited addresses and populist slogans. The absolute failure here belongs to Kılıçdaroğlu and his team who did not take İnce into account and whose only strategy has been, when necessary, to forcibly block any potential political alternatives. The only reason the CHP elites target İnce and try to discredit him in the eyes of the opposition public is that he manifests the concrete consequences of their political miscalculation and a potential loss of votes.

A

ccording to his own account, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, born in Dersim, which was later renamed Tunceli, is a 74-year-old leader from Turkey’s “`68 generation,” who worked at the Scientific Board of the Federation of Social Democracy Associations, participated in almost all student protests, and served as president of the Social and Cultural Actions Association. After 26 years in the bureaucracy, he tried to pursue a political career by knocking on the door of Bülent Ecevit, the DSP (Democratic Left Party) leader, who was famous for challenging the Republican People’s Party (CHP) founder and national chief İsmet İnönü, but to no avail. Thus, Kılıçdaroğlu entered politics with the Republican People’s Party in 2002.

Kılıçdaroğlu became the party’s chairman in 2010 after the late Deniz Baykal, the former CHP leader, who was firmly committed to the party’s founding principles of Six Arrows, was brought down by a videotape blackmail scandal. No one would have guessed until recently that a former general director of the Social Security Institution (SGK), who is remembered for walking backwards down the long corridor of the Prime Ministry following his meeting with former prime minister Tansu Çiller, could one day become a candidate for the presidency of Turkey.

In fact, his most strategic move was to string three Islamist conservative parties, albeit very small ones, in front of him like beads. Otherwise, it would have been impossible for him to form an alliance with the right-wing nationalist Iyi Party (Good Party), let alone the HDP, the PKK’s political arm, which alone collects far more votes than these three small parties.

It was mathematically and politically impossible for the CHP, whose presidential candidate received only 30 percent of the vote in the previous election and which has never once been in power on its own in Turkey’s multiparty political history, to get anyone elected president from its ranks with its historical baggage. “I promise Mr. Kemal will not go back on his word. I promise you, Mr. Kemal will not go back on his word.” With this slogan, he became one of the two favorite candidates for the presidential elections. At least this should not have been the election slogan!

Ibn Khaldun says that a person belongs wherever they identify themselves with. In interviews Kılıçdaroğlu gave after he became CHP chairman, he stated, “My grandfather’s grandfather was a bandit, they used to say so, that’s probably why my father changed our surname from Karabulut to Kılıçdaroğlu.” In 2018, in in a party speech, he said, “My great-grandfather was Seyyid Mahmud Hayrani.” If the 13^th-century Sufi scholar Seyyid Mahmud Hayrani was his grandfather, Kılıçdaroğlu’s ancestry hails from the Ottoman Palace with one of his great-grandfathers being the qadi of Mehmed the Conqueror and another being his grand vizier!

Kılıçdaroğlu once made a long speech at the Yörük Workshop, saying, “What struggles were waged in these tents against the oppression of the Ottomans!” However, before the Great Yörük gathering in January 2023, he did not call the Ottomans cruel this time, but visited the tombs of the people he claimed were his grandfathers in front of television cameras. He did not stop there, but visited tombs in every city during the election campaign.

Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu did not convert from Alevism to Sunnism like the French King Henry IV who converted from Protestantism to Catholicism in order to become king, famously saying “Paris is worth a mass.” This is not necessary. Turkey is not France. Protestant socialist leader Lionel Jospin fell behind even the country’s far-right Breton leader  in the first round of French elections to 2002. Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu is no Jospin either.

Ensar Öğüt, former CHP deputy, who published a book on Kılıçdaroğlu and often speaks in media outlets in support of him, repeatedly says that “Kılıçdaroğlu knows the Holy Quran by heart. He even memorized the Quran,” which makes him a hafiz. This year, for the first time, Kılıçdaroğlu visited the mosque of Hırka-i Şerif, which is opened to visitors every year during the holy month of Ramadan, where the mantle of the Prophet Muhammad is exhibited. On Laylat al-Qadr night, he gave a speech at an iftar dinner in which he talked about “Asma-ul-Husna,” the attributes of Allah. He announced his candidacy on the night of Berat, one of the holy days of Muslims.

At the headquarters of the host Felicity Party (FP), Temel Karamollaoğlu, FP leader, not only announced Kılıçdaroğlu’s presidential candidacy, but asked Allah, “for the sake of the night of Berat, to grant Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy a successful outcome.” The other four leaders of the Nation Alliance, seniors with white beards and green turbans, and CHP supporters shouting “Turkey is secular and will remain secular,” all said “Amen” to this.

When Kılıçdaroğlu moved from the FP headquarters to those of the CHP accompanied by journalists, he embraced his party members in front of two giant banners reading “Among friends, at the Halil İbrahim Table” and “Kılıçdaroğlu, the President of the Turkish Nation.” This was a version of the lines “a little bit of this, a little bit of that, a little bit of neither this nor that” by the communist poet Nazım Hikmet, who was imprisoned for years under the CHP government. The lines originally read “among friends, at the table of the sun, fill up, children, fill up glasses, let’s drink.”

Politicians everywhere in the world change their views over the years, which is neither necessarily good or bad. Sometimes politicians do not say things openly; first, they take the pulse of politics and society, and, in time, they declare their stance on issues more openly. Kılıçdaroğlu’s change of position on the Dersim issue is, of course, understandable. However, his twists and turns on secularism and the freedom of religion debate, or his positions on the July 15 military coup attempt are not the same.

In 2008, he stated, “The Dersim issue should not be perceived as a very dark and deep event in the history of the republic,” while in 2011 he changed his position after then prime minister Tayyip Erdoğan said, “If it is necessary to apologize on behalf of the state, I do.” In fact, Hüseyin Aygün, CHP’s Tunceli deputy, who was introduced to politics by Kılıçdaroğlu, had first opened the debate. While Erdoğan said, “Dersim is the most painful and bloody of the tens and hundreds of disasters of the CHP governments… It is actually the CHP that should confront and apologize for the Dersim tragedy,” Kılıçdaroğlu simply said, “There are those who were exiled, their lands should be returned. Return them exactly as they were.” And he never spoke about this issue again.

Until recently, Kılıçdaroğlu has followed the path of his party’s anti-freedom of religion actions and rhetoric, which has historically/in the republican era been backed by the military and judiciary. He was at the forefront of the headscarf debates arguing “the headscarf is not a headscarf, but a turban,” “the turban is a political symbol,” or “a turban is nothing more than a piece of cloth.” He even appealed to the Constitutional Court for the annulment of the amendment that allowed women to wear the headscarf in universities.

Unsurprisingly Kılıçdaroğlu changed his position after the AK Party government’s legislative amendments allowing women the freedom of dress, from students to women holding public sector jobs. So much so that in a speech he made in the parliament on March 8, International Women’s Day, he said, “They took away your right to education because you wear a headscarf,” as if the perpetrator of the ban was unknown. But still today – and this is not just about the headscarf – there is no written document, even for propaganda purposes, on the CHP policy on secularism and religious freedoms both in terms of politics and legislation.

In a country where a prime minister and three ministers were executed by military coups, the opinions and statements of politicians in this regard are of course important. Judging by his words and actions, Kılıçdaroğlu’s position on this issue, and many others, is ambiguous.

This comes with one exception perhaps: in various discussions, Kılıçdaroğlu has made his position very clear against coups. “We reject any interference in politics through a midnight military declaration or any other means. If there is a coup, I will be the first one to stand against the tanks.” Yet, on the night of July 15, 2016, when he saw the coup plotters surrounding Atatürk Airport with tanks, he and his companions fled, putting up no objections.

D

uran Kalkan, a member of the PKK/KCK Executive Committee, described the operations carried out by Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization (MIT) against the organization’s top leadership as a declaration of “mobilization’’ aimed at purging the PKK leadership. Kalkan even targeted the terrorist wanted list prepared by the Ministry of Interior, lamenting that the PKK’s top leadership had been placed on a “death list.’’

Kalkan characterizes these operations as political pandering, and speaks openly against both the MIT and the Ministry of Interior at an institutional level. However, the targeting of the executive and operative elements of terrorist organizations by the security bureaucracy and its forces is not a new strategy. On the contrary, it is a part of the state’s counterterrorism policy that has been resolutely implemented for many years, and is expected to have strategic, operational, and political outcomes.

Tactical and strategic counterterrorism operations gain momentum

In the MIT’s 2022 annual activity report, Hakan Fidan, its director, underlines the activities carried out by Turkey’s security institutions to realize this successful counterterrorism policy. The MIT possesses proactive intelligence disciplines such as human intelligence, signals intelligence, electronic intelligence, and imagery and satellite intelligence, including unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) capacity.

The MIT demonstrates its technological capacity and capabilities in cross-border operations that neutralize a terrorist organization’s leadership, destroy critical infrastructure facilities belonging to a terrorist organization, and capture many of its members, including the perpetrators of terrorist attacks in Turkey. In 2022 alone, 133 leaders and operative terrorist elements whose identities were shared in open sources were neutralized through internal security and cross-border operations.

Regardless of the terrorist organization and its area of operation, the counterterrorism operations discussed by Fidan continue to be carried out in 2023. The operation in Hasaka neutralized Zeki Gürbüz, the so-called Syria officer of the terrorist organization Marxist-Leninist Communist Party (MLKP), and Özgür Namoğlu, code-named “Fırat Neval,’’ the organization’s so-called Syrian sabotage officer; the operation in Qamishli neutralized Halil Menci who planned the 2022 Taksim attack; the operation that captured Ramazan Güneş, code-named “Soreş/Soreşger,’’ a member of the organization’s “special forces” who carried out 12 terrorist acts in Turkey, and brought him to Suleymaniye, Iraq; the operation in Sinjar neutralized the terrorist Saad Ali Bedel, code-named “Ceko Pir,’’ the so-called military commander of the PKK-affiliated Sinjar Defense Units (YBŞ); and the operation in Aleppo neutralized Mehmet Yıldırım, code-named “Hamza Kobani,’’ the so-called finance officer of Aleppo and Tel Rifat.

Such tactical and strategic counterterrorism operations which aim to eliminate the leadership cadres of the terrorist PKK organization have been effective since 2015 and have gained momentum in Turkey since 2018, in Iraq since 2019, and in Syria since 2022. These operations target the leader or the operative elements directly, and also involve coordinated operations in which the physical infrastructure and resources of the terrorist organization such as shelters, positions, arsenals, logistical support lines, rear basing points, and financial resources are targeted alongside the command control echelon.

Following the detection of the target, the data received from the UAVs is used to identify the target by examining in detail the number of people, weapons, clothes, and whether the targets are civilians or not. After the identification process is completed, the targets in question are tracked by UAVs. At this point, tracking takes a few hours or a few days, depending on who the target is, and where and what kind of activity they is carrying out.

In the analysis phase, plans are made for the neutralization operation. In this context, special attention is paid that the target moves away from civilian areas and that there are no civilians in the operation area. In addition, information from intelligence officers in the field and data from the UAV center are compared. Ultimately, bearing all the data into consideration, when there is a definite conviction that the target is a terrorist element and there are no civilians around, a few operators destroy the target in accordance with the orders they receive from the relevant commander. After the target is neutralized, an evaluation phase is initiated and a report is prepared, thus ending the operation process.

As is evident from the statements of PKK member Kalkan, the psychological damage of these successful operations on the morale and motivation of the terrorist organization and terrorist elements is undeniable. According to the statements of captured or surrendered members of the organization, such operations cause confusion, anxiety, loss of authority, and give rise to situations in which subordinate cadres take initiative independent of the leader. As the number of such operations increases, members of a terrorist organization will have to constantly hide and take stricter measures in internal communication. Consequently, communication problems will lead to a lack of coordination and will seriously hinder senior leaders and operatives’ flexibility.

There will also be several collateral consequences. For example, the terrorist organization will be forced to undergo tactical transformation, and develop avoidance and protection mechanisms and counterattack tactics against the threats targeting the leadership and operative cadres. Meanwhile, while the imminent threats from the PKK are removed from Turkey through preventative counterterrorism operations, the organization, which has expanded its attack volume, will respond to the operations by activating organizational violence, especially in Iraq and Syria.

UAVs/UCAVs stand out in the transformation of counterterrorism activities

It is also important to mention the technological transformation and infrastructure that have facilitated the execution of operations against leadership and operative cadres. The Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the Ministry of Interior, and the MIT carry out such operations by maximizing their use of existing military technology and equipment, and minimizing the risks of field personnel. In fact, the defense industry’s domestic product range and R&D activities are diversifying thanks to user feedback activities.

The platform that has gained the most prominence in recent years is unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)/combat unmanned aerial vehicles (UCAVs). Considering the aerial imagery and visual data collection capabilities of domestically developed UAVs/UCAVs, their ability to provide intelligence feeds to the elements in the field, and even the use of their kinetic strike capabilities in neutralizing terrorist elements, UAVs/UCAVs are evolving into an important complimentary element for security forces in counterterrorism operations. In fact, the destruction capacity of security forces increases in operations that receive air support and UAV/UCAV support.

In the future, we will frequently hear statements from the PKK like that of Duran Kalkan. The PKK has been forced to retreat to its rear basing point by the TAF’s ground and air elements. Today, the PKK has been suppressed on the ground by the incessant counterterrorism operations of law enforcement and security forces, and its command-control and operative cadres have been gradually destroyed as a result of the operations carried out by the MIT both on its own and jointly with TAF elements. The future does not seem very promising to the terrorist group, one can say.

W

hy are foreign observers viewing Turkey’s 2023 elections as the most important election in the world this year? This question becomes even more interesting given the fact that the AK Party has so far won 15 different elections in 21 years. Thus, the question now is how a political party that has remained in power for so long can still make promises that attract the attention of millions of voters. Where does the AK Party’s strength to offer Turkey new highs come from? Let’s try to answer these questions.

In the past, the opposition circles would ponder the question “Which rabbit will Erdoğan pull out of the hat in this election?” In recent years, this question became “Will Erdoğan be able to pull a rabbit out of a hat?” Above all, there is one fundamental point that should be underlined about voter behavior: when voting for a party, voters do not look at the rabbit that comes out of the hat. That is just an illusion which veils reality. If voters were to vote for a gimmick, political parties would remain in power for a maximum of one term.

For a political party that has been in power for a long time, preparing for elections is not limited to making promises, putting forward an election manifesto, holding crowded rallies, and advertising in the media. Such efforts are undoubtedly necessary, and voters cannot be motivated and consolidated without them. However, such ad hoc practices do not win elections. Rather voters silently observe the practices of political parties and leaders from the past to the present.

Continuity and Change in Election Declarations

The AK Party’s first election manifesto was titled “Everything is for Turkey.” Voters were distrustful of the then existing parties as election promises in the 1990s were marketed through “bubble politics.” Trust in politicians and politics had declined and the country’s long-accumulated problems were deepening. The governments could neither solve the existing problems nor offer a future vision.

In this hopeless environment, the AK Party’s manifesto focused on urgent action plans, aimed at restoring trust between politics and society, was committed to expanding the political space through democratic moves, and promised to eliminate obstacles to liberties.

Prior to the 2007 elections in Turkey, the then ruling AK Party was under massive pressure from the centers of the military, media, and Kemalist elite tutelage. The AK Party had prepared an election manifesto that promised, first, to remove this coordinated tutelage in the upcoming elections, and second, to continue the structural transformations it had initiated such as expanding the space for democratic politics and continuing reforms on the road to a new constitution. Therefore, the election manifesto was titled “With Security and Stability, There’s No Rest for the Weary.”

2011 onwards

In the period leading up to the 2011 elections, Turkey was at a critical threshold. Considerable progress had been made in the fight against the tutelage mentioned above, and structural, legal, and institutional arrangements had been made to rehabilitate the political sphere. Laws had been enacted to remove obstacles to freedoms and a “national unity and solidarity” initiative had been launched to solve persisting problems. The “New Turkey Contract: 2023” vision was put forward in the 2011 election manifesto. This declaration defined not only an election period but also the basic paradigm and parameters of politics until 2023. Every election manifesto or vision to be announced in the following periods would be based on the 2011 manifesto, revised and updated with new proposals.

The post-2011 period was another critical threshold for the guardians of the old order, who showed a strong and organized resistance. By taking political risks, the AK Party government tried expanding the scope of freedoms, increasing the welfare of citizens through economic development, and solving long-ignored and gangrened problems such as the Peace Process, the Alevi Opening, the granting of rights to non-Muslim minorities, etc. The government adopted a discourse of stronger democratic values and more human rights, a fight that was ongoing since 2002.

However, this fight came up against a series of strong undemocratic reactions from 2013 onwards. The process started with the violent Gezi Park protests and continued with the truck conspiracy targeting Turkey’s National Intelligence Organization, the December 17-25, 2013 judiciary coup attempt by members of the Fetullah Terrorist Organization (FETO) who were embedded in the judiciary, the October 6-7, 2014 incidents, the trench and pit terrorism that ended the Peace Process, and, finally, the July 15, 2016 failed military coup attempt by FETO.

Starting in the 2015 elections, the AK Party began emphasizing “defensive reforms” that would counteract the adverse attempts launched since 2013 that targeted the state’s institutional capacity and reverse the effects if these attempts through “transformative reforms.” Therefore, the party prioritized system change and the restructuring of the state became an imperative. Both the 2015 and 2018 election manifestos were shaped by this approach.

A New Critical Threshold for the AK Party

On the road to the 2023 elections, the AK Party government has counterbalanced the destabilizing efforts that have been occurring since 2013 and fulfilled its 2011 election promises by focusing on development, service, and investment-oriented policies. The government was successful in reforms restructuring the state mechanism. As a result, the elections marking the centennial of the Republic of Turkey represent a new critical threshold for the AK Party. This new era marks a period in which the AK Party government could complete projects that it has already initiated and achieve new reforms. In this sense, an election manifesto based on the need for supplementary policies in every field was necessary.

All AK Party election manifestos are revised according to Turkey’s changing conditions, sociopolitical demands, and expectations. The manifestos include big projects that will attract the attention of voters. Extensive lists of realized and ongoing projects are presented to the electorate.

The AK Party’s 2023 election manifesto has a broad content. It consists of 6 chapters, 23 titles, and a total of 481 pages. Under each heading, an inventory of what the AK Party has done from past to present is offered followed by future projections. There are significant differences between the manifesto prepared by the AK Party, which has been in power for 21 years, and those prepared by other political parties.

Voters question whether ruling parties have fulfilled the promises they made in the previous election, while the opposition parties’ promises are forgotten by the next election. Opposition parties seem to prioritize bubble politics, characterized by populist promises. Since the AK Party is aware of this reality, in its most recent election manifesto, it reminds voters of everything it has achieved so far with the slogan “What we have done is the guarantee of what we will do.” This reminder also creates a concrete framework to convince voters that new promises have been made and that they will kept.

A

s Turkey approaches its 2023 national elections, the political parties are campaigning both under their alliances and striving to emerge victorious on their own behalf. The great struggle for both the presidential and parliamentary elections is palpable. In what can be described as a normal process up to this point, an issue that has raised eyebrows is the engagement of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and the Nation Alliance with the People’s Democracy Party (HDP) and the Green Left Party (YSP), which was formed as a backup party for the HDP.

It is noteworthy that after various negotiations with Kılıçdaroğlu, the HDP/YSP, the legal extension of the PKK/KCK, decided not to field its own candidate and showed support to Kılıçdaroğlu’s candidacy. Moreover, an adjunct development is the PKK/KCK terrorist organization’s all-out commitment to the election process: a terrorist organization, which by its very nature should be kept away from any legitimate political process, has begun to conduct a political campaign.

The organization’s top leaders have been issuing statements almost every day, propagandizing that President Erdoğan must be toppled. From Cemil Bayık, Murat Karayılan, and Mustafa Karasu to Duran Kalkan, Remzi Kartal, Helin Ümit, and Sabri Ok there is almost no leader of the organization who has not issued a statement.

In fact, immediately after the earthquake, the PKK/KCK made a declaration of non-conflict until the elections. In the declaration, PKK co-chair of the Kurdistan Communities Union Besê Hozat emphasized that the May 14 elections were unlike any other elections. She stated that she supported the HDP’s decision not to field a candidate in favor of Kılıçdaroğlu and announced that the organization had stopped “military actions’’ until the end of the elections. According to Hozat, “If a strong struggle is waged together in the election process, this fascist government will be overthrown on May 14.” Later, similar statements from the so-called leadership cadres followed.

Duran Kalkan’s statements, which appeared in the press on April 18 and were especially striking, elucidated the PKK/KCK’s related course of action. Kalkan stated, “Erdoğan mobilized the National Intelligence Organization (MIT) to kill us. They have announced our names on a list, and no one says a word. We are under attack everywhere: the media, defense areas, in the tunnels in Bakur. We are being killed in Qandil, in Shengal, in Rojava. He kills every day. No one says a word. They have created lists about our leadership. Red list, yellow list, green list, grey list, that is, they put 30 or 40 names on each list. They put pictures. These are not wanted lists; it is a list of those who will be killed publicly.” His statement revealed how the PKK/KCK is under pressure, how the leading cadres have become unable to act and manage the organization, and clearly painted a picture of the PKK’s exhaustion.

The rise of the MIT in the eradication of the PKK

So why is the so-called leadership of the organization burnt out despite the U.S. patronage in Syria, the support of Iran, Hashd Al-Shaabi, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) in Iraq, and all the aid provided by European countries and Israel? The answer is Turkey’s counterterrorism doctrine and the MIT’s operation against the organization. In the aftermath of the July 15 coup attempt, Turkey changed its paradigm with a new security doctrine and adopted a proactive approach in the fight against PKK terrorism, seeking to eliminate the terrorist organization through military and point operations.

One of the most important pillars of this doctrine is undoubtedly the MIT. Especially after the July 15 coup attempt, there have been significant developments in the organization’s capabilities: the MIT, whose human capital and technical capabilities have significantly increased, started to assume important roles in carrying out pivotal operations both within Turkey and across the border in Iraq and Syria, such as Operation Euphrates Shield, Operation Olive Branch, and Operation Peace Spring.

Under the leadership of Hakan Fidan, the organization, which has renewed itself in the face of changing world conditions and security threats, increased its effectiveness by expanding its legal infrastructure, technical, cyber, and human capacity. It has also accomplished great tasks in the context of identifying and neutralizing senior figures of the PKK terrorist organization. Kalkan’s statement that “we [the PKK] are being targeted in all regions, we are being killed,” in fact refers to the MIT’s effective strategy known as “decapitation”—the process of neutralizing the organization’s leadership cadre.

The MIT started to carry out very important operations against the PKK and its subcomponents in Syria and Iraq. While the organization’s leadership cadres were purged and the organization’s command-and-control structure was weakened, the move also aimed to collapse morale and motivation. These aims were met with great success. Since 2016, more than 500 names, including key PKK/KCK central executive committee members from Diyar Garip, a member of the so-called presidency and executive council of the PKK to Sinjar commanders such as Mam Zeki Şengallı have been neutralized in Iraq and Syria thanks to MIT operation units.

Some operations were carried out hundreds of kilometers away from the Turkish borders. These operations, in which UCAVs are used effectively, are managed by agents in the field. While Turkey conducts conventional military operations, the MIT, whose capabilities have been improved in every sense and which has gained a new strategic mission, eliminates elements threatening Turkey’s national security through simultaneous operations. The MIT has become a rising organization in the global context and a very important multiplier for Turkey, reaching a capacity enjoyed only by a few intelligence agencies in the world.

The PKK’s weakening position and Kılıçdaroğlu

The PKK/KCK leadership is burnt out and has largely lost its ability to act within the above framework. It is now focused on targeting the political will led by Erdoğan rather than achieving results through terrorism, thinking that it can escape its predicament with the change of the current government. This is the motive behind the PKK’s decision to be inactive and its systematic statements during the election process. The leadership has instrumentalized its structures such as the HDP and YSP in the legal field to prevent Erdoğan from coming back to power at any cost and, in this way, it hopes to prevent the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF), the MIT, and other security bureaucracies from continuing their current successful work.

Unfortunately, the position of Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu and his staff has vicariously allowed this idea to emerge. While the PKK’s leadership cadres are being purged one by one and the organization is being rendered unable to carry out any action in Turkey and is under great pressure in Iraq and Syria, taking steps to revive the organization would be a betrayal of Turkey’s future.