It goes without saying that nothing is going well between Morocco and Algeria. Everyone is convinced that relations between the two major Maghreb countries have reached a point of no return, and observers are on the lookout for the slightest incident on the ground that could trigger a dramatic acceleration in tension and give rise to a dramatic exodus to Europe much more consistent than the current one.

In the very recent past, experts predicted that the possibility of an armed conflict was improbable, as the two heads of state risked losing more than just a war but instead control over their respective institutions. Now, nobody would bet a single penny on what might happen in the near or distant future.

The facts are there. Algeria, the most over-armed country in North Africa, continues to buy its weapons from abroad; from the Russians, of course, but for some time now it has been taking care to diversify its equipment. And Morocco is still counting on its long-standing ally, the United States, to equip and modernize its army – and with a bonus: following its normalization with Israel, the kingdom has signed several agreements with the latter to manufacture weapons on Moroccan soil.

In this frenetic arms race, anything can happen, otherwise, what is the point of depriving the Moroccan and Algerian populations of these vital financial resources that could be put to good use in preparing for war?

If we want to differentiate between the two countries, we can roughly say that Morocco is a monarchy with a liberal economy, and Algeria is a republic that has long been considered “socialist.” Otherwise, there aren’t many major differences between the two neighbors. The inhabitants speak the same vernacular (Darija) and use Berber languages that are very similar and have the same matrix. Similarly, classical Arabic is the official language in both countries, and French is the idiom of the elite.

Betrayal?

As for the economy, while Algeria’s resources are infinitely greater than Morocco’s, the kingdom has know-how in several key sectors that it has always drawn on to maintain its close relations with the West.

The black spot is in the tumultuous Morocco-Algerian relations. There are several factors, a huge abscess, a mess of mutual reproaches, desires for revenge, and a good dose of hatred that has become structural.

Without looking back too far, we can say that the tension that the Maghreb is experiencing today is not new and not the result of spontaneous generation. Relations between the two countries bear a heavy historical burden.
Some Algerian historians go back as far as the 19th century to look for the source of this legendary enmity between the two enemy brothers that geographical proximity and a semblance of shared history could have reconciled.

According to them, it all started with a “betrayal” that took place after the battle of Isly on August 14, 1844, which pitted the army of the Alawite Sultan Abderrahmane Ben Hicham against that of the French General Thomas Robert Bugeaud. The defeat of the sultan’s mehalla (army) sealed the end of the Moroccan protection enjoyed by Emir Abdelkader, the leader of the Algerian resistance, and above all outlawed him throughout the territory of the Cherifian Empire, which had served as his refuge.

Though “betrayal,” according to some studious Algerians, is the term used to describe this inglorious event, Moroccan counterparts describe it as the inevitable consequence of the catastrophic defeat of the sultan’s mehalla (army) at Isly. Without this painful outlawing, Morocco risked a repeat of the French naval bombardments that destroyed part of the ports of Mogador (Essaouira) and Tangiers.

Algeria’s support for the Polisario

The other major criticism leveled by Morocco targets Algeria’s massive political, diplomatic, and even military support for the Sahrawi independence fighters of the Polisario Front from the outset of the war in Western Sahara in the mid-1970s.

In fact, it was during this war that we came very close to a full-scale conflict between the two Maghreb powers. There were two specific dates. The first was the first battle of Amgala, in January 1976, which saw a direct military engagement by Algeria inside the territory of Western Sahara.

This military confrontation, the first since the Sands War, ended in a Moroccan victory. But a few weeks later, in February of the same year, another armed clash pitted the Moroccans against Polisario Front fighters, supported militarily by the Algerian army. It ended in victory for the Sahrawi independence fighters. It is thought that without the restraint of Hassan II and Houari Boumediene, the consequences of these two bitter and cruel battles would have given rise to a major conflict in the region.

The last time Morocco reproached Algeria was in 1994. That year, French terrorists of Algerian and Moroccan origin targeted places they considered symbolic of the kingdom’s image. These included a Jewish cemetery and, above all, the Atlas Asni hotel in Marrakech, where they murdered two Spanish tourists. Morocco accused the Algerian intelligence services of being behind this attack and closed the very long land border between the two countries. Since then, apart from a brief interlude, the border has remained closed.

This bitter enmity and mutual mistrust could have quietly gone on for several decades if things had not worsened recently.

Iran and the Western Sahara

A few years ago, no doubt under the influence of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf countries, Morocco began accusing Iran of involvement in the Western Sahara conflict. Rabat believes that the Republic of Iran asked its Lebanese armed wing, Hezbollah, to provide active military support to the Polisario Front in the Sahrawi refugee camps at Tindouf. And Tindouf necessarily means Algeria. 

With all due respect to the Moroccans, this accusation has never been proven. Neither by Rabat nor by its American allies, even though they are vigilant when it comes to Iran and Hezbollah.

But this has not prevented Morocco from breaking off diplomatic relations with Teheran on several occasions.

To this must be added Morocco’s clumsy diplomatic initiative at the UN to support the hypothetical independence of Kabylia, a Berber-speaking region of Algeria. This is heresy for Algiers, which retorted violently to this initiative by pointing out that there is no UN process open to deal with this issue, whereas this is indeed the case for the Western Sahara conflict.

The normalization of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel, especially the military agreements, has also turned the region upside down and awakened Algerian diplomacy, which had been dormant for ages due to stagnation at the top of the state, led at the time by the aging President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. From the outset, Algiers has regarded the presence of the Jewish state in the Maghreb as a major threat to its national security, especially when Israeli Foreign Minister Yair Lapid took advantage of his visit to Rabat to rebuke it.

That’s where we are today. An improvement in Morocco-Algerian relations is by no means on the agenda. On the other hand, the slightest armed incident between the two states could have incalculable consequences for the region.

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he elections in Turkey, the most important elections of 2023 worldwide, rolled on after the May 28 runoff, with Recep Tayyip Erdoğan getting 52.18 percent of the votes against his rival, Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, and being re-elected.

On June 3, Erdoğan attended the swearing-in ceremony at the parliament and named the cabinet members right after the ceremony, the same evening. New faces have appeared in fifteen ministerial positions except for two ministries: the ministries of health and culture. The foreign, interior, defense, and finance ministries were among the most crucial cabinet posts with new incumbents. These four vital positions have been filled by well-known, experienced, and respected politicians and bureaucrats who have played critical roles in the country’s past two decades.

The replacement of the foreign minister, Mevlut Çavuşoğlu, with Dr. Hakan Fidan, who served as the head of the National Intelligence Organization (MIT), and the assignment of Prof. Ibrahim Kalin, who served as a presidential spokesperson and advisor to Erdoğan, as the new head of Turkish intelligence have attracted the attention of not only regional powers but also international players due to the duo’s importance for the country and President Erdoğan.

Despite some analysts considering the new assignments as indicators of change, this is not the case. In the past three years, Turkey has adopted a normalization policy merged with its financial aims of attracting foreign direct investment (FDI).

The past three years’ diplomatic and economic attempts have aimed at the deliberate preparation of Turkey’s transforming foreign policy and economy. This transformation has brought about a series of hardships for the country resulting from the fall of the Turkish currency as Turkey seeks to be a regional financial hub. However, the Turkish government plans to make Turkey a “center country” as suggested by Wallerstein’s world systems theory which argues that the world economic system serves to benefit some countries and exploit others.

Turkey’s recent achievements in the defense industry (fighter jets, drones, missiles, etc.), technology, and its indigenous car (TOGG) are among the vital indicators of this intention. Rather than being exploited, Turkey wants to decrease the value of the Turkish lira, and stabilize and improve its relations with regional powers as part of its normalization efforts.

What is more, the country’s proactive role in several conflicts has brought it to the fore as a regional and international spot for resolving conflicts. Since this strategy requires a stabilized region and good diplomatic ties, Ankara, witnessing the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S., started mending its ties with its neighbors, particularly the Gulf countries, which could impact a wide range of areas and regions, including the Maghreb.

Turkey and the Maghreb

What can be expected next in Turkey’s relations with the Maghreb countries in light of Turkey’s new cabinet?

First, it is vital to remember the fact that the newly assigned foreign minister, Hakan Fidan, has been behind the scene of Ankara’s normalization efforts with regional powers. Egypt is among the countries with which Turkey has sought normalization, and Ankara and Cairo have already announced the assignment of their ambassadors after several years of cold diplomatic ties. The normalization between Ankara and Cairo is important since it can help resolve Libya’s more than decade-long conflict, along with the disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. Turkey’s strengthening ties with Egypt would provide Ankara with an advantage against Greece, which signed an MoU with Cairo a year after Ankara signed one with Libya’s UN-backed government.

This can also provide an opportunity to find a solution for the Eastern Mediterranean gas and border rift. Regarding Libya, Turkey has been backing the UN-recognized government headed by Abdul Hamid Dbeibah while being in touch with several parties to the conflict. On the contrary, Egypt has been one of the closest allies of warlord Khalifa Haftar, the Tobruk-based parliament’s speaker and its PM-designate Fathi Bashagha. During Bashagha’s failed attempts to enter Tripoli, Turkey played a balancing role by stopping the clashes and mediating between the warring parties.

Following the visit of CIA Director William Burns to Libya in the middle of January in which he met with Dbeibah and Haftar, Fidan was quick to take action and meet Dbeibah, Menfi, Khalid al-Mishri, the Chairman of the High Council of State, and even Sudan’s army chief Abdel Fattah al-Burhan.

Hakan Fidan

Turkey’s foreign policy during Hakan Fidan’s tenure at the MIT was a conversion of his background activities into diplomatic steps, with Ankara’s grand strategy remaining the same: making Turkey a more independent, balanced, and proactive foreign approach, considering the decreasing hegemonic power of the U.S. in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries have been seen to be happy with Erdoğan’s re-election as they were among the first countries to congratulate him on his election victory. Considering the upcoming visits and meetings between Turkey, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Qatar, Fidan could lead Ankara towards a solution of its long-standing issues.

With an operational intelligence service, proactive foreign policy efforts, and a qualified staff comprising among others the aforementioned ministers, Turkey only needs to eliminate its economic hardships. An improving Turkish economy would also help heal the wounds of the region and the world at large. As the U.S. is losing its hegemony across the region, Turkey, after recovering from an economic and diplomatic crisis, will seek to become a regional and global hub for trade, diplomacy, and politics as per its grand strategy.

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ine Arab countries have entered the club of the top 40 weapons-buying countries in the world, according to a recent report by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). At the same time, between 2018 and 2022, arms imports by European countries increased by 47% compared to 2013-17 while imported arms decreased by 40% in Africa, 21% in the Americas, 7.5% in Asia and Oceania, and 8.8% in the Middle East.

Meanwhile, the global powers’ share in arms exports has varied, with the U.S. share increasing from 33% between 2013-2017 to 40% from 2018-2022, while Russia’s share fell from 22% to 16% in the same years. China’s share of global arms exports amounted to 5.2%, Germany’s share stands at 4.2%,  Italy’s at 3.8%, and Israel’s at 2.3% between 2018-2022.

For the first time, two Arab countries, namely Jordan and the United Arab Emirates (UAE), have joined the list of top 25 arms exporters globally.

Algeria’s global share of arms imports has declined from 4.1% in 2013-2017 to 1.8% in 2018-2022, moving the country from 12^th position to 18^th in arms-importing countries globally. Algeria remains the top country in Africa importing arms.

Morocco’s arms sales have declined from 1.1% in 2013-2017 to 0.8% in 2018-2022 globally. Morocco currently ranks 29^th among arms-exporting countries—a decline from the 21^st position it held.

The GCC takes the lead

The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) occupied the first ranking in arms imports, with 180 war jets ordered by the Gulf monarchies out of 260 exported to the Middle East. Notably, arms exports to the Arab Maghreb have declined while exports to Egypt, which has 4.2% of the global share of arms imports, remained the same.

In 2018-2022, Saudi Arabia came after India in global arms imports, with a total percentage of 9.6% following India’s 11%.

Saudi Arabia’s arms imports declined slightly from 10% of global arms purchases in 2013 to of 8.7% in 2017.

Qatar moved from the position of the world’s 17^th arms importer in 2013-2017, to third in the world in 2018-2022, with an increase of 311%.

The United States was the main contributor to exporting arms to Qatar with 42%, followed by France with 29%, and Italy with 14%.

Egypt and the UAE

The economic crisis in Egypt did not affect the share of its arms imports. Although Egypt receives approximately $1.3 billion annually in U.S. military aid, the United States is not among the top three arms suppliers to Cairo.

Instead, Russia topped this list with circa 34%, followed by Italy and France with 19% each.

On the other hand, the UAE arms imports have declined moving the country from fifth place in the world (2013-2017) to 11^th (2018-2022).

It is likely that the decline in the country’s arms imports is related to the country’s shift towards manufacturing its own weapons, and even exporting them, thus joining the club of top 25 arms exporters.

The UAE ranked 18th in the world in arms exports, accounting for 0.4% of the world’s total arms exports.

Between 2018 and 2022, the UAE exported 28% of Egypt’s arms imports, 27% of Jordan’s, and 15% of Algeria’s.

The United States was the main supplier of arms to the UAE, with about 66%, followed by Turkey (7.4%).

Russia ranked third with 5.4%, although the UAE army is known for its reliance on Western weapons.

The war in Ukraine and East Asian arms exports

Ukraine has become the third-largest recipient of global arms in 2022, accounting for 2% of global arms purchases between 2018 and 2022.

Between the years 2013 and 2017 and the years 2018 and 2022, arms imports by East Asian states increased by 21%. The SIPRI report concluded that “[a]rms imports by China rose by 4.1 per cent, with most coming from Russia. However, the biggest increases in East Asia were by U.S. allies South Korea (+61%) and Japan (+171%).” The report went on to state, “Australia, the largest arms importer in Oceania, increased its imports by 23 per cent.”

The list of major arms importers did not include Arab countries such as Oman, Sudan, Libya, Iraq, Tunisia, Syria, Mauritania, and Lebanon.

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nti-migrant racism in North Africa was thought to be a taboo, but in reality it never was. Racism against African migrants, coupled with unabashed anti-Black xenophobia, is alive and kicking in North Africa. Tunisian President Kais Saied’s recent comments on February 21 about sub-Saharan migrants surely shocked many people. Saied labelled migrants as “hordes” and a “demographic threat” to his country. Even more, Saied called for “the need to put a rapid end to this immigration,” which, to his view, has become a source of “violence, crime and unacceptable acts.”

For a country like Tunisia, a generator of migrants fleeing to find a better life in Europe, Saied’s speech may seem out of place and contradictory. Doesn’t the European far right, which applauded Saied’s speech, say the same about Muslim migrants?

President Saied’s invective is neither unprecedented nor isolated in the larger geographical area, the Maghreb. From Morocco to Libya, passing through Mauritania, Algeria and, of course, Tunisia, hateful allegations are not only the prerogative of what some people there call the “little people” to whom we could add the “uncultured” or the “intolerant.” In the upper echelons, at the highest level of the Maghreb states, the same ideas circulate.

For this discourse is not new. Since the Maghreb became the exit door for migrants from Africa to reach the fabled El Dorado, Europe, this immense territory has been transformed into a huge waiting room for tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands, of sub-Saharan migrants unable to reach the European coast. A waiting room that has turned into an open-air prison over time. Especially since, to curb this migration flow, the European Union outsourced its borders and entrusted their guarding to the Maghreb states by rewarding them financially, diplomatically, or both.

A migrant mass

The direct consequence of this strong policy of containment has been the creation of a migrant mass that has settled permanently in the Maghreb and lives on the fringes of society, waiting for a passage to Europe. It has also caused inevitable impoverishment and generated the phenomenon of criminalization that no one questions, especially not the local population in contact with migrants.

It is important to understand that as long as migrants were only crossing the territory, they were tolerated. It was only when they were prevented from doing so that their presence began to pose a problem and the old demon of racism resurfaced.

Over the past twenty years, many serious and sometimes bloody incidents have taken place against migrants in North Africa, without being properly reported by the press. Police raids followed by robberies and humiliations, assaults, lynching organized by neighborhood lords or angry citizens, and even rapes have targeted this vulnerable population.

Racism is as old as the world and knows no borders. The Maghrebi expressions for Black people, “âzzi” (black), “kahlouche” (negro), “âbid” (slave), or “oussif” (slave, servant), which have been heard with force recently, are not new and are not a relic of colonialism. As far back as the 14th century, Ibn Khaldun, a historian of Arab descent born in Tunis, wrote that “the only peoples who accept slavery are the negroes, because of their lower degree of humanity, their place being closer to that of the animal.”

Legacy of French colonization

These expressions are therefore the fruit of a mentality that predates the French colonization of Algeria and Mauritania, the French protectorates of Tunisia and Morocco, and the Italian occupation of Libya. What has changed is the violence of words and actions.

In 2012, the Moroccan weekly Maroc Hebdo devoted an entire dossier to the “Black Peril,” attacking without embellishment those who “live by begging, engage in drug trafficking and prostitution” and “pose a human and security problem for the country.” On Moroccan social media, there are regular calls for the expulsion of African migrants, the closure of borders, and the banning of mixed marriages in order to preserve an improbable “purity of the Moroccan race.”

On the other side of the border, in Algeria, a hashtag on Twitter resurfaces from time to time (in Arabic), #NotoAfricansinAlgeria, which immediately sets the world on fire by calling for the hunting down and deportation of migrants. Sometimes, the creators of these hateful messages deliberately confuse Black migrants with Black North African citizens. From the Atlantic Ocean to the Egyptian border, there is a Black Maghrebi population whose ancestors were slaves or settled in North Africa several centuries ago. They are certainly citizens, but they are still considered second-class ones.

A few years ago, in 2016, a Black model of Algerian nationality, Amina Hamouine, had to face an extraordinary campaign of hatred because she had the idea, or the “bad idea” as her detractors would say, of being photographed wearing a Kabyle dress—the Kabyle people are Berbers from the region of Kabylia. This was an unforgivable mistake for those who identify the Kabyle woman from the whiteness of her skin.

Too Black?

Recently, Khadidja Benhamou, an Algerian citizen from Adrar in the south of the country, was deemed “too Black” to wear the crown of Miss Algeria 2019—her skin color did not represent all Algerians, it seems.

But it is not only the “little people” who indulge in these feelings that sociologists and anthropologists call “systemic negrophobia.” Some Algerian leaders do as well. In 2017, five years before the Tunisian president’s remarks, senior officials of Algiers, which has a virulent anti-colonial past, were not kind to migrants either.

Ahmed Ouyahia, an Algerian politician who has been appointed prime minister ten times—an absolute record— and who at the time was head of President Abdelaziz Bouteflika’s cabinet as a minister of state, described African migrants on the private television station Ennahar TV as “[t]hese illegal foreigners bring[ing] crime, drugs and several other scourges.” At the time, Ouyahia was the secretary general of the National Democratic Rally (RND), one of the two crutches, along with the National Liberation Front (FLN), that support the government in Algeria.

His words were echoed and amplified a few days later by Algerian Foreign Minister Abdelkader Messahel, who identified the arrival of sub-Saharans in the country as a “threat to national security.”

But the ultimate horror was reached again in 2017 in Libya, when footage filmed by CNN journalists revealed to the world the unimaginable in the 21st century: an auction of migrants from Nigeria at a market near Tripoli.

Anti-racism laws

To counter this unfortunate litany of racist acts, Tunisia passed a law in 2018 penalizing racism and established January 23 as the “National Day for the Abolition of Slavery.” However, the 2018 law, historical, innovative, and the first of its kind in the Arab world, was annihilated by the verbal outrage of President Saied on February 21, 2023, when he evoked a “criminal plan prepared at the beginning of this century to change the demographic composition of Tunisia” and whose objective was to transform the country into an “African-only country” and to remove its “Arab Muslim” identity.

Of course, one can try to nuance this reality by recalling, for example, the decision of the Moroccan authorities to launch campaigns to issue resident permits, such as in 2014, which initially resulted in the regularization of 25,000 undocumented migrants. It can also be argued that, like Tunisia, Algeria adopted a law criminalizing racial discrimination in 2020. But these gestures of goodwill have little impact if they are not followed by campaigns to educate the local population on the need to accept the “other.” Campaigns that television stations refused to broadcast, as was the case in Morocco.

All crises, whether economic or security-based, produce exasperation that ends up finding a scapegoat, and African migrants have become the ideal candidates. They pay for the economic crisis and the criminal behavior of a minority in their own community.

As a scapegoat, they also pay the price for some of the services rendered by the Maghreb states to Europeans: to showcase its status as a paid gendarme of the European Commission, Morocco got carried away by its destructive zeal on June 24, 2022, when it violently curtailed an attempt by several hundred migrants, mostly Sudanese, citizens of a “brotherly Arab” country, to force their way into Ceuta, a Spanish enclave on Moroccan territory.

EU responsibility

The result—24 dead according to the Moroccan authorities, 37 according to a local association, not counting the missing—has not only tarnished Morocco’s image in Africa but also revealed another problem that is worth studying. In which state in the world, except for the former East Germany and the now defunct Berlin Wall and migrants escaping war to Greece and Italy, are dozens of people killed to prevent them from leaving a country that is not theirs to seek refuge elsewhere?

A tragedy that ended with a congratulatory gesture worthy of the former East Germany, as the president of the Spanish government, Pedro Sánchez, praised the brutal intervention of the Moroccan police force.

Finally, the European Union’s migration policy, which consists of preventing human beings from moving freely, by force if necessary, has helped this local outbreak of racism and intolerance, and dynamited several principles, some of them religious, that were thought to be immutable.

Pan-Africanism, the egalitarian and anti-slavery utopia propagated in most of the post-independence Maghreb countries, especially Algeria, has come to an end. The myth introduced by these countries of an integrating Islam that makes no distinction between a white and a Black person has been shattered. Despite many migrants adhering to Islam, they are treated as strangers to the Ummah.

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here has been an uproar in France after French-Algerian author, Hamid Ait-Taleb, who holds two master’s degrees from the Sorbonne, changed his name to “Xavier Le Clerc” over the lack of job offers due to his North African-sounding name. Le Clerc made the statement during a radio interview on September 7, 2022.

In an interview with Radio France Inter, Le Clerc said soon after he changed his name, he got hundreds of calls offering him jobs, where in the past he never got called back after job applications.

Ait-Taleb is the author of the novel A Man without a Title, which speaks of his father’s journey into integration, identity, and poverty in France.

It is not clear whether Le Clerc’s father was with the Harkis, the Algerians who fought under French command during the country’s War of Independence in 1954-1962.

Upon arrival in France, Le Clerc’s father was employed in Normandy as a laborer by an agricultural company.

Surprising?

The statement made by Le Clerc came as a shock to some French, but France’s history of racism especially against Harkis is known to many and does not surprise people with migrant backgrounds in the country.

Le Clerc came out and spoke about the reason that pushed him to change his name after he was subjected to criticism including accusations against him of “betraying his roots and identity.”

Some 1.1 million people have watched the interview with Le Clerc with politicians and figures jumping on the bandwagon and noting that this comes as no surprise to them given the history of France and the rise of the far-right in the country.

Danièle Obono, member of the French National Assembly, tweeted that the case of Xavier Le Clerc is no exception, noting that discrimination in employment is known: an applicant of North African origin is 31.5% less likely to get a job than a white French applicant.

Farida Amrani, a Moroccan-origin member of the French National Assembly, noted that she was asked once in her electoral district how she became an MP while having a migrant background.

In France, a French Name?

According to a study, the gap between French with Maghribi origins and white French when it comes to employment is 15%.

In another study, the French American Foundation concluded that a French name gives universal access to all facets of French society.

France, due to its colonial history, hosts large migrant communities. Muslims make up 6.6% of the population of France or 8.8 million people—the largest Muslim population in a single European country.

As in the rest of Europe, racism in France is on the rise recently. In the most recent general elections an increasing number of French people voted for right-wing candidates whose discourse was mainly focused on their anti-migrant rhetoric.

Muslims find themselves in an increasingly hostile environment in France, which to date refuses to recognize its colonial past and integrate its Muslim population.

The president of the Spanish government Pedro Sánchez flew to Morocco on Thursday, April 7, to have a ftour (Moroccan iftar) with King Mohamed VI, and thus seal a reconciliation with his southern neighbor. It is more than likely that the harira, the traditional soup that Moroccans eat to break their fast, must have had a bitter taste for the Spanish leader.

A few hours before he flew to Rabat, the Spanish Congress of Deputies voted a “Proposición no de ley,” a Spanish parliamentary non-binding non-legislative motion, harshly reproaching the president for his reversal on the Western Sahara conflict.

Only 118 deputies of Sánchez’s PSOE (Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party) voted against the motion. The rest, a total of 168 deputies, some of whom are part of the government coalition or support the government without participating in it, and the conservative right-wing Popular Party MPs voted in favor of the motion. Sixty-one other deputies abstained, representing the far-right Vox and the center-liberals Ciudadanos (Citizens).

With the exception of the Socialists, everyone wanted to express their disagreement, if not anger, at the president for breaking a 46-year-old consensus, respected by all Spanish executives—right, center, and left—since the death of General Franco.

As a former colonial power that is still considered by the UN as the administrative power of Western Sahara (Morocco being a de facto power), Spain was bound to a certain so-called active neutrality. It was not supposed to lean towards either Morocco or the Polisario Front independence fighters. However, in a letter to the King of Morocco, Sánchez stated that he favored the Moroccan proposal of autonomy offered to the Saharawis in 2007, dubbing it “the most serious, realistic, and credible,” thus dynamiting this old and very sensitive balance.

In a widely read tweet, Iceta shared an article from the daily El Periódico de España in which he explained that there had been a barter between Spain and Morocco. In exchange for Madrid’s acceptance of the Moroccan autonomy proposal for Western Sahara, Rabat is said to have committed itself to stop claiming the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands. “The agreement obliges Morocco to give up Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands,” the newspaper wrote peremptorily.

And this is where it all gets murky and incomprehensible. By negotiating its renunciation of the self-determination of the Saharawis, in violation of international law since it is the UN that manages this conflict, did Madrid obtain written assurances from the Moroccans? Nothing could be further from certain.

Morocco will never give up its claims on Ceuta and Melilla, which it has economically suffocated by closing its borders and putting an end to smuggling, which is one of the sources of the prosperity of these two free ports.

It is not for nothing that Morocco has built a huge port on the Strait of Gibraltar, Tangier-Med, in one of the most important maritime crossing points in the world. Tangier-Med, considered today one of the largest ports in Africa, competes directly with the port of Algeciras, located on the other side of the strait, but also with the port of Ceuta.

As for Melilla, the unilateral closure in 2018 of the only land custom crossing between Spain and Morocco, that of Beni Ensar, opened after the Treaty of Fès in 1912 and ratified after Morocco’s independence in 1956, is another manifestation of the Moroccan will to strangle the economy of this city.

On the other hand, although Morocco does not formally claim the Canary Islands, in 2020, the House of Representatives (lower house of parliament) voted two bills extending Moroccan territorial waters to a point overlapping with those of the islands.

It is therefore hard to see Rabat giving up its historical claims to landlocked territories in Africa only to thank the Spanish government for saying that it found the Moroccan autonomy plan for Western Sahara to be the “most serious, realistic, and credible.”

Moreover, in the joint Spanish-Moroccan declaration at the end of the meeting with Sánchez in Rabat, there is no mention of Ceuta and Melilla. On the other hand, Article 3 of the document refers to the “full normalization of the movement of persons and goods,” which “will be re-established in an orderly manner, including appropriate arrangements for land and maritime customs and control of persons.” Does this mean that Morocco will reopen the old Beni Ensar land customs, which was abruptly closed in 2018? It is possible, but not yet certain.

What is certain, however, and is written in Article 6 of this declaration, is that Morocco seems to be backing down on its claims to the territorial waters of the Canary Islands, since it talks about the reactivation of a “working group on the delimitation of the maritime spaces of the Atlantic seaboard (…) with the aim of making concrete progress.” This seems to indicate that Morocco will review the two laws that allow Moroccan territorial waters to overlap with those of Spain.

Emmanuel Macron’s statement on French colonial history and memory in Algeria and his sharp criticism of the Algerian regime sparked a political crisis between the two countries, which are linked with more than 130 years of colonial history. Macron’s statement is not new to the French political elite, which since Algeria’s independence in 1962 has been playing the colonial history card on every occasion for internal political consumption in France. Given the size of the Algerian community in France, Algeria has always occupied a significant place in the sociopolitical agenda.

More than four million Algerians are living in France and more than one million French Algerians are eligible to vote in French elections. During his visit to Algeria in 2007 on the eve of French elections, former French president Nicolas Sarkozy was the first French head of state to utter words of recognition and apology for the French colonial crimes.

However, later, he explicitly withdrew his statement during a presidential visit in December of the same year. What is new in President Macron’s statement is the criticism of the ruling elite in Algeria, his direct targeting of it, and the reference to the military structure of the regime despite the good relations that link these elites with France both publicly and behind the scenes.

This is the reason why Algerian authorities reacted strongly to Macron, especially when he referred to the slackness of the Algerian regime vis-à-vis the popular movement (the Hirak Movement) that erupted on February 22, 2019. Moreover, Macron questioned the existence before French colonialism of an Algerian nation in the first place. In a clear echo of the French orientalists of the nineteenth century, he ignored Algeria’s long history and its emergence as a state, the state of Numidia, a thousand years before the French state existed.

In fact, the French cultural and scientific machine worked hard to justify Algeria’s occupation and dissolving its political structure following its colonization in 1834, claiming it as French soil and its inhabitants as French Muslims. From then onward, France employed the Catholic Church’s religious machinery under the pretext of “civilizing” Algerians by educating them.

Behind Macron’s statement lies that fact that French presidential elections are approaching and according to opinion polls, far-right candidates such as Marine Le Pen, the head of the National Rally, and Éric Zemmour, independent far-right candidate of Algerian origin, have better chances in the elections.

Stora presented his report in January 2021 to Macron, including practical recommendations to bridge the gap between the two countries politically and culturally. Macron also handed over the skulls of 24 nineteenth-century leaders of the Algerian resistance against French colonialism – out of the 500 skulls France keeps – after 170 years of displaying them at the Musée de l’Homme (Museum of Mankind) in Paris. This was a first in the history of French-Algerian relations, and it occurred on the occasion of the 58th anniversary of Algeria’s independence in July 2020.

These steps by Macron were meant to show many Algerians that he is serious about facing the crimes committed during the French colonial rule. Macron’s recent statement, however, brought the matter back to square one and escalated the Algerian position, which insists on a full apology for the crimes of colonialism in the period from 1832 to 1962. The Algerian government demands three conditions to bridge the gap: (1) giving the archival documents presently kept in France back to Algeria; (2) opening the French nuclear explosions file in southern Algeria; and (3) paying compensation and the full recovery of the skulls of the Algerian resistance fighters held in Paris.

France views the bilateral relations through a colonialist memory and logic, which goes up and down in accordance with the strength of the Algerian regime. When the Algerian regime was strong in the 1970s, French politicians and intellectuals were reluctant to rise any serious issues against Algeria in reference to colonial memory. France sought to maintain a solid and calm relationship with Algeria in an effort to preserve its economic interests as stipulated in the Évian Accords of 1962 that granted independence to Algeria.

France, in fact, signed an accord with Algeria in 1968, with which it granted exceptional privileges to Algerians living in France. However, the weakness of the Algerian regime, starting with the military coup in 1992, left the door open for France to blackmail Algerians, who were in dire need of French support at international forums. France launched a campaign to nullify the 1968 accord of its content and made a unilateral amendment to it in 1994 with Decree No. 1103/94. France made another amendment in 2001, which reduced the privileges Algerians enjoy in France, restricting the freedom of movement of Algerians between France and Algeria.

France also started to discuss thorny issues between the two countries, such as the rights of the Pieds-Noirs, the French settlers in Algeria, who left Algeria after independence, and the right of return to their homeland of Algerian Harka, the Algerians who fought with France in the 1954-1962 war and who fled with the French army in 1962, including granting them a full pardon. France has practiced all forms of pressure on the Algerian ruling elite to reverse the policy of Arabization pursued by Algeria since 1972, which aimed at achieving cultural independence from France and strengthening the Algerian identity based on three main pillars: Islam, Arabism, and Amazigh identity.

It is strange that France succeeded, through its Francophone lobbies, in infiltrating the Algerian administration, in blocking the Arabization law of 1991 and the law of 1997, and in stopping all attempts to strengthen the role of the English language in the Algerian educational system. France also obstructed all efforts to pass a law criminalizing the colonial legacy of France by the Algerian parliament. The first draft was put up for discussion in 2009. But, with France’s strong influence on Algerian domestic decision-making, the Algerian regime failed to decolonize the colonial memory, which both the regime and the Algerian people consider one of the central issues in rearranging bilateral relations with France.

The successive French policies of obstructing the presence of Algerian Harkis, who fought alongside France during Algeria’s War of Independence, on French soil escalates during electoral campaigns, and has strengthened and consolidated the official and popular Algerian position. Perhaps the best evidence is Law No. 2005-158, which glorifies colonialism and was passed by the French General Assembly in February 2005 during the time of President Jacques Chirac.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride.

Chirac considers the colonization of Algeria and the rest of African peoples as a matter of French pride. The fourth article of the law includes a paragraph stipulating that school programs should praise the positive role played by the French presence abroad, especially in North Africa. As expected, this law caused a deep rift in Algerian-French relations.

Even though Macron’s recent statement was a strategic move for the upcoming presidential elections in order to win the support of the French far right and to break the popularity of the National Rally, it reflects a deep French conviction not to retreat from the French position on the issue of colonial memory in Algeria.

For Algerians, the best option is a full recognition of French colonialism and its brutality. However, the only way to change the French position and secure a full apology is closely linked to the establishment of a strong and coherent government in Algeria. Macron’s positive statements and promises made before September 2021 and his retreat reflect a state of confusion among the French political elites that began since Nicholas Sarkozy came to power in 2007, and became even worse after Emmanuel Macron became the president in 2017 – a development that shook the French political system.

What had to happen, happened. Algeria and Morocco have broken off their diplomatic relations. Algerian Foreign Minister Ramtane Lamamra made the announcement on Tuesday, August 24, 2021, during a press briefing. Before announcing this fatal outcome, Lamamra made a long presentation in which he listed all his country’s grievances towards Morocco since Algeria’s independence in 1962.

Lamamra began by recalling the Sands War, which pitted the two Maghreb armies against each other between the end of 1963 and the beginning of 1964. He went on to describe all the misunderstandings between the two states over the past 60 years, recalling, of course, the eternal dispute over Western Sahara between the Sahrawi independence fighters of the Polisario Front, supported by Algiers, and the Kingdom of Morocco since 1975. He then moved on to recent history, touching on the recent tensions, which have been shaking the two countries and are not minor.

Here are the reasons that pushed Algiers to break its relations with Rabat. Algeria considers that the normalization of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Israel in December 2020 means the installation of a “Zionist vanguard” in the Maghreb. And this, it has claimed since December, constitutes a threat to its security. The recent official visit to Morocco of the minister of foreign affairs and future prime minister of Israel, Yair Lapid, has only added fuel to fire.

Although it is still not known if he did so with the approval of the Moroccan authorities, from Raba, Lapid criticized the “rapprochement [of Algeria] with Iran” thus expressing the opposition of the Rabat-Tel Aviv axis to the supposed Algiers-Tehran axis. By doing so, he exported to the Maghreb the geostrategic rivalry between Israel and Iran. This move was viewed as a mistake in the eyes of many Moroccans who, despite a bitter Saudi campaign that led to the breakdown of diplomatic relations between Morocco and Iran, do not consider Iran an enemy.

For several years, Rabat has been trying to give credence to the idea that Tehran, through the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, supports the Polisario Front militarily, with the acquiescence of Algeria.

For several years, Rabat has been trying to give credence to the idea that Tehran, through the Lebanese movement Hezbollah, supports the Polisario Front militarily, with the acquiescence of Algeria. But for the moment, despite a few rare opinion articles in the Moroccan and foreign media linked to the Moroccan regime, no serious investigation has been able to confirm this scenario. Even the Americans, although vigilant towards Iran and Hezbollah, have not detected anything.

The other Moroccan blunder that set off the fire was the quasi-recognition of MAK, the Movement for self-determination of Kabylie, supported by Rabat and considered a “terrorist organization” by the Algerian government.

The Algerian state announced its decision to “review” its relations with Rabat and to intensify security control on the western borders due to “the incessant hostile acts” by Morocco.

A few days later, Algeria declared that the forest fires that ravaged the north of the country were caused by MAK militants. To further increase its pressure on Morocco, Algiers accused Morocco of training MAK activists in military camps.

The rupture of diplomatic relations was a matter of days. To show that there was no return back and to signify that the bridges between the two countries had been definitively cut, on August 26, Algiers announced that it would no longer use the Maghreb-Europe Gas Pipeline that connects the Algerian oil fields with Europe via Morocco. Mohamed Arkab, the Algerian energy minister, explained to the Spaniards that from now on, the Algerian gas would only go through Medgaz, another pipeline that links Algeria directly to Spain, without passing through Morocco.

This Algerian decision constitutes an economic loss for Morocco, which used to pump 900 million cubic meters of natural gas every year, let alone the financial losses that Rabat will suffer as it will no longer collect money from Spain for using its territory.

What will happen now? It is unlikely that the escalation between Algeria and Morocco will end with the severing of diplomatic ties.

What will happen now? It is unlikely that the escalation between Algeria and Morocco will end with the severing of diplomatic ties. The fear that Moroccans and Algerians residing in both countries will be expelled from their homes as was the case in 1976 at the height of Algiers’s recognition of the Polisario Front is palpable, yet unlikely, unless the situation escalates.

Today, there are only skirmishes between the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) and the Saharawi independence fighters who broke the ceasefire with Morocco last year after the events of the border post of Guerguerat that separates the disputed territory of Western Sahara from Mauritania.

But we are still in a pre-war situation which has the potential to continue. It can also tip over into an all-out conflict if Algeria allows and supports the Polisario Front in going beyond today’s military commitments.

Morocco and Algeria have engaged in a dangerous arms race in recent decades. In 2015, Algeria’s military budget was $11 billion, while Morocco’s was only $3 billion. Morocco caught up with Algeria after launching a $22 billion five-year rearmament plan in 2017 and then reintroducing mandatory military service in 2018. The two countries have arguably reached a dangerous military equilibrium that experts say will often end in conflagration.

A war, even limited and short, would considerably weaken the two economies, which are already in bad shape, provoke sentiments, and make the much-needed reconciliation far away. Above all, it would destabilize the entire Maghreb region. This does not suit the European Union, which needs Algeria and Morocco to fight illegal immigration.

Morocco and Algeria share a common history, religions, and vernacular languages. Even if the two people might not identify with the diplomatic squabbles and bellicose desires of their rulers, a conflict with death and destruction would break this fraternal bond, which today, despite assurances from both sides, hangs by a thread.

Liberation legitimacy occurs when a group that is fighting a liberation war in the context of foreign domination enjoys the feeling of the support of the masses and attains international legitimacy to fight the war. This feeling of being legitimate often remains as the only force on the ground in the context of foreign domination, occupation, or colonization.

Liberation legitimacy derives its validity from the self-perception of non-state actors fighting a liberation war, the continuation of the foreign occupation, and the relevant international laws that provide that people under occupation have the right to self-determination. This argument, from the point of view of non-state actors and international law, appears to conform to the existence of occupying foreign forces occupying another nation. But the question is, what happens if these forces leave?

In some examples, non-state actors have engaged in civil wars as a result of the emergence of other forces that adopted different views on how to deal with the foreign presence on their soil. This includes Algeria, Palestine, Angola, Lebanon, Afghanistan, and Vietnam, among others. A major justification for the use of force by dominant non-state actors is the legacy of fighting foreign forces which very often provides them with a valid legitimacy. This legitimacy ends when the presence of foreign forces ceases; however, some self-described liberation groups behave as if it lasts even after the foreign forces have left.

Some liberation movements (non-state actors) in many parts of the world, be it in Algeria, Zimbabwe, Mali, and Ghana, have (mis)used liberation legitimacy even after the foreign occupation ended. This has created a dilemma for these self-described liberation groups as in the transition to democracy many of them have leaned on their entitlement to rule which derives from what they view as their liberation legacy. Some non-state actors, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) in Palestine and the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria, act as if this legitimacy is stronger than electoral boxes.

Voters, who might be the same base that gave support to liberation groups during wars of independence, might vote for another group or individuals who didn’t emerge out of liberation groups. In many instances such as the NLF in Algeria, voting a liberation group out of government results in the army’s opposition to such unfavorable electoral results and its intervention which impacts the country for years to come. In other cases, the leaders of the liberation war stay in power indefinitely, claiming a liberation legitimacy and legacy.

An example of a leader who stayed in power by utilizing liberation legitimacy is Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe, the leader of the liberation war, who stayed in power for 30 years despite becoming very ill towards the end of his life. Although Mugabe adopted reforms that defended the rights of his people to better access to education, healthcare, and land, his last years in power saw the deterioration of his country’s economy to record levels. Claiming his right to rule as a result of fighting a liberation war, he even appointed his wife as his deputy. Mugabe was forced out only after the army intervened and pressured him to resign in 2017.

In many cases, liberation movements fail at government because they lack the understanding of the dynamics of governance which are different than waging a liberation war and taking arms. Fighters waging a liberation war tend to have a different understanding and working mechanisms than those involved in government.

Viewing decision-making in absolute terms does not help people on the ground. For this reason, many liberation groups, whose expertise is limited to armed struggle, fail to present solutions to the struggles of people on the ground.

The claim to liberation legitimacy creates a dilemma for liberation groups in government; they sometimes act against the will of their people although they were meant to exist to defend this very same will. Liberation groups need to establish bodies and mechanisms that can ensure a smooth transition to providing good governance after the end of liberation wars.

Once a liberation war is over, it is the electoral box that gives a government its legitimacy. Once liberation groups refrain from respecting the will of the people under the claim of enjoying an absolute liberation legacy, they lose the people’s respect.

The last phase of liberation should always be moving to good and democratic governance. Nelson Mandela, the charismatic leader of South Africa, has set a good example by running for president only once. Refusing to let go of power based on claims of liberation legacy does not sell. What sells for the ordinary people on the ground is providing them with solutions to their problems especially in a post-liberation phase, where transition to government faces many structural challenges.

It does not matter if a group won the country’s independence through arms or through dialogue – what matters at the end of the day is meeting people’s increasing needs. It is up to liberation groups to present people with leaders who can win elections. Once a group is unable to do so, by no means should it use its liberation legacy as an excuse to continue being in power in opposition to the will of the nation’s people.

Settler-colonialism is violent in nature and is built on the negation of natives’ basic rights and their very existence. Algeria under French rule and Palestine under Israeli rule are no exception to such colonial violence. In an attempt to push them to surrender to the will of their colonial masters, the use of excessive and brutal violence against settler-colonized people in both countries has been well documented. But history has proven that this tactic does not work, and it backfires at a high human cost.

On May 8, 1945, France killed 45,000 Algerians who took to the streets to demand independence from France following the victory of the Allied Forces over Nazi Germany. Today, the world is watching the ongoing violent displacement of Palestinians in Jerusalem and elsewhere in silence, without doing more than condemning it.

The proven violent nature of settler-colonialism often produces violent reactions from the colonized people. This is true about the National Liberation Front (NLF) in Algeria, and all Palestinian factions and groups such as Fatah, Hamas, and the PFLP. The NLF in Algeria engaged in a campaign of revolutionary violence that was extraordinary in nature and included, among many other methods of torture, cutting the throats of French soldiers captured by the group “like sheep.” The same applies to the Palestinians who have used various violent means including bombings and kidnappings.

In the cases of both Palestine and Algeria, the state violence against colonized people has excessively surpassed the violence used by non-state Algerian and Palestinian actors. To give an example, France’s use of violence against Algerians was remarkably brutal with hundreds of NLF members being killed under torture – in some cases, they were thrown from high places and announced to have committed suicide. In its most recent confrontation with the Palestinians in May 2021, Israel killed more than 250 Palestinians in 11 days compared to 13 Israelis killed by Palestinian fire.

The use of violence by non-state actors in Algeria and Palestine does not negate their attempts to end colonial rule by dialogue. The NLF was ready to engage in dialogue with the French authorities, but France, which called Algeria “French Algeria,” refused any form of dialogue with the NLF. Although many Palestinian factions consider armed resistance central to their struggle with Israel, factions such as Fatah and Hamas have in many instances engaged in non-violent resistance against Israel, which was also met with violence.

Just like in Palestine, in Algeria, France responded with full force to Algerian non-violent actions, including the 1956 strike, as it viewed any Algerian action against its rule an issue of law and order, negating Algerians’ desire for independence.

This is also true for the protests of the first Palestinian Intifada, which started as non-violent and turned violent as Israel used excessive force against protesters, including breaking their bones. The Great March of Return in the Gaza Strip is another example of how Israel responded to Palestinian engagement in non-violent resistance, with Israeli snipers killing 214 Palestinian, and injuring 36,000 others, while many were intentionally shot in the knee to be maimed. Just like in Palestine, in Algeria, France responded with full force to Algerian non-violent actions, including the 1956 strike, as it viewed any Algerian action against its rule an issue of law and order, negating Algerians’ desire for independence.

The refusal of state actors to use violence can’t win moral ground as long as it permits the use of violence against colonized people. Israel’s creation was accompanied by a surge of violence not just against the Palestinians, who were made refugees, but also against the colonial British forces in Palestine.

In addition to dozens of documented massacres against Palestinians, Zionist militias have used car bombings and assassinations both against Palestinian and British targets, forcing some 750,000 Palestinians out of their towns and villages. The same applies to France, which today glorifies the French (violent) resistance to the Nazi occupation of France during World War II. Glorifying the use of arms by states and denying its use by the very people they occupy deprives these states, namely France and Israel, of the moral high ground.

Today, the use of violence is condemned by most world governments, and non-state actors engaged in violence are often isolated and placed under pressure. The anti-colonial movement of the 1950s and 1960s no longer exists. Today, the challenge for the Palestinians is to be committed to their rights and exert all needed efforts to obtain these rights without being internationally isolated because of their use of violence.

Committing to non-violence as a strategy is one way to achieve this and it proved effective during the Civil Rights Movement in the U.S. and the Salt March in India staged by Mahatma Gandhi. However, whether this will be the case in Palestine is debatable. So far, the use of violence and non-violence alike have not led to their liberation.

The morality of the use of violence in (settler-) colonial contexts should not be questioned in isolation from the state violence used against the colonized people. Settler-colonialism is violent in nature – including that of France and Israel – in the same way the response to it is also violent. Violence creates a vicious cycle and the way to end it passes through ending colonial violence, which creates this cycle in the first place by denying people their national and political rights.

It is no coincidence that today Palestinians and Algerians can relate to each other based on their experiences under colonial rules – similar experiences produce a sense of solidarity emanating from relating to the experience of others. For this reason, the Palestinian flag is a familiar object at Algerian protests and the Algerian flag is an equally familiar object at Palestinian protests against the ongoing Israeli colonization.

Recently, there have been a number of high-profile meetings between the leadership of Libya’s Government of National Unity [GNU] and that of Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco. Besides hosting discussions and affirming their support for the political transition and further cooperation on security, several economic deals have been announced.

Libya and Algeria agreed to resume flights, reopen land borders and launch maritime lines and on the measures to boost trade and investment. Following a visit at the end of May by Tunisia’s Prime Minister, Libya and Tunisia concurred on facilitating border crossings. Morocco just hosted another round of intra-Libyan talks.

While to some, this may seem like a new tangent for Libya’s complicated foreign policy, it is actually a logical and healthy continuation of previous initiatives. Proximity, shared culture, interdependence and shared threats give the countries of the Maghreb common interests. Despite some different circumstances and the intense rivalry between Algeria and Morocco, all three countries have tried to appear neutral and offer constructive diplomatic assistance while attempting to limit any contagion to their own fragile situations.

Historical Context

Besides geography, the countries of the Maghreb share a lot of culture and history. In more recent times, the late Libyan dictator Muammar Qaddafi attempted coups against the leaders of both Morocco and Tunisia as part of his numerous, failed attempts at a larger union. There has also been discord between other members, notably Algeria and Morocco, who have longstanding differences, especially over the fate of the Western Sahara.

Despite all this, Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia established the Arab Maghreb Union in 1989 to promote cooperation and economic integration. However, the issues that divided them proved too difficult to overcome and the organization quickly became dormant. Initially the poorest country in the region, the discovery of oil in the 1950s made Libya the richest nation and therefore an important economic motor for the whole Maghreb. Despite this new wealth, Qaddafi’s quixotic governance meant that Libyans often depended on their neighbors for goods and services.

Plenty to Deal with at Home

Besides good intentions, these three western neighbors may also have had domestic considerations for not getting involved militarily in the Libyan conflict. Without a source of considerable outside financing, it would have been very costly to start an unnecessary foreign adventure and these countries had plenty of drama to deal with. Having overthrown the authoritarian rule of President Zine el-Abidine Ben, Tunisia was going through many growing pains with its more open politics.

There was intense competition between Islamist and more secular parties. A truth commission appointed to investigate human rights violations of previous regimes accused President Beji Caid Essebsi of committing crimes while serving in the government of Ben Ali’s predecessor, Habib Bourguiba. Essebsi died while in office in 2019. The process to replace him was somewhat ambiguous and a formal constitutional court had yet to be established.

Algeria had gone through its own civil war from 1991-2002 and had remained under emergency law until 2011. During the period of the Libyan crisis, long-time President Bouteflika had serious health problems and there were numerous protests demanding more freedom and political change. Following massive street protests, Bouteflika resigned in 2019.

Morocco has continued to deal with its conflict in Western Sahara with the Polisario Front, which rejects its 1975 annexation of the territory.  Following the Arab Spring, Morocco engaged in its own reform program. While avoiding the intense disturbances of many of its neighbors, some tensions have remained.

Common Security Worries

Besides the issues that they have sometimes foisted on each other, the Maghreb countries share many other concerns like radical cross-border groups and pressure by the European Union to stem the flow of migrants. People also flow within the region. After the fall of Qaddafi, an estimated 200-400,000 Libyans decamped to Tunisia [out of a population of around 11 million].

Several thousand Tunisians fought for jihadist groups in the Middle East or Libya between 2011 and 2016. Besides being the closest major theatre of operations, Libya also served as a launching pad for attacks like that of Daesh attack on the border town of Ben Guerdane, allegedly motivated by an air attack on its training base.

Tunisia reinforced its patrols and built a sand barrier covering 168 of the 468 kilometres of its porous border with Libya. An estimated 600 Tunisian extremist jihadis are reckoned to remain in Libya, primarily in the south. Others continue to fight in other countries, including the nearby Sahel region. Though reduced, the threat has not disappeared but the security restrictions are a heavy burden on the economy, particularly for pastoralists and other border communities.

Like Tunisia, Algeria shares a border with Libya and has been worried about infiltration by  Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb [AQIM] like the attack on gas facilities at Ain Amenas and a possible return of radicalized Tuaregs who had served in Qaddafi’s paramilitary “Islamic Legion” such as happened in Mali. The Government reinforced its border with Libya by deploying an additional 30-40,000 troops but like Tunisia, it also has to worry about security restrictions disturbing border livelihoods.

Morocco does not share a border with Libya, but some recruitment of fighters to go to Libya is alleged to have taken place there.

Also… The Sahel

While Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco are concerned by issues in Libya, it is worth remembering that the southern part of Algeria is in the Sahel region and Morocco is close by, if not formally part of it. Several countries of the Sahel are experiencing serious problems of violent Jihadi attacks, inter-ethnic conflict and coups besides chronic issues of extreme poverty and climate change.

Even though they not among the most affected, the Maghreb nations must be watchful of threats and spillover coming from the Sahel as well. Morocco has started to take a keen interest in developments and has started to play a role in the G5 Sahel force.

The Amazighs, usually referred to as Berbers, are native inhabitants of North Africa. Their presence stretches from the Canary Islands of Spain to Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt. Today, they also make up a considerable percentage of immigrants in many countries outside North Africa.

The Amazighs trace their origins to the Libyan tribes that formed strong political entities such as the Garamantes the Gaetulians, and the Meshwesh. The Meshwesh, in fact, annexed Egypt and even installed Shoshenq I as a pharaoh. His lineage carried on for centuries through the 22nd and 23rd Egyptian dynasties (945–720 BC). Apart from this, the Amazighs’ cultural influence on ancient civilizations was extensive as detailed in Greek and Egyptian mythology.

Throughout time, two great powers emerged in the territories where the Amazigh lived: the Phoenicians and the Romans. The Amazighs’ relationships with these two powerful states changed drastically ranging between war, alliances, and cooperation. Yet, throughout the various kingdoms they established, the Amazighs – mainly the Massylii and the Masaesyli – maintained an independent and free will.

The Amazighs, colonialism, and postcolonialism

Due to migration and the unfolding of political events, many Amazighs forgot their language and became Arabized Amazighs. Amazighs speak Darja, the local North African dialect as their primary and mother tongue. North African Darja is highly influenced by the Amazigh language, which is very difficult to understand for native Arabs of the Middle East.

Starting from the colonial era in North Africa, the Amazighs like their African neighbors, lost territory and power to the Europeans, mainly to Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain.

Many other Amazigh groups have kept their native tongue. Such groups include the Chaoui people of eastern Algeria; the Chenouas in western Algeria; the Amazighs of Tripolitania in Libya; the Kabyle people, who are the inhabitants of the historical autonomous region of northern Algeria; and the Chleuh in High Atlas and the Souss Valley of Morocco. Other groups include the Riffians of northern Morocco, the Mozabites of southern Algeria, the Zenata of western and southwestern Algeria, and the Tuaregs of the Sahara.

Starting from the colonial era in North Africa, the Amazighs like their African neighbors, lost territory and power to the Europeans, mainly to Spain, Portugal, France, and Britain. They had to fight long and bloody wars of independence to gain their freedom from colonial powers that created new territorial changes, including the creation of modern Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Tunisia, and Libya.

Today, in Algeria, Tamazight, along with French and Arabic, is one of the three main languages used in media. In 1996, Tamazight began to be taught as an optional subject in regions where it is spoken. On December 27, 2017, Algeria’s former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika recognized Yennayer, the first month of the Amazigh year, as a public holiday to be celebrated on its first day (January 12) every year.

Amazighs are gaining greater political presence in Algeria and Morocco. Many Amazigh figures reached high positions in the social and political hierarchies. Examples include the former president of Algeria, Liamine Zéroual, and its current president Abdelmadjid Tebboune, and the current prime minister of Morocco, Saadeddine Othmani.

In 2019, the Amazighs contributed greatly to the Algerian protests, also known as the Hirak Movement, which resulted in the deposal of the regime of President Bouteflika.

In Algeria today, political parties and popular movements are pushing for granting the Amazighs more rights such as including the Amazigh language as a mandatory language in schools and promoting the restoration of the Amazigh cultural heritage sites. The last two decades have seen an improvement in the political, cultural, and social status of the Amazighs in North Africa, but the road ahead to a full recognition of their rights in still long.

The unification of the Amazigh language and education

To this day, there’s no unified Amazigh language – at least, this is the case in Algeria, where each region claims the use of its local language as the de facto learning language. Academics concerned about the issue are divided between three examples and groups.

The example of the German language where all Amazigh languages become one. The Italian example where one Amazigh language is taught in all regions, and thus the other languages fade away and in time merge with the new de facto official language. And the federal example, where each region keeps its local language.

The main issue, however, in introducing the Berber language to the school system is the alphabet as there are three suggested systems to write Berber texts. The first is Tifinagh, the Amazigh alphabet system, which is still widely used in the Tuareg region. This very old alphabet is found throughout North Africa’s old inscriptions and ruins.

Today, it has been developed and made official by local authorities. It is widely used at facilities such as schools, post offices, and banks, yet some scholars argue that it is not practical and that is hard for new learners, who, instead of learning a new language, have to go through learning a new system instead.

A substantial part of my research investigates the postcolonial history of Algeria. During the data collection process, I had the chance to interview an ex-Algerian mujahid who fought in the Algerian War of Independence and we had the chance to extensively discuss the colonial history of France in Algeria.

The violence and brutality of French colonialism in Algeria was horrendous and undeniable. The vast majority of families have been traumatized by the cruel settlement of France in Algeria, including my own. My paternal grandfather, along with his two brothers, assisted the mujahideen and played a part in the resistance during the seven-year War of Independence. My grandfather was captured by French soldiers when my father was six years old. He was detained and tortured for days until his lungs collapsed and he died.

He was hanged upside down and immersed into a container of ice-cold water repeatedly in order to confess and provide leads on the hideouts of the mujahideen – but he never did! It cost him his life and traumatized my father to this day; however, his legacy will remain for decades to come.

There has been an ongoing discussion about France’s duty and responsibility to provide an official apology for its colonial history and war crimes, which has been met with ignorance and denial. Algeria was the only French colony to be considered a French territory. It was largely exploited and “…was considered ‘the door’ to the Third World and the ‘jewel’ of France’s territorial possessions.”

It wasn’t until 2011 that an Algerian scholar living in France, Ali Farid Belkadi, discovered that the Museum of Mankind in Paris holds skulls of Algerian martyrs and that some of them could be identified. Although his discovery didn’t receive support, Ibrahim Senouci, a professor of physics at the University of Cergy-Pontoise, took a different approach and launched an online petition gathering approximately 30,000 signatures to pressure the French authorities to return the remains of the Algerian martyrs as agreed on the the Évian Accords.

In 2016, France admitted that they are in possession of 18,000 skulls, 500 of which were identified including 36 leaders of the Algerian resistance who were beheaded in the mid-19th century.

The Museum of Mankind was established in 1937 by Paul Rivet. The skulls were taken back to France between 1800 and 1881 as trophies of the slaughter in Algeria and kept in boxes to preserve them.

In 2016, France admitted that they are in possession of 18,000 skulls, 500 of which were identified including 36 leaders of the Algerian resistance who were beheaded in the mid-19th century. France claims that the skulls have been kept for anthropological and scientific purposes.

In 2017, French President Emanuel Macron stated, “I have agreed to a request expressed by the Algerian public authorities several times regarding the return of the skulls of the Algerian resistance fighters, and have taken a decision to initiate the process.”

In the same year, which marked the launching of his presidential campaign, in one of his speeches, Macron declared that the French colonial history in Algeria represents “crimes against humanity.” However, the statement was not followed by an apology.

In July 2020, on the eve of July 5, Algerian Independence Day, 24 skulls of Algerian mujahideen who fought against the French colonial rule and played a crucial role in the resistance were brought back from the museum in Paris.

For over 170 years, the remains of these Algerian national heroes had been deprived their right of burial in the country for which they shed their blood.

The skulls belong to prominent resistance fighters, including Muhammad Lajd bin Abd al-Malik, known as Sherif “Boubaghla”; the “mummified head” of the Algerian officer Issa Hammadi; Sheikh Bouziane, leader of the Za’tasha Resistance in Biskra; Musa al-Darqawi; Si Mukhtar bin Qwaider al-Titrawi; and Muhammad bin Allal bin Mubarak who fought side by side with El Emir Abdelkader, the leader of the first resistance against French colonialism and founder of the modern Algerian state.

According to the writer and political analyst Fayez Abu Shamala, French crimes will not be easily forgiven. He asks, “Will the Algerian people forgive the murderers for their deeds? Will they forget?”

It is believed that this French compromise aims to silence the Algerian public opinion and polish the French image among the Algerian population.

On January 20, 2021, Macron received a report from the French historian Benjamin Stora about the French colonial era in Algeria (1830-1962). The report generated distress, criticism, and anger in the Algerian public opinion, and was considered to be manipulative and biased in terms of providing an accurate and truthful version of French colonial history in the country.

France announced the establishment of a “memories and truth” commission to review the country’s colonial history in Algeria. However, the report ruled out the issue of an official apology for France’s crimes.

Moreover, although the report proposes ways to promote healing, it provides data related to the 1954-1962 period and puts much less stress on the events that took place in the period before the  War of Independence (1830-1954). More importantly, the report is short of advising in favor of a proper and official apology for the atrocious crimes that France committed against the Algerian people for decades.

“It is hard enough to start a revolution, even harder to sustain it, and hardest of all to win it.” 

Larbi Ben Mhidi, FLN Founding Member as portrayed in The Battle of Algiers (1966)

In February 2019, the bid for a fifth term was announced on behalf of Algeria’s former president Abdelaziz Bouteflika who was debilitated after suffering a stroke in 2013. Frustrated and exasperated, the Algerian people flooded the streets in protests demanding the withdrawal of Bouteflika’s candidacy.

Far away from home, I watched the weekly Hirak (activism) as it grew from protests to a full-fledged revolution. Millions of Algerians gathered for a peaceful and creative protest to say “enough.” I could not help but compare it to the 2014 protests against Bouteflika’s fourth mandate which were smaller and weaker for one reason: fear of chaos and violence.

Clearly, the Revolution of Smiles (Thawrat Al Ibtisama) was the result of an anger that accumulated over several years, the president’s absence had become too embarrassing to be tolerated. The Hirak movement succeeded in ousting Abdelaziz Bouteflika, but is yet to succeed in toppling the entire military regime, which has been governing the country since its independence in 1962.

President Abdelmajid Tebboune was elected in the December 12, 2019 elections amidst a very low turnout of around 39.8%. The controversy continued after the election as people openly contested having another president brought in by the military.

Due to the outbreak of the COVID-19 pandemic, the protests had to be suspended; however, the movement’s activism continued online on social media. Although there have been a few protests during the summer of 2020, they remain small in number compared to the massive protests of the Hirak. The Revolution of Smiles is not over yet.

Unfulfilled Promises

One of the Hirak’s most famous slogans was “You thieves, you ate the country,” as the people lamented the large amounts of money claimed to be stolen by government officials while the nation sank into dire poverty. During his campaign, President Tebboune repeatedly promised Algerians that he has a plan to recover some of the money stolen by the previous government.

The president refused to reveal his plan to the media and even openly admitted that he would not divulge it in case he loses the election. A year after his inauguration, the Algerian nation has not heard anything about the plan yet. Even worse, the president himself disappeared after allegedly contracting the COVID-19 virus. The question, therefore, changed from “Where is the money?” to “Where is the president?”

The president spoke to the Algerian people from a German hospital on December 13, 2020. His sickly appearance and obvious weight loss only fanned the flames of concern regarding who is running the country during the president’s absence. Reminiscent of Bouteflika’s era, the concern about having the state institutions paralyzed once again is on a constant rise. These concerns were not calmed by the president’s return to Algeria on December 29, 2020.

The Witch Hunt

One of the main reasons why the Hirak movement managed effectively and peacefully to make change in Algeria was the fact that it does not have any leaders or representatives. It is a national movement of people from different ideologies who all agree that Algeria deserves a better government. The absence of leaders simply means that the corrupt government cannot arrest or blackmail an entire nation.

However, the COVID-19 pandemic has affected the Hirak movement deeply. After national consensus that the weekly protests pose a risk to public health, the Hirak hiatus gave the government more room for attacking symbols of the Hirak.

Another example of the state-led persecution is the arrest of the 25-year-old Algerian social media content creator Walid Kechida whose satirical memes seemed to upset the government.   Kechida was charged with “insulting the president of the republic.” Contrary to the case of Drareni, Kechida’s trial clarified the true intentions of this witch hunt: to tie all tongues of dissent. The witch hunt eventually left no room of negotiations between the movement and the government.

Back to Square One

On December 11, 2020, the former defence minister General Khaled Nezzar returned to Algeria on a private jet after spending months between Spain and France. This was a major disappointment for the people who were anticipating the return of President Tebboune from Germany. The general had been convicted of plotting against the army leadership and posing a threat to state institutions.

After over nine months of Hirak protestors shouting “Throw the army generals in the bin, and Algeria will get its independence,” this turn of events is kindling a national suspicion regarding what is happening backstage at El-Mouradia.

Most importantly, Nezzar is a contested figure in Algeria because he remains a symbol of the state violence committed against civilians during the Black Decade. This return during the president’s absence has sparked a heated debate on whether the former minister has secured an agreement with the government in order to be exonerated, which would undoubtedly ignite a massive wave of anger from the people.

The symbolic value of this return, which coincides with General Toufik leaving prison for convalescence, is also raising a lot of questions about a fight for power between different army generals. After over nine months of Hirak protestors shouting “Throw the army generals in the bin, and Algeria will get its independence,” this turn of events is kindling a national suspicion regarding what is happening backstage at El-Mouradia.

On January 2, 2021, the military court acquitted four top officials whose imprisonment seemed like a temporary success of the Hirak. Said Bouteflika, the younger brother of ousted president Bouteflika, two former security chiefs Mohamed Mediene and Athmane Tartag, and the leader of the Workers’ Party Louisa Hanoune were convicted for plotting against the army and the state. All were acquitted while Bouteflika remains in custody to face other charges of corruption.

Will the Revolution of Smiles Continue in Algeria?

The same question that once urged millions to flood the streets of Algeria still awaits an answer: who is running the country? The temporary sedative of prosecuting a few corrupt government officials is fading away and it is becoming ever clearer that the demands of the Hirak are still the same. The slogan “Ytnahaw ga’” (Off with them all) targets, primarily, the military system. Instead, the Algerian people are surprised to see them all return.

The policies of President Tebboune’s government have not succeeded in giving answers to “their excellency, the people,” but have only engendered new questions regarding how profoundly difficult it is to get rid of the “gang” running Africa’s biggest country. Algerians turned dissent into a form of art: they patiently calculate every movement and adapt their demands according to the republic’s best interest.

It is, therefore, very unlikely that they will accept a change in the civil façade of the junta in power. It is important to emphasize that the Hirak in Algeria is not exclusive to the protests in the streets; every article, every meme, every tweet against the injustice of this system is part of the Hirak, and no system can ever keep all tongues tied. The Revolution of Smiles continues, until they all leave. As disheartening as the recent events have been for the nation, they serve as a reminder that there is only one hero: the people.