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ollowing Viktor Orbán’s defeat, the elections held in Hungary attracted considerable attention in Turkey. Various predictions were made based on election assessments and comparative analyses. Analyses comparing the election winner, Péter Magyar, with Orbán, in particular, interpreted the election results through classic dichotomies, such as democracy versus authoritarianism, liberal democracy versus populism, and the right versus the far right.

However, regrettably, many of these analyses relied on these clichéd distinctions and interpretations. Furthermore, the post-liberal rise in Hungarian and international politics was analyzed from a liberal perspective, resulting in erroneous interpretations. Initial assessments such as the return of liberal democracy, the retreat of authoritarianism, and the defeat of the far right and populism demonstrate an inability to understand the true nature of the sociopolitical transformation occurring in Hungary and around the world.

The true significance of the Hungarian election results

The clearest conclusion to be drawn from the election results is that there is a significant crisis of legitimacy and trust within the political landscape, rather than an ideological shift. Orbán was defeated by another post-liberal figure who uses similar language, draws on the same social base, and shares a similar perception of the crisis. In other words, contrary to what is often assumed, the new prime minister, Magyar, is not so much a liberal democrat as he is another figure who largely represents the post-liberal current due to the rhetoric he employs and the ideological position he occupies. From this perspective, the Hungarian elections should not be viewed as a regime change or political transformation but rather as a renewal and cleansing of actors within post-liberalism itself.

More precisely, Orbán’s defeat and the winner’s profile do not, contrary to many interpretations, signify that the social demands he represented and championed have disappeared. On the contrary, the election results indicate that post-liberal tendencies persist, but the current government has lost its ability to represent these demands.

The most significant indicator of this is that the dynamics underpinning the post-liberal quest remain firmly in place. The inequalities brought about by neoliberalism, the uncertainties arising from technological transformation, and the perceived cultural disintegration caused by liberal democracy continue to generate a strong need for security and meaning across broad sections of society. People still expect a political stance that delivers public services and defends their own values.

For this reason, the election results should be interpreted as a rearticulation of the social demands represented by post-liberalism, despite the fact that these demands are being discredited with labels such as populism, authoritarianism, and far-right extremism. When Orbán’s political platform could no longer meet these expectations, the electorate did not abandon that platform. Instead, they chose a new leader whom they believed could represent it more effectively. Thus, the transformation witnessed in the Hungarian elections is more indicative of a crisis of representation being resolved than an ideological rupture. Society did not change its demands; it simply updated its choice of who would represent them.

Why did Orbán lose?

The real breaking point that led to Orbán losing his 16-year reign was not the depletion of his ideological framework. As the standard-bearer of the post-liberal movement, Orbán began contradicting his own claims. Over time, he formed a new power bloc to replace the “corrupt elites” he had criticized. This network, centered on the distribution of state resources, became the focal point of accusations of corruption and nepotism.

In foreign policy, however, his decision to replace the “corrupt EU,” which he claimed was victimizing the Hungarian people through liberal democratic impositions, opposing moral values, and neoliberal economic policies, with Putin’s Russia and Trump’s U.S. began to backfire. The hegemonic rhetoric of foreign policy suffered as a result of the increasing visibility and influence of Russia and the U.S. Indeed, anti-elitist rhetoric has lost credibility and is now perceived as merely anti-EU.

Furthermore, the deterioration in economic performance has accelerated this crisis of legitimacy. Financial pressures arising from high inflation, interventionist policies, and tensions with the EU have undermined the government’s claims of “stability” and a “protective state.” Consequently, the disconnect between rhetoric and material reality has become more apparent. Orbán, the champion of the post-liberal movement he defines as “illiberal democracy,” was unable to maintain the moral and political framework he had established. This has led to the collapse of his credibility, reliability, consistency, and moral superiority claims. All of this has driven centrist voters, who were already opposed to Orbán and predominantly reside in major cities, as well as peripheral voters, where Orbán traditionally enjoys a high concentration of support, to seek an alternative.

The political significance of Magyar

Péter Magyar’s rise and electoral victory are most significant at this juncture. Magyar is neither a radical alternative nor an outsider to the political discourse established by Orbán. However, it cannot be said that he has abandoned Orbán’s ideology and “found the right path,” as is often assumed. On the contrary, Magyar is a figure who speaks a similar language yet promises to anchor it within a more rational, balanced, and trustworthy framework.

What sets Magyar apart is his promise to rebuild the political ground represented by Orbán and sustain it more honestly and fairly. Consequently, Magyar is not a representative of a classical liberal restoration, and his frequent emphasis on the rule of law should not be interpreted as such. He neither abandons the idea of a strong nation-state within the post-liberal framework nor entirely abandons the space for debate and politics of self-valorization opened up by the Orbán era. Instead, Magyar promises to embed post-liberalism and politics of self-valorization within a more rational, institutionalized, and sustainable framework. In this respect, Magyar does not aim to abandon the “post-liberal” approach t rather to fulfill their requirements honestly and successfully. Thus, the political significance of Peter Magyar should not be assessed as an ideological break in Hungarian politics but rather as a recalibration of the same line.

Taking all this into account, Magyar can essentially be described as the leader of a populist initiative that takes the form of “anti-Orbánism.” His strategy is based on an anti-corruption narrative and the idea of “cleansing the state of a handful of corrupt Orbánist elites.” This is a powerful manifestation of populism. By projecting an ethical stance, Magyar positions himself as a central figure in rebuilding a legitimate and just order. This is precisely the area that was most eroded during Orbán’s tenure, and Magyar has succeeded in winning over peripheral voters with this approach.

The difference in approach toward relations with the EU is also a significant indicator of anti-Orbánist populism in foreign policy. Unlike Orbán, who sometimes relies on a confrontational rhetorical style, Magyar aligns more closely with the principle of “a strong Hungary, a strong Europe” as a European nation. This approach largely stems from the perspective that Europe’s strategic autonomy is achievable through strong nation-states, which is somewhat anti-Russian and anti-American. Consequently, while Magyar’s ideology is similar to Orbán’s, his practical policies diverge.

The picture that emerges within this framework clearly demonstrates the following: Magyar embraces post-liberalism and promises to rescue it from Orbán’s grasp, purify it, and rebuild it through discipline. While preserving the mobilization generated by populism, Magyar aims to rebuild the institutional and economic foundations eroded by Orbán. In this respect, Magyar represents a more refined, accountable, and enduring version of post-liberalism. He seeks to reinforce this by upholding the same social sensitivities through the rule of law, institutional balance, and economic rationality.

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n Germany, in September 2013, a new party narrowly missed entering the federal parliament (Bundestag) in its first election, receiving only 4.7% of the vote. The Alternative for Germany Party, or AfD for short, founded in April 2013, quickly completed the necessary registration requirements at the federal level and qualified to participate in the parliamentary elections. At the time, it was not surprising that the AfD, considered by many to be a populist, anti-European party fueled by conspiracy theories and making empty promises and threats in its political rhetoric, failed to enter parliament. Indeed, experts had stated that German voters would never show interest in such political movements.

The most unpredictable turning point in the political history of Germany, which was rebuilt after World War II, was the dismissal of the AfD after the 2013 federal parliamentary elections, and its being seen as a politically insignificant movement. This policy of ignoring the AfD shaped the political attitude towards it. It paved the way for the unstoppable rise of the AfD in Germany, which began with the 2014 European Parliament elections. At the same time, it created rifts in the German social structure, opening the way for far-right and populist movements like PEGIDA and helping the AfD to build voter support.

Far-right movements in Europe, long ignored as in Germany, began to emerge as a rooted political movement from 2010 onwards. In January 2017, the “ENF (Europa der Nationen und der Freiheit)” political group in the European Parliament met in Koblenz, Germany. This meeting witnessed some very interesting encounters and statements. Nearly 40 far-right representatives from 9 countries that had far-right parties represented in the European Parliament at the time attended this meeting.

Led by Marie Le Pen of the French Front National, the meeting also featured speakers including Geert Wilders from the Netherlands, Frauke Petry from the AfD leadership in Germany, and Matteo Salvini representing the Lega Nord in Italy. The outcome of the meeting was quite alarming: Nine far-right European parties, led by Le Pen, who describe the European Union as an oppressive regime for the European people, pledged a new European future, declaring that the current EU and world system has ended and that the construction of a new future has begun.

The Bannon effect on the European far right

Another significant event at the Koblenz meeting was the celebration of Trump’s election as U.S. President in 2017 by representatives of European far-right movements, who called for a new wave of freedom in Europe, a “European Nationalism.” Even today, many consider the Koblenz meeting, although Steve Bannon did not directly attend, to be one of the first movements in Europe within the context of his “Global Populism” network, and the first example of the European far-right movement becoming jointly visible on the international stage.

Bannon’s success in Trump’s election, his subsequent impeachment, and his then-return to Europe present a rather interesting chain of events. His active involvement in European politics through “The Movement,” a Brussels-based foundation he established in 2017, his overt efforts to create a far-right, anti-EU supergroup within the European Parliament, and the similarities between these actions and the call made by far-right political parties at a meeting in Koblenz in 2017 are all highly noteworthy.

Following the Koblenz meeting, an examination of undeniable connections reveals that Steve Bannon met with numerous far-right populist politicians and political party officials in 2018-2019. One of Bannon’s biggest admirers is the leader of the Dutch PVV party, Geert Wilders. Many other far-right or right-wing populist politicians, including Alice Weidel of the AfD, Matteo Salvini of the Lega, UKIP leader Nigel Farage, Marine Le Pen of France, and Giorgia Meloni of Italy, also frequently met with Bannon.

Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban and Czech President Zeman are also among those who have met with Bannon in the past. His participation in Le Pen’s party general assembly in France in 2018, and his invitation to a conference in the Bundestag by the AfD, are examples of the unhidden connections within the Populist/Global Network that Bannon is trying to build.

Prior to the EU Parliament elections in May 2019, Bannon made various efforts to unite the European far right. Although his target of one-third of the vote was not achieved in the 2019 European Parliament elections, Bannon provided the European far right with an unprecedented opportunity, creating a political network of far-right and populist groups across Europe and even across the Atlantic.

Just as there was a tendency to ignore the rise of the far right, a large media outlet, looking at the results of the 2019 EU Parliament elections, lamented Bannon’s failure. However, what seemed like a failure to those trying to save the day, or even the moment, for European politics, actually brought together the European far right and populist political base. Bannon’s intervention gave further impetus to the European far right and populist movements. In Germany, the AfD became the main opposition party in the federal parliament after the 2017 Federal Parliament elections. In the 2025 elections, it increased its number of members in parliament to 152 as the main opposition party.

The far-right on the rise in Europe

In 2023, Wilders’ party PVV emerged as the leading party in the Dutch elections. In last year’s Czech elections, the right-wing populist party ANO, with Andre Babis, won as the leading party. Marine Le Pen reached the second round twice against Macron in the French presidential elections and lost, but increased her vote share each time. The party, formerly known as Front National, changed its name to Rassemblement National (RN) and won the local elections as the leading party. It is highly likely to be the leading party again in the elections to be held in March 2026. Furthermore, Le Pen is considered a sure winner of the 2027 presidential elections – providing she remains eligible to run.

The situation is no different across Europe. Far-right radical parties and right-wing populist parties, which have a significant presence in national elections, entered the EU Parliament in the 2024 elections with 187 members in three different groups. In the EU Parliament, far-right and right-wing radical parties formed a group under the name European Patriots (Patriots.eu), while anti-EU right-wing parties such as the European Conservatives and Innovators (ECR) and far-right radical parties like the AfD formed a group under the name ESN (Europe of Sovereign Nations). These far-right parties, constantly appearing to be seeking innovation and new directions across the EU, have increased their number of members in the parliament through name changes. The common characteristic of these groups is their anti-EU skeptical nature.

News that the Trump administration would focus on Italy, Austria, Poland, and Hungary leaving the EU, as outlined in the National Security Document (NSS) released in the U.S. in December 2025, sent shockwaves across Europe. While the White House denied these statements were included in the NSS, the fact that Bannon could, even years later, achieve his goal of creating an anti-European movement seems quite plausible after witnessing the examples of UKIP and Brexit.

Examinations of the released Epstein files indicate that Epstein and Bannon corresponded regularly between 2018 and 2019 regarding European politicians and the European far right and populist right-wing movements. In these communications, Bannon reportedly shared information about his influence on right-wing movements in Europe, specifying which politicians and parties he advised, and even naming the parties and politicians involved. While the AfD has not denied the portion of the conversations related to them, they have stated that the allegations of receiving advice from Bannon are untrue.

Anti-EU sentiment – ​​anti-immigrant sentiment – ​​Islamophobia

From the perspective of far-right and populist right-wing movements, it is possible to state that far-right political movements in Europe share three distinct common narratives. These narratives are: opposition to the European Union or the withdrawal of their countries from the European Union; xenophobia and hostility towards immigrants and foreigners, aiming to eliminate immigration to Europe; and the exclusion of Islam from the public sphere in Europe, imposing bans on Islam at the national level and restricting the rights of Muslims. According to AfD ideologue Björn Höcke, Muslims, considered foreign elements in Europe, should be expelled east of the Bosphorus. Bannon’s statements also periodically emphasize the need for a “very strict and aggressive stance against radical Islam.”

Another point worth emphasizing is the emboldening of far-right and populist movements in Europe following Trump’s re-election for a second term. It is noteworthy that these movements have brought Trump’s MAGA (Make America Great Again) or America First slogans to Europe. Babis’s campaign in the Czech Republic with the slogan “Czech Republic First,” and Hungarian Prime Minister Orban’s implementation of the MEGA (“Make Europe Great Again”) slogan during Hungary’s rotating presidency, demonstrate the spread of a different kind of Trumpism across Europe.

The stance of the Visegrad countries, members of the EU, on anti-immigrant sentiment has long been well-known. In other Western European countries, anti-immigrant sentiment and the halting of immigration are at the forefront of the main election slogans of political parties. Trump’s claims that Europe will lose its identity due to immigration by the end of 2025, and that the continent is destroying itself due to an immigrant invasion, have strengthened the rhetoric of right-wing populist and far-right parties in Europe. Even at the local level, in the German state of Bavaria, the AfD party has included in its party program the possibility of establishing a special team called AFA (Refugee Search and Deportation Police), similar to ICE in the U.S., if they come to power in that state.

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wenty-six European Union member states on Sunday urged calm and restraint following recent US military action in Venezuela, stressing the need to uphold international law and the principles of the United Nations Charter.

In a joint statement issued by EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas, the bloc said escalation must be avoided and emphasized that all actors are bound by international legal norms, regardless of circumstances. Hungary did not support the statement, standing apart from the rest of the EU.

“The European Union calls for calm and restraint by all actors, to avoid escalation and to ensure a peaceful solution to the crisis,” the statement said. It added that respect for international law and the UN Charter remains a cornerstone of global security.

UN security council

The statement recalled the “particular responsibility” of UN Security Council members to uphold international law, describing it as a pillar of the international security architecture. It underscored the EU’s longstanding position that the erosion of legal norms risks destabilizing the global order.

The EU reiterated its stance that Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro lacks democratic legitimacy and reaffirmed support for a peaceful, Venezuelan-led transition to democracy that respects the country’s sovereignty.

“The right of the Venezuelan people to determine their future must be respected,” the statement said, while stressing that any resolution to the crisis must be inclusive, democratic and negotiated by Venezuelans themselves.

While condemning transnational organized crime and drug trafficking, the EU emphasized that such challenges must be addressed through sustained international cooperation conducted in full respect of territorial integrity and national sovereignty.

The bloc said it remains in close contact with the United States, as well as regional and international partners, to support dialogue among all parties involved. The objective, it said, is to facilitate a negotiated and peaceful solution to the crisis.

The statement also called for the unconditional release of all political prisoners in Venezuela and confirmed that EU member states’ consular authorities are coordinating closely to ensure the safety of EU citizens, including those allegedly detained unlawfully.

US capture of Maduro sparks global reaction

The EU statement followed remarks by US President Donald Trump, who said that US military action in Venezuela resulted in the capture of Maduro and his wife, Cilia Flores. Trump also said Washington would assert control over Venezuela “for the time being,” including through the deployment of US troops if necessary.

Maduro and Flores were transferred to New York late Saturday and are being held at a federal detention facility in Brooklyn. They face US charges related to drug trafficking and alleged cooperation with criminal groups designated as terrorist organizations.

Maduro has denied all accusations, describing the operation as a kidnapping and insisting he remains Venezuela’s legitimate president. Officials in Caracas have called for his release.

Maduro pleads not guilty in US court

On Monday, Maduro pleaded not guilty to multiple narcotics-related charges during a court appearance in Manhattan, where he appeared shackled and wearing prison attire. His wife also entered a not-guilty plea. The next court date was set for March 17.

Maduro told the court he was innocent and said the charges were politically motivated. His defense lawyer said the case would involve extensive legal challenges, particularly concerning what he described as an unlawful military abduction.

Hours later, Venezuela’s Vice President Delcy Rodriguez was sworn in as interim president in Caracas. While expressing support for Maduro, she gave no indication that her administration would directly confront the US operation.

The US has long considered Maduro an illegitimate leader following the 2018 election. However, legal experts and several governments have questioned the legality of capturing a sitting head of state, warning that the move could undermine the rules-based international order.

Russia, China and several Latin American allies of Venezuela condemned the US action, while the UN Security Council convened to debate its broader implications.

Despite international concern, the Trump administration has defended the operation as lawful and necessary, framing it as part of a broader campaign against international drug trafficking.

As uncertainty surrounds Venezuela’s political future, the EU reiterated that restoring democracy, respecting sovereignty and upholding international law must remain central to any resolution of the crisis.

(Source: Anadolu Agency and Reuters)

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eftwing independent Catherine Connolly has won Ireland’s presidential election by a decisive landslide, securing 63% of first-preference votes in a result that stunned the political establishment and delivered a major symbolic blow to the ruling coalition.

The 68-year-old Galway TD and long-time social justice campaigner will become the Republic’s 10th head of state, succeeding Michael D Higgins after his 14-year tenure.

Speaking at Dublin Castle on Saturday night after being officially declared president-elect, Connolly pledged to be “a president for all”, vowing to defend Irish neutrality, champion climate justice and give a platform to the marginalized.

“I will be a voice for peace, a voice that builds on our policy of neutrality, a voice that articulates the existential threat posed by climate change,” she said, switching between Irish and English. “Together, we can shape a new republic that values everybody and champions diversity.”

A shock for the political mainstream

Connolly secured 914,143 of 1,442,698 valid votes, far ahead of Fine Gael’s Heather Humphreys, who received 424,987 (29%). Fianna Fáil’s candidate, Jim Gavin – who had withdrawn following a financial scandal but remained on the ballot – won 103,568 votes (7%).

Despite the commanding win, turnout fell to 46%, unusually low for a presidential election, and more than 213,000 ballots were spoiled or invalid, reflecting frustration with the lack of choice and the perception of a two-horse race.

Though the presidency is largely ceremonial, Connolly’s victory is widely interpreted as a rebuke to the two big centrist parties that have dominated Irish politics for a century.

Her candidacy surged on the back of anger over Ireland’s housing and cost-of-living crises, missteps by government strategists, unity among leftwing parties, a viral, youth-driven online campaign.

Sinn Féin, Labour, the Social Democrats and People Before Profit all backed Connolly once her momentum became clear, giving her a rare pan-left coalition of support.

A more outspoken presidency ahead?

Connolly has long been a critic of western foreign policy and has accused the U.S. and U.K. of enabling genocide in Gaza. Her victory raises questions about how far she will test the traditionally soft-spoken boundaries of the presidency.

Political analysts say friction with the government is likely if she uses the Áras as a platform for moral advocacy in the tradition of Mary Robinson and Michael D Higgins—but with a more radical tone.

For her supporters, Connolly embodies a generational shift and a rejection of politics-as-usual.

She gained traction with younger voters through podcasts, cultural endorsements and viral videos—including a lighthearted football keepy-uppy clip that became a campaign trademark. She was publicly supported by musicians and artists such as Kneecap and The Mary Wallopers.

Outgoing president Higgins congratulated her in a statement, saying the office would offer “full support” as she prepares for her inauguration next month.

Connolly will take office amid high expectations from Ireland’s left — and deep unease within government ranks — setting the stage for a presidency unlike any other in recent decades.

(Source: The Guardian)

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srael has been carrying out a genocide in Gaza for almost five months now, and it seems that no one in the world has enough power to prevent it from taking place in front of the eyes of all. The number of countries that oppose the Israeli attacks is undoubtedly much greater than the number of countries that support them, but it seems that the determination and courage of those who oppose the attacks lag behind the sentiments of those who support them. The European Union appears to be the second most important actor, after the United States, in supporting and enabling Israel’s genocide against the people of Gaza.

The extent of this support can be seen in the economic and military aid given to Israel, the pro-Israel votes in the UN, and the statements of support for the attacks on Gaza. However, the EU’s Gaza policy is not a monolithic pro-Israel one. The leaders of certain EU countries, such as Spain, Ireland, and Belgium, have issued statements criticizing Israel’s massacres, and some EU officials, such as the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Josep Borrell have also been increasingly vocal in condemning Israel’s massacre policy and calling for a ceasefire. On the other hand, names such as Ursula von der Leyen, the president of the European Commission,  have followed a policy based on the principle that the “EU is on Israel’s side” and have supported the Israeli aggression from the very beginning.

Even in the first days of the Israeli aggression, Borrell stated that Israel’s total blockade of Gaza was against international law and opposed the statements of European politicians about cutting off aid to Palestine. In the same statement, Borrell declared that Israel has the right to defend itself, but that it must do so in accordance with international law, and that some decisions by the Israeli government were contrary to this. About two weeks later, Borrell emphasized that a “humanitarian pause” in the Israeli attacks was the most important issue for the delivery of aid to people in the besieged areas. At a time when many European politicians, including von der Leyen, do not dare to talk about a humanitarian pause or a ceasefire, continuously repeating the refrain of “Israel’s right to defend itself” and shying away from criticizing the massacres Israel is committing, Borrell’s statements criticize the Israeli administration, shaking the Western world behind it and seriously disturbing the Zionist network.

In the later stages of the ongoing massacre, Borrell warned that the West should not apply double standards with regard to Gaza, saying, “While we apply international law in Ukraine, we cannot ignore it in Gaza.” He warned that the international community has failed to find a solution to the Israeli-Palestinian problem, and this failure has been expressed by the Security Council. Borrell also stated that UN Security Council could make up for it with a unanimous decision on the two-state solution. In recent weeks, as the scale of Israel’s genocide has grown, Borrell has stepped up his criticism of both Israel and the U.S., which supports Israel heavily. In a statement on February 12, when U.S. President Joe Biden expressed discomfort at the deaths of so many people in Gaza, Borrell responded, “If you think too many people have been killed, maybe you should provide fewer weapons to prevent so many people from being killed.”

In contrast to Borrell, the President of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen made unconditional statements of support for Israel, offering no criticism of Israel’s massacres neither during nor after her support visit there. More sensible circles in Europe, including EU staff, have criticized her for this. In a letter to von der Leyen, more than 800 EU staff and diplomats wrote, “We call on you to join the leaders of the entire Union in calling for a ceasefire and the protection of civilian life.” The letter went on to say, “This is the essence of the EU’s existence,” and warned that the “EU is in danger of losing all its credibility.” Clare Daly, an independent socialist member of the European Parliament from Ireland, called von der Leyen “Ms Genocide” for her extreme pro-Israel stance and accused her of putting pressure on EU members to defend Israel.

Borrell’s pro-human rights stance despite the Zionist lobby

Von der Leyen’s European identity also leads to the same observations. The EU’s policy towards Israel and Palestine is also in the grips of the Zionist lobby. If we were to look at how this relationship was established and developed, we encounter four types of actors. First, we see that politicians, bureaucrats, and members of the media who directly belong to the Zionist lobby have built a pro-Israeli and anti-Palestinian discourse in Europe. Second, actors who are in close contact with these lobbyists and who have reached or maintained certain positions with their support repeat the pro-Israel discourse.

The third group includes the politicians and members of the media who believe that they have no choice but to support Israel because they know that criticizing Israeli aggression will lead to the wrath of the Zionist lobby and they are afraid of the consequences. The fourth group are politicians and members of the media who stand up for human rights and justice, whatever the cost, and oppose the genocide in Gaza and Israeli aggression in general. Borrell, for example, belongs to the fourth group; the scale and uniqueness of the atrocities committed by Israel have forced him to abandon his “cautious” position and make statements against the ongoing genocide.

Borrell is a politician from Spain where the influence of the Zionist lobby is much more limited than in Germany, and belongs to the Spanish Socialist Workers’ Party, which has a successful record of standing up to the pressure of both the Zionist lobby and the United States. These facts have prevented him from being swayed like von der Leyen on issues such as respect for human rights and international law. The fact that Spanish Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, who is also a member of the PSOE, is among the European leaders who oppose Israeli aggression and call for a ceasefire is evidence that the PSOE has a generally consistent approach to human rights and international law. However, the small number of politicians like Borrell in Europe and the strong influence of politicians like von der Leyen have meant that the EU has so far remained a spectator to the Gaza massacre.

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Birleşmiş Milletler Dünya Ekonomik Durumu ve Beklentileri (WESP) 2024 raporu, Avrupa’nın önümüzdeki yıl ılımlı bir ekonomik toparlanmaya hazır olduğunu gösteriyor. Ancak bölge, yüksek faiz oranları, sıkı maliye politikaları ve jeopolitik çatışmalar nedeniyle olumsuzluklarla karşı karşıya. Rapor, temkinli bir küresel ekonomik görünüm sunuyor ve küresel ekonomik büyümenin 2023’teki %2,7’den 2024’te pandemi öncesi %3,0 büyüme oranının altında %2,4’e yavaşlamasını öngörüyor.

Avrupa’nın ekonomik gidişatı parasal sıkılaştırmadan, geçmişteki faiz artışlarından ve reel ekonomiyi etkileyen azalan likiditeden etkilenmeye devam ediyor. Avrupa Birliği’nin (AB) 2024’te ortalama %1,2’lik bir büyüme yaşaması bekleniyor; bu, 2023’teki %0,5’ten mütevazı bir iyileşme ancak pandemi öncesi yaklaşık %2’lik büyüme hızının çok altında.

İyileşmenin tüketici harcamalarındaki artış, yavaşlayan enflasyon, artan reel ücretler ve güçlü işgücü piyasaları ile desteklenmesi bekleniyor. Ancak tüketici ve iş dünyası güveni düşük olmaya devam ediyor ve mali politikaların daha kısıtlayıcı hale gelmesi bekleniyor.

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n a landmark move after protracted deliberations, European Union negotiators have announced a significant breakthrough in reforming the bloc’s dated asylum system. The preliminary agreement, achieved following intense overnight discussions on December 20, 2023, sets the stage for a comprehensive overhaul of the EU’s migration policy framework.

As confirmed by the EU’s Spanish presidency, envoys from the member states, the European Parliament, and the European Commission, have concurred on the principal political aspects of the new Pact on Asylum and Migration. This accord arrives nearly three years after the pact’s introduction in September 2020, a period when the EU grappled with an unprecedented influx of refugees, primarily from conflict zones in Syria and Iraq.

The original asylum regulations had buckled under the strain of over a million undocumented arrivals in 2015, necessitating a robust response. However, progress on the new pact stalled as member countries contended over the distribution of responsibilities for processing migrants and the extent of mandatory solidarity among states.

Key points of consensus

Key points of consensus have now been reportedly reached on critical issues, including the initial screening of undocumented migrants, the application of biometric data, criteria for determining responsible EU countries for asylum claims, and the associated procedural mechanisms.

Amid fading hopes for reform, the EU had increasingly relied on external agreements to manage migration flows, exemplified by a controversial arrangement with Tunisia. Critics have accused such deals of outsourcing the bloc’s migration challenges at the expense of humanitarian considerations.

With the EU elections looming from June 6-9, the pressure is on to finalize the agreement. To implement the plan, officials and legislators emphasize that accord on all ten segments of the pact must be reached by February. This development represents a critical step toward a collective European approach to migration and asylum, balancing responsibility sharing and solidarity among member states.

Hungary and Poland opposition

In the year leading up to November 2023, European authorities have noted 255,332 irregular migrant arrivals, indicating a pressing need for coherent migration management. “The pact needs to be finalized before the European electorate casts their ballots,” insisted Margaritis Schinas, the European Commission’s Vice President, labeling the recent deal as the long-awaited keystone in the EU’s migration and asylum reform efforts.

The perilous journey across the Mediterranean has claimed the lives of countless refugees, many escaping the ravages of war and poverty. Such tragedies underscore the lethal consequences of Europe’s stringent immigration policies, increasingly scrutinized by advocates of human rights.

Amidst the backdrop of such humanitarian crises, right-wing factions in nations like Italy, Hungary, Poland, and Germany are amplifying their calls for more stringent immigration controls, placing the asylum system under the microscope as a central tenet of their political agenda.

Hungary and Poland, both of which have expressed opposition to the recent agreement, are next in line to assume the EU presidency following the impending elections. Despite their resistance, the pact was endorsed by a majority.

Source: The Associated Press and Aljazeera English

People have migrated throughout history in search of basic resources and better living conditions. According to Francis Fukuyama, after the catastrophic world wars and the collapse of communism, the liberal democratic bloc declared itself victorious and idealism was born prophesizing that state boundaries would disappear and economies would be integrated.

Alas, no great war was in sight! However, this peaceful world vision developed a boil and a new wave of unprecedented global immigration emerged. As liberalism offered a perpetual peace, Europe, the most important representative of this theory in practice, became a top destination for emigrants who are in search of a better life. The EU has become one of the largest recipients of emigrants starting from the nearby Balkans.

Indeed, it is very difficult to account for a single reason that triggers migration from the Balkans. Reasons vary and combine economic, environmental, political, and social factors. However, generally, the academic literature on emigration studies underlines the economic reason as the primary and dominant push factor.

Migration comes along with a brain drain as the skilled labor force of poor countries gets poorer due to economic and political conditions and emigrates to richer countries for higher pay. Currently, Western Balkan countries and specifically Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Kosovo, and Serbia are losing their well-educated youth.

According to Friedrich Ebert Stiftung Youth Studies, in 2018, one third of young people from the Western Balkans expressed a “strong” or a “very strong” desire to emigrate from their countries, ranging from 26% in Montenegro, 27% in Bosnia, 30% in Serbia, 34% in Kosovo, 35% in North Macedonia, and 43% in Albania. These figures are even higher in some other studies.

A population loss

The emigration from the Balkans is considered a permanent one. Balkan countries are now in jeopardy of losing a substantial portion of their population density and their demographic characteristics.

Migration has a very general effect on the Balkans. Economically, if the shortage of qualified workers continues, it will discourage foreign investments and directly affecting the GDPs of Balkan countries. Critical industries may not be able to find qualified staff, especially the health sector. Politically, emigrants are mostly young and educated, and don’t give credit to the old-fashioned political clichés and the incapable political leaderships, which hide behind nationalist rhetoric.

Migration from the Balkans in numbers

According to the Institute of Statistics (INSTAT) of Albania, there have been  around 400,000 emigrants between 2011 and 2020. According to Hurriyet Daily, about 1.7 million, roughly 37% of the population, has left the country in the past 30 years.

Currently, the Albanian population is 2,837,740 and the primary destinations of emigration are Italy and Greece. According to the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Albania ranks 4th globally in the emigration of a skilled labor force and most youth dream of a future abroad.

Additionally, some officials and researchers don’t trust KAS numbers. According to them, KAS estimates are lower and the real numbers are higher. Also, interestingly, between 2014 and 2015, around 100,000 Kosovars emigrated to the EU, a massive emigration wave that was dismissed by the government of Kosovo at that time. The number of emigrants in 2019 was 34,911, and the chief destinations were Germany, Switzerland, Italy, and Austria.

It is hard to find an accurate data on Montenegrin emigration. According to data by the United Nations, in 2015 the population of Montenegro was 625,781. Additionally, based on UN statistics, the overall number of Montenegrin immigrants worldwide increased from 148,982 in 2010 to 153,009 in 2019. Germany receives the highest number of Montenegrin immigrants, and Italy and Luxemburg were among the most popular countries. However, in recent years, preferences have changed and intraregional migration has become more popular, especially to former Yugoslav states such as Serbia, Croatia, and Slovenia due to the proximity and cultural similarities.

Lastly, the current population of Serbia is around 6,908,220. The UN estimated that emigrants from Serbia in 2017 reached nearly one million at a rate of between 30,000 and 60,000 a year since the breakup of Yugoslavia. The main destinations of Serbs are Austria, Germany, and Switzerland.

Urgent need to end brain drain

Can a common solution be found for the continuous emigration waves from the Balkans? First of all, the European Union should seriously step in and provide financial support in finding an applicable policy. Since the EU opened up for skilled labor from non-EU countries, it is partly responsible and should take responsibility for the brain drain in the Western Balkans.

Especially Germany, Austria, Italy, the Netherlands, and Switzerland should share the burden as they have benefitted the most. If the necessary precautions are not taken, Balkan countries will lose their youth and enthusiasm, and will end up empty villages within the so-called global village.

What is more, Western Balkan countries need to improve their databases on emigration. This is crucial to understanding the situation on the ground in order to formulate and recommend proper policies. Regular assessment is a must in line with accurate data and monitoring mechanisms.

The Western Balkan governments have to reverse this brain drain and encourage the sustainable return and placement of skilled emigrants in developing sectors such as IT, digitalization, robotics, design, etc. Countries could follow the example of Croatia.

The Netherlands listed a Dutch pacifist activist on a terrorism list and shared his data with Europol, the European police agency, and Interpol, the international police agency. Here are the risks the activist is now facing.

Surveillance society 

The threat of terrorism and organized crime has led countries around the world to develop surveillance systems meant to prevent attacks and crimes. Large scale databases have been set up to inform law enforcement authorities about the activities, movements, and statements of suspected persons.

Because of the movement of suspects across borders, police authorities cooperate and exchange information about their identity and whereabouts.

Interpol and Europol store information on persons in the form of alerts sent by national police authorities. Those alerts request for a particular action to be taken such as the surveillance, arrest, detention or the deportation of the person.

A Dutch pacifist activist on a terrorism list

For years, Frank van der Linde has been advocating for social justice. He has demonstrated and publicly defended anti-racism causes and the rights of the Palestinians.

In 2014, the Dutch police and the National Coordinator for Counterterrorism and Security (NCTV) started surveying van der Linde, including by recording his statements on Twitter. From 2017 to 2019, they added his personal data to a terror list alongside terrorist suspects and shared this information with Europol and Interpol. Since then, the police referred to Frank activities with a CTER-code (Counter Terrorism Extremism and Radicalization).

In October 2018, for the first time, van der Linde requested the police provide him with the information they stored about him, and he learned about being surveilled. In February 2019, police agencies including the NCTV recognized Frank’s activism as non-violent and removed him from the terrorism list.

Black Boxes of Information 

Interpol’s constitution, adopted in 1956 after the police agency had briefly fallen into Nazi hands, states neutrality as one of the main principles guiding its actions. The organization is strictly forbidden to undertake any intervention or activities of a political, military, religious or racial character (Article 3, Interpol Constitution).

Interpol’s red notices have been used by states to track and imprison political opponents who have fled their home countries.

Similarly, Europol as a European agency adheres to the key principles of good governance promoted by the Ombudsman’s European Code of Good Administrative Behaviour, including impartiality.

Interpol’s red notices have been used by states to track and imprison political opponents who have fled their home countries. Recognized refugees fleeing persecution have been targeted with alerts asking for their detention and return.

Vivid criticism from members of civil society led to the reform of Interpol and to the creation of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF) that reviews whether alerts are in line with Interpol’s rules. In practice, however, plenty needs to be done, and the vetting system remains inconsistent and secretive.

The European Data Protection Supervisor (EDPS), the supervisory authority for Europol, admonished the European police agency last year for collecting information outside of its mandate. Large scale databases were sent by member states to Europol’s big data case for analysis. Due to the number and complexity of the information, the police agency stored them all before reviewing them.

Vivid criticism from members of civil society led to the reform of Interpol and to the creation of the Commission for the Control of Interpol’s Files (CCF) that reviews whether alerts are in line with Interpol’s rules

The decision to transfer personal data to a police agency should not be taken lightly. To protect the principle of impartiality and individual rights, police agencies should review all data shared by states before making them available in their system.

Who polices the police?

Van der Linde’s information has been removed from the Dutch terror list.

However, there is no automatic deletion from Interpol and Europol systems after the data has been deleted from the national database.

Europol has decided in this case to keep the data in its database. The EDPS is currently reviewing Europol’s decision to refuse van der Linde’s request for information. The supervisory authority has nonetheless no enforcing power on Europol. Indeed, Europol’s big data case has not been followed by corrective measures from the police agency. On the contrary, the recent reform proposal by the commission regarding Europol regulation will legalize the unlawful practices of the police agency.

In May, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) decided on the case of a German citizen who after suspicion of fraud had his personal information recorded in a red notice by Interpol. After settling the case in Germany with the payment of a fine, he complained that his data continued to be stored by Interpol due to an alert based on the same fraud in the United States.

Earlier this month, the Polish Constitutional Court ruled that several provisions contained by the Treaty on European Union were incompatible with the Polish Constitution, at least under a certain interpretation. According to the judges, the phrases setting out “an ever-closer union” and the principle of “sincere cooperation” violate the Polish Constitution, but only insofar as they serve to create “an ever-closer union” and allow the EU authorities to “act outside the scope of the competences conferred upon them.”

The Polish Constitutional Court also ruled that if the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) or European Court of Justice (ECJ) were to “grant domestic courts … the competence to … review the legality of the procedure for appointing a judge” in Poland, this would constitute a violation of the Polish Constitution.

In sum, quite a few conditions need to be fulfilled before the top Polish court would consider an action by the EU as unconstitutional. Still, this is probably the most radical stance taken by a national top court when it comes to the age-old debate of whether and under what conditions EU law is superior to national law.

In an interview, the president of the ECJ, Belgian professor Koen Lenaerts, stated that “when [Hungarian PM] Orban says that primacy of EU law is only valid for competences attributed to the EU, he is absolutely right. However, then, there is the question whether something is within or outside the scope of the EU’s competences, and who should rule on this. The ECJ has the monopoly to supervise respect for the distribution of competences between the EU and member states.”

Quite a few conditions need to be fulfilled before the top Polish court would consider an action by the EU as unconstitutional.

The dispute however is that many top courts of member states have in the past openly distanced themselves from the interpretation taken by the ECJ on this.

Speaking at the European Parliament, Polish Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki stated,

We have no doubt about the primacy of European law over national laws in all areas where competence has been delegated to the Union by member states. However, like the courts in many other countries, Polish Tribunal raises the question as to whether the monopoly of the Court of Justice to define the actual limits of entrusting these competences is the proper solution.

Solutions 

In the end, the key problem is that the ECJ is part and parcel of the EU system and therefore it is not neutral in the discussion on whether a competence belongs at the national or at the EU level. This is often up for interpretation.

Therefore, I have suggested the creation of a so-called subsidiarity court, a new intergovernmental institution superior to the EU legal order and comprised of representatives of the judicial branches of EU member states, exclusively tasked to stop the European Court of Justice from adopting unacceptably extensive interpretations.

Meanwhile, the dispute between Poland and the EU will need to be sorted out. In effect, the Polish ruling followed a question of clarification coming from the Polish government on when precisely EU law is superior. Supposedly, the Polish government may try to use this as justification for not complying with ECJ rulings, for example on the ECJ ordering it to shut down a coal mine near the Czech border or with regards to fines that have resulted from this. Here, compromises are possible, even if it may not be obvious.

Several EU member states, including Belgium, the Netherlands, and Sweden, are pushing to cut EU funds to Poland as a punishment for violating the EU’s rule of law. This may sound appealing to some, but it is a tricky path. There is a serious danger of double standards: why would Poland need to be punished and not Romania, which was condemned  by the European Court of Human Rights over the firing of the chief prosecutor of the National Anticorruption Directorate? That’s not to say that there is no problem with the rule of law in Poland, of course, but to let other democracies be the judge of that is a risky game.

Fundamentally, the main action the EU can take is to stop fueling cronyism in member states by indulging them with a lot of EU funds. A lot of those EU funds all too often support local oligarchs, who often acquire large amounts of political power on that basis as well. In Southern Europe, organized crime groups have skimmed off a lot such money.

In that sense, to cut EU funds is a great idea. After all, a 2016 Centre for Economic Policy Research report concluded that “EU structural funds [are] negatively correlated with regional growth.” However, it should happen equally and for everyone.

The right of religious adherents to wear religious clothing remains a divisive issue in Europe. Not only national governments have restricted this right in recent years, but private employers too are increasingly imposing bans on religious clothing. And while such bans are usually couched in neutral terms, they are often directed against Muslims, raising the fear that they will entrench Islamophobia. Nonetheless, the EU’s highest court has ruled that private employers may pursue a policy of neutrality and cite their business interests to justify discrimination against female Muslim employees.

Already in 2017, the EU Court of Justice had ruled that private employers may not discriminate directly against employees wearing the hijab, but that they may project an image of neutrality: they may not single out Muslim employees but can effectively reach the same result by cloaking their discriminatory intentions in neutral terms. Despite the torrent of criticism that followed, the Court confirmed its decision last week. Employers may adopt a policy of neutrality if there is a genuine need on their part, for example preventing social conflicts at work or meeting the wishes of customers not to see religious people.

According to the Court, member states can maintain laws that offer greater protection against religious discrimination than the EU minimum, but such laws should not unduly harm the interests of employers. In essence, the right not to be discriminated against was found to be less important than the desire of colleagues and customers not to interact with female Muslim employees.

How will the judgment affect Muslim employees?

How the judgment will affect the rights of Muslim employees in Europe is not entirely clear. Defenders of last week’s ruling point out that individual states may still adopt rules that are more protective of the right to religious freedom at work. In the 2017 judgment, the Court seemed to suggest that all EU member states must allow private employers to project an image of neutrality, including states with rules that are more favorable to the protection of religious freedom. Last week, however, the Court clarified that EU law does not impose uniform standards: member states can maintain rules that are more favorable to the right to wear religious clothing.

How the judgment will affect the rights of Muslim employees in Europe is not entirely clear.

However, the Court also ruled that more favorable national rules must not unduly harm the business interests of employers, a finding that is contrary to EU anti-discrimination legislation. The legislation aims to contribute to the full participation of all citizens in economic life.

To that end, it provides a robust framework for combating discrimination in employment, while allowing member states to adopt rules that are more favorable to the protection of equality than the EU minimum. The Court, instead, ruled that more favorable rules may need to be disapplied when the economic interests of employers are at stake. It found that the pursuit of equal opportunities for religious groups may be less important than the desire of companies to cater to the anti-religious views of their customers.

In particular, they should ask the Court to reflect on the real reasons behind so-called neutrality policies. These policies are not neutral between different beliefs, but disproportionally affect female Muslims. Moreover, private employers seem to have no reason to project an image of neutrality, were it not for their desire not to offend employees or customers with different beliefs. Should they really be allowed to cater to customers who are so prejudiced that they get upset at the sight of religious garment? Asking the question is answering it, but not, unfortunately, for the EU’s highest court.

Perhaps the Court’s approach to religious discrimination is explained by a fear of being drawn into the fractious debate over neutrality in France and Belgium.

Is religion different?

The European Union can be justly proud of its approach to discrimination. EU legislation offers comprehensive protection against discrimination on grounds such as race, gender, sexual orientation, and religion. The Court has been fairly consistent in ruling that exceptions to the right to be free from discrimination must be drawn narrowly. According to settled case law, for example, employers may not invoke their business interests to justify discrimination on the basis of their race or sexual orientation. For some reason, however, its approach to religious discrimination is different. This poses the question: Is religion so different from other protected grounds that a different approach is justified?

Some have defended the Court saying that it would be too controversial to meddle with national approaches to religious freedom. Perhaps the Court’s approach to religious discrimination is explained by a fear of being drawn into the fractious debate over neutrality in France and Belgium. However, even these countries make a distinction between public and private sector employment: the principle of laïcité does not apply to private employment. The Court could have respected the Franco-Belgian conception of neutrality without allowing private employers to pursue similar policies.

Another reason that has been put forward for treating religion differently is that it might seem unfair to distinguish between different expressions of personal belief. If an employer may wear the hijab, may a conservative person wear an “Abortion is Murder” t-shirt? May a vegetarian employee wear a hoodie that reads “Meat is Murder”? However, not all personal beliefs are equally worthy of protection. First, unlike the “Abortion is Murder” t-shirt, no one can reasonably be offended by someone wearing the hijab.

Second, while the hijab can often not be removed without remorse, our conscience is not usually burdened by a ban to manifest our commitment to vegetarianism. So yes, regulating religion clearly poses difficult questions, but that does not justify the EU court dodging such questions at the expense of religious minorities. And the right answer to such questions is certainly not to sacrifice the rights of Muslims on the altar of economic interest.

It has been ten years since popular protests in Syria against Assad’s regime started. Many European governments became involved in the armed conflicts in Syria and Iraq, while a number of their citizens became foreign fighters by joining the Syrian civil war as members of armed groups in conflict zones.

Some have joined different jihadist or militant opposition groups such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Daesh (ISIS), while others in Northern Syria are fighting in the ranks of the YPG, the Syrian branch of the PKK terror group.

An estimated 40,000 foreign fighters are members of the terror group Daesh (ISIS), including nearly 5,000 European citizens. According to the Dutch General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD), around 305 of them are Dutch. Among them, there are children who unwillingly bear the responsibility for their parents’ decisions.

The children are European citizens left to face their fate without any foreseeable future. Dutch sociologists, lawyers, and human rights activists have shared their concerns over these children’s situation and future in Iraq and Syria. However, European countries do not offer any help to protect them. What is the reason?

In June 2020, the Supreme Court of the Netherlands ruled that the Dutch government is not obliged to bring Dutch Daesh women and their children back from refugee camps in Northern Syria. The state has put forward the following reasons: First, the national security in the Netherlands and other Schengen countries, which would be endangered if they return.

Second, the security risks that Dutch officials and other parties would be exposed to when bringing them back from Northern Syria. Third, the Dutch international reputation in Northern Syria may be adversely affected by contacting state and non-state actors.

The chairman of the Dutch Supreme Court indicated that human rights treaties are not directly applicable in this case, since these women are outside Dutch territory. How legitimate is this provision? Does the application of human rights treaties end as soon as one crosses the Dutch border?

Besides the Netherlands, other Schengen countries are faced with the dilemma of the repatriation of Daesh women and their children. The German and French governments last year declared that they would bring the foreign fighters back and assess the situation on an individual basis. According to the Geneva-based United Nations Human Rights Committee, Belgium is expected to guarantee the return of its nationals. However, the Court of Appeal in Brussels ruled in February 2019 that a group of women and their children do not have to be repatriated by the state.

Child returnees from conflict zones

The retrieval of Daesh fighters is and will remain a difficult issue as it is an unprecedented incident. However, this cannot be said about the situation of the children who are in conflict zones. There have been development programs aimed at child soldiers in the Congo and other parts of Africa, where the return to society has had a positive effect on them.

There is, therefore, a possibility with the help of de-radicalization programs for European children to return from the Syrian civil war. According to reports from the UN Security Council, children in Syria are being used as suicide bombs and to carry weapons which makes them vulnerable to indoctrination. The children of European foreign fighters in refugee camps under the YPG’s control suffer even further because of the humanitarian crisis and the constant uncertainty they live in.

The right to family reunification

Under international law, children cannot be legally separated from their parents. When children arrive in the Netherlands, they have the right to family reunion. This means that the return of mothers could also be possible. Most conservative and right-wing politicians propose bringing back only unaccompanied children whose parents have died. But should the problem be solved by fighting inhumanity with inhumanity?

Regardless of how difficult the situation might be, European politicians should keep in mind that these women and children are human beings entitled to the basic human rights that apply to everyone on Earth. Leaving European nationals to face their own fates is wrong. International human rights treaties and laws provide a solid legal framework, but when it comes to the application of these laws and to people’s sensitivity regarding foreign fighters and their families, there is still a lot of work to be done.