Ever wondered why the prices of commodities keep rising? In the realm of commerce, the change of prices is a constant. However, when the prices of a multitude of goods and services rise collectively, a phenomenon known as inflation emerges.  If you feel like your money doesn’t stretch as far as it used to, that’s the erosion of currency value over time that we call inflation. But here is the twist – even when inflation is slowing down, prices aren’t necessarily falling; but rather, increasing at a slower pace.

Recent times have witnessed a noteworthy shift in economic discourse, marked by a renewed concern over inflation. After a prolonged period of perplexity surrounding persistently low inflation, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic instigated a substantial departure, introducing an era characterized by stubbornly high inflation. This surge in prices is linked to various factors.

These factors for the inflationary trend can be interpreted along the lines of supply and demand. On the supply side, disruptions stemming from COVID-19, such as logistical challenges and workforce shortages, converged with spikes in energy and food prices induced by geopolitical events, notably the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

Simultaneously, on the demand side, substantial financial injections into households and enterprises by governments during the pandemic aimed at mitigating the impacts of lockdowns and layoffs resulted in an increased money supply, potentially contributing to the inflationary surge.

This economic shift, has exacerbated financial burden as a result of pivotal commodities experiencing substantial price increments—such as housing, energy, and food, particularly for those whose income has not kept pace with inflation. In many countries around the world, peaking inflation had threatened governments with social unrest, noteably in Sri Lanka ,Pakistan and numerous countries in Latin America, as well as protests in relatively high income countries like the U.K.

As inflation persists, in this month’s book bundle we examine books that demystify inflation, delve into unexplored trends, address common policy mishaps, and offer solutions to aid both policymakers and citizens to sustainably navigate these seemingly precarious times.

Inflation: What It Is, Why It’s Bad, and How to Fix It unravels the complexities of the most significant inflationary upheaval in over four decades, a phenomenon that has gripped headlines and left many grappling with the tangible impacts on their finances. Against the backdrop of the cost-of-living surge triggered by the COVID pandemic, the book sounds the alarm about the potential resurgence of a “Great Inflation,” with some observers expressing concerns of an even more ominous descent into hyperinflation that has historically devastated nations.

In response, the authors, Steve Forbes, Nathan Lewis, and Elizabeth Ames, engage readers in a captivating discussion that not only answers pressing questions but also charts a course for preparing for an uncertain future.

The authors draw on their expertise—Forbes as the chairman of Forbes Media, Lewis as an internationally recognized authority on money and taxation, and Ames as an accomplished author and journalist—to challenge prevailing misperceptions that have contributed to the current crisis.

They confront the widely held belief that central banks can spur prosperity by conjuring money “out of thin air” and debunk the notion that a certain level of economic “stability” necessitates “a little inflation.” These ideas, treated as sacrosanct in Washington for decades, are scrutinized in detail in Inflation exposing why they are flawed and how they have fueled the existing challenges.

The book critically examines the heedless money-printing and underscores the perilous path such policies could lead us down. Through a compelling blend of examples drawn from contemporary headlines and historical episodes, Inflation offers a real-world exploration of the subject, directly addressing the everyday concerns of individuals dealing with the tangible consequences of rising prices. Moreover, the authors provide practical steps that readers can take to protect their wealth.

Steve Forbes, Nathan Lewis, and Elizabeth Ames, Inflation: What It Is, Why It’s Bad, and How to Fix It (Encounter Books, 2022) ISBN: 9781641772433, 196 pages

In The Inflation Myth and the Wonderful World of Deflation, Mark Mobius embarks on a journey that might just prove everything we conventionally know about inflation wrong, presenting a thought-provoking narrative that questions the very foundations of our economic understanding.

In a world marked by rapid technological advancements, Mobius contends that our traditional metrics for measuring inflation are no longer adequate, urging readers to reconsider long-held beliefs about the economic phenomenon.

Mobius explorates of the shifting landscape of technological innovation driving the creation of cheaper and superior products. The heart of his argument lies in the assertion that these transformative changes are not accurately reflected in the ways we currently measure inflation. The book boldly contends that our contemporary understanding of inflation is nothing short of a myth.

One of the book’s standout features is its illumination of the political dimensions of inflation measurement. Mobius exposes the unsettling reality of governments manipulating and exploiting inflation figures to align with their economic agendas. He delves into the extreme challenges involved in gathering accurate data for inflation measurement, highlighting the inherent inaccuracies that result from these endeavors.

A crucial point of contention raised by Mobius is the fallacy of relying on currencies as a measure of inflation when these very currencies are continually being debased by the governments that issue them. This revelation challenges readers to reconsider the reliability of traditional economic indicators and prompts a deeper examination of the intricate relationship between currency devaluation and inflation.

Most significantly, Mobius underscores the impact of technological advancements and automation on the continuously falling costs of goods and services. The book articulates how these advances contribute to a deflationary trend, contrary to the prevailing narrative of perpetual inflation. Through compelling arguments and well-supported evidence, Mobius encourages readers to recognize the transformative power of technology in reshaping our economic landscape.

Mark Mobius, The Inflation Myth and the Wonderful World of Deflation (Wiley, 2020) ISBN: 978-1-119-74142-8, 256 Pages

Another important myth-busting source is We Need to Talk About Inflation: 14 Urgent Lessons from the Last 2,000 Years. In the book, economist Stephen D. King delivers a compelling exploration of the resurgence of inflation, exposing the desperate gullibility of central bankers, finance ministers, and the collective failure to learn from historical lessons. The book dismantles the widespread assumption that inflation was a relic of the past, revealing a new economic reality that threatens to exacerbate wealth inequality on a global scale.

In a world where investors, monetary authorities, governments, and policy makers had collectively believed inflation to be a thing of the past, King highlights the startling emergence of a poisonous economic reality. This new reality brings with it the ominous specter of increasing wealth inequality, forcing individuals worldwide to confront the profound implications of this unforeseen turn of events.

King, having been among the few to sound the alarm ahead of the latest inflationary upheaval, delves into the roots of the current situation. We Need to Talk About Inflation becomes a beacon, shedding light on the key lessons from history that policy makers either ignored or chose not to heed. From the days of ancient Rome through the American Civil War and up to the asset bubbles of today, King traces the common threads of inflation, attributing its resurgence to policy errors, sovereign greed, and a collective loss of faith in currencies.

The book stands as a sobering reminder that the economic challenges we face today are not unprecedented; they are deeply rooted in a historical continuum of bad judgment and misunderstanding. We Need to Talk About Inflation serves as a crucial intervention, cutting through centuries of oversight and misinformation to offer actionable insights that can be implemented now.

Stephen D. King, We Need to Talk About Inflation: 14 Urgent Lessons from the Last 2,000 Years (Yale University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780300270471, 240 pages

Paul Mattick’s The Return of Inflation: Money and Capital in the 21st Century emerges as both a historical retrospective and a contemporary analysis, offering a profound examination of what is undeniably the defining economic concern of our time.

Mattick’s work delves into the surprise surge in price increases. Amidst the varying perspectives on the current economic landscape, there is unanimous agreement on one aspect: the imperative to curb inflation, even if the methods to achieve this goal are a subject of contention.

The Return of Inflation distinguishes itself by placing contemporary events within the broader context of capitalism’s history. Mattick skillfully entwines the past and the present, providing readers with a comprehensive understanding of the economic forces at play. An exploration into the nature of money serves as a foundational element of the book, offering readers a concise and jargon-free grasp of recent inflation trends and the strategies implemented to manage them.

What sets this book apart is its ability to demystify the complexities surrounding inflation. Mattick takes the reader on a journey through the historical antecedents of inflation, shedding light on the evolving dynamics of the economy. Through this lens, the book illuminates the state of our contemporary economic landscape, offering insights that bridge the gap between past and present.

Mattick’s insightful exploration provides a nuanced perspective on the current economic challenges and offers a valuable resource for those seeking clarity on the defining economic concern of our time.

Paul Mattick, The Return of Inflation: Money and Capital in the 21st Century (Reaktion Books, 2023) ISBN: 9781789147919, 184 pages

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n an era marked by unprecedented global challenges, few issues resonate as profoundly as the quest for food security. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the grain shortage that followed showcased the grave vulnerability of existing systems. The imperative of ensuring that everyone, everywhere has access to safe, sufficient, and nutritious food looms large on the global stage. This month’s book bundle presents a curated selection of books that delve into food security, examining it from multiple angles, and offering insights, strategies, and solutions.

From the intricacies of international trade policies to the sustainability of food systems, and from the impacts of geopolitical conflicts to the strategic place of food, these books provide a comprehensive understanding of the challenges and opportunities in the realm of global food security.

Whether you are a policymaker, researcher, student, or simply a concerned global citizen, this collection provides valuable resources for understanding, navigating, and contributing to the discourse on global food security.

Food Security: Availability, Income and Productivity is a pertinent book that explores the pressing issue of global food security as our world population continues to grow. The author focuses on three key conditions necessary to achieve food security: food availability, adequate incomes, and increased agricultural productivity.

The book draws insights from history and contemporary contexts to thoroughly examine these conditions. It takes a close look at the obstacles preventing consistent food availability and discusses how to overcome these challenges. It also delves into the importance of ensuring sufficient incomes, highlighting programs like food stamps and food banks. Furthermore, the book provides valuable insights into the factors driving enhanced agricultural productivity.

Food Security caters to a broad audience, including agricultural experts, policymakers, and NGOs working in food aid. It’s also a valuable resource for students studying agriculture and public policy. The book not only informs but also encourages critical thinking about the complex task of feeding a projected nine billion people by 2050.

In a world where food scarcity is becoming increasingly worrisome, this book offers essential insights into the intricate web of food security. It provides a well-reasoned analysis that will contribute to ongoing discussions and efforts aimed at ensuring a sustainable food future for everyone.

William A. Kerr, Food Security: Availability, Income and Productivity (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2023) ISBN: 978 1 03531 270 2, 234 pages

Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security by Matias E. Margulis is a groundbreaking exploration of the influence exerted by United Nations (UN) organizations within the World Trade Organization (WTO) despite their absence from the formal negotiation table. Margulis introduces the concept of “shadow negotiators,” illustrating how UN bodies strategically engage in political actions to shape multilateral trade negotiations.

The book’s primary focus is on the contentious issue of agricultural trade liberalization. It provides a detailed analysis of interventions by four UN organizations: the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the World Food Programme (WFP), the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Food (SRRTF).

Margulis unveils the innovative strategies these UN entities employ to influence global trade regulations. Importantly, he emphasizes that their motivation isn’t rooted in competition with the WTO or ideological opposition to trade liberalization. Instead, it stems from their concern that certain trade rules could negatively impact global food security, running counter to their core mission of addressing world hunger and safeguarding the right to food.

Shadow Negotiators is a meticulously researched work that offers fresh insights into the often-unseen dynamics of international trade. It’s essential reading for those interested in the intersection of trade policy and global welfare, making a valuable contribution to the field of international relations and trade studies.

Matias E. Margulis, Shadow Negotiators: How UN Organizations Shape the Rules of World Trade for Food Security (Stanford University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9781503633520, 292 pages

Universal Food Security: How to End Hunger While Protecting the Planet by Glenn Denning explores the path towards a world where hunger and malnutrition are eradicated, and everyone can access healthy and abundant food for a productive life. The book emphasizes the need to transform our food systems, focusing on sustainability and environmental restoration, from production to distribution.

Denning, drawing from his extensive experience in over fifty countries, offers a practical guide to making healthy diets accessible to all while ensuring sustainability. He identifies key priorities, including sustainable agriculture intensification, robust market infrastructure, responsible postharvest practices, promoting healthy eating, and establishing social safety nets. The book underscores the pivotal role of practitioner-leaders in driving this transformation, highlighting the importance of education and development in instigating change.

But beyond the roadmap, Denning reminds us that the engine driving this transformation is practitioner-leadership, underscored by education and development. This book stands as a testament to the potential for meaningful change when individuals and institutions commit to reshaping our world, making universal food security not merely a dream but a tangible and sustainable reality.

Glenn Denning, Universal Food Security: How to End Hunger While Protecting the Planet (Columbia University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780231197618, 448 pages

The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security explores the global food security implications of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, which occurred during a period of already high food prices due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The book highlights the importance of the Black Sea region for global food production and Russia’s role in supplying natural gas and fertilizers.

The potential disruption of trade in this region posed a significant threat, with the potential to raise food prices and worsen poverty and hunger in vulnerable countries. The conflict primarily impacted trade in cereals and vegetable oils, fertilizer exports, and energy costs, potentially pushing millions into hunger and poverty.

The International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI) responded swiftly by providing information and policy advice. They established a blog series and online resources to disseminate critical information rapidly. This book compiles these blog posts, offering an overview of the crisis’s progression, international responses, and lessons for ensuring food security in the wake of disruptions.

This book provides essential insights into a rapidly evolving crisis with far-reaching implications for global food security, making it valuable for policymakers and researchers.

Joseph W. Glauber, Ed. and David Laborde Debucquet. Ed., The Russia-Ukraine Conflict and Global Food Security (IFPRI, 2023) ISBN: 9780896294394, 196 pages

Bread and Autocracy: Food, Politics, and Security in Putin’s Russia offers a compelling analysis of the pivotal role food has played in Russian politics from the 1917 Revolution to the present under Putin’s leadership. The authors, Janetta Azarieva, Yitzhak M. Brudny, and Eugene Finkel, argue that Russia’s transition from a grain importer to a global food exporter was a deliberate, long-term strategy aimed at enhancing national security and regime stability. This focus on food self-sufficiency sets Russia apart from other autocracies, as it prioritizes domestic food production over imports, highlighting its significance in maintaining autocratic rule.

The book’s relevance is heightened in today’s world, where food issues are once again at the forefront of global concerns and nations are emphasizing self-reliance. Bread and Autocracy provides a timely and comprehensive exploration of Russia’s unique approach to food politics, shedding light on its implications for both domestic and international affairs. It is a valuable read for those seeking a deeper understanding of Russia’s distinctive stance on food and its impact on political power. The book will be available in hardcover on September 1, 2023.

Janetta Azarieva, Yitzhak M. Brudny, and Eugene Finkel, Bread and Autocracy: Food, Politics, and Security in Putin’s Russia (Oxford University Press, 2023) ISBN: 9780197684368, 525 pages

The saying “Money makes the world go round” takes a more powerful meaning in a globalized capitalist economy. But what happens when the ones at the very top of the money chain are corrupted? In this month’s book bundle, we share with you three books that explore the influence of the rich and powerful, discuss how the world really goes round, and expose the staggering cases of how corruption hides itself often in plain sight with its effects rippling into the depth of systems, societies, and the lives of each one of us.

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he COVID19 pandemic revealed to many an eye-opening trend of wealth centralization: the rich are getting richer, and governments around the world are hardly able to protect those who are most vulnerable from the detrimental economic and social effects of a crisis. Who is the culprit?

The New York Times‘s award-winning global economics journalist Peter S. Goodman presents a page-turning exposé of the global billionaire class, the “Davos Man,” and its hostile takeover of the world. Davos Man documents billionaires’ exploitation of the COVID19 pandemic, which turned “taxpayer-financed bailout packages into corporate welfare schemes.” This global billionaire class instrumentalized its power to conceal the truth by hiring lobbyists, PR managers, and journalists in media.

Furthermore, Goodman uncovers the concealed impacts of their oligarchic control reaching into every branch of society and modern life, from wages to housing, healthcare to everyday products and taxation. He argues that their systematic plunder ultimately destabilized democracy by widening wealth inequality, leaving governing systems vulnerable, and triggering the rise of anti-democratic nationalism. He provides the answer to the problem of wider context: how did the liberal democratic order become a breeding ground for the right-wing hate?

Goodman not only provides a vividly written description of the realm of the ultra-rich but more importantly the realities of those who are dissipated by their appropriation all around the world including accounts from a blue-collar worker in Buenos Aires, a Bangladeshi migrant in Qatar, a doctor in Seattle during the COVID19 pandemic, an African immigrant in Sweden, a textile manufacturer in Italy, and an Amazon warehouse employee in New York City. Davos Man is a must-read for those concerned about inequality, economic justice, the resilience of societies, democracy, and the great challenges of our time.

Peter S. Goodman, Davos Man: How the Billionaires Devoured the World (Custom House 2022) ISBN: 9780063078314, 472 pages

The anonymous leak of the Panama Papers in 2016 revealed millions of financial and legal documents that show how ultra-high-net-worth individuals hide their money using complex webs of offshore vehicles. How were these structures set and who plays a role?

Spiderweb Capitalism uncovers the shadow economy and the mechanics behind the illicit movement of wealth across borders through the invisible, complex networks of lawyers, accountants, company secretaries, and fixers.

Sociologist Kimberly Kay Hoang traveled the globe to follow the money through a web-like supersystem and conducted hundreds of in-depth interviews with these ultra-high-net-worth individuals, private wealth managers, fund managers, entrepreneurs, C-suite executives, bankers, auditors, and other financial professionals to find an answer.

Hoang reveals the strategies behind spiderweb capitalism and examines the moral dilemmas of making money in legal, financial, and political gray zones as she traces the flow of capital from offshore funds in places like the Cayman Islands, Samoa, and Panama to special-purpose vehicles and holding companies in Singapore and Hong Kong and risky markets in Vietnam and Myanmar. How are these smaller markets interconnected in a broader system of global capitalism?

Spiderweb Capitalism sheds critical light on how global elites capitalize on risky frontier markets.  Hoang argues that spiderweb capitalism explains the rapid rise of foreign capital in risky markets with low levels of trust and cooperation. Economic growth in such markets is a consequence of tightly embedded relations between the economic elite and political elites that result in a variety of corruptions.

Contrary to the “economic mantra that development can only occur in economies with a strong rule of law,” Spiderweb Capitalism shows a paradox of global economic growth sustained through states where the line separating the legal from the corrupt is not always clear. Hoang’s research further reveals that old paradigms like First World/Third World and Global North/Global South are no longer useful for framing the global economy.

Spiderweb Capitalism is a unique and worthwhile read, not only uncovering the dynamics of a global system of corruption but also the sociological backgrounds of playing in the grey.

Kimberly Kay Hoang, Spiderweb Capitalism: How Global Elites Exploit Frontier Markets (Princeton University Press 2022) ISBN: 9780691229119, 288 pages

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n Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy, activist Dr. Vandana Shiva compiles essays and articles from more than 20 authors and organizations to show how ruthless capitalistic exploitation branded as philanthropic altruism forges a direct path to global destruction. According to David Orr, philanthrocapitalists are those who “promise to solve hunger, disease, poverty, and a rapidly destabilizing climate often by selling us more of the same things that made them very rich,” which oftentimes ignores the root causes and inequities.

How do global capitalists wield philanthropy to monopolize and privatize land use, food production, and the public health sector effectively? Through various initiatives, suborganizations, development schemes, and funding mechanisms. The book points out that the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation’s empire, in particular, is an intricate network of power and influence solidified by targeted and well-financed PR campaigns to shape public opinion in pursuit of profit and market expansion.

Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy criticizes the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation and similar organizations’ many privileged relationships with private companies, governments, and the World Health Organization that allow them exclusively to set the global agenda on health. The book argues that simplified solutions based on technical and scientific developments introduced by these organizations are often narrow in scope and remain insufficient in solving complex problems. Furthermore, they corrode the integrity of democratic institutions guised under a banner of future-oriented innovation.

Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy reveals the destructive power of overly capitalistic systems that enable mass human suffering and environmental catastrophe via the entanglement of private investment and public policy, and aims to bring forward democratic discussions about transparency, accountability, and inclusivity.

Vandana Shiva, Philanthrocapitalism and the Erosion of Democracy: A Global Citizen’s Report on the Corporate Control of Technology, Health, and Agriculture (Synergetic Press 2022) ISBN: 9780907791911, 240 pages

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n 1798, Thomas Robert Malthus said that the world population increases in geometric progression while the food production in arithmetic progression, and predicted that hunger, disease, death, and wars might occur due to insufficient food. However, Malthus could not have predicted the unprecedented productivity increase achieved due to the use of technology in agriculture as mechanical, electrical, biological, chemical, and digital technology has tremendously increased agricultural productivity.

Vertical and soilless agriculture has also reduced the land constraint to a certain level, and the hunger-based diseases, deaths, and wars that Malthus predicted did not occur with food production having become more than enough to meet needs. In some parts of the world, the reason for food shortage and hunger is not insufficient food production, but its ineffective distribution to the people in need.

Dilemma in agriculture

The increasing use of inputs from new technologies in agriculture contributes to a faster increase in greenhouse gas emissions. It is estimated that 17% of this contribution is directly from agricultural practices, while an additional 7-14% from changes in land use.

Agricultural greenhouse gases comprise nitrous oxide from grazing animals, tillage, fertilizer use, and urine, and methane gases produced by ruminants and rice cultivation. These gases have the potential to increase global warming at a higher rate than carbon dioxide. Therefore, agriculture is potentially an important part of both the problem and the solution to climate change.

The concept of sustainable agriculture entered the world agenda years ago with the promise of transferring natural resources and the environment to future generations in a secure way. Implementing policies that increase sustainable productivity and, at the same time, reduce input-intensive practices that cause climate change have become the priority targets.

Supporting sustainable, climate-friendly, and productive agriculture that does not harm natural resources and the environment as well as ameliorating wrong incentives at all levels have come to the fore.

In parallel with these trends, measures at the global and regional level have entered the global agenda. Policies that came into being following the United Nations Paris Agreement (2015) and the latest European Green Deal (2019) after the Kyoto Protocol (1997) regulate economic activities to protect natural resources and the environment.

The emission reduction strategies in the Paris Agreement provide the chance for agriculture and the food chain to be an active part in the solution to climate change. The Green Deal aims to end net greenhouse gas emissions in Europe by 2050. However, these limitations are approached with suspicion due to the COVID19 pandemic and the food insecurity that emerged following the Russia-Ukraine War.

Conventional agriculture represents one end of agriculture, while sustainable agriculture represents the other. Sustainable/organic agriculture is a production system that emphasizes the health of soils, ecosystems, and people. Based on ecological processes, biodiversity and natural cycles adapted to local conditions. Thus, rather than the use of inputs with adverse effects, organic farming combines tradition, innovation, and science.

Sustainable agriculture is a more holistic approach to farming than conventional agriculture, as it relies on ecosystem services and causes much less damage to the land used. It is a natural way of producing food and provides a range of social, economic, and environmental benefits.

Which agriculture – sustainable, good, ecological, natural, or organic?

Sustainable agriculture is given different names with slightly different meanings such as good, ecological, natural, or organic. In fact, all refer to agriculture that minimizes or completely removes synthetic inputs from the ecosystem. However, there are differences between them. Good agriculture refers to agriculture that does not harm health, animal welfare, or the environment, and uses only necessary chemical inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides at the lowest level to ensure that chemical residues do not penetrate the product.

Natural and ecological agriculture can be defined as growing in a natural environment, where no chemicals are used. Organic agriculture refers to the agriculture with a certification process, which rejects the use of any chemical at every stage from production to consumption. However, the concepts of natural, ecological, and organic farming are often used interchangeably.

In sustainable agriculture, farmers combine a variety of crops to provide biodiversity and prevent pests and pathogens, rather than using synthetic pesticides, herbicides, and fertilizers to produce food. While conventional systems promote uniformity, and depend on synthetic chemicals for protection against disease and pests, sustainable systems rely on biodiversity as a safeguard against these risks.

Preventive agriculture works too

One of the sustainable agricultural practices that emphasizes economic benefits and environmental health is preventive agriculture. By increasing the organic matter content and moisture holding capacity of the soil, it can double the subsistence crop yield in areas where the use of fertilizers is not economical and sustain production in low rainfall years. Preventive agriculture focuses on producing high yields without compromising environmental integrity.

The organic farming practices of the Amish people in the U.S. states of Pennsylvania and Ohio are examples of preventive agriculture. Utilizing the power of horses instead of tractors and mostly engaging in organic farming away from chemical inputs, the Amish produce more productive corn than the farms in the vicinity that use chemicals by providing organic matter and moisture accumulation in the soil.

Comparison of conventionality and sustainability

A comparison of conventional and sustainable agriculture could be made in terms of (1) production, (2) biodiversity, (3) soil composition/erosion, (4) water use, (5) energy use, and (6) greenhouse gas emissions. The environmental impact and production levels of each method determine its overall applicability as a solution to emerging trends.

It is necessary to make these comparisons to determine the best farming method that can sustainably meet the needs of the current population. Although these comparisons are based on scientific data, studies that consider local conditions in detail are needed to make a definitive judgment.

Conventional agriculture, despite its detrimental effects to the environment, is a viable way to provide food for more people. Population growth and the increasing consumption of high-calorie and meat-intensive diets are expected to double human food demand by 2050. Production levels become a serious benchmark for this rapid growth. Organic yields might be on average 25% lower than conventional yields globally, but varying by crop and farming system, according to a recent meta-analysis, is much better in the long run. For example, under drought conditions, organic farming tends to produce higher yields because of more water retained in the soil. Although production levels decline in sustainable agriculture, research shows that higher biodiversity levels are linked to healthier crops.

Biodiversity plays a big role, as it is a determinant of healthy food and performance. The greater the biodiversity, the more immune the plants are to pests and diseases. This is important because conventional agriculture discourages biodiversity and instead uses synthetic chemicals to maintain the health of crops.

With the Ukrainian ports blocked for three months, the “bread wars” began in Africa. States whose food supply security depends on imports are nowadays facing similar situations even more so as they face the worst food crisis in living memory. Many of them predictably hope Russian President Vladimir Putin will soon reach an agreement with Ukraine to stop the war and prevent the food crisis.

The Russian leader is accused of blocking exits from major Ukrainian ports since the beginning of the war and has been asked by the West to remove barriers hindering access to ports in order to resume the export of Ukrainian grain to the rest of the world. Approximately 15 million tons of grain are reportedly blocked in the ports of Ukraine, which currently accounts for nearly 10 percent of the world’s wheat trade. The war has interrupted international shipment of wheat, causing acute famines and increasing prices globally.

According to the report by the World Food Program released in early June 2022, the ongoing Russia-Ukraine war has forced more than 20 million people in Africa to suffer acute food shortages. With the start of the war, the situation worsened when, the Port of Odessa, the main port for agricultural exports, was blocked by Russian troops. The report warns that if emergency aid is not provided to several countries in Africa, the region will enter a further stage of famine. While the number of people suffering from hunger has quadrupled in the last two years in Kenya, more than 700,000 people in Ethiopia need urgent food aid every day.

Recent developments

Before the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, the food supply security crisis was eminently in the making due to climate change and the COVID19 pandemic. Now, the grain crisis and states’ protectionist self-sufficiency policies rub salt into the wound.

Ukraine’s wheat export is interrupted by Russia. China, which has 51 percent of the world’s wheat stock, increased its own stocks by 20 percent. The world production of wheat increased  by 8 percent (from 732 to 790 million tons) in the last four years but, at the same time, stopped its wheat export.

The picture is not entirely that grim. The outlook for global food supply remains positive. But the food prices have risen sharply due to higher shipping costs and trade cuts because of the war, as well as the rising import of inputs such as fertilizer prices and thus import bills. This affects the world’s poorest countries and developing countries the most.

Food prices have been high before, and the war is driving food prices even higher. The most affected commodities are wheat, corn, edible oils, and fertilizers. Global commodity markets face upside risks from reduced grain supply, higher energy prices, higher fertilizer prices, and disruption to trade due to the closure of major seaports such as Pivdennyi, Odessa, Mykolaiv, and Chornomorsk, which account for about 80% of the total throughput of Ukrainian seaports.

After the start of the Russia-Ukraine war, trade interventions by countries increased. From January to early June 2022, 268 policy measures were announced and implemented by 75 countries. The number of policies regarding food and fertilizers stood at 85 percent of trade interventions, while the percentage of policies regarding raw materials and fuels stood at 15 percent.

Globally, hunger levels continue to rise at an alarming rate, with close to 193 million people reportedly having experienced severe food insecurity in 2021. According to the Global Report on Food Crises, it is predicted that by the end of 2022, all figures will be exceeded, and approximately 40 million more people will suffer from food insecurity compared to 2020. Surveys recently conducted in 83 countries to detect the effects of the recent food crises show that a significant number of people run out of food or already reduced their consumption in the first two years of the COVID19 outbreak.

Russian position

Russia and the West play a blame game over the export of Ukrainian grain. Putin announced that Russia does not prevent grain exports from Ukraine claiming that those exports can be made through ports on the Black Sea and neighboring countries, putting the blame on the West, which claims that Russia blocks exports from Ukraine.

Putin noted that there are several ways to export grain to the Danube River and then Romania, Hungary, and Poland via the Ukrainian-controlled ports of Berdyansk and Mariupol. He also called for “clearing” the waters of mines around the ports held by Ukraine, saying that the ports under the control of Kiev, especially Odessa, could also be used. However, he added that the simplest, easiest, and cheapest way to transport agricultural and food products to the Baltic ports is by exporting them through Belarus and from there to any part of the world. But, he added, exports via Belarus would be conditional on the West “lifting sanctions” against Minsk.

As the Russia-Ukraine war entered its fourth month, Ukrainian officials accused Russia of obstructing exports, claiming that Putin’s forces had already stolen 500,000 tons of grain. Alerted by possible food shortages, several Western countries urged Moscow to stop its military offensive.

On the other hand, UN Secretary-General’s spokesperson Stéphane Dujarric said that he is trying to reach a “package deal” to restart Ukraine’s food exports and Russia’s food and fertilizer exports, adding that the situation is volatile. Dujarric also said that with the Secretary General and UN staff, they will go wherever is needed to finalize this project.

United States’ position

The U.S. ambassador to the United Nations said the Biden administration supports Russian grain and fertilizer shipments to address growing global food insecurity caused by the war in Ukraine. He said there were no U.S. sanctions on Russia’s grain and fertilizer shipments, but that companies were backing down because they were “a little nervous.”

It has been stated that the United States is ready to issue “letters of relief” to grain and fertilizer exporters and insurance companies to get much-needed agricultural products out of Russia. The U.S. supports the UN’s efforts to allow grain exports from Ukraine by train and via the Black Sea, as well as to ensure the unrestricted access of Russian food and fertilizers to global markets.

Turkey’s role in opening ports

Around 30 percent of the wheat traded across the world is produced in Russia and Ukraine. Dozens of container ships are stranded in Ukrainian ports, surrounded by Russian forces and protected by mines, preventing the transfer of wheat, sunflower oil, and other goods, as well as agricultural fertilizers.

President Putin reiterated to President Erdoğan that the Kremlin would support “unhindered” exports of Ukrainian grain from ports, but demanded the lifting of the Western embargo on Moscow in return. The meeting between the Turkish and Russian leaders reveals that Russia is ready to export large amounts of fertilizers and agricultural products if the Western sanctions are lifted.

A microbe, causing political instability, inflation, and even insurrections around the world seems somewhat of a stretch—more like a sci-fi thriller plot, than reality. If it only were the case!

For one, disease outbreaks may worsen pre-existing tensions within a society, as happened in the second cholera pandemic in France. The poor suspected the elite of poisoning them while the rich accused the poor neighborhoods of being the breeding grounds for the infection. The subsequent insurrection, known as the Paris Uprising of 1832, wounded or killed about 800 people.

Civil unrest spread to other countries, including England, Ireland, and Prussia, and in Russia, the disturbances came to be known as the Cholera Riots. Indeed, social scientists have noted that disease, unrest, and war, co-occur in a pattern.

Alarmingly, the makings of similar crises are all present now. Rising prices, food shortages, and famines, in the present day, do not just happen on far-off islands of poverty, leaving the powerful unscathed. They are already bringing down governments and becoming a political force to be reckoned with. Here’s how it all connects.

The war in Ukraine and the global food crisis

Food prices saw a rise due to the pandemic on account of logistical disruptions affecting supply and a sharp economic recovery that increased demand, themes I covered in an earlier article. But the lion’s share of the current food inflation is a direct consequence of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. War has meant more problems for farmers. Ukraine is unable to export grains on account of the blockade, and prices of some inputs like fertilizers, of which Ukraine and Russia are major exporters, are rising.

This is a war between the geographically largest country in Europe (Ukraine) and the geographically largest country in the world (Russia), and given the abundance of fertile land, especially the area’s amazingly productive “black earth,” these two giants are among the world’s top grain exporters.

As supply is disrupted, wheat, corn, and edible oil prices are rising. Already, global food prices are 57 percent higher now than a year earlier.

This is especially concerning for the extremely poor, i.e., those living on $1.90 a day or less. Food expenditure takes up approximately two-thirds of their income. This means, even in normal times, they’re able to spend only $1.25 on food a day. Soaring food prices pose a tough choice for the poor: eat food of less than $1.25 cost or reduce consumption of other necessities like medicine to below 63 cents.

Sensing trouble, India had banned wheat exports, while Indonesia had stopped all exports of palm oil. The policy attracted criticism abroad as international prices surged while causing uproar by farmers at home, as domestic prices plummeted. Faced with criticism, both countries have eased the restrictions, but the episode shows how panic about food security in a country can spontaneously trigger an international crisis, especially endangering the food-importing countries.

Riots, violent protests, and the rising challenge for governments

Already, people are getting increasingly frustrated and governments around the world are having to take the heat.

In Sri Lanka, Prime Minister Mahinda Rajapaksa had to resign, after violent protests against inflation. Unsustainable dollar-denominated debt, worsened by the free fall of the tourism-dependent Sri Lankan rupee, left the government, which has now defaulted, in a tight spot.

Food inflation in Sri Lanka reached 57.4 percent in May and may worsen with a further fall of the rupee, which has already depreciated by a staggering 80 percent since March. The spokesperson for the UN humanitarian agency Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) warned of Sri Lanka being on the verge of a “full-blown humanitarian emergency,” as it faces severe shortages of food, fuel, and medicine. The government is now trying a 4-day work week to help manage fuel and food shortages, by encouraging people to stay home and “engage in agricultural activities.”

Meanwhile, Pakistan has seen the fall of the popular government of Imran Khan, which despite handling the pandemic rather well, couldn’t really get a handle on inflation. Allies in Khan’s coalition government, sensing the pulse of the public—some say, of the powerful military—jumped ship.

Yet, the new Shahbaz Sharif-led coalition government, which led “End Inflation March” weeks before coming to power, is having a tough time finding its feet. The rupee depreciated by more than 13 percent in about two months and the inflation trajectory has considerably worsened since the new government took charge. In an effort to resume the stalled IMF program, the petrol price has risen by 56 percent and high speed diesel by a whopping 83 percent in just 20 days.

Peru, meanwhile, saw violent protests against inflation in which at least six people died demanding President Castillo’s resignation. Argentina, where inflation reached 58% in April 2022, is similarly seeing protests. The IMF has warned that Latin American countries could face social unrest if immediate measures to help the poor are not taken.

Even relatively stable, high-income countries, with many more resources to tackle inflation at their disposal, have seen growing dissent. The approval rating for Joe Biden in the U.S. has been continuously falling, as gasoline prices have crossed $5 per gallon in a historic first. In the UK, Boris Johnson survived the vote-of-no-confidence recently, but his popularity has seen a sharp decline. Meanwhile, in Australia, Scott Morrison lost elections to Anthony Albanese, in a contest where the economy and inflation featured prominently.

Leaders need to act now, any government could be next

The economic squeeze faced by people as a result of the pandemic is getting worse by the day due to the added effects of the Russian war. Some accuse Russia of using war-inflicted inflation and the threat of hunger as a bargaining chip. Russia, on the other hand, blames the Ukrainian mines in the defending country’s ports, and an array of sanctions on Russia that have increased the costs of trade and are responsible for inflation.

Whatever the actual share of responsibility for the crisis is between Ukraine and Russia, what’s clear is that soaring living costs are threatening livelihoods, as men of power struggle to sort their egos out.

This war needs to end. But until that happens, governments urgently need to introduce policies to protect the vulnerable. If the wounds of the hapless are allowed to simmer, the resulting chaos will bring more than just the poor down, if history is any guide. Time is running out.

As of mid-2022, the price of money and the cost of borrowing are increasing again in many advanced economies. Decades of ultra-loose monetary policy and cheap (close to zero or even negative cost) money has come to a new end. The United States, the UK, Canada (even Australia and New Zealand), and to a limited extent the Eurozone, are increasing interest rates.

For example, the Fed and BoE (Bank of England) are fast increasing their benchmark rates. The Fed first increased its key interest rate by 25 bps in March 2022, then embarked on a 50 bps increase in May. Finally, in June 2022, there was another 75 bps raise (to the 1.50-1.75 percent range). This 75 bps hike was, meanwhile, the Fed’s highest rate rise in the past 28 years (since 1994). The BOE on the other hand, have so far raised rates during the past four meetings (policy rate rose to 1 percent). The ECB (European Central Bank) is taking a rather moderate approach. They are expected to raise the policy rate in July (by a quarter percent), the first rise since 2011.

Global rate gaps have also been rising lately, both between the advanced economies (AEs) and developing economies (DEs), and also amongst the AEs. From neutral to negative and to the substantially positive rate rises, global rate paths are diverging. Markets are, in a way, swinging between the tightening cycle in the West and the loosening cycle in the East.

The Euro area and the UK are more exposed to the recent energy crisis and the war in Ukraine. Diverse economic dynamics and differing policy approaches among the ECB members also make the decisions and policy approaches rather more colorful in Europe. (Fig. 1) So, the tightening cycle is expected to be more moderate compared to that in the U.S.

It should meanwhile be underlined that strong national currencies (in the AEs) are mainly used to fight high inflation and keep prices stable. In that sense, the focus of central banks in the AEs is primarily over nominal factors, predominantly focusing on bringing down the inflation rate. On the other hand, central banks in most DEs and even Japan focus on real targets such as encouraging growth and increasing employment.

Meanwhile, Japan, China, Russia, and Turkey are keeping their easing stance. For example, in China, recent restrictions and lockdowns as well as the weak property market activity have all led to interest rate declines (a recent 10 bps decline to 3.7 percent). Banks are encouraged to lower borrowing rates. Mortgage rates in China were also recently cut by the highest rate on record.

Under normal circumstances, a strong USD would be expected to positively affect the developing economies and their exports. However, in particular, the rapid surge in value of the USD has also potential huge risks for the global economy. In the meantime, the U.S. inflation has also resumed a new acceleration trend in May.

Inflationary effects of weak national currencies should be noted first. Imported good and service prices, energy and commodity prices would all push the prices up in countries where national currencies depreciate. Therefore, cost of living will surely go up in the rest of the world. For example, Japan’s ultra-loose monetary policy and weak yen are expected to increase inflation expectations.

In addition to the rising dollar price, increasing energy, food, and fertilizer prices would also mean higher import bills and higher cost of production. Hence a higher producer inflation.

Capital is also likely to flow into tightening economies such as the U.S. and its financial markets. That means capital outflow from the developing economies. Therefore, financial stability is likely to be negatively impacted by the capital flight from the DEs. Increasing financial volatility would mean higher exchange rate volatilities and amplified current account deficits.

Investments and capital inflows into emerging markets (EMs) will also fall. The risk of investments into EMs would be rising. More specifically, developing countries already struggling may face further financial difficulties looking forward.

In today’s ever-integrated global economy, huge financial capital flows also lead to monetary policy transmissions into the other developing economies. For instance, many Latin American economies, including Brazil and Mexico, have already started a tightening cycle in 2021.

Emerging economies with huge debt denominated in US dollars are also likely to be negatively impacted. Both sovereign and corporate dollar-denominated debt is at enormous sizes today. Real debt burden, in particular, foreign currency-denominated debt burden will increase. Hence, cost of borrowing and financial instability will both rise again.

Cost of external finances, that is the credit default swap (CDS) and risk premiums paid will be higher for the DEs. A strong U.S. dollar (and capital inflow into the U.S. markets) makes access to financial capital much more difficult and more expensive for individuals and businesses outside the U.S. Global financial conditions, and access to credit markets will tighten.

A strong U.S. dollar may also bring up debates regarding reverse currency wars, as the U.S. dollar appreciates along with aggressive rate rises. After all, the post-Great Recession and post-2020 pandemic quantitative easing (QE) policies of the AEs brought forth a new currency war argument.

Another critical issue is that the world, including the AEs, should be careful not to fall into another round of recession while dealing with the global inflation. After all, nowadays, there is a huge concern that the Fed’s hawkish stance might mitigate economic growth, and even lead to economic decline and stock market crashes.

Meanwhile, it is still not clear whether this new strong USD trend will lead to another round of trade war, due to increasing U.S. trade deficits.

Greater borrowing cost divergence even within the Western economies is another potential issue. While the Fed is even expected to take a “restrictive” stance if inflation proves stickier, the European Central Bank may have to hit the brakes if sovereign borrowing spreads seem to widen.

The year 1996 saw the publication of Roger Bootle’s provocatively titled book The Death of Inflation, which argued that inflation was no more the threat it used to be and fixation with keeping prices low can hamper growth unnecessarily. The book is a compelling read. Yet, the challenges brought about by the pandemic may be in conflict with the optimism in it, as reflected in Bootle’s own columns and interview.

COVID19 did not just catch the global health infrastructure off guard, but wreaked havoc on the world economy as well, particularly in terms of ushering in an era of intractable inflation. Here’s a look at how the infection jumped from person to person, eventually subduing the economy, and throwing demand and supply into a nagging imbalance.

The demand side: The virus and the price of your groceries

Faced with sudden outbreaks, panicking governments the world over were left with no choice but to swallow the bitter pill of lockdowns. It was clear that there was no alternative, at least in the short run. The policy helped control the contagion, but not without business closures and job losses. This, in turn, raised a natural question: how to help the common person muddle through the crisis with the economy at a standstill?

Almost all economists favored economic stimulus—financial help from the government channelled through the fiscal and/or monetary policies—but answers to how, how much, when, and where varied drastically.

Most governments around the world offered one kind of stimulus or another. Yet some countries with the highest stimuli—say, Canada, Germany, Spain, or the United Kingdom—are now experiencing record inflation.

Inflation in the United States, the country with perhaps the largest stimulus packages, has hit a 40-year high, with prices this March being 8.5% higher than March last year. This has meant the average household having to spend nearly $327 more per month than they used to, a year ago.

One of the reasons the oil price fell is that oil supply is relatively “inelastic” in the short run. That is to say, oil companies cannot cut down on oil production suddenly. These are giant enterprises with fixed, long-term costs. As demand vanished due to the virus—and supply could not suddenly be scaled back immediately—oil flushed markets, and oil price fell drastically.

This should have made everything cheaper. But as economies recovered, often with a sharp, V-shaped recovery, thanks to the vaccines, the demand for oil rebounded phenomenally. So much so that even though the world economy still has not fully recovered from the pandemic, oil demand may have already surpassed its pre-pandemic levels.

The resurgence in oil demand—with limited supply available—made the prices skyrocket, from a record low of minus $40 per barrel at the start of the pandemic to around $120 per barrel now.

Yet of course, this rise is not without the added conundrum of Putin’s war on Ukraine. Supply disruptions due to the war, with the added effect of sanctions, and now an embargo, have worsened the spike in energy, both oil and gas, prices, given the fact that Russia is among the top three producers of crude oil, and the second largest producer of natural gas in the world.

In addition, uncertainty brought by the war has affected investment and financial markets the world over. Stock markets have been bearish. Businesses are having to look for alternative trading partners. These factors, along with higher oil prices, are making costs of businesses soar, leading to “cost-push inflation”—higher prices arising from higher costs of production.

The outlook is not good as yet, and the distressed need help

Together, resurgence in demand after quick initial recovery, and a fall in global supply due to higher costs of production, have translated into an indomitable surge in prices the world over. Turkey has seen prices rise by 70% between April 2022 and April last year.

The corresponding figure for Argentina stands at 58%, and for Venezuela, Sudan, and Lebanon, at over 200%. While inflation in these countries may not be attributable exclusively to the above stated factors, as these economies were already stuck in macroeconomic blues—sometimes trying their luck with unorthodox policies—the pandemic and war have complicated things considerably. Even in advanced economies, the IMF estimates a 38-year high record inflation for the current year.

Average incomes, in turn, will grow only modestly this year, as reflected in the world GDP forecasts being revised over and over again. While growth in the oil-exporting Gulf economies forms an exception, as they are benefiting from higher energy prices, even those will not be immune to food inflation, considering 85% of their food comes from imports.

But the outlook for the developing economies is particularly concerning. They are facing capital flight as investors opt for higher return in the advanced economies, where interest rates are rising, pushing the indebted countries closer to default. This will further pressure stressed currencies, worsening inflation, with more countries having to knock the IMF’s door, sooner or later. Calls for international financial institutions to take a more helpful role to help the distressed countries are, understandably, increasing.

Likewise, devising a careful policy at the national level may be crucial to people’s livelihoods. It may be argued that governments need to prioritize fighting inflation over showcasing economic growth. A blind pursuit of growth would lead to higher demand and translate almost inevitably into more inflation.

As for the micro level of managing a household, it may be just prudent to adapt our spending patterns to the disheartening reality of deep-seated inflation, and perhaps spare a few bucks to help those in distress. Inflation isn’t dead, as yet. But the world needs a healing touch, now perhaps, more than ever.

In two years, we went from living in a stable global economy and a relatively peaceful international order to a troubled global economy and shaky international order. This abrupt decline was mainly due to two major developments: the COVID19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. The pandemic disrupted not just our daily lives but also led to cracks in our interdependent world. From banning international flights and closing borders to limiting export of healthcare products, government interference in the global economy on the grounds of national interest has become widespread.

In response to the pandemic, many governments initiated national vaccine development programs and increased their efforts towards self-sufficiency in healthcare technologies. As the global shipping slowed because of COVID19-related restrictions, manufacturing industries were also urged to relocate their factories from China to the United States and Europe.

At the beginning of this year, many thought the pandemic would be over soon and we could go back to some form of normalcy. But when the pandemic slowed down, Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shattered the hopes for return of normalcy to global economy and politics. Analysts caution that the war in Ukraine may spread to neighboring countries and pave the way for a world war. The global economic stability is also endangered by conflict, as many European nations, particularly Germany, depend on Russian natural gas for their energy needs.

The economic sanctions imposed on Russia by the West seek to trigger a regime change in Russia. However, thus far, the sanctions only led to Russia’s introduction of the export bans on some of its minerals and agricultural products, which hurt both Russian companies and the importers of their products.

The overall picture is thus one of tit-for-tat between Russia and the West, and the result may be the end of globalization and concomitant interdependence of the world economy. There is no doubt that the COVID19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine weakened global interdependence as a norm and brought self-sufficiency to the forefront.

Although self-sufficiency may appear ideal to deal with the challenges we experience today, I argue that self-sufficiency efforts are mostly futile. We are embedded in a “complex” interdependence which guarantees that every country and each individual will be worse off in the case of self-sufficiency replacing interdependence as the global norm.

The war in Ukraine was not unexpected; a full-fledged war between Russia and Ukraine was anticipated since the annexation of Crimea by Russia in 2014. That is why most commentators agreed that the EU should have prepared itself to cope with its dependence on Russian gas, and energy self-sufficiency should now be prioritized by the union. But this argument only holds if we assume that Russia is not dependent on the West, ignoring its dependence on European trade and goods.

Between the EU and Russia there existed some form of complex interdependence as each needed the other for something which may either be costly or inaccessible if sought from elsewhere. The removal of Russia from SWIFT and the withdrawal of Western companies and investment from the country are all towards disentangling Russia from the cobweb of complex interdependence, which will inevitably hurt both the Russians and their trade partners.

In short, there is no winner in moving towards self-sufficiency, both Russia and the West stand to lose. Disintegration of the liberal political and economic order of the world would lead to economic stagnation and political upheaval, the complex nature of the existing economic and political relationships cannot be undone in an efficient and peaceful way.

The response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine should target the Russian elites but not seek to exclude Russia from the global economic architecture. Sanctions such as SWIFT and Western companies’ withdrawal from the Russian retail market are counterproductive. Sanctions targeting ordinary people usually prove ineffective in authoritarian regimes and rather serve as justification of the governments’ self-sufficiency efforts.

Most efforts seeking to replace the complex interdependence at the international level with self-sufficiency at the national level are doomed to fail. The level of complexity has increased dramatically since the concept was first coined. Compared to the 1970s, today’s world relies on electronic devices, for instance. All electronic devices, such as computers and smartphones, are built with microchips and powered by sophisticated software. The design and manufacturing of the microchips and software are progressing so fast that no country can dominate either field or fully control both sectors.

Food self-sufficiency is also no longer a possibility; many nations currently have a much more reduced amount of arable land than they had in the 1970s and larger populations which make them ever more reliant on each other to feed their population. In brief, given the ever-increasing complexity of interdependence, even in the times of global crises, self-sufficiency cannot match the level of well-being provided to us by the sophisticated global economy.

In the aftermath of the financial crash of 2008, many countries struggled to access the U.S. dollar (USD) to save their national currency as the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank tightened its grip on the global reserve currency. The resulting liquidity shortages and lack of access were severe to many currencies which saw their values decrease against the dollar. Export-led economies gained some competitiveness due to such devaluations, but those that rely on imported raw materials struggled to finance their main industrial inputs due to the higher cost of borrowing dollars.

In search of solutions, many countries proposed to de-dollarize trade and instead conduct bilateral trade in national currencies. Such trades will be based on fixed exchange rates which will mitigate the risks associated with currency devaluations and severe exchange rate fluctuations. Furthermore, geopolitical troubles and the impact of currency wars can be better managed in such an internally controlled relationship with no exposure to USD influence.

In recent years, with the increased weaponization of the dollar and the use of sanctions, many countries became more incentivized to explore trading in national currencies and using international payment systems other than SWIFT, which is heavily influenced by the U.S. The calls to trade in national currencies have grown even more recently in the aftermath of the largest ever western U.S.-led sanctions on Russia after it launched a “military operation” in Ukraine “to prevent it from joining NATO.”

The sanctions alarmed more countries to the risks associated with relying only on the USD as the international trade currency and promoted the need to encourage trade in national currencies that are not influenced by the U.S. government and financial institutions.

This global trend has extended to the Middle East region. Many efforts, led by Iran and Turkey, were made in the past few years to discover and promote trade in national currencies. Thus far, bilateral trade among Middle Eastern countries increased, but remains limited. However, Iranian and Turkish leaders have increasingly voiced their willingness to boost such trading.

The path to de-dollarization

Globally, China, Russia, and India are leading the efforts to conduct trade in national currencies especially after Russia fell under western sanctions in 2014 following the annexation of Crimea. To enable such a process, Russia and China have created their own alternative payment mechanisms to SWIFT, namely the “System for Transfer of Financial Messages” (SPFS) and the “Cross-Border Interbank Payment System” (CIPS) to conduct bilateral and multilateral trade. India has also joined such efforts.

More recently, following the war in Ukraine and the ensuing western sanctions, Russia has asked “unfriendly countries” engaged in sanctions against it to pay for their fuel purchases in rubles. This would help stabilize the ruble and undermine the significance of sanctions.

The BRICS countries have also sought to discuss deepening trade in national currencies. For example, the R5 initiative was proposed and targets the use of the respective national currencies of BRICS countries—ruble (Russia), rand (South Africa), real (Brazil), rupee (India), and renminbi (China)—to settle trades mutually and globally.

Such a strategy would include measures to boost trade and long-term investments, the creation of common settlement/payment systems, and promoting BRICS currencies as reserve currencies. On 9 April 2022, the Finance Minister of Russia called on the BRICS group of emerging economies to speed up work in the following areas: the use of national currencies for export-import operations, the integration of payment systems and cards, the creation of a financial messaging system and the creation of an independent BRICS rating agency. The call for urgency signals Russia’s embracement of a new financial architecture needed to overcome western sanctions that are strangling Russia’s economy.

In March 2022, the Eurasian Economic Union-China dialogue said it was discussing the development of a project for an independent international monetary and financial system that will be based on a new international currency, whose value will be calculated as an index of the national currencies of the participating countries and commodity prices. The aforementioned efforts confirm the direct development of the global financial system away from the dollar towards a multipolar financial global order.

De-dollarizing MENA

In the MENA region, Iran has conducted trade in national currencies with Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and is seeking further trade with Turkey which has been reluctant in growing its trade in national currencies due to sanctions. Iran is motivated by its wish to overcome western sanctions and to extend its trade in national currencies conducted with Russia, India, and China.

Turkey has also sought to expand its trade links in national currencies in the region and beyond. Most recently, Turkey signed a 5-billion-dollar currency swap deal with the UAE for three years. It also signed a similar agreement with Qatar for 15 billion dollars. The Turkish lira is also now heavily used in Syria and Libya by citizens who do not trust the value on their own national currencies and wish to continue trade with Turkey.

Globally, Turkey has signed swap agreements to trade in national currencies with Russia, China, South Korea, and some Islamic countries. In the future, regional powers are expected to deepen their interregional trade settlement and financial dealings in their national currencies further.

The limits of trading in national currencies

Trading in national currencies can relieve anxieties about using the dollar in trade which undermines countries’ abilities to import affordable raw materials and energy for their manufacturing activities. However, there are many limitations to watch out for.

First, national currencies are not always stable, and they can easily be influenced by domestic economic and monetary policies. In Turkey, the value of the lira swung heavily in November 2021. Similar things happen in China, which exercises heavy controls over its currency in order to maintain its import competitiveness in the global market.

While national currencies might be useable for short-term trading, in the long term they remain unreliable as an option to save or as reserve currencies that can survive the test of time and changing policy, geopolitics, and international alliances.

Second, national currencies are particularly unstable for smaller countries whose economies are small, political systems are unstable, and lack the ability to protect themselves from outside threats. Thus, national currencies might be more realistically used by regional and global powers only, and hence will have limits to their universal adaptability.

Technology can help in overcoming such problems by creating an indexed digital international currency, but there will remain the need to ensure the security of small countries by regional or global guarantors who can ensure stable economic activity and security and thus local currencies.

The move towards de-dollarization remains in its nascent stage; however, the Russian war in Ukraine may have accelerated the growing move towards trading in national currencies to avoid the weaponization of the dollar and sanctions.

All in all, it remains to be seen if international mechanisms will be established to formalize such steps and discuss the introduction of guarantees that can protect such a trading system from diverse kinds of shocks such as domestic instability and international conflicts. In the MENA region, Iran and Turkey are likely to remain the main prominent forces supporting such an idea. However, realignments might hinder such efforts or slow their progress as both countries draw closer to the west.

The ongoing impact of the COVID19 pandemic and the long-term adverse effects of climate change have led to significant increases in food prices. Declining productivity in many parts of the world, rising global demand, and food supply chain problems have led to reduced stocks of grains and oilseeds. Prices reached the highest levels in the last decade.

Declining soybean yields in South America, reduced palm oil supply in Malaysia, and the use of palm and soybean oil for biodiesel production are driving vegetable oil prices to a record high. On the other hand, prices of energy-intensive basic inputs such as fuel, fertilizers, and pesticides continue to increase rapidly. Finally, the war in Ukraine is giving new impetus to food and input prices.

Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine is threatening world agriculture and thus food security. Ukraine and Russia are agricultural powerhouses that make up a very important share of the world’s wheat, corn, oilseed, and fertilizer exports. The Ukraine war negatively affects all aspects of agriculture in the country and slows down exports from Russia.

Twenty-six countries across the world import at least half of their wheat from Russia and Ukraine. Low supply and high prices are likely to hit these most food-insecure countries first. On the other hand, the low supply and high prices of maize, oilseeds, and fertilizers play an increasing role in the prices of other commodities with their expansionist effects.

The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) announced that the global Food Price Index for March 2022 reached an all-time high with steady gains. In addition to the effects of climate change, the UN estimates that the number of people experiencing food insecurity worldwide could be at its highest level of the last 15 years due to the effects of the COVID19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine.

FAO’s moderate scenario shows that wheat prices may increase by about 9% in the short term, and over 21% in the severe scenario. Undernutrition scenarios show that the additional increase in the number of undernourished people in the world could reach more than 13 million in a few years. In short, war threatens the food security of millions of people.

Figures on agricultural trade

Over the past 30 years, the Black Sea region has become a major global supplier of grains and oilseeds, including vegetable oils. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the early 1990s, the region was a net importer of grain, while Russian and Ukrainian exports today account for about 12% of the total calories traded in the world. The two countries are among the top five global exporters of many important grains and oilseeds, mainly wheat with 34.1%, barley with 26.8%, sunflower with 23.9%, and corn with 17.4%.

Ukraine is also an important source of sunflower seed oil, providing about 49.6% of the global market. When we add Russia to this figure, this share rises to 72.7%. Many importing countries depend on these products from Ukraine and Russia. North Africa and the Middle East import more than 50% of their grains from these two countries, and most of their wheat and barley. Ukraine is an important supplier to many North African markets, including Egypt and Libya, as well as the EU and China.

Risks created by the Russia-Ukraine war

The war causes a decrease in the agricultural production of the region, problems in the food supply chain, and logistics disruptions, as well as risks that have already reflected on the whole world and negatively affect global food security. These risks can be examined both globally, in terms of Ukraine and Russia, and in terms of Turkey, which imports substantial amount of agricultural products and inputs from these two countries.

The most obvious risks are the trade-related ones. Due to the sudden and sharp decline in shipments between and by Russia and Ukraine, as already seen, countries importing wheat from Russia and Ukraine will definitely find alternative sources, pay higher prices or, worst of all, face shortages of supply. The war has already caused the closure of ports, oilseed processing plants, and other critical commercial facilities. In this sense, Turkey also experienced difficulties in the shipment of sunflower oil.

Price risk is also one of the leading risks. The global Food Price Index published by FAO averaged 159.3 points in March 2022, up 17.9 points (12.6 percent) from February, making a giant leap to a new highest level since its inception in 1990. The latest increase reflects new all-time highs for vegetable oils, cereals and meat sub-indices, while those of sugar and dairy products also rose significantly. The price increases in food supplies such as flour and sunflower oil in March added to the constantly increasing food prices and increased Turkey’s March food price index by 4.73 percent.

On the other hand, logistical risks also come to the fore. These include damages to roads, ports, storage, and processing facilities as well as port blockades. Ninety percent of exports from Ukraine take place through ports. In other words, there is a risk of loss of more than 15 million tons of different commodities that Ukrainian farmers cannot export. The capacity of the Western Ukraine border and the railway connection is around 300,000 tons per month. Ukraine, which usually exports around 4-5 million tons of goods in the spring, will not be able to do this. Therefore, Ukrainian trade logistics are at risk.

Meanwhile, production risk threatens the next production period. Considering the livelihoods of the Ukrainian farmers, their families, and those living in the countryside, the situation is alarming. What will be the output of the harvesting of crops currently planted? Will farmers be able to plant next spring? According to a field study, farmers in Ukraine have only 20% of the diesel fuel needed and 65% of the other inputs. Multinational companies that stop their operations for the safety of their employees, for example, cannot process sunflower into oil. Damages caused between the fields and the processing facilities, production logistics problems, and labor supply difficulties are important production risks.

The energy risk is one of the most common risks raised by those concerned. Agriculture is completely dependent on energy for, among others, the production of fuel, electricity, fertilizers, pesticides, and lubricants. These risks concern not only the war zone, but the whole world. Russia is a very important supplier of agricultural inputs, especially fertilizers and natural gas. This fact creates an additional layer of risk. Turkey, which imports a significant amount of these inputs from Russia, is also at significant risk.

Exchange rates, borrowing, and economic growth risks increase due to war. There is already a significant loss of value in currencies that will adversely affect investments. There are significant decreases in money conversion speed. Agriculture is the backbone of the economy in many developing countries of the world that borrow in U.S. dollars. The permanent appreciation of the dollar against the currencies of these countries due to the war causes very serious risks for these economies. The depreciation of the Turkish lira in the last three months gained a new momentum with the effect of the war and became a very serious source of risk.

Of course, the most important are human-centered risks. In this sense, besides the fact that Ukrainians are refugees in excess of three million, the risks to their lives and livelihoods come to the fore. Before the war, one in four Eastern Ukrainians was already receiving international support as they were food insecure.

We are entering a period in which the purchasing power of a whole nation will decrease with the decrease in agricultural production, decrease in economic activity, and increase in prices. It is clear that these developments will increase food insecurity and malnutrition in Ukraine.

Global security has the extraordinary characteristic that states, irrelevant of their strength, do not respond according to their capacity. Global escalations, which have contributed immensely to our knowledge base, have transformed what is “normal” for humans, society, and humanity in this sense. The term “normal” has, actually, become blurred since traditional, modern, and post-modern have become intertwined. We are experiencing a mixture of old and new conceptualized – or not – political phenomena enriched by emerging challenges. Such complex developments perplex all actors in international politics.

Scholarship has shaped our understanding of international and transnational security under the clout of natural disasters, societal mobility, pandemic diseases, climate change, or living standards. There is no unity and resilience in addressing these emerging risks among state actors, though awareness has been expanding among individuals, civil society, and the global public.

In this frame, international community actors are trying to put such concerns on the agenda. This requires resilience, collaborative engagements, and compliance with the prerequisites of what has to be committed to in order to respond to the dangers exposed. Unfortunately, the states’ commitments to keep security risks at a tolerable level are not the same as the ones by those affected by global security concerns.

A consensus was reached among state actors to take joint action against the well-circulated threats. Nevertheless, they ignore the issues which have an economic or political impact on the continuity of their sovereignty or their economic interests and territorial gains. For instance, global climate change has been a concern for most states, in parallel with the demand for action by individuals or societies. Developing states with vast populations, like India and China, refrain from complying with the Paris Conference decisions, while the U.S. stance is vulnerable to any governmental policy change.

In other words, individuals and communities press for a “change,” but states resist, while individuals and society themselves challenge the climate objectives by insisting on consumption habits. Like the climate challenge, protectionism of culture and identity have pushed individuals and communities to put pressure on the state. Cultural and identity protectionism have been equated to countering immigration and xenophobia.

Another case worth scrutinizing is the pandemic of the last two years. There has been a solid stance to fight COVID19 at all levels and units in international politics. But vaccine diplomacy, affiliated with the vaccine economy, diverted the firm stance to a competitive pattern whereby states compete which will profit the most from vaccine sales. The economic consequences of the pandemic, on the other hand, have boosted concerns of political security and, for some countries, regime continuity.

In other words, the pandemic could not prevent conflicts across the globe, like those in Syria and Libya, while its consequences can devastate the order of the international political system. It has shifted attention away from dedicated cooperation and the grants given by developed countries to less developed ones, and what remains is only symbolic commitments.

Global concerns, as manifested in the emerging “soft” threats and challenging situations described above, are not only about the experienced traumas in our lives but cover a broader spectrum. The newly emerging concerns can form a long list like digital currencies, space mining, cultural expansion, consumption habits, digital space, importing high-level human resources from developing countries. These new challenges will be on our agendas as humans and society feel their impact in their ordinary course of lives. Hence states or groups will be compelled to compete for more gain or enhance protectionism against the new interpretations of security.

Strategy-Making for Multilayered and Multilateral Security

The strategy-making of this era, with its obligation to address complicated structures and threats, requires flexible and critical thinking with intelligent technologies. Policymakers have to scan more dynamics, actors, and variables of all sorts with a heightened capacity for analysis and synthesis. As options increase for all brands of actors in the international realm, predictability becomes compelling. In other words, the probabilities of “misunderstanding” and “miscalculation,” which may spark any conflict, have become a risk for peace and stability.

What is more, the features of the contemporary era, which are integrating modernity and pre-modernity with new interpretations, require all international community actors to invent sui generis modus operandi for all courses of political, economic, military, or environmental actions. Today’s strategy-making has to address multilayered concerns regarding “unusual” situations in order to be prepared for the worst-case scenarios.

For all actors and against the backdrop of this new security environment, the strategy-making process needs to address the emerging structure of today’s politics. In this frame, actors prefer to use multilateralism as the new mood of the day. This term implies the existing superpower, namely the U.S., and the potential ones with long-term projections. Given the militarily inspired statements of French President Macron and the German quest to dominate the EU economically and diplomatically, Europe wants to be more independent. Russia is more concerned about re-establishing the former Soviet “sphere of influence.”

Finally, China is inclined to be a superpower to honor the 100^th anniversary of the PRC with a pledge to the teachings of Mao and Deng Xiaoping. On the other hand, the U.S. is committed to countering the emerging superpowers while building a check mechanism based on NATO and partners. One can, then, question whether multipolarity brings stability as achieved by the Cold War through mutually assured destruction or imposes a “Cold Peace” which sustains low-intensity conflicts with its emerging modus operandi. This picture of international politics expands the courses but strains the states’ options.

Regionalism’s Scattered Structure

Other than global politics, there is another level of complexity involving actors, dynamics, and events in the regional systems.  Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver’s regional security complex theory includes new, uncontrollable inputs whereby the classical balance of power or bandwagoning strategies are not fit for addressing modern concerns. For instance, the Gulf countries function beyond their traditional area of interest spanning across vast regions beyond the Persian Gulf, where they compete with one another, all made possible by their wealth.

“Glocalism” pushes these states to observe the concerns of their citizens due to the trauma of the Arab Spring (or Winter?) while making sure their regimes – not states – are seen as able to play this challenging role in order to retain credibility. On the other hand, external actors continue to search for security in rentier economies. Compared to the Gulf countries, the Middle East appeared to have more regional systems inside its multilayered regional system. On the other hand, regionalism in Central Asia, the Balkans, or the Caucasus is reminiscent of the Cold War era. As a result, regions have their sui generis characteristics. Nevertheless, regional complexities can bring back the traditional threat perceptions of the Cold War.

Transnational Interaction

States and the organizations of what the states make are short of covering the cobweb of individuals and communities. The strength of individuals vastly increased in the last two decades, thanks to communication technology and human mobility. The interaction among individuals of different communities has resulted in new communities of interest and groups that put pressure on international actors. States cannot control individuals, and have concerns about maintaining their existence and regime security. The fundamental challenge to the state regards the loyalty, sacrifice, and dedication of communities.

Hence, a self-organizing body of individuals and their collectivity exist with unique interests, concerns, and commitments. This picture compels states to take conservative measures for preserving the societal order within their borders while encouraging a change abroad through access to the digital world. Hence, transnationalism is a threat to the state, but inspired by the state for a controlled transformation in other actors.

After all the discussion on global and regional systems (and subsystems), the themes addressed denote changes in the structure of actors and engagements in the international system. Traditional responses are still valid, but the expansion and deepness of the sectors and units in international politics has entered a new phase. The essential features of this new phase are unsteadiness, intertwined dynamics, and the degradation of consequences. In this sense, international situations cannot be fixed to a particular course but rather need to be treated flexibly.